# Intensive Supervision for High-Risk Probationers

## Findings from Three California Experiments

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Joan Petersilia, Susan Turner

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# PREFACE

In 1986, with the help of the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), U.S. Department of Justice, three California counties designed an experiment to implement intensive supervision probation (ISP) programs as an alternative form of supervision for high-risk probationers. These programs generally place offenders on small caseloads and require that they participate in work, submit to random urine and alcohol testing, and perform community service. Proponents of this concept believe that ISP will reduce rearrests and increase offender participation in work and treatment programs. Los Angeles, Ventura, and Contra Costa counties each received funding for two-year ISP programs.

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) cosponsored with the BJA an evaluation of the effects of the three California ISP programs, using a randomized field experiment. Detailed information on individual backgrounds, services received, and one-year outcome measures (including recidivism and social adjustment indicators) were collected for each of the 488 program participants. The costs of the ISP programs and those of their respective control programs were also estimated.

The study and its results should be of interest to policymakers, corrections practitioners, and others concerned with developing intermediate sanctions—punishments less severe than imprisonment but more restrictive than routine probation.

Other aspects of the study have been discussed in several earlier publications, including the following:

Petersilia, Joan, and Susan Turner, "Reducing Prisons Admissions: The Potential of Intermediate Sanctions," *The Journal of State Government,* March/April 1989.

Greenwood, Peter, Joan Petersilia, C. Peter Rydell, and Susan Turner, *The RAND Intermediate Sanction Cost Estimation Model,* The RAND Corporation, N-2983-EMC/RC, September 1989.

Petersilia, Joan, "Implementing Randomized Experiments: Lessons from BJA's Intensive Supervision Project," *Evaluation Review,* Vol. 13, No. 5, October 1989.

Petersilia, Joan, "Conditions That Permit Intensive Supervision Programs to Survive," *Crime & Delinquency,* Vol. 36, No. 1, January 1990.

Petersilia, Joan, and Susan Turner, "Comparing Intensive and Regular Supervision for High-Risk Probationers: Early Results from an Experiment in California," *Crime & Delinquency,* Vol. 36, No. 1, January 1990.

Petersilia, Joan, "When Probation Becomes More Dreaded Than Prison," *Federal Probation,* March 1990.

Petersilia, Joan, and Susan Turner, *Diverting Prisoners to Intensive Probation: Results of an Experiment in Oregon,* The RAND Corporation, N-3186-NIJ, November 1990.

# SUMMARY

Since the 1960s, crime rates have risen dramatically in this country, making the criminal-justice system handle not only more offenders, but a higher proportion of serious criminals. Further, the rise in violent crime has spurred demand that the system treat convicted criminals more severely. Under the circumstances, prisons have become so seriously crowded that in many states, sentencing and parole decisions involve a harrowing tradeoff between public safety and the breakdown of prison systems. Efforts to adjust have been further complicated by fiscal constraints and attempts to wage a "war on drugs."

By the early 1980s, many states had begun to explore the possibilities of alternative sanctions, the most promising of which appeared to be intensive supervision probation (ISP). Intensive programs had been tried in the 1970s, but these programs were primarily probation management tools, in contrast to the newer ISP programs, which focus on offender control and monitoring.

There is no generic ISP sanction, but the newer ISP programs generally provide closer supervision of offenders than traditional probation does, through some combination of curfew, multiple weekly contacts with probation officers, unscheduled drug testing, strict enforcement of probation conditions, and requirements to perform community service. Some programs also involve house arrest and/or electronic monitoring. Caseloads typically range from 30 to 50 probationers.

Between 1980 and 1985, forty states implemented ISP programs, and the published outcomes were encouraging. Recidivism rates were low, and the majority of new arrests were for technical violations rather than new crimes.

However, many people questioned whether the ISP programs were responsible for the observed outcomes. Because the programs were untested, judges exercised great caution in sentencing offenders to them. Most programs limited participation to property offenders with minor criminal records, which undoubtedly helped explain the low rearrest rates. In the absence of an experiment that randomly assigned offenders to treatment and control groups, it was impossible to know whether the outcomes (e.g., recidivism rates) resulted from the manipulated variables (e.g., the sentence imposed) or from systemati-

cally biasing factors (e.g., less serious offenders being assigned to ISP).

In 1986, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) provided funding for an ISP demonstration project involving random assignment. The primary intent was to determine how participation in ISP programs affected the subsequent behavior of offenders. Fourteen sites in nine states participated in the project. The RAND Corporation was selected to evaluate the ISP programs, and RAND staff were involved in program design, staff training, data collection, and program implementation at the sites.[1]

In California, three counties—Contra Costa, Ventura, and Los Angeles—participated in the demonstration project. This report presents the evaluation of these three sites' ISP programs.

We have singled out the California programs for separate analysis for a number of reasons, the most important of which is that these programs were among the first funded. Case assignment to ISP began earlier at these sites, and enough eligible offenders were located in 1987 and 1988 to permit a one-year outcome evaluation to be undertaken in 1989. Also, these counties all implemented *probation-enhancement* rather than *prison-diversion* ISPs; thus, they had similar purposes and were dealing with rather similar populations.

## ISP PROGRAM DESIGN

The BJA encouraged individual agencies to tailor their ISP programs to their local clienteles' needs and risks, their own financial resources, and internal and external political contexts. Thus, the three California programs operationalized the general ISP protocol slightly differently. Key elements of each site's planned ISP program were:

- **Contra Costa.** The ISP program focused on drug-involved adult probationers (identified by drug use or current conviction). Caseloads were limited to 40, and offenders progressed through three graduated phases of supervision. In phase 1, program participants were to receive one face-to-face contact and two telephone contacts per week, weekly drug testing, and counseling and job referrals. The control program was

[1]Funding for the RAND evaluation was provided by the BJA and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ). The BJA also provided funding to Rutgers University and the National Council on Crime and Delinquency for staff training and technical assistance.

routine probation, where caseloads consisted of 150 to 200 probationers, and scheduled contacts, drug testing, counseling, and job referrals were infrequent.

- **Ventura.** The ISP program focused on high-risk adult probationers, identified through an objective scoring instrument. ISP caseloads were limited to 19, and offenders went through a three-phase program. In phase 1, participants were to have four face-to-face contacts and two telephone contacts per week. Program officials planned to work closely with local law enforcement, make extensive use of employment training and job referrals, and require frequent random drug tests. Ventura County chose as its control group an existing intensive probation program, the Community Resource Management Team (CRMT). The CRMT caseloads consist of 50 probationers who typically have two face-to-face contacts and one telephone contact per month.
- **Los Angeles.** In Los Angeles, ISP program participants were high-risk adult probationers, identified through an objective scoring instrument. Two programs were implemented, one that incorporated 24-hour electronic monitoring and one that relied on human surveillance. The two programs had identical conditions, except for the electronic monitoring. Caseloads for both the electronic-surveillance (ESP) and ISP programs averaged 33, and participants went through a three-phase program. In phase 1, participants were to receive three to five face-to-face contacts and two telephone contacts per week. The control program was routine probation, where caseloads consisted of 150 to 250 probationers and scheduled contacts were infrequent.

## EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION

Each site developed its own ISP eligibility criteria, and each was responsible for determining whether probationers met those criteria. Once a site determined that an offender was eligible for inclusion, RAND staff randomly assigned the offender to either the experimental (ISP) program or the control (routine probation) program.[2] The study assignment period began in January 1987 and continued

[2]For ease of discussion, the control programs will be referred to as routine probation, even though Ventura used the CRMT as its control program.

through July 1988. The one-year follow-up period was defined individually for each participant, beginning on the day of assignment to a program. The final sample in Contra Costa comprised 170 offenders; in Ventura, 166 offenders; and in Los Angeles, 152 offenders.

For each offender, staff were required to fill in three data collection forms, using official probation files (e.g., presentence investigation, chronological notes). Each of the three forms took approximately one hour to complete. The Background Assessment Form recorded the offenders' prior record, demographics, current offense, and various items relating to risk of recidivism and need for treatment. Six- and twelve-month reviews then documented the services the offenders had received in the program (e.g., the number of contacts, number of counseling sessions, and number of drug tests), as well as technical violations and new arrests, employment, restitution, and fee payment.

To record time-at-risk information, the data collection forms also included a "status calendar," which was completed at the end of six months and at the end of one year. The calendar included the dates the probationer was placed on and removed from ISP, ESP, or routine probation, as well as the dates of entry into and release from jail, residential placement, or prison.

Information on the environment in which the ISP program was implemented, as well as each county's cost for various correctional sanctions, was also recorded.

## MAJOR FINDINGS

### Who Participated in California's ISP Experiment?

The probationers who participated in California's ISP and ESP programs were serious offenders. More than half of all the study participants had served prior incarceration terms, and nearly half had serious drug-abuse problems. On an objective risk-of-recidivism scale, 75 percent of them scored as "high" or "intensive" risk.

### What Services/Surveillance Did ISP Offenders Receive?

The ISP and ESP offenders received more probation contacts of each type than did their counterparts assigned to routine probation, although the "delivered" contacts generally fell short of those outlined in the original ISP protocol.

The California ISP and ESP programs, as designed and implemented, were primarily surveillance- rather than service-oriented. While the courts often ordered offenders to pay victim restitution, fines, and court costs, less than a third of the ISP or ESP offenders in Los Angeles and Contra Costa did each of these things (about half of the Ventura probationers paid fines or fees).

### How Did the ISP Programs Affect Recidivism?

At the end of the one-year follow-up period, approximately a quarter of the ISP offenders in each site had no new incidents (technical violations or new arrests), about 40 percent had technical violations only, and about a third had new arrests. Only one significant difference in rearrests was observed between the experimental and control programs: Ventura's ISP offenders were less likely to be arrested than the CRMT offenders. However, when the average number of arrests per year of street time was used as the criterion, the Ventura difference was no longer statistically significant. Thus, the evidence suggests that ISP (or ESP) supervision in these sites was not associated with a reduction in new arrests. Furthermore, no significant differences were found in the severity of the arrest offenses of experimental and control offenders who were arrested.

Between 41 and 73 percent of all probationers experienced a technical violation. Technical violations consisted primarily of failure to attend mandated treatment programs, not showing up for scheduled probation sessions, and testing "dirty" for drug use through urinalysis. The only significant differences in these percentages between ISP participants and routine probationers appeared in Contra Costa, where ISP offenders had more technical violations, even when time at risk was controlled for. Furthermore, citing offenders for violations of technical conditions did not appear to suppress criminal activity; statistical analyses failed to reveal a relationship between having a technical violation and having a new arrest.

The response to technical violations and arrests differed across the sites, with Ventura officials treating both technical violations and new arrests most harshly. In Ventura, 41 percent of the ISP offenders were jailed as a result of a technical violation, and 19 percent were sent to prison. In Los Angeles and Contra Costa, about a quarter of the ISP/ESP probationers were jailed as a result of technical violations, but less than 2 percent of those in Contra Costa were sent

to prison, and only about 16 percent of those in Los Angeles were sent to prison.

At the end of one year, between 36 and 70 percent of the participants were still active in their originally assigned probation programs, 7 to 25 percent had absconded, and 8 to 37 percent were incarcerated in jail or prison. Ventura and Los Angeles offenders were more likely to be incarcerated than those in Contra Costa, probably because those offenders were more serious to begin with, were arrested more often, and were dealt with more harshly by the courts.

### Did ISP Affect the Offenders' Employment, Education, and Treatment Participation?

Participation in treatment programs varied considerably across sites. In Los Angeles, less than 20 percent of the ISP/ESP offenders participated in any counseling sessions. In Contra Costa, nearly 40 percent of the ISP offenders received counseling. In both sites, ISP offenders were more likely than those on routine probation to participate in counseling sessions. Nearly 80 percent of Ventura's probationers participated in counseling, the rates being similar for the ISP and CRMT offenders.

In many instances, ISP staff reported that they were simply unable to get probationers into needed treatment programs because of the unavailability of appropriate treatment slots or long waiting lists. This was particularly true for drug treatment. In Contra Costa, 50 percent of the ISP offenders with "high" drug-treatment needs participated in drug counseling (compared with 29 percent of those on routine probation). In Ventura, 67 percent of the ISP offenders with "high" drug-treatment needs participated in drug counseling (compared with 58 percent of those on CRMT). In Los Angeles, less than 20 percent of those on either ISP or ESP with "high" drug-treatment needs received drug counseling (compared with 0 percent of those on routine probation).

While the overall level of treatment and program participation was generally low, statistical analyses revealed a relationship between such participation and recidivism. Greater participation in counseling, employment, restitution, and community service was associated with lower levels of recidivism (both technical violations and new arrests). This result held true even when the offender's risk-of-recidivism level was statistically controlled.

### How Did the Costs of ISP Compare with Those of Routine Probation?

The high violation and incarceration rates of ISP offenders drove up estimated program and court costs, which averaged $7,240 to $8,902 per offender for the year, compared with $4,923 to $7,123 for routine probation and $8,633 for ESP. The figures for both ISP and routine probation are higher than commonly calculated because they include the costs of correctional supervision and the court costs associated with reprocessing recidivists.

## INTERPRETING THE FINDINGS

### Why Did the California ISPs Have Higher Failure Rates than ISP Programs in Other States?

The answer to this question is fairly straightforward. The offenders in the California demonstration samples were more serious and at higher risk of recidivism than were those who participated in most of the previously evaluated ISP programs. Although the California counties chose to implement probation-enhancement ISP programs, their participants were more serious offenders than those who participated in prison-diversion ISP programs in many other places. For example, only one-third of the participants in Georgia's ISP program were judged "high risk," whereas the majority of those in the California sample were in this category. In Ventura, which had the highest recidivism rates, over 80 percent of the ISP probationers were classified "high risk."

It appears that ISP programs have enjoyed widespread support partly because lower-risk offenders have been sentenced to them. This is not to suggest that diverting prisoners to such programs is inappropriate. On the contrary, a state that has a pool of low-risk offenders in prison is well advised to divert them to less-expensive community-based programs. But as higher-risk offenders are sentenced to such programs, higher violation rates must be expected—especially if the programs vigorously enforce their technical conditions. Given the lack of effect that closer monitoring apparently has on high-risk offenders, high arrest rates are also to be expected.

The importance of this lesson cannot be overstated: States that are considering implementing ISP programs must look closely at their candidate pools. Design and implementation of appropriate programs depend critically on recognizing differences in offender profiles and

understanding the risk levels of different offender populations within local areas (e.g., parolees, probationers). The differences in these levels also must be taken into consideration when recidivism rates are compared across states and jurisdictions.

## Why Were Outcomes So Similar for ISP Probationers and Routine Probationers?

In addition to higher overall failure rates, the California results also differ from other ISP program results in the comparative outcomes for ISP participants. Other ISP programs were judged successful precisely because the offenders who participated in them had much lower revocation and recidivism rates than offenders on routine probation or parole. In the three California ISP sites, the arrest rates of the two groups were virtually identical.

But previous evaluations have not been based on random assignment to ISP programs, so comparisons of ISP and routine probation or parole outcomes may have been misleading. Differences in outcomes in the previous evaluations may have resulted more from differences in populations than from the ISP programs themselves.

Because offenders were randomly assigned to routine probation or ISP in the California experiment, the reverse is true: The outcomes can be interpreted as program, not population, effects. Thus, the results reported here bring into question a basic premise of ISP, i.e., that increased surveillance will act as a constraint and the likelihood of detection will act as a deterrent to crime. These theoretical effects, of course, can be expected only if the ISP program actually does impose more conditions and surveillance than routine probation does. The California ISP demonstration programs did intensify supervision, but they did not produce the expected effects. More supervision, *without a substantive treatment component,* evidently had little effect on offenders' underlying criminal behavior, as manifested in their arrest rates.

## Is There Continued Justification for ISPs?

Our results suggest that ISP programs, as implemented in this study, are not effective for high-risk offenders *if effectiveness is judged solely by offender recidivism rates.* But as we have noted previously, ISP programs are designed to serve three primary goals: (1) to conserve scarce prison space and money that would otherwise be spent

on incarceration; (2) to keep offenders from committing crimes in the community while they are involved in the program; and (3) to impose an "intermediate" punishment less severe than prison, but more severe than routine probation (Petersilia et al., 1985). The California ISP programs were successful at imposing an intermediate punishment, for which the court-ordered conditions were more credibly monitored and enforced than was possible with routine probation. Discussions about whether ISP is a promising direction for crime-control policy must therefore move from micro-level questions, such as whether such programs benefit their subjects, to macro-level concerns about their contribution to overall sentencing policy.

The most compelling reason for continued development of ISP programs is the objective of *just deserts,* i.e., making the punishment fit the crime. Under present circumstances, California courts place many high-risk offenders on routine probation, where probation officers have caseloads of 150 or more and cannot provide close supervision. In large urban counties in California, probation supervision is often little more than unsupervised community release and monitoring for rearrest. Routine probation clearly does not constitute just punishment for felons with serious prior records.

Another compelling reason for developing ISP programs is the long-standing need for a range of sanctions that reflect the range of crimes and criminal behavior. The United States has failed to develop and establish sanctions that are less severe than incarceration but more restrictive than probation. According to Morris and Tonry:

> Effective and principled punishment of convicted criminals requires the application of a range of punishments between prison and probation. Imprisonment is now used excessively, probation even more excessively. Between the two is a spectrum of intermediate punishments that are hardly used at all (1990:231).

Ideally, the system should develop a continuum of punishments, ranging from warnings and restitution, through diverse community-based punishments (including probation and ISP, fines, and community service orders), to incarceration. Sanctions could then be adjusted to suit the individual offender's conviction crime, prior record, and threat to the community. Developing and utilizing such a continuum would not be a trivial undertaking, however, and it could not be accomplished by fiddling at the margins of the existing corrections system. Revamping the system would require single-minded under-

standing of the problem and public acceptance of the need, as well as a serious commitment of will and resources.

### What Should Be the Future Course of ISP Programs?

Even if the public and politicians accept the arguments favoring ISP, the long-term viability of ISP programs may depend on (1) realistic reappraisal of what they can be expected to accomplish, (2) a shift in emphasis, and (3) the adoption of different criteria for judging effectiveness.

The results that ISP programs can accomplish will depend largely on the nature of their "candidate pools" and other aspects of their corrections environments. As noted, surveillance-oriented ISP may not deter many high-risk offenders. Further, it will not be able to incapacitate them unless the local jails have more space than most jurisdictions have. In the present environment, ISP programs serve primarily as a way to impose conditions that come closer to just deserts than routine probation can.

Because they have better access to treatment programs and job placement services, ISP programs also have some potential for rehabilitating offenders. At all three of the California study sites, offenders who received counseling, were employed, paid restitution, and did community service were shown to have less recidivism. Because the level of involvement in program services was low, these activities may not have had much effect on the overall recidivism rates for the sites. However, the finding of a difference in recidivism has important implications for treatment and outcomes. It seems likely that overall outcomes might have been different if a greater proportion of the sample had been employed and had participated in rehabilitative activities.

The experimental results indicate that greater emphasis on drug treatment is particularly important for ISP. Almost half of the offenders in the California sample had serious drug problems: 53 percent in Ventura, 41 percent in Los Angeles, and 42 percent in Contra Costa. Most of the rest probably also had some drug involvement. Yet ISP staff had trouble obtaining drug treatment for these people. In Los Angeles, for example, only 20 percent of the ISP offenders with high drug-treatment needs received drug counseling. The critical need for such counseling is underlined by the drug/crime nexus: About one-third of all new arrests were drug-related.

### Shifting the Emphasis of ISP

The prevalence of drug involvement among offenders raises another issue: the emphasis ISP places on conditions and technical violations of those conditions. Drug use is one of the major reasons for the high revocation and recidivism rates of serious offenders. Most serious criminals in this country have drug histories and/or problems. If drug users are excluded from ISP eligibility, the candidate pool will virtually dry up. If they are not excluded and drug testing is included in the ISP programs, violation rates will probably be high. If a program responds rigorously to violations, it will have high incarceration rates.

The emphasis on technical violations largely reflects the assumption that such violations are proxies for criminal behavior. In other words, technical violations signal that offenders are "going bad." Thus, if an ISP officer discovers violations and an offender's probation is consequently revoked, the system may be preventing crimes. However, that assumption had not been tested empirically prior to this study, and one of our most important findings was that offenders who had technical violations were no more likely to have new arrests than those who did not.

If technical violations are not proxies for criminal behavior, then, it seems reasonable to question ISP programs' emphasis on them—especially the practice of sending offenders to prison for them. The effort and resources spent on monitoring and incarcerating people for technical violations might be better spent on, for example, more drug/alcohol treatment and job-placement efforts.

One argument against deemphasizing technical violations is that this would effectively reduce the punitive aspect of ISP. Conditions such as curfew, drug testing, and reporting embody ISP's purpose and its difference from routine probation. If a program does not monitor observance of its conditions or revoke participation for failure to meet those conditions, why should offenders be expected to comply? If the conditions are merely paper requirements, how does ISP differ from routine probation? If it doesn't differ, what happens to just deserts? That argument deserves a closer look, in view of our results showing the lack of correlation between technical violations and arrests.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

The contribution of this California experiment in testing the ISP concept cannot be overemphasized. The Law Enforcement Assistance

Administration (LEAA) funded more than 100 ISP projects between 1970 and 1977. When the Government Accounting Office (GAO) reviewed what was known about ISP in 1977, it concluded that very little had been learned from those projects. That is certainly not the case here. The California sites received federal funding in 1986; and as of 1990, they had given us solid, empirical evidence about the degree of success with which the ISP programs were implemented, what they accomplished, and what they cost their local systems. The California jurisdictions that participated have made a valuable contribution to our understanding of ISP and its potential as an alternative sanction. Policymakers should evaluate this critical information before investing resources in full-scale ISP programs.

# ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research effort benefited from the contributions of many people and organizations. Our deepest appreciation goes to the probation officials in Contra Costa, Ventura, and Los Angeles counties who opened their agencies and records for our inspection. Participating counties always run the risk of looking bad when research findings become known, but these officials were willing to take that risk in hopes that the resulting research would help them and others learn more about the potential of community-based sanctions. We could not have asked for better cooperation.

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# 1. STUDY BACKGROUND

Probation is no longer a sentencing alternative reserved primarily for first-time misdemeanants and petty offenders.[1] In 1988, 40 percent of the 114,000 adults placed on probation in California had been convicted of felonies in Superior Court. Of these, 15 percent were convicted of violent crimes (Bureau of Criminal Statistics, 1989). The probation population not only appears more serious, but it has increased substantially in size. Over the past decade, the number of probationers has increased by 50 percent, yet the number of probation officers has declined by 20 percent during the same period. Probation caseloads have grown so large (400 persons per officer in some areas) that several departments can provide active supervision to less than one-third of their probationers. Offenders typically receive minimal supervision, and the enforcement of probation conditions is spotty. Gerald Buck, Chief Probation Officer in Contra Costa County, recently commented:

> The majority of adult offenders granted supervised probation might just as well have been given a suspended sentence with no supervision (1989:66).

Moreover, a 1985 study revealed that 65 percent of the felons on probation in Los Angeles and Alameda counties were rearrested during the course of their sentences, many of them for serious offenses such as burglary, assault, and robbery (Petersilia et al., 1985). The study also found that 25 percent of the offenders granted probation were indistinguishable in terms of crime or criminal records from the offenders who were sentenced to prison.

Most Californians agree that something must be done to decrease the threat to the public posed by felony probationers. But what?

[1]The practice of probation began informally in 1841, when John Augustus (now referred to as the father of probation) asked the court to "bail to him" a man accused of being a common drunk. Augustus signed a court contract indicating that he would take responsibility for the man and periodically accompany him back to court to report on progress. This informal practice of "bailing" offenders to members of the community was initially used for misdemeanants (see Dressler, 1959). While good statistics are not available for those early years, the New York State Department of Corrections reports that in 1930, 90 percent of the adult probationers in New York had been convicted of misdemeanors, nearly half of them consisting of nonsupport or petty larceny (New York State Department of Corrections, 1934).

Prison does not seem to be a viable option, given the current crisis in prison crowding and the extremely high costs of incarceration. The prison population in California has grown from about 22,500 in 1979 to 87,000 today—the largest statewide increase the nation has ever witnessed. California has 34,000 more state prisoners than New York, which has the second largest prison system in the country (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1989).

Not surprisingly, such unprecedented growth has spawned serious overcrowding. With a design capacity of about 47,000 persons, California's prisons are now operating at 170 percent of capacity (again, California ranks first in the nation in percentage of overcrowding). Crowding is also a problem in California's jails, which currently hold about 70,000 inmates and are operating at 135 percent of their design capacity (California Commission on Inmate Population Management, 1990).

This extensive use of incarceration is expensive. Construction costs average $50,000 to $75,000 per cell, and the average cost of housing an inmate is about $14,000 a year (McDonald, 1989). The high cost of prisons is a major factor in the growth of the California Department of Corrections' budget, which is currently $1.6 billion (4.2 percent of the general budget) and is expected to increase to $3.4 billion by 1994 (6.3 percent of the general budget).

The state, however, is unable to build itself out of the prison crowding problem. During the next five years, California plans to create an additional 37,000 prison and jail beds, at a cost of over $5.2 billion. But these additional beds will not relieve prison crowding: Projections show that in 1994, prisons will probably still be operating at 150 percent of their design capacity (California Commission on Inmate Population Management, 1990).

Large and increasing prison populations are not unique to California. Nationwide, prison populations have more than doubled since 1975 (Jamieson and Flanagan, 1989). Thirty-one states are under court order to reduce prison crowding, and corrections has become the fastest-growing component of most state budgets (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1988; National Conference of State Legislatures, 1985). Yet despite the enormous investment in prisons, the level of violent crime is now substantially higher than it was a decade ago (Jamieson and Flanagan, 1989).

What correctional alternatives are available other than routine probation and prison? There is a growing consensus that the best hope for relieving prison crowding and ensuring public safety may be intensive supervision probation (ISP)—a type of sanction that is more

stringent and punitive than traditional probation, but less expensive and brutal than imprisonment. Intensive supervision is designed to hold the middle ground between incarceration and routine probation, in terms of punitiveness, the degree of safety afforded the public, and cost. ISP programs can be designed to provide enhanced supervision for high-risk probationers or to serve as an alternative to incarceration for prison-bound offenders.

There is no generic ISP program. In fact, so many programs call themselves ISP that the acronym alone reveals little about any program's particular character. The only common characteristic of the ongoing ISP programs is that they are more "intense" than routine supervision. Most ISP programs call for some combination of multiple weekly contacts with a supervising officer, unscheduled drug testing, strict enforcement of probation conditions, and a requirement to perform community service. Caseloads of supervising officers typically consist of 30 to 50 probationers.

The apparent promise of ISP programs led to the following conclusion in 1985:

> Intensive community surveillance/supervision programs will be the most significant experiment made by the criminal justice system in the next decade. We expect to see such programs adopted in jurisdictions across the country. If ISPs prove successful over time and across jurisdictions, they will not only restore probation's credibility, but they could also reduce incarceration rates without increasing crime. And perhaps most important, such programs may well rehabilitate at least some of the offenders who participate (Petersilia et al., 1985:77).

By 1990, jurisdictions in every state had instituted ISP programs, and the published results of ISP evaluations have been encouraging. Reported recidivism rates are generally quite low—fewer than 10 percent of program participants have been rearrested while on ISP, and nearly all of those arrests have been for technical violations rather than new crimes (Petersilia, 1987).[2] Fewer than 5 percent of participants in ISP programs in Georgia and New Jersey have been convicted of new offenses (Erwin, 1987; Pearson and Harper, 1990). Moreover, many ISP programs claim to save at least $10,000 per year

[2]A probation violation that does not consist of the commission of a crime or is not prosecuted as such is usually called a technical violation, indicating that it is behavior forbidden by the court order granting probation, but not forbidden by legal statute.

for each offender who would otherwise have been sentenced to prison (Byrne, Lurigio, and Baird, 1989).

But despite the apparent promise of ISP programs, it is premature to claim that they are responsible for the observed outcomes. The low recidivism rates may actually reflect systematic differences between the types of offenders who are sentenced to ISP programs and the types who are sentenced to routine probation or prison.

Because ISP programs are still experimental, judges are exercising great caution in sentencing offenders to them. Most of the programs limit participation to property offenders with minor criminal records, which undoubtedly helps explain the low rearrest rates. Further, although judges may be asked to certify that offenders who are directly sentenced to ISP would have gone to prison if they had not had the ISP option, such certification can hardly be considered proof that the offenders were truly prison-bound. Unless the participants would actually have occupied a prison cell, the claims of cost savings are exaggerated.

Moreover, past ISP evaluations have not employed methodologies that permit differentiation between program and participant effects. Thus, any claims about the effects of ISP on recidivism and public safety are suspect. At this point, there has been less demonstrated success of ISP than its widespread adoption might lead one to predict.

The most direct way to evaluate the success of ISP programs is to conduct experiments in which eligible offenders are randomly assigned to routine probation or to ISP. Random assignment helps to ensure that the outcomes (e.g., recidivism rates) result from the manipulated variables (e.g., the sentences imposed), rather than from systematically biasing factors (e.g., less serious offenders being assigned to ISP). Although researchers have long advocated such experiments, as of 1986, no experimental evaluation of adult ISP had been completed.[3] To remedy this situation, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) provided funding for an ISP demonstration project that involved random assignment of eligible offenders.[4] The primary intent of the demonstration project was to determine the effects of participation in an ISP program on the subsequent behavior of offenders.

In the request for proposals to participate in the project, the BJA stipulated that the sites had to agree to:

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[3]Six ISP experiments have been conducted, but they all included only juvenile offenders (Reimer and Warren, 1957, 1958; Palmer, 1978; Pond, 1970; Lichtman and Smock, 1981; Sarason and Ganzer, 1973).

[4]The BJA is an agency within the U.S. Department of Justice that provides financial support to local criminal-justice agencies that wish to implement new practices.

- Design and implement an ISP program, following the general ISP model developed in Georgia, which had begun to serve as a prototype for programs throughout the nation. The basic program components were to be small caseloads, employment training, community service work, routine and unscheduled alcohol and drug testing, and curfews.[5]
- Participate in several training conferences and technical assistance activities, which would be provided by outside experts.[6]
- Participate in an independent evaluation that would require program officials to maintain core data elements and to cooperate with the evaluator in the random assignment of cases.

Each of the selected ISP projects was funded for 18 to 24 months, at a level of $100,000 to $150,000 per site.

After a competitive review process, The RAND Corporation was selected by the BJA to evaluate the ISP demonstration program. The RAND researchers also assisted in program design, staff training, data collection, and project implementation.[7]

Fourteen sites participated in the ISP Demonstration Project.[8] Each site followed identical procedures with respect to random assignment, data collection, and overall evaluation.

To our knowledge, this was the largest randomized corrections experiment ever conducted in the United States. It involved several cities in several states, technical assistance and training, and an independent evaluation. Sites began accepting clients in February 1987, and some continued to accept cases through January 1990. By the time the experiment was completed, nearly 2,000 offenders had participated.

The data collection and subsequent analysis addressed the following questions:

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[5]For complete descriptions of Georgia's ISP program, see Erwin (1986), Petersilia (1987), and Byrne et al. (1989).

[6]The training component was directed by Carol Shapiro and Todd Clear at Rutgers University, and the technical assistance was provided by Douglas Holien and Audrey Bakke at the National Council on Crime and Delinquency.

[7]The evaluation component of the project received additional funds from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ).

[8]The participating sites were Contra Costa County, California; Los Angeles County, California; Ventura County, California; Marion County, Oregon; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Georgia (Atlanta, Macon, and Waycross); Des Moines, Iowa; Santa Fe, New Mexico; Seattle, Washington; Texas (Houston and Dallas); and Front Royal, Virginia.

- Who participated in the ISP program?
- Did ISP participants receive more surveillance and services than offenders on routine probation?
- How did participating in the ISP program affect the offenders' future criminality?
- Did ISP affect the offenders' employment, education, counseling, community service, and payment of fines and fees?
- How did the costs of ISP supervision compare with those of routine probation?
- For whom was ISP most effective?

This report focuses on the outcomes of the three California ISP programs, located in Los Angeles, Ventura, and Contra Costa counties. These three programs were singled out for separate analysis for a number of reasons, the most important of which is that they were among the first funded. Case assignment to the ISP and control programs began earlier in these counties than at the other sites, and enough eligible offenders were located in 1987 and 1988 to enable a one-year outcome evaluation to be undertaken in 1989. Also, all of the California ISP programs are probation-enhancement programs rather than prison-diversion programs. Probation-enhancement ISPs complement routine probation by providing more strict supervision for "high-risk" probationers, whereas prison-diversion ISPs apply a community sanction to offenders who would otherwise go to prison. In each of the California sites, the probationers selected had already been granted probation and were randomly assigned to ISP or routine supervision.[9] Thus, these programs have similar purposes and deal with rather similar populations.

In addition, the results from California's programs are of particular personal interest. The authors have been studying the California probation system since 1982 and believe that the results of these earlier studies provided some of the impetus for implementing ISP programs. An earlier report, *Granting Felons Probation,* contained the following recommendation:

> The criminal justice system needs an alternative, intermediate form of punishment, one that changes the perception of probation

[9]Only two of the 14 sites—Marion County, Oregon, and Milwaukee, Wisconsin—chose to implement prison-diversion ISP programs. These programs encountered implementation difficulties which limited the total number of cases handled during the course of the project.

> as a "slap on the wrist" to that of a viable alternative to imprisonment. The core of such an alternative must be intensive supervision, coupled with community service and/or restitution (Petersilia et al., 1985:65).

Each of the California agencies that submitted proposals stated that it was designing an ISP program partly in response to that recommendation.

Section 2 of this report summarizes prior ISP research and identifies its limitations; suggests how the current research will improve upon past studies; and discusses the theoretical foundations of the ISP concept. Section 3 describes the characteristics of the California ISP (experimental) programs and the routine probation (control) programs. Section 4 discusses the random assignment procedures, the data collection instruments, and the procedures employed to protect the privacy of the offenders studied. The evaluation results are presented in Sections 5 through 7. Section 5 describes the characteristics of the offenders who participated in the demonstration and compares the level of services received by ISP probationers with that received by routine probationers. Section 6 examines the effects of ISP on subsequent recidivism, employment, and other measures of social adjustment. Section 7 compares the costs of ISP supervision with those of routine probation. Finally, Section 8 summarizes the study findings and outlines their implications for public policy.

# 2. A REVIEW OF PRIOR ISP RESEARCH

Prior studies of ISP can be divided into "early projects" (research conducted in the 1960s and 1970s to assess the effects of caseload size) and "new projects" (those implemented in the 1980s to deal with prison crowding).

## THE EARLY ISP PROJECTS TO ASSESS CASELOAD SIZE

While the ISP concept is being hailed by some as the panacea for modern corrections, veteran correctional administrators may well be asking, Why all the excitement? About 25 years ago, dozens of intensive probation programs were developed, primarily with funds from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA).[1]

Early ISP projects were primarily probation-management tools, designed to determine the ideal caseload size for achieving rehabilitation. Most probation staff supported the medical model, which assumed that offenders were sick, disadvantaged, or otherwise disabled. In this model, the probation officer's task was to diagnose the trouble correctly and provide appropriate treatment (either directly or by referral to another agency); the officer was seen as an advocate or counselor for the probationer. The obligation to enforce court-ordered conditions was acknowledged, but aspects of control, monitoring, and surveillance were of secondary importance.

Probation officers assumed that "smaller" was "better" and that smaller caseloads would lead to increased contact between the probation officer and the client, resulting in improved service delivery and more efficient treatment, which would in turn increase rehabilitation (Carter and Wilkins, 1984).[2]

The best-known study of probation caseloads was the so-called San Francisco project, carried out by researchers at the University of Cali-

[1]The LEAA was created by Congress in 1968 to act as "a catalyst for the introduction of innovative ideas and techniques." It provided over $7 billion to support more than 100,000 projects during its tenure. The LEAA was disbanded in 1976 amid criticism that it had failed in its mission.

[2]Carter and Wilkins (1984), Neithercutt and Gottfredson (1973), and Latessa (1979) review evaluations of ISP programs conducted during this early period.

fornia, Berkeley, between 1964 and 1966. For research purposes, federal probation authorities assigned offenders to four levels of supervision: "ideal" (caseloads of 50 offenders per officer), "normal" (caseloads of 70 to 130), "intensive" (caseloads of 20), and "minimum" (caseloads of several hundred). After two years, the major effect of smaller caseloads on recidivism was that they generated more technical violations. Crime rates were about the same for all categories (Carter et al., 1967).

Similar conclusions were reached by Banks et al. (1977), who conducted a review of the effectiveness of ISP projects prior to that date. After examining information on 46 separate programs and conducting site visits to 20 of these programs, they concluded that:

- Smaller caseloads often failed to produce more contacts between officer and client, i.e., the projects failed to become "intensive."
- Projects designed as alternatives to incarceration consistently failed to attract a target group of true diversions from incarceration and instead "widened the net" by providing ISP to offenders who otherwise would have received regular probation.
- Intensive supervision, especially for adults, either had no effect on failure rates or seemed to increase them.

These findings were similar to those from evaluations of a wide variety of criminal-justice treatments. The dominant finding was a null effect, i.e., no particular treatment was found on the average to be any more or less effective than any other, and individuals emerged from treatment with no appreciable behavior change.

Such findings led to growing disillusionment with rehabilitation, and federal funding for correctional treatment programs began to evaporate. In 1975, the Martinson review of the effectiveness of correctional treatment programs concluded that "with few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism" (Lipton et al., 1975). Eighteen ISP projects were included in this review, and the results were consistent with the "nothing works" conclusion. Under these circumstances, most of the earlier ISP projects were dismantled and remained dormant until the early 1980s.

## THE NEW, SURVEILLANCE-ORIENTED ISP PROGRAMS

### Theoretical Foundations

Considering the early evaluations, one might reasonably ask, Why the resurgence of support for intensive probation supervision? Indeed, Clear et al. (1987:33) noted, "The new call for intensive probation is not based on a firm grounding of social science...which is at best only promising, and at worst downright shaky."

It is widely acknowledged that if prison crowding disappeared tomorrow, thereby eliminating the need to create less-expensive sanctions, so would a major incentive to develop intensive supervision programs.[3] Thus, it was the crisis of prison crowding that added new vitality to a relatively old concept.

Yet ISP programs are not without theoretical foundation. They rely heavily on a sentencing model that emphasizes specific deterrence and incapacitation and places less emphasis on rehabilitation.[4] Deterrence-based programs attempt to change offenders' perceptions of the costs associated with committing crime. There is a long-held utilitarian notion that offenders weigh the consequences of their actions, both positive and negative, and commit crimes only when it is in their self-interest to do so. Jeremy Bentham expressed this view as follows:

> The profit of the crime is the force which urges a man to delinquency; the pain of the punishment is the force employed to restrain him from it. If the first of these forces is the greater, the crime will be committed; if the second, the crime will not be committed (quoted in Zimring and Hawkins 1973:75).

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[3]Both prison-diversion and probation-enhancement ISPs are thought to be cost-effective, in either the short or long term. Prison-diversion ISPs directly reduce crowding by using ISP instead of imprisonment. Probation-enhancement ISPs are thought to prevent crimes through close surveillance and are thereby expected to reduce the future need for imprisonment. Probation-enhancement programs could also affect overall sentencing practices, in that judges might be more willing to sentence felons to probation instead of prison if they felt the probationers would be subjected to close scrutiny.

[4]Specific deterrence is the inhibiting effect of sanctioning an offender on his or her own future behavior. General deterrence is the inhibiting effect of sanctioning an offender on another potential offender's criminal behavior. Incapacitation refers to the crimes prevented while the offender is restrained in some way (e.g., by being in prison). Rehabilitation refers to changes in an offender's underlying propensity to commit crime. For a review of these sentencing goals and empirical evidence of their validity, see Blumstein et al. (1978, 1983) and Sechrest et al. (1979).

Such classical deterrent notions are at the core of ISP supervision.[5] Administrators hope that ISP—which involves close monitoring, coupled with threats of detection and subsequent incarceration—will influence the choices made by individuals regarding their participation in crime. Increased monitoring and surveillance are expected to increase offenders' perceptions of the effectiveness of the system in detecting and punishing criminal behavior.

Close supervision should increase the probability of detection and subsequent arrest of offenders who are not deterred by the program and continue in crime. Quick revocation to custody results in incapacitation, and because ISP participants are encouraged to be employed and attend counseling sessions, rehabilitation may occur. However, the newer ISP programs do not count on rehabilitation to ensure public safety.

Programs designed to increase deterrence and threaten incapacitation have a narrow, short-term, in-program crime-control focus. In this sense, they are quite different from rehabilitation programs, which attempt to achieve longer-term offender change (e.g., desistance from crime). The emphasis on deterrence and incapacitation, on the one hand, and rehabilitation on the other, is often referred to as "control versus cure" (Harland and Rosen, 1987). Most current ISP models emphasize control.

The newer ISP programs do not give priority to the offender's need for services, but rather focus on the community's need for protection. Program developers hope that ISP will be able to deter and incapacitate offenders, even if it fails to rehabilitate them:

> The strength of newer ISP programs lies in realism about the punitive nature of the experience of surveillance. We are no longer deceiving ourselves and attempting to deceive the probationers about the therapeutic benefits of the relationship between the officer and the offender (Conrad, 1987:85).

[5]The deterrence proposition has generated a large and rapidly expanding criminology research literature. Empirical studies generally examine the relationship between the certainty and severity of punishment and crime. In general, the evidence suggests that certainty of punishment is more effective in deterring criminal behavior than severity of punishment. For recent reviews of the literature, see Ross and LaFree (1986) and Paternoster (1989).

## Current ISP Program Models

While the general objectives of ISP are consistent, practices vary considerably from program to program. Recent nationwide surveys of ISP programs have found that no two are alike (Petersilia, 1987; Byrne, 1986). The required number of face-to-face contacts between officer and client varies from one per day to two per month. About half of the ISP programs impose night curfews, usually beginning at 10:00 p.m. during the week and midnight on weekends. And a majority of the programs try to recoup some of their costs by collecting offender supervision fees, usually ranging from $20 to $50 per month for each offender.

Some programs exclude offenders with drug and alcohol problems, while others consider them the target groups. For example, Montgomery County, Maryland, selects "first offender felons with alcohol, drug, or mental health problems."

Some ISP programs are designed for offenders with particular needs. The Monroe County, New York, program selects "unemployed or underemployed probationers," while the Suffolk County, New York, program concentrates on "persons with repeated convictions for driving while under the influence of intoxicants." Selection processes also vary with each program's objectives, e.g., prison diversion, probation management, or early release from prison.

The newer ISP programs are basically of three types:[6]

- *Prison-diversion,* commonly referred to as "front door" programs because their goal is to keep offenders from entering prison's front door.
- *Early-release,* commonly referred to as "back door" programs because they hasten the prisoner's exit through the prison's back door.
- *Probation-enhancement or case-management,* programs created and controlled by probation managers, in which participants who are deemed high-risk are selected from the pool of sentenced felony probationers.

Proponents of prison-diversion and early-release ISPs claim that these programs reduce prison crowding and save public funds by replacing expensive imprisonment with less-expensive ISP, while at the

[6]Reviews of the newer ISP programs have been conducted by Petersilia (1987), Byrne, Lurigio, and Baird (1989), and Tonry and Will (1988).

same time protecting the public by means of surveillance. Case management ISPs, on the other hand, are not claimed to be alternatives to incarceration and only indirectly serve as a means to reduce prison crowding or save public monies by preventing crimes and thereby reducing future need for prison beds.

The best-known ISP programs are described below, with a brief discussion of what is known about their effectiveness.

## The Georgia ISP Program

**Program Description.** Georgia's ISP program is the best-known front-door program, and it has been widely replicated around the country. As of 1987, more than 20 states had used it as a model for their own ISP programs (Petersilia, 1987a). The Georgia program was inaugurated in 1982, without legislation or appropriations, as an attempt to alleviate the state's burgeoning prison costs. Its original intent was to demonstrate that serious offenders could be safely and effectively supervised in the community. A major public relations effort was undertaken to enhance the acceptance of the program among judges and other community leaders.

One year following its implementation, Georgia's ISP program was dubbed "the toughest form of probation in the United States" and the "most ambitious of several programs across the country that are attempting to make probation a tough sanction against crime" (Gettinger, 1983:7). In commenting on solutions to prison crowding, *The New York Times* (December 18, 1985) reported:

> The state that has led the way is Georgia, and the most common new program spreading across the South and the nation is modeled on the Georgia program of intensive probation supervision.

The target subjects for Georgia's program are largely nonviolent, lower-risk, prison-bound offenders, but probation revocation cases are also included. Candidates can enter the program as diversionary, prison-amended cases or can be sentenced directly in response to the recommendations of a presentence investigation report. Roughly equal numbers of direct and amended-sentence offenders have been accepted into the program. As of January 1, 1987, more than 4,000 offenders had participated in Georgia's ISP program, the typical participant being a white male under the age of 25 who had been con-

victed of a property crime. About a quarter of the project participants have been convicted of drug- or alcohol-related offenses.

Probation caseloads are restricted to 25 offenders and are managed by a supervision team comprising a surveillance officer, whose main role is to monitor the offender closely, and a probation officer, who provides counseling and has legal authority over the case.

Offenders usually spend 6 to 12 months under ISP, followed by a year on regular probation. Most of the probationers progress through three graduated phases of supervision. In the first phase, offenders are seen five times per week either in the probation agency office (by the probation officer) or at the offender's residence (by the surveillance officer). In the second phase, three face-to-face contacts per week are required; contacts decrease to two per week in phase 3. Successful completion of one phase is required before the probationer may progress to the next.

While in ISP, offenders are required to perform 132 hours of community service and be employed in a full-time educational/vocational program. Employment is necessary because, like other probationers in Georgia, ISP participants are required to pay a probation supervision fee of $10 to $50 per month, in addition to fines and restitution previously ordered by the court. The probation officer or the judge can (and usually does) impose additional restrictions as well, such as curfews, and there is frequent unannounced drug and alcohol testing.

**Effectiveness Evaluation.** The Georgia Department of Corrections published an internal evaluation of the state's ISP program in 1986. Its positive conclusions helped fuel the optimism surrounding the potential of ISP to reduce prison expenditures. The evaluator concluded:

> The citizens of Georgia have had little reason to fear for their safety at the hands of the 2322 offenders who have been diverted from prison to ISP supervision. ... The statistics show that [less than 1 percent] of the ISP probationers have been convicted of any crimes which are categorized as violent personal, although 16 percent of all the offenders served have been revoked for technical or criminal violations (Erwin, 1986:1).

Furthermore,

> ISP probationers had a lower rate of reconviction for serious crimes against persons than either the regular probation or incarcerated comparison cohorts (Erwin, 1986:23).

Georgia's ISP program was also reported to have saved money. Erwin and Bennett (1987) claimed that each case diverted from prison saved $6,775. David Evans, Georgia's Director of Corrections, subsequently noted, "The ISP programs basically saved the cost of building at least two new prisons."

For the evaluation, characteristics of the 542 offenders sentenced to ISP in Georgia in 1983 were used to select comparison groups of offenders sentenced to regular probation and prison during the same year. A comparison group of 753 probationers was selected, matched by age, type of crime, and risk score (Erwin, 1987:12). A group of 173 prisoners was selected by prison counselors from five institutions who were asked to identify inmates they believed would have been sentenced to ISP if the option had been available in their respective circuits at the time of sentencing.

Unfortunately, this method failed to define similar groups. Erwin and Bennett (1987) report that the offenders in the prison comparison group were twice as likely as ISP probationers to be black, three times as likely to be female, and half again as likely to have been convicted of crimes against persons or to be classified "high risk" or "maximum risk." The ISP and prison comparison groups were not only not very comparable, they differed in characteristics that are known to affect recidivism (e.g., high risk).

The three groups were then tracked for an 18-month follow-up period. The ISP probationers had a lower rate of reconviction for serious crimes against persons than either the regular probation or prison comparison cohorts. However, those results are not meaningful, because the groups were not comparable. The prisoners were higher-risk offenders, and the routine probation group, although it more closely resembled the ISP group, was supervised much less intensively and therefore was less likely to be discovered violating probation conditions.

In Georgia, ISP was most successful for drug offenders and least successful for violent offenders:

> Offenders originally convicted of drug-related offenses had the highest success rates (90 percent successful), followed by property offenders (75 percent), and personal offenders (65 percent). Drug offenders...did better under ISP than they did under regular probation, suggesting that the frequent contacts during evening and weekend hours and the urinalysis monitoring may be particularly effective in supervising this type of offender.

It is possible, however, that the drug offenders were more likely to be in the low-risk category, so that what appears to be a link between offense type and recidivism is actually a relation between risk level and recidivism.

The average cost for routine probation in Georgia was $300 per offender per year (Erwin, 1987); the cost for ISP was $1,600 per probationer per year, and prison costs were $9,000 per inmate per year.[7] Thus, placing an offender on ISP rather than in prison appeared to produce a cost saving of over $7,000. But since the prisoners and ISP offenders were not similar, such cost comparisons can be misleading.

It is also quite possible that offenders who would have been sentenced to routine probation were instead sentenced to ISP. If this is the case, then the correct cost comparison would be between probation and intensive supervision rather than between prison and intensive supervision. The ISP-versus-prison cost comparisons also do not reflect the costs of reincarceration for offenders who failed on intensive supervision.

## The New Jersey ISP Program

**Program Description.** New Jersey's ISP program is the best-known back-door ISP program, and it has been used as a model for similar efforts in Texas, Tennessee, Colorado, and Michigan. The program is based on the premise that certain prisoners can be released to the community with minimal public risk if they are placed in a highly structured environment.

The New Jersey ISP program has been operational since 1985, when $1 million was allocated for it in an attempt to alleviate prison overcrowding. The ISP program is run by the Administrative Office of the Courts, the state-level agency that oversees county probation operations.

Only inmates who are currently serving a prison term are eligible to participate. Judges are not permitted to sentence directly to ISP—a procedure designed to ensure that only offenders who would otherwise be occupying a prison bed participate.

The ISP program is further restricted to prisoners serving sentences for nonviolent crimes. Inmates can apply for admission to the ISP after they have served at least 30, but no more than 60, days in

[7]The estimated prison costs include operating but not capital expenditures. For a complete review of the many components of corrections costs, see McDonald (1989).

prison. The median prison time served before release into intensive supervision is about three months (Pearson and Harper, 1990). New Jersey's ISP program thus resembles a shock incarceration program.[8]

An offender who applies for the program must develop a personal plan to govern his activities upon release. The plan must describe the offender's problems, future plans, resources in the community, and the people who can help. Each offender must have a community sponsor, with whom he will initially live after being accepted into the ISP program. The people identified in the community who will help the offender meet his or her obligations are referred to as the "network team." Like the community sponsor, they are expected to maintain close contact with the offender and his ISP officer. To ensure that everyone involved understands his obligations, the offender, the community sponsor, and all members of the network team must sign the offender's ISP plan. Before an offender can be accepted into the program, he must also have confirmed employment or placement in a vocational training course.

Each applicant must complete a form that calls for personal and criminal-history background. Once the form is completed, an ISP officer interviews the inmate and assesses the suitability of the community sponsor. This information is submitted to the ISP screening board, which consists of the director of the ISP program and representatives from corrections and the public. When an inmate is deemed eligible, the board forwards his application to a three-judge resentencing panel for a final decision. If the resentencing panel approves the application, it grants permission for resentencing, adjourns the hearing for 90 days, places the applicant on recognizance to the community sponsor, and requires adherence to the applicant's plan.

The New Jersey ISP program is designed to admit only low-risk prisoners and has some of the most stringent selection criteria of any program in the nation. Between the start of the program in 1985 and June 30, 1986, 4,373 applications were evaluated in at least one stage of the screening process. Only 16 percent of the applicants were admitted to the program.

Participants are accepted into the program for a period of 18 months, divided into three stages. In the first stage, each offender is required to have at least 20 contacts per month with the probation

[8]Shock incarceration consists of a short period of confinement, typically three to six months, followed by intensive community supervision. For a complete evaluation of the effects of shock incarceration programs, see Parent (1989).

officer (12 of the contacts must be face-to-face). In addition, he must perform at least 16 hours of community service each month, if appropriate opportunities are available. He must also participate in weekly counseling sessions and treatment programs if so ordered by the ISP officer.

Participants are required to be at home from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. every day, although the curfew requirement may be relaxed at the discretion of the ISP officer. The ISP officers may also restrict participants' movement in the community by invoking periods of home detention not to exceed 48 hours.

New Jersey uses both an electronic monitoring system and telephonic robots to assure that curfews are being observed. About 20 of New Jersey's ISP offenders are on monitoring at any one time, at an average cost of $18 per day, of which the probationer pays $5 to $18, depending on his financial ability.

An additional 175 ISP participants are monitored by telephonic robots. A central computer, using a preprogrammed, irregular calling schedule, automatically dials participants' homes during curfew hours. When the offender answers, the prerecorded message requests certain information (e.g., name, address) and tape records the answers. The probation officer subsequently listens to the taped responses and determines that the respondent was indeed the ISP participant, thus verifying that he was at home during the required time period.

All ISP participants must successfully complete a minimum of one year in the program. Thereafter, they may be returned to regular probation supervision or discharged entirely, at the discretion of the resentencing panel.

While in the ISP program, offenders are on bench-warrant status. If a participant is charged with a probation violation of any kind, any judge authorized to issue bench warrants can orally approve a revocation, causing the offender to be arrested and returned to prison.

**Effectiveness Evaluation.** New Jersey's ISP program was evaluated by Frank Pearson, at Rutgers University, under a grant from the National Institute of Justice (Pearson, 1988; Pearson and Harper, 1990).

Pearson found that between 1984 and 1986, the New Jersey ISP program succeeded in delivering the contact levels that were initially proposed: The median number of contacts was 31 per month for the first stage, 25 for the second stage, and 22 for the third stage (1987:101). Furthermore, 96 percent of all ISP participants were

employed at least part time, and almost all of the offenders were satisfying their community-service requirements.

Like the Georgia evaluation, the New Jersey evaluation did not measure the services delivered to offenders on regular parole. Thus, it is not known whether supervision practices were significantly different for those offenders.

A comparison sample of 500 randomly selected prisoners convicted of crimes that would have made them eligible for ISP was obtained using a computerized database. Unfortunately, the comparison group was very different from the ISP clients. Therefore, Pearson selected a subsample of 132 offenders who most closely resembled those on ISP, i.e., they were sentenced for ISP-eligible crimes and had served ordinary terms of imprisonment (OTI) followed by parole. Nevertheless, the ISP offenders were still less serious in terms of prior convictions, prior incarcerations, and overall risk score (Pearson, 1987:131).

Two-year follow-up recidivism data on the New Jersey ISP and OTI offenders showed that during their first year "at risk," 11 percent of the ISP offenders were rearrested, compared with 26 percent of the OTI offenders. Reconviction rates were also lower for the ISP group. Thus, the "failure rates" of ISP offenders, variously measured, were lower than those of the OTI comparison group (Pearson 1987:156–157).

However, the rates of return to prison for technical violations (e.g., curfews and drug-test failures) were higher for ISP participants. Approximately 40 percent of them were returned to prison during their first year "at risk," compared with 32 percent of the close OTI group. Of those who were returned to prison, 75 percent were technical violators, primarily drug-test failures. Pearson concluded:

> These findings suggest that increasing the level of control over offender behavior will improve community protection (e.g., there will be fewer arrests of ISP participants). However, we pay a price for control, in both prison crowding and the costs of incarceration (1987:187).

As in Georgia, the ISP participants had less serious records than offenders in the comparison group, so the methodology "stacked the deck," thereby making ISP look effective.

Comparison of the cost of ISP with traditional prison incarceration showed that ISP was 30 percent less expensive than holding the same offenders in prison to the end of their terms, saving roughly $7,000 to

$8,000 per offender compared with OTI and parole.[9] The median number of days served in prison by ISP offenders was 107; another 449 days were spent on ISP. Prison time was costed at $50 per day, and ISP at $13 per day. The ISP program, which included the costs of imprisoning the ISP failures, was calculated to be about $17,300 per case.

While Pearson's analysis includes the costs of reprocessing the failures and reflects the actual number of days offenders were on ISP and under various other sanctions, he was still unable to adjust for the lack of comparability between ISP and close OTI offenders. Therefore, any definitive statements about the public-safety effects of the program or its cost benefits could be misleading.

## The Massachusetts ISP Program

**Program Description.** Unlike the Georgia and New Jersey ISP programs, the Massachusetts program is not designed to reduce prison populations, but to manage high-risk probationers more effectively. In this sense, it is the program that most closely resembles the California ISP programs.

Offenders sentenced to probation in Massachusetts are placed in one of four supervision-level classifications: minimum, medium, maximum, and intensive. Statewide, about 15 percent of active probationers meet the criteria for intensive supervision. They are generally the offenders rated "high risk" on the National Institute of Corrections (NIC) risk-classification instrument.[10]

In 1985, the ISP program was implemented in ten District Court and three Superior Court jurisdictions. It calls for ten contacts per month, mandatory referrals to meet social and/or personal needs related to criminal behavior, and stricter enforcement of probation conditions.

**Effectiveness Evaluation.** James Byrne, of the University of Lowell, is directing a comprehensive evaluation of the Massachusetts ISP program. The research design includes a pretest/posttest comparison of cases in courts that implemented the ISP program with a matched sample of cases from courts that did not. The final evaluation report has not yet been released; however, the initial results on implementation and recidivism are presented in Byrne et al. (1989).

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[9]The prison cost estimates include operational, but not capital, expenditures.

[10]Estimates of risk are based on degree of prior criminality, stability of lifestyle, and prior experience in treatment.

Since the sole criterion for placement on ISP in Massachusetts is the offender's score on the risk-classification form (the score must be 10 or less), this was also the sole criterion for inclusion in the study's comparison groups. The total population of ISP offenders sentenced in the courts that implemented the program was identified, and a separate sample of ISP-eligible offenders who were placed on probation in the same courts in the same months of the previous year was selected. In addition to the pretest/posttest comparisons, the evaluators also identified the total population of ISP-eligible offenders in 13 other courts that did not implement ISP during the same time period. These courts were comparable in terms of level, location, and size. Cases from these non-ISP courts serve as the control or comparison cases in the evaluation.

The final evaluation sample included both the 834 high-risk, ISP-eligible offenders described above and a random sample (35 percent, N = 2,534) of all other offenders placed on probation during the pretest/posttest period in the experimental and control courts. A few significant differences were found between the ISP and control cases, and these differences were statistically controlled for in the analyses.

Byrne and Kelly (1989) comprehensively measured program implementation and concluded:

> The ISP model was not fully implemented as designed. Specifically, only 27.2 percent of the ISP offenders were supervised in a manner which reflected a high degree of compliance with the original program model (Byrne and Kelly, 1989:208).

No overall differences were found in either offender adjustment or offender recidivism. The recidivism rate for both ISP and control cases was approximately 60 percent when "any rearraignment" during the one-year follow-up was used as the criterion and about 35 percent when "any felony rearraignment" was used. However, there were significant improvements in both areas as the degree of program implementation increased; in both the experimental and control groups, recidivism was found to decrease significantly across a range of alternative outcome measures.

The evaluators further concluded that in the courts where the ISP program was implemented, the level of supervision of high-risk offenders had an indirect effect on subsequent recidivism, through its effect on offender change, an intervening variable. Offender change was measured in terms of substance abuse, employment, and marital/family relationships. Offenders who showed initial improvement

in employment and substance abuse were found to be much less likely to recidivate than those whose status did not change or degenerated.

A time-to-failure analysis showed that high-risk offenders supervised on ISP were less likely to fail in the first month of supervision than similar offenders on routine probation, regardless of outcome measure. However, the cumulative proportion of offenders surviving until the end of each of the remaining months was quite similar. This suggests that intensive supervision may initially have a specific deterrent effect, but this effect disappears by the end of the offender's second month of supervision (Byrne and Kelly, 1989:273). Across all offenders who were arraigned, the median time to first arraignment was about nine months.

## STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE PRESENT EVALUATION

The most serious deficiency in previous ISP evaluations has been the inability to identify a truly matched comparison group. The selection procedures used to identify appropriate clients for ISP often ensure that no comparable cases can be found in the regular system, particularly if the ISP program is designed to accept all suitable offenders. This is true whether the ISP program targets high-risk probationers, leaving less-serious probationers "untreated" (as in Massachusetts), or low-risk prisoners who are distinctly different from the higher-risk prisoners left behind (as in New Jersey); or whether the assignment procedures allow for such judicial discretion that the ISP participants resemble neither the routine probationers nor the prisoners (as in Georgia).

The California experiment addressed this shortcoming and improved upon the evaluations discussed above by:

- Randomly assigning offenders to ISP or to routine probation, thus creating subgroups that are similar prior to treatment.
- Making sure that each individual is tracked for the same amount of time—one year—following assignment to the ISP or control program. This assures that each offender was exposed to the "treatment" for the same time period.
- Measuring the actual services received by both the ISP and control offenders. This is necessary to assess whether ISP was effectively implemented and to determine whether ISP services were significantly different from routine probation.

- Collecting information on the offender's "status" during the follow-up period—specifically, the number of days the ISP and routine probationers were on regular probation, on ISP, in jail, and in prison. These data are critical for estimating the true costs of the program, as well as for calculating actual contact rates (e.g., the number of contacts per month).

While the evaluation reported here represents a significant advance over previous efforts, it still contains some limitations, the most important of which are described below.

**Reliance on Official Record Data.** All data on participating offenders, including the contacts delivered and the extent of recidivism, come from official criminal-justice records. Therefore, the data have all the shortcomings inherent in officially recorded data.

The accuracy and thoroughness of the records on contact levels are likely to differ among the programs (and among individual officers). The ISP program officers, knowing they were participating in an innovative project and were the subjects of an outside evaluation, may have provided fuller documentation than officers responsible for the control cases. If the evaluation shows, for example, that ISP participants had more contacts, it may be that ISP officers were not actually making more contacts, but simply writing down more of what they did.

It is particularly difficult to estimate recidivism, because official records inevitably underestimate the true amount of crime committed, since they contain information only on crimes that result in arrest. One method of estimating actual crimes committed is to personally interview offenders, asking them to report how many crimes they actually committed (including those for which they were not arrested). However, personal interviews are expensive to conduct, and the veracity of the information obtained from criminals is always questionable.[11]

**Inability to Distinguish Quality from Quantity of Supervision.** We collected data on the quantity of contacts and services received by each offender during the study period. No attempt was made to collect information on the quality of those contacts, e.g., the length of time contacts lasted, the subject matter discussed, and the usefulness of the contacts from the offender's perspective.

[11]For a more complete discussion of the validity of offenders' self-reports, see Petersilia (1978) and Chaiken and Chaiken (1982).

**Inability to Disentangle Offender Behavior from Enforcement Activities.** One of the key questions asked by policymakers is, Does ISP reduce the actual number of crimes an offender will commit? This evaluation cannot provide the answer, but it does show whether ISP reduces an offender's criminal behavior as measured by arrests, convictions, and incarcerations. Many policymakers fail to understand the importance of this distinction. The major outcome measure in this study (as in most corrections evaluations) is *officially recorded recidivism.* Recidivism is actually a product of the offender's underlying criminality and law enforcement's ability to detect that criminality and arrest for it (i.e., arrest probability).

ISP offenders may be committing less crime, but ISP surveillance may have also altered the probability that the crimes they commit will be detected by authorities, thereby increasing arrest probabilities. If this is the case, the ISP offender's recidivism rate may be identical to (or even higher than) that of the non-ISP offender, who is committing more crimes but has a lower arrest probability.

The following formulas illustrate this point:

*Intensive Supervision Probation (ISP)*

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Moderate criminality | x | Good law enforcement detection | = | Moderate crime observed |
| 4 crimes committed/year | x | 0.50 arrest probability | = | 2 arrests in one-year follow-up |

*Routine Probation*

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| High criminality | x | Poor law enforcement detection | = | Moderate crime observed |
| 10 crimes committed/year | x | 0.20 arrest probability | = | 2 arrests in one-year follow-up |

Thus, on the basis of the study findings, observers might conclude that ISP had no effect on offenders' criminality. But it is important to remember that lower criminality combined with a higher arrest probability can yield the same outcome as higher criminality combined with a low arrest probability.

**Inability to Assess Particular Program Components.** This evaluation measures the effectiveness of the ISP program package as

delivered in the experimental sites. It was generally not possible to reach conclusions about the effectiveness of any particular component within the overall ISP program (e.g., urinalysis testing). An exception, however, is the effectiveness of electronic monitoring (EM) in Los Angeles. It was possible to comparatively evaluate three program conditions: ISP with EM, ISP without EM, and routine probation.

**One-Year Follow-Up Period.** This evaluation focuses on one-year program outcomes, although a longer follow-up would have been preferable. Previous research suggests that recidivism continues to increase for about two years, at which time offenders have either resumed their criminal careers or have "retired" (Petersilia et al. 1985; Klein and Caggiano, 1986; Illinois Criminal Justice Authority, 1986; Hoffman and Stone-Meierhoefer, 1979). However, because the BJA and the participating sites were anxious to receive early feedback, a shorter time frame was adopted.

# 3. CALIFORNIA'S ISP AND ROUTINE PROBATION PROGRAMS

Probation in California is primarily a county responsibility; the state is responsible only for such functions as setting standards and arranging for training courses. In 38 other states (including Georgia, New Jersey, and Massachusetts), probation is the responsibility of a state-level agency. Collectively, the 59 California probation departments now supervise about 255,000 adults, in caseloads ranging from 100 to 400 per officer.[1]

When the BJA issued its request for proposals in 1986, Los Angeles, Contra Costa, and Ventura counties each proposed a probation-enhancement ISP targeting high-risk offenders—that is, offenders whose characteristics, including the length and diversity of their criminal records, indicate that they have a high probability of some future, serious law violation. An offender's risk-of-recidivism category is usually established through the use of a statistical assessment instrument. Thus, when these sites designed their ISP programs, they indicated that they intended to tap the high end of a spectrum of offenders arrayed according to probability of a new, serious offense.

Once the grants were awarded, the sites made a number of policy decisions, each of which shaped the program to which it applied. The decisions addressed the following questions:

- Which offenders would constitute the target group?
- Who (if anyone) would be eliminated from participating (e.g., by crime type, prior record, drug/alcohol use, location of residence)?
- What components of the general ISP model would be incorporated in local programs (e.g., random urine testing, curfews, electronic monitoring, community service, supervision fees, victim restitution, number of contacts)?
- How long would the various phases of ISP supervision last, and how would people be moved on and off the ISP caseload?

[1]The three counties examined in this study supervise about half of all the probationers in the state (42 percent of the state's probationers are in Los Angeles County).

- How would various types of infractions be handled, and at what point would offenders be revoked and sentenced to incarceration?

Of course, project officials made many other operational decisions, but the above issues largely dictated each program's nature.[2]

All three programs chose to identify eligible offenders by use of the NIC risk-needs instrument, an objective scoring system that categorizes offenders by level of recidivism risk and need for services.[3] This instrument was already being used in their departments to assign probationers to supervision levels. Male and female adult probationers who were rated "high risk" (i.e., those who scored a total of more than 11 points on the scale) were initially targeted for more intensive supervision.

Los Angeles and Ventura counties also allowed offenders to become eligible for ISP if the supervisor indicated a "serious offense override." This discretion was allowed so that offenders having serious current conviction crimes (e.g., homicide, rape, assault) could become eligible, even if they had no prior criminal record.

Contra Costa County further limited its pool of eligibles to offenders convicted of drug crimes or drug-related felonies who were sentenced to probation for at least one year. Los Angeles and Contra Costa eliminated offenders with any sex-offense history.

The ISP programs emphasized different techniques for monitoring compliance with probation conditions. Los Angeles implemented two ISP programs, one of which utilized an electronic-monitoring system. Contra Costa relied heavily on unannounced urinalysis testing, whereas Ventura coordinated extensively with law enforcement in making unannounced home visits.

All of the projects called for reduced caseloads and supervision phases under which "successful" offenders were gradually transferred

[2]Experience has shown that innovations generally are more likely to succeed if agencies adapt them to the local context rather than trying to make the agency fit the innovation (Ellickson and Petersilia, 1983). Except for the general guidelines noted in Section 1, the BJA encouraged individual agencies to tailor the specifics of their programs to their local clienteles' needs and risks, the agencies' financial resources, and internal and external political contexts.

[3]Recidivism risk is predicted on the basis of employment history, attitude, mobility, drug and alcohol usage, and prior incarceration and conviction history. Need for services is determined by considering the offender's academic and vocational skills, emotional stability, drug and alcohol use, and marital and family relationships. For a complete review of statistical prediction instruments, see Clear (1988).

to routine probation supervision. The major features of the ISP and control programs for each county are described below.

## THE CONTRA COSTA COUNTY PROBATION PROGRAMS

Contra Costa County is located about 30 miles northeast of San Francisco. It has a population of about 725,000 and is economically and racially diverse. One area in particular, North Richmond, has been identified as having serious drug-trafficking problems and a high crime rate.

The Contra Costa Probation Department developed its ISP program in response to the significant drug problem in the Richmond area. The program was linked to "Operation Clean Streets," an existing coordinated effort of law enforcement, the district attorney, and the probation department to curb drug-trafficking and drug-related crimes.

The goals of Contra Costa's ISP program (Webbe and Murakawa, 1987) were:

- To reduce probationer recidivism.
- To reduce drug trafficking, drug abuse, and drug-connected offenses in the project area.
- To increase the employment of ISP participants.
- To increase the amount of restitution paid by ISP participants.
- To quickly revoke the program status of ISP participants who violate their probation conditions.

Contra Costa's target population is male and female probationers convicted of felony and misdemeanor drug dealing, drug use, and nonviolent drug-related offenses. Eligible offenders must have at least one year of probation to serve at the time of screening and must be residents of the West County area. Selection of eligible participants is made by the ISP Unit Supervisor, usually while the probationer is serving part of his or her probation term in a local jail. (Split sentences, combining jail and probation, are common in California.)

Program participants are supervised in caseloads of about 40. All ISP probationers are placed into a one-year, three-phase program, structured as follows:

*Phase 1:* a minimum of four face-to-face contacts per month, two telephone contacts per week, four drug tests per month, employment verification, and job and counseling referrals if necessary.

*Phase 2:* a minimum of four face-to-face contacts per month, four telephone contacts per month, two drug tests per month or continued use of a telephone call-in system, surveillance checks, employment verification, and referral for treatment and counseling as necessary.

*Phase 3:* one face-to-face contact per month, two monitoring checks, and drug testing and employment verification as deemed appropriate.

After completing phase 3, offenders are placed on regular probation or minimal (summary) probation, or they are terminated from supervision, depending on the probation officer's recommendation to the court.

Contra Costa uses a telephone drug-testing system known as the Drug Testing Hotline. Offenders are given numbers and are required to call the hotline six days a week to listen for their number on a prerecorded message. If an offender hears his or her number, he or she must report for urinalysis drug testing by the end of the following day. The ISP staff place numbers on the hotline message based on their perceptions of offenders' possible drug use and ISP program requirements.

Offenders assigned to routine probation are on caseloads of 150 to 300 per officer, are obviously seen much less frequently than those on ISP, have infrequent urine testing for drugs, are not subject to the Drug Testing Hotline, and have less stringent counseling and employment conditions.

## THE VENTURA COUNTY PROBATION PROGRAMS

Ventura County borders on the Pacific Ocean and has a population of about 600,000. Its boundaries are contiguous with those of Los Angeles, Santa Barbara, and Kern counties.

Ventura's present ISP program was developed from its existing Community Resource Management Team (CRMT) program, an intensive supervision program for adult offenders that has been in operation since the late 1970s. The CRMT program focuses on identifying offender needs and making referrals to local services that seem likely to be able to meet those needs. The CRMT caseloads are small, and a team approach is used. Ventura's ISP program is similar to the

CRMT program, but it incorporates more intensive surveillance and victim-sensitivity sessions (described below).

The stated goals for Ventura's ISP program (Ventura County Community Corrections Agency, 1986) were:

- To reduce the probationer's opportunity to commit crimes, and to quickly detect new crimes.
- To hold offenders more accountable by requiring victim restitution, community service, and, if appropriate, participation in victim-sensitivity sessions.
- To support offender resocialization, particularly as it relates to criminal behavior.
- To improve the credibility of probation as a sentence.

Ventura's program targets male and female probationers who have been convicted of felonies and who either (1) are classified as high risk on a local risk/needs instrument or (2) have been convicted of a particularly serious crime. Participants are drawn from the entire county.

The ISP team's senior deputy probation officer screens clients and determines eligibility. The screening is done after sentencing, usually while the offender is completing his or her jail sentence and has less than two months left to serve in custody.

Caseloads for the ISP program average 19 per officer. Support services, such as job training, remedial education, sex-offender treatment programs, and parenting skills classes are strongly emphasized, and a drug-testing system similar to Contra Costa's Hotline is used.

The Ventura County ISP officials work closely with county law enforcement. Local police are told which probationers are on ISP and what their court-ordered conditions are, and they are asked to notify the probation staff if they become aware of probation violations. The program also provides a victim-oriented educational program, the goal of which is to make offenders more sensitive to victims and to the damage caused by criminal acts. Victim-sensitivity workshops are coordinated by the supervising deputy probation officer through the Victim/Witness Unit of the District Attorney's Office.

Each offender is expected to spend a minimum of nine months in the ISP program, progressing through the following phases:

*Phase 1:* four face-to-face contacts per week (two in the office and two in the field), two telephone contacts per week, two to three monitoring checks per week, and one drug test per week.

*Phase 2:* two face-to-face contacts per week (one in the office and one in the field), one telephone contact per week, two to three monitoring checks per week, and one drug test every two weeks.

*Phase 3:* one face-to-face contact per week (either in the office or in the field), two to three monitoring checks per week, and discretionary drug testing.

After completing phase 3, participants are placed on regular probation, the average term being nearly five years for these offenders.

The control program for Ventura County is the CRMT, which supervises about 15 percent of the county's adult probationers in caseloads of 50 offenders per officer. The CRMT clients have a minimum of two face-to-face contacts and one phone contact per month.

## THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY PROBATION PROGRAMS

Los Angeles County has a population of over 8 million and is the largest county in California. The L.A. County Probation Department developed two ISP programs, one that incorporates electronic monitoring and one that relies on human surveillance.[4]

The stated goals of Los Angeles' ISP and ISP-with-electronic-monitoring (hereafter referred to as ESP) programs were:

- To establish effective supervision and control of high-risk probationers.
- To reduce recidivism through programs for offender resocialization.
- To enforce victim restitution conditions ordered by the court.
- To maximize surveillance of probationers by coordinating efforts with other criminal-justice agencies and community resources.
- To return all probation violators to court expeditiously for appropriate disposition.

The target population for the Los Angeles County program consists of male and female offenders convicted of felonies who are sentenced to probation and who are classified "high risk" on the NIC risk-needs instrument. However, the program includes an override clause:

[4]Los Angeles County leases its electronic monitoring equipment from Trax Monitoring, a private vendor located in Las Vegas, which in turn leases its equipment from BI Home Escort Systems. Trax monitors the ESP clients outside of normal probation working hours.

> When the risk score does not compute as maximum on the risk scale, other factors may be utilized to identify a case for ISP, such as severity of present offense, juvenile history, frequency of prior arrests, DMV record, and risk to victims (Los Angeles County Probation Department, 1988).

The ISP clients come from several courts in the Los Angeles area, but most are from Central Court, which disposes of about 60 percent of all cases in the county. Eligibility for ISP is determined after the offender is sentenced; most felony probation sentences require that the offender serve some jail time, so offenders are usually screened for ISP while in jail. Cases are screened by Probation Department investigators who determine which Probation Department area office would serve the offender best. If a case fits the criteria outlined above, the investigators notify the Deputy Probation Officer in charge of screening cases for the ISP/ESP units. The ISP and ESP programs are identical, except for the electronic monitoring.

The ESP clients are placed on continuously signaling (active) electronic monitoring for a minimum of 90 days. A curfew schedule is set up, and a transmitter is placed on the offender's ankle. A receiving device, placed in the probationer's home, emits a signal every two minutes to confirm that the offender is within a 150-foot radius of the homing device. If the offender is not within acceptable distance of the receiver at prearranged times, the ESP team is notified and immediately goes to the offender's home or calls him or her.

Caseloads for both the ESP and ISP programs average 33 per probation officer. Offenders are expected to spend an average of one year in the program, progressing through the following three phases:

*Phase 1:* three to five face-to-face contacts and two telephone contacts per week; ESP clients are placed on home restriction with constant electronic monitoring (90 days minimum).

*Phase 2:* two to three face-to-face contacts and two telephone contacts per week; ESP clients are placed on home restrictions with no electronic monitoring.

*Phase 3:* one to two face-to-face contacts and one telephone contact per month; ESP clients are placed on home restrictions with no electronic monitoring.

Offenders proceed to routine probation following the one-year ISP or ESP program.

High-risk offenders on routine probation in Los Angeles County are usually assigned to caseloads of about 250 per officer (unless they are

part of the Narcotic Testing Program, in which caseloads average 150). Routine probationers have a minimum supervision requirement of one direct contact per month, with telephone or collateral contacts as needed.

The key components of the three California ISP and routine probation programs are summarized in Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3.

**Table 3.1**

**CHARACTERISTICS OF ISP AND ROUTINE PROBATION PROGRAMS: CONTRA COSTA COUNTY**

| Characteristic | ISP | Routine Probation |
|---|---|---|
| Target population | Adult drug offenders | Same |
| Selection criteria | Felony misdemeanor, drug conviction, or drug-related conviction | Same |
| Months in ISP program | 12 | |
| Contact levels | 1. 1 face-to-face/week<br>2 phone/week<br>1 drug test/week<br>1 monitoring/week<br>2. 1 face-to-face/week<br>1 phone/week<br>1 drug test/2 weeks<br>1 monitoring/week<br>3. 1 direct/month<br>drug/discretionary<br>2 monitoring/month | Officers' discretion (contact standards by classification level, but difficult to enforce because of large volume of cases) |
| Caseload size | 40:1 | 150–200:1 |
| Additional emphasis: | | |
| Elec. monitoring | | |
| Employment | x | |
| Counseling/referrals | x | |
| Random drug tests | x | |
| Probation fees | | |
| Victim restitution/ other | | |
| Community service | | |
| Police notification | x | |
| Job training/ remedial education | | |

Table 3.2

CHARACTERISTICS OF ISP AND ROUTINE PROBATION PROGRAMS: VENTURA COUNTY

| Characteristic | ISP | CRMT |
|---|---|---|
| Target population | Adults convicted of felonies | Same |
| Selection criteria | High-risk score (11+) on NIC scale, or serious offense override, or probation revocation for felony plus high-risk score | Same |
| Months in ISP program | 9 months minimum | |
| Contact levels | 1. 4 face-to-face/week<br>2 phone/week<br>1 drug test/week<br>2.5 monitoring/week<br>2. 2 face-to-face/week<br>1 phone/week<br>1 drug test/2 weeks<br>2.5 monitoring/week<br>3. 1 face-to-face/week<br>drug/discretionary<br>2.5 monitoring/week | No levels; all clients have 1 face-to-face/2 weeks and 1 phone/month |
| Caseload size | 19:1 | 50:1 |
| Additional emphasis: | | |
| Elec. monitoring | | |
| Employment | x | x |
| Counseling/referrals | x | x |
| Random drug tests | x | x |
| Probation fees | | |
| Victim restitution/ other | x | |
| Community service | | |
| Police notification | x | |
| Job training/ remedial education | x | x |

Table 3.3

CHARACTERISTICS OF ISP AND ROUTINE PROBATION PROGRAMS: LOS ANGELES COUNTY

| Characteristic | ISP/ESP | Routine Probation |
|---|---|---|
| Target population | Adults convicted of felonies | Same |
| Selection criteria | High-risk score (11+) on NIC scale, or serious offense override, or probation revocation for felony plus high-risk score | Same |
| Months in ISP program | 12 | |
| Contact levels | 1. 3–5 face-to-face/week<br>2 phone/week<br>90 days (min.) EM<br>2. 2–3 face-to-face/week<br>2 phone/week<br>3. 1–2 face-to-face/week<br>1 phone/month | 1 nonspecific/month |
| Caseload size | 33:1 | 150–250:1 |
| Additional emphasis: | | |
| Elec. monitoring | x (ESP only) | |
| Employment | | |
| Counseling/referrals | | |
| Random drug tests | | |
| Probation fees | | |
| Victim restitution/ other | | |
| Community service | | |
| Police notification | | |
| Job training/ remedial education | | |

# 4. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CALIFORNIA ISP EVALUATION

Although the individual California ISP projects differed, the evaluation design was the same for all sites. Each site was required to (1) assign cases randomly to the ISP (experimental) program or the routine probation (control) program and (2) collect the data required for the evaluation and forward them to RAND for analysis. All senior ISP staff were also required to attend two week-long training sessions, at which the research design and data collection forms were explained. Follow-up site visits and training sessions were held as the need arose. The visits usually involved training new staff on the randomization procedures and data collection forms.

This section describes the randomization process, the sample size, the protection of human subjects, the data collection instruments, and the method used to obtain program costs.

## RANDOM ASSIGNMENT OF ELIGIBLE PROBATIONERS

As noted in Section 3, each site developed its own ISP eligibility criteria, and each was responsible for determining whether sentenced probationers met those criteria. The probation staff was directed (usually through a memorandum from the Chief Probation Officer) to screen all probationers to determine which ones met the agreed-upon and published screening criteria. All cases that met those criteria were to be randomly assigned by RAND project staff. The resources available for this evaluation did not permit us to monitor this process closely, particularly in Los Angeles, where it was virtually impossible (and certainly not feasible) to screen all 60,000 adult probationers to see who met the ISP eligibility criteria. Thus, we relied on the field staff to refer persons on their caseloads who appeared qualified. This referral process was probably incomplete, and as a result, those who were referred constituted some subset of the true population. We do not know how representative the members of that subset were, and if they were unrepresentative, we do not know in what respects.[1] Once

[1]A related problem pertains to the discretion Los Angeles and Ventura permitted in determining who was eligible. A few of the offenders were referred to the ISP program as a result of a "serious offense override," meaning their current offense was particularly serious although they did not score high risk on the NIC risk-needs

an offender was determined eligible for inclusion, random assignment was implemented as follows:

1. Site officials provided the research staff with lists of eligible offenders, including their names, local identification numbers, dates referred to the local site, and conviction offenses. This information was recorded on a master list for each site.
2. Offenders were assigned to either the ISP program or the control program, according to a predetermined random assignment list. Eligible offenders were given the first available assignment. The site maintained total control over offender eligibility, leaving control over actual placement to a neutral third party.[2]
3. The sites implemented the random assignment; the experimental cases proceeded to the ISP (in Los Angeles, the ISP or ESP), and the controls went to routine probation (in Ventura, to the CRMT unit).
4. The sites were instructed to collect and forward the background assessment form for each offender as soon as possible.

In most cases, initial screening was done while the offender was in custody serving the jail portion of a split sentence (i.e., jail followed by probation). In California, offenders like those who participated in this study are typically sentenced to six months in jail, followed by three to five years' probation. At all sites, most offenders were screened when they had one or two months left to serve in jail prior to being released to probation.

Because random assignment was a critical departure for these agencies, we anticipated resistance. That anticipation was reinforced by anecdotal evidence from colleagues and from reports of experiments in other fields. However, all of the sites cooperated and appeared to faithfully follow the procedures. Two factors seem to have accounted for this: (1) a neutral party, rather than agency staff, made the random assignments, and (2) site personnel were convinced that

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instrument. Again, this procedure limits our ability to know what population this subgroup of offenders represents.

[2]Site personnel were told that deviations from the random assignment were allowed only in emergencies, e.g., when an influential judge demanded that an offender be placed on ISP. These "direct judicial commits" were discouraged, but when they occurred, sites were asked to provide the names of the offenders. Across the three sites, fewer than ten cases were directly committed to ISP caseloads. These cases were deleted from the final evaluation sample.

random assignment would provide them credible information about ISP effectiveness.

Practitioners often resist random assignment because they believe they know intuitively, and from experience, the appropriate treatment for a particular client. They believe that denying that treatment to a client, when it is available and legally appropriate, is irresponsible. One early experiment, the Lankashire Milk Experiment, quickly fell into disrepute because teachers overrode random assignment so that more of the "needy" children could get milk (Fisher and Bartlett, 1931). Several criminal-justice experiments have failed because of such manipulations and because of practitioners' unwillingness to abide by the assignments researchers provided (Kelling et al., 1974; Kobrin and Klein, 1983).

Consequently, it has been recommended that agencies should not be responsible for the random assignment in experiments (Dennis, 1988), but that researchers or neutral third parties should do it. This experiment followed that advice, and it seemed to work well. Nearly all of the offenders were past probation failures, and practitioners admitted that they did not know what kind of program might have been more appropriate or effective. Thus, there was little concern that random assignment was irresponsible, and this may have made it easier to gain the approval of random assignment and to implement it successfully.

Probation staff and administrators were also informed about the importance of random assignment for answering questions about "what works." Having experienced budget cuts and a loss of public confidence in their ability to rehabilitate offenders, most probation staff were eager to discover the effects of ISP. If ISP programs proved beneficial, agencies wanted to be able to document their successes so that future funding would be assured.

The agencies clearly understood that not having adequate data to support their programs had hurt them in the past. Once the agency officials believed that the random assignment would help produce better evaluation data on program effectiveness, they seemed willing to cooperate. In fact, Ventura and Contra Costa counties continued assigning cases randomly even after the number of cases needed for the evaluation had been assigned.

The most cynical explanation for the agencies' cooperation is that random assignment was the string tied to the federal funding. This

situation probably weeded out agencies that would have been more resistant.[3]

## SAMPLE SIZES AND STATISTICAL POWER

The goal for each site was to assign 75 experimental and 75 control cases (in Los Angeles, the goal was 75 each to ISP, ESP, and routine probation). This number was chosen because it was the maximum the ISP staff believed they could adequately supervise (using the proposed contact levels) over the course of the project and the minimum that could provide reasonable estimates of the effects of ISP supervision.

Each site relied on cases as they came through the court systems (i.e., offenders who were convicted of certain crimes and sentenced to probation). The sites were therefore limited in terms of both the overall number of offenders who became eligible and the timing of the offenders' entry into the experiment.

At the initial training session, site personnel were encouraged to choose criteria that would identify high-risk probationers while not limiting the eligibility pool so severely that too few offenders would qualify during the study period.

A major concern with field experiments is statistical power, i.e., the probability of reaching the correct conclusion when the treatment produces an effect (Medler et al., 1981:836). The power of a statistical test depends upon three parameters: the significance criterion (Type I error),[4] the reliability of the sample results, and the "effect size," or the degree to which the phenomenon exists (Cohen, 1977:4). Sample size is relevant to the second criterion. Other things being equal, the larger the sample, the greater the reliability of the results. The greater the reliability of the results, other things being equal, the more powerful the test.

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[3]For a more complete discussion of the issues and problems involved in managing this field experiment, see Petersilia (1989).

[4]Concluding that the treatment is effective when in reality it is not is referred to as Type I error. The accepted standard for Type I errors is to keep the probability of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis to 5 percent. Thus, the common significance criteria of $\alpha = 0.05$ is employed in statistical inference. If the research fails to reject the null hypothesis when in fact the phenomenon is present, a Type II error is said to occur.

It was necessary to determine how large a sample would be required to detect the size of the expected effects in this study. Typically, studies of correctional interventions do not reveal large differences between the outcomes of experimental and control groups. If reductions in outcomes are found, they are generally around 20 to 25 percent (see Gendreau and Ross, 1987).

This expected effect size translates into a "moderate effect," as defined by Cohen (1977),[5] who has provided tables to assist researchers in estimating the sample size needed to obtain expected effect sizes with a high degree of confidence.[6] According to the tables of power calculations for different sample sizes (1977), a group of approximately 75 offenders and an alpha of 0.05 (two-tailed) provide sufficient power to detect a moderate-size effect within a site. According to Cohen's Tables 2.3.5 and 6.3.5, the power to detect a small difference between the two groups (5 to 10 percent differences between ISP and routine probation) would not be achieved until each group contained almost 400 offenders.

If we assume that the usual failure rate for this type of sample is 70 percent and the alternative program might have a failure rate of only 45 percent, this translates into an effect size of 0.5, or a moderate effect. With sample sizes of 75 per group, the power to detect this moderate effect is a respectable 0.87.

Given these combined concerns, each site was instructed to assign 75 offenders to each study program (a total of 150 persons in Contra Costa and Ventura counties, and 225 persons in Los Angeles County). Contra Costa and Ventura began assigning cases in February 1987, and by January 1988, both sites had met their goals, with 170 offenders assigned in Contra Costa and 166 in Ventura.[7] Los Angeles did not assign its first case until August 1987, because of difficulties encountered in setting up the electronic-monitoring equipment. The 152 cases assigned in Los Angeles County by April 1988 were included in the evaluation. Figure 4.1 shows each site's assignment

[5]According to Cohen, a small effect size means that the difference between groups is between 5 and 10 percent; a moderate effect means that the groups differ by about 20 to 25 percent; a large effect translates into raw differences of from 35 to 39 percent. These power calculations do not assume the introduction of covariates.

[6]Different tests are used to compute statistical power and necessary sample sizes, depending on whether one is measuring differences in means or differences in proportions. These tests are fully explained in Kraemer and Thiemann (1987).

[7]Ventura continued to refer cases until March 1988, resulting in 199 assigned offenders. This analysis focuses on the first 166 cases, for whom one-year follow-up data were available at the time of the evaluation.




Fig. 4.1—Time frame for offender assignment and follow-up

period and follow-up period. Data collection began when the first case was assigned and ended one year after the last case was assigned.

It is important to note that the one-year follow-up period is defined individually for each study participant, beginning on the day of assignment to ISP or the control program.

## DATA COLLECTION

The three primary data sources for this evaluation were:

- Official record data collected at the individual level.
- Contextual information regarding program implementation.
- Criminal-justice cost data for each site.

### Official Record Data for Individual Offenders

Staff were required to complete three data collection forms for each offender; each form took about one hour to complete. The data collection forms are reproduced in Appendix A.

The first form, the Background Assessment, was completed shortly after program assignment. It includes prior record information, demographics, and current offense information. Coders relied heavily on the offender's presentence investigation report for this information.

The Six-Month Review form was completed six months after program assignment, and the Twelve-Month Review form, covering the period from the seventh to the twelfth month after program assignment, was completed one year after assignment. The review forms document the nature and type of services received during the program, as well as each individual's social adjustment and recidivism. Information for the forms was taken primarily from the chronological notes maintained in the probation officer's folder.[8] As these forms were completed on-site, they were mailed to RAND, edited, and entered into a database to create an analysis file.

[8]Initially, officers were instructed to complete a reassessment for each offender at six and twelve months after assignment, using the NIC risk-needs instrument. This plan was abandoned about six months into the project when it was deemed to be too time-consuming; in addition, the staff considered the information such reassessments provided to be unreliable.

The major items collected in the various forms are listed in Table 4.1. Details of the coding of each variable are shown on the forms in Appendix A.

Because the BJA had limited resources to spend on the demonstration, it was decided at the outset that personnel at the sites would have to collect the individual-level data themselves. Each site was required to set aside 5 to 10 percent of its grant funds to pay for this activity.[9]

This arrangement was not ideal, from a research standpoint. Because the data collectors did not work directly for the investigators, the conditions could not be controlled rigorously. Validity checks were conducted at each of the sites, but the evaluation had to rely primarily on the data provided.[10]

### Status (Street-Time) Calendar

Prior ISP research was severely deficient in that it failed to track the time offenders were actually "on the streets" rather than in custody during the follow-up period. To compute valid monthly contact rates, it is necessary to know the number of months the offender was actually on ISP, and to accurately measure program costs, it is necessary to know the number of days of each type of sanction (e.g., ISP, jail) the offender underwent during the follow-up period.

To record time-at-risk information, a "status calendar" was completed at the end of six months and at the end of one year. The calendar included the dates the probationer was placed on and removed from ISP, ESP, or routine probation, as well as the dates of entry into and release from jail or prison. The calendars were filled out by the site coders, using information from the offenders' probation files.

[9]In Los Angeles, college students collected the data. Ventura hired a former probation officer for this job. In Contra Costa, an office secretary collected background information, and a former probation officer was later hired to collect the six-month to one-year follow-up data.

[10]On several occasions, RAND staff selected small samples of cases from each site to recode for consistency. For most cases and items, there was a high degree of consistency between the two coders. The only exception was the recording of the total number of prior arrests and convictions, where the coded numbers sometimes differed by one or two. However, since the exact numbers of prior arrests and convictions were not used in any of the analyses, this inconsistency is not particularly troublesome. Also, each completed form was subject to a number of editing checks to identify coding inconsistencies (e.g., if the coded form indicated that the offender was arrested while in jail). Coders were instructed to consult the original data to resolve any inconsistencies.

**Table 4.1**

**DATA COLLECTED ON INDIVIDUAL OFFENDERS**

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***Section 1: Background Assessment Form***

- Demographics
  - Date of birth
  - Race
  - Sex
  - Education
  - Marital status
  - Number of dependents
  - Living arrangements at time of arrest
- Offender status after assignment
  - Offender location (probation, jail, prison, parole, other)
  - Primary probation supervision level
  - Date sentenced to probation
- Prior criminal record
  - Number of prior arrests (including juvenile citations)
  - Date of first arrest or official juvenile citation
  - Date of first conviction/adjudication
  - Number of prior convictions for misdemeanor, felony, felony crimes against the person, felony property crimes, drug crimes
  - Number of prior sentences to probation, jail, state/federal prison
  - Number of prior probation, parole revocations
- Current offense information
  - Status at time of arrest
  - Date of current arrest and conviction
  - Conviction offense(s)
  - Primary court docket number
  - Type and length of current sentence imposed
  - Probation conditions court-ordered
- Risk-needs assessment
  - Number of address changes in last 12 months
  - Percent time employed/in school/in training in last 12 months
  - Offender's attitude

**Table 4.1 (continued)**

- Academic/vocational training needs
- Need for employment assistance
- Need for financial management assistance
- Alcohol-treatment needs
- Other drug-treatment needs
- Marital/family counseling needs
- Need for health counseling or assistance
- Health status
- Type of companions

Offender's emotional stability

Sexual behavior (normal or dysfunctional)

***Sections II and III: Six-Month and Twelve-Month Review***

Current status of offender (i.e., prison, ISP, terminated)

Record of each arrest and technical violation, its disposition, and sentence/sanction

Services received (for each month during follow-up)

- Number and type of face-to-face contacts
- Number and type of phone and collateral contacts
- Number and type of monitoring and record checks performed
- Community service hours performed
- Days on electronic monitoring (if applicable)
- Type of electronic monitoring (if applicable)
- Number of contacts between client and community sponsor (if applicable)
- Number and type of sessions in counseling
- Number of days in training, type of training
- Number of days in paid employment and earnings
- Number of drug tests taken
- Number of alcohol tests taken
- Amount of restitution paid
- Amount of fines and court costs paid
- Amount of probation fees paid

## Contextual Information

We also collected information on the environment in which the ISP was implemented. Each site provided all its memoranda, policy manuals, and quarterly progress reports, as well as notes from key ISP staff meetings. In addition, the research staff visited each site to observe the program and discuss implementation issues. These materials were used to identify the factors that seemed to enhance or impede the successful implementation of ISPs. The most important conditions for implementation success were:[11]

1. The project had to address a pressing local problem.
2. The project had to have clearly articulated goals that reflected the needs and desires of the community.
3. The project had to have a receptive environment in both the "parent" organization and the larger system.
4. The organization had to have a leader who was vitally committed to the objectives, values, and implications of the project and who could devise practical strategies to motivate and effect change.
5. The project had to have a director who shared the leader's ideas and values and used them to guide the implementation process and operation of the project.
6. Practitioners had to make the project their own, rather than being coerced into it—they had to participate in its development and have incentives to maintain its integrity during the change process.
7. The project had to have clear lines of authority and no ambiguity about "who is in charge."
8. The change and its implementation could not be complex or sweeping.
9. The organization had to have secure administrators, low staff turnover, and plentiful resources.

These conditions, however, were not equally important to the implementation process:

> Having a supportive internal and external environment was necessary for the survival of an ISP, whereas the other conditions

[11]These conditions were based on information from all of the ISP-BJA demonstration sites, not just the three California programs. For a complete discussion, see Petersilia (1990).

were relevant only if that essential condition was met. Unless a community recognizes or accepts the premise that a change in corrections is needed, is affordable, and does not conflict with its sentiments regarding just punishment, an ISP project has little hope of surviving, much less succeeding (Petersilia, 1990:144).

## Cost Data

As noted above, a primary motivation for the renewed interest in ISP is the need to save money. The cost figures shown in Table 4.2, based on a national survey of probation departments, have fueled the popular notion that ISP is highly cost-effective when compared with jail and prison. However, money is saved only if the offender placed on ISP was really prison-bound. California's ISP participants were not; they were selected from offenders who received probation. As such, the California ISP programs were unlikely to save their counties money unless they prevented new crimes and subsequent incarcerations.

Moreover, the cost figures in Table 4.2 pertain solely to supervision, do not reflect geographical variation, and ignore the cost of reprocessing any recidivists. If ISP results in more arrests, court appearances, and jail time, the system bears those reprocessing costs as well. (The average cost to dispose of an arrest is $1,500 to $2,500.) The cost issue is clearly more complicated than it first appears, and any valid estimate must, at a minimum, include some of these secondary expenses.

Table 4.2

ANNUAL COSTS OF ISP AND OTHER SANCTIONS IN 1987

(Exclusive of construction costs)

| | Cost per Offender ($) |
|---|---|
| Routine probation | 300–2,000 |
| Intensive probation | 2,000–7,000 |
| House arrest (without electronics) | 2,000–7,000 |
| With telephonic call-back system | 2,500–5,500 |
| With passive electronic monitoring | 2,500–6,500 |
| With active electronic monitoring | 4,500–8,500 |
| Local jail | 8,000–12,000 |
| Local detention center | 5,000–15,000 |
| State prison | 9,000–20,000 |

NOTE: Cost data were computed from a nationwide survey of probation departments, as reported in Petersilia (1987).

To obtain data for cost comparisons between ISP and routine probation, we asked each county to estimate the daily cost of community sanctions (regular probation, ISP, ESP, residential centers, CRMT) and incarceration (jail, prison, halfway house, work furlough, routine parole, intensive parole).

In each county, the Chief Probation Officer obtained the relevant 1988–1989 estimates, usually after consulting with county budget officers. The counties did not have information on local court processing costs, so we used nationwide averages, as reported in Haynes and Larsen (1984).[12] Costs were then calculated for each probationer for each service he or she used during the one-year follow-up period, based on information recorded on the status calendar.

## PROTECTION OF PRIVACY OF STUDY PARTICIPANTS

Any study involving human subjects—especially investigations of criminal behavior—must take care to protect the legitimate interests of those subjects. Our primary concern was to maintain the confidentiality of the data and the names of persons who participated. The offenders' personal consent was not required, since all the information was being extracted from official criminal records, which the study had permission to utilize.

The study followed all Department of Health and Human Services regulations, and procedures for maintaining data privacy were submitted to The RAND Corporation's Human Subjects Protection Committee (HSPC) for approval. The HSPC approved the project's data safeguarding plan in April 1987. The key features of the plan were:

1. All individually identifiable data collected for the evaluation were to be held in strict confidence and not disclosed to any persons not working directly on the ISP project.
2. All subjects would be adequately protected from any research risks by:
   — protecting all identifiable raw data forms in the field and in transit. The sheets that identify subjects by name (Page 1, Background Assessment) were to be mailed in a separate envelope, apart from the contents of the rest of the coding form;

[12]These dollar estimates were not inflated to reflect 1988–1989 dollars.

- storing all identifying information in locked, limited access files at both the original site and the analysis facility. All information identifying individuals had to be stored separately from any outcome data;
- deciding on a clear time schedule for destruction of information.

The HSPC reviewed the project annually and found it to be in compliance at each review.

# 5. THE ISP PARTICIPANTS AND THE SERVICES THEY RECEIVED

## THE PARTICIPANTS IN CALIFORNIA'S ISP EXPERIMENT

Because California courts tend to incarcerate proportionately fewer convicted felons than other states, it is commonly thought that California's probationers are more serious offenders than those elsewhere. California courts rank sixteenth in the nation in rate of incarceration of arrestees, and forty-second in rate of incarceration of people arrested for serious offenses, making it one of the least punitive states (Austin and Brown, 1989). This suggests that the high-risk, felony probation population targeted for ISP in California may indeed be a higher-risk population than that designated for ISP in other states.[1]

Assessments of ISP effectiveness must include detailed descriptions of ISP program participants, since the kinds of offenders placed in the programs certainly affect ultimate outcomes. If California's recidivism rates are higher than those in other states, it may simply reflect the fact that California probationers are more serious offenders to begin with.

As noted in Section 1, all of the California sites designed probation-enhancement ISP programs, selecting offenders currently on probation who were judged to need more intensive supervision. Table 5.1 lists the characteristics of the California study samples, combining the control and experimental offenders within each site. Clearly, the participants in this ISP demonstration project were quite serious offenders.

More than 80 percent of the participants in all three sites were male; their average age was 28 to 30 years. The offenders in Los Angeles and Contra Costa were predominantly from minority groups: 97 percent of those in Los Angeles and 82 percent of those in Contra

[1]States that have regularly incarcerated comparatively lower-risk offenders obviously have a larger pool of less-serious prison-bound offenders to target for ISP. In California and elsewhere, similar offenders may be probation-bound. Any state can reduce its prison commitments by a given amount by simply selecting its lowest-risk prison-bound offenders and targeting them for ISP. California, however, could do that only by putting some fairly dangerous offenders on the street. The ability to select comparatively lower-risk prison-bound offenders probably accounts for the success of some states in reducing prison commitments through ISP programs. This issue is discussed in more detail in Petersilia and Turner (1989).

Table 5.1

CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTICIPATING CALIFORNIA OFFENDERS

(ISP and control offenders combined)[a]

| Characteristic | Contra Costa | Ventura | Los Angeles |
|---|---|---|---|
| Male (percent) | 81 | 85 | 87 |
| Race (percent) | | | |
| White | 18 | 50 | 3 |
| Black | 79 | 15 | 86 |
| Hispanic | 3 | 35 | 11 |
| Age at current conviction (years) | 28 | 30 | 29 |
| Current conviction (most serious) crime (percent) | | | |
| Homicide/rape/kidnap | 0 | 9 | 1 |
| Assault | 6 | 9 | 7 |
| Robbery | 2 | 10 | 7 |
| Burglary | 9 | 12 | 10 |
| Theft/forgery | 13 | 19 | 10 |
| Drug sale/possession | 69 | 37 | 59 |
| Other (e.g., DUI, weapons) | 2 | 4 | 5 |
| Prior criminal record (average number) | | | |
| Arrests | 6 | 7 | 7 |
| Felony convictions | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Misdemeanor convictions | 2 | 5 | 2 |
| Probation terms | 2 | 4 | 2 |
| Jail terms | 1 | 3 | 2 |
| Summary measure of prior record (percent) | | | |
| No prior arrests | 15 | 15 | 10 |
| Arrests only | 18 | 4 | 11 |
| Prior probation (maximum) | 23 | 13 | 11 |
| Prior jail term (maximum) | 39 | 50 | 44 |
| Prior prison term (maximum) | 5 | 18 | 24 |
| Risk/needs assessment (percent) | | | |
| High drug-treatment needs | 42 | 53 | 41 |
| High alcohol-treatment needs | 6 | 34 | 13 |
| High employment needs | 17 | 12 | (b) |
| Offender risk score (percent) | | | |
| Low (1–5) | 10 | 10 | 4 |
| Moderate (6–10) | 26 | 8 | 19 |
| High (11–15) | 21 | 10 | 24 |
| Intensive (16+) | 43 | 73 | 53 |

[a]No within-site statistical differences between ISP and control offenders were found, except in Contra Costa, where 54 percent of the ISP offenders had a "high" need for drug treatment, compared with 28 percent in Los Angeles. The ESP, ISP, and routine probationers in Los Angeles were statistically different in terms of age at current conviction: Routine probationers were younger than the ISP and ESP offenders ($\chi^2$ (2) = 9.9, $p < 0.05$). But, as discussed in Section 6, neither of these exceptions was related to recidivism within the site, so their presence is not troublesome for assessing ISP effectiveness.

[b]This information was missing for 55 percent of the sample; of the remaining offenders, 18 percent had high employment needs.

Costa were Hispanic or black.[2] More than half of the offenders in these counties were convicted of drug crimes, compared with about one-third of the Ventura offenders. Twenty-eight percent of the Ventura offenders, 8 percent of the Contra Costa offenders, and 15 percent of the Los Angeles offenders had been convicted of violent crimes.

Offenders in all three sites had extensive prior records. They averaged six to seven prior arrests, two to five misdemeanor convictions, and one prior felony conviction. More than 40 percent of them had served a prior jail term; 18 percent of the Ventura offenders, 24 percent of the Los Angeles offenders, and 5 percent of the Contra Costa offenders had served prior prison terms. Additionally, 43 percent of the Contra Costa participants were judged to be "intensive" risk-of-recidivism offenders, compared with 73 percent in Ventura, and 53 percent in Los Angeles.[3]

Almost half of the offenders in each site had "high" drug-treatment needs, defined as "frequent abuse causing serious disruption, in need of treatment." Between 12 and 17 percent of the offenders had employment assistance needs rated as "high," operationally defined as "virtually unemployable and needs training." From 6 to 34 percent of the offenders had "high" alcohol needs (defined as "frequent abuse causing serious disruption, in need of treatment"), with Ventura having the highest percentage.

Among the California sites, *Ventura's offenders appear more hard-core than those in Los Angeles or Contra Costa, on the basis of their prior criminal records, current conviction crimes, and overall risk-of-recidivism levels.*

The California ISP participants were more serious than those in the New Jersey and Georgia experiments and most similar to those in Massachusetts (see Table 5.2).[4] In Georgia and New Jersey, 20 percent of the ISP participants were judged "intensive risk," compared with 57 percent of the California participants; 50 percent of the New Jersey ISP participants were judged "low risk," compared with 8 percent of those in California. Moreover, a greater percentage of the

[2]Both programs concentrated on particular regions within their counties whose populations were primarily minority (i.e., North Richmond in Contra Costa and the Central Court District in Los Angeles).

[3]The risk score was computed by RAND for each offender, using information collected as part of the background assessment. The items that constitute the RAND risk score closely parallel those of the well-known NIC risk-needs assessment, except that the RAND score does not automatically rate offenders with a current or prior assault conviction as high or intensive risk.

[4]Relevant data were supplied by Billie Erwin (Georgia), Frank Pearson (New Jersey), and James Byrne (Massachusetts).

Table 5.2

CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTICIPANTS IN FOUR EVALUATED PROGRAMS[a]

(Percent of all program participants)

| Characteristic | Georgia | New Jersey | Massachusetts | California |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current conviction crime | | | | |
| Violent | 10 | 1 | 26 | 17 |
| Property | 51 | 43 | 40 | 24 |
| Drug | 24 | 43 | 14 | 55 |
| Other | 13 | 13 | 20 | 4 |
| Prior jail or prison | 42 | 34 | 50[b] | 60 |
| Overall risk level | | | | |
| Low | 32 | 50 | 0 | 8 |
| Moderate | 22 | 30 | 0 | 17 |
| High | 26 | — | 0 | 18 |
| Intensive | 20 | 20 | 100 | 57 |

[a]The California percentages combine ISP and routine probationers, using data from the three sites. The other states' samples reflect only ISP offenders. New Jersey uses only three risk levels.

[b]Incarcerated as part of the current sentence (i.e., split sentence) or during the year prior to participating in the ISP.

California offenders were convicted of violent or drug offenses, and more of the California sample had been previously incarcerated—both factors known to be statistically associated with recidivism (Blumstein et al., 1986).

## LENGTH AND CONDITIONS OF PROBATION SENTENCES

Probation is the conditional freedom granted by the court to an adjudicated offender, who thereafter must meet certain conditions of behavior. Conditions for adult felons, as set forth by the courts granting the probation, frequently include maintaining regular employment, abstaining from drugs and alcohol, not associating with known offenders or other specified persons, paying restitution or a fine, regularly reporting to a probation officer, and/or remaining within a designated geographic area. All probation is conditional on not committing another offense.

Table 5.3 shows the probation conditions imposed by the court at sentencing in the California sites. When offenders are convicted of the types of serious crimes indicated here, judges in California often

Table 5.3

CHARACTERISTICS OF CURRENT PROBATION SENTENCE

(ISP and control offenders combined)

| Characteristic | Contra Costa | Ventura | Los Angeles |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sentence characteristics[a] | | | |
| Length of probation term (months) | 36 | 60 | 38 |
| Percent with jail term imposed | 95 | 97 | 96 |
| Average jail term imposed (months) | 6 | 8 | 6 |
| Percent with fine ordered | 86 | 36 | 65 |
| Average fine amount ($) | 102 | 103 | 71 |
| Percent with restitution imposed | 38 | 56 | 88 |
| Average restitution amount ($) | 104 | 748 | 401 |
| Court-imposed technical conditions (in percent) | | | |
| Remain employed | 100 | 99 | 76 |
| Participate in alcohol treatment | 1 | 24 | 9 |
| Participate in drug treatment | 82 | 56 | 24 |
| Participate in education program | 3 | 1 | 15 |
| Perform community service | 0 | 1 | 84 |
| Refrain from alcohol use | 6 | 38 | 15 |
| Adhere to curfews | 0 | 0 | 76 |
| Submit to urine testing | 92 | 88 | 86 |
| Wear electronic monitor | 0 | 0 | 64 |
| Other drug-related conditions[b] | 86 | 49 | 30 |

[a]Averages are calculated for all offenders.

[b]"Other" drug conditions include registering as a drug user, according to the Health and Safety code; abstaining from using drugs; and conditions regarding combinations of drugs, such as drugs and work, drugs and driving, drugs and weapons, and drugs and restrictions on leaving the city or county.

use "split sentencing." Accordingly, nearly all the offenders in the California sample had been sentenced to serve jail terms averaging six to eight months. This may be important, since these probationers were subjected to short terms of incarceration prior to their return to the community on ISP or routine probation, and the "shock incarceration"[5] experience could have produced a deterrent effect; on the other hand, it may have broken family and community ties that would be related to successful reintegration into society.

The Los Angeles courts imposed more probation conditions than the courts in the other two counties. In Los Angeles, 84 percent of the

[5]As noted in Section 2, *shock incarceration* is a term for programs in which the sentencing judge may release an offender from prison or jail after he has served some portion of his sentence and place him on probation or parole.

offenders were ordered to perform community service, compared with about 1 percent of the offenders in the other two sites. This is interesting from at least two perspectives. First, as shown in Table 3.3, Los Angeles' ISP, ESP, and routine probation programs did not incorporate community service. In fact, Los Angeles chose to include only increased contacts in its ISP program—yet the courts imposed more requirements there than in the other two sites. Second, although the Los Angeles courts imposed more conditions overall than did the courts in the other two sites, probation caseloads in Los Angeles were the highest in the state; hence, probation officers were presumably less able to enforce probation conditions.[6]

In contrast, Ventura's ISP program incorporated a strong victim restitution component, yet its court system imposed restitution payments on only 56 percent of the offenders, as compared with 88 percent of the Los Angeles offenders. The court's failure to place these restrictions on the Ventura offenders may have contributed to the Probation Department's difficulties in implementing these aspects of the ISP program, as discussed in Section 6. There seems to be a mismatch between the court orders and the ISP programs: In Los Angeles, more conditions were imposed by the court than were enforced at the probation-officer level, and in the other two sites, the opposite appears to have been the case.

## SURVEILLANCE AND SERVICES RECEIVED BY ISP PARTICIPANTS AND OFFENDERS ON ROUTINE PROBATION

One of the most consistent findings of previous ISP evaluations is that the mere establishment of smaller caseloads does not guarantee a more intensive level of supervision. Clear and Hardyman suggest that greater intensity is difficult to achieve because "substantial ambiguity exists about precisely what should be done with an offender when there is extra time available" (1990:43).

There is no agreement on how many contacts are required for a program to be truly "intensive." As Byrne et al. point out:

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[6]An informal survey conducted by the California Chief Probation Officers Association in 1987 revealed that California adult probation caseloads averaged 150 probationers per officer in most counties but were highest in Los Angeles, where they averaged 300.

> Contact standards have, to date, been more a function of perception than of demonstrated need. If daily contacts will prompt judges to use ISP, daily contact will be required. However, there are no data available to suggest that this level of contact is more effective in controlling offender behavior than a level of, say, two contacts per week (1989:15).

Likewise, there is no empirical literature that identifies ISP program components that are related to success. While many ISP programs are modeled after those in Georgia and New Jersey, program developers often add (or delete) specific features to meet their own needs. Harris (1989) has warned that "ISP programs seem to be continually adding new program features, with little concrete evidence that these new elements will increase community protection and/or result in greater offender rehabilitation."

During their training sessions, the California ISP staff were encouraged to give a great deal of thought to program design and to include only features and contact levels that could reasonably be provided. Each site decided on its program's design after considering the needs of its target population, its own resources, and its sense of how the ISP program would have to be structured to gain acceptance from the judiciary, probation officials, and the community.

This evaluation measures surveillance and service as actually delivered. Specifically, it addresses two questions: (1) To what degree were the planned ISP program activities actually delivered? (2) To what extent did the ISP services and contacts differ from those provided to the control groups (i.e., routine probationers)?

Table 5.4 shows monthly contact or supervision rates, by type, averaged over the one-year follow-up period. These rates were calculated using information from the six-month and one-year review forms. Supervision rates were then calculated for each offender by dividing the number of contacts by the number of days under community supervision, as follows:

1. All contacts of a given type were summed for each offender.
2. Using the status calendar, all calendar days the offender was on ISP, ESP, routine probation, work furlough, or residential treatment were summed.
3. The number of contacts calculated in step (1) was divided by the number of days calculated in step (2). This daily contact

Table 5.4

MONTHLY ISP AND ROUTINE PROBATION CONTACT LEVELS

(Means averaged over the one-year follow-up)[a]

| | Contra Costa | | Ventura | | Los Angeles | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Contact Type | ISP | Routine Probation | ISP | CRMT | ESP | ISP | Routine Probation |
| Face-to-face contacts | | | | | | | |
| At probation department | 2.2 | 0.4* | 6.3 | 2.7* | 2.8* | 2.7* | 0.5 |
| At work/ school/other | 0.4 | 0.0* | 0.3 | 0.1* | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.1 |
| At home | 0.2 | 0.0* | 0.9 | 0.2* | 1.0* | 1.1* | 0.0 |
| Total | 2.7 | 0.5* | 7.4 | 3.0* | 4.1* | 4.1* | 0.6 |
| Telephone/collateral contacts | | | | | | | |
| At home | 1.5 | 0.3* | 0.8 | 0.4* | 3.7* | 3.8* | 0.2 |
| At work/ school/other | 0.4 | 0.0* | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.0 |
| Collateral monitoring | 2.8 | 0.4* | 3.2 | 2.1* | 1.4* | 1.5* | 0.2 |
| Total | 4.4 | 0.7* | 4.1 | 2.7* | 5.4* | 5.4* | 0.4 |
| Law-enforcement checks | | | | | | | |
| Criminal record | 0.3 | 0.2 | 9.3 | 0.4* | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Police checks | 0.7 | 0.3* | 2.9 | 0.1* | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Warrants issued | 0.4 | 0.1* | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Empl. verification | 0.1 | 0.0* | 0.3 | 0.1* | 0.0 | 0.1* | 0.0 |
| Other | 3.0 | 0.6* | 1.5 | 0.2* | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Total | 4.3 | 1.1* | 13.3 | 1.1* | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| Days on elec. monitoring | NA | NA | NA | NA | 5.1 | NA | NA |
| Drug tests | 1.7 | 0.2* | 2.7 | 1.3* | 0.4* | 0.5* | 0.2 |
| Alcohol tests | 0.2 | 0.0* | 0.9 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |

NOTE: For Contra Costa and Ventura counties, an asterisk indicates whether ISP contact levels differed from those of the control group. For Los Angeles, separate t-tests were conducted to determine (1) whether ESP contact levels differed from those for routine probationers, (2) whether ISP contact levels differed from those for routine probationers, and (3) whether ESP was different from ISP. Asterisks in the ESP column indicate that ESP rates were different from routine probation rates; asterisks in the ISP column indicate that ISP rates were different from routine probation. No differences were found between ESP and ISP. Throughout the table, asterisks indicate statistical significance at $p < 0.05$. All tests were two-tailed.

[a]Rates were rounded to the nearest tenth; those greater than zero and less than 0.049 are represented by 0.0. In no case did the data contain any true zeroes.

rate was then multiplied by 30 to convert it to a monthly contact rate.[7]

4. The individual rates were then averaged separately for ISP and control offenders.

As shown in Table 5.4, all of the ISP programs were more intensive than their respective control programs: At each site, ISP participants had significantly more face-to-face and telephone contacts, as well as drug tests, than their counterparts in the control programs. In addition, in Contra Costa and Ventura, the ISP offenders received more law-enforcement checks than the control offenders.

Of the three sites, Ventura had the most intensive ISP program.[8] Program participants averaged more than seven face-to-face contacts, four telephone contacts and thirteen law-enforcement checks per month. In contrast, CRMT offenders averaged three face-to-face contacts, nearly three collateral contacts, and one law-enforcement check per month. The Ventura ISP participants underwent drug testing nearly three times per month, whereas those in CRMT had slightly more than one drug test per month. Alcohol tests were performed about once per month for ISP, but less frequently for CRMT; however, the difference did not reach statistical significance.

In Los Angeles, ESP and ISP offenders averaged about four face-to-face and five telephone contacts per month, in dramatic contrast to the less than one contact of each type for offenders on routine probation. Los Angeles showed the largest absolute difference in the number of face-to-face and telephone contacts between ISP/ESP and routine supervision. There were no statistically significant differences in any of the contact types between the ISP and ESP programs. This might seem surprising, since ESP is often seen as a substitute for personal contacts, but the design of the Los Angeles program called for contact levels that would be the same for both program types. Los Angeles ESP offenders were actually hooked up to the monitoring equipment an average of about five days per month. The figure is low because only 23 of the 52 offenders (44 percent) assigned to ESP were

[7]This calculation assumes that no contacts are made during jail, prison, abscond time, transfer time, and failure-to-appear (FTA) time.

[8]Across-site differences are descriptive only; they were not tested for statistical significance.

ever monitored electronically during the study period.[9] Those who were monitored electronically averaged 78 days of monitoring.

*Unlike earlier ISP efforts, particularly those conducted in the 1960s and 1970s, the ISP programs studied here did involve more contacts.* This suggests that probation officers increase contacts when given the resources, training, and organizational incentives to do so. And while a greater number of contacts does not necessarily mean a higher quality of supervision, ISP officers often stated that they were "finally getting to do probation the way it was supposed to be done," leaving the impression that ISP affected both the quantity and the quality of supervision.

Although the ISP programs were more intensive than the control programs, we still do not know whether the contact levels were intensive enough. Contra Costa's ISP program averaged about 13 contacts per month; Ventura's, about 28 per month; and Los Angeles', about 10 per month. According to a survey conducted by Byrne (1986), ISP contact levels nationwide range from 2 to 32 per month, the average being 10 to 12. As measured by contact levels, the Contra Costa and Los Angeles ISP programs were of about average intensity, whereas the Ventura program was more intensive than average. It is worth noting that Ventura's supervision levels are close to the maximum ISP levels reported by Byrne (1986).

## HOW WELL WERE THE PLANNED ISP PROGRAMS DELIVERED?

As shown in Table 5.4, contact rates in the ISP programs were higher than those in the control programs. But how close did these "delivered" contacts come to the "planned" contact levels described in each site's original ISP program plan?

Implementing change is neither an easy nor an entirely predictable process, and simply adopting a new project on paper does not necessarily mean that changes will occur among the staff and in the services they deliver to clients. After studying dozens of projects funded by the LEAA, Ellickson and Petersilia (1983) concluded that while many innovations were adopted by local agencies, few affected organizational practice and fewer still were incorporated into the agencies'

[9]Los Angeles experienced time delays in finalizing the contracts with the providers of the electronic-monitoring equipment, which hindered full implementation of the planned ESP program.

routines. In short, there was little evidence that what presumably was paid for and deemed desirable was actually undertaken.

Program impact is heavily dependent on the integrity with which a model is applied (Williams and Elmore, 1976). Before program effects can be measured, it is necessary to determine how, whether, and with whom the program was implemented. As Rossi and Freeman state:

> There is no point in being concerned with the impact or outcome of a particular project unless it did, indeed, take place and did serve the appropriate participants in the way intended. Many programs are not implemented and executed according to their original design. Sometimes project staffs may be prevented by political or other reasons from undertaking what they intended. Some project staff members may not have the motivation or know-how to carry out their tasks as outlined. In still other instances, either poor budget estimates or inflation leads program staff to modify their efforts (1985:40).

Understanding the problems encountered in implementation is critical for the development of an ISP program, and planners must identify the design features that are particularly difficult.

Measurement of program implementation in this evaluation was hindered by a number of factors. First, the ISP programs did not all include each type of contact (e.g., Los Angeles did not include drug testing). Second, each ISP program was designed to deliver a different number of contacts. Finally, in each ISP program, the number of contacts was planned to decrease over time as the offender successfully completed phases, and during the final phase, certain contacts (e.g., drug testing in Ventura) were expected to take place only on an "as needs basis." These considerations had to be taken into account in describing implementation for each site.

We used the following procedure to evaluate implementation at the sites:

1. First, the relevant program components for each site were determined from the program materials (shown in Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3).[10]

[10]The Contra Costa and Ventura ISP programs had four components: face-to-face contacts, telephone contacts, record checks, and drug tests. The Los Angeles ISP program included face-to-face and telephone contacts. The Los Angeles ESP program included face-to-face and telephone contacts, as well as electronic monitoring.

2. Second, for each relevant component for each site, the number of monthly contacts planned during the one-year follow-up was determined. The first six-month contacts were determined by averaging the required contacts for phase 1 and phase 2 for each component. The second six-month contacts were determined by averaging the required contacts for phase 2 and phase 3.
3. Third, the average monthly contacts delivered (shown in Table 5.4) were compared with the planned contact rates. Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of contact rates for the California ISP programs.[11]

The data in Fig. 5.1 suggest that the ISP programs proposed by the three sites were rather fully implemented. For some components, Contra Costa and Ventura ISP programs actually exceeded their planned contact rates. The largest discrepancy between the planned and delivered services occurred in Los Angeles, where both the ISP and ESP programs had planned to deliver an average of 10.5 face-to-face contacts per month during the one-year follow-up, but actually delivered an average of 4.

To perform the implementation analysis, we assigned an implementation score to each participant, reflecting the extent to which he or she received the planned ISP program (as opposed to a group average). This type of measure was necessary to assess whether receiving the "full" ISP model was associated with outcome. We compared each offender's actual contact rates with those of the program's planned rate to determine a rating for each program feature as follows:

Low: Offender received 50 percent or less of planned services.
Medium: Offender received 51 to 79 percent of planned services.
High: Offender received 80 to 100 percent of planned services.

Table 5.5 shows how the offenders at each site scored on each program component. In addition, all program components were combined to create a summary measure of ISP implementation in each site. Offenders who scored "high" on all but one relevant component were considered to have received "high" (or full) ISP implementation.

[11]For presentation clarity, the mean values are not shown, but in most cases, the median and mean values are similar. The width of the bar for each contact type represents delivered contact rates between the 25th and 75th percentile.




Fig. 5.1—Distribution of monthly probation contacts during one-year follow-up

Table 5.5

IMPLEMENTATION LEVELS FOR ISP PROGRAMS, BY SITE

(Percentage of all ISP program participants)

| Program Component | Contra Costa | Ventura | Los Angeles | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | ESP | ISP |
| Face-to-face contacts | | | | |
| Low-level | 25 | 5 | 60 | 73 |
| Medium-level | 31 | 46 | 32 | 22 |
| High-level | 44 | 49 | 8 | 6 |
| Telephone/collateral contacts | | | | |
| Low-level | 18 | 37 | 30 | 35 |
| Medium-level | 26 | 22 | 22 | 18 |
| High-level | 56 | 41 | 48 | 47 |
| Law-enforcement checks[a] | | | | |
| Low-level | 34 | 0 | 58 | NA |
| Medium-level | 11 | 3 | 4 | |
| High-level | 55 | 97 | 38 | |
| Drug tests | | | | |
| Low-level | 35 | 21 | | |
| Medium-level | 7 | 5 | | |
| High-level | 58 | 74 | NA | NA |
| All components combined[b] | | | | |
| Low-level | 11 | 0 | 26 | 31 |
| Medium-level | 59 | 46 | 42 | 18 |
| High-level | 27 | 54 | 32 | 51 |

[a]In Los Angeles, law-enforcement checks refer to electronic monitoring only.

[b]In Contra Costa and Ventura, offenders who received 50 percent or less implementation on all program components were considered "low level"; those with high (at least 80 percent of planned) implementation on at least three of the four components were classified as "high level"; all others were considered "medium level." Because Los Angeles did not incorporate law-enforcement checks and drug tests, different criteria were used. ESP offenders had to receive high implementation on two of three components; ISP offenders had to receive high implementation on one component to be considered "high level" for all components combined.

Although ISP was more intensive than routine probation overall, only between 27 and 54 percent of the participants (across sites) received a high level of implementation for all of the services that ISP administrators had planned.

The ISP staff suggested that this disjuncture occurred because they had promised certain contact standards to gain local support. The exact number proposed was not based on any empirical evidence concerning the appropriate number of contacts, but rather on a subjective sense of what would be required to appear punitive. In imple-

menting the programs, the staff quickly discovered that very high contact standards were unrealistic (and perhaps unnecessary as well). Over the course of the programs, ISP officers became increasingly involved in paperwork and in court proceedings necessary to process the violators. These activities had to take precedence over maintaining planned contact levels.[12]

[12]A detailed discussion of ISP implementation difficulties is given in Petersilia (1989).

# 6. EFFECTS OF ISP PARTICIPATION ON OFFENDERS' FUTURE CRIMINALITY AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

One of the goals of ISP programs is to reduce recidivism—that is, to reduce offenders' return to crime. It is very difficult to measure recidivism, because there is no uniformly accepted definition for the term. Indeed, the literature is replete with suggestions regarding correct definitions, optimal methods of counting, and the most valid sources of information (e.g., Maltz, 1984).

To make this study as comprehensive as possible, we have used multiple indicators of recidivism. All of these indicators are derived from official records, not offender self-reports. Unfortunately, official records underestimate criminality, since only a fraction of all crimes committed result in arrest.[1]

The recidivism measures used here are based primarily on arrests rather than convictions. Using arrests as the primary recidivism indicator means that the analysis will necessarily include some individuals who should be excluded, since police sometimes arrest people who have not committed crimes. But if only those who are convicted are included, the true level of criminality will be underestimated, since many people known to be guilty of crimes are not convicted, for reasons totally unconnected with the strength of the case (e.g., victims may decline to prosecute).

On the basis of empirical data, Blumstein and Cohen (1979:565) concluded that "the errors of commission associated with truly false arrests are believed to be far less serious than the errors of omission that would occur if the more stringent standard of conviction were required." Maltz (1984:58) agrees, stating that "arrest is a better indicator of offender conduct than conviction."

## EXTENT OF RECIDIVISM

Figures 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 show the percentages of probationers in the three California sites who incurred technical violations and new

[1]The probability of arrest, given crime commission, is generally quite low. Various estimates put it at less than 0.1, although it is believed to differ widely among crime types, from a low of 0.01 for drug dealing to 0.7 for murder (Boland and Wilson, 1978; Blumstein and Cohen, 1979; Blumstein et al., 1986).




*Groups significantly different, $p < 0.05$

Fig. 6.1—Extent of probationers' recidivism during one-year follow-up: Contra Costa County




Fig. 6.2—Extent of probationers' recidivism during one-year follow-up: Ventura County




*Groups significantly different, $p < 0.05$

Fig. 6.3—Extent of probationers' recidivism during one-year follow-up: Los Angeles County

arrests within the one-year follow-up period, as well as selected court dispositions for technical violations and arrests.[2] Details about the technical violations, arrests, and dispositions are given in Table B.1 of Appendix B.

Overall, between 41 and 73 percent of the studied probationers had new technical violations, primarily failures to appear for scheduled probation appointments, not participating in treatment programs, or violating drug-related conditions (usually drug use, as detected through urinalysis).

The extent of new arrests is slightly more encouraging: Across the ISP programs, about one-third of the participants had a new arrest, but fewer than 10 percent had new arrests for violent crimes.

*Comparison of the experimental and control offenders on the probability of having an arrest or a technical violation revealed two statistically significant differences: Contra Costa ISP offenders were more likely to have a technical violation than offenders on routine probation ($\chi^2$ (1) = 8.51, $p < 0.001$), and Ventura's ISP offenders were less likely to be arrested than offenders on CRMT ($\chi^2$ (1) = 7.54, $p < 0.01$).*

The coding form also recorded the ultimate disposition of each new arrest and technical violation. These data can be used to examine how the different sites responded to these events. Across sites, between 11 and 26 percent of the offenders were convicted of a new crime during the follow-up period (with the exception of the CRMT probationers, 45 percent of whom were subsequently convicted). The conviction percentages are shown in Table B.1 of Appendix B.

Figures 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 also show the percentages of offenders who were jailed and imprisoned as a result of technical violations. In Contra Costa, 25 percent of the ISP offenders (compared with 11 percent of the routine probationers) were jailed as a result of a technical violation ($\chi^2$ (1) = 5.83, $p < 0.02$); and 2 percent of the ISP offenders and 1 percent of routine probationers were sentenced to prison as a result of a technical violation ($\chi^2$ (1) = 0.34, $p < 0.56$).

In Ventura, 41 percent of the ISP offenders and 50 percent of the CRMT offenders were jailed as a result of a technical violation ($\chi^2$ (1) = 1.28, $p < 0.26$); 19 percent of those on ISP were sent to prison as a

[2]Our analysis of the extent of recidivism investigates the probability of an arrest and the probability of a technical violation as separate events. In the studied sites, an offender cited for a technical violation was not necessarily precluded from having an arrest (and vice versa). In fact, as discussed later in this section, no correlation was found between technical violations and arrests. If technical violations and arrests were competing events, more sophisticated analyses (such as multinomial logistic regression) would be required to take into account the interrelationship of these two outcomes.

result of a technical violation, compared with 27 percent of those on CRMT ($\chi^2$ (1) = 1.50, p < 0.22).

In Los Angeles, 35 percent of the offenders on ESP were jailed as a result of a technical violation, compared with 16 percent of those on ISP and 12 percent of those on routine probation ($\chi^2$ (2) = 8.93, p < 0.01). Between 16 and 20 percent of the ESP, ISP, and routine probationers in Los Angeles were imprisoned for technical violations ($\chi^2$ (2) = 0.39, p < 0.82).

### System Responses to Recidivism

The above percentages are based on all offenders in each type of program. A more illuminating measure of the punitiveness of each county's response to technical violations and new arrests would be the dispositions for only those who experienced a new technical violation or arrest (i.e., the conditional probabilities). Analysis of these data should indicate (1) whether within a site, the response to ISP or control offenders differed, and (2) across sites, the apparent differences in responses to offenders. Table 6.1 shows the conditional probabilities of jail and prison terms for offenders with technical violations and new arrests. Only one significant difference appeared in the treatment of ISP and routine probationers within a site: In Los Angeles, ESP offenders with a technical violation were the most likely to be jailed. The between-site differences are more informative.[3] Ventura appears most punitive for placing offenders in jail, for both technical violations and new arrests. However, Los Angeles appears to be equally punitive in terms of placing offenders in prison and jail. The percentage of those with technical violations and new arrests who are sentenced to prison is actually higher in Los Angeles than in Ventura for offenders with new arrests. Overall, as the table indicates, Contra Costa appears to be more lenient than the other two counties.

### Seriousness of Recidivism

Another way to examine recidivism is to investigate the seriousness of the recidivism events. Figure 6.4 categorizes individuals according to the "most serious" recidivism event they experienced during the one-year follow-up.

[3]Because offenders were not randomly assigned to sites, we did not conduct tests of statistical significance between sites.

Table 6.1

CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES OF JAIL AND PRISON TERMS

(In percent)

| Program | To Jail | To Prison |
|---|---|---|
| Contra Costa | | |
| With technical violations | | |
| ISP | 39 | 4 |
| Routine probation | 26 | 3 |
| All offenders combined | 34 | 3 |
| With Arrests | | |
| ISP | 31 | 0 |
| Routine probation | 52 | 13 |
| All offenders combined | 41 | 6 |
| Ventura | | |
| With technical violations | | |
| ISP | 58 | 26 |
| CRMT | 67 | 36 |
| All offenders combined | 63 | 31 |
| With Arrests | | |
| ISP | 52 | 24 |
| CRMT | 73 | 18 |
| All Offenders Combined | 66 | 20 |
| Los Angeles | | |
| With technical violations | | |
| ESP | 51* | 26 |
| ISP | 26 | 26 |
| Routine probation | 21 | 35 |
| All offenders combined | 34 | 29 |
| With Arrests | | |
| ESP | 32 | 21 |
| ISP | 25 | 38 |
| Routine probation | 13 | 27 |
| All offenders combined | 24 | 28 |

NOTE: An asterisk indicates that study groups are significantly different (within a site), using $\chi^2$ tests, $p < 0.05$.

Forty percent of the ISP offenders in Contra Costa had technical violations as their most serious event, compared with 26 percent of those on routine probation. The figures are similar for Ventura, where 43 percent of the ISP and 29 percent of the CRMT probationers had technical violations as their most serious recidivism measure. In Los Angeles, 42 percent of the ISP and 46 percent of the ESP participants had technical violations, in contrast to 40 percent of those on routine probation. Figure 6.4 also shows that between 2 and 9 per-




Fig. 6.4—Probationers' most serious recidivism outcome during one-year follow-up

cent of the various samples were arrested for a new violent crime (virtually all for robbery or assault). Further details on these "most serious" recidivism outcomes are given in Table B.2 of Appendix B.

To statistically test whether the "most serious" outcomes were different for the experimental and control samples, we ranked each offender's recidivism outcomes as follows: (1) no technical violation or arrest; (2) at most a technical violation; (3) an arrest. We then ran cross-tabulations between program condition and this ranking.

In Contra Costa and Ventura, the severity of recidivism differed for the experimental and control offenders ($\chi^2$ (2) = 6.2, $p < 0.04$; $\chi^2$ (2) = 7.7, $p < 0.02$, respectively). These differences were primarily the result of more ISP offenders in Contra Costa having technical violations and more CRMT offenders in Ventura having arrests. In Los Angeles, no significant differences were found between program type and the "most serious" recidivism measure ($\chi^2$ (4) = 2.1, $p < 0.70$).

For offenders with an arrest, we examined whether ISP offenders had less serious arrest offenses than control-program offenders. Arrests for violent offenses were considered the most serious, followed by property, drugs, and "other" crimes. Each arrested offender was ranked by the most serious arrest he or she incurred during the follow-up period. Cross-tabulations were then performed between the most serious arrest and probation program type (e.g., ISP versus routine).

In all three sites, no statistically significant differences appeared between experimental and control offenders in the severity of their arrest offenses (Contra Costa, $\chi^2$ (3) = 2.38, $p < 0.50$; Ventura, $\chi^2$ (3) = 1.18, $p < 0.76$; Los Angeles, $\chi^2$ (6) = 5.92, $p < 0.43$).

## THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TECHNICAL VIOLATIONS AND ARRESTS

Most ISPs require that offenders meet certain conditions (e.g., observe curfews, abstain from alcohol and drugs, attend treatment sessions). The ISP staff monitor offenders' compliance through frequent visits, random drug testing, and random contacts. The implicit rationale underlying these activities is that noncompliant behavior should be monitored and brought to the court's attention, because it may signal that the offender is "going bad." It is also thought that offenders who are disregarding court-imposed restrictions may be committing new crimes, and hence, enforcing technical conditions should increase

public safety.[4] However, the relationship between technical violations and arrests had not previously been empirically tested.

We examined this relationship using a number of different approaches. First, within each site, we computed correlations between the number of arrests and the number of technical violations for (1) all offenders combined and (2) each study group separately. These correlations are shown in Table 6.2. Correlations significantly different from zero (at the $p < 0.05$ level) are indicated with an asterisk.

There were no significant negative correlations between the number of arrests and the number of technical violations for any group except the offenders on routine probation in Los Angeles. This suggests that filing charges for technical violations was not associated with fewer arrests.

However, filing charges for specific types of technical violations may reduce subsequent arrests (either overall or for specific crime types). For example, research has consistently demonstrated that offenders commit more crime when under the influence of drugs

Table 6.2

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF TECHNICAL VIOLATIONS AND THE NUMBER OF ARRESTS

| Program | Correlation |
|---|---|
| Contra Costa | |
| ISP | 0.13 |
| Routine probation | –0.01 |
| All offenders combined | 0.06 |
| Ventura | |
| ISP | 0.15 |
| CRMT | 0.20 |
| All offenders combined | 0.16* |
| Los Angeles | |
| ESP | –0.15 |
| ISP | –0.08 |
| Routine probation | –0.29* |
| All offenders combined | –0.15 |

NOTE: An asterisk indicates that the correlation is statistically different from zero, $p < 0.05$.

[4]Such activities also increase the punitiveness of ISP and thereby help accomplish the objective of just deserts.

(Chaiken and Chaiken, 1982; Anglin and Speckart, 1986). Revoking probation for drug-use violations might therefore reduce subsequent arrests.[5] To explore this possibility, we cross-tabulated whether an offender had a drug technical violation with whether he or she had (1) any arrest, (2) any violent arrest, (3) any property arrest, or (4) any drug arrest.[6] The results are shown in Table 6.3. Chi-square tests of significance were computed within each site for the four cross-tabulations. None of the resulting values reached statistical significance ($p < 0.05$), which suggests that there is no relationship between having a drug technical violation and having an arrest for any crime or an arrest for a specific crime type.[7] For example, 24 percent of the offenders in Contra Costa who had a drug technical violation were arrested for a new crime, compared with 30 percent who had no drug technical violations.[8]

**Table 6.3**

**PERCENTAGE OF OFFENDERS HAVING NEW ARRESTS, BY PRESENCE OF DRUG VIOLATIONS**

(Experimental and control offenders combined)

| | Contra Costa | | Ventura | | Los Angeles | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arrest Type | Drug Violation | No Drug Violation | Drug Violation | No Drug Violation | Drug Violation | No Drug Violation |
| Drug arrest | 10 | 11 | 19 | 16 | 15 | 15 |
| Property arrest | 10 | 9 | 14 | 12 | 0 | 5 |
| Violent arrest | 5 | 5 | 3 | 8 | 0 | 6 |
| Any arrest | 24 | 30 | 35 | 44 | 23 | 34 |

[5]As noted earlier, the drug violations of study participants consisted mostly of drug use as detected through urinalysis.

[6]Because most offenders had no more than one arrest of a particular offense type, cross-tabulations were more appropriate than correlations for this analysis.

[7]Identical analyses were performed within each study group (e.g., offenders on ISP, offenders on routine probation). These analyses also failed to reveal any statistically significant relationships between drug technical violations and arrests.

[8]While this seems a rather straightforward analysis, it was difficult because of the nature of probation data. Since a new arrest is always a violation of probation, some probation officers and departments automatically file a technical violation when a new arrest occurs. This analysis required that only violations not connected solely to the occurrence of an arrest be identified and included. The coding form distinguished between technical violations and arrests, so all technical violations that resulted solely from new arrests were deleted from the analysis. Future research on the relationship between technical violations and new arrests should correct for this bias in routinely collected probation data.

## COMPARING ARREST RATES, CONTROLLING FOR STREET TIME

The recidivism figures in Figs. 6.1 through 6.4 do not account for the offenders' "street time" (i.e., time when they were not incarcerated). If offenders are not incarcerated and remain in the community for greater time periods, their exposure, or time at risk, is greater than that of offenders who have fewer days on the street. The ISP offenders in this study, for example, may have spent more time incarcerated during the follow-up period than routine probationers. If these street-time differences are not accounted for, offenders with less street time will appear to have lower levels of recidivism, but this would not necessarily reflect lower criminal activity. As noted in Section 3, failure to consider differential time at risk in earlier evaluations of ISP programs has created problems for comparisons across study groups.

We constructed an overall arrest rate by summing the total number of arrests for each individual during the one-year period and dividing the result by his or her total number of street days during that year (i.e., days on ISP, routine probation, summary probation, and work furlough, excluding any days spent in jail or prison). These rates were then multiplied by 365 (the number of days in a year) to arrive at an annualized individual arrest rate. In effect, the resulting rate is the offender's expected number of arrests if he or she were free in the community the entire year. These individual rates were then averaged over the study samples to estimate the number of arrests per year of street time (shown in Table 6.4).[9]

Table 6.4 presents the overall arrest rates of study participants and those for four major categories of crimes: violent, property, drug, and other (these categories are further defined in Table B.1 of Appendix B). The overall arrest rates range from 0.7 to 2.5 per year, with the highest rates occurring in Ventura, for both the ISP and CRMT probationers.

We used analysis of variance to compare the arrest rates for each crime category for the experimental and control offenders within a site. No statistically significant differences were found (in Contra

[9]Another technique would have been to (1) sum all ISP and non-ISP offender arrests and/or technical violations, (2) sum all ISP and non-ISP offender street days, and (3) divide (1) by (2) for each group. This procedure is preferable for estimating group rates because it is less biased by the high rates of a few individuals. However, if we had used this procedure, we could not have performed statistical tests of the differences between the ISP and non-ISP offenders' rates, and such tests were a primary purpose of the evaluation (see Cohen, 1986, for a complete discussion of this issue).

Table 6.4

AVERAGE NUMBER OF ARRESTS PER INDIVIDUAL, ONE YEAR OF STREET TIME

| Crime Category | Contra Costa | | Ventura | | Los Angeles | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | ISP | Routine Probation | ISP | CRMT | ESP | ISP | Routine Probation |
| Violent | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 |
| Property | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Drug | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 1.1 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.6 |
| Other | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.1 |
| All crimes combined | 1.0 | 0.7 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 0.8 |

Costa, $F(1,164) = 0.78$, $p < 0.38$; in Ventura, $F(1,161) = 0.80$, $p < 0.37$; in Los Angeles, $F(2,140) = 0.96$, $p < 0.39$).

The most important finding, however, is that once street time was controlled, there is no evidence that the experimental ISP programs significantly reduced arrest rates. In fact, while not statistically significant, the trend was in the opposite direction in Contra Costa and Los Angeles counties: ISP offenders had higher arrest rates than those on routine probation. The high rates of Ventura offenders are probably related to the fact that Ventura has the most intensive program, with a strong law-enforcement component.

## Issues in Measuring Recidivism

As noted in Section 2, a central question regarding recidivism outcomes is the extent to which they reflect measurement bias, since ISP may increase opportunities to observe technical violations and new criminal behavior. The observed outcomes may reflect not only offender behavior, but also the increased opportunity to observe failure. If we knew true offender behavior (which perhaps could be obtained through offender self-reports), we could directly estimate the extent of the measurement bias. We do not have such data, but we have investigated the measurement bias issue using official record data.

We calculated the correlations between the total number of contacts (combining face-to-face, collateral, monitoring, and drug checks) and the following indicators of recidivism: (1) any arrest, (2) any technical violation, (3) the number of technical violations, and (4) the number of arrests. Correlations were computed for experimental and

control groups separately, as shown in Table 6.5. We examined the relationships within experimental and control groups separately, and in no case did we observe a positive relationship between the number of contacts and any of the four recidivism measures.[10] Thus it does not appear that the recidivism rates of ISP offenders were artificially high because of greater opportunities to observe the failure of ISP probationers in the community.

Table 6.5, however, does indicate a negative relationship between technical violations and contacts for ESP offenders in Los Angeles. This pattern appears to result from technical violations being filed when offenders failed to report to their probation officer (and thus had fewer contacts than others).

Measurement bias is conceptually quite complicated in studies such as these, and a number of issues remain open. Future research

**Table 6.5**

**CORRELATIONS BETWEEN RECIDIVISM MEASURES AND TOTAL NUMBER OF CONTACTS**

| Program | Any Arrest | Number of Arrests | Any Technical Violation | Number of Technical Violations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Contra Costa | | | | |
| ISP | .01 | –.05 | –.12 | –.15 |
| Routine probation | .14 | .19 | .06 | .08 |
| Ventura | | | | |
| ISP | –.14 | .00 | –.03 | .07 |
| CRMT | .00 | .08 | –.04 | .05 |
| Los Angeles | | | | |
| ESP | .06 | .07 | –.39* | –.41* |
| ISP | –.05 | –.06 | –.23 | –.02 |
| Routine probation | –.11 | –.12 | –.27 | –.18 |

NOTE: An asterisk indicates that the correlation is significantly different from zero, $p < 0.05$.

[10]We also performed correlations for experimental and control offenders combined. These analyses revealed a significant positive correlation (0.18) between the number of technical violations and contacts in Contra Costa; a significant negative correlation between the number of contacts and any arrest in Ventura; and a significant negative correlation between contacts and any technical violation in Los Angeles. These results mirror the overall recidivism outcomes, as we would expect, given the high correlation between contacts and type of probation program (0.67 in Contra Costa, 0.69 in Ventura, and 0.50 in Los Angeles).

should address, for example, the role probation officers play in subsequent arrests. Are ISP probation officers more likely than routine probation officers to call upon police to arrest an offender suspected of criminal behavior? In addition, alternative measures of recidivism could be used that are potentially less sensitive to the intensity of contacts. For example, one could standardize the number of technical violations and arrests by dividing them by the total number of opportunities for observation (or failure). This would require measuring not only the number of completed contacts, but also the attempted contacts. Our data recorded only completed contacts and thus were inadequate for such an analysis. Finally, the relationship between intensity of contacts and recidivism is not well understood. We have been concerned with the possibility that increased contacts could lead to increased violations and arrests. One could argue, however, that offenders with more contacts would actually have less recidivism. Compliant offenders would appear at all the face-to-face contacts, answer the phone calls, etc. They would also be less likely to have technical violations or to engage in criminal behavior, resulting in a negative correlation between contacts and recidivism. Future analyses should explore whether both processes are operating, and if so, for which types of offenders.

## STATUS OF OFFENDERS ONE YEAR AFTER PROGRAM ASSIGNMENT

Figure 6.5 shows the status of offenders at the end of the one-year follow-up period. (A more detailed breakdown of these categories is given in Table B.3 of Appendix B.) Particularly interesting is the finding that 36 to 70 percent of the sample are still "active" in their originally assigned programs. Contra Costa offenders tend to be retained in their programs more than offenders in the other two sites, where about a quarter of the entire study sample was in prison at the end of one year.

## SURVIVAL ANALYSIS

Our final recidivism analysis was a survival analysis, measuring the pace of recidivism among offenders. This type of analysis speci-




Fig. 6.5—Status of probationers at end of one-year follow-up

fies the proportion of probationers who survive by not recidivating (and, conversely, the proportion who fail) across specified intervals within the follow-up period, making it possible to determine these proportions within any month, week, or even day of the period. Survival analysis thus provides more precision and specificity than fixed-observation analysis.[11] While the previous analyses showed that the annualized arrest rates did not differ between the experimental and control offenders, survival analysis could reveal that one group's failure rate during the first several months of the year was considerably higher than that of the other group.

Although the value of failure-rate models for recidivism analyses was noted more than 15 years ago (Stollmack and Harris, 1974), the technique has been used infrequently. The National Academy of Sciences' Panel on Research on Criminal Careers noted:

> failure rate models have been applied only rarely in criminal justice prediction problems...and so the extra statistical power they can provide in separately predicting frequency rates for active offenders and dropout rates is not yet widely understood and appreciated (Blumstein et al., 1986:171).

Selecting the most appropriate model for a given application requires an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the possible models, and how each is best suited, given the characteristics of the database and the research questions being addressed. After reviewing the most popular survival techniques, we chose the Kaplan-Meier method for this analysis.[12]

The Kaplan-Meier model is nonparametric and is one of the simplest forms of survival-rate analysis. It was appropriate for this evaluation because the offenders in the sample were randomly assigned (obviating the need for covariates to adjust for pretreatment differences), the sample sizes were relatively small, and the follow-up time

[11]Detailed explanations of survival analyses are given in Schmidt and Witte (1988), Maltz (1984), and Illinois Criminal Justice Authority (1986).

[12]There are three major categories of failure-rate models: (1) nonparametric models, such as the life-table method or the Kaplan-Meier method; (2) Cox proportional-hazards models, which are a compromise between simple nonparametric models and the more complicated parametric models; and (3) parametric models, including Maltz's split population models. Cox proportional-hazards models are particularly appropriate for estimating the effects of covariates in a regression-like manner, after preliminary work has been done using the simpler models. Fully parametric models are the most complex models; they require that the analyst consider the underlying form of "failure" in the data and have very detailed data on large samples (on the order of several thousand persons).

period was relatively short (thus, the data provide at most a preliminary picture of recidivism patterns). Also, our purpose was not to fit regression-type models to the data, but rather to answer the direct research question of whether ISP is related to time to failure. Finally, the output from the Kaplan-Meier model is straightforward and easily interpreted.[13]

The Kaplan-Meier model (like all survival analysis) derives measures based on two assumptions: (1) that "terminal" cases cease to remain exposed to risk after they terminate (e.g., once a probationer is arrested or has a technical violation, he or she is no longer at risk of failing again), and (2) that "censored observations" are treated as nonterminating "withdrawals" when the offenders are no longer at risk (for example, if a probationer dies or is transferred, he or she is not considered to have failed or survived, but is simply dropped from the analysis).

For survival analysis, it is necessary to determine which events (and their corresponding dates) will serve to "censor" an individual from continued observation. For this study, offenders were considered censored when they were transferred, died, were terminated from supervision, or were sentenced to prison.

Figure 6.6 presents the monthly survival rates across the one-year follow-up period, using two recidivism measures: time until first technical violation and time until first arrest. Time to failure was measured from the first day the offender was on the street (for most of the sample, this was the day he or she was released from jail for the current offense and returned to the community on probation).

In Contra Costa, the ISP offenders failed faster when failure was measured by the criterion of a new technical violation (Wilcoxon $\chi^2$ (1) = 18.00, $p < 0.001$), but there were no differences when failure was measured in terms of having a new arrest (Wilcoxon $\chi^2$ (1) = 0.18, $p < 0.67$).

In Ventura, the opposite was true: ISP and CRMT offenders failed at the same pace when technical violations were the measure (Wilcoxon $\chi^2$ (1) = 0.12, $p < 0.73$), but the CRMT offenders failed sooner for arrest than the ISP offenders (Wilcoxon $\chi^2$ (1) = 4.90, $p < 0.03$).

[13]The life-table method was also applied to these data, and the results were virtually identical to those obtained by the Kaplan-Meier method. The Kaplan-Meier models were used in the Massachusetts ISP evaluation (Byrne and Kelly, 1989) and the Illinois Criminal Justice Authority evaluation (1986). Wheeler and Hissong (1988) also used this method to analyze time to failure for misdemeanor offenses.




Fig. 6.6—Probationers' survival estimates during one-year follow-up

The data suggest that ISP (or ESP) offenders in Los Angeles will fail faster than routine probationers when technical violations are the criterion (Wilcoxon $\chi^2$ (2) = 9.17, $p < 0.01$), but there will be no difference between the two groups when arrests are the measure (Wilcoxon $\chi^2$ (2) = 0.41, $p < 0.81$).

The average (mean) survival times were between five and nine months, as shown in Table 6.6.

**Table 6.6**

**AVERAGE (MEAN) MONTHS TO FIRST TECHNICAL VIOLATION AND NEW ARREST[a]**

| | Contra Costa | | Ventura | | Los Angeles | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Item | ISP | Routine Probation | ISP | CRMT | ESP | ISP | Routine Probation |
| Months to first technical violation | 5.8 | 8.6 | 5.4 | 5.2 | 5.7 | 6.9 | 8.4 |
| Months to first arrest | 8.3 | 8.7 | 9.5 | 8.0 | 8.8 | 7.9 | 8.9 |

[a]Calculated from the first day the offender was on the street until the date the first technical violation was filed by the probation officer, or the date of arrest as recorded in the police records (and noted in the probation files).

## EFFECTS OF ISP ON OFFENDERS' EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION, COUNSELING, COMMUNITY SERVICE, AND PAYMENT OF FINES AND FEES

Program effectiveness, of course, is measured by more than just recidivism. The ISP programs encouraged (and sometimes mandated) that participants be employed, attend treatment, and perform community service. We next investigated whether ISP offenders were more likely than routine probationers to participate in these types of activities.

Figure 6.7 shows the percentage of offenders who participated in various programs during the one-year follow-up period. Any program participation during this period was counted, regardless of its intensity. Details on the intensity and types of counseling offenders received are given in Table B.4 of Appendix B.

The level of participation in programs was generally quite low, particularly in Los Angeles, where 17 percent of the ESP and 16 per-




Fig. 6.7—Probationer participation in programs during one-year follow-up

cent of the ISP offenders received counseling during the study period, compared with 2 percent of the routine probationers ($\chi^2$ (2) = 6.72, p < 0.04). In Contra Costa, 39 percent of the ISP offenders participated in counseling, as did 14 percent of the routine probationers ($\chi^2$ (1) = 13.32, p < 0.001). In both counties, officials reported a serious lack of treatment programs for drug-involved probationers. Program participation was much higher in Ventura, where 78 percent of the ISP and 76 percent of the CRMT probationers participated in counseling ($\chi^2$ (1) = 0.08, p < 0.77).

To enable more extensive analysis of program participation, we created a summary scale for each offender, with one point assigned for participation in each of the following:

- Any employment during the year.
- Any counseling sessions attended.
- Any community service performed.
- Any restitution during the year.

Each offender was given a score of 0 to 4. The ISP model asserts that, theoretically, the more an offender participates in these program activities, the better his chances are of law-abiding behavior.[14] Table 6.7 shows the percentages of offenders at each scoring level in each site.

We then ran cross-tabulations between participation scores and experimental/control status. In both Contra Costa and Los Angeles, ISP (and ESP) offenders had higher program-participation scores than their counterparts on routine probation ($\chi^2$ (3) = 18.46, p < 0.001; $\chi^2$ (8) = 18.29, p < 0.02, respectively). Although there were no differences between the scores of ISP and CRMT probationers in Ventura ($\chi^2$ (4) = 1.39, p < 0.85), their overall program participation was higher than that of probationers in Contra Costa and Los Angeles.

## THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROGRAM PARTICIPATION AND RECIDIVISM

We also explored the relationship between offenders' program participation scores (as measured in Table 6.7) and recidivism. For this

[14]Correlations between individual items and the summary scale were generally above 0.4. Correlations between the individual measures ranged from –0.05 to 0.31. Chronbach's alpha ranged from 0.42 in Ventura and 0.43 Los Angeles to 0.24 in Contra Costa.

Table 6.7

PERCENTAGE OF OFFENDERS PARTICIPATING IN PROGRAMS: SUMMARY MEASURE

(Percent of study sample)

| Score on 4-Item Scale | Contra Costa | | Ventura | | Los Angeles | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | ISP | Routine Probation | ISP | CRMT | ESP | ISP | Routine Probation |
| 0 (no participation) | 40* | 64 | 10 | 6 | 46+ | 45* | 78 |
| 1 | 37 | 33 | 18 | 22 | 27 | 33 | 14 |
| 2 | 22 | 2 | 41 | 42 | 23 | 14 | 8 |
| 3 | 1 | 1 | 26 | 26 | 4 | 6 | 0 |
| 4 (participated in all activities) | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 0 |

NOTE: An asterisk indicates that the ISP score distribution is significantly different from that of routine probation; a plus sign indicates that the distribution for ESP is different from that for routine probation in Los Angeles.

analysis, we cross-tabulated each offender's summary score with whether he or she had either a new technical violation or a new arrest in the one-year follow-up. Table 6.8 shows that for all three sites, program participation was associated with decreased recidivism (Contra Costa, $\chi^2$ (3) = 8.86, $p < 0.04$; Ventura, $\chi^2$ (4) = 14.23, $p < 0.01$; Los Angeles, $\chi^2$ (4) = 20.83, $p < 0.001$).[15]

Table 6.8

RECIDIVISM, BY PROGRAM PARTICIPATION AND SITE

(Percent of sample having either a technical violation or an arrest)

| Program Participation Score | Contra Costa | Ventura | Los Angeles |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 70* | 77* | 87* |
| 1 | 53 | 94 | 63 |
| 2 | 57 | 83 | 52 |
| 3 | 0[a] | 61 | 100[a] |
| 4 | NA | 88[a] | 0[a] |

NOTE: An asterisk indicates whether program participation was related to recidivism, using $\chi^2$ tests of significance.

[a]Based on five or fewer cases.

[15]Additional analyses, not shown here, found that the relationship between program participation and recidivism held true when arrests and technical violations were examined separately.

This analysis does not incorporate the random-assignment aspect of the study, since the degree of program participation was not randomly assigned to offenders. Thus, selection processes may be operating. In particular, higher program participation scores may be correlated with lower risk. In other words, "better" offenders may not only have lower recidivism rates, they may also participate in more programs. If this is the case, program participation should not be viewed as causing a reduction in recidivism; the two items are simply correlated.

To examine this possibility, each offender's program participation score was correlated with his or her risk score (as shown in Table 5.1). It was found that in Ventura and Los Angeles, higher-risk offenders had lower program-participation scores ($r = -0.22$, $p < 0.05$; $r = -0.20$, $p < 0.05$, respectively). In Contra Costa, no correlation was found between program participation and risk score ($r = -0.02$, $p > 0.05$).

To determine whether the observed relationship between program participation and recidivism disappears when the offender's risk level is statistically controlled, we used logistic regression to model each recidivism outcome as a function of (1) offender risk and (2) program participation. This analysis directly controlled for offender risk in assessing the relationship between program participation and recidivism.

The results show that in Contra Costa and Los Angeles, program participation remained associated with lower recidivism ($b = 0.55$, $p < 0.02$ for Contra Costa, and $b = 0.51$, $p < 0.02$ for Los Angeles). In Ventura, however, program participation was not related to recidivism, once offender risk was controlled ($b = 0.23$, $p < 0.31$). This may reflect the fact that nearly all Ventura offenders were high risk, and nearly all participated in programs.

## THE OFFENDERS FOR WHOM ISP WAS MOST EFFECTIVE

It is now well accepted that treatment programs are not equally effective for all offenders and that the appropriate question to ask when looking at outcomes is not, Did it work? but, For whom did it work best? Erwin (1987) suggests that ISP works best for drug offenders; Byrne and Kelly (1989) suggest that employed ISP offenders have lower recidivism rates and that higher levels of implementation

(incorporating both treatment and surveillance) are associated with success.

Although our analysis did not find ISP to be more effective than routine probation in reducing recidivism overall, we wanted to investigate whether it might be more effective for *some subgroups* of the population. If this were the case, future ISP programs could be tailored to those subgroups for whom they appear most effective.

Prior probation research has shown certain background characteristics to be related to recidivism (Petersilia et al., 1985; Petersilia et al., 1986; Vito, 1987; Pritchard, 1979). We selected the following variables to test the differential effectiveness of ISP:

Sex (male, female)
Race (white, black, Hispanic)
Age (<26, 26–30, 31+)
Risk (1–5, 6–10, 11–15, 16+)
Prior record (less than jail, jail +)
Living arrangement (with spouse, all other arrangements)
Drug-treatment needs (high, other)
Any paid employment during one-year follow-up (yes, no)
Implementation (low, moderate, high)[16]

We examined whether the interaction between background characteristics and program type (ISP or control) was significantly related to any of three recidivism outcomes (any technical violation, any arrest, any technical violation or arrest). We used multiple logistic regression to model each outcome variable as a function of (1) the background characteristic, (2) the program type, and (3) the interaction between background characteristic and program type. These analyses showed no statistically significant interaction effects between any background characteristic and program type, for any of the three recidivism outcomes.[17] In short, ISP does not appear differentially effective for offenders with different background characteristics. Ta-

[16]Employment and implementation (particularly implementation levels) can be considered outcome measures rather than background factors. Therefore, caution must be taken in relating them to outcomes.

[17]This finding may be due to the fact that the offenders in a particular site were rather homogeneous, having been screened by a number of criteria for inclusion (e.g., a majority of Ventura offenders were high risk, and most Los Angeles offenders had rather similar prior criminal records).

bles B.5, B.6, and B.7 of Appendix B show the three outcome measures by program type and background characteristics for each site.[18]

[18]While no differential program effects were found for offenders with different backgrounds, the following characteristics were generally shown to be related to recidivism, regardless of program type: prior criminal record (those with prior incarcerations had higher recidivism rates); risk level (higher-risk persons had higher recidivism rates); living status (those who lived alone had higher recidivism rates); and level of drug needs (those with greater drug needs had higher recidivism rates).

# 7. COST COMPARISON OF ISP AND ROUTINE PROBATION

One goal of this study was to estimate the total criminal-justice dollars spent on each offender during the one-year follow-up period, including both corrections and court costs.[1] We did this by:

1. Estimating the costs of each type of local sanction or service used by the study sample.
2. Using information from the status calendar and twelve-month reviews on each offender's whereabouts (e.g., in jail, on ISP) on each day in the follow-up period, and "billing" each offender for each service used.
3. Averaging across all probationers, within a given site and program, in the ISP and control programs.

Information on the daily costs of supervision and incarceration was collected from each of the three California counties. The site-specific information proved quite similar across sites, so the estimates were averaged, and the average was used in the cost calculations. The average costs of processing an arrest or a technical violation were taken from Haynes and Larsen (1984). The daily costs of prison were taken from the California Commission on Inmate Population Management (1990).

Table 7.1 shows the cost components and annual costs of the ISP, ESP, and control programs. The table also shows the proportion of the total one-year follow-up period that offenders spent in various corrections programs. Across the sites, the experimental offenders actually spent an average of six months on ISP.

The cost totals show that placing felons on routine probation is much more costly than the currently estimated $300 to $2,000 shown in Table 4.1. The estimated corrections costs of the California routine probation programs studied here range from $4,024 to $6,122, simply because so many offenders have violations and are sent to jail or prison.

[1]Zedlewski (1987) argues that crimes committed by probationers also entail social costs, such as victims' losses from missed work and hospital bills, as well as increased fear, which can translate into the purchase of more private security. No adequate method presently exists for quantifying such social costs, so they are not included here; however, they are likely to be substantial.

Table 7.1

CALCULATING THE COSTS OF ISP, ESP, AND ROUTINE PROBATION

| Costs | Est. Daily Cost ($) | Average Number of Days Used[a] During One-Year Follow-Up: Contra Costa ISP | Contra Costa Routine Probation | Ventura ISP | Ventura CRMT | Los Angeles ESP | Los Angeles ISP | Los Angeles Routine Probation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Correctional costs ($)** | | | | | | | | |
| Supervision | | | | | | | | |
| ISP | 5.15 | 177 | 0 | 174 | 0 | 132 | 171 | 0.6 |
| Routine prob. | 0.90 | 0 | 230 | 7 | 18 | 2 | 0.2 | 173 |
| Summary prob. | 0.50 | 0.3 | 5 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Parole | 0.90 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 0 |
| CRMT | 4.98 | — | — | — | 165 | — | — | — |
| Elect. monitoring | 7.00 | — | — | — | — | 34 | — | — |
| Res. treat. center | 53.25 | 15 | 2 | 9 | 9 | 4 | 8 | 0 |
| Work furlough | 31.87 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 0.2 | 0 | 0 |
| Transfer, other | 0 | 21 | 6 | 14 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 1 |
| Custody | | | | | | | | |
| Prison | 44.00 | 3 | 5 | 36 | 32 | 43 | 51 | 36 |
| Initial jail | 54.24 | 36 | 39 | 25 | 20 | 18 | 38 | 33 |
| Subsequent jail | 54.24 | 30 | 18 | 38 | 60 | 56 | 30 | 41 |
| Hospital, detox | 53.25 | 0.4 | 1 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0 |
| Other | | | | | | | | |
| Failure to appear/ abscond | 0.50 | 58 | 36 | 37 | 27 | 47 | 37 | 62 |
| Dead | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Total corrections | 0 | 5915 | 4024 | 6957 | 7654 | 7477 | 7690 | 6122 |
| **Court Reprocessing Costs** | | | | | | | | |
| Cost per technical violation | 500.00 | 1.3 | 0.5 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.0 |
| Cost per arrest | 1500.00 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 |
| Total court | | 1325 | 899 | 1591 | 1952 | 1156 | 1212 | 1001 |
| FULL COSTS | | 7240 | 4923 | 8548 | 9606 | 8633 | 8902 | 7123 |

NOTE: Dashes indicate not applicable.

[a]The number of days used is averaged across all offenders in each study group.

In terms of correctional costs alone, ISP as implemented in Contra Costa and Los Angeles counties costs about $1,500 to $1,900 more than routine probation. Ventura's ISP and CRMT programs cost about the same, $6,957 versus $7,654. The court costs add between $900 and $1,950 to the correctional costs, making the yearly costs ex-

pended per person between $4,923 and $9,606. It is also worth noting that the costs of ESP in Los Angeles were not greater than the costs of ISP without ESP—persons assigned to either of the two programs cost the corrections system about $7,500 during the one-year follow-up. This reflects the fact that only 44 percent of the ESP offenders were actually placed on ESP during the study period (as discussed previously in Section 5).

# 8. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

## MAJOR FINDINGS

The major findings of this study are summarized below:

1. The probationers who participated in California's ISP and ESP programs were serious offenders. More than half had served prior incarceration terms, and nearly half had serious drug-abuse problems. On an objective risk-of-recidivism scale, 75 percent of them scored high or intensive risk.
2. The ISP and ESP offenders received more probation contacts of each type than did their counterparts who were assigned to routine probation; this contradicts much prior research which shows that ISP programs frequently fail to be "intensive."
3. The California ISP and ESP programs were primarily surveillance- rather than service-oriented. While the courts often ordered offenders to pay victim restitution, fines, and court costs, less than a third of those in the Los Angeles and Contra Costa programs did any of these things (about half of the Ventura probationers paid such fines or fees).
4. Participation in rehabilitative programs by ISP offenders varied considerably across the three sites, from a low of 16 percent in Los Angeles to a high of 78 percent in Ventura. However, in Los Angeles and Contra Costa, ISP offenders were more likely than those on routine probation to participate in such programs.

   Statistical analyses revealed that greater participation in counseling, employment, restitution, and community service was associated with lower levels of recidivism (both technical violations and new arrests). This result generally held true even when the offender's risk level was statistically controlled.
5. Across sites, about a third of the ISP offenders were arrested for a new crime during the one-year follow-up period. About half of all new arrests were for drugs and other miscellaneous offenses; less than 10 percent were for violent crimes.

   Only one significant difference in recidivism, as measured by arrests, was observed between the experimental and control programs: Ventura's ISP offenders were less likely to be

arrested than offenders on CRMT. However, when the average number of arrests per year of street time was considered, the Ventura difference was no longer statistically significant. Thus, the evidence suggests that ISP (or ESP) supervision, as implemented in these sites, was not associated with a reduction in new arrests. Furthermore, the analysis failed to show any significant differences between experimental and control offenders in the severity of the arrest offenses of those offenders who were arrested.

6. Between 41 and 73 percent of all probationers experienced a technical violation. Statistical analyses, however, failed to reveal a relationship between having a technical violation and having a new arrest.
7. At the end of the one-year follow-up period, about a quarter of the ISP and ESP offenders across all three sites had no new incidents (technical violations or new arrests), about 40 percent had technical violations only, and about a third had new arrests. The only significant differences between the percentages for ISP participants and routine probationers appeared in Contra Costa, where ISP offenders had more technical violations, even when time at risk was controlled for.

   In Ventura, 41 percent of the ISP offenders were jailed as a result of a technical violation and 19 percent were sent to prison. In Los Angeles and Contra Costa, about a quarter of the ISP or ESP sample was jailed as a result of technical violations, but less than 2 percent of those in Contra Costa and only about 16 percent of those in Los Angeles were sent to prison.

   Once arrested or cited with a technical violation, ISP offenders were not treated differently from routine probationers in terms of sanctions (i.e., the same proportions were imprisoned and jailed). There were differences, however, across the three sites. In Contra Costa, approximately one-third of those with technical violations and 41 percent of those with arrests were jailed; in Ventura, approximately two-thirds of those with technical violations and arrests were jailed; in Los Angeles, approximately one-third of the technical violators and one-quarter of those arrested were jailed. Prison was generally used as a sanction less often than jail. In Contra Costa, only 3 percent of the offenders with technical violations and 6 percent of those with arrests were imprisoned. But in Ventura, one-third of those with technical violations and 20 per-

cent of those with arrests were imprisoned, and in Los Angeles, just under 30 percent of offenders with arrests or technical violations were imprisoned. Overall, Ventura appeared to be the most punitive of the three sites in terms of incarceration.

8. Two experimental ISP programs were implemented in Los Angeles, one with electronic monitoring (ESP) and one without. The two programs were identical, except that ESP offenders were electronically monitored in their homes during certain time periods, and ISP offenders were not. No differences were observed between the two groups in the rates of technical violations or new arrests.
9. At the end of one year, between 36 and 70 percent of the participants were still active in their originally assigned probation programs, 7 to 25 percent had absconded, and 8 to 37 percent were incarcerated in jail or prison. Ventura and Los Angeles offenders were more likely to be incarcerated than those in Contra Costa, no doubt because they were more serious criminals to begin with, were arrested more often, and were dealt with more harshly by the courts.
10. The high violation and incarceration rates drove up program and court costs: The ISP programs averaged $7,240 to $8,902 per offender for the year, compared with $4,923 to $7,123 for routine probation and $8,633 for ESP. These figures are higher than is commonly calculated because they include the costs of correctional supervision and the court costs associated with reprocessing recidivists.

## INTERPRETING THE FINDINGS

These findings raise a number of difficult questions and complex issues, the most obvious of which are:

1. Why should probationers in ISP programs in other jurisdictions have technical violation and arrest rates so much lower than those in California?
2. If offenders in ISP programs are monitored so much more intensively than those on routine probation, why are the arrest rates virtually the same?
3. Is there continued justification for ISP programs?
4. What course should ISP programs take in the future?

### Why Did the California ISP Probationers Have Higher Failure Rates than Probationers in ISP Programs in Other States?

The answer to this question is fairly straightforward. The offenders in the California demonstration samples were more serious offenders and were at higher risk of recidivism than those who participated in most of the previously evaluated ISPs. Although California chose to implement a probation-enhancement ISP program, its participants were more serious offenders than those who participated in prison-diversion ISPs in many other places. Only one-third of the participants in Georgia's ISP program, for example, were judged high risk. In the California sample, the majority were in this category, and in Ventura, which had the highest recidivism rates, over 80 percent of the ISP probationers were high risk.

It appears that ISP programs have enjoyed widespread support partly because lower-risk offenders have been sentenced to them. This is not to suggest that diverting prisoners to such programs is inappropriate. On the contrary, a state that has a pool of low-risk offenders in prison is well advised to divert them to less-expensive community-based programs. But as higher-risk offenders are sentenced to such programs, higher violation rates must be expected—especially if the programs vigorously enforce their technical conditions. Given the apparent lack of effect of closer monitoring on high-risk offenders, high arrest rates are also to be expected.

The importance of this lesson cannot be overstated: States that are considering implementing ISP programs must look closely at their "candidate pools." The design and implementation of appropriate programs depend critically on recognizing differences in offender profiles and understanding the risk levels of different offender populations (e.g., parolees, probationers) within particular areas. The differences in these levels also must be taken into consideration when recidivism rates are compared across states and jurisdictions.

### Why Were Outcomes So Similar for ISP Probationers and Routine Probationers?

In addition to higher overall failure rates, the California results also differ from other program results in terms of comparative outcomes. Other ISP programs were judged successful precisely because the offenders who participated in them had much lower revocation and recidivism rates than offenders on routine probation or parole. In

the three California ISP sites, the arrest rates between the experimental and control groups were virtually identical.

Previous evaluations, however, were not based on *random* assignment to ISP programs. Thus, comparisons of ISP and routine probation or parole outcomes may have been misleading. Judges have been very sensitive to the risks involved in putting prison-bound offenders in community programs—and to public concerns about the courts being soft on criminals. Consequently, the offenders sentenced to ISP are likely to be very different from the rest of the offender population, and the differences in outcomes might have resulted more from differences in populations than from the ISP programs themselves.

Because offenders were randomly assigned to either routine probation or ISP in the California experiment, the reverse should be true: The outcomes should represent program, not population, effects. Our results therefore bring into question a basic premise of ISP, i.e., that increased surveillance will act as a constraint and the likelihood of detection will act as a deterrent to crime. These theoretical effects, of course, can be expected only if the ISP actually does impose more conditions and surveillance than routine probation does. In the California demonstration, the ISP programs intensified supervision, but they did not produce the expected effects. More supervision, without a substantive treatment component, evidently had little effect on offenders' underlying criminal behavior, as manifested in their arrest rates.

## Is There Continued Justification for ISP Programs?

Our findings suggest that ISP programs, even those as rigorous as Ventura's, are not effective for high-risk offenders if effectiveness is judged solely by offender recidivism rates. Given that these programs are more expensive than routine probation and apparently provide no greater guarantees for public safety, is there any future for them? That depends on what ISP programs set out to accomplish and what kinds of sentencing options the system wants or needs.[1]

As noted in Section 1, ISP programs are designed to serve three primary goals: (1) to conserve scarce prison space and money that would otherwise be spent on incarceration; (2) to keep offenders from committing crimes in the community while they are on probation; and

[1]The issue also requires more research. This study has taken a first step in experimental analysis. Further research using random assignment is needed in jurisdictions with different risk populations and resources.

(3) to impose a punishment less severe than prison, but more severe than routine probation. For high-risk offenders, ISP programs are slightly more expensive but apparently no more effective than routine probation in lowering recidivism rates. However, the programs evaluated here did impose an "intermediate" punishment, for which the court-ordered conditions were more credibly monitored and enforced than was possible with routine probation. Discussions about whether ISP is a promising direction for crime-control policy must therefore move from micro-level questions, such as whether they benefit their subjects, to macro-level concerns about their contribution to overall sentencing policy.

The most compelling reason for continued development of ISP programs is the system objective of just deserts, i.e., making the punishment fit the crime. California courts presently place many high-risk offenders on probation, where caseloads of 150 or more preclude probation officers from providing close supervision. Probation supervision in California is often little more than unsupervised community release and monitoring for rearrest. Caseloads in many jurisdictions permit only minimal contact with the probationer. Thus, routine probation clearly does not constitute just punishment for felons with serious prior records.

Another reason for developing ISP programs is the long-standing need for a range of sanctions that reflect the range of crimes and criminal behavior. The United States has no established sanctions between incarceration and probation. As Morris and Tonry state:

> Essentially we are both too lenient and too severe with convicted offenders—too lenient with many on probation who should be subject to tighter controls in the community, and too severe with many in prison and jail who, if under adequate supervision, would present communities with no serious threat.
>
> Effective and principled punishment of convicted criminals requires the application of a range of punishments between prison and probation. Imprisonment is now used excessively, probation even more excessively. Between the two is a spectrum of intermediate punishments that are hardly used at all (1990:231).

The present study indicates that the "threat" to public safety depends on how serious the offenders being released in the community are. Certainly, the system does not want to put offenders who are a serious threat into the community. However, most states cannot build prisons fast enough to keep up with the rate of serious crime.

Given this situation, justice would be better served by alternatives to routine probation that more closely match the seriousness of offenders' crimes.

The problem of inappropriate punishment also exists for less serious offenders. In the absence of intermediate sanctions, some states imprison people whose crimes and records hardly seem to merit incarceration. The low recidivism rates of some prison-diversion ISP programs appear to validate this. Justice is not served by putting many low-risk offenders in prison. In states with large pools of such offenders, building more prisons is neither cost-effective, rational, nor humane.

Ideally, the system should develop a continuum of punishments, ranging from warnings and restitution, through diverse community-based punishments (including probation and ISP, fines, and community service), to incarceration. Sanctions could then be adjusted to suit the individual offender's conviction crime, prior record, and threat to the community. Developing and implementing such a continuum would not be a trivial undertaking, however, and it cannot be accomplished by fiddling at the margins of the existing corrections system. Revamping the system will require single-minded understanding of the problem and public acceptance of the need, as well as a serious commitment of will and resources.

To achieve public acceptance, the case also must be made that ISP can reasonably constitute just deserts for serious offenders. In the California experiment, the ISP programs certainly came closer than routine probation did, in terms of constraints and requirements. They were clearly more intrusive and constraining than routine probation in both structure and intent, with participants having two to three times more face-to-face and telephone contacts and law-enforcement checks than routine probationers had.

Nevertheless, most people would argue that ISP is less punitive than state prison, and indeed, prison does come closer than ISP to the norm of punishment for a large percentage of high-risk offenders. But there are two responses to this argument: (1) In many states, there is no more room in prison, and ISP imposes at least some degree of punishment, and (2) as their behavior attests, high-risk offenders are not "most people," and they may have a different perception of the ISP/prison comparison.

In Marion County, Oregon, selected nonviolent offenders were given the choice of serving a prison term or returning to the community to participate in an ISP program. These offenders had been convicted, and the judge had imposed prison sentences. During the

one-year study period, about a third of those eligible for the experiment chose prison instead of ISP (Petersilia, 1990a). Obviously, prison conditions seem less punishing than ISP requirements to some offenders. Further, in some states, offenders know that they will have to spend more time on ISP than they would spend in prison. That certainly is the case in California, where a two- to three-year prison sentence often translates into less than six months of actual prison time (California Commission on Inmate Population Management, 1990).

## What Should Be the Future Course of ISP Programs?

Even if the public and politicians accept the arguments favoring ISP programs, the long-term viability of such programs may depend on realistic reappraisal of what they can be expected to accomplish, a shift in emphasis, and different criteria for judging effectiveness.

What ISP programs can accomplish depends largely on the nature of the "candidate pool" and other aspects of the corrections environment. As noted, ISP is not going to deter many high-risk offenders, and it will not be able to incapacitate them unless the local jails have more space than most jurisdictions have. In this situation, ISP programs function primarily as a way to impose conditions that come closer to just deserts than routine probation can.

Because they have better access to treatment programs and job-placement services, ISP programs also have some potential for rehabilitating offenders. At all three of the California study sites, offenders who received counseling, were employed, paid restitution, and did community service had less recidivism. Because the level of involvement in program services was low, however, these activities may not have had much effect on the overall recidivism rates for the sites. Nevertheless, the finding of a difference in recidivism has important implications for treatment and outcomes. Whether the participants who had lower recidivism were truly rehabilitated remains to be seen, and a longer-term follow-up would be required to test that. Still, the reduction in recidivism is considered a positive sign of rehabilitation, and it seems reasonable to conjecture that overall outcomes might have been different if a greater proportion of the sample had been employed and had participated in drug-treatment programs.

The experimental results indicate that greater emphasis on drug treatment is particularly important for ISP. At all three sites, about half of the offenders had serious drug problems: 53 percent in Ven-

tura, 41 percent in Los Angeles, and 42 percent in Contra Costa. Most of the rest probably also had some drug involvement. Yet ISP staff had trouble obtaining drug treatment for these people. In Los Angeles, for example, only 20 percent of the ISP offenders with high drug-treatment needs received drug counseling. The critical need for such counseling is underlined by the drug/crime nexus: About one-third of all new arrests were drug-related.

Offenders cannot be expected to overcome drug and alcohol addictions just because they know they will be subjected to urinalysis. Even if some offenders might be deterred by fear of revocation, those who are involved with drugs and alcohol usually do not think rationally and clearly. Drug use alters the cost-benefit assessment of engaging in crime (Ohlin and Tonry, 1989). Further, if the drug users are already embracing high-risk behavior in their addictions, they clearly are not risk-weighers. Thus, the consequences of testing results from urinalysis can hardly be expected to have much effect on their habits. As one probation officer put it,

> Many of our probationers are behaviorally out-of-control, and live in out-of-control communities. Until we can bring them back, rational models such as those represented by ISP—where you are trying to get the offender to become aware of his behavior and the increased consequences of crime—seem misdirected (informal discussion).

Recent research indicates that ISP programs may provide a particularly effective context for drug treatment:

> Despite less favorable preadmission characteristics, legally coerced clients (e.g., probationers) benefited from treatment as much as other clients, and their addiction-related behaviors markedly improved after entry into treatment. ... The evidence generally supports the proposition that a collaborative relationship between the criminal justice system and community-treatment delivery systems produces, at an aggregate level, enhanced treatment outcomes (Anglin and Hser, 1990:143).

## Shifting the Emphasis of ISP

The prevalence of drug involvement among offenders raises the issue of the emphasis ISP places on conditions and technical violations of those conditions. Drug use is one of the major reasons for the high

revocation and recidivism rates of serious offenders, most of whom have drug histories and/or problems. If drug users are excluded from ISP eligibility, the candidate pool will virtually dry up. If they are not excluded and drug testing is included in the ISP program, violation rates will probably be high. If a program responds rigorously to violations, it will have high incarceration rates.

The emphasis on technical violations largely reflects the assumption that such violations are proxies for criminal behavior, i.e., signals that offenders are "going bad," and thus, if an offender's probation is revoked for violations, the system may be preventing crimes. That assumption had not been tested empirically prior to this study. One of our most important findings is that offenders who had technical violations were no more likely to have new arrests than those who did not.

Since technical violations evidently are not proxies for criminal behavior, it seems reasonable to question ISP programs' emphasis on them—especially the practice of sending offenders to prison for them. The effort and resources spent on monitoring and incarcerating people for technical violations might be better spent, for example, on more drug/alcohol treatment and job placement efforts.

One argument against deemphasizing technical violations is that this would effectively reduce ISP's punitiveness. Conditions such as curfew, drug testing, and reporting embody ISP's purpose and its difference from routine probation. If a program does not monitor observance of its conditions or revoke participation for failure to meet them, why should offenders be expected to comply? If the conditions are merely paper requirements, how does ISP differ from routine probation? If it doesn't differ, what happens to just deserts? That argument deserves a closer look, given what these results now show about the lack of correlation between technical violations and arrests and what has happened in the state of Washington. In 1984, Washington officials decided to reconsider sentencing and corrections policies regarding court-imposed conditions for probationers. As in other states with a high proportion of high-risk offenders, a great many probationers were revolving in and out of prison for technical violations, and judges typically imposed a "standard" list of eight to ten conditions on probationers.

This practice raised some provocative questions: Were these conditions being imposed because they were relevant to the offenders' conviction crimes and past problem behavior or simply to cover judicial flanks? Did the specter of a Willie Horton-type horror story make judges want the record to show that they always imposed as many

constraints as possible? If so, is justice served by imposing conditions that are not strictly relevant to the case? Finally, how much was this practice contributing to prison crowding?

After considering these questions, the Washington State Legislature developed new rules regarding conditions and the handling of violations (Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission, 1983). Washington courts can now impose only conditions that are directly relevant to an offender's conviction crime and his past criminal behavior. This typically results in no more than two or three conditions. In addition, prison cannot be used as a sanction for technical violations. Revocation for technical violations carries a penalty of not more than 60 days in a local jail.

The preliminary results in Washington support the argument for deemphasizing technical conditions and bear out the finding that technical violations are not proxies for criminal behavior. Although no formal empirical studies have been conducted, officials believe that revocation for technical violations has decreased in Washington, while arrest rates for new crimes have remained roughly the same (Greene, 1988). Obviously, decreasing the number of conditions imposed would by itself lower revocation rates somewhat: If drug testing, for example, is not a condition, using drugs is not going to result in a revocation. However, if the old assumptions about technical violations were true, arrest rates would, theoretically, have risen. Since the rates have not risen, technical conditions may not be strongly related to recidivism or public safety.

Another statistic from Washington is particularly interesting: It is now the only state in the union with available prison space. In fact, Washington is renting prison space to the federal government. No relationship has been established between this situation and the de emphasis of technical conditions. However, prior to the changes, 15 to 20 percent of the prisoners entering the state's prisons on any given day were probationers revoked for technical violations; officials estimate that the figure is now closer to 5 percent.

But what about just deserts? It seems more just to impose only conditions that are relevant to an individual's case than to set standard conditions for all offenders (the common practice). Moreover, imposing only relevant conditions does not mean that offenders are watched less closely. Instead, monitoring concentrates on the limited conditions imposed and the offenders' general behavior. If ISP programs did not continue to closely monitor behavior and impose sanctions for violations, they would no longer be providing intensive supervision probation. They would not be holding offenders accountable

or attempting to ensure public safety, and they would be no more stringent than routine probation.

If there are no significant differences in arrest rates between ISP and routine probation, when time at risk is controlled, as was the case in the California study, what good does the monitoring do? Some proponents of the ISP concept believe that ISP may well have decreased crime rates, even though the programs did not hold down arrest rates. As discussed in Section 2, the study outcomes reported here are based on officially recorded recidivism data, which is a product of the offender's crime rate and his or her arrest probability. The ISP offenders were known by local police, and in some instances, the police were asked to assist probation officers in making random home visits. When a crime was committed, police might have been more aware of the whereabouts of ISP offenders, and therefore may have had a greater chance of connecting one of them to a crime, hence, raising his or her arrest probability. If that did occur, real crime was prevented by ISP, even though the official records imply similar arrest rates for ISP and routine probationers. The data available for this study did not permit us to evaluate the extent to which this may have occurred.

### Rethinking the Criteria for Success

The ISP programs studied here focused primarily on surveillance. As programs move away from rehabilitation and toward control, some might argue that higher arrest rates should be seen as an indication of program success, not failure, especially when dealing with high-risk offenders. Barry Nidorf, Chief Probation Officer for Los Angeles County, reflected:

> As I begin to look at the effectiveness of my ISP program, I question whether recidivism rates—the number of offenders who return to crime—are really an appropriate outcome measure. When rehabilitation was our primary purpose, recidivism rates seemed appropriate. However, if control and community protection are ISP goals, then a "success" might be viewed as the identification and quick revocation of persons who are committing crimes. After all, the police are in the business of surveillance and control, and they judge an "arrest" a success, whereas we deem it a "failure."
>
> If community safety is the primary goal, then perhaps an arrest and revocation should be seen as a success and not a failure. Yet we continue to judge these programs by how many

> offenders they have "rehabilitated." It seems to me that serious rethinking about how to judge the effectiveness of these new programs is in order (personal communication).

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

Two conclusions emerge from this study's findings and implications: First, jurisdictions must judge the potential of ISP on the basis of their own candidate pools, their own resources, and their own political situations. Second, more research is needed on ISP, especially research involving random assignment of various kinds of offenders to probation, prison, and ISP.

The importance of the candidate pool has been discussed above at length. The importance of resources has been succinctly stated by two officials in California:

> As anticipated, ISP without adequate resources in the community is only half a program. We're convinced that the proper role for probation and especially ISP includes holding probationers accountable and taking sure and swift actions on violations, but probation must also provide the offenders with opportunity to change. We found our probationers would not or could not wait months on a waiting list in order to get into a drug treatment program. This resulted in continuing drug use and a high violation rate (Gerald Buck, Chief Probation Officer for Contra Costa County, personal communication).
>
> * * * * *
>
> Without drug treatment programs, and with our commitment to public safety, we ended up violating a lot of probationers who might have succeeded if we had effective treatments. Philosophically, we assume that drug offenders are often in states of social and emotional instability, and that our role is to move these probationers towards community stability and responsibility by control, counseling, drug-testing and treatment.... Unfortunately, the lack of available treatment programs was a missed opportunity for these persons and the community (Yoshio Murakawa, Supervisor in Contra Costa County, personal communication).

It is particularly important for jurisdictions to understand how the public perceives the objectives of ISP. If the public expects and demands deterrence and the jurisdiction has a high-risk candidate pool,

public support for ISP is not likely to be strong. However, a number of recent studies of public attitudes about crime and punishment have discovered that Americans strongly favor increasing the use of alternatives to incarceration, except for violent offenders. And support for alternative sanctions increases further as the public learns about the costs of incarceration (Doble, 1987).

Finally, we cannot overemphasize the contribution this California demonstration project has made in testing the ISP concept. When the Government Accounting Office (GAO) reviewed what was known about ISP, it concluded that very little had been learned from the more than 100 projects funded by the LEAA between 1970 and 1977 (Banks et al., 1977). That is certainly not the case here. The California sites received federal funding in 1986; and as of 1990, they have provided solid, empirical evidence about the success of their ISP program implementations, what the programs accomplished, and what they cost their local systems. Policymakers should evaluate this critical information before investing resources in full-scale ISP programs.

From that standpoint, the ISP experiment in California has been a great success. The jurisdictions that participated have made a valuable contribution to our understanding of ISP and its potential as an alternative sanction.

# Appendix A
# DATA COLLECTION FORMS

# EVALUATION OF INTENSIVE SUPERVISION DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM

Joan Petersilia, Principal Investigator

The RAND Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90406

Sponsored by: **The Bureau of Justice Assistance and the National Institute of Justice**
**U.S. Department of Justice**

EVALUATION OF INTENSIVE SUPERVISION DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM

The RAND Corporation
Attn: Helen Giglio
1700 Main Street, Santa Monica, California 90406
(213) 393-0411

BACKGROUND ASSESSMENT FORM - PART I

**********
THIS FORM IS DUE FOR EACH OFFENDER ASAP AFTER HIS/HER ASSIGNMENT TO THE EXPERIMENTAL/CONTROL CONDITIONS OF THE STUDY.
THIS COVER PAGE IS TO BE USED FOR ALL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION ABOUT THE CASE. MAKE SURE NO PERSONAL IDENTIFIERS APPEAR ON SUBSEQUENT PAGES. THIS PAGE SHOULD BE DETACHED FROM THE REST OF THE FORM AND MAILED SEPARATELY.
**********

1. SITE:_____ |___|

2. CODER:_____

3. DATE CODED: |__|__|__|__|__|__|
| MO | DAY | YR |

4. OFFENDER'S NAME _____

5. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER _____- _____- _____

6. RAND ID #: |__|__|__|__|__|

7. PRIMARY COURT DOCKET NUMBER: 1. |__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|

SUPPLEMENTAL " " : 2. |__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|

SUPPLEMENTAL " " : 3. |__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|

8. LOCAL PROB DEPT IDENTIFIER |__|__|__|__|__|__|__|

9. STATE ID #: |__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|

10. DATE OF BIRTH |__|__|__|__|__|__|
| MO | DAY | YR |

11. NAME OF DPO RESPONSIBLE (Initially):_____

Telephone number: (____) _____

**********

CASE SUMMARY

Use this space for any information you think is important but could not find a place for it (continue on back if necessary).

EVALUATION OF INTENSIVE SUPERVISION DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM

The RAND Corporation
Attn: Helen Giglio
1700 Main Street, Santa Monica, California 90406
(213) 393-0411

DEFENDANT BACKGROUND INFORMATION

CARD NO: 01 1-2/

1. RAND ID #: |__|__|__|__|__| 3-7/

2. SITE NO: |__| 8/

3. SEX: (circle one)

Male.....1 9/
Female.....2

4. RACE: (circle one)

White.....1 10/
Black.....2
Hispanic.....3
Asian.....4
Unknown.....9

5. EDUCATION:

(circle one)

8 years or less.....1 11/
9 - 11 years.....2
H.S. graduate or GED.....3
Post H.S. graduate.....4
Unknown.....9

6. MARITAL STATUS:

(circle one)

Single.....1
Married.....2 12/
Divorced/Separated/widowed.....3
Unknown.....9

7. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS:
(enter 99 if unknown)

(enter number)

|__|__| 13-14/

8. LIVING ARRANGEMENTS AT TIME OF ARREST:

(circle one)

Both Parents.....1 15/
One Parent (mother or father).....2
Spouse.....3
Alone.....4
Other Relative.....5
Other person.....6
Other (group facility/situation).....7
Unknown.....9

---

OFFENDER STATUS AFTER ASSIGNMENT TO STUDY

This section is to determine exactly where the offender is after assignment to the experimental/control conditions.

---

1. PHYSICAL LOCATION OF OFFENDER AFTER RAND ASSIGNMENT:
(circle one)

Probation.....1
Jail.....2
Prison.....3

16/

2. PRIMARY PROBATION SUPERVISION LEVEL ASSIGNMENT FOR STUDY:
(Also include for cases held in jail awaiting community supervision).

(circle one)

Unclassified.....01

17-18/

REGULAR:
Minimum.....02
Medium.....03
Moderate.....04
Maximum.....05

SPECIAL:
Intensive.....06
Electronic Surveillance.....07
CRMT (Ventura Only).....08
Special caseload.....09
(specify)_____

N/A (Prison only).....99

3. DATE SENTENCED TO PRISON:
(If N/A fill in zero's)

|__|__|__|__|__|__|
| MO | DAY | YR |

19-24/

4. ESTIMATED RELEASE DATE FROM PRISON:
(If N/A fill in zero's)

|__|__|__|__|__|__|
| MO | DAY | YR |

25-30/

5. DATE SENTENCED TO CURRENT PROBATION:
(If N/A fill in zero's)

|__|__|__|__|__|__|
| MO | DAY | YR |

31-36/

6. DATE PROBATION SUPERVISION BEGAN:
(for cases still in jail put the estimated date to begin probation supervision)

|__|__|__|__|__|__|
| MO | DAY | YR |

37-42/

PRIOR CRIMINAL RECORD

This next section deals with the offender's prior criminal record. EXCLUDE THE CURRENT OFFENSE IN THESE COUNTS. Complete this section AND attach a photocopy of the criminal record (rap sheet) to this form. White-out any personal identifiers from the rap sheet.

PART I - PRIOR ARRESTS (Adult and Juvenile)

1. DATE OF FIRST ARREST OR OFFICIAL JUVENILE CITATION: |__|__|__|__|__|__| (MO | DAY | YR) 43-48/

2. TOTAL REPORTED PRIOR ARRESTS AND/OR OFFICIAL JUVENILE CITATIONS: (enter number) |___|___| 49-50/

PART II - PRIOR CONVICTIONS (Adult and Juvenile)

3. DATE OF FIRST CONVICTION/ADJUDICATION: |__|__|__|__|__|__| (MO | DAY | YR) 51-56/

4. TOTAL REPORTED PRIOR FELONY CONVICTIONS/ADJUDICATIONS: (enter number) |___|___| 57-58/

5. TOTAL REPORTED PRIOR MISDEMEANOR CONVICTIONS/ADJUDICATIONS: (enter number) |___|___| 59-60/

6. TOTAL REPORTED PRIOR CONVICTIONS/ADJUDICATIONS FOR FELONY CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS (See offense codes on last page for the list of crimes against persons): (enter number) |___|___| 61-62/

7. TOTAL REPORTED PRIOR CONVICTIONS/ADJUDICATIONS FOR FELONY PROPERTY CRIMES (See offense codes on last page for the list of property crimes):

(enter number)

|__|__| 63-64/

8. TOTAL REPORTED PRIOR CONVICTIONS/ADJUDICATIONS FOR DRUG OFFENSES (See offense codes on last page):

(enter number)

|__|__| 65-66/

PART III - PRIOR SENTENCES SERVED

**INCLUDE BOTH ADULT AND JUVENILE**

9. TOTAL PRIOR PROBATION SENTENCES SERVED (WITH OR WITHOUT JAIL): (Includes court/summary/conditional releases/probation grants)

(enter number)

|__|__| 67-68/

10. TOTAL PRIOR JAIL COMMITMENTS SERVED: (Includes local Juvenile commitments)

(enter number)

|__|__| 69-70/

11. TOTAL PRIOR STATE/FEDERAL PRISON TERMS SERVED: (Includes State Juvenile Training schools)

(enter number)

|__|__| 71-72/

| | |
|---|---|
| CARD NO: 02 | 1-2/ |
| RAND ID #: \|__\|__\|__\|__\|__\| | 3-7/ |

PART IV - REVOCATIONS (Includes Both Adult and Juvenile)

12. TOTAL PRIOR PROBATION REVOCATIONS:
(Includes revocations based on new crimes and technical violations)

(enter number)

|___|___| 8-9/

13. TOTAL PRIOR PAROLE REVOCATIONS:
(Includes revocations based on new crimes and technical violations)

(enter number)

|___|___| 10-11/

CURRENT OFFENSE INFORMATION

This next section deals with the offense(s) for which the offender was placed in the study.

1. STATUS AT TIME OF ARREST:

(circle one)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Free | 1 | 12/ |
| Juvenile supervised probation | 2 | |
| Juvenile parole | 3 | |
| Adult supervised probation | 4 | |
| Adult parole | 5 | |
| Work Furlough or other supervised release | 6 | |
| Escapee Prison/Jail | 7 | |
| Unknown | 9 | |

2. CURRENT OFFENSE ARREST DATE: |__|__|__|__|__|__| 13-18/
MO | DAY | YR

3. CURRENT OFFENSE CONVICTION DATE:

|__|__|__|__|__|__| 19-24/
MO | DAY | YR

4. CONVICTION OFFENSE CRIME TYPE:
(See Offense Codes on last page, code up to 3 most serious)

(enter code)

a. |__|__|__| 25-27/

b. |__|__|__| 28-30/

c. |__|__|__| 31-33/

5. CURRENT SENTENCE IMPOSED:

(Circle one)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Prison | 1 | 34/ |
| Jail and Probation | 2 | |
| Probation only | 3 | |
| Other | 4 | |

(specify)_____

_____

---

FOR ITEMS 5-A THROUGH H BELOW FILL IN TOTAL SENTENCE IMPOSED IN EACH CATEGORY - IF AN ITEM IS NOT APPLICABLE, FILL IN ZERO'S.
DO NOT SUBTRACT CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED OR DETENTION TIME.

---

5-A. TOTAL PRISON SENTENCE:
(exclude suspended sentences)

(enter time in months)

|___|___|___| 35-37/

B. TOTAL MONTHS PROBATION SENTENCE:

(enter time in months)

|___|___| 38-39/

1. JAIL TIME INCLUDED IN PROBATION SENTENCE:

(enter time in days)

|___|___|___| 40-42/

2. TOTAL DAYS RESTITUTION CENTER:
(OREGON ONLY) (enter time in days)

|___|___|___| 43-45/

C. TOTAL HOURS COMMUNITY SERVICE:

(enter hours)

|___|___|___|___| 46-49/

D. TOTAL AMOUNT RESTITUTION:
(Round to nearest $. If not yet determined, enter 00098)

(enter amount)

$ |___|___|___|___|___| 50-54/

E. TOTAL AMOUNT FINES/COURT COSTS - INCLUDES ATTORNEY'S FEES
(Round to nearest $. If not yet determined, enter 00098)

(enter amount)

$ |___|___|___|___|___| 55-59/

F. TOTAL AMOUNT PROBATION FEES:
(Round to nearest $. If not yet determined, enter 00098)

(enter amount)

$ |___|___|___|___|___| 60-64/

CARD NO: 03 1-2/

RAND ID #: |__|__|__|__|__| 3-7/

INITIAL PROBATION CONDITIONS ORDERED:
(either by the court or by probation dept.)

(circle all conditions that apply):

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| None or N/A (prison cases) | 0 | 8/ |
| Maintain/seek employment | 1 | 9/ |
| Alcohol treatment program | 2 | 10/ |
| Drug treatment program | 3 | 11/ |
| Refrain from contact with specified persons | 4 | 12/ |
| Education program | 5 | 13/ |
| Psychological counseling | 6 | 14/ |
| Community service | 7 | 15/ |
| Abstain from use of alcohol | 8 | 16/ |
| Abide by special curfews | 10 | 17-18/ |
| Submit to urine/blood/breath analysis | 11 | 19-20/ |
| Participate in electronic surveillance | 12 | 21-22/ |
| Take antabuse | 13 | 23-24/ |
| Submit to searches by probation/police | 14 | 25-26/ |
| Evaluation at mental health facility | 15 | 27-28/ |
| Have a community sponsor | 16 | 29-30/ |
| Other | 17 | 31-32/ |

(Specify):_____
_____
_____
_____

RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT

If you have a formal risk/needs assessment already completed for the offender, please photocopy it, (white-out any identifiers) and attach it to this form. MAKE SURE THE RAND ID # IS ON THE COPY YOU SEND TO RAND. If you do not have a risk/needs assessment completed for the offender, please complete this section using either official written documentation, or the Probation Officer's Report.

1. NUMBER OF ADDRESS CHANGES IN LAST 12 MONTHS:
(circle one)

| | |
|---|---|
| None....1 | 33/ |
| One....2 | |
| Two or more....3 | |
| No information available....9 | |

2. PERCENT OF TIME EMPLOYED, IN TRAINING, OR IN SCHOOL:

(circle one)

| | |
|---|---|
| 60% or more....1 | 34/ |
| 40% to 59%....2 | |
| Under 40%....3 | |
| Unemployable and/or supported by other means....4 | |
| No information available....9 | |

3. ATTITUDE:

(circle one)

| | |
|---|---|
| Motivated to change; receptive to assistance....1 | 35/ |
| Dependent or unwilling to accept responsibility....2 | |
| Rationalizes behavior; negative, not motivated to change....3 | |
| No information available....9 | |

4. ACADEMIC/VOCATIONAL TRAINING NEEDS:
(circle one)

High school or above skill level (NO NEED).....1 36/
Adequate skills; able to handle every day requirements (LOW NEED).....2
Low skill level causing minor adjustment problems (MODERATE NEED).....3
Minimal skill level causing serious adjustment problems (HIGH NEED).....4
No information available.....9

5. EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE:
(circle one)

Satisfactory employment for one year or longer (NO NEED).....1 37/
Secure employment; no difficulties reported; or homemaker, student or retired (LOW NEED).....2
Unsatisfactory employment; or unemployed but has adequate job skills (MODERATE NEED).....3
Unemployed and virtually unemployable; needs training (HIGH NEED).....4
No information available.....9

6. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE:
(circle one)

Long-standing pattern of self-sufficiency; e.g., good credit rating (NO NEED).....1 38/
No current difficulties (LOW NEED).....2
Situational or minor difficulties (MODERATE NEED)..3
Severe difficulties; may include garnishment, bad checks or bankruptcy (HIGH NEED).....4
No information available.....9

7. ALCOHOL TREATMENT NEEDS:
(circle one)

No interference with functioning (NO NEED).....1 39/
Occasional abuse; some disruption in functioning (LOW/MODERATE NEED).....2
Frequent abuse; serious disruption; needs treatment (HIGH NEED).....3
No information available.....9

8. OTHER DRUG TREATMENT NEEDS:

(circle one)

No interference with functioning (NO NEED).....1 40/
Occasional abuse; some disruption in functioning (LOW/MODERATE NEED).....2
Frequent abuse; serious disruption; needs treatment (HIGH NEED).....3
No information available.....9

9. MARITAL/FAMILY COUNSELING NEEDS:

(circle one)

Relationships and support exceptionally strong (NO NEED).....1 41/
Relatively stable relationships (LOW NEED).....2
Some disorganization or stress but potential for improvement (MODERATE NEED).....3
Major disorganization or stress (HIGH NEED).....4
No information available.....9

10. MENTAL ABILITY:

(circle one)

Able to function independently (NO NEED).....1 42/
Some need for assistance; potential for adequate adjustment; mild retardation (LOW/MODERATE NEED)..2
Deficiencies severely limit independent functioning; moderate retardation (HIGH NEED).....3
No information available.....9

11. HEALTH:

(circle one)

Sound physical health; seldom ill (NO NEED).....1 43/
Physical condition or handicap interferes with functioning on a recurring basis (MODERATE NEED)..2
Serious handicap or chronic illness; needs frequent medical car (HIGH NEED).....3
No information available.....9

12. COMPANIONS:

(circle one)

Good support and influence.....1 44/
No adverse relationships.....2
Associations with occasional negative results.....3
Associations almost completely negative.....4
No information available.....9

13. EMOTIONAL STABILITY:

(circle one)

Exceptionally well adjusted; accepts responsibility for actions.....1 45/
No symptoms of emotional instability; appropriate emotional responses.....2
Symptoms limit but do not prohibit adequate functioning; e.g. excessive anxiety.....3
Symptoms prohibit adequate functioning; e.g. lashes out or retreats into self.....4
No information available.....9

14. SEXUAL BEHAVIOR:

(circle one)

No apparent dysfunction.....1 46/
Real or perceived situational or minor problems.....2
Real or perceived chronic or severe problems.....3
No information available.....9

END OF BACKGROUND ASSESSMENT -- PART I

Thank you very much for your cooperation
in completing this evaluation.

PLEASE SEND THIS FORM TO: The RAND Corporation
Attn: Helen Giglio
1700 Main St.
Santa Monica, CA. 90406

**********

OFFENSE CODES

CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS

| | (Codes) |
|---|---|
| Homicide | 050 |
| Forcible Rape | 051 |
| Robbery (armed) | 052 |
| Robbery (strong arm) | 053 |
| Aggravated Assault | 054 |
| Other assaults (no weapon, battery) | 055 |
| Other sex offenses | 056 |

DRUG CRIMES

| | (Codes) |
|---|---|
| Possesion Narcotics | 070 |
| Sale/Transp. Narcotics | 071 |
| Possession non-narc. controlled sub | 072 |
| Sale/Transp. non-narc. controlled sub | 073 |
| Possession Marijuana for sale | 074 |
| Sale/Transp. Marijuana | 075 |
| Other felony drug offenses | 076 |
| Other misdemeanor drug offenses | 077 |

PROPERTY CRIMES

| | (Codes) |
|---|---|
| Burglary | 060 |
| Larceny-theft | 061 |
| Motor-Vehicle theft | 062 |
| Arson | 063 |
| Forgery/counterfeiting/ fraud/embezzlement | 064 |
| Receiving Stolen Property | 065 |
| Weapons; carrying, possessing | 066 |
| Vandalism | 067 |
| Other property offenses | 068 |

OTHER CRIMES

| | (Codes) |
|---|---|
| Prostitution/commercial vice | 080 |
| Gambling | 081 |
| Driving under the influence | 082 |
| All other offenses | 083 |
| Violation of probation/parole | 084 |

**********

EVALUATION OF INTENSIVE SUPERVISION DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM
The RAND Corporation
Attn: Helen Giglio
1700 Main Street, Santa Monica, California 90406
(213) 393-0411

PROBATION SERVICES RECEIVED -- PART II -- 6 MONTH REVIEW

**********
FOR ISP CASES, THIS FORM IS DUE SIX MONTHS AFTER THEIR PROGRAM BEGAN. FOR NON-ISP CASES, THIS FORM IS DUE SIX MONTHS AFTER ASSIGNMENT TO THE STUDY. THIS COVER PAGE IS TO BE USED FOR ALL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION ABOUT THE CASE. MAKE SURE NO PERSONAL IDENTIFIERS APPEAR ON SUBSEQUENT PAGES. THIS PAGE SHOULD BE DETACHED FROM THE REST OF THE FORM AND MAILED SEPARATELY.
**********

1. SITE:_____ |__|
|__|

2. CODER:_____

3. DATE CODED: |__|__|__|__|__|__|
| MO | DAY | YR |

4. OFFENDER'S NAME:_____

5. RAND ID #: |__|__|__|__|__|

**********
CASE SUMMARY

Use this space for any information you think is important but could not find a place for it (continue on back if necessary).

PROBATION SERVICES RECEIVED -- PART II -- 6 MONTH REVIEW

CARD NO: 01 1-2/

RAND ID #: |__|__|__|__|__| 3-7/

SITE NO: |__| 8/

---

OFFENDER STATUS

For ISP cases, this section pertains to the status of the offender six months from the date he/she first began on supervision. For non ISP cases, this section pertains to the status of the offender six months after assignment to the experimental/control conditions of the study.

---

1. CURRENT STATUS OF OFFENDER AT SIX MONTH REVIEW: (circle one)

a. Still active intensive probation.....01 9-10/

b. Still active non ISP regular probation.....02

c. Still active electronic surveillance (ESP).....03

d. In Jail.....04

Estimated Release Date: |__|__|__|__|__|__| (MO | DAY | YR)

e. In prison.....05

Estimated Release Date: |__|__|__|__|__|__| (MO | DAY | YR)

f. Successfully progressed from ISP to reg. prob.....06 11-16/

Date: |__|__|__|__|__|__| (MO | DAY | YR)

g. Absconded.....07

Date: |__|__|__|__|__|__| (MO | DAY | YR)

h. Other.....08

specify:_____

_____

Date: |__|__|__|__|__|__| (MO | DAY | YR)

FOR CASES STILL INCARCERATED, STOP HERE.
ALL OTHER CASES PLEASE CONTINUE

RAND ID#: |__|__|__|__|__|

AMOUNT OF PROBATION SUPERVISION BY MONTH

**********

CALENDAR INSTRUCTIONS

The purpose of this calendar is to determine the amount of time the offender was on ISP, ESP, or regular probation, versus his/her street time and incarceration time. The calendar should include the dates for which the probationer was placed on/off intensive supervision, electronic surveillance and regular supervision, as well as the dates in and out of jail or prison.

Example: 1987

| JANUARY | FEBRUARY | MARCH | APRIL | MAY | JUNE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ISP | Jail | ISP | | Reg. Sup. | |
| 1/5 | 2/28 | 3/2 | | 5/15 | |

**********

CALENDAR

1987

| JANUARY | FEBRUARY | MARCH | APRIL | MAY | JUNE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | |

| JULY | AUGUST | SEPTEMBER | OCTOBER | NOVEMBER | DECEMBER |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | |

RAND ID#: |__|__|__|__|__|

CALENDAR

1988

| JANUARY | FEBRUARY | MARCH | APRIL | MAY | JUNE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | |

| JULY | AUGUST | SEPTEMBER | OCTOBER | NOVEMBER | DECEMBER |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | |

*NOTES:* If you need to clarify any points concerning the calendar, use this space provided.

CARD NO: 2&3

MAJOR INCIDENTS OF NEW ARRESTS AND TECHNICAL VIOLATIONS
6-MONTH REVIEW

SEE CORRESPONDING CODES ON NEXT PAGE

TECHNICAL VIOLATIONS

| | INCIDENT DATE (M M D D Y Y) | | TECHNICAL INCIDENTS CODE | | SANCTION IMPOSED CODE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | | 17-22/ | | 23-24/ | | 25-26/ |
| 2. | | 27-32/ | | 33-34/ | | 35-36/ |
| 3. | | 37-42/ | | 43-44/ | | 45-46/ |
| 4. | | 47-52/ | | 53-54/ | | 55-56/ |
| 5. | | 57-62/ | | 63-64/ | | 65-66/ |
| 6. | | 8-13/ | | 14-15/ | | 16-17/ |
| 7. | | 18-23/ | | 24-25/ | | 26-27/ |
| 8. | | 28-33/ | | 34-35/ | | 36-37/ |
| 9. | | 38-43/ | | 44-45/ | | 46-47/ |

**********

NEW ARRESTS

| | ARREST DATE (M M D D Y Y) | | ARRESTS CODE | | CONVICTION RESULTED? CODE | | SENTENCE IMPOSED CODE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | | 48-53/ | | 54-55/ | | 56/ | | 57-58/ |
| 2. | | 59-64/ | | 65-66/ | | 67/ | | 68-69/ |
| 3. | | 8-13/ | | 14-15/ | | 16/ | | 17-18/ |
| 4. | | 19-24/ | | 25-26/ | | 27/ | | 28-29/ |
| 5. | | 30-35/ | | 36-37/ | | 38/ | | 39-40/ |
| 6. | | 41-46/ | | 47-48/ | | 49/ | | 50-51/ |
| 7. | | 52-57/ | | 58-59/ | | 60/ | | 61-62/ |
| 8. | | 8-13/ | | 14-15/ | | 16/ | | 17-18/ |
| 9. | | 19-24/ | | 25-26/ | | 27/ | | 28-29/ |

CODE SHEET

1. TECHNICAL INCIDENTS

Curfew violation.....01
Failure to report.....02
Dirty drug tests. .....03
Dirty alcohol tests.....04
Other drug violation.....05
Other alcohol violation...06
Employment/School.....07
Community service.....08
Possession of weapon(s).....09
Fines/Fees.....10
Treatment violation.....11
Unauthorized contacts with victims..12
Absconded.....13
Association with minors.....14
New crime no arrest.....15
Other violations of probation conditions.....16

2. NEW ARRESTS

Crimes Against Person

Homicide.....50
Forcible Rape.....51
Robbery (armed).....52
Robbery (strong arm)....53
Aggravated assault.....54
Other Assaults (no weapon, battery)...55
Other sex offenses.....56

Drug Crimes

Possession Narcotics.....70
Sale/Transp. Narcotics.....71
Possession non-narc.controlled sub...72
Sale/Transp. non-narc controlled sub.73
Possession of Marijuana for sale.....74
Sale/Transp. Marijuana.....75
Other Felony drug offenses.....76
Other Misdemeanor drug offenses.....77

Property Crimes

Burglary.....60
Larceny-theft.....61
Motor-Vehicle theft.....62
Arson.....63
Forgery/counterfeiting/ fraud/embezzlement.....64
Receiving stolen property.....65
Weapons; carrying, possessing..66
Vandalism.....67
Other property offenses.....68

Other Crimes

Prostitution/commercial vice....80
Gambling.....81
Driving under the influence.....82
All other offenses.....83
Violation of Probation/Parole...84

3. CONVICTION RESULTED?

1 = Yes  2 = No  3 = Pending

4. SANCTIONS/SENTENCES IMPOSED

Cont'd on current program, no change.....01
Cont'd current program + new conditions.....02
Cont'd current program + new conditions + jail..03
Placed in a residential diversion program.....04
Jail.....05
Prison.....06
Shock Incarceration.....07
Probation revoked.....08
Pending.....09
Other.....10
Unknown.....99

## PROBATION SERVICES RECEIVED

This section pertains to the type and level of supervision and services ordered by the probation officer and/or staff in the past six months. DO NOT INCLUDE OTHER COMMUNITY SERVICES NOT ORDERED BY PROBATION SERVICES, i.e. police ordered programs for drunk driving. It is imperative that this form be completed six months after program initiation.

CARDNO: 3&4

1. NUMBER OF FACE TO FACE CONTACTS BETWEEN PROBATION OFFICER AND CLIENT PER MONTH:

| Specify month: | MO1 | MO2 | MO3 | MO4 | MO5 | MO6 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. At Probation Department | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | 30-41/ |
| b. At Work/School | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | 42-53/ |
| c. Home visit (includes curfew checks) | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | 54-65/ |
| d. Community service | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | 8-19/ |
| e. Other, specify _____ _____ | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | 20-31/ |

2. NUMBER OF PHONE CONTACTS BETWEEN PROBATION OFFICER AND CLIENT:

| Specify month: | MO1 | MO2 | MO3 | MO4 | MO5 | MO6 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. At home (includes curfew checks) | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | 32-43/ |
| b. At work/School | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | 44-55/ |
| c. Other, specify _____ _____ | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | 56-67 |

CARD NO: 6&7

3. NUMBER OF MONITORING CHECKS PERFORMED:

| | MO1 | MO2 | MO3 | MO4 | MO5 | MO6 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Specify month: | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | |
| a. Criminal Record Checks | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | 8-19/ |
| b. Other law enforcement checks | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | 20-31/ |
| c. # of warrants issued | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | 32-43/ |
| d. Alcohol Tests | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | 44-55/ |
| e. Drug Tests | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | 56-67/ |
| f. Employment Verification | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | 8-19/ |
| g. Collateral contacts: home, school,work,comm.service. | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | 20-31/ |
| h. Other, specify: _____ _____ | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | 32-43/ |

4. COMMUNITY SERVICE HOURS:

| | MO1 | MO2 | MO3 | MO4 | MO5 | MO6 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Specify month: | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | |
| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | 44-55/ |

5. NUMBER OF DAYS ON ELECTRONIC MONITORING:

| | MO1 | MO2 | MO3 | MO4 | MO5 | MO6 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Specify month: | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | |
| a. Passive System | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | 56-67/ |

CARDNO: 7&8

| | MO1 | MO2 | MO3 | MO4 | MO5 | MO6 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Specify month: | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | |
| b. Active System | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | \|__\|__\| | 8-19/ |

6. NUMBER OF CONTACTS BETWEEN THE CLIENT AND HIS/HER COMMUNITY SPONSOR:

| Specify month: | MO1 | MO2 | MO3 | MO4 | MO5 | MO6 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ | 20-31/ |

7. NUMBER OF SESSIONS IN COUNSELING:

| Specify month: | MO1 | MO2 | MO3 | MO4 | MO5 | MO6 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. Psychological Counseling (individual or group) | ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ | 32-43/ |
| b. Family/Marital Counseling | ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ | 44-55/ |
| c. Drug/Alcohol Counseling | ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ | 56-67/ |
| d. Other (specify):_____ | ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ | 8-19/ |

8. TRAINING PARTICIPATION:

| Specify month: | MO1 | MO2 | MO3 | MO4 | MO5 | MO6 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. Educational program | ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ | 20-31/ |
| b. Vocational Training | ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ | ____ | 32-43/ |

9. NUMBER OF DAYS IN PAID EMPLOYMENT:

| | MO1 | MO2 | MO3 | MO4 | MO5 | MO6 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Specify month: | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | |
| | \|__\|__\|\|__\|__\|\|__\|__\|\|__\|__\|\|__\|__\|\|__\|__\|\|__\|__\| | | | | | | 44-55/ |

10. EARNINGS/PAYMENTS DURING THE PAST SIX MONTHS:
(Round to nearest $)

a. Gross:

| | MO1 | MO2 | MO3 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Specify month: | _____ | _____ | _____ | |
| | $\|__\|__\|__\|__\| | $\|__\|__\|__\|__\| | $\|__\|__\|__\|__\| | 56-67/ |

| | MO4 | MO5 | MO6 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Specify month: | _____ | _____ | _____ | |
| | $\|__\|__\|__\|__\| | $\|__\|__\|__\|__\| | $\|__\|__\|__\|__\| | 8-19/ |

b. Restitution Paid:

| MO1 | MO2 | MO3 | MO4 | MO5 | MO6 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | |
| $\|__\|__\|__\| | $\|__\|__\|__\| | $\|__\|__\|__\| | $\|__\|__\|__\| | $\|__\|__\|__\| | $\|__\|__\|__\| | 20-37/ |

c. Fines & Court Costs Paid:

| MO1 | MO2 | MO3 | MO4 | MO5 | MO6 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | |
| $\|__\|__\|__\| | $\|__\|__\|__\| | $\|__\|__\|__\| | $\|__\|__\|__\| | $\|__\|__\|__\| | $\|__\|__\|__\| | 38-55/ |

d. Probation Fees Paid:

| MO1 | MO2 | MO3 | MO4 | MO5 | MO6 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | |
| $\|__\|__\|__\| | $\|__\|__\|__\| | $\|__\|__\|__\| | $\|__\|__\|__\| | $\|__\|__\|__\| | $\|__\|__\|__\| | 8-25/ |

RISK/NEEDS REASSESSMENT

If you have a formal risk/needs reassessment already completed for the offender, please photocopy it, (white-out any identifiers) and attach it to this form. MAKE SURE THE RAND ID # IS ON THE COPY YOU SEND TO RAND. *If you do not have a risk/needs reassessment completed for the offender, please complete this section using either official written documentation, or the Probation Officer's Report.*

1. NUMBER OF ADDRESS CHANGES IN LAST 12 MONTHS:
(circle one)

None.....1 26/
One.....2
Two or more.....3
No information available.....9

2. PERCENT OF TIME EMPLOYED, IN TRAINING, OR IN SCHOOL:
(circle one)

60% or more.....1 27/
40% to 59%.....2
Under 40%.....3
Unemployable and/or supported by other means.....4
No information available.....9

3. RESPONSE TO COURT OR BUREAU IMPOSED CONDITIONS:
(circle one)

No problems of consequence.....1 28/
Moderate compliance problems.....2
Has been unwilling to comply.....3
No information available.....9

4. USE OF COMMUNITY RESOURCES:
(circle one)

Not needed.....1 29/
Productively utilized.....2
Needed but not available.....3
Utilized but not beneficial.....4
Available but rejected.....5
No information available.....9

5. SOCIAL IDENTIFICATION:
(circle one)

Mainly with non-criminally oriented individuals....1 30/
Mainly with delinquent individuals.....2
No information available.....9

6. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT LIVING SITUATION:
(circle one)

Relatively stable relationships.....1 31/
Moderate disorganization or stress.....2
Major disorganization or stress.....3
No information available.....9

7. ACADEMIC/VOCATIONAL TRAINING NEEDS:
(circle one)

High school or above skill level (NO NEED).....1 32/
Adequate skills; able to handle every day requirements (LOW NEED).....2
Low skill level causing minor adjustment problems (MODERATE NEED).....3
Minimal skill level causing serious adjustment problems (HIGH NEED).....4
No information available.....9

8. EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE:
(circle one)

Satisfactory employment for one year or longer (NO NEED).....1 33/
Secure employment; no difficulties reported; or homemaker, student or retired (LOW NEED).....2
Unsatisfactory employment; or unemployed but has adequate job skills (MODERATE NEED).....3
Unemployed and virtually unemployable; needs training (HIGH NEED).....4
No information available.....9

9. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE:
(circle one)

Long-standing pattern of self-sufficiency; e.g., good credit rating (NO NEED).....1 34/
No current difficulties (LOW NEED).....2
Situational or minor difficulties (MODERATE NEED)..3
Severe difficulties; may include garnishment, bad checks or bankruptcy (HIGH NEED).....4
No information available.....9

10. ALCOHOL TREATMENT NEEDS:

(circle one)

No interference with functioning (NO NEED).....1 35/
Occasional abuse; some disruption in functioning (LOW/MODERATE NEED).....2
Frequent abuse; serious disruption; needs treatment (HIGH NEED).....3
No information available.....9

11. OTHER DRUG TREATMENT NEEDS:

(circle one)

No interference with functioning (NO NEED).....1 36/
Occasional abuse; some disruption in functioning (LOW/MODERATE NEED).....2
Frequent abuse; serious disruption; needs treatment (HIGH NEED).....3
No information available.....9

12. MARITAL/FAMILY COUNSELING NEEDS:

(circle one)

Relationships and support exceptionally strong (NO NEED).....1 37/
Relatively stable relationships (LOW NEED).....2
Some disorganization or stress but potential for improvement (MODERATE NEED).....3
Major disorganization or stress (HIGH NEED).....4
No information available.....9

13. MENTAL ABILITY:

(circle one)

Able to function independently (NO NEED).....1 38/
Some need for assistance; potential for adequate adjustment; mild retardation (LOW/MODERATE NEED)..2
Deficiencies severely limit independent functioning; moderate retardation (HIGH NEED).....3
No information available.....9

14. HEALTH:

(circle one)

Sound physical health; seldom ill (NO NEED).....1 39/
Physical condition or handicap interferes with functioning on a recurring basis (MODERATE NEED)..2
Serious handicap or chronic illness; needs frequent medical car (HIGH NEED).....3
No information available.....9

15. COMPANIONS:

(circle one)

Good support and influence.....1 40/
No adverse relationships.....2
Associations with occasional negative results.....3
Associations almost completely negative.....4
No information available.....9

16. EMOTIONAL STABILITY:

(circle one)

Exceptionally well adjusted; accepts responsibility for actions.....1 41/
No symptoms of emotional instability; appropriate emotional responses.....2
Symptoms limit but do not prohibit adequate functioning; e.g. excessive anxiety.....3
Symptoms prohibit adequate functioning; e.g. lashes out or retreats into self.....4
No information available.....9

17. SEXUAL BEHAVIOR:

(circle one)

No apparent dysfunction.....1 42/
Real or perceived situational or minor problems.....2
Real or perceived chronic or severe problems.....3
No information available.....9

END OF 6 MONTH REVIEW -- PART II

Thank you very much for your cooperation
in completing this evaluation.

PLEASE SEND THIS FORM TO: The RAND Corporation
Attn: Helen Giglio
1700 Main St.
Santa Monica, CA. 90406

# Appendix B
# SUPPORTING DATA

**Table B.1**

**EXTENT OF PROBATIONERS' RECIDIVISM DURING ONE-YEAR FOLLOW-UP**
(Percent of each group)

| | Contra Costa | | Ventura | | Los Angeles | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Offense | ISP | Routine Probation | ISP | CRMT | ESP | ISP | Routine Probation |
| **Technical viol.** | 64 | 41* | 70 | 73 | 67 | 61 | 57 |
| Fines/fees | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Treatment viol., other[a] | 26 | 11* | 51 | 64 | 37 | 24 | 22 |
| Fail to report | 45 | 29* | 13 | 15 | 21 | 26 | 25 |
| Abscond | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 19 | 18 | 14 |
| Curfew | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| Alcohol-related | 0 | 0 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| Drug-related | 24 | 1* | 25 | 20 | 6 | 8 | 12 |
| **New arrest** | 29 | 27 | 32 | 53* | 38 | 32 | 30 |
| Miscellaneous | 5 | 9 | 18 | 26 | 15 | 10 | 8 |
| DUI, prost., misc. | 2 | 6 | 18 | 24 | 15 | 10 | 4 |
| Weapons | 2 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| Drug crimes | 12 | 9 | 10 | 23* | 10 | 18 | 18 |
| Miscellaneous | 0 | 1 | 5 | 15* | 4 | 8 | 4 |
| Poss./sale marijuana | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Possession narcotics | 2 | 2 | 4 | 8 | 4 | 8 | 10 |
| Sale/transport narcotics | 7 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 4 |
| Property crimes | 9 | 9 | 10 | 15 | 6 | 2 | 6 |
| Forgery/misc. | 4 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Theft/auto theft | 2 | 5 | 6 | 9 | 6 | 2 | 0 |
| Burglary | 5 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 6* |
| Violent crimes | 7 | 2 | 4 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 2 |
| Assault | 6 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 0 |
| Robbery | 1 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 2 |
| Homicide/rape | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **New conviction**[b] | | | | | | | |
| From arrest | 11 | 11 | 26 | 45* | 21 | 22 | 12 |
| Violent | 4 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 4 | 0 |
| Property | 2 | 2 | 8 | 13 | 6 | 2 | 2 |
| Drug | 2 | 4 | 6 | 19* | 4 | 10 | 6 |
| Other | 2 | 4 | 15 | 20 | 12 | 10 | 4 |
| **Sent to jail** | 32 | 21 | 46 | 63* | 39+ | 24 | 16* |
| For tech. viols. | 25 | 11* | 41 | 50 | 35+ | 16 | 12* |
| From arrest | 9 | 14 | 16 | 38* | 12 | 8 | 4 |
| **Sent to prison** | 2 | 4 | 23 | 28 | 23 | 26 | 22 |
| For tech. viols. | 2 | 1 | 19 | 27 | 17 | 16 | 20 |
| From arrest | 0 | 4 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 12 | 8 |

NOTES TO TABLE B.1

NOTE: An asterisk indicates ISP and control-program percentages are significantly different, $p < 0.05$ (using chi-square tests). For Los Angeles, an asterisk indicates that the three groups (ISP, ESP, routine probation) are different. Separate tests were conducted to compare (1) ESP and routine probation, and (2) ISP and routine supervision. A plus sign indicates that these two-group comparisons were significantly different, $p < 0.05$.

[a]"Other" technical violations are employment/school violations, failure to perform community service, possession of weapons, treatment violation, and unauthorized contact with victim. Miscellaneous drug offenses are other felony drug offenses, other misdemeanor drug offenses, possession of nonnarcotic controlled substances, and sale/transportation of nonnarcotic controlled substances. Miscellaneous property offenses are arson, vandalism, and other property offenses. Miscellaneous offenses are prostitution/commercial vice, gambling, DUI, weapons, and all other offenses.

[b]Some arrests were still pending at one year. As such, the conviction rates may be somewhat depressed in the data.

**Table B.2**

**MOST SERIOUS RECIDIVISM OUTCOME**

(Percent of each group)

| | Contra Costa | | Ventura | | Los Angeles | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | ISP | Routine Probation | ISP | CRMT | ESP | ISP | Routine Probation |
| **No incidents** | 29 | 47 | 25 | 19 | 17 | 27 | 29 |
| **Technical violation** | 40 | 26 | 43 | 29 | 46 | 42 | 40 |
| Fines/fees | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Treatment viol./other | 1 | 2 | 21 | 9 | 15 | 6 | 0 |
| Fail to report | 20 | 24 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 10 | 20 |
| Abscond | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 17 | 16 | 12 |
| Curfew | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Alcohol-related | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| Drug-related | 19 | 0 | 16 | 13 | 6 | 8 | 6 |
| **Arrest** | 29 | 27 | 32 | 53 | 38 | 32 | 30 |
| Miscellaneous | 3 | 6 | 9 | 12 | 14 | 6 | 6 |
| DUI, prost., misc. | 2 | 5 | 9 | 12 | 14 | 6 | 2 |
| Weapons | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| Drug | 10 | 9 | 9 | 19 | 10 | 16 | 16 |
| Miscellaneous | 0 | 1 | 3 | 12 | 4 | 8 | 2 |
| Poss./sale marijuana | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Possession narcotics | 2 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 4 | 6 | 10 |
| Sale/trans. narcotics | 6 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 4 |
| Property | 9 | 10 | 10 | 13 | 6 | 2 | 6 |
| Forgery/misc. | 2 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Theft/auto theft | 2 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 2 | 0 |
| Burglary | 5 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| Violent | 7 | 2 | 4 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 2 |
| Assault | 6 | 0 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 0 |
| Robbery | 1 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 2 |
| Homicide/rape | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

NOTE: Totals may not add to 100 percent because of rounding.

**Table B.3**

**STATUS OF OFFENDERS ONE YEAR AFTER ASSIGNMENT**
(Percent of each group)

| | Contra Costa | | Ventura | | Los Angeles | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | ISP | Routine Probation | ISP | CRMT | ESP | ISP | Routine Probation |
| Still active | 58 | 70 | 38 | 36 | 48 | 41 | 45 |
| On street | 45 | 68 | 33 | 29 | 48 | 39 | 33 |
| In resident. treatment | 6 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Detention | 7 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 12 |
| Progressed to routine/ summary probation | 1 | 3[a] | 13 | 15 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| On abscond status | 14 | 14 | 14 | 7 | 14 | 22 | 25 |
| In jail | 13 | 4 | 6 | 8 | 8 | 4 | 4 |
| In prison | 4 | 4 | 24 | 29 | 23 | 26 | 25 |
| Terminated[b] | 11 | 5 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 2 |

[a]Includes one offender who was successfully terminated from supervision altogether.
[b]Includes transferred to other jurisdiction, deported, dead.

**Table B.4**

**OFFENDER PARTICIPATION IN PROGRAMS**

(Percent of each group)

| | Contra Costa | | Ventura | | Los Angeles | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | ISP | Routine Probation | ISP | CRMT | ESP | ISP | Routine Probation |
| Any counseling | 39 | 14* | 78 | 76 | 17+ | 16+ | 2* |
| Psychological | 13 | 6 | 23 | 19 | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| Family | 2 | 1 | 14 | 2* | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Drug/alcohol | 38 | 11* | 63 | 60 | 15+ | 14 | 2 |
| Other | 5 | 2 | 43 | 14* | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Average # sessions (for participants, all types combined) | 51 | 38 | 36 | 23 | 12 | 4 | 1 |
| In training program | | | | | | | |
| Educational | 4 | 2 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 6 | 0* |
| Vocational | 1 | 0 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Any paid employment | 41 | 26* | 80 | 79 | 35 | 45+ | 18* |
| Any community service | 4 | 1 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 6 |
| Any restitution made | 1 | 0 | 31 | 36 | 21+ | 14 | 4* |
| Any paid fines/court costs | 6 | 17* | 34 | 40 | 35+ | 29+ | 6* |
| Paid probation fees | 0 | 0 | 50 | 58 | 14 | 12 | 2 |

NOTE: An asterisk indicates that ISP and routine probation are significantly different, $p < 0.05$. A plus sign indicates that ESP (or ISP) is significantly different from routine probation in Los Angeles.

Table B.5

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS AND RECIDIVISM: CONTRA COSTA COUNTY

(In percent)

| Characteristic | Any Technical Violation in 12 Months | | Any Arrest in 12 Months | | Any Arrest/Technical Violation in 12 Months | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Routine Prob. | ISP | Routine Prob. | ISP | Routine Prob. | ISP |
| Sex | | | | | | |
| Male | 42 | 69 | 31 | 37 | 55 | 76 |
| Female | 39 | 40 | 17 | 13 | 44 | 47 |
| Age | | | | | | |
| 25 and under | 35 | 61 | 33 | 33 | 49 | 72 |
| 26 to 30 | 65 | 65 | 29 | 29 | 71 | 65 |
| Over 30 | 36 | 70 | 20 | 35 | 48 | 75 |
| Race | | | | | | |
| White | 31 | 57 | 13 | 29 | 44 | 64 |
| Black | 44 | 67 | 31 | 34 | 54 | 75 |
| Hispanic | 0 | 25 | 100 | 25 | 100 | 25 |
| Risk level | | | | | | |
| Low | 33 | 50 | 0 | 25 | 33 | 50 |
| Moderate | 33 | 60 | 19 | 30 | 38 | 65 |
| High | 25 | 57 | 42 | 29 | 50 | 67 |
| Intensive | 47 | 73 | 39 | 42 | 64 | 82 |
| Prior record | | | | | | |
| At most, probation | 31 | 63 | 18 | 26 | 41 | 67 |
| Jail or prison | 56 | 64 | 42 | 41 | 69 | 74 |
| Living arrangement | | | | | | |
| With family/others | 41 | 69 | 30 | 34 | 55 | 74 |
| Live alone | 67 | 0 | 33 | 0 | 67 | 0 |
| Live with spouse | 33 | 25 | 11 | 25 | 33 | 38 |
| Drug treatment needs | | | | | | |
| None/some | 40 | 65 | 26 | 41 | 51 | 70 |
| High | 33 | 61 | 38 | 30 | 52 | 70 |
| Summary implementation score | | | | | | |
| ≤ 50% implementation | 34 | 50 | 25 | 50 | 49 | 50 |
| 50–79% implementation | 71 | 60 | 47 | 31 | 71 | 69 |
| ≥ 80% implementation | 0 | 72 | 0 | 36 | 0 | 77 |
| Paid employment | | | | | | |
| None | 41 | 70 | 32 | 40 | 54 | 78 |
| Some | 41 | 54 | 18 | 23 | 50 | 60 |

## Table B.6

### RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS AND RECIDIVISM: VENTURA COUNTY

(In percent)

| Characteristic | Any Technical Violation in 12 Months | | Any Arrest in 12 Months | | Any Arrest/Technical Violation in 12 Months | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | CRMT | ISP | CRMT | ISP | CRMT | ISP |
| Sex | | | | | | |
| Male | 74 | 65 | 55 | 32 | 80 | 72 |
| Female | 70 | 93 | 60 | 29 | 90 | 93 |
| Age | | | | | | |
| 25 and under | 80 | 85 | 68 | 39 | 92 | 94 |
| 26 to 30 | 85 | 58 | 65 | 17 | 95 | 67 |
| Over 30 | 56 | 54 | 31 | 25 | 59 | 57 |
| Race | | | | | | |
| White | 67 | 76 | 45 | 32 | 76 | 81 |
| Black | 100 | 77 | 82 | 38 | 100 | 77 |
| Hispanic | 75 | 59 | 63 | 30 | 84 | 70 |
| Risk level | | | | | | |
| Low | 17 | 56 | 17 | 22 | 33 | 56 |
| Moderate | 33 | 20 | 33 | 0 | 50 | 20 |
| High | 40 | 50 | 60 | 30 | 60 | 50 |
| Intensive | 84 | 79 | 61 | 34 | 90 | 87 |
| Prior record | | | | | | |
| At most, probation | 54 | 63 | 50 | 22 | 73 | 67 |
| Jail or prison | 82 | 73 | 58 | 37 | 85 | 81 |
| Living arrangement | | | | | | |
| With family/others | 86 | 82 | 64 | 38 | 89 | 90 |
| Live alone | 50 | 80 | 55 | 20 | 75 | 80 |
| Live with spouse | 76 | 39 | 35 | 17 | 76 | 43 |
| Drug treatment needs | | | | | | |
| None/some | 72 | 52 | 60 | 30 | 82 | 64 |
| High | 76 | 81 | 55 | 30 | 84 | 84 |
| Summary implementation score | | | | | | |
| ≤ 50% implementation | 45 | NA | 55 | NA | 60 | NA |
| 50–79% implementation | 83 | 44 | 57 | 19 | 89 | 50 |
| ≥ 80% implementation | 100 | 95 | 50 | 43 | 100 | 100 |
| Paid employment | | | | | | |
| None | 78 | 81 | 67 | 44 | 89 | 88 |
| Some | 72 | 67 | 53 | 30 | 79 | 73 |

Table B.7

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS AND RECIDIVISM: LOS ANGELES COUNTY

(In percent)

| Characteristic | Any Technical Violation in 12 Months | | | Any Arrest in 12 Months | | | Any Arrest/Technical Violation in 12 Months | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Routine Prob. | ESP | ISP | Routine Prob. | ESP | ISP | Routine Prob. | ESP | ISP |
| Sex | | | | | | | | | |
| Male | 59 | 64 | 56 | 35 | 47 | 27 | 72 | 84 | 66 |
| Female | 50 | 71 | 70 | 50 | 29 | 50 | 100 | 71 | 100 |
| Age | | | | | | | | | |
| 25 and under | 52 | 54 | 47 | 39 | 54 | 37 | 65 | 85 | 58 |
| 26 to 30 | 46 | 67 | 70 | 23 | 27 | 35 | 69 | 80 | 85 |
| Over 30 | 82 | 74 | 58 | 45 | 48 | 17 | 91 | 83 | 75 |
| Race | | | | | | | | | |
| White | 0 | 50 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 100 | 0 | 50 | 100 |
| Black | 60 | 64 | 63 | 38 | 47 | 23 | 76 | 84 | 70 |
| Hispanic | 60 | 80 | 50 | 20 | 20 | 67 | 60 | 80 | 83 |
| Risk level | | | | | | | | | |
| Low | 0 | 75 | 50 | 0 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 75 | 50 |
| Moderate | 50 | 67 | 38 | 38 | 67 | 25 | 63 | 92 | 63 |
| High | 20 | 50 | 60 | 20 | 50 | 47 | 40 | 67 | 73 |
| Intensive | 78 | 73 | 64 | 39 | 32 | 28 | 91 | 86 | 76 |
| Prior record | | | | | | | | | |
| At most, probation | 59 | 59 | 50 | 35 | 53 | 21 | 59 | 76 | 64 |
| Jail or prison | 58 | 69 | 62 | 35 | 40 | 35 | 81 | 86 | 76 |
| Living arrangement | | | | | | | | | |
| With family/others | 53 | 63 | 62 | 35 | 43 | 27 | 70 | 83 | 69 |
| Live alone | 100 | 0 | 33 | 67 | 0 | 67 | 100 | 0 | 100 |
| Live with spouse | 100 | 100 | 50 | 0 | 60 | 50 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Drug treatment needs | | | | | | | | | |
| None/some | 45 | 62 | 60 | 34 | 45 | 20 | 66 | 83 | 60 |
| High | 88 | 75 | 52 | 38 | 45 | 48 | 88 | 85 | 81 |
| Summary implementation score | | | | | | | | | |
| ≤ 50% implementation | 59 | 85 | 50 | 34 | 62 | 31 | 73 | 100 | 63 |
| 50–79% implementation | 0 | 57 | 67 | 100 | 38 | 33 | 100 | 76 | 67 |
| ≥ 80% implementation | 0 | 63 | 62 | 0 | 44 | 31 | 0 | 81 | 81 |
| Paid employment | | | | | | | | | |
| None | 65 | 68 | 68 | 35 | 41 | 39 | 80 | 88 | 86 |
| Some | 22 | 61 | 48 | 33 | 50 | 22 | 33 | 72 | 57 |

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