

MANAGING THE CHANGES IN CALIFORNIA NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT
BROUGHT ABOUT BY ASSET SEIZURE LAWS

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by

EDWARD E. TUNSTALL

COMMAND COLLEGE CLASS VIII

PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING (POST)

SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA

1989

PART I - A FUTURES STUDY

HOW WILL ASSET SEIZURE LAWS CHANGE CALIFORNIA
NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES BY 1999?

PART II - STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

A STRATEGIC PLAN TO DEVELOP THE OPPORTUNITIES AND
MINIMIZE THE THREATS CREATED BY FUTURE CHANGES.

PART III - TRANSITION MANAGEMENT

A TRANSITION PLAN TO SUPPORT THE IMPLEMENTATION
AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE STRATEGIC PLAN.

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE
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Abstract

PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING
(POST)

Supplementary Executive Summary

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Abstract

Federal and state asset seizure Laws have created the opportunity for narcotics investigations to generate impressive revenue by seizing the ill-gotten gains of the drug dealer and converting them to drug enforcement use. As a result, California narcotics enforcement agencies have begun actively pursuing investigations that will lead them to the assets of the narcotics dealer. The added enforcement dimension will certainly cause changes in other aspects of California narcotics enforcement. The study assesses the futures of California narcotics enforcement relative to these changes by evaluating the threats and opportunities that are ahead. The evaluation led to a recommended policy for implementation that can minimize the threats that surface from these changes while enhancing the crime-fighting opportunities in the future of California narcotics enforcement.

Supplementary Executive Summary

Federal and state asset seizure laws have created the opportunity for narcotics investigators to generate impressive revenue by seizing the ill-gotten gains of the drug dealer and converting them to drug enforcement use. This study evaluates the future of California narcotics enforcement relative to the changes caused by these new laws.

Part I - A Futures Study uses futures research methodology to assess the possible futures of California narcotics enforcement. This methodology determined emerging trends in California narcotics enforcement that were then forecasted ten years into the future. Possible future events were then determined and then probability of occurrence was forecasted. The interaction of these trends and events led to the scenarios of the possible futures of California narcotics enforcement.

Part II - Strategic Management performs a situational audit that first evaluates the environmental forces affecting California narcotics enforcement. This is followed by an analysis of organizational capabilities and resources and an analysis of the key personnel. This situational audit produced an overview of the weaknesses, strengths, threats, and opportunities in the environment of California narcotics enforcement.

The futures study and the situational audit revealed that the asset seizure laws present significant opportunities, pri-

marily in generating revenue for narcotics enforcement purposes. However, this process also revealed possible threats that can be categorized in three broad areas:

1. Asset seizure investigations could dominate narcotics units, leaving little time or resources for other investigations.
2. Interagency disputes over asset distribution could occur.
3. Drug use and the availability of drugs are steadily increasing.

The strategic management of this issue then turns to formulating a policy recommendation that mitigates future threats and enhances opportunities by capitalizing on strengths and avoiding weaknesses. After evaluating several alternatives, the following policy is recommended:

- * Agencies should join together to form interagency task forces, or larger agencies should designate specialized units, to investigate major drug traffickers and emphasize asset seizure.
- * The mission of the local narcotics unit should be established as the well-rounded enforcement of drug problems within the community.
- * A portion of the assets seized from drug dealers should be used to support drug prevention and intervention programs within the community.
- * A portion of the assets seized from drug dealers should also be used to finance enhanced drug enforcement training and equipment for patrol officers.

This recommended policy emphasizes the importance of asset seizure investigations by establishing specialty units dedicated to asset seizure investigations. However, the local narcotics unit should be dedicated to the prevention and investigation of drug-related crimes in their community. Such a policy is intended to seize asset seizure opportunities while continuing to aggressively pursue local problems.

Demand-side enforcement surfaced during this study as an important weapon in the drug war. Therefore, the recommended policy allocates portions of the seized assets towards drug prevention and intervention programs within the community. Finally, the recommended policy provides funding to enhance training and equipment for patrol officers in the investigation of drug-related crimes. This additional demand side approach is intended to attach a high risk to use or possession of drugs by increasing the likelihood of arrest and successful prosecution.

Part III - Transition Management identified the chief of police as the key to the acceptance of the recommended policy. However, the narcotics commander was identified as the project manager who should be responsible for the transition to the desired future state.

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INTRODUCTION

California law enforcement, compared to the private sector, has generally been slow to change, proceeding cautiously with new technology, philosophies, and procedures. An obvious exception to this generalization is the speed with which police executives responded to the opportunities presented by the enactment of state and federal asset seizure laws. As California narcotics enforcement continues to evolve in response to asset seizure concepts, other changes will certainly occur and problems will arise. This study addresses those changes in an effort to avoid or reduce the impact of future problems while enhancing future opportunities.

Traditionally, California narcotics enforcement has been a multifaceted task. Narcotics detectives were asked to investigate the use and sales of a variety of drugs, as well as investigate other crimes. Heroin use and sales were frequently a priority because heroin addicts have been shown to be responsible for many of the crime problems (Davis 1989). Other priorities changed as the popularity of different drugs grew or declined, with cocaine growing dramatically to near epidemic proportions as the drug of choice (Jehl 1989) and, therefore, sharing the spotlight with heroin enforcement. Narcotics officers were respon-

sible for investigating varying levels of dealers with the investigations starting from information provided by concerned or upset citizens or from informants developed during other investigations. Often narcotic units were responding to complaints from neighbors, schools, or parents about drug trafficking in their area (Hernandez 1989). The investigations of large dealers were frequently left to state or federal bureaus or larger departments who had more adequate resources for such long and complicated investigations (O'Neill 1988).

However, a new element was added to the drug enforcement arsenal in 1983 when California, and then the federal government, enacted what are commonly referred to as "asset seizure laws". These laws allowed police agencies to seize the cash and material assets of drug dealers when it can be proven, through a civil process, that the assets were generated via illegal drug transactions. Under California law, police agencies can now keep 76.5 percent of seized cash and may also seize vehicles and other assets, including homes and property. The successful prosecution of the offender is not an element of the seizure; rather, police must only prove through a "preponderance of evidence" that the assets are drug related (Ensminger 1988). As an added benefit, the law states that these seized funds cannot be used to replace existing budgets; rather, the seized funds can only be used to enhance or increase narcotics enforcement.

As reports of million dollar seizures began to circulate, police executives throughout the state began modifying the structure, emphasis, or mission of their narcotics units, hoping to join in this new found source of revenue (O'Neill 1988). This new emphasis was highlighted by Lt. Gene Hernandez, Narcotics Commander of the Orange Police Department, who said, "The old philosophy was: Stay in your own city; if investigation led you out of the city, hand it off to the local agency or the Drug Enforcement Administration. The new philosophy is to follow the trail within reason...depending on how aggressive you want to be." (Plendl 1989). In addition, the manpower assigned to narcotics units increased and asset seizure specialists were created. The State of California created seminars and computer software to assist in asset seizure. Special squads were created within departments, and cities joined manpower to form inter-agency task forces (O'Neill 1988). Further, investigators' attitudes changed as evidenced by the comment of Sgt. Joe Klein of the Fullerton Police Department who said, "Whenever we narcs got together, we used to talk about how much dope was seized. Now it's how much money did you get, what kind of car, did you get a phone?" (O'Neill 1988).

California law enforcement's quick response to the new laws has produced impressive results. California law enforcement received \$57.3 million of federally-processed funds since 1984, more than one-third of the national totals with much more still

pending in the system. As an example, as of December 31, 1987, the West Covina Police Department had \$6 million seized or in process, Simi Valley \$2.9 million, Torrance \$5.4 million, Burbank \$3.6 million, Glendale \$8.5 million, Montebello \$1.7 million, and Fullerton \$1.1 million. The Los Angeles Police Department has \$42 million seized or pending and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department has seized or is awaiting \$34 million. These figures deal only with assets processed under federal laws and do not include assets seized under California law (O'Neill 1988).

Tim Simon, head of the Orange County Regional Narcotics Task Force (OCRNTF), which combines nineteen agencies, said that in the two years since the inception of the task force, they have seized \$32 million in cash, nearly 4 tons of cocaine, 24 pounds of heroin, and a ton of marijuana. Simon said, "When I look over the news clippings of the past few years, I keep seeing me use the word 'amazed'. But that's what I am." (Eddy 1988). The success of the OCRNTF was highlighted in April, 1989, when President George Bush flew to Rancho del Rio, a ranch in Orange County seized from a drug dealer, to personally present \$4.39 million in cash to the OCRNTF. This cash, also seized from a drug dealer, was being presented for dramatic effect to emphasize the battle against drugs (Peterson 1989).

These cash seizures, coupled with the drug seizures, must surely have a negative impact on the drug trafficker. Therefore,

the value of these laws need little more justification. However, as an additional plus, the added revenues have been used to improve law enforcement by financing additional manpower and equipment. Seized funds have been used to purchase helicopters, computers, high-tech surveillance tools, dope-sniffing dogs, guns, cars, radio equipment, etc. (O'Neill 1988; Plendl 1989). This double benefit of hurting the dealer while helping the police makes the asset seizure laws a true boon to law enforcement.

Although clearly beneficial, the asset seizure laws have begun to create problems. For instance, investigators report that disputes between agencies over cases have developed, and that competition between agencies for lucrative cases has adversely affected interagency relationships and case investigations.

Dave Marsden of the Torrance Police Department described such conflicts as the "downside of asset forfeiture". Marsden described the culmination of a six-week investigation where another agency interrupted during the last stages, "This other agency was overly aggressive-greedy is a more appropriate word. They went in and got zero, we ended up with no charges against the guy" (O'Neill 1988). This growing problem was also highlighted by Dick Verbrugge (1989), president of the California Narcotics Officer's Association, who wrote in his "President's Message":

Law enforcement itself is not without fault when it comes to asset sharing.

Agencies which previously openly shared information on cases of mutual interest or that were multi-jurisdictional have ceased communicating with one another. They are attempting to keep the asset sharing with any other agency to a minimum. In some cases, agencies that have had minimal participation in a major asset seizure have submitted exorbitant sharing claims for their assistance. If this type of philosophy is allowed to continue and grow from agency to agency, there is only one group of individuals who will really benefit, and that's the illicit narcotics dealers.

Further, because the cash seizures come primarily from cocaine investigations, the emphasis has shifted away from other drugs (Davis 1989). Heroin use and sales, which are less glamorous investigations but have a direct relationship to crime, have become a lower priority because of the relatively low cash flow compared to cocaine. Finally, because the investigation of large dealers is complicated and very time-consuming, often requiring months of investigation, there is frequently insufficient manpower to handle small dealers and other local problems. This conflict between asset seizure emphasis and the enforcement of local problems is reinforced by the statement of Jerry Schultze of the Pasadena Police Department who said:

You've got to remember what our primary goal is-to get the dope off our street in our city. If I've got all these people calling me up and complaining about dope dealers, and my crew is 20 miles away on a case that has nothing to do with Pasadena, how am I going to explain that? It's just a different philosophy. (in O'Neill 1988).

In response to California narcotics enforcement's success in seizing their assets, it can be anticipated that the drug dealers will become more sophisticated in their money handling, making investigations even more complex (Jehl 1989; Verbrugge 1989). Investigators now report a tendency to use rental cars and to conceal cash flow with sophisticated financial arrangements that now include complex gold transactions and even purchasing banks (Register News Service 1989; Deutsch 1989; O'Neill 1988). Reports indicate that drug lords have been studying documents from past police investigations to learn and counter police procedures (Hernandez 1989). As a result, it can be anticipated that cash seizures will become less frequent and will require more and more man hours of investigation.

Although asset seizure must certainly be detrimental to dealers, it has not yet succeeded in impacting drug production, importation, or use. A State Department report published in early 1989 reported that coca production increased 7.2 percent, the marijuana crop increased 22 percent, the opium crop increased 15 percent, (New York Times 1989). Cocaine seizures are becoming larger and more frequent, with seizures of a ton or more becoming commonplace. The Drug Enforcement Administration now places cocaine imports at over 100 metric tons annually, a 35 percent increase over 1985 (Jehl 1989). Federal agencies now report that California has become the major importation point for Columbian cocaine (Morganthan and Miller 1989; B.O.C.C.I. 1987).

Unfortunately, our appetite for drugs has not declined, as evidenced by a nationwide poll of seven thousand pre-teens, teens, and adults, indicating that 13 percent of pre-teens smoke marijuana and 16 percent have been offered drugs. Beyond grade school, 19 percent of 17 year olds admitted to using cocaine and 49 percent admitted using marijuana (Healy 1989). America's increasing appetite for drugs is also reflected in tragedy: in 1984 there were 470 cocaine deaths and 7,155 cocaine-related illnesses; in 1988 there were 1,582 deaths and illnesses rose to 39,657 (Morganthau and Miller 1989). This expanding American need provides a marketplace that the drug dealers appear ready and able to supply.

Based on these facts, if the mission of drug enforcement is to control drug use and sales, then our success is limited at best. Drug enforcement officials, squeezed between this booming demand and the increasing sophistication of suppliers, acknowledge that they have been outpaced (Jehl 1989).

Finally, there is an undercurrent of concern over the ethics of police work becoming a business for profit. Alan Price of the Montebello Police Department said simply, "Police work is becoming big business" (in O'Neill 1988). At the same time, criticisms have been leveled at seizures of homes and properties where the level of involvement was questionable (Grzybowski 1989). Gerold F. Uelman, Dean of the Santa Clara University School of Law, questioned the ethics of asset seizure by stating,

"What concerns me is the injection of the profit motive into our system of justice in which the enforcers have an interest in the outcome. It's like converting all of our police officers into bounty hunters" (O'Neill 1988). These concerns point to the possibility of court challenges or public disapproval that could erode the asset seizure laws.

Asset seizure is truly an emerging issue that brings great promise as well as potential problems to California narcotics enforcement. By forecasting these trends and anticipating the probability of relevant events, a view of possible futures relative to these changes can be generated. From this viewing point, the future threats and opportunities become clearer, leading to policy alternatives designed to mitigate the future threats and seize opportunities. The asset seizure laws have opened new arenas for narcotics enforcement. By strategically planning these issues, California law enforcement can better control the future of narcotics enforcement.

PART I - A FUTURES STUDY

HOW WILL ASSET SEIZURE LAWS CHANGE CALIFORNIA
NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES BY 1999?

TRENDS AND EVENTS

The futures study is accomplished by determining and evaluating trends that may impact the issue and events that may impact the trends. This data is then used to view the possible futures via scenarios.

IDENTIFYING CANDIDATE TRENDS AND EVENTS

The first phase of the futures study was to develop an extensive list of possible trends that could have an impact on the issue. Simultaneously, a similar list of possible events that could impact the trends was assembled. These lists of possible trends and events were established using several methods:

1. Literature scanning of newspapers, magazines and law enforcement publications disclosed issues and topics as well as revealing relevant trends and events.
2. Informal interviews with narcotics officers, police executives, and other knowledgeable professionals disclosed several key topics that were translated into trends and events.
3. Brainstorming produced a wide range of ideas, trends, and events when 19 police executives were presented with the issue.

This large list of possible trends was then screened to the most relevant trends using the following criteria:

1. Does the trend impact the future of asset seizure or narcotics enforcement in California?
2. Is the trend measurable?
3. Is the trend enough to be forecasted?
4. Is the trend emerging or continual, as opposed to a trend that is stagnant?

The screening supplied the following list of candidate trends:

1. Narcotics unit's emphasis on street-level dealers.
2. The size of narcotics unit budget.
3. Narcotics unit's emphasis on asset seizure.
4. Public support for asset seizure laws.
5. Regionalized narcotics enforcement.
6. The effectiveness of drug prevention programs.
7. Total value of assets seized per year.
8. Level of drug use in high schools.
9. Cost of cocaine.
10. Asset seizure funds used to finance narcotics detail.
11. Manpower assigned to narcotics bureaus.
12. Asset seizure specialists created within departments.
13. Narcotics unit's emphasis on heroin enforcement.
14. Emphasis on cocaine investigations.
15. The level of crimes related to drug use.

The large list of possible events was then screened to the most relevant events using the following criteria:

1. Is the event foreseeable?
2. Is the event relevant to the issue?
3. Is the event clear and easily understood?
4. Is the event distinct and measurable?

This screening produced the following list of candidate events:

1. Decriminalization of cocaine.
2. Asset seizure laws are destroyed by the courts.
3. Supply glut of cocaine.
4. Columbian drug cartel destroyed.
5. Cocaine-producing nations cooperating with the United States in eradication.
6. Cocaine use drops by 50 percent.
7. Criminal penalties increased significantly.
8. United States Armed Forces join the drug war.
9. Interagency lawsuits over asset distribution.
10. Heroin use doubles.

EVALUATING CANDIDATE TRENDS AND EVENTS

With the candidate trends and events now identified, nine knowledgeable individuals from throughout California were selected to forecast and evaluate these trends and events. This group included police executives, city government executives, and

businessmen. Because it would not be practical to assemble as a group, a Modified Conventional Delphi process was used.

Each Delphi member was mailed a Delphi instrument (Appendix A), asking that they forecast the past and future of each trend by answering the following questions for each trend:

Assuming a trend level of 100 for 1989,

1. What was the trend level in 1984?
2. What will the trend level be in 1994?
3. What will the trend level be in 1999?
4. What should the trend level be in 1994?
5. What should the trend level be in 1999?

The Delphi panel members were also asked to forecast the events by answering the following questions for each event:

1. What year would the probability of occurrence first exceed zero?
2. What will the probability of occurrence be by 1994?
3. What will the probability of occurrence be by 1999?
4. If the event should occur, what affect will it have on the issue?

TREND SELECTION AND FORECASTING

The results of the Delphi process were then collated and evaluated using the following criteria:

1. Consistency of forecasts.
2. Range of forecasts.

3. Relevance based on the direction and level of the trend forecasts.
4. Relevance based on the disparity between will be and should be forecasts.

This evaluation identified the following trends as the most relevant to the issue and the most consistently forecasted:

- T1. Narcotics unit's emphasis on asset seizure.
- T2. Level of drug use in high schools.
- T3. Narcotics unit's emphasis on heroin enforcement.
- T4. Narcotics unit's emphasis on street-level dealers.
- T5. Manpower assigned to narcotics units.

Chart 1
Trend Evaluation


	TREND STATEMENT	Level of Trend Today=100					
		Was in 1984	Today	Will Be		Should Be	
				in		in	
			1994	1999	1994	1999	
T 1	Narcotics Unit's Emphasis on A.S.	19	100	191	255	185	200
T 2	Level of Drug Use in High Schools	89	100	108	106	57	53
T 3	Narcotics Unit's Emphasis on Heroin	148	100	75	58	118	125
T 4	Narcotics Unit's Emphasis on St. Dlrs	165	100	88	68	134	152
T 5	Manpower Assigned to Narcotics Unit	80	100	154	200	210	236

N=9

Median results displayed

T1 - The narcotics unit's emphasis on asset seizure assesses


the amount of emphasis that narcotics units in California are placing on investigations leading to potential asset seizure.



"Will be" forecast median * "Should be" forecast median

T1 is a critical trend to forecast as evidenced by the data. Five years ago, asset seizure was an almost nonexistent aspect of narcotics enforcement. Now, it is a major issue that is expected to double in the next five years and to continue to increase into the future. The range of responses on the "will be" (nominal) forecast was rather wide, suggesting disagreement between the raters. However, the steady and dramatic increase indicating future significance in the trend cannot be ignored.


T2 - The level of drug use in high schools serves as a barometer of the effectiveness of drug awareness and detection programs. By forecasting drug use in high schools, a picture of drug use in general becomes visible.



The forecast predicts an unchanging trend remaining somewhat constant from 1984 to 1999. The significance lies in the "should be" projections which are half of the forecasted levels. This disparity points to a need for policy changes or modifications that should be addressed in narcotics enforcement policy-making scenarios. The nominal range of responses further points to the nature of this trend in that the lowest nominal forecast does not meet the "should be" forecast for 1999.

T4 - The narcotics unit's emphasis on street dealers


evaluates the time and effort spent by the narcotics unit on the investigation of lower level dealers.



"Will be" forecast median * "Should be" forecast median

T4 is included as a relevant trend because the data suggests that the emphasis on street dealers has peaked and will decline in the five and ten year forecasts. This is opposed to the "should be" evaluations, which suggest a need to put extra pressure on the street dealers. The direction of this trend could be a direct result of the increased emphasis on asset seizure which points investigations away from small dealers towards large dealers with high cash flow.

T5 The manpower assigned to narcotics units is a measure of the importance that the agency places on narcotics enforcement in the form of the number of men assigned to the unit.



"Will be" forecast median * "Should be" forecast median

The data on T5 indicates a steady and significant increase in the manpower assigned to narcotics units with the manpower doubling in the next ten years. The "should be" forecasts call for even more manpower. This trend was the most consistently forecasted trend, indicating a degree of consensus that there is need for significant increases in manpower.

EVENT SELECTION AND FORECASTING

The results of the event evaluations were then studied to choose those events that fit the following criteria:

1. Will have significant impact on the issue area should they occur or not occur.
2. Are relevant to the issue and can be affected by policy changes.
3. Were consistently forecasted.


The following events were then chosen to provide an event list that is balanced based on probability, impact, and validity.

- E1. Asset seizure laws destroyed by the courts.
- E2. United States Armed Forces join the drug war.
- E3. Interagency lawsuits over asset distribution.
- E4. Supply glut of cocaine.
- E5. Heroin use doubles.

Chart 2
Event Evaluation


EVENT STATEMENT	MEDIAN PROBABILITY			IMPACT ON THE ISSUE IF EVENT OCCURRED	
	YEAR FIRST >0	BY 1994 (0-100%)	BY 1999 (0-100%)	POSITIVE (0-10)	NEGATIVE (0-10)
E1 A/S laws lost	1990	35%	45%		-10
E2 Army fights drugs	1991	50%	70%	+3	
E3 Interagency lawsuit	1989	80%	95%		-3
E4 Supply glut of coke	1992	40%	60%	+5	
E5 Heroin use doubles	1991	65%	85%		-5

E1 - Asset seizure laws destroyed by the courts would occur when either state or federal asset seizure laws were either destroyed or neutralized by court or legislative action.




The probability of asset seizure laws being lost first exceeds zero almost immediately. By 1994 the probability grows to 35 percent and 45 percent by 1999. Although the probability of such an event is relatively low, this event must be considered because of its importance to the issue. Further, the range of forecasts is high, indicating that some of the raters considered the probability much higher than the median.

E2 - The United States Army joining the drug war would occur when, by federal government decree, a branch of the armed services actively joins in the drug war. This could occur by naval blockade, air surveillance or interception, or the use of ground forces.




The raters felt that there is a 50 percent probability the U.S. Military will join in the drug war by 1994. The probability increases to 70 percent by 1999. The range of forecasts is relatively small, with the lowest probability for 1999 rated at 50 percent.

E3 - Interagency lawsuits over asset distribution would occur when two or more law enforcement agencies challenge each other in court over the distribution of assets seized from drug dealers.




The probability for an interagency lawsuit over the distribution of funds exceeds zero immediately. By 1994, the raters felt that the probability reaches 80 percent, growing to 95 percent by 1999. Obviously, this is an important event to influence, especially considering the negative impact on the issue.

E4 - Supply glut of cocaine would occur when the supply of available cocaine exceeds the demand. This could be determined by government statistics or more likely, by a severe drop in price.



The raters felt that an oversupply of cocaine is at least three years in the future. However, the probability increases to 40 percent in 1994 and 60 percent in 1999. The range of forecasts extends higher above the median than below, indicating the possibility that the probability is more likely to rise than fall.

E5 - Heroin use doubles would occur when either the reported number of heroin addicts seeking treatment doubles or heroin overdoses double.



Clearly, this event is the most alarming of the events forecasted. The rater's median forecast indicates a 65 percent probability of heroin use doubling, which increases to 86 percent in 1999. Considering the social and criminal implications, this event must be a target of policy considerations. The forecast range for 1999 is very small, indicating the severity of this possible event.

TREND AND EVENT CROSS-IMPACT EVALUATION

With the trends and events now established and forecasted, the task then became to determine the relationship between the trends and events. This was accomplished through the completion of a cross-impact matrix.

The cross-impact matrix compared the impact of each event upon the other events by answering the question, "If event X actually happened, how would the probability of event Y occurring be effected at the moment of greatest impact?"

The cross-impact matrix compared the impact of each event on each trend by asking the question, "If event X actually occurred, what percentage change, if any, would this occurrence cause in the projection of trend X at the point of greatest impact?"

Chart 3
Cross-Impact Evaluation

Suppose this event actually occurred... How would the probability of these events occurring be affected?

V	E1	E2	E3	E4	E5
E 1	X	+ 2%	-75%	+20%	no change
E 2	no change	X	no change	-40%	-10%
E 3	+10%	no change	X	+ 5%	+ 5%
E 4	no change	+20%	no change	X	-10%
E 5	no change	+10%	no change	no change	X

- | | |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| E1. Asset seizure laws lost | T1. Emphasis on asset seizure |
| E2. Military fights drugs | T2. Drug use in high schools |
| E3. Interagency lawsuits | T3. Emphasis on heroin |
| E4. Supply glut of cocaine | T4. Emphasis on street dealers |
| E5. Heroin use doubles | T5. Narcotics manpower |

Suppose this event actually occurred... How would the level of these trends be affected?

V	T1	T2	T3	T4	T5
E 1	-80%	+10%	+25%	+25%	-20%
E 2	no change	-15%	no change	+ 5%	no change
E 3	+80%	no change	+10%	+10%	- 5%
E 4	-15%	+20%	-10%	+20%	+ 5%
E 5	-10%	no change	+25%	+20%	no change

Cross-impact evaluation continued by determining which events had the most impact on other events and trends. Those events with the highest impact, as determined by counting events that impact other trends and events, are considered "actor" events. There were three actor events identified:

- E1. Asset seizure laws destroyed by the courts.
- E3. Interagency lawsuits over asset distribution.
- E4. Supply glut of cocaine.

The actor events must be identified because they are the events that have the highest possibility of causing change affecting the issue. Therefore, policy changes can be directed at influencing these actor events, thus achieving the highest benefit.

For instance, the highest actor event (E1 - Asset seizure laws destroyed by the courts) would impact eight of the other nine events and trends. For the most part, these impacts would have a negative impact on narcotics enforcement and society in general. Therefore, policy considerations should be made to decrease the probability of occurrence or, at the very least, not increase the probability of occurrence. The same can be said for the other two actor events, E3 and E4.

By counting the number of impacts upon each trend or event (columns), the most reactive trends or events are identified.

The "reactors" are:

T4. Narcotics unit's emphasis on street-level dealers.

T1. Narcotics unit's emphasis on asset seizure.

T3. Narcotics unit's emphasis on heroin enforcement.

These three trends are those most affected by the action of the events and therefore, the most easily influenced. For this reason, policy considerations must be evaluated based on their impact on these "reactors". Therefore, the emphasis on street-level dealers is the most reactive, increasing by as much as 25 percent if asset seizure laws were destroyed, suggesting that a shift in emphasis would occur. Also, a supply glut of cocaine (E4) or the doubling of the heroin use (E5) would increase this trend by 20 percent, suggesting a response by law enforcement to an emerging crisis. Policy considerations must serve to increase desirable trends and decrease trends that have an adverse impact.

SCENARIOS

Using the data developed thus far, the futures are further explored by developing scenarios. The purpose of the scenarios is to project today's world, relative to the issue area, into the future using the interrelationship of the trends and events. The scenarios present another avenue to developing policy considerations that may improve or favorably alter the future.

Three scenarios have been designed to present a varying approach to this methodology.

SCENARIO 1 - NOMINAL OR EXPLORATORY

Current trends are projected into the future allowing a "system change" by integrating the forecasted events.

SCENARIO 2 - HYPOTHETICAL - WORST CASE

The year 1999 is described looking back on the assumptions, policies, and tactics that lead to the world at this "slice of time".

SCENARIO 3 - NORMATIVE - DESIRED AND ATTAINABLE

A "demonstration" of a plausible path to an improved future reached by altering the path of trends and the probability of events.

Scenario 1 - Nominal or Exploratory

California narcotics enforcement is certainly different now compared to ten years ago. The concept of seizing cash and other assets of the drug dealers burst upon the drug enforcement scene with unprecedented force. Law enforcement executives foresaw a cash bonanza that could be used to finance narcotics units, buy exotic equipment, and create impressive bank rolls. To fully utilize this new tool, narcotics units were made larger, and specialists were created who were closer to accountants than police officers. The emphasis in narcotics enforcement clearly shifted: hurt the dealer by seizing his cash and assets then use his money to finance more investigations and seizures. The results were impressive with million dollar seizures becoming commonplace.

These investigations of major dealers and money launderers are long and complicated, leaving little time or manpower for anything else. Further, the big money is in the hands of cocaine dealers, so they are clearly the priority. The use and sales of less glamorous drugs are seldom investigated because the money is not there. To make matters worse, the dealers have become more sophisticated by concealing their assets, thus compounding the complexity of investigations.

With the mission of narcotics units so tightly focused, the newly created fringe areas get little attention. We have not had much impact on society's appetite for drugs, and the supply lines

continue the flow to meet our demand. Every neighborhood has the local dealer who completes the link providing a ready supply to the regular or casual users. Well-meaning citizens report the dealers, but there is little manpower available for enforcement.

We have not helped the crime picture by concentrating on cocaine at the expense of other drug investigations. Heroin use, which has long been tied to crime rates, has gone relatively unchecked. Heroin addiction is increasing, forcing more addicts to steal more and more to finance their needs. Methamphetamine is readily available as the "poor man's cocaine", with labs flourishing in many remote areas.

Finally, interagency relationships have suffered on all levels. We do not share information and work jointly as much for the fear of losing a critical drug lead or case. Disputes over the distribution of seized assets have created conflicts and disrupted personal and professional relationships. The end result is that our ability to impact crime has suffered.

We have made a great deal of money and created considerable problems for cocaine dealers at all levels; we have probably put some of them out of business, but the asset seizure laws that were seen as such a benefit to narcotics enforcement have created serious problems. Had we managed these issues earlier, we would not have the much larger problems that confront law enforcement today.

Scenario 2 - Hypothetical - Worst Case

Ten years ago, in 1989, we looked on the asset seizure laws as a real plus to law enforcement; it seemed to be the essence of poetic justice in that we could seize the dealer's assets, then use them to arrest other dealers. Narcotics officers began driving Mercedes Benz and Porsches, and were equipped with the latest in high-technology equipment. We doubled the narcotics enforcement manpower, hoping to increase the effort, and the extra detectives paid off. Large cash seizures became commonplace to the point that the million-dollar seizures got little media attention. With a swiftness uncharacteristic of law enforcement, narcotics investigations became a profit-seeking enterprise whose success relied upon the efforts of accountants and was measured by the bottom line, rather than drug seizures or arrests.

The philosophy behind asset seizures seemed solid at the time. We could hurt the dealers most by taking their money, thus destroying their profit and their business. However, we underestimated their flexibility and their profit margins. The dealers became smarter and more sophisticated, making seizures more difficult and less fruitful. Further, they made so much money that our seizures frequently were an inconvenience rather than a devastating loss. We were able to stop many of the dealers, but the large cartels, with their experience and sophistication, grew even larger and stronger.

Unfortunately, we lost the desire and the ability to work

the less glamorous cases. As a result, small dealers flourished in the neighborhoods providing anyone easy access to drugs. Heroin enforcement, which had a low cash flow, was a low priority and the heroin availability was high. Heroin addiction soared, leading to a dramatic rise in heroin-related crimes. The experts who really knew how to work "hypes" had become obsolete and retired so we had to start over again training officers to work these types of investigations.

We were not very successful in stopping the flow of drugs. Cocaine became so plentiful that the price dropped dramatically. At the "bargain basement" prices, cocaine became affordable to just about everyone, including school-aged children. In response to this critical problem, the federal government finally authorized military troops to patrol the coastline and borders.

Then very destructive disputes erupted over the distribution of assets. Our interdepartment relationships and cooperation were destroyed by lawsuits and conflicts. Each department, particularly when it came to narcotics enforcement, became a sole proprietor in competition rather than in cooperation with the neighboring agencies. These lawsuits have severely hampered our ability and efficiency in conducting drug investigations, as well as other investigations.

In the late 1990s, an equally disturbing trend developed. The Columbian cartels began an offensive against the concept of asset seizure. With their vast resources, they challenged

seizures in court, freezing the seized assets and costing us thousands of dollars to litigate our right to the assets. What is worse, they made headway, overturning some of the seizures and forcing the return of cash. It seems that the courts took a dim view of our tactics. With the concept of asset seizure in jeopardy, and the possibility that our entire enforcement effort could be facing destruction, we had to make immediate changes in policy and procedures, leading to confusion and chaos in narcotics enforcement.

Scenario 3 - Normative - Desired And Attainable

When asset seizure burst upon the narcotics enforcement scene, law enforcement reacted quickly to seize this opportunity. Narcotics units shifted emphasis, investigatory methods changed, asset seizure specialists were created, and extra manpower was added to the effort. These changes paid off as large cash seizures were made throughout the state, providing unencumbered funds to finance further investigations.

Fortunately, we recognized these newfound opportunities as potential problems and made policy changes to allow law enforcement to maximize opportunities while minimizing threats. Law enforcement executives established a clear mission for narcotics units, that of reducing drug use in general. This meant attacking the demand as well as the supply. With this goal in mind, cities combined forces to form large interagency task force

agreements to investigate major dealers and money launderers. Their purpose was to take advantage of asset seizure laws and locate the cash stock piles, as well as the drugs. The assets seized were funneled back to the agencies based on a predetermined formula, thus avoiding disputes.

With this newfound financing, the individual agencies became better equipped to fight the overall drug battle within their jurisdiction. They held true to their mission with a balanced attack that addressed local problems before they became out of control. We had the time and resources to investigate a variety of drug crimes, dealers, and problems. When the local agencies developed information on large dealers, the information was funneled to the interagency task forces who were better suited to conduct the investigation.

The seized assets were also used to battle street use by financing additional training and equipment at the patrol level. Realizing the importance of controlling drug-related property crimes, the funds financed intensive training in the investigation, recognition, and evaluation of heroin addicts, with the stated goal of turning every patrolman into a narcotics enforcement expert. The intensive effort at the local level attached a much higher risk to individual use, possession and sales, making such activities much less attractive.

We made the most impressive inroads into reducing California's drug appetite by funneling seized assets into drug

awareness and drug abuse programs. By financing the improvement of drug programs in the schools, we were able to influence the youth against drug use. For those who did become involved, we financed programs to assist parents and schools in detection and intervention.

In retrospect, the asset seizure laws have been an important contribution to drug enforcement. We have not won the war, but we are fighting effectively on a variety of battlefields with many of the battles financed by money and other assets seized from the drug dealers. Even if we somehow lost the asset seizure laws, the training, equipment, manpower, and programs that they financed will remain for years to come.

PART II - STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

A STRATEGIC PLAN TO DEVELOP THE OPPORTUNITIES AND
MINIMIZE THE THREATS CREATED BY FUTURE CHANGES.

SITUATIONAL AUDIT

The first part of this project assessed the trends and events that are affecting narcotics enforcement in California relative to the asset seizure laws. This assessment of trends and events led to a view of the possible futures that can be both beneficial and harmful. It became evident that policies could be implemented to improve the future by developing the strengths and mitigating the weaknesses. Part II of this project is a strategic plan to accomplish this goal.

The first phase of the strategic management process is to perform a situational audit that establishes the foundation and the parameters for the policy considerations. First, an environmental assessment was conducted to determine those factors in the environment that will have an affect upon policy considerations. Any policy considerations must address these elements of the environment in an effort to avoid surprises. The situational audit then conducted an assessment of the organizational capabilities and resources which evaluated those persons and resources involved in the strategic management; their abilities, their strengths, and their weaknesses. Finally, the situational audit identifies stakeholders, their assumptions, and their importance to the strategic management of the issue. It is intended to

identify weaknesses, opportunities, threats, and strengths within the organization and the environment that will certainly play a part in influencing the success of any policy selected.

The situational audit is divided into three parts, an assessment of the environment, an audit of organizational capabilities and resources, and an evaluation of the stakeholders in this issue.

THE ENVIRONMENT

To conduct this assessment of the environment, the researcher reviewed the data collected during the literature scan, the interviews, and the modified conventional delphi process conducted during the futures research. This assessment of the previously collected data revealed elements of the environment that translate into threats and opportunities for California narcotics enforcement.

The environment within which California narcotics enforcement must operate is divided into three segments: the supply side, the demand side, and the enforcement side. The supply side is represented by the dealers and drug traffickers and the factors that they interject into the environment. The demand side is represented by society and the demands that society introduces into the environment. Finally, the enforcement side introduces factors into the environment that are responding to these forces of supply and demand.

The supply side of the environment contributes the following factors:

1. California has become the major importation point for drugs (Morganthan and Miller 1989).
 - a. Increasing cash and drug transactions.
 - b. Increasing the opportunity for seizure.
 - c. Lowering the price of cocaine.
 - d. Increasing the narcotics unit's workload.
2. The price of cocaine is dropping (Morganthan and Miller 1989).
 - a. Making the drug accessible to more and more people.
 - b. Increasing use.
 - c. Decreasing the profit margin of dealers.
3. Drug dealers are becoming more sophisticated (Jehl 1989; Verbrugge 1989).
 - a. Making investigations more difficult.
 - b. Reducing the number and size of cash seizures.

The demand side of the environment contributes the following factors:

1. Drug use continues to increase (Healy 1989; Morganthan and Miller 1989).
 - a. Creating a growing market for traffickers.
 - b. Increasing social problems that impact the police.

- c. Increasing drug-related crime.
 - d. Increasing the number of dealers to meet the demand.
 - e. Increasing public outcry.
 - f. Overburdening treatment facilities.
 - g. Increasing the police workload.
2. Public awareness is growing (Morganthan and Miller 1989).
- a. Increasing the public demand for action.
 - b. Increasing support for narcotics enforcement.
 - c. Increasing information provided to narcotics units.
 - d. Decreasing public apathy.
3. Drug awareness and treatment programs are increasing (Elias 1989).
- a. Placing financial strain on government budgets.
 - b. Increasing public awareness.
 - c. Potentially reducing future demand.

The enforcement side of the environment contributes the following factors:

1. Asset seizure is growing in emphasis (O'Neill 1988; Plendl 1989).
- a. Changing investigatory priorities.
 - b. Creating a source of revenue.
 - c. Creating specialists.

- d. Reducing the flexibility of narcotics units.
 - e. Increasing the complexity of investigations.
 - f. Reducing effectiveness in dealing with local problems.
 - g. Creating interagency competition and conflict.
2. Narcotics units are growing in size and sophistication (O'Neill 1988).
- a. Making investigations more successful.
 - b. Increasing the opportunity for cash seizure.
3. Interagency task forces and special units are being created (O'Neill 1988; Eddy 1988).
- a. Reducing interagency competition.
 - b. Improving the ability to investigate major dealers.
 - c. Decreasing the control by individual agencies.
 - d. Creating a source of revenue.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES


A continuation of the situational audit addresses narcotics enforcement's strategic strengths and weaknesses in a capability analysis. To complete this assessment, a survey was conducted using a capability analysis form (Appendix B) that assessed the strengths and weaknesses of California narcotics enforcement as an organization.

The capability analysis rating form used the following scale to assess the level of capability for each listed dimension:

- I. Poor - Problems that create roadblocks.
- II. Improvement Needed - Some obvious problems.
- III. Average - Acceptable, neither good nor bad.
- IV. Good - Suitable, few problems.
- V. Excellent - No problems.

The capability analysis rating form (Appendix B) was given to nine officers who were either narcotics investigators, narcotics supervisors, or executives responsible for the narcotics units in their agency. The researcher chose nineteen dimensions to be evaluated that are critical to the smooth operation of a narcotics unit or are critical to the implementation of change. Each officer was asked to rate each dimension, using the above scale, relative to California narcotics enforcement as a whole. Their responses were averaged and reflect their collective view of the organizational capabilities and resources of California

narcotics enforcement. These median results, depicted on Chart 4, point to strengths and weaknesses in the organizational structure of California narcotics enforcement.



The capability analysis revealed key strengths and weaknesses that must be considered in policy formulation and implementation. First, California narcotics enforcement is below average in technological resources and budget provisions. Technology, which includes advanced procedures and techniques, goes beyond mere equipment and will be critical to combating the growing sophistication of the drug traffickers. Budget provisions reflect the portion of the police department's budget allocated for the narcotics unit. These weaknesses could be exploited as targets for improvement, using resources generated from asset seizure. Manpower, which rated slightly below average, could be a secondary selling point. Conversely, equipment was rated as better than average, which is supported by the interviews conducted during the initial phases of this study, indicating that that seized funds were being used to purchase helicopters, radios, surveillance tools, and other equipment for narcotics units. Finally, a strength in training indicates that training programs, instructors, and facilities are already in place to facilitate the introduction of new procedures and policies.

The capabilities of the narcotics investigators are apparently a significant strength. They are rated as highly skilled with good attitudes. This is important because it indicates the ability to respond to improvements in technology as well as respond to the increased sophistication of narcotics investigations. The investigators were also seen as flexible,

which is by definition a requirement of the assignment, but will also be necessary in accepting changes brought about by new policies.

Finally, the police executives are viewed as somewhat inflexible, indicating a reluctance to change. This could seriously threaten the success of policy implementation because the police executives will be an essential hurdle to overcome during all phases of acceptance and implementation. However, an opportunity for inroads exists in the police executives' high goal orientation. This points to the prospect of selling policy choices by representing the policies as avenues toward accomplishing the goals of the department and the community.

Thus far, the situational audit has assessed the environment by identifying factors that are influencing the world within which narcotics enforcement operates. This produced threats and opportunities that must be considered. The evaluation of organizational capabilities and resources identified strengths and weakness within narcotics enforcement. Together, these weaknesses, opportunities, threats, strengths (WOTS-UP), and their interaction provide the framework for the policy considerations. The policy considerations can only influence the futures if they consider the environmental concerns and the internal capabilities.

Chart 5
WOTS-UP Analysis

<u>Threats</u>	<u>Opportunities</u>
Price of cocaine is dropping Dealer sophistication Drug use levels Major importation point Interagency disputes Overburdened drug programs	Public awareness growing Increased revenues from A/S More manpower Interagency task forces
<u>Strengths</u>	<u>Weaknesses</u>
Investigator skills & attitude Investigator flexibility Better equipment Better training Executive goal orientation	Technology Budget Executive inflexibility Manpower

By viewing the weaknesses, opportunities, threats, and strengths together, it is possible to recognize some of the threats and weaknesses as actual opportunities. For instance, the increasing public outcry and increasing drug-related crime rates can be used to establish the goals of the community which should influence the police executives. Increased drug dealer sophistication, coupled with poor technology and budget constraints, point to a need for policies that will allow narcotics

enforcement to battle the dealers with greater efficiency and better technology, while financing both the battle and the technology. Further, by developing policies that support the overburdened drug awareness programs, considerable support can be expected from the schools and politicians.

STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

The final phase of the situational audit is an evaluation of those persons or groups who will be impacted by policy choices, who have the ability to impact policy implementation, or who have a concern about the organization or the issue. These stakeholders were evaluated using the Strategic Assumption Surfacing Technique (SAST) that identifies the importance of outsiders and others who could and do have impact on policy choices and implementation.

To begin the stakeholder analysis, the researcher created a list of potential stakeholders. A preliminary evaluation by the researcher reduced this list to the following stakeholders that were considered most significant in their ability to influence the success of policy choices:

1. Chiefs of Police
2. Narcotics Commanders
3. Narcotics Supervisors
4. Narcotics Investigators
5. City Managers

6. School Officials
7. Public Non-Drug Users
8. City Councils
9. Patrol Officers
10. Drug Dealers

Of the 10 stakeholders, the narcotics unit supervisor was identified as someone who can significantly impact policy choices, even though he has been insignificant thus far. The first line supervisor must wear two hats, walking the line between management and the line personnel. Because he must often sell policy, as well as implement policy, he can be a critical component in the process. However, thus far in the situational audit the narcotics supervisor has not surfaced as a significant or critical player, indicating the potential to be an unexpected problem.


Next, the researcher assessed each stakeholder's stance relative to narcotics enforcement and the asset seizure issue. This assessment is made by determining what the stakeholder cares about or wants, given the strategic issue, and making assumptions based on these needs. These assumptions were generated from the personal experience of the researcher and telephone interviews with an Orange County chief of police, a city manager from a northern California city, and several supervisors of narcotics units in Southern California.

The basic assumptions about the stakeholders are as follows:

1. Chiefs of Police Will respond to political or community pressure.
Will be goal oriented.
2. Narcotics Commanders Will resist outside intrusion.
Will resist reallocation of revenue.
3. Narcotics Supervisors Will implement policy directives.
4. Narcotics Investigators Want aggressive enforcement policy.
Want improved equipment and technology.
Will adjust to new policies.
5. City Managers Will strive to meet political and community needs.
6. School Officials Want increased drug awareness programs.
7. Public Non Drug Users Will pressure government for action.
Want aggressive drug enforcement.
8. City Councils Will strive to satisfy community needs.
9. Patrol Officers Desire increased training and expertise.
10. Drug Dealers Will attempt to combat police procedures.

The third phase of SAST is to plot these assumptions based on the importance of the stakeholder to the issue and the degree of certainty about the assumptions attributed to the stakeholder.

Chart 6
Stakeholder Assumption Map



- | | |
|----------------------------|---------------------|
| A. Chiefs of Police | F. School Officials |
| B. Narcotics Commanders | G. Non-user Public |
| C. Narcotics Supervisors | H. City Councils |
| D. Narcotics Investigators | I. Patrol Officers |
| E. City Managers | J. Drug Dealers |

As evidenced by the SAST map, it is fortunate that the assumptions generated about the most important stakeholders (chiefs of police) are also the most certain. With the chief of police recognized as a key stakeholder, it is fortunate that he is goal driven and heavily influenced by political and community pressures points to possible implementation strategies. The assumptions about the public, city council, and city managers are relatively certain and important. Their symbiotic relationship can be a key strategic point that can be used as a support base.

The importance of the narcotics supervisors, coupled with the considerable uncertainty concerning the assumptions about them, indicates that they must not be forgotten in the strategic plan. A key goal of the strategic plan should be to raise the level of certainty relative to this group.

The assumptions about the school officials, the narcotics investigators, and the patrol officers are very certain. However, their importance is much lower primarily because they will be the benefactors of many of these policy considerations with very little turmoil introduced into their environment.

Finally, a particular problem could be the narcotics commander. With his or her close proximity to the chief of police, and the tendency towards "turf protection", the narcotics commander becomes an important stakeholder. The assumptions about the narcotics commanders are not entirely certain, pointing to a

need to formulate a strategy that impresses this stakeholder favorably.

POLICY FORMULATION

With these elements of the situational audit in mind, the second phase of the strategic management of this issue is to develop a variety of policy considerations that will influence the issues discovered in the futures study. Based on the future envisioned in the third scenario, the policy considerations will be evaluated and key policies will be chosen for implementation.

Referring back to the WOTS-UP analysis, the researcher developed several alternative strategies in an effort to minimize threats and seize opportunities by using strengths and avoiding weaknesses. Additional strategies were developed to utilize the threats to an advantage, thus creating opportunities. This list of alternative strategies was then reduced to a workable number of selected strategies by removing impractical strategies, eliminating duplication, and combining similar ideas, resulting in the following list of alternative strategies:

1. Create interagency task forces or special units that emphasize asset seizure.
2. Create special enforcement units within departments to handle local problems.
3. Use seized funds to finance drug awareness and drug intervention programs.

4. Establish asset seizure as a clear priority.
5. Train the patrol force to handle narcotics enforcement at the street level.
6. Align priorities of the narcotics unit to include all aspects of narcotics enforcement.
7. Abandon asset seizure as an emphasis.
8. Create an asset pool to share seized assets equally.

These alternative strategies were then evaluated using a Modified Policy Delphi Technique. The original Delphi panel from the futures research segment was provided with a synopsis of the results from the futures research and the situational audit and asked to evaluate each alternative strategy based on the data provided and their own personal and professional experience. Using a Delphi questionnaire (Appendix C) the nine Delphi panel members rated the desirability (D) and feasibility (F) of each policy alternative on a scale from zero to three, three being highest. Their combined rating (maximum 27) for each policy alternative is as follows:

	D	F	Total
1. Interagency task force/special units.	23	24	47
2. Special enforcement units.	14	19	33
3. Finance drug awareness programs.	25	21	46
4. Asset seizure a clear priority.	11	17	28
5. Train patrol to handle narc. inv.	26	16	41
6. Prioritize narc. unit to all aspects.	25	14	39
7. Abandon asset seizure as an emphasis.	9	16	25
8. Asset pool to share seized assets.	7	12	19

Based on this rating, the following strategies were regarded as the most desirable and most feasible:

1. Create interagency task forces or specialized units within departments that emphasize asset seizure.
2. Use seized funds to finance drug awareness programs.

By reviewing the range of scores within each evaluation, two policy alternatives stand out as having the broadest range of scores, indicating that they are the most controversial and highly polarized.

1. Train the patrol force to handle narcotics enforcement at the street level.
2. Align priorities of the narcotics unit to include all aspects of narcotics enforcement.

The top two strategies appear to be solid alternative strategies, with solid support from each member of the Delphi panel. Larger departments could create specialized units within their department and small departments could combine resources to form interagency task forces, each capable of conducting the complicated and time-consuming investigations of major dealers. This would free the traditional narcotics units to concentrate on other problems that require more flexibility and the ability to respond quickly to emerging problems.

By diverting some of the seized funds toward drug awareness

and intervention programs, the demand side of the drug enforcement equation could be addressed. This demand-side approach is gaining considerable support in law enforcement circles where the futility of trying to stop the supply is most apparent (Morganthan and Miller 1989). A demand-side approach also makes sense from the economist's standpoint according to Lester Thurow (1989), dean of the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who wrote:

Drug dealers face what is known in economics circles as an inelastic demand curve. Put simply, this means that if supply is cut back by ten percent, prices raise by more than ten percent, leaving the seller with higher profits than he had before. Where there is a huge demand, profits will remain enormous and suppliers will always come forward. Individual sellers can be arrested, but others will always come forward.

As an added benefit, this strategy to attack the demand side with awareness and intervention programs, financed by assets seized from the drug dealers, could garner considerable support from the community, schools, and, thus, the politicians.

The two highly polarized strategies received high scores in desirability but were judged as not very feasible. Their high-desirability rating makes them worthy of further evaluation. It appears that both alternatives could have considerable obvious impact on the future of narcotics enforcement but resource limitations make them impractical.

It would certainly be beneficial to have patrol officers

trained to the level of narcotics officers. But such training would be very expensive and time-consuming, as evidenced by the Drug Recognition Expert training program (DRE) of the Los Angeles Police Department, which requires 96 hours of training per officer (Davey 1989). However, a policy that enhances their abilities to work the street could also be very beneficial. For instance, using seized funds, patrol officers could utilize improved training and equipment to battle drug-related crimes and criminals at the street level, thus having a very positive impact on the community.

Certainly, a well-balanced narcotics unit that efficiently attacks all aspects of the drug problem would be ideal. However, manpower restraints, made worse by the complexities of investigating large dealers, would limit such an approach. An attempt at all-encompassing diversity could easily result in an overall performance that was, at best, mediocre.

However, with the interagency task force/specialized unit strategy as a part of the policy targeted at drug seizure, the remaining narcotics enforcement unit could be left to concentrate on the other drug enforcement issues and local problems. To establish this concept would require the expression of a clear mission statement for the narcotics unit. With such priorities established, and financing from the assets seized by the interagency task forces or specialized units, the narcotics units could be a viable force in confronting the drug problems in its

community. Thus, when included in a policy that stresses asset seizure through interagency task forces or specialized units, the two highly polarized policy alternatives become feasible.

Based on the results of the Modified Policy Delphi, the following policy was formulated:

- * Form interagency task forces or specialized units within departments to investigate major drug traffickers and emphasize asset seizure.
- * Establish the well-rounded enforcement of local problems as the priority for the local narcotics units.
- * Use part of seized funds to support drug awareness and intervention programs.
- * Use part of seized funds to finance enhanced drug enforcement training and equipment for patrol officers.

This policy allows narcotics enforcement to seize the opportunities presented by the asset seizure laws by specifically targeting the interagency task forces and specialized units within departments toward the major dealers with high cash flow. The seized funds could then be funneled back to home agencies using a predetermined formula that limits interagency disputes. The seized funds would be partially earmarked to balance the threat of increased usage and increased drug-related crime by financing drug awareness programs and intensified training and equipment

for patrol officers.

Finally, by establishing the mission of local narcotics units as an attack on local problems and drug use, the threat of crisis-level problems is reduced. Such a focused unit would have the flexibility to respond quickly and efficiently to local problems, thus serving the needs of the community. The leaders of this unit must resist the temptation to chase the glamorous cases, deferring them to the interagency task force or specialized unit, and must remain true to their mission.

IMPLEMENTATION

The final phase in strategically managing this issue will be the combining of the elements of the situational audit with the chosen policies to form an implementation plan. The implementation plan will draw on the strengths of the environment while attempting to avoid the weaknesses in an effort to produce a plan for implementing these selected policies.

Since this policy has several parts, it must be implemented incrementally; it must also be sold and approved incrementally. However, those implementing this policy must remember that this is a three-part policy, with each part complementing the others, not different policies working independently.

The key stakeholder, in gaining acceptance and supporting implementation of this policy, is clearly the chief of police. The degree of selling and the approach will vary depending on the structure and personality of each individual agency.

PHASE ONE

The implementation of this policy must be done incrementally with each phase building upon the previous. First, agencies must recognize the potential benefits of an aggressive asset seizure program and commit to such enforcement. This has already been

done in many agencies who are now participating in interagency task forces or who now have dedicated asset seizure units. Those agencies who have not taken this first step should consider the course of action most appropriate. Clearly, the chief of police must be sold on the benefits of asset seizure units as a clear path towards accomplishing the goals of the department and the community.

The key stakeholder, in gaining acceptance and supporting implementation of this policy, is clearly the chief of police. The degree of selling and the approach will vary depending on the structure and personality of each individual agency. If the concept of asset seizure emphasis is not yet established, then the obvious benefits, coupled with the results of other agencies, should be sufficient to open the door for consideration.

PHASE TWO

With the asset seizure phase in place, California law enforcement must seek to avoid the pitfalls of asset seizure by establishing a clear mission for their existing local narcotics units. This clear mission statement must dedicate these units to a well-rounded enforcement effort that concentrates on local problems. It is imperative that the local units resist the temptation to work major cases, with the potential high-profile payoff, and forward these cases to the specialized units.

The critical point in implementation will come once the in-

teragency task force/specialized unit concept has been accepted. At this point, the mission of the local narcotics unit must be addressed. Here, the support of the narcotics commander, and particularly the agreement of the first-line supervisor, will be essential. Unfortunately, they may see their unit relegated to a second class status and resist the imposition of such a mission. Again, overcoming the issue will depend on the make-up of each agency. In any case, problems can be avoided by structuring the interagency task force or specialized unit as part of the local unit, rather than as an elitist, separate entity.

PHASE THREE

Once the first two phases are in place, and cash stores are building, California law enforcement must avoid the temptation to stockpile the funds or buy more and more equipment. Rather, the last phase of the policy is to further avoid this pitfall by assisting the demand side of the battle and assisting the street battle. By diverting part of the seized funds to prevention and intervention programs, law enforcement will be joining social organizations in a big step towards lowering the community's appetite for drugs. It is easy to argue that with fewer customers there will be fewer dealers, lower profits, and less drug-related tragedy. Further, with a high-profile street program, trained and funded by seized assets, agencies will again be attacking drug use and sales by increasing the risk of arrest.

PART III - TRANSITION MANAGEMENT

A TRANSITION PLAN TO SUPPORT THE IMPLEMENTATION
AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE STRATEGIC PLAN.

TRANSITION MANAGEMENT

Based upon the possible futures for California Law Enforcement relative to the changes caused by asset seizure laws, a strategic plan has been developed that includes a recommended policy. Parts of the policy may already be in place in some agencies but to be fully effective, all elements of the policy should be implemented. The management of this transition will vary from agency to agency, depending on the degree of change required. However, some basic transition management evaluation applies to most agencies.

Change is a distinct and measurable event where something starts, stops, or happens in another way. By assessing the impacts of a proposed or anticipated change and managing the transition, the harmful by products of the change can be avoided, leading to a more successful implementation. Thus, this transition management is designed to reduce uncertainty, conflicts, perceived inconsistencies, and stress in the stakeholders.

The first phase of transition management is to identify those "critical mass" stakeholders whose active support will ensure that the change occurs or whose active opposition could stall the change process. Once identified, the critical mass will be evaluated to determine their anticipated stance on the

proposed change, compared to a preferred stance. The transition management process then turns to developing strategies to influence the critical mass to the desired position.

With the critical mass evaluation and commitment plan completed, the task turns to determining the proper management structure for the transition. The proper management structure is critical to a successful implementation and transition because many of the pitfalls can be avoided merely by choosing the correct management structure.

CRITICAL MASS ANALYSIS

By reviewing the actual or potential role of each stakeholder in the approval, implementation, or execution process, the researcher determined the critical mass to be:

1. Chiefs of Police
2. Narcotics Commanders
3. Narcotics Supervisors
4. City Managers

The remaining six stakeholders do not appear to have control over the success or failure of the policy implementation. Although certainly important, the capability analysis revealed that the narcotics investigators are flexible enough and skilled enough to adapt to the change. Further, they lack the position power to have significant impact. The school officers and patrol officers are primarily benefactors of the policy whose support is

important but also relatively assured. The city councils should be heavily influenced by the school support and the public support, leaving active support as both an attractive and politically necessary position. Finally, the drug dealers will attempt to counter any enforcement efforts, but the skill and training of the narcotics detectives should make the the detectives able opponents.

COMMITMENT PLANNING

With the critical mass identified, the task now turns to comparing the current level of commitment to the level of commitment needed to support implementation and transition. This analysis was completed by comparing the data from the situational audit and the implementation plan and is depicted on the commitment analysis chart.

Chart 7
Commitment Analysis

Critical Mass	Block the Change	Let the Change Happen	Help the Change Happen	Make the Change Happen
Chief of Police		X ---	-> ----	-> O
Narc Commander	X ---	-> ----	-> O	
Narc Supervisor		X ---	-> O	
City Manager	X ---	-> O		

X = Current commitment level O = Desired commitment level

The chief of police generally allows the division commanders to make policy changes in their division with his concurrence. In this case, due to the interdivisional aspects of this policy, the chief of police must become the change agent who makes this change happen. The policy should be presented to the chief of police as a tool to meet both the goals of the department and the goals of the community relative to addressing the drug problems. If the particular department already has an established asset seizure program, then the policy should also be shown as a tool to mitigate future problems.

The narcotics commander may well resist this change, particularly if the policy is viewed as an outside infringement or as demeaning to the unit. For that reason, the policy must be sold by the chief of police as the best of both worlds, that is, aggressive asset seizure and aggressive local problem solving. To further avoid the outside interference issue, the narcotics commander should be installed as the project manager responsible for the operational aspects of the implementation. In this role, the narcotics commander can still protect the critical interests of his or her areas of responsibility while satisfying the department and community needs.

Because of a lower status in the power structure, the narcotics supervisor, at worst, would merely let the change happen. However, in this position as the liaison between management and

line personnel, the narcotics supervisor will be responsible for selling the policy to the line level and thus must be committed to helping the change happen. To avoid being seen as subservient to the interagency task force, the narcotics supervisor should be established as the direct supervisor or liaison with the interagency task force or specialized unit. This should develop sufficient ownership to give a stake in the success of the unit. The mission of the local narcotics unit, established by the chief of police and supported by the narcotics commander, must be fulfilled in order for the narcotics supervisor to be considered a success. Therefore, his or her support for this aspect of the policy is relatively certain.

Finally, the city manager, as the supervisor of the chief of police, is in a position to block the change, but by selling the policy based on the benefits to the schools and the community, he or she should be easily encouraged to let the change happen. However, the city manager could become more critical if the third phase, that of diverting seized funds to school programs and patrol training, should stall or meet resistance. In that case, the city manager will be forced to make the change happen to insure that the benefits promised to the community and the city council are delivered.

MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

The management structure for the transition management of this policy change becomes clear after the critical mass analysis. Clearly, the chief of police has a key role in establishing the vision of the desired future state. The chief of police will also be responsible for gaining the support of the city manager and city council.

However, the key management structure will be that of the project manager. The project manager, operating with the authority of the chief of police, will be responsible for the achieving of the desired future state. In this case, the narcotics commander, serving as the project manager, will have the responsibility for forming the interagency task force or specialized unit. Simultaneously, the narcotics commander can begin the transition towards the acceptance of the new role of the local narcotics unit as defined by the chief of police. Finally, the narcotics commander is in a position, and has the responsibility, to work with the commanders of other divisions in establishing the awareness and intervention programs, as well as the improved patrol training aspects of the policy.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

Part I, the futures study of this report, clearly revealed that the new state and federal asset seizure laws offer tremendous opportunities to generate impressive revenue while battling drug dealers on a new front. To this end, many agencies have initiated aggressive asset seizure programs, resulting in frequent and large cash seizures. This futures research points to an increasing emphasis in asset seizure during the next ten years.

The opportunities offered by this growing trend to asset seizure emphasis are easy to visualize. Certainly, these impressive seizures hurt the dealers and the revenues generated are a needed and welcomed resource to supplement narcotics enforcement. However, the futures research also uncovered future threats in the form of trends and events that must be mitigated to prevent problems in the future.

Part II began the strategic management of this issue by performing a situational audit of the environment within which California narcotics enforcement operates. This assessment was followed by an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of California narcotics enforcement as an organization, taking a look at the structure and personnel within the organization. As

the futures study revealed opportunities, the situational audit located key strengths in the organization that must be utilized to implement policy choices.

The futures research and the situational audit also revealed threats in the environment and weaknesses in the organization that can be categorized in three broad descriptions:

1. Asset seizure investigations could dominate narcotics units, leaving little time or resources for other investigations.
2. Interagency disputes over asset distribution could occur.
3. Drug use and the availability of drugs are steadily increasing.

Part II concluded by analyzing several policy alternatives designed to mitigate these future threats, and the several sub-threats while capitalizing upon the opportunities in the future and the strengths in the environment. This analysis resulted in what can be considered the product of this study, a recommended policy to be considered for implementation by the different components of California narcotics enforcement.

Part III identified the chief of police as a key to the initial acceptance of this policy. However, the transition to the desired future state, as defined by the chief of police, rests in the hands of the narcotics commander. Installed as the project manager, the narcotics commander must implement the policy with

the support of the narcotics supervisor. The final phase of the policy, which diverts seized funds to prevention and intervention programs, may need a push from the city manager who will have a political stake in ensuring that the community realizes the promised benefits.

RECOMMENDED POLICY

- * Agencies should join together to form interagency task forces, or larger agencies should designate specialized units, to investigate major drug traffickers and emphasize asset seizure.

- * The mission of the local narcotics unit should be established as the well-rounded enforcement of drug problems within the community.

- * A portion of the assets seized from drug dealers should be used to support drug prevention and intervention programs within the community.

- * A portion of the assets seized from drug dealers should also be used to finance enhanced drug enforcement training and equipment for patrol officers.

The recommended policy first suggests that interagency task forces or specialized units within departments should be formed to conduct asset seizure investigations. These dedicated units must be large enough to conduct the complex investigations and thus generate revenue. The interagency task force approach should reduce the likelihood of interagency conflicts and free the local narcotics units to conduct the traditional investigations.

The nature of police work and police officers is that they will gravitate to the biggest and best cases. Therefore, the mission of the local narcotics unit must be clearly stated. Their focus must be aimed toward investigating local problems and controlling the drug problems within its jurisdiction, avoiding the temptation to become involved in the glamorous major investigations that could monopolize the unit and destroy flexibility. This should not be considered a second-class assignment. Rather, the aggressive assault on local dealers, attacking drug use in schools, and battling drug-related crime should be realized as the most important mission. The purpose of the asset seizure unit should be that of providing support for these primary efforts.

This policy recommendation also addresses the importance of attacking the demand side of the drug equation. Rather than continuing to invest the seized funds in more equipment and manpower, this policy recommends that part of the resources should

be directed towards the implementation and support of drug prevention and intervention programs. More and more, law enforcement is recognizing the futility of trying to stop the importation of drugs and realizing that the supply will diminish only when the demand is reduced (Thurow 1989; Verbrugge 1989; Morganthau and Miller 1989). Colorado State University psychologist Fred Beauvais says that the recent upswing in peer counseling in USA high schools may be the most promising answer to the nation's drug problem (Elias 1989). By using the drug dealer's assets to support drug intervention programs such as Drug Awareness Resistance Education (DARE) and "Just Say No", law enforcement can take an important step toward reducing the future drug appetite of the community.

The recommended policy further addresses the demand side by allocating assets to the training of patrol officers in narcotics enforcement with the goal of turning each patrol officer into a street drug enforcement expert. A prototype for such a statewide program is the 96-hour Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) program of the Los Angeles Police Department (Davey 1989). Although expensive, such programs attach a higher risk to the possession and use of illegal drugs by increasing the likelihood of arrest and successful prosecution. Further, these expertly trained patrol officers would be better equipped to attack the large number of drug related crimes in the community.

There are other positive by products that should result when

the aspects of this policy are implemented. First, and possibly foremost, the policy should generate considerable public support for the police department. By properly publicizing the financing of the awareness and intervention programs, a new dimension of police work would be exposed, increasing public awareness and fostering an atmosphere of mutual support and seeking common goals. Also, by seizing the drug dealers' assets, California narcotics enforcement will be taking a step towards removing the vestments of wealth and success that establish the drug dealers as unwelcomed role models within the community.

Finally, the emphasis on establishing a clear mission for the local narcotics unit is designed to ensure that such a unit remains flexible and responsive to local problems. Narcotics abuse is a critical problem in all communities and public outcry is growing, placing pressure on city governments and police departments. Narcotics units, spread thin by complicated asset seizure investigations, would be slow or unable to respond to emerging problems creating public dissatisfaction. However, a narcotics unit dedicated specifically to preventing and attacking emerging local problems would garner additional public support and accolades, reflecting favorably on the entire department.

To continue the present trend of increased asset seizure emphasis, without considering the down side, could lead to severe problems requiring reactive problem solving at some future date. To consider the issue today and manage the future through proac-

tive strategic policy assessment and implementation places California narcotics enforcement in a position to enhance its opportunities while avoiding future threats.

RESEARCHER'S COMMENTS

Having been both a narcotics detective and supervisor prior to the introduction of the asset seizure laws, the researcher undertook this study with considerable interest. The researcher was overwhelmed by the asset seizure successes of some agencies and the opportunities available. Not all aspects of the issue could be addressed in this project therefore, the following topics for future research are suggested:

1. Interagency conflicts are increasing rapidly and could seriously impair narcotics enforcement. Although the recommended interagency task forces would reduce this problem, more research is needed.

2. Expand asset seizure beyond drug dealers. With such success in the drug arena, opportunities exist in other areas such as financial crimes, prostitution, and bookmaking to seize the ill-gotten gains of the criminal.

3. Demand side enforcement surfaced during this study as a necessary and important aspect of the drug war. To the researcher's surprise, this aspect of drug enforcement should be considered at least partially the responsibility of law enforcement. For that reason, demand side enforcement is represented prominently in the recommended policy. However, more research is

needed to best determine the most appropriate programs and policies.

4. The ethical considerations surrounding asset seizure procedures must be evaluated and policies must be established within organizations to regulate seizures. The asset seizure laws are very broad, giving considerable latitude. If this latitude is abused, the courts or the legislature will certainly impose reforms.

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APPENDIX A

DELPHI PANEL COMPOSITION

1. Chief of Police. Medium-sized Los Angeles County city.
2. Lieutenant. Ventura County Sheriff. Extensive narcotics investigations background.
3. Captain. Orange County city with active asset seizure program. Extensive narcotics investigations background.
4. Narcotics Commander. Medium-sized Orange County city. Active asset seizure program.
5. Chief of Police. San Bernardino County city. Extensive background in narcotics enforcement.
6. City Manager. Ventura County city. Experienced in asset seizure.
7. City Manager. Large Northern California city. Participant in narcotics task force.
8. Narcotics Task Force Commander. Large task force in Southern California.
9. Private Attorney. Southern California practice specializing in defense against civil litigation.

TREND EVALUATION FORM

	<u>TREND</u>		<u>TREND LEVEL</u>	
	1984	1989	WILL BE 1994 1999	SHOULD BE 1994 1999
1. NARCOTIC UNIT'S EMPHASIS ON STREET DEALERS.	<input type="text"/>	100	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
2. THE SIZE OF NARCOTICS UNITS BUDGETS.	<input type="text"/>	100	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
3. NARCOTICS UNIT'S EMPHASIS ON ASSET SEIZURE.	<input type="text"/>	100	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
4. PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR ASSET SEIZURE LAWS.	<input type="text"/>	100	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
5. REGIONALIZED NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT.	<input type="text"/>	100	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
6. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DRUG PREVENTION PROGRAMS.	<input type="text"/>	100	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
7. VALUE OF ASSETS SEIZED.	<input type="text"/>	100	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
8. DRUG USE IN HIGH SCHOOL.	<input type="text"/>	100	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
9. COST OF COCAINE.	<input type="text"/>	100	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
10. ASSET SEIZURE FUNDS FINANCE NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT.	<input type="text"/>	100	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
11. MANPOWER ASSIGNED TO NARCOTICS BUREAUS.	<input type="text"/>	100	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
12. ASSET SEIZURE SPECIALISTS CREATED WITHIN DEPARTMENTS.	<input type="text"/>	100	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

TREND

TREND LEVEL

13. NARCOTIC UNIT'S EMPHASIS ON
HEROIN ENFORCEMENT

WILL BE
1994 | 1999

SHOULD BE
1994 | 1999

14. EMPHASIS ON COCAINE INVESTIGA-
TIONS.

15. THE LEVEL OF CRIMES RELATED TO
DRUG USE.

EVENT PROBABILITY FORM

EVENT STATEMENT	PROBABILITY			IMPACT ON ISSUE	
	FIRST >0%	1994 0-100%	1999 0-100%	POS. 0-10	NEG. 0-10
1. DECRIMINALIZATION OF COCAINE.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. ASSET SEIZURE LAWS ARE DESTROYED BY COURTS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. SUPPLY GLUT OF COCAINE.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. COLUMBIAN DRUG CARTEL DESTROYED.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. COCAINE-PRODUCING NATIONS COOPERATING WITH USA IN ERADICATION.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. COCAINE USE DROPS BY 50 PERCENT.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. CRIMINAL PENALTIES INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. U.S. ARMED FORCES JOIN THE DRUG WAR.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9. INTERAGENCY LAWSUITS OVER ASSET DISTRIBUTION.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10. HEROIN USE DOUBLES.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

CROSS-IMPACT ANALYSIS

If Asset seizure laws destroyed by the courts should actually happened,

how would the probability of the following events occurring be effected?

U.S. Armed Forces join the drug war.	change _____
Interagency lawsuits over asset distribution	change _____
Supply glut of cocaine	change _____
Heroin use doubles	change _____

If Asset seizure laws destroyed by the courts actually occurred, what percentage change, if any, would this occurrence cause in the projection of the following trends at the point of greatest impact?

Narcotics unit's emphasis on asset seizure	change _____
Level of drug use in high schools	change _____
Narcotics unit's emphasis on heroin enforcement	change _____
Narcotics unit's emphasis on street dealers	change _____
Manpower assigned to narcotics unit	change _____

If U.S. Armed Forces join the drug war should actually happened, how would the probability of the following events occurring be effected?

Asset seizure laws destroyed by the courts.	change _____
Interagency lawsuits over asset distribution	change _____
Supply glut of cocaine	change _____
Heroin use doubles	change _____

If U.S. Armed Forces join the drug war actually occurred, what percentage change, if any, would this occurrence cause in the projection of the following trends at the point of greatest impact?

Narcotics unit's emphasis on asset seizure	change _____
Level of drug use in high schools	change _____
Narcotics unit's emphasis on heroin enforcement	change _____
Narcotics unit's emphasis on street dealers	change _____
Manpower assigned to narcotics unit	change _____

If Interagency lawsuits over asset distribution should actually happened,
how would the probability of the following events occurring be effected?

Asset seizure laws destroyed by the courts.	change _____
U.S. Armed Forces join the drug war.	change _____
Supply glut of cocaine	change _____
Heroin use doubles	change _____

If Interagency lawsuits over asset distribution actually occurred,
what percentage change, if any, would this occurrence cause in the projection of the following trends at the point of greatest impact?

Narcotics unit's emphasis on asset seizure	change _____
Level of drug use in high schools	change _____
Narcotics unit's emphasis on heroin enforcement	change _____
Narcotics unit's emphasis on street dealers	change _____
Manpower assigned to narcotics unit	change _____

If Supply glut of cocaine should actually happened,
how would the probability of the following events occurring
be effected?

Asset seizure laws destroyed by the courts.	change _____
U.S. Armed Forces join the drug war.	change _____
Interagency lawsuits over asset distribution	change _____
Heroin use doubles	change _____

If Supply glut of cocaine actually occurred,
what percentage change, if any, would this occurrence cause in
the projection of the following trends at the point of greatest
impact?

Narcotics unit's emphasis on asset seizure	change _____
Level of drug use in high schools	change _____
Narcotics unit's emphasis on heroin enforcement	change _____
Narcotics unit's emphasis on street dealers	change _____
Manpower assigned to narcotics unit	change _____

If Heroin use doubles should actually happened,
how would the probability of the following events occurring
be effected?

Asset seizure laws destroyed by the courts.	change _____
U.S. Armed Forces join the drug war.	change _____
Interagency lawsuits over asset distribution	change _____
Supply glut of cocaine	change _____

If Heroin use doubles actually occurred,
what percentage change, if any, would this occurrence cause in
the projection of the following trends at the point of greatest
impact?

Narcotics unit's emphasis on asset seizure	change _____
Level of drug use in high schools	change _____
Narcotics unit's emphasis on heroin enforcement	change _____
Narcotics unit's emphasis on street dealers	change _____
Manpower assigned to narcotics unit	change _____

APPENDIX B

CAPABILITY RATING FORM

MARK AN "X" AT THE MOST APPROPRIATE POINT ON EACH SCALE

- I. POOR II. IMPROVEMENT NEEDED III. AVERAGE
IV. GOOD V. EXCELLENT

	I	II	III	IV	V
MANPOWER					
TECHNOLOGY	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
EQUIPMENT	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
BUDGET	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
TRAINING	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
INVESTIGATOR SKILL	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
INVESTIGATOR FLEXIBILITY	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
INVESTIGATOR ATTITUDE	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
INVESTIGATOR MORALE	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
INV. GOAL ORIENTATION	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
SUPERVISOR SKILL	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
SUPERVISOR FLEXIBILITY	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
SUP. GOAL ORIENTATION	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
EXECUTIVE SKILL	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
EXECUTIVE FLEXIBILITY	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
EXEC. GOAL ORIENTATION	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
COUNCIL SUPPORT	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
CITY MANAGER SUPPORT	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
COMMUNITY SUPPORT	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

APPENDIX C

RATING SHEET FOR POLICY DELPHI

FEASIBILITY RATING		DESIRABILITY RATING	
Definitely Feasible	No hindrance to implementation, no R&D, no political roadblocks, public acceptance.	Very Desirable	Will have positive effect, no or little negative effect extremely beneficial, justifiable on merits
Possibly Feasible	Possibly implementable, some R&D required, political and public reaction must be studied.	Desirable	Will have positive effect, minor negative effects, justifiable as a by-product or with other items
Possibly Infeasible	Some indication not workable, unanswered questions.	Undesirable	Harmful, negative effect, justified only with other very desirable item
Definite Infeasible	All indication negative, unworkable, cannot implement.	Very Undesirable	Will have a major negative effect, extremely harmful

ALTERNATIVE 1: CREATE TASK FORCE/SPECIALIZED UNITS FOR ASSET SEIZURE.

Feasibility	DF	PF	PI	DI	
	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	
Desirability	VD	D	U	VU	SCORE= _____
	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	

ALTERNATIVE 2: CREATE SPECIAL ENFORCEMENT UNITS TO HANDLE LOCAL PROBLEMS.

Feasibility	DF	PF	PI	DI	
	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	
Desirability	VD	D	U	VU	SCORE= _____
	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	

ALTERNATIVE 3: USE SEIZED FUNDS TO FINANCE DRUG AWARENESS PROGRAMS.

Feasibility	DF	PF	PI	DI	
	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	
Desirability	VD	D	U	VU	SCORE= _____
	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	

ALTERNATIVE 4: ESTABLISH ASSET SEIZURE AS A CLEAR PRIORITY.

Feasibility	DF	PF	PI	DI	
	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	
Desirability	VD	D	U	VU	SCORE= _____
	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	

ALTERNATIVE 5: TRAIN PATROL TO HANDLE NARC. ENFORCEMENT AT STREET LEVEL.

Feasibility	DF	PF	PI	DI	
	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	
Desirability	VD	D	U	VU	SCORE= _____
	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	

ALTERNATIVE 6: ALIGN PRIORITIES OF NARC. UNIT TO ALL ASPECTS OF LOCAL PROBS.

Feasibility	DF	PF	PI	DI	
	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	
Desirability	VD	D	U	VU	SCORE= _____
	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	

ALTERNATIVE 7: ABANDON ASSET SEIZURE AS AN EMPHASIS.

Feasibility	DF	PF	PI	DI	
	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	
Desirability	VD	D	U	VU	SCORE= _____
	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	

ALTERNATIVE 8: CREATE ASSET POOL TO SHARE ASSETS EQUALLY.

Feasibility	DF	PF	PI	DI	
	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	
Desirability	VD	D	U	VU	SCORE= _____
	(3)	(2)	(1)	(0)	