

WHAT IMPACT WILL CRIME VICTIM ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
HAVE ON LAW ENFORCEMENT BY THE YEAR 2000?

by

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COMMAND COLLEGE CLASS VIII

PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING (POST)

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PART ONE - A FUTURES STUDY

What impact will crime prevention assistance programs have on law enforcement agencies by the year 2000?

PART TWO - STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

A model plan for a small or medium-sized police agency, in general and the La Mesa Police Department, in particular.

PART THREE - TRANSITION MANAGEMENT

A description of a management structure for a planned transition for La Mesa, California with no victim assistance program to a community with a viable in-house program.

SUPPLEMENTARY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PART ONE -- A FUTURES STUDY

Overview

In a society where crime is a part of daily life and a growing source of concern to its citizens, an increased awareness of the plight of crime victims has arisen. Victims of crime often suffer physical injury, financial loss, and emotional stress. The situation can be aggravated by insensitive/inappropriate treatment on the part of police personnel.

This study looks at the question of what effect crime victim assistance programs will have on small to medium-sized police agencies in the State of California by the year 2000. It provides a description of how a police agency can establish a crime victim assistance program that will provide practical and emotional support through a network of law enforcement professionals sensitive to, and knowledgeable about, victim issues.

Impact Upon Law Enforcement Agencies By Year 2000

The question was studied by ten people who formed a nominal group technique (NGT) panel, brought together in La Mesa. The criteria for selecting panel members were their positions within their respective departments, their law enforcement backgrounds, and their knowledge of the criminal victim assistance needs in San Diego County. Five trends were selected as most related to the thrust of the study: (1) increased legislative and court-mandated programs, (2) an increased expectation for local government assistance, (3) increased police liability, (4) a drain on society's resources, and (5) an expectation of more private sector involvement. Five probable events considered to be the most critical were: (1) a major earthquake/other natural disaster, (2) an economic recession, (3) a prominent individual becoming a victim, (4) enactment of adverse legislation, and (5) abolishment of Proposition 13 or other restrictive measures occurs. This combination of trends and events became the focus for the development of policies to produce desired change.

Policies

Three policies were determined to be both economically and politically feasible:

1. Agency policies and procedures for the department to establish an in-house victim assistance program including the following:
 - a. A group of volunteer citizens to identify the needs and concerns of crime victims.
 - b. A crime victim advocate for the Crime Prevention Unit.
2. Agency mission statements to include focus on crime victim assistance and the associated issues and concerns.

3. A departmental training policy to focus on the crime victim assistance issue.

PART TWO -- STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

Strategic Plan

California municipal policing agencies, the City of Glendale, Arizona and, specifically, the La Mesa Police Department were analyzed to determine external and internal resources, governmental structure, and organizational capability. A stakeholder analysis was carried out and related to future commitment planning.

Implementation Plan

The processes involved in developing a commitment plan based upon a critical mass analysis are discussed in general terms. The types of planning systems to consider when implementing a strategic plan are included. Of particular importance are the adoption, administration and control of the strategic plan to the city council, city manager and the chief of police.

PART THREE -- TRANSITION MANAGEMENT

Victim Assistance Programming In Transition

Using a "representative of constituencies" model, the planned transition will require the following:

1. A public statement detailing the problem, the need for change, and the desired results.
2. A media statement.
3. Identification of and communication with the critical mass.
4. A committee composed of representatives of constituencies.
5. The ability to assimilate information, address issues, ask and answer questions, make decisions, and relieve concerns.

The transition plan will require the commitment of the chief of police. A transition manager (crime victim advocate) will need to be selected. He/she will coordinate all levels and functions within the organization involving crime victim assistance. This individual will interface with the community in providing the services of the in-house program.

DEDICATION

To My Daughters

Christine and Kathleen

and

Those Who Gave Me Encouragement and Support During This Project

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PART ONE - A FUTURES STUDY

PROJECT BACKGROUND

Introduction

Citizens, legislators, and jurists are placing increasing demands on police departments to assist victims of crime. Major concerns voiced by activist groups insist that those victimized by criminals be given psychological, physical, and monetary assistance. This new emphasis in California has resulted in profound changes in the handling of domestic violence. Law enforcement officers are now required to document each incident of disharmony between couples and, when necessary, incarcerate an offending party. Referrals must be made so that the victim can seek additional assistance and/or counseling. Much of this change has been "patchwork", and little time has been spent determining what the long-term effects will be on the law enforcement function. Significant changes, such as domestic violence regulations, have altered and will continue to alter the complexities of policing in the future. The role of the police officer will have to be redefined and the individual who wears the distinctive law enforcement uniform will have to be educated and prepared to deal with victims who have rising expectations.

Law enforcement officers are the most visible arm of local government. On a daily basis, they must deal with societal dysfunctions. A natural outcome of crime is the emergence of victims.

In the early 1970's, a unique experiment using the services of a professional social worker was tried in a Southern California city in order to render assistance to victims of crime. The experiment was never fully understood and eventually met with failure. Failure was predictable from the outset and was succinctly stated in an epitaph by a senior police official when he said that the program was "not perceived by the public as needed." Today, this same individual will profess that "its (the program) time has now come, and if it were implemented, would be of importance for many years to come."

The Plight of the Crime Victim

It has been said that while crime may be the result of social injustices, and that criminal rehabilitation and the prevention of crime are important in the reduction of crime, the major impact of criminal behavior on society cannot be resolved by these methods.

When crime prevention fails, the problem of crime becomes the problem of the victim.¹

Recently, individuals in authority have come to realize that victims of a crime react similarly to those who have experienced war conditions, a natural disaster, or a catastrophic illness.

This reaction was substantiated when research in 1975 focused on victim experiences both with crime and with the criminal justice system. The findings had a significant impact on the thinking of criminal justice planners and the development of programs for victims and witnesses. Researchers at Marquette University interviewed 3,000 victims and witnesses

¹ National Organization For Victim Assistance:
Network Information Bulletin, Vol.1, No.2. November, 1984.

from cases active in Milwaukee County's court system and 1,600 persons identified as victims of serious personal crimes by a previous National Crime Survey.

They found mental or emotional suffering to be the most frequent problem expressed by victims in general, while time and income loss posed the greatest difficulties for victims involved in the court process. The fear and emotional distress experienced by victims often extended as well to the victims' families and friends...²

Sadly, victims often see the criminal justice system responding to the needs of the criminal element and not to innocent victims. The attitude of a victim can best be summarized in the following poem:

Survivor Status

I have been victimized.
I was in a fight that was not a fair fight.
I did not ask for the fight. I lost.
There is no shame in losing such fights, only in winning.
I have reached the stage of survivor and am no longer
a slave of victim status.
I look back with sadness rather than hate.
I look forward with hope rather than despair.
I may never forget,
but I need not constantly remember.
I was a victim.
I am a survivor.³

² "Crime Victims: Learning How To Help Them", National Institute of Justice, Robert C. Davis, No. 203, May/June 1987.

³ Unknown author.

Two indignities must be borne by the victim, physical injury and financial loss.⁴

Physical injury can consist of the following:

1. Minor physical injuries which may have a significant impact on the victim, depending on the psychological and/or physical character of the individual. An elderly person may not fully recover from a minor physical injury or become so frightened that he/she withdraws from a previously active productive lifestyle.
2. Permanent injuries that can alter the life of a victim. This is best depicted by a victim who has suffered a physical injury that does not allow him/her to lead a productive life.
3. In death, the loss of an individual can be measured in not only productivity but, also in the loss of emotional support to those that have been left behind.

Financial loss may include the following: (1) property destruction, (2) direct dollar loss, (3) loss of income, (4) medical expenses, and (5) retraining or rehabilitation costs.⁵

The problems of a victim are increased by the many trials which he/she encounters with the criminal justice system. Added miseries can be found in court delays, postponements,

⁴ "Victim and Witness Assistance - New State Laws and the System's Response", Journal V68, N 6 (December 1985), p 220-244.

⁵ National Organization For Victim Assistance, Volume 1, Number 2. November, 1984.

and inadequate case preparation.⁶

It is vital that law enforcement planners take into consideration the "plight" of the crime victim in order to guarantee future success in meeting the needs of victims.

SCOPE OF PROJECT

This futures study examines how victims of crime will be dealt with by the police officer of a medium-sized police agency in California at the beginning of the next century. This study will not deal with technological advances that may alter the delivery of service to citizens of the targeted community, but will make reasonable predictions using data and methodologies accepted and anticipated to be available in the year 2000.

This study will also focus on the role of police managers in facilitating the prompt and effective delivery of service to victims of crime. The scope of the study will identify programs already in existence and how they, and other programs, may evolve to deal with victims of crime into the next century.

A medium-sized community with a population between 50,000-100,000 persons will be the subject of this study. Smaller jurisdictions may not be able to provide the resources needed to run a program designed for the targeted community, whereas a larger agency may have resources that allow for larger numbers of personnel and expensive technology

⁶ "Constitutional Considerations - Government Responsibility and the Right Not To Be a Victim". R.L. Aynes, Pepperdine Law Review, V.11 (1984), p. 63.

not available to a medium-sized agency.

METHODS: IDENTIFICATION

The following methodologies will be utilized to develop and evaluate information:

1. Review of literature
2. Personal interviews
3. Questionnaire
4. Personal knowledge
5. Trends and events identification
6. Trends and events forecasting
7. Cross-impact evaluation analysis
8. Futures scenarios

LITERATURE SEARCH

The topic was defined and refined by a review of related literature, professional journals, topical magazines, and news articles. Background information was generated on the current status of victim assistance programs and efforts being made by law enforcement agencies in addressing the crime victim issue. This literature search involved the use of "scanning" and the development of a "futures file" of articles reporting on trends or patterns of similar technological, environmental, economic, sociological, or political issues. The "futures file" was begun in August 1988 and maintained through March 1989.

INTERVIEWS AND QUESTIONNAIRES

Personal interviews were conducted with knowledgeable individuals who are providers of victim assistance programs. In 1972, a pilot program was initiated with federal funds at the La Mesa, California, Police Department. The administrator for this program was

located and questioned about the impact of the program, its pitfalls, and the reasons for its failure. The San Diego East County Administrator for Victim Assistance was interviewed to gain insight into program(s) available today and their effectiveness. The researcher also traveled to the City of Glendale, Arizona, to view a model program that has received national recognition for its effectiveness and innovative approach in dealing with the crime victim's needs. Individuals interviewed were able to relate their perceptions of victim assistance and those trends that were developing in their field. The information from these interviews was included in the nominal group technique (NGT) process.

Personal interviews were conducted with experts and informed individuals within various law enforcement and social services communities. Each was asked to give their perspective on the trends that would have implications on victim assistance. This information was used to prepare for the nominal group technique process.

Interviewed were a human services director, a senior child protective services worker, an assistant for the county of San Diego's victim assistance program, and a detective of a metropolitan police department.

Each expert/informed person was asked what he/she felt was the most pressing issue involving crime victim assistance. All four indicated that victim assistance programs lacked adequate funding to address all the needs of victims. When asked what effect inadequate funding had on the delivery of service to victims' they responded (1) not all victims are assisted who report crimes, (2) professional counselors are not available to

assist crime victims, (3) 24-hour assistance is not available, (4) follow-up referrals are not being made to appropriate social service and victim compensation programs, and (5) victims are not being properly educated about the operation of the criminal justice system and the way it treats victims.

It was learned from this group that the victim rights movement resulted from interest of the women's movement in victims of rape and domestic violence, and law enforcements concern about the failure of victims to report crimes and cooperate with prosecutors. Those interviewed agreed that crime inflicts feelings of powerlessness, guilt, and rage on the victim and that effective assistance permits the victim to recover.

A questionnaire was also prepared and mailed to eighty-nine small and medium-sized police agencies in California (Table #1) to measure their level of awareness and capability to begin victim assistance programs. Unfortunately, the majority of the assistance programs studied are inadequate at meeting the needs of their clients. Also noted was a reluctance on behalf of the responding agencies to become involved in any program that was not funded by the State of California.

Fifty-seven agencies responded to the questionnaire and only nine had in-house victim assistance programs (Table #1). Victims in the other areas were referred to a county agency or a private provider. Twenty-six respondents indicated that they had a department regulation or instruction addressing the needs of victims.

The majority did believe that victim assistance programs would increasingly impact their agencies in the future. Forty-three respondents indicated they would be unable to absorb additional programs without additional manpower and funding. This does not bode well for someone interested in starting a program in the post-Proposition 13 environment. This question reflects that most agencies are "not ready" to deal with an in-house victim assistance program.

**Table 1 - Statistical/Informational Breakdown Of Respondents To Questionnaire
(57 California agencies)**

		High	Low
Average number of officers	58.6	146	10
Average population of municipality	44,397	118,000	4,340
Average number of detectives	8.3	25	1
Average number of detectives assigned to Crimes Against Persons	2.3	6	0
Average number of Patrol Personnel	36.9	111	9
No. in-house victim asst. programs	9	N/A	N/A
No. with department regulation or instruction/needs of victims	26	N/A	N/A
Agencies indicating they are unable to absorb add'l programs w/o add'l manpower and funding	43	N/A	N/A

VICTIM ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS -- ON-SITE STUDIES

Two crime victim assistance programs were studied by this researcher in an attempt to identify and compare their attributes.

The City of La Mesa Victim Assistance Experience

In August of 1971, the City of La Mesa applied for a grant under Section 301b of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Specifically, a position was sought for a social service coordinator to be assigned to the La Mesa Police Department at 8181 Allison Avenue, La Mesa, California 92041. The purpose of this position was to assist victims of crime; to prevent recidivism of juveniles involved in delinquent behavior; and to work with families who were having problems as a unit, or with their neighbors.⁷ The idea was prevention and rehabilitation in situations where problems had already developed and police action was necessary and to provide on-scene and follow-up assistance to crime victims. A professionally trained social worker, with a Master's degree in social work from an accredited graduate school, was to provide follow-up counseling to individuals in the community whose problems could be solved with a minimum of police involvement. In the original grant proposal, it was noted that the program would allow the police officer to do more and better police work because he was not spending time attempting to provide services which required a professionally trained counselor. The program target was the entire community of La Mesa, California. Referrals came from either the patrol officer or

⁷ California Council On Criminal Justice, Grant Application.
August 1, 1971. Submitted by Glenn B. Adams, Chief of Police.

at the request of the citizen. Not every case was to be handled by the social worker; there was to be a control group, those that would not be involved with the social worker, and an experimental group, those that would receive social work assistance in order to determine if there was a difference in the behavior of those who had contact with the social worker during the grant period. In this way, statistical information needed for evaluation could be established. The social worker would also make referrals to other agencies within the county of San Diego and serve as a consultant in those cases when necessary. The approach for achieving the objectives was to hire a professionally trained social worker who was experienced in working with individuals, families, groups, and the community. This social worker was to be trained in understanding underlying or unconscious motivations of human behavior. He/she was to be skilled in understanding the effects of human relationships on individual behavior as well as the social, emotional, cultural, and economic factors contributing to such behavior. He/she was to be able to propose solutions to problems confronting victims, juveniles, parents, and schools, based not only on technical understanding but also on sensitivity to the needs of the parties involved. He/she was also to have a working knowledge of community agencies and resources for the purpose of referral and collaboration.⁸ Admittedly, it was stated in the proposal that there was no concrete evidence that the approach would work, and that this particular tack had never been tried before. However, the feeling was that the new, innovative, non-law enforcement approach would aid the police department and provide services to those in the community, helping to reduce crime rates for the community which lacked this type of service. The grant proposal was for a period of one year and the total project cost was

⁸ Robert L. Platt, Master Social Worker, La Mesa Police Department. December 28, 1971.

placed at \$21,315. An official City of La Mesa press release indicated that the new social worker, Robert Platt, was the first full-time social worker and counselor ever assigned to any police department. With this assignment, the City of La Mesa was attempting to thwart social problems before they became police problems and assist crime victims.

The then-current Chief of Police, long noted for his progressive and innovative administration, wanted the social worker to act as a family and juvenile counselor and also to assist victims of crime. Community relations were stressed, with the implementation of this program intended to bridge the gap between law enforcement officers and professional social service agencies. The Chief encouraged all La Mesans with the need for counseling or assistance to phone the social worker at the police station or to visit him in his office, adding that there was no charge for the service provided.

To garner information on the program, the researcher located the social worker, who had been hired in 1971. In a personal interview with the worker, the interviewer learned that the program in his estimation was a success in that his impact was significant. His involvement with victims of crime included personal and telephone contact, referrals to outside social agencies, and preparation of literature to be disseminated by police department members. Sadly enough, with the election of a new mayor in 1972, this position was slashed from the budget. The rationale for this firing was to "increase efficiency and to save the taxpayers money." The funds saved by this dismissal were earmarked for "placement and construction of sidewalks, curbs, gutters, sewer mains and laterals, and pavement patching." Press coverage at the time questioned the appropriateness

of dismissing the professional social worker.⁹ It was generally believed that the program had been successful in that the plight of crime victims had been addressed. An analysis by the worker on why the program failed suggested:

1. Poor planning.
2. The political arena was not understood or was ignored.
3. The governmental decision makers changed.
4. Little or no commitment to a long-term existence.
5. Lack of funds.

On October 13, 1972, an official letter from the personnel department informed the master social worker that the position had been eliminated from the budget and his services were no longer needed. Since the failed experiment, the department has not adopted an in-house policy or procedure to assist crime victims. Officers currently are required to provide a fact sheet to domestic violence victims. This sheet is oftentimes given to victims of other crimes in an attempt to refer them to an assisting agency. The initiative of the officer plays an important role in what type of assistance a victim receives at the scene.

The Glendale, Arizona, Victim Assistance Experience

This researcher, in January 1989, traveled to the City of Glendale, Arizona, to observe and study their nationally acclaimed Victim Assistance Services (VAS) program. The information gleaned came from printed literature and interviews with key personnel associated with this program.

⁹ San Diego Union, Copley News Service, October 13, 1972.

The Victim Assistance Services program has been an independent component of the Glendale city government since 1975 and was one of 19 model programs funded by the federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) for a period of three years.

Key city staff members in the implementation of VAS were the mayor, police chief, city manager, assistant city manager, youth services director, and the federal grant coordinator. In January of 1978, the city assumed total funding. The human services director indicated that approximately \$523,000 was allocated to the city's total human services function and that approximately 65% of this figure was allocated to the victim assistance services component.

The program services available through the VAS program combine both on-scene crisis work with outreach to non-crisis victims. The program focuses on counseling, information, advocacy, and support to victims. The crisis intervention services function dictates that the victim assistance staff be available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, to respond to the scene of an immediate crisis. All calls are routed through the Glendale Police Department. The patrol officer or sergeant has the ability to call for VAS to help any citizen in a state of severe crisis, either crime or non-crime related. Policy indicates that not all calls require immediate personal contact with the citizen, but that calls, which include deaths (homicide, suicide, traffic, sudden infant, and natural causes), suicidal persons, psychiatric emergency, social services, and domestic violence family problems, make up the majority of calls requiring immediate response. Comprehensive follow-up is

provided to many crisis call victims. It is not unusual for caseworkers to accompany victims to police interviews and prepare them for court appearances. Crisis counseling is also available to crime victims. The caseworker has the ability to refer victims to other community agencies where long-term therapy or psychiatric treatment is recommended. Also provided is a non-crisis victim service to victims of most non-business crimes. Assistance may include personal, telephone, or letter contact. Thousands of referrals are received each year.

A casework assistant reviews police records to determine the level of VAS follow-up. An agreement has been made permitting access to records because of the proven follow-up benefits of VAS. This caseworker also has the ability to provide feedback to victims regarding case status, court procedure, detective assignment and other information that would assist the victim in coping with the unknown, including requirements that may be placed on him or her for successful prosecution of the suspect.

Policy within the VAS program requires personal contact by the caseworker in crimes involving children and elderly victims. In all sex-related crimes, including assault, indecent exposure, obscene phone calls, and domestic violence, form letters with general and specialized brochures are mailed to the victims. There may also be telephone calls or visits to offer assistance.

There is limited financial aid available to victims who are left destitute by a crime or for those hurt financially when assisting in the prosecution of a criminal. Many of these funds

are used to provide emergency food and shelter to domestic violence victims and to compensate others who have lost wages or require transportation and/or child care in order to appear in court.

A unique feature of the program is emergency security and cleanup. The VAS function has the capability to arrange for city crews to secure homes after security measures are breached through burglary or fire. Also provided is a free cleanup service by a private janitorial service whenever there is a homicide or suicide, the feeling being that surviving family members are saved from added trauma by not having to deal with this task.

A neighborhood mediation service is available to restore peace and reduce police callbacks to neighborhood problems. The aid may take the form of a formal mediation session with all disputants present, or a problem-solving meeting to help the citizens resolve their differences. Finally, the VAS staff are very active in providing community presentations to increase the awareness of the needs and rights of victims, and to share crime prevention alternatives. This prevention function works closely with the police community relations division in providing outreach to the schools, senior citizens groups and other community organizations within the community. Much has been done over the years to develop a close working relationship between the VAS program and the Glendale Police Department.

Initially, the program planners were aware that some law enforcement agencies have resisted victim programs, viewing victim advocates as "meddlesome social workers." To resolve this, police personnel have been involved in planning the vast function from the

very beginning. Police administrators, especially the chief, were instrumental in designing a program that would meet victim's needs. The victim assistance program is viewed as a backup to the police function. Great lengths have been gone to present VAS as beneficial to the law enforcement function. The special skills, training and expertise of the officer are readily accepted by caseworkers and it has never been implied that the Victim Assistance Program was to replace the police. Time was spent interviewing key personnel within the VAS program and the police department. Interviewees agree that Glendale had a unique program. Most felt that the following attributes contributed to the successful implementation of the program and have been instrumental in its continued acceptance within local government and the community:

1. Exceptional planning.
2. A political arena conducive to the program.
3. Continued support by decision makers even though there have been changes in personnel and political factions.
4. A lasting commitment for the program.
5. Sufficient funds to sustain the program and to address the increasing needs of the community.

NOMINAL GROUP TECHNIQUE (NGT)

An accepted futures research technique is the use of a nominal group (NGT). This device provides a structured format for developing and forecasting trends and events associated with the chosen topic. Members of this group were chosen because of their knowledge

and experience in the field of local government, public finance, victimology, and social services.

Approximately two weeks prior to the NGT process, a packet was furnished to the NGT members detailing the dynamics/expectations of the process (Appendix B).

The NGT meeting was held on January 26, 1989. The group consisted of a "mix" of public and private individuals who live and/or work in the County of San Diego. I intentionally selected individuals whom I felt would be knowledgeable and aware of the issue(s) that this exercise might raise. Participants of the NGT group included the following: (1) a chief of police, (2) supervising social worker - Child Protective Services, (3) Graduate student - criminal justice major, (4) retired vice principal, (5) Senior Crime Prevention Specialist, (6) close relative of homicide victim, (7) domestic violence victim, (8) two police watch commanders, and (9) a school liaison officer.

The NGT question, "What impact will crime victim assistance programs have on law enforcement by the year 2000?" was prominently displayed in the conference room. A brief overview of the Command College program and its goals was given after introducing each member of the nominal group. Members were given the opportunity to insert up to three additional trends and two events to this list.

Trends (Patterns Of Happenings Over Time)

The NGT group was instructed to pick five trends that they felt were most important. Each member of the group was then asked to record a numeric value for each trend using a scale of one to five with the number one as "least important" and the number five as "most important." The following two questions were posed to the group when evaluating each trend as to its importance:

"Which of these trends would be crucial in a police department's attempts to cope with the needs of victims?"

"Which of these trends would be most important to monitor if we could develop an action plan that altered the course of the trend?"

After the NGT participants recorded their judgments, the following five distilled trends were mathematically identified:

Trends:

T1 - Number of legislative and court mandated programs.

T2 - Public expectation for local government assistance.

T3 - Police liability costs.

T4 - Financial drain on society.

T5 - Private sector involvement.

Forecasting And Evaluating The Trends

After list of candidate trends was distilled to the five most important, the NGT group was instructed to list them on the "Trend Evaluation Form" (Appendix C). As the facilitator, I advised them that the overall importance of each of these trends rated a score of "100" today. This valuation of "100" was the standard on which they were to base their subsequent ratings. The group was then asked to estimate a value for each trend five years ago (1984). The following question was posed to them:

"How important was this trend, as it relates to the issue, in 1984?"

The participants were then asked to complete the two remaining columns of the form.

They were asked to consider the following two questions when scoring their estimates:

"How important will this trend be in five years (1994) if we continue our present course and nothing changes?"

"How important will this trend be in ten years (2000) if reasonable changes are expected to occur?"

The results of this analysis were averaged and indicate the direction and velocity of each trend.

"Trend Evaluation Form" data (Appendix C) are depicted and commented on in the following Tables:

Table 2 - Trend 1: Number of Legislative And Court Mandated Programs

	five years ago	today	+5 years "will be"	+10 years "should be"
Level of trend today ratio:today = 100	52	100	116	134

Legislative and court-mandated programs have increased approximately 48% in the past five years, and in 1995, we can anticipate an increase of 16% over the current level. The group felt the problem will not increase as dramatically as the period 1984 through 1989. The group believes that the pace of legislative and court-mandated programs should only increase 34% in the next ten years.

Table 3 - Trend 2: Public Expectation For Local Government Assistance

	five years ago	today	+5 years "will be"	+10 years "should be"
Level of trend today ratio:today = 100	52	100	124	131

The group indicated that law enforcement agencies have experienced an increased expectation for local government assistance over the past five years of approximately 48%. In 1995, the expectations will increase about 24% over the present rate. This increase is appreciably less than experienced over the past five years; the rate would slow by the

year 2000 (approximately 31%).

Table 4 - Trend 3: Police Liability Costs

	five years ago	today	+5 years "will be"	+10 years "should be"
Level of trend today ratio:today = 100	51	100	106	120

Group participants indicated that police liability had increased 49% over the past five years. In 1995, the liability issue will only increase 6%. This increase is significantly lower than was experienced over the past five years. The group concurred that police liability will increase 20% by the year 2000.

Table 5 - Trend 4: Financial Drain On Society

	five years ago	today	+5 years "will be"	+10 years "should be"
Level of trend today ratio:today = 100	51	100	106	120

The financial drain on society has increased approximately 34% in the past five years. It is estimated that this drain should increase 16% by 1995 to cover the costs of victim assistance programs. It is predicted that the demand on finances will increase 36% by the year 2000.

Table 6 - Trend 5: Private Sector Involvement

	five years ago	today	+5 years "will be"	+10 years "should be"
Level of trend today ratio:today = 100	51	100	118	127

The group indicated that private sector involvement has increased 49% in the past five years and it was predicted their involvement will increase 18% by 1995. Private sector involvement should increase 27% over the present level by the year 2000.

Events (Discrete Occurrences)

Upon completing the "Trend Evaluation Form," each participant was again asked to independently choose the five events (from the nineteen total events identified) that they felt would have the greatest impact on the issue. Each member was asked to rank-order these selections as they had previously done with the trends.

Prior to rating these events, the group was instructed to consider the following question:

"Which of the listed events would have the most important and dramatic impacts on the issue of victim assistance at the law enforcement level?"

The results were tabulated and the following five distilled events were selected by the

group:

Events:

E1 - Major earthquake/other natural disaster.

E2 - Economic recession.

E3 - Prominent individual becomes victim.

E4 - Adverse legislation.

E5 - Abolishment of Proposition 13 or restrictive spending
measures.

Comment: The NGT members independently identified trends and events along with those that had been identified by the researcher. The researcher provided data gleaned from a literature search and conversations had with persons knowledgeable with victim assistance programs.

Forecasting And Evaluating The Events

Five most critical events were identified by the group (Appendix D). They were asked to assign numerical values to each indicating the probability of the event taking place by the years 1995 and 2000. The data was compiled and averaged. It is depicted in Table 6.

The evaluation also rated the impact on the issue area and the impact on law enforcement.


Table 7 - Critical Events

Event Statement	Year Prob. > 0	Probability		Impact On The Issue Area If The Event Occurred	
		by 1995	by 2000	Positive 0-10	Negative 0-10
		0-100	0-100		
E1 Major Earthquake	1995	60	85	+2	-8
E2 Econ. Recession	1992	65	75	+1	-8
E3 Prominent Victim	1990	65	85	+6	-1
E4 Adverse Legislation	1993	55	80	+0	-7
E5 Removal of Prop. 13/Spnding Measures	1989	30	45	+7	-1


The group evaluated the five identified events with the following conclusions (included are some concerns/comments that were expressed):

Event #1 - Major earthquake or other natural disaster (probability by 2000 is 85%).

The group concurred that the first year that a major earthquake or natural disaster was probable was 1995. The probability of the event occurring by 1995 is 60%; the group felt that there is a 85% chance that it will occur by the year 2000. A significant disaster would obviously result in an influx of assistance from state, federal, and private sector providers. Property damage, injuries, and loss of life would be so great that the community would have extreme difficulty recovering and re-establishing services to levels currently enjoyed.




Event #2 - Economic recession (probability by 2000 is 75%). The first year that an economic recession is most likely to occur is 1992. The probability of this event occurring by 1995 is 65%, with a 75% chance that it will occur by the year 2000. If the recession were to occur it was felt by the group that interest rates would drop and inflation would decrease. This event would have a significant negative impact on the availability of funds to local governmental agencies. Tax dollars would diminish as sales, property, and user fees softened. Spending cuts would adversely affect victim assistance programs. Administrators would elect to provide essential services and discard programs that did not have a direct impact on public safety.




Event #3 - Prominent victim (probability by 2000 is 85%). Individuals in the group felt that a prominent individual would become a victim by 1990. The probability of this occurring by 1995 is 65%, with a 85% chance that it will occur by the year 2000.

Members felt that notoriety associated with a prominent member of society becoming a crime victim would underscore the need for victim assistance programs. If the event were to occur in a jurisdiction like La Mesa where minimal assistance is available, the reaction may be more pronounced, particularly if the victim becomes indignant and critical of the level of service currently available. If the victim were a leader, and his or her absence would be felt, there may be a negative/adverse impact on day-to-day operations on society.




Event #4 - Adverse legislation (probability by 2000 is 80%). The group felt that the first year that adverse legislation was probable was 1993. The probability of legislation occurring by 1995 is 55%, with a 80% chance that it will occur by the year 2000.

Adverse legislation would deplete revenue allocations which may have been earmarked for victim assistance programs. Mandatory programs could be forced on police agencies without provisions for funding or reimbursement. Group concern was expressed that another bill similar to the domestic violence legislation would be enacted without consideration of what immediate and long-term impact it would have on agencies.



Event #5 - Abolishment of Proposition 13 / restrictive spending measures (Probability by 2000 is 45%). The first year that the abolishment of Proposition 13 and/or other restrictive spending measures is most likely to happen is 1989. The probability of abolishment of these measures by 1995 is 30%, with a 45% chance that this event will occur by the year 2000.



The abolishment of restrictive spending measures would have a positive effect on local government and the services it wishes to provide. It would allow additional discretionary funds to establish services that would aid victims. It could make funds available for preventative programs which would lessen the likelihood of a person(s) becoming a victim. A vigorous economy would mean higher employment and prosperity, therefore supposedly less crime to support basic human needs.

Table 8 - Cross-Impact Evaluation

EVENT PROBABILITY BY 2000		E1	E2	E3	E4	E5	T1	T2	T3	T4	T5	ACTORS
E1	85%	X	+65%	+80%	+60%	+75%	+55%	+90%	-15%	+100%	+80%	9
E2	75%	NE	X	+20%	+65%	-50%	+10%	+100%	+10%	+95%	-10%	8
E3	85%	NE	NE	X	+35%	NE	+85%	+90%	+20%	+15%	+95%	6
E4	80%	NE	+60%	NE	X	-45%	+90%	+10%	+25%	+90%	+15%	8
E5	45%	NE	+20%	NE	-45%	X	+20%	+75%	+10%	-65%	+30%	7
REACTORS		0	3	2	4	3	5	5	5	5	5	

Legend:

- Event 1 - Major earthquake / other natural disaster 85%
- Event 2 - Economic recession 75%
- Event 3 - Prominent individual becomes victim 85%
- Event 4 - Adverse legislation 80%
- Event 5 - Abolishment of Prop. 13 or restrictive spending measures 45%

- Trend 1 - Increased legislative and court mandated programs
- Trend 2 - Increased expectation for local government assistance
- Trend 3 - Increased police liability
- Trend 4 - Financial drain on society
- Trend 5 - More private sector involvement

Analysis of the Cross-Impact Evaluation (Table 8)

Actor Events.

The events were rank-ordered as to their importance pertaining to change by tabulating the "hits" on the Cross-Impact Evaluation Form horizontally. These events are called "actor" events. The most significant "actor" was event #1 -- major earthquake/other natural disaster. Also, events #2 -- economic recession and #4 -- adverse legislation has a high propensity for causing disruptive change.

Reactor Trends.

Reactor trends were identified by tabulating the columns and recording the number of "hits". Reactor trends are affected by the occurrence or non-occurrence of the "actors." All five trends had the maximum number of hits.

Event to Event Cross-Impact

If an event occurred (with a given probability), how would the events or trends interacting with it be affected? The following conclusions were formulated using the above criteria and the cross-impact results.

Event #1. If a major earthquake/other natural disaster were to occur, it was felt that the economic strain on both the public and private sector not only in Southern California, but the nation as well, would be detrimental. Disasters do not change the basic responsibilities of government; they increase the need for fulfilling them promptly and effectively under emergency conditions. Resources would have to be diverted to repairing and rebuilding lives, systems, and organizational infrastructure. Increased spending would result and activities would be focused in an attempt to return society to its previous level.

An earthquake/other natural disaster could affect all communities in the Southern California area. How each community is affected will depend on whether or not the natural disaster occurs in the immediate vicinity and whether resources would be used or diverted away from its jurisdiction to assist the impacted area.

The magnitude of this type of event will determine the number injured, killed, or separated from their loved ones. Many will suffer personal property loss, or at the very least be inconvenienced. This tragic experience will be felt by all segments of society because of ties with others throughout the country.

The injury or loss of a prominent member of government, private enterprise, sports, and/or the entertainment field will result in national media coverage. This loss will accentuate the need for assistance. If assistance is defined as lacking, or unavailable, there will be those who will call for measures to insure it is made available.

Adverse legislation may occur because of an earthquake/natural disaster. Local as well as state governmental bodies will hastily enact legislation to deal with the immediate needs of individuals and businesses in the disaster area. Police agencies may be asked to step in and provide the essential service, and additional duties will be heaped onto an already overburdened police function. Without adequate resources, the traditional enforcement approach will be redirected or changed. This change may alter the delivery of police services permanently.

In the event that a significant earthquake strikes the Southern California area, Proposition 13 and other restrictive measures may be rescinded. Much of the recovery will be dependent on the availability of state funds. The NGT group felt that the state, along with the federal government, would be the only viable entities that would have the clout and resources to levy taxes that would offset the reconstruction costs of a major disaster. Property tax hikes would be inevitable.

Event #2. If an economic recession were to occur, it would have no effect on the probability that an earthquake would occur.

Given an economic recession, the chance of a prominent individual becoming a victim may increase. An individual with criminal intent or a desire to survive may prey on an affluent individual. Once the crime has occurred, assistance may not be forthcoming. Funds may be limited or unavailable for victim assistance programs due to budget constraints. Ironically, a prominent individual would most likely have friends or relatives who would

come to their assistance if he/she would become the victim of a crime. Such a level of support would be lacking for the ordinary citizen who may have access to fewer resources.

An economic recession will result in adverse legislation. Revenues will be reduced. The impact may take the form of spending cuts by some or all governmental agencies.

Legislation may be enacted without funding provisions. Police agencies will be asked or directed to take programs that have been reduced or eliminated because of limited funding. The reduction or abolishment of support services such as victim assistance, probation, and juvenile diversion programs will lead to confusion, repeated calls-for-service, and increased recidivism.

If an economic recession were to occur, property owners would resist attempts to rescind Proposition 13 (a California legislative measure that restricts/limits property taxation) and other similar measures. Property owners and taxpayer groups would lobby against increased taxes and would probably seek additional relief in an attempt to maintain their economic interests.

Event #3. Should a prominent individual become a victim, no increase or decrease in the probability of an earthquake/natural disaster will occur.

Likewise, should a prominent individual become a victim, there will be no effect on the increase or decrease on the possibility of a recession or downturn in the economy.

A prominent individual who becomes a victim could lead to legislation that may have an adverse effect on police agencies. Additional duties may be thrust on agencies that mandate "special relationships" and/or responsibilities to victims. Criminal as well as civil sanctions may be attached for inappropriate or non-compliance by police personnel. Changes deemed simple and nonobtrusive may have a "ripple effect" on the criminal justice system that will overburden it and have a lasting effect in the future.

If a prominent individual becomes a victim, there should be no effect on increasing or decreasing the probability of abolishing Proposition 13 or other restrictive spending measures.

Event #4. The enactment of adverse legislation will have no effect on the probability of an earthquake or other natural disaster. This doesn't mean that adverse legislation will not have an impact on society's ability to deal with a disaster.

Adverse legislation could lead to an economic recession. Attempts may be made to cool off an "overheated" economy by limiting spending or raising interest rates. These types of manipulation could limit funds available for new programs and result in spending reductions in already established programs.

The NGT group felt that if adverse legislation were enacted, it would have no effect on increasing or decreasing the possibility of a prominent individual becoming a victim. The author is uncomfortable with this assessment. If cuts in spending for public safety or

social service programs do occur, there is the possibility that society's ability to deal with criminality may be hindered.

If adverse legislative action does take place, Proposition 13 and other restrictive spending measures may not allow service providers to devise alternative funding measures. There is the distinct possibility that problem areas will go unaddressed. Insufficient funding or the additional burden of legislation that impacts the law enforcement function will detract from police agencies accomplishing their missions. The law enforcement members of the group stated that their agencies are nearing maximum efficiency with the funding that is now provided, and new legislation that did not provide funding would have an adverse effect.

Event #5. Proposition 13 and other restrictive spending measures will have no effect on the probability of a major earthquake or another natural disaster occurring.

Proposition 13 or other restrictive spending measures could contribute to an economic recession. The Gramm Rudman Bill may be an example of a restrictive spending measure that will have an adverse effect on the economy. Given "caps" on spending by the federal government, fewer state and local government funds would be available. A significant reduction in military expenditures will have a negative impact on the economy of California. A "cooling" of the Southern California economy would mean higher unemployment, a reduction in wholesale and retail sales, and a myriad of other factors that will mean a reduction in state revenue taxes.

Proposition 13 and other restrictive spending measures will have no effect on the likelihood that a prominent individual will become a crime victim.

The group proposed that Proposition 13 and associated restrictive measures will insure that other similar measures will not be enacted. Voters may now realize that further cuts in appropriations and taxes will severely impact or curtail essential services they have come to expect. There was mention of the "grass roots" approach to involvement in local government and the need to be a part in the decision-making process. Involvement in this approach will provide a sensitivity to those who in the past have felt disdain for government. They will find that government is sometimes the only answer to solving pressing problems in the community. The group felt that certain restrictive spending measures may be rescinded before the year 2000, depending on the economic and social health of society.

Event To Trend Cross-Impact

Event #1. If a major earthquake or other natural disaster were to occur, there would be an increase of 55 percent in the likelihood that there would be additional legislative and court-mandated programs. After the initial flood of relief-oriented legislation and programs, law makers and citizens will want to enact measures that will minimize their fear and the impact of a subsequent event. This "glow effect" will be significant if citizens perceive that government has been ineffective or unable to provide adequate service.

There would be a 90 percent increase in the likelihood that citizens would expect assistance from local government in the event of a major earthquake or other natural disaster. The role of local government in a major disaster may only involve summoning mutual aid from outside the impacted area and community. Resources will be depleted or inadequate at the local level. Currently, an elaborate mutual aid assistance program exists at the local, regional, and state levels and this program could be activated in the course of such an event.

The NGT group surmised that there would be a 15 percent decrease in the likelihood that there would be increased police liability in the event of an earthquake or major natural disaster. Police will be required to make decisions that may be questioned later, but because of the gravity of the event, it will be difficult to condemn them or hold the involved agency civilly or criminally liable. Any action will have to be shocking to the senses before it will become an issue at a later date.

If an earthquake or other natural disaster were to occur in a populated area there would be a 100% increase in the probability that there would be a financial drain on society. Caring for the injured and the dead, response by public and private agencies for assistance, the use of outside assistance and relief measures, and reconstruction will have a monetary as well as a social cost.

There would be a 80 percent increase in the probability that the private sector would be involved in addressing the needs of the community if there a major earthquake or other

natural disaster. This assistance would take the form of knowledge, manpower, equipment, supplies, and money.

Event #2. If an economic recession were to occur, the NGT felt that there would be a probability of a 10 percent increase in additional legislative and court-mandated programs. Many programs dependent on donations from corporate and private sources would be impacted. Private sector discretionary income would disappear as sales and profits dwindled. Providers and those in need of the affected service will look to government and the courts for relief.

With the onset of an economic recession, there is a 100 percent probability that there will be an increased expectation for local government assistance. The group felt that citizens would look to local government when services traditionally provided by the private sector and state and federal entities were cut back or ceased to exist. As an example, the County's juvenile diversion programs may be curtailed or become expendable, and informal counseling and follow-ups may become the responsibility of the arresting officer or a designated representative of the police agency.

The probability of police liability will increase 10% because of an economic recession. Because of increased calls for service, officers will be involved in more situations that may expose them to costly civil litigation. Also, desperate and/or devious individuals may attempt to use misfortune or mishaps involving police personnel to collect damages.

Members of the NGT group concurred that there is a 95 percent probability that a financial drain on society would occur if an economic recession were to occur. Available monies would have to be diverted to implement or sustain domestic programs that would assist those directly affected by the economic crisis. A recession would have a "ripple effect" on revenue collection and expenditures by government unless there is manipulation (in the form of increased deficit spending, loosening of the money supply, or interest concessions) by Congress or the Federal Reserve Board.

There would be a 10 percent reduction in the probability of more private sector involvement if an economic recession were to occur. Stated was the feeling was that private companies, persons, and charitable groups would have less discretionary income to donate to sustaining or initiating new social service programs. The group noted that volunteerism would become more prevalent and that critical shortages in manpower may be resolved or augmented in this manner.

Event #3. If a prominent individual were to become a victim, there would be a 85 percent increase in the probability that legislative and court-mandated programs will result. When actress Theresa Saldana was brutally attacked in Los Angeles, much attention was drawn to the incident in the written media and television. Ms. Saldana has become an advocate for victims of violent crime and has spoken on their behalf and her story has been used to influence the legislative branch of California government. Stiffer sentencing is a direct result of these efforts.

If a prominent individual becomes a victim, there would be a 90 percent increase in the probability that citizens would expect assistance from local government. The group noted that citizens would be more informed because of name recognition and media exposure and may become galvanized in their opinion and demand immediate assistance from local sources. If they perceive that the needed assistance is not available, they will approach elected officials for relief. Notwithstanding, if local government cannot cope with their needs (as encountered with domestic violence situations), legislators at the state level will be asked to become involved.

A prominent individual who becomes a victim will increase the probability of increased police liability by 20 percent. The group felt that the notoriety that would result in a prominent individual becoming a victim would focus attention on any deficiencies in the support or victim assistance provisions now available to the public. Individuals would use the tools available to them to seek economic or physical relief. Police personnel who did not perform to expectation or to the dictates of legislation would be held accountable. The result would be litigation in the civil and criminal courts.

If a prominent individual becomes a victim, members of the group felt that there would be a slight increase (15 percent) that there would be a financial drain on society and funds would be allocated or redirected to programs that would satisfy the needs of victims. The impact would be dependent upon the severity of the act, the individual who is the victim, and indignation that is evoked by the members of the community. The media would be very instrumental in reporting the details of an incident and sustaining reader or viewer

interest. Such a "media event" would increase the probability significantly.

If a prominent individual becomes a victim there will be a 95 percent in the probability that the private sector will become involved. The group perceived that the public sector would not be utilized by a prominent person, but that he or she would seek out a private provider -- at their own expense. Ironically, this would draw attention to that provider and future victims would flock to that individual or organization for assistance, even though services could be found through the public sector. Private providers would also be willing to provide a service if they saw profit potential.

Event #4. Adverse legislation will increase the probability 90 percent of mandated programs having an impact on the police function. As cited in this paper, domestic violence legislation was rooted in remedying the inconsistencies in how victims and suspects were handled at the scene, what notifications were given, referrals to available providers and services, and enhancement and assessment of penalties. Legislation for the above-expressed reasons has had a significant impact on law enforcement.

With adverse legislation, there is a 10 percent increase in the probability that there will be an expectation for local government assistance. The group, in reviewing this assessment, expressed confusion with this pairing. Some thought that adverse legislation would significantly increase the need for governmental involvement. Others felt that the legislation would initially require significant local involvement, but once the desired results were obtained, the demand would subside. The desired results would be obtained by the

reallocation or diversion of limited/scarce resources. Other programs would suffer or be dropped for lack of funding. An attempt to negotiate a consensus did not resolve the conflict in opinion.

Adverse legislation would cause a 25 percent increase in the probability of additional police liability. More rules and legislation would place law enforcement personnel in civil and criminal peril. Some members felt that if the legislation was not in the officer's best interest or conflicted with their feelings it would be ignored or bastardized. The officers would be adversely affected, along with the agencies they represent, when charges are brought against them in criminal and/or civil court. Officers, along with their employers would be forced to defend themselves whenever it was perceived that they had not acted in the spirit of the legislation. Considering today's litigious environment, the need to defend could amount to considerable cost.

There would be a 90 percent increase in the probability that there would be a financial drain on society with the advent of adverse legislation. Any new mandated program would cost in either manpower and/or funds. This expenditure would have to be made up with additional tax dollars or the reallocation of funds already earmarked for other programs or projects. The group wondered if the "long term costs" would be considered when the legislation is enacted.

Given adverse legislation, there will be a 15 percent increase in the probability that there will be more private-sector involvement. Segments of the private sector will attempt to fill

the void that exists when there is the possibility that a profit can be made. When the profit motive is lacking, volunteer groups and organizations will be asked to provide the services needed to meet legislative mandates. This can be seen today in services provided by rape crisis centers, suicide prevention hotlines, and family planning facilities.

Event #5. If Proposition 13 or other restrictive spending measures were rescinded, there would be a 20 percent increase in the probability that there would be increased legislative and court-mandated programs. Again, the group was indecisive on the effect that the abolishment of restrictive spending measures would have on legislative and court-mandated programs. Some members felt that the availability of funds would lead legislators to increased acceptance of new proposed programs, hence increased spending. Others felt that the austere attitude that has prevailed throughout the eighties would continue for fear that unbridled spending could result in another tax revolt and that local entities have learned to work harmoniously and effectively because of budget constraints.

Given that Proposition 13 and other restrictive spending measures are abolished, there is a 75 percent probability that there will be an increased expectation for local government assistance. Most members felt citizens and lawmakers would come to realize that the only way to get additional services would be through additional taxes and fees. An example demographically is the aging of the general population. "Baby Boomers" will be approaching their 50s and 60s by the year 2000. As their incomes begin to peak, and in many cases decrease, this group will look to government for assistance. They will have political clout because of their numbers. They will look for increased police help, rent

subsidies/control, recreation programs, health benefits, convenient local transportation, and other inexpensive assistance.

If Proposition 13 and other restrictive spending measures are removed, there is a 10 percent probability that police liability will increase. The group felt that more officers would be available for service in the community. This would allow for adequate coverage, better supervision, and extra training time. Advanced technology, victim assistance programs, prevention programs, and crime suppression methods would be available to policing agencies.

Given the abolishment of Proposition 13 and other restrictive spending measures, there would be a 65 percent decrease in the probability that there would be a financial drain on society. The group's approach to this combination was somewhat "myopic." They envisioned that additional funds would minimize the liability that is attached with inadequate resources, coverage, and training. The researcher's contention is that there may be an increase in both legitimate and spurious claims because of the perception by the public of an increasing "deep pockets" pool. Discussion led to the belief that, given an increase in funds, there would be an increase in the number of police personnel, thus a subsequent increase in lawsuits because of increased activity and exposure.

Given the abolishment of Proposition 13 or other restrictive spending measures, the group felt that there would be a 30 percent increase in the probability that more private sector entities would become involved in providing services. More funds would be available.

State, county, and local governments would find contractual programs provided by professionals and businesses to be more efficient and cost effective.

FUTURE SCENARIOS

Through the nominal group technique (NGT) process, in addition to the literature search, personal interviews, and surveys, trends/ events were identified that could be incorporated into a series of scenarios. A scenario is described as an integrating mechanism or device for bringing together and synthesizing large quantities of both hard and soft projections that cannot be handled systematically by other known means (Broucher 1986). Each scenario will contain the elements derived from the futures data developed in the literature search, questionnaire, interviews, and the NGT process:

Scenario One will "play out" the data and contain information that will include a driving force, a system change, and a scene based on a slice of time.

Scenario Two will depict the "desired and attainable" approach. Information included in this approach will include a demonstration, a driving force, and a scene based on a slice of time.

Scenario Three will show the "what if..." state. This approach will be shown by a demonstration, a driving force, a system change, and a scene based on a slice of time.

Advantages associated with scenarios are as follows:

1. They serve to call attention viable possibilities.
2. They force the analyst to deal with details and dynamics.
3. They help to illuminate the interaction of psychological, social, economic, cultural, political factors.
4. They can illustrate forcefully certain principles.
5. They can be used to consider alternative possible outcomes of certain real past and present events.
6. They can be used as artificial case histories to make up to some degree for the paucity of actual examples.¹⁰

Scenario Number One -- Exploratory Mode ("Play Out" or "Surprise-Free")

It is a typical Southern California summer afternoon commute. The temperature is 94 degrees with heavy smog. Traffic is crawling along at approximately 15 miles per hour. There is no particular reason for the slow-moving traffic other than the volume of vehicles that must travel daily to the East County of San Diego. This is the same route I have taken over the past twenty years to my place of employment -- the La Mesa Police Department. On the windshield, I am able to read the afternoon news report while keeping my eyes on the road. I note in the local section that another residential robbery has occurred in an adjacent jurisdiction. There is no indication of injuries suffered by the victim(s) or the amount of the loss. Arriving at the station, I prepare for the evening shift as a uniformed police officer.

¹⁰ H. Kahn & A. Wiener, *The Year 2000*, 1967, p.263.

Things are unusually quiet for a Friday night. By eight o'clock, I have only taken two reports and responded to one call of a drunk disturbing the peace. At 8:03, this trend suddenly changes. I receive a priority one call of a person down in a residential neighborhood in the northern part of the city. Arriving at 8:07, I am met by a hysterical woman. She shrieks that she and her husband have just been robbed and that the suspects have fled in her vehicle. She says that her husband is inside the house injured. Before the arrival of the second police unit, I enter the house to render first aid to the husband. I find him in the living room. He appears to be in his late 60s, and closer inspection reveals that he has not survived the attack. He has a sizable wound on the left side of his head. Brain matter is on the carpeting with a large quantity of blood. The crime scene is secured and a call is put in to have the homicide squad, evidence technicians, and the victim assistance caseworker to respond.

The victim assistance caseworker arrives at approximately 8:35. She is a respected professional who knows her job. Many times in my career, I have called on the victim assistance team to assist me in handling matters like this. She immediately goes to the wife of the victim and inquires if there are local family members or neighbors that may be available to come stay with her. She asks if other family members live with them and makes arrangements for a volunteer to go pick them up.

It is now 12:45 and the evidence team informs the caseworker that the crime scene investigation is completed. Before her evening is done, she informs those affected of the

victim assistance services available to them. She also calls a cleaning contract service to make arrangements for the clean-up of the living room, thus sparing the wife additional grief and agony.

It is now 4:00 PM Saturday. Jill, the victim assistance caseworker, calls me and lets me know how things went after I left the scene. She asks if I had any concerns. I gratefully thank her for her dedication and professional assistance.

I think back ten years and realize how fortunate the citizens of my city are now. Crime is still a fact of life in the twenty-first century but society has come to realize that after the shock of a criminal act such as this, it is society's responsibility to assist those victimized or left behind.

Scenario Two -- Normative Mode (Desired and Attainable)

The date is March 1, 2000. The location is the conference room at the La Mesa Police Department. Present at a scheduled monthly meeting are the chief of police, the operations and services commanders, the director of the Crime Prevention Unit, the director of the Victim Assistance Program, and a five-member Victim's Rights Advisory Committee (VIRAC).

VIRAC came into existence in June, 1989, after a series of brutal murders and physical attacks on women that accentuated the need for a in-house victim assistance unit. The county at that time was unable to effectively respond to the needs of the victims and their

families. The county's victim assistance program was limited by severe budget cuts due to the lack of funding from the state and federal governments. There was a public outcry for a viable program that would meet the needs of the affected parties in the City of La Mesa.

The purpose of the meeting is to brief the parties to the 2000-2001 preliminary budget. VIRAC and police administrative personnel have spent many hours together formulating the Victim Assistance Program budget this year as in past years. During the meeting, members reminisce about the last twenty-two years and the changes that have evolved in how victims of crime are handled by the police department. Conditions in the mid-80's had warranted significant changes in helping victims of crime. Through hard work and cooperation, city officials and citizens responded to the needs of victims. Members of this group had done the following: 1. obtained a federal grant in 1989 to start the victim assistance program. Key actors who planned the grant application represented the decision-makers of La Mesa -- the mayor, police chief, city manager, assistant city manager, crime prevention manager, and VIRAC members, 2. received a commitment for funding in the police budget from community leaders after the three-year grant ran out, and 3. developed a strategy that would provide the community with a non-crisis victim service, financial assistance for victims, emergency security and cleanup at crime scenes, a neighborhood mediation service, and a prevention component.

There is now a harmonious relationship between local government and crime victims. The police department is proud of its role during the period of transition and the subsequent delivery of service. Their leadership helped precipitate change and promote a climate of

optimism.

Other benefits which have been realized from the police department's participation in the victim assistance program are a reduction in property and violent crimes through preventative training, the involvement of citizen volunteers to assist victim assistance professionals, a public relations program that explains the victim assistance program to the community, and a heightened awareness by police officers of the needs of victims.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the committee votes 5-0 to accept the budget "as is."

Scenario Number Three -- Hypothetical Mode ("What if..")

Watch Commanders Recap, June 14, 2000, 1600 hours -

The unspeakable has just happened. Two of my officers and a rape suspect have been gunned down in the parking lot of the police department. The rape suspect and one officer are dead at the scene and the second officer is being treated at the local hospital for a wound to his left shoulder. The shooting suspect, the rape victim's husband, was taken into custody without incident right after the shooting. His initial statement was that the criminal justice system was "f... up" and that justice could only be served by taking matters into his own hands. His frustration was compounded by the fact that he and his wife had not received any physical, psychological, or monetary assistance. In reflecting on this case, I can only share his frustration with the way his situation was handled.

In 1994, Southern California suffered an economic recession that put many of its citizens out of work. This event had a ripple effect that caused a significant strain on the resources available to public agencies. One of the first casualties in this sector was the County of San Diego Victim Assistance Program. Funds for this program were re-routed to the Sheriff's Department because of the dramatic rise in crime and resultant incarcerations. Without the San Diego County Victim Assistance Program, the responsibility for helping victims fell on the local jurisdictions. My city was suffering the same fiscal shortfall as the county. Times were hard and decisions, no matter how unpopular, were made to keep the city solvent. A victim assistance program just did not carry the weight to be included in a "bare bones" budget. Well, as you might imagine, as the economy recovered in 1995, there was a reluctance on the county's behalf to reinstate the Victim Assistance Program. Negotiations failed between the cities and the county and the matter ended up in the courts. There the issue remains to this day, under the appeals process, so there has been no public assistance available to victims since 1994.

The rape victim in this case was poor. When she was contacted at the crime scene, officers tried to calm and assist her. The officers did the best they could to inform her of her rights as a victim and what was necessary on her part for successful prosecution of the case. She was emotionally distraught, and it was only after she was taken to the hospital via the police department that her husband was notified by hospital personnel. Approximately two hours had elapsed since she was contacted by the police. At the county hospital, only a Catholic priest was available for spiritual support (he had no

training in crisis counseling). The nurses and emergency room doctor tried to deal with her questions while conducting the physical exam. She sat alone in a barren cubicle until the arrival of her husband two hours after her arrival at the hospital. She gave a statement to the sex crimes investigator three hours after arriving at the hospital. The investigator did his job and commented that his caseload was large, gave her a one-page fact sheet, said that he would recontact her in several days, and left.

As might be expected, frustration on the part of the victim and her husband became anger. The wife had difficulty in coping both physically and psychologically with the rape. She did not have the financial ability to seek out private medical and psychological assistance. She did not understand the callousness of the "system." No one was available to explain what assistance was available and what was required of her to prosecute the suspect.

Family problems developed. The husband's anger, left unchecked, began to grow. He began to accuse his wife of inviting the actions on behalf of the suspect. This led to a complete breakdown in communications between he and his wife. Frustration, anger, recriminations, and hate evolved. Today's event is not a total surprise.

Had there been a victim assistance program with crisis intervention services, financial assistance, emergency security and cleanup, and professional one-on-one follow-up, this incident may never have taken place.

End of Watch Commander's Report...

PART TWO -- STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

Introduction

The second objective of this project is to develop a strategic planning and management process. The object is to link the analysis-defined present and scenario-defined future through strategic decision-making, strategic planning, and the development of policy considerations.

The SMEAC (Situation - Mission - Execution - Administration - Control) model is used to structure and assist in developing a strategic plan for La Mesa, California.

Environmental Assessment

La Mesa, "The Jewel of the Hills", has long been considered one of the most desirable places to settle and raise one's family. Primarily a bedroom community measuring approximately nine square miles, it is centrally located on the eastern border of the City of San Diego with easy access to virtually any part of the County. Interstate 8 runs through the middle of the City, dividing the north from the south and State Highway 94 forms the border on the south side of the City. Both of these freeways are major routes to the downtown area of San Diego and intersect other freeways and major thoroughfares that crisscross the County.

La Mesa had a population growth of 28.4 percent from 1970 to 1980, increasing from 39,178 to 50,308. Much of this increase was due to the annexation in 1977 of adjacent unincorporated areas on the south and west side of the City and a small area on the east side of the City. La Mesa's growth rate was below the County's growth rate of 37 percent.

Based upon statistics found in the City's 1986 Environmental Scan and Situation Audit, La Mesa was identified as having a senior population proportionately higher than the average for the San Diego region. The Union-Tribune Review Of San Diego Business 1985 reported that the total persons 55+ years of age was 13,500 or 26.9% of La Mesa's population. At the same time only 4,687 or 8.9% of the population was under 9 years of age. This suggests that La Mesa is aging in more ways than just increasing the numbers of those over the age of fifty-five years. The smaller percentages of young probably reflects a lack of growth in families and/or family size.

Statistical comparisons show that in 1970 the median age in La Mesa was 31.4 years. In 1980 this figure had increased to 33.3 years. The median age forecast is predicted to be:

	1980	1990	1995	2000
La Mesa	33.3	37.9	40.0	42.0
San Diego Region	28.8	32.4	33.9	35.3

It can be readily seen that the median age in La Mesa is increasing at a rate exceeding that of the region as a whole.

The "Council on Aging" predicts that seniors will continue to grow in numbers and at a faster rate than will the younger generation. This trend is attributable to the post World War II "baby boomers" who are progressing in age and the shrinking family unit size.

The 1980 Census recognized La Mesa as having a very small representation of minorities. Statistics reveal the following ethnicity breakdown: (1) 1.8% blacks, (2) 6.3% Hispanics, (3) 1.6% Asians and Pacific Islanders, and (4) 90.3% white.

The City of La Mesa is a California General Law City operated by a Council/Manager form of government. As a legislative body, the City Council consists of a Mayor and four Councilmembers, each elected at large for a four-year term. In its legislative capacity, the Council enacts laws, decides land use issues and establishes City policy.

The City Manager is responsible for directing, organizing and controlling all City departments with the exception of the Office of the City Clerk and City Attorney. He oversees the enforcement of all pertinent State and Federal laws and municipal ordinances, and the preparation of the operating and capital improvement budgets. In addition, the manager is responsible for administering all budgets after adoption by the City Council. The City Manager advises the Mayor and City Council regarding policy decisions, performs administrative studies, and acts upon the requests of the City Council.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) collects data from most law enforcement agencies in the nation through the Uniform Crime Reporting System. In the State of California, these data are tabulated by the State Bureau of Criminal Statistics (BCS) and forwarded to the FBI. The index offenses include willful homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. In this report, the FBI Index refers to the first seven offenses.

Table 9 - Reported Crimes by Type of Offense, FBI Index - City of La Mesa

Offense	1987	1988	% Change
Homicide	0	2	N/A
Rape	11	7	-36%
Robbery	92	70	-24%
Aggravated Assault	123	99	-20%
Burglary	738	724	-2%
Motor Vehicle Theft	648	838	29%
Larceny	1779	1475	-17%
CRIME INDEX	3391	3215	-5%

The ratio of crimes to the population at risk provides an indicator of the likelihood that an individual will be a victim. Over half of all crime is not reported to the police; therefore, these data do not represent all crimes committed.

Table 10 - Victimization Rates, SANDAG Report - San Diego County, 1987-88

Ratio of Crimes to Population at Risk			
Offense	Population at risk	1987	1988
Homicide	All Residents	12775	10165
Rape	Females	1375	1489
Robbery	All Residents	415	450
Aggravated Assault	All Residents	227	215
Residential Burglary	Households	35	36
Larceny Theft	All Residents	29	29
Motor Vehicle Theft	All Reg. Vehicles	52	42

Over half the victims of violent crimes were under 30 years of age, ranging from 54% of the robbery victims to 73% of the women raped.

Victims of burglary and theft were more likely to be 30 or older.

Females represented a majority of the rape and assault victims.

Men were more often reported as victims of homicide, robbery, burglary, and theft.

With the exception of homicide, most victims were white. Non-whites constituted 58% of the homicide victims.

There will be a need to exploit threats and opportunities as they arise. How we cope with the demands made by victims today and the next ten years will be closely scrutinized and evaluated not only by La Mesa's citizens but also by other entities.

Internal Capability Assessment

To measure present capabilities, an analysis was performed to determine California law enforcement's weaknesses, opportunities, threats, and strengths (W.O.T.S. UP). To facilitate this analysis, two rating forms were used to assess police agencies' ability to change. The first questionnaire measured the "present capabilities" of police agencies and the second

measured their "adaptability to change" (Appendix E). A group of eight individuals, including police managers, city administrators, and non-sworn employees, was asked to rate agencies in San Diego County. Below are the cumulative results:

Present Capabilities

Strengths:

Technology
Equipment
Supplies
Skills
 Management
 Supervisory
 Police Officer
Image
Community Support

Weaknesses:

Manpower
Training
Growth Potential
Morale
Funding

The group found law enforcement's capability to be questionable. The group rated the law enforcement function as "Superior" or "Better Than Average" in eight categories. They determined the strengths to be the following: 1. technology, 2. equipment, 3. supplies, 4. management skills, 5. supervisory skills, 6. police officer skills, 7. image, and 8. community support. The five categories identified as "Problem Areas" were as follows: 1. manpower, 2. training, 3. growth potential, 4. morale, and 5. funding.

Future Adaptability

An inquiry of law enforcement's "future adaptability" regarding the victim assistance issue revealed that agencies and their personnel are capable of initiating and sustaining minor changes. Feedback revealed that victim assistance does not weigh heavily on the minds of police administrators. They would have to be persuaded or compelled to adopt

programs (reactive). This was evident in the questionnaire that was administered at the beginning of the study. It was also felt that law enforcement would seek out methods of implementing change that had been successful in the past.

Line officers and middle management will have to be informed and given clear directions as to their role. Without their cooperation and involvement, failure of any assistance program will most likely result.

MISSION STATEMENTS

1. Macro Level -- THE MISSION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IS TO PROVIDE ALL CITIZENS PROFESSIONAL, EFFECTIVE, AND TIMELY POLICE SERVICES, TO STRIVE TO PROTECT LIFE AND PROPERTY, ENFORCE LAWS, IDENTIFY AND APPREHEND CRIMINALS, AND MAINTAIN A SAFE ENVIRONMENT.

2. Micro Level -- THE SECONDARY MISSION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IS TO PROTECT AND ASSIST VICTIMS OF CRIME, TO PROVIDE QUALITY SERVICE, MAINTAIN THE QUALITY OF LIFE, AND PROMOTE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE COMMUNITIES THEY SERVE.

Stakeholder Analysis

During several brainstorming sessions, individuals were asked to compile a list of "stakeholders." A "stakeholder" is defined as a person or group of people who would

impact on, or be impacted by, the issue of victim assistance over the next ten years. A total of twenty-eight potential stakeholders were initially identified. They were the following:

1. Chiefs of police
2. City managers
3. County chief executive officers(CEO)
4. City councils
5. Boards of supervisors
6. Police and sheriff's officer associations
7. Citizen activists (victim advocates)
8. Victims who want services
9. Crime prevention units
10. Businesspersons
11. Finance directors
12. Media
13. Police Officer Standards and Training (POST)
14. Law enforcement training officers
15. Courts
16. Defense attorneys
17. District attorneys
18. City attorneys
19. State legislature
20. Health providers
21. Insurance companies
22. American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
23. Private sector providers
24. Jail personnel
25. Police academy
26. Tax payers
27. Welfare departments
28. Volunteer citizen groups

After much discussion, the members of this exercise narrowed the field of stakeholders down to twelve. The distilled list of stakeholders is as follows:

1. Chiefs of police
2. City managers
3. City council
4. Police and sheriffs officers associations

5. Citizen activists (victim advocates)
6. Victims who want services
7. Crime prevention units
8. Taxpayers
9. Finance directors
10. Media
11. Private sector providers
12. Volunteer citizen groups

Assumptions

After the twelve distilled stakeholders were identified, a list of assumptions about them relative to the victim assistance issue was formulated. The assumptions are as follows:

1. Chiefs of Police
 - a. will attempt to identify needs of citizens, allocate limited resources, and want to maximize service levels.
 - b. will see process as resource and time consuming, but a potential threat to the police organization if not addressed.
 - c. will establish department policy for the assistance of crime victims.
 - d. would be supportive of training and educational programs.

2. City Managers
 - a. consider policing and related issues as a high priority.
 - b. are concerned with the city's public image.
 - c. are sensitive to elected officials and their constituents.

3. City Councils
 - a. will want to control nature and funding of programs targeted at crime victims.
 - b. will be sensitive to voters' wishes.
 - c. will usually be supportive of law enforcement goals.
 - d. will be concerned about image.

4. Police and sheriffs associations
 - a. will note that demands for increased service will continue.
 - b. will note that dealing with crime victims will pose unique problems and will require innovative solutions.
 - c. will agree that officers' community-relations skills will change.
 - d. will say services will change.

5. Citizen Activists (Victim advocates)
 - a. agree that there is a critical need for additional services for the victims of crime.
 - b. agree adversary role will result when expectations are not met.
 - c. will be less patient and willing to work with traditional methods.
 - d. will expect to be involved in the development of training programs for handling victims.

6. Victims who want service
 - a. believe police are usually trustworthy and sympathetic to needs of crime victims.
 - b. think police can and will handle their problems if given resources and training.

- c. don't want to be charged for services.
- d. would expect that all victims be treated equally.
- e. would want assurances that assistance would not be discriminatory and would take into consideration cultural differences.

7. Crime Prevention Units

- a. will understand the need to initiate victim assistance programs and want to be involved in their development.
- b. believe requests for victim assistance will increase.
- c. will want to incorporate victim assistance programs into their units.
- d. could provide design and groundwork materials in initiating a victim assistance program.

8. Taxpayers

- a. will resist any new tax hikes.
- b. will have to see the need for a victim assistance program.
- c. will have to be sold on the need for an effective victim assistance program.
- d. will want to sustain the program, will have to be "satisfied" with the program.

9. Finance Directors

- a. know additional services will cost and alternate sources of revenue will have to be found.

b. will insist that programs are effective and cost-efficient.

10. Media

a. will try to monitor trends and problems involving victim assistance.

b. feel obligated to identify abuses and inefficiencies of police responses and programs.

c. will maintain role as "watchdog."

11. Private sector providers

a. would want to be involved in any program that deals with crime victims and would be of benefit to them.

b. would be profit-oriented.

c. would have expertise and resource material for development of program(s).

d. would support policies requiring the use of private-sector providers to assist victims.

12. Volunteer citizen groups

a. are willing to be utilized in assisting victims of crime.

b. are an inexpensive resource/tool.

c. would expect orientation and training.

d. would want satisfaction and recognition.

Summary Of Stakeholder Assumptions

Who will have the most influence on the issue of crime victim assistance is subject to debate? Historically, it has been legislative (in answer to the wishes of the electorate) and court decisions that have dictated the types of service that are provided by police agencies. The victim assistance issue is not beyond the scope of this type of action. Recent enactment of domestic violence laws has once again proven this. Most, if not all, of the stakeholders will want to have a say in the formulation or implementation of a program. The state legislature and local city councils have the authority to make laws pertaining to victim assistance. This action may be brought about by political pressure from concerned citizens or advocates who perceive an injustice or need. A program of this nature will have a fiscal impact on the city budget and the finance director will advise the council on the financial impact of such a measure.

When taxpayers are approached for funding, they will weigh the advantages of such a program and whether or not it is their best interest.

An air of pessimism, due to the post Proposition 13 environment, exists in a planner's mind when funding for this type of program is considered.

Police associations will understand that implementation and involvement in the program will have a direct impact on the officer's field activity. Additional formal and in-service-training will be required so that the officer will meet the requirements of the legislation. They will also be concerned with civil or criminal sanctions which may result if the officer

does not perform as prescribed.

Crime prevention units may see a new program as a threat. Entities within government, and well as private providers, will fight to maintain current funding levels and want their "fair share" of future allocations. One crime prevention specialist interviewed saw the funding dilemma as a very real threat--saying that a new program would only come at the expense or loss of another program. Crime prevention specialists may envision themselves as administering a victim assistance program as a way of insuring their livelihood. They also are an excellent source of data to identify past victims and crime potential locations.

Volunteer groups will enhance whatever program is implemented. They may have knowledge and expertise that can spell success. They will also help bridge the gap when funds are insufficient to administer the program.

Members of the media are the self-appointed "watchdogs" of society. This form of "checks and balances" is supposed to ensure that laxness or abuse does not occur in government.

Execution

To facilitate the development of strategic alternative approaches to the victim assistance issue, a modified policy delphi (MPD) was conducted using police personnel, businesspersons, and an educator. The purpose of the MPD was to generate strategic alternative approaches to the policy issue, analyze the feasibility and desirability of each

alternative, and reduce the number of alternatives to a manageable number.

Each participant was given a copy of the revised Executive Summary and was asked to give a strategy/policy statement to cover the next ten years. The following strategies were developed:

1. The department should enlist a group of volunteer citizens to identify concerns and needs of crime victims. The group would have the ongoing responsibility to assist the police agency in delivering services. This group's input would also be used by police administrators to develop policies, procedures, and training within the agency.

2. The police department should conduct a survey to identify what practices, programs, and functions in dealing with victims can be improved.

3. The department should add a victim rights advocate to the Crime Prevention Unit.

Some of the responsibilities of this individual would include the following:

- (a) receive and evaluate complaints.

- (b) conduct crime victim programs.

- (c) monitor trends and devise methods to reduce incidence of victimization.

4. The department should study programs developed by other agencies in California and neighboring states that address the needs of crime victims. The department would incorporate programs that will assist victims of crime.

5. The department should explore possible sources of revenue to supplement the police and crime prevention budgets, approach the business community to fund awareness and prevention programs, and devise methods to fund civilian personnel to assume the burden

of additional demands made by crime victims.

6. The department should monitor and attempt to influence legislation that protects crime victims. This task would be accomplished by direct communication with legislators, county supervisors, and city councilpersons.

7. The department should set limits on and/or curtail services to the elderly because of limited funding and resources.

8. The department should utilize the crime prevention unit to furnish the services required by crime victims that the regular officers are unable to furnish, such as crime awareness and prevention programs, direct assistance to crime victims, and liaison with police and city support groups.

The group was then instructed to rate the strategies to determine the two most feasible and desirable. They were also asked to identify the most polarized. This task was accomplished by giving each member of the group a "Strategy Evaluation Scorecard." The members were instructed to rate each strategy on a scale of 0-3 with respect to its feasibility and desirability. The scores were then tabulated.

The group recommended the following as the two most preferred strategies:

Strategy 1. The department should enlist a group of volunteer citizens to identify the needs and concerns of crime victims. The purpose of this group is to assist the agency in delivering services.

Strategy 3. The department should add a crime victim advocate to the crime prevention unit.

The most polarized strategy was:

Strategy 7. The department should set limits on and/or curtail services to crime victims because of limited funding and resources.

To validate the three strategies chosen by the group, a brief discussion was had on each of the original eight strategies, and strategies #1 and #3 continued to be the most preferred and #7 the most polarized.

Stakeholder Analysis

Strategy #1. The department should enlist a group of volunteer citizens to identify the needs and concerns of crime victims.


PROS

- a. Direct citizen involvement
- b. Timely responses to requests/needs
- c. Inexpensive
- d. Can identify and reduce criminal impact on citizens
- e. Can deal with specific problems

CONS

- a. Disruptive political ramifications
- b. No guarantee of effectiveness
- c. Recruitment selection process
- d. Ignorance/naive perception of law enforcement function
- e. Implementation of program
- f. Jurisdictional disputes

Stakeholders:	For	Against	Neutral	Split
1. Crime victims	X			
2. City council/City manager	X			
3. Chief of police	X			
4. Police association				X
5. Crime prevention unit	X			
6. Business community			X	
7. Other special interest groups				X
8. Welfare groups	X			
9. Private providers				X



Strategy #3. The department should add a crime victim advocate to the crime prevention unit.


PROS

- a. Individual responsible for and able to focus on issues
- b. Simplifies communication
- c. Proactive image
- d. Strong influence on departmental policy and/or procedures
- e. Political and media liaison
- f. Accountable to chief of police

CONS

- a. Additional costs (personnel expenses, support materials)
- b. Effectiveness not guaranteed
- c. Organizational changes and disruptions
- d. Internal resistance to change

Stakeholders:	For	Against	Neutral	Split
1. Crime victims	X			
2. Police chief				X
3. Local political leaders	X			
4. Crime prevention unit	X			
5. Taxpayers				X
6. Minorities				X
7. Social welfare groups				X
8. City manager	X			
9. City personnel officer			X	
10. Police officers association				X



Strategy #7. The department should set limits on and/or curtail services to crime victims because of limited funding and resources.


PROS

- a. Reduced financial impact
- b. Bounded and structured
- c. More money for other policing responsibilities
- d. Will necessitate prioritizing service response
- e. Will reduce called-for-services

CONS

- a. Viewed as insensitive to needs of crime victims
- b. Political whiplash
- c. Loss of confidence in police department and city

Stakeholders:	For	Against	Neutral	Split
1. Chief of police				X
2. City council		X		
3. Taxpayers				X
4. Finance director			X	
5. Services commander	X			
6. Crime victims		X		
7. Social welfare agencies		X		
8. Business community			X	
9. Crime prevention unit		X		
10. Police officers association				X



Two "snail darters" (a individual or group who can bring about unexpected influence that may delay or oppose programs) were identified during the stakeholder analysis.

The city council may be pressured by crime victims to furnish services without the availability of funding. Also, economic conditions at the national and state level may influence the revenue allocated to the city which, in turn, will have a direct impact on the police department's budget. The loss of funds or the implementation of new programs may hinder worthwhile programs and projects.

Other special interest groups will openly compete for the limited funds available. They will contest attempts to appropriate dollars to crime victims if it erodes their funding.

Course of Action

The proposed course of action for the La Mesa Police Department is a synthesis of the two preferred strategies developed by the MPD group. The addition of a crime victim advocate to the crime prevention unit and the formation of a volunteer citizens advisory group would allow the department to assess, monitor, and provide for the needs of crime victims in La Mesa.

Prior to the implementation of the following steps, the chief of police should issue a statement to all employees and the media for dissemination to citizens. This statement will list the department's organizational values. Several examples of these values are as follows:

1. the department values accessibility and openness.
2. the department values professionalism.
3. the department values service to the public.
4. the department values a humane organization and other values pertinent to the delivery of quality law enforcement services.

Short term (1-3 years).

1. The La Mesa Police Department will identify key stakeholders and possible "snail darters" and solicit their input. The resultant data may be used in the plan. Stakeholders will be encouraged to offer input so that the plan can be reflective of their needs and the needs of the community. The plan will be explained and the possible outcomes discussed so that possible future negative reactions can be addressed and resolved.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN SHOULD TAKE NO ONE BY SURPRISE AND THE PLAYERS SHOULD FEEL THEY HAVE HAD A SAY IN THE FORMULATION OF THE PLAN. A PLAN REQUIRES THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE OTHER PARTIES FOR SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION.

2. Police management and their support staff will meet on a regular basis to brainstorm measures to address the needs of crime victims. This group will also be asked to formulate methods to implement any pertinent ideas they develop.

ANTICIPATE NEEDS AND ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE DECISIONS, TRENDS IN PROGRESS, AND DECISIONS.

3. The La Mesa Police Department will evaluate present practices, programs and functions to determine how they may be improved. With each evaluation, the department will take appropriate action.

STUDY FUNCTION AND TAKE STEPS TO INCREASE EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS.

4. The department will prepare a survey to determine the needs and desires for services for crime victims. The survey will measure the impact of current services and the services that are perceived as needed in the future. The survey will also attempt to measure the willingness of the respondents to pay additional taxes to pay for the perceived services.

COLLECT AND ANALYZE DATA PERTINENT TO THE CRIME VICTIM ASSISTANCE QUESTION.

5. The department will assess current services offered to crime victims and the general population. Expenditures will be scrutinized with the intent on reducing where possible. Funds will be redirected to activities that have the most impact on crime victims and the community as a whole.

EVALUATE THE PRESENT DELIVERY OF SERVICES AND ALLOW FOR NECESSARY ADJUSTMENTS.

6. The department will create a "futures file" that will track trends and events that deal with crime victim assistance. This information will be used by the staff to formulate midcourse alterations to the plan when necessary.

ATTEMPT TO TRACK TRENDS AND EVENTS TO UNDERSTAND THE DYNAMICS THAT LED AND CONTRIBUTED TO THE PROBLEM.

Long term (4+ years).

1. The department should develop training programs for its personnel directed at the problems, concerns, and needs of crime victims. The Regional Academy should be asked to develop a block of instruction to sensitize new recruits about the problems inherent with victims of crime.

DEVELOP AN ENLIGHTENED PROACTIVE APPROACH TO DEALING WITH THE CRIME VICTIM ASSISTANCE QUESTION.

2. The department should lobby legislators and the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) to certify and reimburse local agencies for training.

ATTEMPT TO REDUCE THE FINANCIAL IMPACT ON THE ORGANIZATION, STANDARDIZE TRAINING, AND POOL RESOURCES.

The above strategies, when implemented, will provide information to determine if additional policies and procedures are needed. It is imperative that the organization knows that present programs and services are being provided efficiently. If additional services are needed, police management's task will be to research and devise effective and efficient

programs for the future.

Administration And Logistics

To implement the two recommended strategies, the following steps will have to be taken (this is an abbreviated list of actions due to imposed space limitations):

A. Crime Victim Advocate

Short term (1-3 years).

1. Police staff to contact the key stakeholders to get input and support.
2. Police staff and crime prevention personnel to formulate the duties of the proposed position.
3. Police staff to study operational impact of position on organization.
 - a. How will position interrelate with the crime prevention program and patrol function?
 - b. Who will have functional control?
4. Services commander to prepare item for submission to city council.
5. Investigations commander to coordinate with personnel department for recruitment and selection process. Hire and orient individual chosen.
6. Crime prevention advocate and crime prevention unit to implement program.
7. Crime prevention unit to develop and initiate advertising campaign.

Long term (4+ years).

1. Police staff to study feedback mechanisms to evaluate impact of program. Staff to make necessary adjustments.
2. Services commander to identify alternative funding sources to assist/assume costs of program.
3. Crime victim advocate to utilize volunteers to assist in administration of program.

B. Volunteer Advisory Group

Short term (1-3 years).

1. Police staff to contact the key stakeholders to get input and support.
2. Citizens and police staff to formulate task(s) of advisory group.
3. City council to announce formation of group at council meeting. Media to be utilized to seek volunteers.
4. Chief of police to appoint seven members to the group.
5. Bi-monthly meetings to meet in conference room of police department.

Where applicable, advisory group plans will go into effect. Where there is no answer, police agencies may be asked to step in and provide the essential service. Additional duties may be heaped onto an already overburdened police function. Without adequate resources, the traditional enforcement approach will be redirected or changed. This change may alter the delivery of police services permanently.

Long term (4+ years).

1. A person can be targeted to champion the needs of the agency and crime victims.
2. Other police agencies can be enlisted and the resultant resources can be pooled to increase political clout and reduce the cost to each individual agency.
3. If no funds are available the agency can "ride the coattails" of a larger, more affluent agency by maintaining relations with them and requesting that they assist our police department with our needs (altruism).

Having an understanding of the key policy points that are critical to my policy strategy, I am unwilling to negotiate the following:

1. The department will prepare a survey to determine the needs and desires for services for crime victims.

Comment: Embarking on a strategy without first identifying the needs of crime victims would be foolish. It is imperative that data be collected beforehand and reflect the current attitude and future needs of victims in La Mesa. The survey will allow the police department to prioritize their responses if restraints are placed on the budget.

2. The La Mesa Police Department will identify key stakeholders and solicit their input.

Comment: Any policy strategy will require the support of crime victims and other affected parties. No one should be taken by surprise. The players should feel that they have had

input in formulating the plan. Citizens will be asked to fund programs that are the result of carrying out the strategy or resultant consequences of not acting on them in a timely manner.

3. Police management and their support staff will meet on a regular basis to brainstorm measures to address the needs of crime victims.

Comment: Staff can identify/anticipate the needs of crime victims and attempt to influence decisions made by others, trends in-progress, and public opinion. This approach will ensure a coordinated attack on solving problems of crime victims.

4. The department will create a "futures file" that will track trends and events that deal with victims of crime. This information will be used by the staff to formulate midcourse changes to the plan when necessary.

Comment: This is another cost-effective method of gathering data of historical significance, tracking trends and events, and understanding the dynamics that have an impact on furnishing police services to crime victims.

5. The department to develop training programs for its personnel directed at the problems, concerns and needs of crime victims.

Comment: In-house training programs can be devised to address the needs of crime victims without having an adverse fiscal impact on the department. With an unsure economic future, this may be the only way of addressing the problems associated with crime victims.

PART THREE - TRANSITION PLAN

STAKEHOLDERS AND STRATEGIES

The Critical Mass

In the book Organizational Transitions -- Managing Complex Change, it is stated that anytime there is change in an organization "there is a critical mass whose active commitment is necessary to provide the energy for the change to occur." The "critical mass" is the organization, groups, or individuals who have an interest in, or are affected by, the future trends, and whose influence could make or break the plan. The success of this project will ultimately hinge on the degree of commitment or resistance each member of the critical mass exerts on the decision.

Originally, twenty-eight stakeholders were identified that would have an impact on, or be impacted by, the issue of criminal victim assistance over the next ten years. Of the twenty-eight stakeholders, twelve were chosen as members of the "critical mass." The selection of the "critical mass" was accomplished with the help of three law enforcement administrators, two City administrators, a City Attorney, a retired educator, and a Senior Probation Officer. The "critical mass" are:

1. Chiefs of police
2. City managers
3. City council
4. Police association
5. Citizen activists/Victim advocates
6. Victims who want service
7. Crime prevention units
8. Taxpayers
9. Finance directors
10. Media

- 11. Private sector providers
- 12. Volunteer citizen groups

The Commitment Chart below depicts the assessment of the current level of commitment each of these critical mass groups has towards the plan, whether they will try to block change, have no commitment, let change happen, help change happen, or make change happen.

COMMITMENT CHART

Critical Mass Players	Block	No Com.	Let It Happen	Help It Happen	Make It Happen
Chiefs of Police					XO
City Managers		X-----O			
City Councils		X-----O			
Police Associations	X-----O				
Citizen Activists/ Victim Advocates				X-----O	
Victims who want service			X-----O		
Crime Prevention Units		X-----O			
Taxpayers		X-----O			
Finance Directors		X-----O			
Media		X-----O			
Private sector providers			X-----O		
Volunteer Citizen groups				XO	

Legend: X = Present Position
O = Desired Location

Analysis Of Commitment Chart

Chiefs of Police.

Obviously, for a victim assistance program to be a success it will need the support of the chief executive of the law enforcement agency. The Chief will identify the need for a program through the political arena, as a result of moral indignation on behalf of the citizens of the city, or through a mandate from the legislative/judiciary branches of state government. The chief is in the position to establish policies and/or procedures dealing with the organizational approach to the victim assistance issue. He or she will mobilize the department's staff to prepare and implement a program. A commitment from the leader will ensure that resources are committed to address the problem. He or she by involvement and support will legitimize the program. Chief executives of police departments will have to "make change happen."

City Managers.

The top city administrator realizes that victim assistance is becoming a "cause celebre." His staff will glean data from studies and articles prepared by the local media and SANDAG (a county planning agency). He is aware that this trend will have a significant impact on the service responsibilities of the police department. His political fortunes will be enhanced if he prepares for this eventuality before it becomes volatile. The city manager will be asked to "help it happen."

City Councils.

As an elected body, the city council must be sensitive to their constituents' needs.

Currently, the problem and the need for change is not readily perceived by the council. In the future, the council will feel political pressure from crime victims for increased services from the police department. The police department will in turn ask the city council to formulate methods to satisfy these needs. The Council will make promises that will satisfy the voters. Whether they will be capable of fulfilling the promises will depend on available funds and resources. In any event, there will be significant political pressure on the council to find solutions.

As the most visible entity of city government, the police department will be asked to fulfill the gaps in service when other city or county departments are unavailable or unprepared to provide the requested services. This can be seen today -- the police department filters weekends calls for public works, sanitation, animal control, and the parks and recreation department. Citizens are currently provided ambulance service, security checks, and information by the police department.

The council will want current services sustained. Whether funding for future programs will be available will depend on the political and economic climate.

The department will ask for increases in budget and personnel to satisfy the demands of crime victims. It will be the council's responsibility/privilege to grant these requests.

Confidence in the department's impact on the problems of crime victims will also weigh

heavily in the council's decision to grant funding requests.

The council will monitor and lobby for assistance from county, state, and federal agencies. They will contest any legislation that will have a detrimental impact on the city. Their success will have a direct impact on the city's ability to grant funding.

The council will not and cannot avoid the crime victim assistance issue without placing themselves in political jeopardy. The council will support the compromise that adopts the use of a citizen volunteer advisory group. The council will be asked to "help it happen" by approving programs and budget requests.

Police Associations.

Associations will want to review policies and procedures they are required to comply with. They will want to negotiate any attempt to change their working conditions. The police association will be one of the conduits available to management to "sell" the victim assistance program to line officers. Involvement by the association in the decision-making process and the implementation plan will reduce anxiety and confusion. The staff will have to provide training to insure that policies and procedures are understood and followed. Initially, the police association's position will be to "block change." With patience and their involvement in any proposed change, it is hoped that they will assume a position of "let change happen."

Citizen Activists/Victim Advocates.

Activists will encourage the implementation of victim assistance programs. They will want to be involved in the planning and implementation of programs so that the needs of victims are met.

Their efforts are rewarded with each new piece of legislation, court decision, or implementation of a new program to address the needs of crime victims. They will lobby at the federal, state, and local levels. They will use the courts to force change if they are not successful at the legislative level. Direct intervention may take the form of demonstrations, sit-ins or boycotts. As citizens become more educated, exposed, and socially sophisticated this group will receive increasing support from the general public. Their popularity and effectiveness will be enhanced by their use of the media. This group will take a posture of "help change happen" and will target "make change happen" as their goal.

Victims Who Want Service.

Victims will be acutely aware of the need for an effective victim assistance program. Their experience with a ineffective program will accentuate for them and their family members and acquaintances, the need for change. They will be supportive of a proposed program that assists victims and at the very least will "let the change happen" with a desire to "help change happen" if they are capable of influencing the outcome.

Crime Prevention Unit.

This unit's existence is dependent on its impact on crime. They are charged with analyzing criminal data and implementing programs to lessen the criminal impact on the community. They are not willing to relinquish this task to another division or outside agency.

When this unit was originally organized in La Mesa in 1978, it was charged with reducing the residential burglary rate in the community. By 1983, the residential Neighborhood Watch program was in place, and burglary statistics had dropped dramatically. With the addition of another crime prevention specialist, the unit branched out into other areas in the community. Programs like Business Alert, Senior Savvy, and Hospital Watch were devised to meet specific problem areas. As these programs have become established and mature, time has become available to assume other responsibilities. It will be apparent to this unit that the assistance, safety, and security of crime victims will ensure their future livelihood.

The unit will have mixed feelings about supporting another full-time position required by the crime victim advocate. They will argue that no additional cost will result by utilizing their services. Conversely, if the position falls within the unit's sphere, it may be perceived as an expansion of the crime prevention unit's powerbase in the police agency. This would also enhance the unit's continued livelihood.

Another advantage they will surely exploit will be their communications network in the community. They are highly visible and respected. There will be economies in using their

connections and expertise. This group can and should "help it happen."

Taxpayers.

Since the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978, experience indicates that voters are leery of any new governmental spending that may require a tax increase. Numerous tax increase initiatives, bonds, and special district assessments have been voted down even though they have been deemed crucial. Lacking tax dollars, law enforcement agencies have had to devise ways to: (1) efficiently and effectively deliver service with little or no increase in resources, (2) reevaluate, prioritize, and/or eliminate functions that had been traditionally handled by the police, (3) utilize technology to overcome tedious and time consuming tasks, and (4) educate and train personnel to handle the complicated demands of society. The reluctance to approve tax initiatives may be the "root evil" for society's inability to address the ills that confront us. Given the above trend, law enforcement has been fortunate inasmuch as when budget time comes around, public safety is seen as crucial issue. The largest portion of the budget is allocated to public safety. With this in mind, those wishing to implement a victim assistance program will encounter an attitude of "block change." If the proposal is properly formatted and sold to voters, they will evolve to a position of "let change happen."

Finance Directors.

This group will be guarded in their commitment to a victim assistance program. They will be concerned where the funds will come from to support the program. If there is no increase in local taxes or support from the county or the state, they will be hesitant to

support a new spending measure. Independent of the police function, the finance director's opinion will carry significant weight with the city manager and the city council. He or she will question the practicality and financial wisdom of such a program. It will be important to obtain either a "no commitment" or "let it happen" stance from this group.

Media.

This group could vacillate among all the categories on the Commitment Chart, depending on the position of the editor, political affiliation of the owner(s), or the social climate. If a victim were wronged by an ineffective and insensitive police agency, it would not be unlikely for the media to take the position of a victim rights advocate. They would "help change happen" by sensationalizing the event and demand that "change happen." For purposes of this program the implementors of a victim assistance program would want to work with the media to provide an environment favorable to change. Promotion of understanding, cooperation, and support from the media will "let change happen."

Private sector providers.

This group may see a victim assistance program either as an opportunity or a threat. There will be a need for local government to contract for services from the private sector when demands can not be met. Given sufficient demand and an opportunity to make a profit the private sector will step in and provide the essential service. It will be important to identify these providers beforehand and give them the chance to buy into the program. If the victim assistance program infringes on a service already provided by a private-sector provider, stiff opposition may be encountered, especially if the provider is offering the

service at a better price.

Another aspect of this conflict may be the rationale that the user should bear the cost of the service, rather than the taxpayer who will have to absorb the cost of a public program. The assistance of the private sector is important, but they are a support group and should not be asked to be involved in attempting to "make change happen." They will be needed to "help change happen."

Volunteer citizen groups.

This pool of talent can be of immeasurable help in promoting and implementing a victim assistance program. Recently, there has been an awakening within local government that recognizes this resource for its many well-educated and talented individuals who have the expertise to successfully perform in victim assistance programs. Their willingness to assist places them in the "help change happen" category. Drawbacks encountered in the use of volunteers are: (1) the lack of an organizational structure within local government to identify, catalog, and track potential candidates, (2) the lack of a method of advertising and recruiting volunteers in the community, and (3) a reluctance on behalf of government leaders to relinquish positions that have traditionally been occupied by paid employees.

The data in the Commitment Chart demonstrates a strong reaction to change. It is obvious that conflict will result on specific issues. Police management will have to use techniques and tools to promote an attitude of "make" or "help change happen" to ensure a successful transition. At the very least, the minimal commitment needed from opposing players will

be to "let it happen." Another method to facilitate this would be to depict the vision (future plan) so that all the players understand the need for change and the methodology to attain the ultimate goal. To accomplish this, we must project a picture of the future state so that there is a common vision.

The vision of the future state when looking at our stated issues for change should look somewhat like this:

At the outset, a comprehensive study was conducted to determine what impact an in-house victim assistance program would have on the La Mesa Police Department. Included in the study was a survey that queried the citizenry as to the services they felt were necessary to satisfy their current and future needs. The police staff analyzed the data and input and prepared a package for consideration by the critical mass. Great pains were taken to educate/enlighten those involved. After extensive negotiations, approval was obtained from all parties. Opposition was overcome through the above process and devices were set in place to monitor, receive feedback, and assist in making midcourse changes.

The police department must possess the following qualities to achieve the desired future state: (1) a mission and values that are clear, (2) a quality measurement system, (3) a willingness to assign responsibility to achieve results, (4) public acknowledgement of individuals who succeed and support for individuals who make honest mistakes or fail, (5) experimentation, and (6) prioritization of activities.

Responsibility Charting

In an attempt to clarify relationships, thus reducing ambiguity, wasted energy, and adverse emotional reactions (Harris, 1987), a Responsibility Chart was prepared. This chart is a tool to be utilized in bridging the past state to the desired future state. This process addresses roles and clarifies responsibility for the development and adoption of the proposed policies in this project.

For the purpose of this project, let's propose that there is a need for an in-house

departmental training program to prepare a line officer for a new victim assistance program.

A Hypothetical Responsibility Table follows (Table 11):

HYPOTHETICAL RESPONSIBILITY TABLE

DECISION/ TASKS	ACTORS										
	CITY MANAGER	CHIEF OF POLICE	TRAINING MGR.	POLICE ASSN. REP.	POLICE OFFICERS	VICTIMS	CRIME PREVENTION MEMBERS	SERVICES COMMANDER	CITY COUNCIL MEMBER	MEDIA MEMBER	POLICE SUPERVISORS
Who will develop lesson?	-	A	R	I	-	I	S	S	I	I	I
Where will training occur?	I	I	A	I	I	-	-	S	-	I	I
Who will prepare and approve scheduling changes?	-	I	S	I	I	-	-	S	-	-	R
Who will obtain lesson plan materials?	-	I	A	-	-	-	S	S	-	-	-
Who will select instructors?	-	I	A	I	-	-	S	S	-	I	I
What will it cost & where will funds come from?	-	A	R	-	-	I	S	A	S	I	I

Legend:

- R** = Responsibility (not necessarily authority)
- A** = Approval (right to veto)
- S** = Support (put resources toward)
- I** = Inform (to be consulted)
- = Irrelevant to this item

The Process of Formulating a Responsibility Table

To facilitate this process, a group (preferably members of the police department staff) would be asked to identify the "actors" who have a say in each decision or task regarding the victim assistance issue. They would then be instructed to list the "actors" on the horizontal axis of the table.

Each member of the group would then note the required behavior of an "actor." The behaviors charted were:

R -- Responsibility: to see that decisions or tasks occur.

A -- Approval: of tasks or decisions with the right to veto.

S -- Support: provision of resources but with no veto power.

I -- Informed: of task or decision but with no veto power.

Having completed the above task, the group formed a consensus as to who the "actors" are. Using a flip chart to record each participant's thoughts, the group will identify what behavior can be expected of the "actors." Again, through discussion, a consensus hopefully will occur as to what behavior can be expected of each "actor."

With the above information, the group can use the table to determine whether the "actor's" behavior is appropriate or not. Responsibility charting allows for the understanding and appreciation of a individual's role in the decision-making process and his/her attitude toward the task.

Management Structure

Each of the issues discussed has a significant impact within and outside the La Mesa Police Department. The management structure chosen to lead the police organization towards the change goal is "representative of constituencies." This structure is ideal when input and feedback is needed from those affected. Examples of devices that are available under this format include (1) committees that can be utilized to monitor or oversee the change, (2) public workshops that will educate and assist in problem-solving, (3) team building workshops between the police department and other affected governmental agencies which will help in implementing programs, and (4) hearings conducted by elected officials so that constituents can air their opinions and concerns.

An example would be the formation of a committee to seek ways to assist crime victims in reporting crimes to the police department. The committee would include members from law enforcement, the crime prevention unit, the city manager's office, the city council, social services, and concerned/interested citizens. The committee would be selected by the crime victim advocate. Members of the committee would select a leader/spokesman. Their task would be to review current methods of police service delivery and how these methods could be fashioned to meet the needs of victims. It is envisioned that they will have to address such problems as (1) the hearing impaired and the inherent difficulties in their using the telephone or participating in conversations with an officer -- providing someone proficient in sign language, (2) other handicapped individuals who require specialized services (the homeboundk those in need of specialized transportation, etc.), and (3) those needing specialized communication skills (to include foreign language, mentally impaired,

individuals who are unable to write, etc.).

Another committee may be asked to focus on a specific crime and formulate a way to combat it. Members of the committee will consult with police department personnel and the victims of crime. The committee may discover that a remedy is not possible by the use of traditional law enforcement methods. Economic conditions and social problems may be the breeding ground and corrective measures will have to come from outside the law enforcement community.

The obvious advantage in the use of the "representative of constituencies" structure in the management of transition is the involvement of the critical mass in the change. Their knowledge of the issue, ability to have input, and the subsequent feedback allows them to buy into the change. It also allows for the identification of problem areas.

This type of management structure serves as the first step in the transition process by providing data and tools necessary for a smooth transition.

Technologies And Methods

Using the "representative of constituencies" model, a transition plan (prepared by the police department staff) will have the following progression:

A. Initially, there will be a need to prepare a public statement detailing the problem and the need for change, and the desired results. The statement will itemize the pros and cons of the problem and will emphasize the benefits of the change to those involved. Before

the statement is released, the critical mass players most affected will be contacted for input. Hopefully, with this type of prior notice the critical mass will have an opportunity to "buy into" the change and, if not, will have the opportunity to voice concern/objections. This approach may defuse or pave the way to a simplified change, short-circuiting the need for a more lengthy approach. It will also allow for the identification of those critical mass members who can assist the change who will resist or derail the measure. This will ensure that a clear and complete assessment will be made and that no one will be surprised. An individual will be appointed to answer concerns of the affected group. The above actions will telegraph to those affected that the problem has been studied and that change is a logical result.

B. With the above accomplished, a media statement will be made detailing the new study or the issue the department wants to pursue. This will allow the public and the critical mass group to provide feedback to the individual designated by the department.

C. Having allowed adequate time for feedback, the department will review the responses from the critical mass and the public and evaluate whether or not to proceed. Included in this evaluation process will be a determination as to whether or not the timing is right to effect the change and who the main opponents/detractors to the change are.

D. The next step is to pick a committee composed of "representatives of constituencies." The selection of committee members can be enhanced by using a "readiness/capability assessment" to rank each member according to their readiness and capability with respect

to the change.

The readiness assessment formula that should be used is:

$$"C = A \times B \times D"$$

This equation represents:

C = The likelihood that change will occur.

A = The level of dissatisfaction with the status quo.

B = The existence of clear goals.

D = The perception that there are viable first steps available for achieving the goals.

An assessment (by the author) of present conditions would result in the following values on the above factors:

C = The need for victim assistance programs within police agencies is increasing. Service demands will increase and change. A high probability exists for change.

A = Dissatisfaction is high.

B = Clear goals do not exist.

D = Few viable first steps exist for achieving goals. No goals exist.

In order to assess the current position, it is important to apply this formula should be applied to all of the critical mass. It would be beneficial to perform a readiness/capability assessment to determine actual ability of the critical mass to adapt to change.

Transition management methods can be applied to "soften" resistance and create a proper atmosphere for change.

E. With the appointment of the members of the committee, they will be asked to do the following:

1. refine the issue so that it is understood by all.
2. provide pertinent information so that the committee has an understanding of the dynamics of the change.
3. identify methods to involve those not directly represented in the committee's work in the decision process.
4. provide structure so that each member understands their role and the atmosphere desired during meetings.
5. provide the methods and tools to get the job done.
6. provide a feedback mechanism.
7. provide a procedure to make midcourse adjustments.
8. know when to disengage and terminate the committee.

F. When the plan is in the action stage, and information is flowing, advisements must be timely, honest, and unconditional. This is crucial if the committee is to react to problems that occur during the change and remain creditable.

G. As the transition plan matures, committee members must continue to interact. They must address issues, ask and answer questions, make decisions, and relieve concerns. This will continue throughout the transition.

In conclusion, if properly administered, the above system will deal with personal fears and frustrations. It is imperative that committee members be available to the individuals who are involved in the change.

CONCLUSIONS

In a society where crime is a part of daily life and a growing source of concern to its citizens, an increased awareness of the plight of crime victims has arisen. In the 1970's and 80's, a start has been made toward recognizing victims of crime. A number of citizens' groups, local governments, and police departments combined to pioneer the first organized victim assistance programs.

Legislation during this period has been generated in an attempt to address the needs of crime victims. The 1982 Omnibus Victim and Witness Protection Act was enacted giving greater protection to victims at the federal level. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act and the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 granted federal funds for state victim compensation and victim assistance programs. The State of California has enacted comprehensive legislation protecting the interests of crime victims. In 1982, the California Victim's Bill of Rights included a provision that victims have a right to appear and be heard at adult felony sentencing proceedings and at parole eligibility proceedings for adults and juveniles. Since then, bills have been introduced and passed to address the specific needs of the elderly, children, and rape victims.

A law enforcement officer is usually the first official in authority that is encountered by a victim after a crime. With this initial contact, the officer is asked to assess the victim's willingness to cooperate with the criminal justice system and to evaluate what the victim's

physical and mental condition is. A profound effect may be had on the victim by the way the officer handles the victim. If the victim feels that the officer is professional and caring, he or she is more apt to cooperate and feel comfortable with the system.

Unfortunately, not every officer or department has an understanding of a victim's needs or the compassion that may be expected. Not only does the victim benefit from an effective program, but those agencies that have adopted effective victim assistance programs have shown that, given such help, victims are more likely to assist police and prosecutors in their efforts to apprehend and convict criminals.

Detailed in this study were two programs depicting attempts to assist victims of crime.

The success of the Glendale, Arizona, program has been attributed to exceptional planning, a positive and supportive political arena, continued support by decision makers, a lasting commitment, and sufficient funding to sustain the program. The failure of the La Mesa, California, program resulted from the lack of the qualities found in the Glendale program.

In planning a victim assistance program, leaders must select a citizen advisory group. This group will seek advice and support from those sources impacted by the program. The group may consist of elected and government officials, law enforcement entities, members of the community, victims, their families and friends, direct service providers, and supplemental service providers. Persons involved in the planning must know and understand the task before them. Knowledge can be gleaned from other agencies that have successful programs. It is important to get a true assessment of the community's needs. The group needs to determine the level of service desired. Preliminary information will

provide the project a baseline for later measuring the program's impact. The next step will be to assess the community's available resources. This information can be obtained from sources such as law enforcement agencies, district attorney's office, community relations and crime prevention units, the courts, local governmental agencies, mental and social service agencies, community based and private programs, and religious programs. Other resources should be researched for their ability to provide resources. With the completion of a needs assessment and the identification of resources, the group will want to define the program. Questions that will have to be answered are:

1. Who will be the clientele?
2. What services will be provided?
3. Where will be the program location?
4. What geographic location will be served?
5. Where will funds come from to provide the service?

Once the above is accomplished, the group will have to put the plan in writing. The group will want prepare a statement of purpose, goals, and objectives; an action plan; and a method of evaluating the program.

Through the strategic planning process, it was determined that police agencies would be best served by enlisting a group of volunteers to identify the needs and concerns of crime victims, adding a crime victim advocate to the Crime Prevention Unit, and stalling/opposing any attempt to set limits on services to crime victims because of limited funding and resources.

The formulation of a transition management plan incorporating the above recommendations will necessitate that the chief executive of an agency be knowledgeable and ready to:

- (1) assist those stakeholders and critical mass members who will have an interest in or will impact the implementation of a policy(ies).
- (2) comprehend the present level of commitment or resistance that each person or group has to the proposed policy(ies).
- (3) format strategies that may increase commitment or reduce resistance to the policy(ies).
- (4) formulate an appropriate transition plan to implement the policy(ies).

A questionnaire mailed to eighty-nine law enforcement agencies in the state of California revealed that major inconsistencies exist in how crime victims are treated. Only nine agencies had in-house victim assistance programs. The rest were referred to a county agency or a private provider. Twenty-six respondents said that they had a department regulation or instruction addressing the needs of victims. Conversely, the majority did believe that in-house victim assistance programs would increasingly impact their agencies in the future.

It is imperative that law enforcement agencies recognize the need for in-house victim assistance programs. Now is the time to establish a program that will address the needs of crime victims. Once an appropriate program is on-line, future legislation can be assimilated with little, or no, adverse impact on the agency.

Future studies could be directed towards the following questions:

1. Can police officers be trained successfully in techniques to alleviate the victim's trauma?
2. Can programs designed to aid victims promote greater willingness of victims to cooperate with the criminal justice system?
3. What benefits can be derived by using the private sector to provide services to crime victims?

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

POLICE DEPARTMENT



ROBERT R. SOTO
CHIEF OF POLICE



CITY OF LA MESA

8181 ALLISON AVENUE
LA MESA, CALIFORNIA 92041-5099
PHONE (619) 469-6111

November 11, 1988

Dear Police Chief,

Small to medium-sized police departments are facing increased demands from citizens, legislators and jurists to provide assistance to victims of crime. Activist groups now insist that those victimized by criminals be given psychological, physical and monetary assistance. In California, this new emphasis has resulted in profound changes in the handling of domestic violence incidents. Changes in crime victim assistance will alter the complexion of policing in the future. The role of the police officer will have to be re-defined and the individual who wears the distinctive law enforcement uniform must be prepared to deal with victims' rising expectations.

As a member of the P.O.S.T. Command College, I ask for your assistance in determining what the future role of the police officer will be in assisting victims. Completion of the enclosed questionnaire will play an important part in validating this research project.

This study will be available to all law enforcement agencies through P.O.S.T. in June, 1989. If you have questions related to this inquiry, feel free to call me at (619) 469-6111.

A timely response will be appreciated and a stamped, self-addressed envelope is enclosed for return prior to December 1, 1988.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "R. John Oleksow".

R. John Oleksow
Patrol Commander

RJO:kb

Enclosure (1)

R E S E A R C H Q U E S T I O N N A I R E

1. How many sworn personnel in your agency? _____
2. What is your city's current population? _____
3. How many full time detectives do you have? _____
4. How many detectives are assigned to Crimes Against Persons? _____
5. How many full time Patrol personnel? _____
6. Does your agency have a Victim Assistance Program?

Yes _____ No _____

Who is responsible for its administration?

Name _____

Phone _____

7. If your agency provides no victim assistance, who does?

County Welfare Department _____

County Probation Department _____

Courts _____

Hospital _____

Other (specify) _____

8. Do you have a Department Instruction or Regulation that addresses how agency members are to handle victims?

Yes _____ No _____

If so, please enclose a copy with your response.

9. In your opinion, do you see your agency's commitment to victim assistance programs increasing?

Yes _____ No _____

10. If the State Legislature or courts were to mandate additional programs without funding, could your agency absorb this added responsibility with the manpower already available?

Yes _____ No _____

RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

Page 2

11. As a police administrator, are you satisfied with those programs available to victims in your jurisdiction?

Yes _____ No _____

If not, how would you improve service delivery to victims of crime?

12. Are there any political or social concerns that need to be addressed to prepare the police officer for their involvement in victim assistance?

13. Comments you have relative to this study and the future role of law enforcement in assisting victims of crime?

YOUR AGENCY NAME _____

PERSON WHO COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRE _____

Nominal Group Technique Discussion

Thursday, January 26, 1989
9:00 AM - 11:30 AM
La Mesa Police Department
Conference Room
8181 Allison Avenue
La Mesa, California 92041
469-6111

The Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (P.O.S.T.) is currently studying issues that may have an affect on policing in California in the future. The goals of this endeavor are: 1. To develop a future perspective of issues affecting law enforcement, 2. To enhance the problem-solving, decision-making, and leadership capabilities of law enforcement executives, and 3. To provide specific contributions to the body of knowledge and practice of law enforcement.

The Command College has been chosen by P.O.S.T. to facilitate this task. As a member of this academic approach the below issue has been chosen for study. The information derived from this group will be studied by policymakers locally and at the state level. It will be incorporated into strategies where appropriate.

TOPIC: "WHAT IMPACT WILL CRIME VICTIM ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS HAVE ON LAW ENFORCEMENT BY THE YEAR 2000?"

This discussion will focus on how victims of crime will be dealt with by a medium-sized police agency in California at the beginning of the next century. This study will not deal with technological advances that may alter the delivery of service to citizens of the targeted community (the City of La Mesa).

During this meeting you will be asked to identify trends that will shape the law enforcement function in the next ten years. You will also be asked to identify events that could impact the law enforcement community during this same time period.

#21

TREND EVALUATION FORM


Subgroup: _____

TREND STATEMENT		LEVEL OF THE TREND (Ratio: Today = 100)			
		5 Years Ago	Today	5 Years From Now	10 Years From Now
			100	/	/
			100	/	/
			100	/	/
			100	/	/
			100	/	/



EVENT EVALUATION FORM

EVENT STATEMENT	PROBABILITY			IMPACT OF THE ISSUE AREA IF THE EVENT OCCURRED	
	Year that Probability First Exceeds Zero	Five Years From Now (0-100)	Ten Years From Now (0-100)	Positive (0-10)	Negative (0-10)



CAPABILITY ANALYSIS - RATING ONE

STRATEGIC NEED AREA:

Instructions:

Evaluate each item, as appropriate, on the basis of the following criteria:

- I Superior. Better than anyone else. Beyond present need.
- II Better than average. Suitable performance. No problems.
- III Average. Acceptable. Equal to competition. Not good, not bad.
- IV Problems here. Not as good as it should be. Deteriorating. Must be improved
- V Real cause for concern. Situation bad. Crisis. Must take action.

Category:	I	II	III	IV	V
Manpower	---	---	---	---	---
Technology	---	---	---	---	---
Equipment	---	---	---	---	---
Facility	---	---	---	---	---
Money	---	---	---	---	---
Calls for Service	---	---	---	---	---
Supplies	---	---	---	---	---
Management Skills	---	---	---	---	---
P.O. Skills	---	---	---	---	---
Supervisory Skills	---	---	---	---	---
Training	---	---	---	---	---
Attitudes	---	---	---	---	---
Image	---	---	---	---	---
Council Support	---	---	---	---	---
City Mgr. Support	---	---	---	---	---
Specialties	---	---	---	---	---
Mgt. Flexibility	---	---	---	---	---
Sworn/non-sworn Ratio	---	---	---	---	---
Pay Scale	---	---	---	---	---
Benefits	---	---	---	---	---
Turnover	---	---	---	---	---
Community Support	---	---	---	---	---
Complaints Rec'd	---	---	---	---	---
Enforcement Index	---	---	---	---	---
Traffic Index	---	---	---	---	---
Sick Leave Rates	---	---	---	---	---
Morale	---	---	---	---	---

CAPABILITY ANALYSIS

RATING TWO

STRATEGIC NEED AREA:

Instructions:

Evaluate each item for your agency as to what type of activity it encourages:

- | | | |
|-----|------------|-------------------------|
| I | Custodial | Rejects Change |
| II | Production | Adapts to Minor Changes |
| III | Marketing | Seeks Familiar Change |
| IV | Strategic | Seeks Related Change |
| V | Flexible | Seeks Novel Change |

Category:	I	II	III	IV	V
TOP MANAGERS:					
Mentality Personality	—	—	—	—	—
Skills/Talents	—	—	—	—	—
Knowledge/Education	—	—	—	—	—
ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE:					
Culture/Norms	—	—	—	—	—
Rewards/Incentives	—	—	—	—	—
Power Structure	—	—	—	—	—
ORGANIZATION COMPETENCE:					
Structure	—	—	—	—	—
Resources	—	—	—	—	—
Middle Management	—	—	—	—	—
Line Personnel	—	—	—	—	—