

COMMUNITIES AND CRIME CONTROL:  
WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS

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Committee on Research on Law Enforcement and  
the Administration of Justice

Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education

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## SUMMARY OF WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS

The Workshop on Communities and Crime Control was convened in Miami, Florida, on January 28-29, 1988, with a distinguished group of criminal justice researchers, policy makers, and leaders of community-based anticrime programs in attendance. The workshop was convened under the aegis of the National Research Council's Committee on Research on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, with support from the National Institute of Justice (see Appendix A for the workshop program); a total of some 70 persons attended the workshop (see Appendix B for a list of participants). The workshop was planned by the committee's Working Group on Communities and Crime Control, which was comprised of three committee members, two persons selected for their knowledge of research on community-level influences on crime rates, two persons experienced in evaluating community crime control programs, and two persons familiar with the operation of police and neighborhood programs intended to involve the community in crime reduction.

Two major traditions of research about crime were represented at the workshop. One is concerned with the behavior of individuals--either offenders or victims, but usually not both. A central concern of theories of offender behavior is explaining variation in the parameters of the individual criminal career, primarily as a result of personal or family characteristics or life events. In suggesting approaches to crime control, this research frequently points to individual-level policies that are intended to prevent nonoffenders (especially children) from becoming offenders, to discourage criminals' continuing offending by providing

structural or behavioral deterrents or legitimate alternative opportunities, or to allocate scarce prison resources to high-rate offenders.

By contrast, the second research tradition attempts to explain variation of aggregate crime patterns across time and space. Its object is to explain territorial variation in crime rates, especially in neighborhoods or communities. Its focus is on community crime careers and on how their life courses can be changed so as to reduce their crime rates. Correlatively, community-level theories about controlling crime focus on the differential social organization of these communities and in their structural composition and stability.

The workshop brought together researchers working in both traditions with practitioners who had developed and maintained local community programs in crime control.

Some of the programs represented were located in police agencies, while others had been implemented by indigenous community organizations. Although all the programs had been shaped in part by structural characteristics of their communities, they differed in the relative emphases placed on community- and individual-level interventions to control crime.

These researchers and practitioners were brought together in the expectation of accomplishing four major objectives:

- (1) To present for critical examination recent scientific findings on community crime control that might aid practitioners in controlling crime in communities;

(2) To disseminate information on a number of major programs in community crime control for examination and discussion by others who might learn from their diversity;

(3) To examine and critically review the problems of evaluating community-based anticrime programs from the perspective of practitioners and scientific evaluators; and

(4) To identify promising directions for research on community-level causes of crime and community crime control programs, especially collaborations between practitioners and researchers.

#### WORKSHOP PRESENTATIONS

The workshop presentations in the plenary session dealt with a number of broad topics. The first of these, "Why Focus on Communities?" introduced the key questions and issues for the workshop. A second plenary explored "Evaluating Community-based Anti-Crime Programs," focusing particularly on tensions inherent in the evaluator-practitioner relationship. The third plenary session, "Generating and Sustaining Community Oriented Programs" dealt with issues of resource mobilization in the community. It was followed by a luncheon address by Irving Harris of the Harris Foundation, Chicago, on early prevention programs as the foundation of any community anticrime program. The final plenary session, "Focusing Research and Action in Community Crime Control," identified

promising directions for research and community-based crime control programs. Transcripts of the panelists' presentations are included in this report.

The workshop also featured four break-out sessions at which practitioners and evaluators shared information on specific community crime control programs. Attendees were divided into two groups, so that each attendee could participate in each of the four sessions.

Session One, "Community-Oriented Policing and Crime Control," addressed questions of how community-oriented policing can be more effective in reducing crime than is traditional command-and-control reactive policing. Two models, "Problem Oriented Policing" and "Community Oriented Policing" were compared.

Session Two, "Community-based Crime Control Programs," examined the basic goals and strategies of anticrime programs operated by indigenous community organizations.

Session Three, "The Experience with Community-oriented Crime Control Programs", examined specific community-based policing programs. The Newport News, Va., Police Department presented their model of problem solving policing, the Minneapolis Police Department their model of RECAP or repeat call policing, and the Houston Police Department their fear reduction projects.

Session Four, "Community-based Anti-Crime Programs" presented descriptions of private or volunteer anticrime programs in New York City and Washington, D.C. Those discussed were the Center for Successful Child Development in Chicago; the East New York Crime and Fear Prevention

Project in New York; and the Bromley-Heath Tenant Management Corporation in Boston.

Transcripts of these break-out sessions are also part of this report.

#### THEMES

Although it is difficult to capture the richness of the discussions and the exchange between research investigators and practitioners of community crime control programs, a number of common threads emerged from the plenary presentations and discussions. Some, but by no means all, of those worth noting follow.

(1) The variability in community crime rates cannot be explained by the ethnic heritage of the people who reside within them.

Considerable evidence has accumulated that the crime rates associated with ethnic populations vary considerably, depending on their community of residence. Moreover, it appears that moving from high-rate to low-rate communities has a substantial effect on the crime rate of any ethnic population.

(2) Neighborhoods and communities have careers in crime.

Evidence is only now beginning to accumulate on what causes the crime careers of neighborhoods and communities and on what can be done to alter them. There is evidence that family and community structure have an

important role in shaping community crime careers. Special attention was drawn to evidence suggesting that low social integration of communities is a contributory factor, as is high neighborhood density of female-headed households with young, especially male, children.

(3) Communities with the highest serious crime rates provide the greatest obstacles to organizing anticrime programs.

More research is needed to determine precisely why this is the case. It has been especially difficult to implement and sustain community programs in communities with high crime rates. The difficulties seem clearly to be structural rather than specific to crime problems.

(4) Even in communities with high crime rates, crime is not uniformly distributed by residential location.

Recent research on repeat calls for police service demonstrates that a small percentage of locations accounts for a substantial volume of all calls and that these are disproportionately located in high-crime-rate areas. This work suggests a strategy of policing and of anticrime programs generally based on determining what causes these concentrations.

(5) There are at best only modest correlations among the different outcome measures used to evaluate community anticrime programs. Among the common measures are the rate of crime, fear of victimization by crime, satisfaction with police service, and satisfaction with living in the community.

Just why the correlations among these dimensions are so modest is unclear. Some of the variance undoubtedly is accounted for by variation among the programs, and some seems due to variability among communities. High priority should be placed on research to clarify these relationships.

(6) Formal organizations such as police, schools, and public housing in communities are recalcitrant regarding crime control changes.

There was considerable discussion of the ways in which these organizations might facilitate change more effectively, such as decentralizing administration to local managers, encouraging problem solving at the community level or by specialized teams, increasing citizen participation in problem solving and managing communities, and creating volunteer programs to reduce crime. Each of these major strategies remains to be evaluated in different environmental settings.

#### PRIORITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The panel presentations, break-out sessions, and plenary discussions surfaced a number of areas in which either past or future research should contribute to understanding and practice of community crime control.

Perhaps not surprisingly, most practice of community crime control is not grounded in the substantial theoretical and research literature on organizations and their environment. This absence is partly owing to the



fact that much of the literature on organizational control deals with complex or large-scale organizations and far less is known about small organizations, especially informal organizations that arise outside those complex organizations.

Both the larger literature on complex organizations and that on community crime control will be enhanced if more research is done on questions such as:

(1) What accounts for the differential survival and effectiveness of community crime control organizations?

(2) How can indigenous community crime control organizations be integrated or work effectively with more formal government organizations existing in the community, such as the police, the schools and the public housing authority?

(3) How can the indigenous not-for-profit organizations of a community mobilize the private and governmental sector for local crime control?

Research on these and other questions about community crime control should draw more systematically on the literature on organizational structure, strategy, and tactics.

A central issue in understanding and developing community crime control programs is determining to what extent one can presume that community exists in an organizational form in our urban areas--especially in inner cities, where most of the high crime rate communities are

located. Are inner-city territories organized on a communal basis as neighborhoods or communities, or are they largely comprised of residential aggregates that are bound merely by symbiosis rather than consensus?

There was some substantial disagreement concerning presumptions about the utility of postulating a residential community based on consensus and common control as the basis for interventions to control crime. This is partly owing to the fact that most organizations in the community are operating units of large, complex bureaucratic organizations that are centrally rather than locally controlled.

There was much discussion concerning how social control organizations such as the police can control crime in high-crime-rate areas. Should such organizations focus largely on policing places and problems in these areas, or should they attempt either to organize local crime control programs or to work with ones that arise with indigenous leadership? Which strategy has the higher payoff? Does one gain from the mixed strategy that seems to characterize crime control in many local areas of our cities? How can one evaluate these strategies so as to guide crime control policy?

There was general agreement that the causes of crime lie beyond the bounds of communities, thus giving rise to the question of what local communities can do to affect local crime rates. Is their effectiveness largely limited to affecting macro-societal structures and processes or can local organizations have some effect on crime rates?

Quite clearly, evaluation research is far from sufficiently developed to compare the effectiveness of alternative approaches to community crime control. Research was called for on developing workable designs to evaluate local organizational programs--designs that

accommodate the complexities of program implementation and that yield methodologically defensible results. There was, likewise, a call for more field experiments in community crime control, although these experiments seemed more feasible for large organizations operating in different communities of a city than for local organizations unique to a locality.

Several speakers, including Irving Harris of the Harris Foundation in Chicago and James Stewart of the National Institute of Justice, emphasized that community crime control efforts should focus more on prospective strategies for preventing crime rather than merely on strategies for reacting to crime after it occurs.

P R O C E E D I N G S

WELCOME

Albert J. Reiss, Jr.  
James K. Stewart

MR. REISS: Good morning. I want to welcome you to this Workshop on Communities and Crime Control which is being held under the aegis of the Committee on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice of the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences with the support of a grant from the National Institute of Justice of the U.S. Department of Justice. If you do not understand what all of those organizations are, I want to begin by giving you just a short course, not on the justice side, which Chips will take care of, but just who is this committee and why is it in this area.

I will start by just saying that the National Academy of Sciences was chartered by President Abraham Lincoln as the major scientific organization of the United States, and it went along strictly as an academic organization until 1916 at which time the Congress of the United States created the National Research Council as a body under the Academy of Sciences to advise the government on any kind of practical problems whenever a government agency sought the advice of the scientific community.

That went along largely as an organization made up of what is often called the hard sciences advising the government, often what later became the Department of Defense, but on problems relating to the defense of the United States, and then gradually to other areas. It is probably only beginning about 30 or 40 years ago that gradually the scope was extended to include a much larger range of government agencies and issues. For

about 15 years now there has been a rather active participation with the law enforcement and criminal justice and civil justice community, and that falls under this committee of the National Research Council.

Which brings me to the point that the purpose of workshops like this is to bring together persons who are practitioners or who have experience in dealing with problems with persons from the academic or scientific community to talk about those problems. This Committee has sponsored a series of workshops, of which this is the fifth. The first workshop was on criminal careers and it was designed to disseminate the report of a panel of the Committee on Criminal Careers. The second was on Drugs and Crime and the third was on Prison Overcrowding, and the last one was on Field Experiments on Criminal Justice.

This one is devoted to a topic that is close to my heart, namely Communities and Crime. We are gathered here this morning and tomorrow, today and tomorrow, to talk about that topic. Shortly, we will have a plenary session. I think all of you have copies of the agenda for the two days, and I will not bother to go over to that. Before turning to Chips in a moment, I simply wanted to say that some people have brought materials with them that relate to this. Darrel Stephens has brought us the report of problem-oriented policing at Newport News. There are two boxes of the report at the back of the room, and as you go out to the breakout groups, you are welcome to take a copy of problem solving and problem oriented policing at Newport News.

Again, on behalf of the Committee and of the Academy and the Research Council, and with thanks to the National Institutes of Justice, I welcome you to this workshop. Chips?

MR. STEWART: Thank you, Al. On behalf of the National Institute of Justice, I, too, would like to welcome all of you, my friends and colleagues who have labored so long both as law enforcement professionals and community leaders. I welcome you all to the home of sunshine and orange juice. We are part of what I think is one of the most important national resource--a national treasure--the people who work and live in the communities, the people who enforce the communities laws, and the people who study the communities. That is a very important trilogy. If we can bring it all together and create that synergy that we want, then I think it is going to make a big difference.

Abraham Lincoln, who helped our country and our people so much, also created the National Academy of Sciences, and the Academy's record is one more indication of President Lincoln's foresight. For its part, the Academy had the good judgment to appoint the distinguished Albert Reiss, Jr., as leader of this workshop. A lot of focus has been always put on the individual criminal and not much on how communities responded. I am delighted that we are focusing much more correctly and comprehensively on the community. In the room I see Sister Falaka Fattah from the House of Umoja and a number of other community leaders; Tony Bouza and Neal Behan and so many other law enforcement professionals we have worked with for so long; Carey Bittick from the Sheriffs' Association; and certainly Lloyd Street. When Lloyd and I first met, he had come all the way from Cornell to study at Oakland and I had come all the way from Oakland to study in Washington, D. C. We happened to meet at about, I think, 30,000 feet over Denver, Lloyd has been working extraordinarily well on communities and social policy. George Kelling and Larry Sherman have done so much to enhance our ideas about what seems to work.

Let me just say a few words. You mentioned eggheads. Because of my rising forehead, I am very sensitive to that, Al. Have I grown too close to the academics? I'm reminded of a little joke about perception, which I think is very important in looking at communities and crime. The President told this story about police: a police officer saw an out-of-state plate going down the road attached to a car without tail lights. It was night, and the police officer pulled the guy over. The driver said, "Officer, what is the matter?"

The officer, in his most professional way, said, "well, you have lost your tail lights." The driver said, "oh, my God!" "Listen," said the officer, "it's not a big deal. Just get out of the car and take a look at it." The driver gets out and says "oh, oh, oh." "Let me just try to calm you down for a second," says the officer. "Don't worry, this is not serious here in the State of Florida. Tail lights out, that is not a big problem."

"But officer, you do not understand," he said. "I know it is not a big deal. But officer, if I lost my tail lights, it means I lost my trailer, my dog, my three kids and my wife 300 miles back." (LAUGHTER)

I think this story reminds us that we think we have the right idea. We look at something and we say, this makes such a difference. Then when we go to the people who make the largest difference, they can let you know whether that is really important or not. That is why I am excited about the forces that are coming together to talk about communities and crime.

The National Institute of Justice is sponsoring this conference, because we regard it as an investment in change. As we expand our knowledge about what communities can do to deal with crime problems, we

have to get the word out that crime and the fear it brings is a much bigger story than it is given credit for in the media. It is the quality of life and our sense of liberty that we are talking about. Crime is consistently one of the biggest fears facing Americans.

At the very least, it constrains our behavior. It restricts our opportunities on a daily basis, especially in the inner city. Anyone who doubts that people are deeply concerned, and motivated to do something about crime and fear need only look at the facts. One fact that speaks louder than anything else, I think, is that we spend over \$50 billion of our own money and our own capital every year on private security--twice what we spend for public justice. We spend it on guns and dogs and guards and alarm systems and bars, and radio systems, and that is twice as much as we budget for public law enforcement.

Some community organizations, law enforcement professionals, and researchers have developed creative programs to help communities confront this threat in an active way. At this conference, we come together as partners. Everyone's role is important here. We know the criminal justice system's way of doing things is not necessarily the best answer or the only answer. Community organizations or local officials may have a better one. And research can help show us the ways to improve and the things that work, not because the researchers are doing it but because you are doing it, and the researchers can help you measure it.

If we work together, we have a better chance of developing a range of solutions that can have a real impact on our problem. We are still in the early stages of research on communities and crime control. In the recent years, we have learned some things that have brought us down the path to this conference today--the Hartford Environmental Design Studies



and the Crime and Justice volumes that the National Institute of Justice has continued to fund; a very fine piece by George Kelling and James Q. Wilson, "Broken Windows;" and problem-oriented policing. Jay Carey is here from Newport News, and we recognize Darrel Stephens's fine work, and Herman Goldstein's excellent ideas.

As we work toward to the future of law enforcement on community crime control, there is an analogy I would like to make with health care. Obviously, health care involves treating the individual, but our personal health is not just something contained inside our own skin. It is also a communal issue. AIDS, of course, is a prime example of my point. There is not a lot we can do at this point to treat the individual AIDS victim, but there may be a great deal we can do to contain the spread of the disease by treating the community through education, communications and focusing on relationships between people. This form of treatment is not necessarily medical in nature.

Another medical concern that we have talked about parenthetically is tooth decay. I have suffered from it, and my parents suffered from it, but my children and your children do not--essentially because putting fluoride in the water really helped. This is more of a communal treatment, and it has saved so many people from health problems and expensive bills. My point is it is not just what doctors and nurses do to solve the health crisis that gives us a healthy community. The same is true in our neighborhoods in terms of crime. It is not just what the police and prosecutors can do, although they are important. Even in the most crime-ridden cities, some areas are relatively safe zones--islands of health. They might be right down the street from another neighborhood, that is dangerous to walk through in broad daylight. The question that Al

Reiss raises in his article is "why does this happen?" What makes one neighborhood or community more crime resistant? What makes another more vulnerable. Lloyd Street worked on what makes one neighborhood more accessible to institutions of criminal justice and social research.

To find out what makes the difference, and to empower us to know that we are on the right course, we need to do experiments just as the medical profession has done. They do not have to be large experiments involving hundreds of thousands of people. They can involve small communities, small groups, which keep records and try to decide what is best and what makes a difference. For example, we have supported Gary Mendez's work as a National Institute of Justice Visiting Fellow. Gary comes to NIJ the Urban Institute, and is working on the black-on-black crime project.

In Newark and Houston, with Hubert Williams and Lee Brown, the fear of crime project devised various techniques to bring the police and the citizens closer together. As the Hartford study found, the physical environment and the organization of residents and police services are all interdependent in making neighborhoods much more crime-resistant. Other efforts are adding to our understanding. The Harvard Executive Session on Policing with its community focus, and the work in Minneapolis being done by Larry Sherman on Operation RECAP, focusing on the hot spots in policing in Minneapolis. These are extremely important. They tell us we have to target our resources better. They tell us that if we work smarter, we can accomplish much more. I think that is our challenge today.

Before you is a front page of the New York Times from Paul Cascarano of NIJ. The story talks about the Drug Use Forecasting system of the National Institute of Justice, which I think is a brilliantly designed

project. It is going to help all of us in this room. In the 1960's, all of us knew that drugs were a community problem but we talked about "the drug scene" and where the "drug scene" was.

That term, drug scene, is essentially a very neutral term. It does not contain any negatives. It just sort of says, here are some drugs; the users are hanging out here, and they are here to stay. Drugs are part of the scene. In the 1960's and 1970's, drugs were part of the landscape but it became a terra incognita, an unknown landscape in which we were almost helpless. We could not engage in useful debate because we did not have hard data.

But the National Institute of Justice has illuminated some of the darkest corners of the drug scene's landscape. We have taken a look very effectively at 12 major cities across these United States. We looked at these cities, not because they were drug areas but because they represented geographically different places. The surprise was that in heartland cities like Phoenix and Indianapolis--where people thought they did not have a drug problem--our sample showed that at least five out of ten of the people arrested in those cities had used drugs immediately prior to their arrest. This was in cities which did not think they had a problem. In the cities which acknowledged having a problem and are working hard to deal with it, drug use among arrestees was as high as 80 percent. I think this was a surprise because it indicated the linkage between drug use and criminal activity.

Now, science has confirmed what I think all of us knew, and that is that the criminal with a cocaine habit is a fearsome predator. Drug use does disrupt our communities, and now we have some hard evidence that we can use to talk to the young people and to people in our communities and

persuade them to "just say no." Al Reiss, in his very fine article, talked about risk perception--that we form our ideas of where bad places are not because we know the individual criminal is in that place but that the area is a bad area. Knowledge about community areas is very important. Al also notes that existing data sources we collect are not adequate for research about community crime control, and they are not helpful many times to the police and to the community when they are trying to help a community.

The Drug Use Forecasting project gives you a snapshot of people arrested and what kinds of drugs they are using. DUF is so important because it allows you to map in your community the kinds of drugs that are being used. What the DUF project showed was not only that drug use by criminal suspects was uniformly high across this country. Everybody said, "well, we knew that." What was a surprise to us was that the drug of choice varied so much from region to region. On the West Coast, amphetamines were big and in the District of Columbia, PCP was big, and in New York City and some other places, cocaine was big. So you do not have one big uniform drug all across America. That, I think was very important.

And the same thing is probably true in your community. If you have different kinds of drugs being used, it means different markets, different kinds of distribution, different kinds of prevention, different kinds of treatment, and different kinds of enforcement tactics are needed. You can have that kind of information through something like the Drug Use Forecasting system, and I think it is extraordinarily important.

I am not proposing any blanket answers to the drug problem because if it was an easy problem, we would have solved it 2,000, 3,000 years ago. It is a major problem. If we eliminate the drug problem, we will

still have crime. We are not going to put ourselves out of business, but what we can do by attacking drug abuse is we can cut the crime rate dramatically. That is what we have got to understand: we can cut the crime rate substantially.

We need many different answers for the different kinds of problems that crime presents. Crime is like disease. When doctors look at disease, they do not see disease as a general sort of thing that one pill is going to cure. They see it in terms of smallpox, they see it in terms of degenerative back disease, in terms of typhoid, in terms of polio--as distinct and different kinds of causes and different kinds of relationships requiring different treatments.

That is the important thing we are talking about. We have to be smart enough to be able to diagnose more effectively what kind of problem we have in our community, and then begin to apply what we think are the best kinds of treatments. That is where I think we need to have the kind of feedback and the kinds of things that are going on. While there is no grand solution to crime, I think what we can do is find incremental solutions at many different levels. The good news is that we realize that it is not just the police. It is not just the courts and it is not just corrections. But it is how we work together as people, sharing a common ideal of safety and liberty and justice, that is going to make a difference in all our lives.

I hope this workshop boosts our knowledge and energy and morale in this effort. I look at you, really, as eventually apostles that are going to back out into your community. You have got some very trying situations, but armed with the knowledge that each of you is going to share with us today and tomorrow and the next day. I think we are going

to make the difference. And this is an enormous bright spot in our history as a country.

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you. The National Institute of Justice is really pleased that you have taken time out of your schedules to come here and deal with what I think is the most serious problem in our country and among our people today. Let me turn it back to Al now. Thank you very much.

(APPLAUSE)

## WHY FOCUS ON COMMUNITIES?

### Panel

Albert J. Reiss, Jr.  
Lloyd Street  
Lawrence W. Sherman

MR. REISS: Thank you, Chips, for that inspiring opener. One of the things that we thought about in planning for this conference is that we did not want to have too much talking without giving everybody a chance to talk. So as you see, we have tried to organize it with a relatively short plenary followed by breakout groups, and we will tell you after this first short plenary about the breakout groups. But at this point, I am going to invite my fellow panelists out here and we are going to try to keep the schedule.

I am Al Reiss, to introduce myself again, and I am joined by my fellow panelists, Lloyd Street and Larry Sherman. We are going to talk a little bit at the outset about why we should focus on communities and crime. Of course, the idea behind this is why focus on them, rather than focus on individual criminals or individual victims of crime. Why should communities be our focus?

I would like to have you think for a moment that the year is 1928 and not 1988. You are seated and about to hear a report of the Wickersham Commission, a Presidential Commission appointed by and reporting to President Herbert Hoover, and otherwise known officially as the President's Commission on Law Observance and the Administration of Justice. As you listen to the findings of the Commission, its staff members, and its research consultants you may hear familiar themes in an unfamiliar vocabulary. The reports on crime in Chicago seem especially interesting. It is pointed out that crime varies considerably among the communities of Chicago with crime rates being especially high in areas

occupied by Polish, Italian, and other East and South European immigrants. In reading about organized crime there are repeated references to Jewish gangs and mobsters with Italians gaining foothold.

Listening more intently, we hear two University of Chicago sociologists--Clifford Shaw and Henry D. McKay--saying something very interesting about these high crime rate areas. They have traced the history of crime and delinquency in these areas since the turn of the century. Once these areas were occupied by Germans, Irish, and other North European immigrants. Crime in them is very high also. But now the Germans, the Irish, and other Anglo-Saxons before them have moved out to areas where the crime rates are low. And stretching further beyond, others have noted that these communities with high crime rates in 1928 once had low crime rates.

It may have occurred to you by now--but where are the blacks and high crime? To be sure there are references in the 1928 report to a Black Belt of Chicago located on the near South Side. But blacks didn't figure prominently in high crime in Chicago or any other U.S. city of that time, most certainly not in cities of the North. There were high-crime areas then but they had been occupied as Shaw and McKay observed by a succession of immigrant and migrant groups to Chicago--groups we ordinarily associated with a white America.

I provide you with this flashback to an earlier era and an earlier Crime Commission to draw your attention to a number of points that 60 years later are among the reasons for directing our attention to communities and crime.

While Shaw and McKay were well aware of the fact that people commit crimes and that their victims either directly or indirectly are people,



what they wished to emphasize was that crime seemed to characterize some communities of the cities more than others. Moreover, they were convinced that there was nothing criminal about any group of people who resided in these areas. Each group in time "changed" its crime pattern as they moved to other communities--areas with characteristics they eventually saw as related to their low crime rates. Were they here to remind us, they would emphasize that the crime of blacks, Hispanics, and other recent immigrants to our cities today--though somewhat different now from that of their predecessors because of the greater role of drugs in crimes--is on the whole very much the same. The higher crime rates of some communities is not to be found in the ethnic heritage of groups who live there but in their ethnic status in the larger city, in their community organization, in their socioeconomic status, and in their relative power to change their lot.

We can draw one other conclusion from these observations--that communities have a life history of crime. They move over time from low to high crime rates. They have what we have come to call community crime careers. Communities, like people, have careers in crime and like people the fundamental question is: What can we do to change their life course. How can we bring their crime rates down?

One answer to that, as you well know, is that we have to deal with the offenders and process them in our law enforcement and criminal justice systems.

Yet the new cohorts of offenders come on. Today's juvenile offenders are tomorrow's adult offenders. Equally to the point, today's juvenile offenders were yesterday's kids in the community.

The answers then are not so simple. It is more than a matter of dealing with people who offend. It is a matter of how crime arises in and devastates whole communities. As Chips Stewart likes to say, crime destroys neighborhoods and communities. At the same time, somewhat paradoxically, the very communities they destroy are the ones that spawn them. We must seek our answers, at least in part, in understanding how communities in their crime careers link to individuals in them.

I hope that we will not spend a great deal of time arguing about what is a neighborhood or what is a community. How do we define them, find their boundaries, give them life, make them work, or whatever. For a community is a socially constructed space by the people, the organizations, and the larger society of which they are apart.

But, I want you to flash back again with me, not to 1928, but to the places where you and I grew up. A good many years ago a sociologist by the name of Roper pointed out that kids in cities are the core residents of a neighborhood. Their mothers also are far more likely to neighbor and recognize their neighborhood as a distinct place. Employed fathers--fathers who go off to work to places at a distance--are less likely to neighbor. To be sure, today's kids in cities are also more territorial than their elders. They have a sense of belonging together and at times they even war over their turf.

What I am trying to say is that in talking about communities and crime it may be well remembered that much of it has to do with youth. Young people grow up in them. What are they like?

Most of us here are familiar with homes in those high crime rate communities. We go in as police officers, as community workers, as crime experts, and some of us as research workers. All too often I suspect we

see them through the eyes of an adult rather than through the eyes of their most numerous inhabitants, the eyes of a permanently incarcerated minority of children. They are not there by choice but by lot. They did not choose their surroundings; often the state has given it to them and their families as public housing or as a welfare allotment. Many have a minority status. They are surrounded by older kids and adults in trouble. Many see drugs bought and sold in their neighborhood. They did not choose the blackboard jungle that is their school, at the same time that some of them make it so. The ghetto's children are in many ways the true victims of their communities, of which crime victimization is only a part. There are kids--often a majority of kids--who become street-wise at an early age.

As you and I go about these high crime rates communities we are struck by their impoverishment in every way.

There are the abandoned buildings--not quite so abandoned as to be without residents. They harbor the shooting galleries, the homeless, and the derelicts. These residents and others may declare their local turf as grate people--not the grateful dead, but the warmth of the subway grate. Theirs is the turf of the street-corner unemployed.

In some of our cities, communities are identified by an earlier solution to crime and poverty--the ubiquitous public housing. The solution to the slumlord was the public housing high rise which destroyed any sense of neighborhood. Not surprisingly, many of its residents, especially its youth, respond to such housing with contemptuous destruction. It is not the adults who physically destroy these communities, but their offspring. I think of the Robert Taylor Homes in Chicago with their outside walkways walled by cage wire to keep toddlers

from plunging to their deaths and cynically wonder if they are not being prepared to look out of prison cages as adults! I think of Omaha, Nebraska and a housing project known to the police and its residents as Vietnam. There is a sense of community there but hardly one that a civilized society intentionally fosters. I think also of places like Harlem in New York where white kids with names like Kennedy buy drugs from black pushers. I think of combat zones where the residents must tolerate outsiders and their penchant for vice with the state supporting the rights of the outsiders. For the next two days we hope to see what we can do about crime in communities by sharing our knowledge and experience about efforts to bring crime in communities down.

(APPLAUSE)

Lloyd Street takes up the next of themes which were listed for this conference. Lloyd and I first met in Oakland, California when he was sponsoring what I think was one of the most interesting community studies of crime that I have ever encountered. Lloyd?

MR. STREET: There are a variety of community based policies and practices now being tried by law enforcement. Some programs are new and some only appear to be new for both the theory and practice of community based anticrime programs have attracted criminal justice policy makers for a long time.

The attractiveness of the community concept to criminal justice policy makers resides in the structures, processes and promises that make up the community concept.

First, community processes comprehend the notions of social and crime control, which interpret how people commit themselves to live with others, offending neither sensibilities nor law. The reciprocity of I-you

is central to the social psychological processes of community law abidingness. Normative processes infuse virtually all community action with social control potential.

Second, the concept of community embodies organizational and political forms and structures that can be manipulated for the purposes of devising new or strengthening old control strategies. We can, and we do, for example, devise many ways to reach people, groups and organizations by using political and organizational structure of community to increase participation in conformity enhancing behavior.

Finally, community holds out the promise of relatively powerful anti-crime strategies. We can envision community-based criminal justice strategies that run the gamut from simply listening to the needs and demands of community members in order to better direct agency response to developing new community action that co-produces security. As community groups and law enforcement increasingly share responsibility for anticrime activities we see emerging trends that bear examination. Some policy and practice trends in community based anticrime programs are these:

1. Police-initiated community programs are likely to focus on issues like decentralization of police administration, reorientation of patrol, the development of community political work. There is resistance to sharing warrants of authority for security and crime prevention which is the legal basis for all anticrime work.
2. Community-initiated anticrime programs tend to generate demands for service rather than new roles and responsibilities for citizens. Citizens tend to bring their organizations and resource issues with them. That is, local community initiatives often seek more services and try to farm public revenues.

3. For most constituencies, including local government, the interest is in funding cost, on-the-cheap fixes. That is, both public and agency constituencies seem to prefer minimal involvement in community-based anticrime strategies. The citizen role, from this common perspective, would be to identify and report offenders. The police would arrest and transport offenders to the next stage in CJS processing. Law enforcement would stand with community and its organizations thereby enhancing the legitimacy of local institutions. The members of the community would handle incivilities and the near crimes on their own. If the community lacks the wherewithal to engage in such community action, organizers might be used to get the job done.

4. In the context of black community, these practice and policy trends are even more pronounced and pose an even more difficult set of problems.

#### POLICE COMMUNITY PROGRAMS IN THE BLACK COMMUNITY

The first problem we face in crafting community based anti-crime programs in black communities is an almost total lack of experience in race related policy development. Race has a palatable reality that is volatile and subject to strong opinions against race based policies. Most publics avoid or downgrade the importance of race based policies; without willingness to discuss, dissect, review, analyze, particularize and generalize about race as accurately and fairly as possible, we cannot make headway in dealing with crime in this country. For any policy on crime which does not take race into account is not reality grounded.

Criminal justice reluctance to engage race variables while crafting community based anti-crime policies and practices is a criminal justice failure which can only return to hurt us.

And, black community members all over the nation must resolve the conflict between viewing the police as oppressors and relying on the police as protectors. There is a deep rooted contradiction in the relation of Afro-American people to American policing. Historically, black group experience validates the view of police as head beaters, shooters, the man who tells you to get back on your side of the community line or else. And, at the very same time, it is the police who are the last line of security for most communities. When no one else (except firemen) will come, the police will. When no one else will pick you up after you have been injured or victimized, the police will. However, the historical role of police in relation to black community has changes. Even allowing for bad officers doing bad police work in black neighborhoods, police simply are no longer a source of oppression. For example, in tracing out the history of policing in Oakland, we find no less than four distinct historical periods which characterize the relation of law enforcement to Afro-American community. Two of them were singularly oppressive periods with law, custom and policy supporting police oppression. Oakland now has one of the better police departments in the nation - relative to race and police services. Nevertheless it is still difficult as a consequence of institutional memory to find Black people who readily let go of the view of police as oppressors in the face of widespread support for the police.

Now these views of policing and the police relationship to the black community are not individual and personalistic. That is, the police

are likely to limit their cooperation, less likely to share warrants of authority and responsibility for the production of security with the black community for political and institutional reasons. And, the black community is less likely to work with police without antagonism and challenges directed toward the police--for political and institutional reasons rather than personal ones.

The sources of these difficulties are found in the tendencies I have already noted and in the following tendencies as well. First there is the politics of race: politicians are more likely to be elected by cultivating racial constituencies than by cross-class constituencies. This political factor does not enhance the likelihood of open and honest political dialogue on crime issues by politicians. Crime is a cheap ride for too many politicians.

Second, there is the problem of "facticity" and generalizations about the characteristics of black community and its anti-crime capacity. We have all heard that the black community is incapable of fighting crime, of keeping its young people on the right track, of fielding effective local leaders--of its being so beset by problems that only triage can save many black communities. What is a variable truth for a small number of black communities is erroneously generalized as a case for the whole. And we act on our own fiction: we cut off many black communities, declaring that we can do nothing about crime, before we deal with poverty, education, family life, nutrition, health and so on. And, as social scientists, planners, and criminal justice system agents, we announce that these problems make the anticrime task impossible. At the same time, people in Afro-American communities like those we find in Oakland tell us that they prefer collective action to deal with crime. Only 13 percent



opt for social programs to deal with poverty, education, etc. before crime is addressed.

#### WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

Where do we start? What are the propositions that might reasonably initiate the work of community oriented policing in black community? I begin with the organizational and political goals of local community and law enforcement.

The first police organizational task is to engage in community organization building. Such work seeks to establish local anticrime organizations in black communities. The organizers are the police and local citizens.

The political task of the anticrime organization is to incorporate the majority of law abiders in the black community into the crime fight through political education. Political education is that process by which government, by example and text, teaches people that they are part of the larger polity and its benefits, accepting the law abidingness of the community.

The interracial task is to begin to understand the perspectives that inform black community members as they engage in anticrime work, and to understand white law enforcement perspectives. The goal here is not interpersonal understanding, not touchy-feely training, but to understand what enhances or undercuts the delivery of police services because of race relations.

The police organizing the task must incorporate their anti-crime resources into the communities that most need it. Talk about self help is appropriate when the work to be done is within the resources of the local

community. The police own anticrime resources - the hardware and skills of much of police work. To ask local black communities to create, through "self help," their own agencies of justice is nonsense. Communities must influence the use of police resources and use their own in efficient ways.

The police with the local leadership would build the anticrime organization fitted to the particularities of local community.

The police and local black community leadership must build a deliberative structure that provides a platform for police and citizens to amicably discuss anticrime programs under established rules and procedures. Such a community resource does not now exist in most cities. Both police and citizens must seek to bring local politicians along so that they do not oppose such anticrime organizations.

A realistic implementation period for building anticrime organization must be adopted. Reducing and fighting crime is not subject to quick fixes.

The emphasis would be put on middle management police leadership which is more skilled in dealing with issues of race and communities. Are there findings about community which can justify such a program? Let me speak of Oakland, where the largest proportion of community members in Oakland's black and white communities say that they prefer to engage in collective action with the police over all other strategies. Moreover, the black organizations in Oakland are most likely to engage in crime fighting. Both police and citizens give every indication that they need stable organizations to devise anticrime action. Having a place to meet is the strongest predictor of engaging in anticrime work in Oakland's black communities.

Organizations that engage elected officials in local problems do not get much done--that's their own sad assessment--but they do raise

issues. On the other hand, those who work with line staff in criminal justice report success in dealing with crime. Finally, it is the local organization, not the city-wide one, that produces results and engages crimes.

These clues, a nerve born of failure, and imaginative community and police leadership is all we need to begin such a plan.

Certainly we have little to lose except our despair that we are losing the crime fight. For however much cities might differ, is there not considerable overlap in neighborhoods that make up black America?

MR. REISS: Thank you, Lloyd, for those very challenging thoughts. We turn now to the third panelist, Lawrence Sherman, and since we are pressed for time, I am not going to introduce Larry. He is at the University of Maryland in the Institute of Criminology and Criminal Justice, and has worked on police and many other programs. Larry?

MR. SHERMAN: Walk...your talk. That's what Martin Luther King used to say to his colleagues. "You've got to walk your talk." Put your plans into deeds. Make your dreams happen. There are people at meetings like this all over the country, talking about crime in their communities. Former President Jimmy Carter, who has been doing carpentry work for inner city housing renovations, recently spoke to a meeting like this at the Corporate Forum in New York. He concluded by saying, "to be blunt about it, I think that this group and others like you, can talk the rest of your lives and have a very intriguing exchange or dialogue among each other, and never do a darn thing about the problems that are discussed."

Our meeting is different...not just because it is convened by the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, the most prestigious scientific organization in the country, and not just because

it is sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, which, under Chips Stewart's leadership, has done a better job of putting research into action that any other government agency I know.

Our meeting is different because we can talk about almost two decades of research on communities and crime. We are lucky to have with us both the leading practitioners who tried to make things happen, and the leading researchers who tried to study the results.

What have we learned from all this research? The most important conclusion is that it is awfully damn hard to make things happen, to implement community programs against crime. That conclusion holds, regardless of whether you look at police departments, community groups or other government agencies.

More specifically, the findings uniformly show that the communities with the worst crime problems are the most difficult to help--the hardest places to implement almost any kind of community anti-crime program. The places where community oriented police, going door to door get the doors slammed in their faces.

The places where community organizers cannot find a single resident willing to host a block club meeting, or even help arrange one. The places where teenagers shoot each other for their boom boxes or jackets. The places where drug use, child abuse, teenage pregnancy and single parent households are widespread.

Perhaps these findings should have been obvious. But many of the community crime prevention and community policing programs proposed in the 1970's seem to ignore this reality. They drew instead on a romanticized nostalgic concept of "community" that no longer exists.

Maybe you can get Ozzie and Harriet in their "Our Town" neighborhood to go to crime prevention block club meetings, but that's not

where the major crime problems are. Nor are we likely, even with the most inspired leadership, to create Ozzie and Harriet families in our most troubled communities.

There are two possible responses to this problem. One is to write off the worst neighborhoods and to concentrate our efforts on the middle class. Many programs, in fact, have done just that. This may not be a bad idea, since middle class flight to the suburbs--both black and white--can only make things worse for the underclass communities. It would surely be a mistake to ignore middle class concerns about crime, to focus exclusively on the highest crime areas. But it would be an even worse mistake to write off the very poor, just because they don't qualify for our standard of community participation and spirit--or just because they don't like to go to meetings. Nor is it necessary since there is another approach we can try. We can split the atom. We can stop talking about neighborhoods that don't even exist in any traditional sense, and start dealing with specific places with identifiable ownership and control.

We can try to make things happen one place at a time. Rather than taking on the whole neighborhood or even a single block front, we can focus on those specific places where crime is concentrated, the "hot spots" of crime. We may even find that there is no such thing as a "dangerous neighborhood." We may find instead that there are only dangerous places.

Consider these statistics from the Crime Control Institute's research in Minneapolis, which was supported by the National Institute of Justice: fifty percent of all calls to the police over the course of a year came from only three percent of all street addresses and intersections; one hundred percent of all robbery calls were reported at

only two percent of all places; one hundred percent of all rape calls were reported at only one percent of all places; One hundred thirteen places had five or more robberies; twelve places had five or more rapes; combining rape, robbery and auto theft, 100 percent of those crimes occur at only five percent of all places--ninety five percent of the places in the city were free of those crimes. While it is true that such crimes are so rare in relation to the number of addresses that at only four percent of the addresses would have such an offense reported, the concentration is far greater than could be expected by chance. Even in the highest crime neighborhoods, we estimate that 73 percent of the places were free of those crimes over an entire year.

What kind of places are these "hot spots" of predatory crime? As table four in my briefing book shows you they are mostly public places. With the exception of a few high rise apartments, they are not the residences to which so much community crime prevention effort has been devoted.

But they are the bars, the 7-11's, street corners and parks where local residents are most likely to be victimized by violent stranger crime.

With the major exceptions of burglary and domestic violence, we may do better to focus our resources away from residences and in to community gathering places for commerce and entertainment. But what does that mean?

Sergeant David Niebur of the Minneapolis Police commands the RECAP unit. RECAP stands for Repeat Call Address Policing. He can and will tell you what it means to focus on the hot spots of crime, both public and residential. For the past year, his unit of five officers has been doing for places the same things community organizers have been talking about

for communities for the past 20 years. They have been organizing every available resource to solve the problems generating the greatest concentrations of calls at 250 of the most active hot spots in the city.

They have, for example, worked to revoke the liquor license of two of the most violent bars in the city. We recently calculated that the more violent of the two had over 100 violent crime calls in one year, and a nightly patron would have a one out of four chance of being assaulted or robbed. Sgt. Niebur's investigation showed that waitresses were serving drinks with cocaine on the side, and the bartenders were acting more like pharmacists.

The RECAP unit has struggled with the public housing authority, vainly trying to get them to stop their volatile mixing of elderly residents with young, mentally handicapped persons whose major handicap is an inability to behave civilly.

RECAP has had more successes with private landlords. Some of them have cooperated voluntarily, while others have had to be threatened with a loss of their business license. Many have corrected their housing code violations, and used evictions to enforce reasonable tenant conduct.

The Minneapolis effort has also shown how to use mental health resources to cope with community problems. One troublesome street person responsible for many crimes, known locally as the "Birdman," was committed to a state mental institution at the request of the police--the first time police had used such initiative in anyone's memory. And in a new experiment in Minneapolis, just funded by NIJ, the police will concentrate patrol resources at some of the most active "hot spots" of both hard and soft crime. By comparing crime rates in places with intensive patrol to crime rates in hot spots without intensive patrol, we hope to extend the

Kansas City preventive patrol experiment, and learn more about the deterrent effects of visible police presence.

Now, some of you may object. These strategies, you say, will do nothing more than push crime around, displacing it from one location to another. That remains to be seen. But if you agree that crime cannot happen without suitable opportunities, then every effort to eliminate some of these opportunities may help to reduce the total volume of crime.

The more basic problem is how to reduce those opportunities--how to organize the resources needed to change the activities producing crime at those hot spots. New York City has a program under a special statute called "Operation Padlock" which gives police broad powers to close down crime plagued establishments.

Gainesville, Florida, has a new ordinance, requiring late night convenience stores to employ at least two clerks, in the belief that the stores will be less likely to be robbed than if one clerk is on duty alone.

Minneapolis is developing a program (CNAP: coordinated neighborhood action program) for coordinating every city agency that deals with problem addresses, including the health department, fire department, building inspectors, and others. But in the absence of such innovative statutes how can we make things happen? How can we walk our talk, place by place, hot spot by hot spot, to reduce predatory crime? And how can we maintain the things we begin, even after the honeymoon excitement is over?

We can start with the premise that leadership lies in our actions and not in our job titles. Sgt. Niebur is living proof that much to Chief Tony Bouza's delight, you don't have to be Chief of Police to exercise leadership in a police department. Some of our most knowledgeable and



effective leadership in community problem-solving can--and must--come from people who are neither elected nor appointed as top executives--but people who know how to get things done.

A second point is that you should be prepared for confrontation and resistance within bureaucracies. The biggest obstacle to closing the violent bar in Minneapolis, for example, was the objection of the narcotics and licensing units that the bar was their turf and that they were dealing with the problem. Housing authorities generally feel tied by federal regulations and unable to make changes in their tenant mix policies. Building inspectors say their work load is too heavy, and middle managers in large corporations keep passing the buck. They may not even return your phone calls.

The third point is that the press is the most powerful tool for mobilizing any recalcitrant organization. Once you do your homework to document a major crime problem in a specific place, the local press will find it newsworthy--and any organization you can blame for inaction will at least start to return your phone calls.

But even if we attack crime place by place, and even if we use the most sophisticated leadership possible, it will still be awfully hard to make things happen. We should be prepared for this, and try for small victories--little successes that we can point to for the inspiration to keep us going. Just as the civil rights movement gradually destroyed legalized race discrimination, just as medical research slowly discovered new ways to prevent disease, we can continue to test new approaches to reduce certain kinds of crime in certain kinds of places, even in the most troubled communities. Each new triumph at each new place can help us to maintain everyone's effort.

No one expects us to solve these problems overnight. The 1960's are long gone, and we no longer expect the Age of Aquarius to arrive any day now. But that should merely strengthen our resolve to tackle crime in our communities, just as I hope this conference will. We have got two days to talk, perhaps we can learn better how to walk. Thank you.

(APPLAUSE)

MR. REISS: Thank you very much, Larry. We will take 15 minutes for our break.

(WHEREUPON THE SESSION WAS ADJOURNED)

CRIME CONTROL AND THE COMMUNITY  
(BREAK-OUT SESSIONS)

Group 1: Community-oriented Policing and Crime Control

Moderator - George Kelling

Presenters

Chief Cornelius Behan  
Mary Ann Wycoff

MR. KELLING: My name is George Kelling and I have been asked to moderate this session, and you all know each other already, and we know each other, but maybe we could just quickly go around the room and identify who we are by name so that we will have a little sense of familiarity. At least, maybe I can start and we can go to my right. My name is George Kelling and I am from Northeastern University and Harvard University.

MR. BEHAN: Neal Behan, Baltimore County Police Department and the president of PERF.

MR. DOBROTKA: David Dobrotka, Minneapolis Police Department.

MS. BOMAR: Barbara Bomar, National Crime Prevention Institute.

MS. HART: Suzanne Hart, Crime Commission of the city of St. Louis.

MS. MOWERY: Susan Mowery, Newport News Police Department.

MR. HOETMER: Gerry Hoetmer, ICMA.

MR. BRADSHAW: Bob Bradshaw, Reno, Nevada, Police Department.

MR. WEAVER: Pete Weaver, Minneapolis Police Department.

MR. WADMAN: Bob Wadman, Omaha, Nebraska, Police Department.

MR. KOBY: Tom Koby, Houston Police Department.

MR. HOWARD: I am Mark Howard with the Seattle Community Crime Prevention Program.

MS. CANTRELL: I am Betsy Cantrell with the National Sheriffs Association.

MR. FLAHERTY: Mike Flaherty, Prince Georges County, Maryland.

MS. STOREY: Kay Storey with the Whittier program in Minneapolis.

MR. SULLIVAN: I am Mercer Sullivan from the Vera Institute of Justice in new York City.

MS. COHEN: Jacqueline Cohen, Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh.

MS. MOCK: Lois Mock from the National Institute of Justice.

MR. KLEIN: Sid Klein, Chief of Police, Clearwater, Florida.

MR. KELLING: Those of you that came in?

MR. BRADFORD-EL: Darnell Bradford-El, Around the Corner to the World.

MR. KINLOW: Benjamin Kinlow, Seattle Police Department.

MS. JONES: Marisa Jones, Neighborhood Community Liaison.

MR. PALUMBO: Frank Palumbo, Clearwater Police Department.

MR. STEPHENS: Darrel Stephens, Police Executive Research Forum.

MS. JERGENS: Felice Jergens, Citizens Committee, Neighborhood Crime Center.

MR. KELLING: Has everyone introduced themselves?

MS. WYCOFF: I have not. I am Mary Ann Wycoff of the Police Foundation.

MR. KELLING: One matter of convenience for the recorder. When you have comments or ask a question, if you would begin by introducing

yourself again to the machine at least so that proper transcript can be kept of the proceedings. I thought we would proceed much as we did with the first presentation. Rather than deliver separate presentations, I began by defining community policing. Neal and Mary Ann commented on that definition, and then we proceeded through the questions that were listed in the discussion guide.

I encourage you, if there is something that is of particular interest during the discussion to comment, ask a question. You can feel free to cheer and applaud if you like, or if you want to boo and carry on in some other fashion, that is all right as well. I will try to keep us to the list of questions, but, as during the first presentation, as the discussion got going, we departed from it. However, I felt it was not inappropriate to say we had not gotten to a particular question so let us hold questions now and proceed on. If that is all right with the group, if that same method of proceeding is all right with the group, I will begin then with a brief definition, no more than four or five minutes of what community policing is so at least you understand what my point of view which is, I think, largely shared by my two colleagues and so you know where essentially we are coming from to use a 1960's expression.

First of all, what it is not. Community policing is not community relations. Community relations was a development during the 1960's and from my point of view, essentially assumed that what the police was doing was right and the task of community relations officers was to go out and spread the good news about police work, and essentially to stroke citizens and say, even though you may not like some of the things that we are doing, in the long haul it is in your best interest. For the most part,

the information that community relations officers got was not processed in the police department for any major decision making. It was traditional with the command and control organization, and it communicated information, it communicated down and did not listen terribly well to the message.

Not only that. These community relation officers were rarely able to make any decision about anything, and were the subject of some ridicule in police departments. In Kansas City, community relations officers would have been referred to as the empty holster crowd but that does not mean that there is not some derision at the present time of officers involved in community policing as well.

Secondly, community policing is not a program to be inserted inside of police departments as I use the phrase, but community policing essentially redefines the business that policing is in, and I want to talk about the elements of the strategy that is different than traditional policing. I would find those differences in seven categories.

First of all, the authorization for policing, that is, traditional policing, authorization primarily came from the criminal law and the professional wisdom of police. In community policing, the emphasis is on authorization from the community--that is, if police are to successfully work in a community, they must be authorized by that community to do the things that they do. That reintroduces into policing a legitimate form, I think, of political influence. Not corrupt political influence, but the will of the people, expressed through politics and through community organizations, etc., as a legitimate authorization for police and not a form of authorization to be rejected and scorned.

Secondly, the primary emphasis at least in terms of the function of policing in the traditional model was primarily defined as crime control. That did not mean that police did not do other things, but crime control was what was held up as the central mission of police and all other activities were seen as of at least second rate and there was a saying during the 1950's, 1960's, if only we did not have all the social work to do, we could really get down to the business of real policing. Policing was law enforcement. It was not policing, it was not municipal policing, it was law enforcement.

The function of community policing is far broader, a focus on improving the quality of urban life, reducing fear and other kinds of emphases. In terms of the organizational structure, traditional policing was organized along the lines of quasi-military command and control organization that we are all familiar with and that is orders go down, some information flows up, a very steep bureaucracy. The tooth-to-tail ratio is biased in favor of the tail rather than the teeth, many of layers of management. The organization for community policing emphasizes decentralization, so that decision making can be made closest to where the problems are identified rather than by those that have traditionally been viewed as having the best ideas and, as you know, the chief would have the best ideas and then on down the line with the patrol officer, of course, having the worst ideas, the second worst by the sergeants, etc.

In terms of the environment, the relationship with the police, the police relationship to the environment in traditional policing was remote. The emphasis was on professional distance. The caricature of that, of course, was Sergeant Friday--just the facts, ma'am, just the

facts--and to stand at a distance from the community and not be involved in the community. In community policing the emphasis is on intimate relationship with the community. The police get involved with the community and are a part of the community.

In terms of demand, traditional policing emphasized the control of demand through the telephone, and that demand was centrally controlled. People did not go to their local police officer, even their district station, to talk about the problems that they were having. In fact, in Boston when they put in 911, they changed all the telephone numbers in the district stations so people would stop calling the district stations. The focus on demand in community policing is it still uses 911 but 911 becomes much more a vehicle along the lines that Larry was talking about, for identifying demand in terms of problems rather than incidents. It is hot spots as a delineation of chronic problems rather than isolated incidents, but also that police officers go to the community and listen to the community and ask what are the problems out here and so there are additional sources of demand.

Tactics. The traditional tactics focus on blanketing the community with police, equitably across communities, preventive control, rapid response to calls for service. It was a monolithic approach through omnipresence and rapid response. The tactics in community policing emphasize a variety of different tactics depending on the nature of the problem, problem solving, foot patrol, preventive patrol along the areas of Larry's hot spots and those kinds of things.

Finally, those things which you ask the police department to measure, the success of a police department was in terms of crime, as



indicated by the Uniform Crime Reports. The success of community policing is generally viewed as the quality of life, reduction of fear, citizen satisfaction with the police. These, then, are what I would view as the contrasting organizational strategies of traditional and now community policing.

Neal, do you want to make some introductory comments?

MR. BEHAN: Okay, briefly. The definition of community policing is not clear. It is open to debate. It means different things to different people. George captured it rather well. We see it as a philosophy rather than a process and I say that because most of us in police work, and certainly in government and most bureaucracies, deal with process. That is how we get things done. There are rules, regulations, we abide by them, and we are very efficient. What I am saying is that community policing is above that. It is a philosophy that the police can make a difference in what happens in their community.

It also has to be coupled with a strong desire to, as George mentioned, improve the quality of life in a county or in an area, and a belief that you can do that, a real belief. I cited to the other group, when Tony Bouza and I, who is now the Chief in Minneapolis, worked together in New York City. We were captains together and we were very new at what we did. We looked over our particular geographical areas, and saw dirt in the streets and lots that were unkept and overgrown and many things were not happening that were really not police jobs. We said to ourselves, well, if no one else is doing it, whose job is it? We concluded that it was ours, not that we would actually take the broom and sweep it up, but it was our job to make a difference.

I remember when Tony tried to clean up a dirty stream in the Bronx, he made the front pages of most of the papers because that was insane for a police captain or a police commander to do that. In Brooklyn South, I tried to cement relations and find new ways of enforcing the law and working with Hassidic Jews, who have a whole different philosophy about how police should work, in trying to accommodate their needs.

You also have to believe that policing is important. Police in our society are an integral part of why a free society works. It is not an add-on, it is not something you put in casually. It is an integral part of the success of our democracy. You must believe it. If that is so, and if it is important to maintain freedom, then we have an obligation to work toward improving the quality of life. We have to rethink what we do, and we have to think about decentralizing what we do as police. Community policing means getting the power down to the lowest level.

The last thing I want to mention is that community policing is doing what the public wants. In police work we often talk about we and they. It is them against us kind of thing. Well, what we are saying now in community policing is this: what they want is important and that is what we will try to do. Roughly that is what I would add to your definition.

MR. KELLING: Mary Ann?

MS. WYCOFF: A few months ago I went to another conference on community oriented policing. The title of the conference was "Community Oriented Policing: Rhetoric or Reality?" At that meeting many participants asked, "What is this mushy thing? Is there anything coherent that we are talking about here? Several of the academics present felt

there was not a coherent concept we were attempting to deal with. Other people pointed out that we did not have very much yet that we could say about the effectiveness of community policing because no one had been able to clearly define the concept or specify measures of it. If we could never measure it, how would we ever know what it was we were dealing with and whether it worked?

Now, it may be that the audience is different for this particular meeting. I think more than that, though, we have come a long way conceptually in a short period of time--a very short period of time--to the understanding and the acceptance of the fact that while community policing is still more a philosophic statement than a guide to practice, it is a philosophy that better aligns policing with the reality of what police always have been doing. I do not think the function of policing is changing so much as the image of policing is changing. I think it is a healthy change because it reasserts and it places value on core aspects of the police role. If you look at all the studies of calls for service that have ever been done in this country, the vast majority of the things that citizens call police about have nothing to do with crime. Police have been frustrated all along at not being able to do better the things that citizens have always asked them to do.

So, I think what we have here is a development that brings rhetoric in line with reality in trying to provide a much better way for police to do what they have always been asked to do. I think it is the strength of community oriented policing as a concept that it can mean a lot of things to a lot of people because the kinds of communities police are working in are different, the kinds of problems they are asked to deal with are

different, and the strategies they will need to implement within the philosophic guidance of community oriented policing will and should differ. The challenge to researchers is to understand that we are not out there to evaluate the philosophy or the rhetoric but to evaluate these specific strategies and to articulate to the practitioner what the strategies are, in what contexts the strategies are developed, in response to which problems.

We spun wheels and wasted vast amount of resources about ten years ago in trying to evaluate the "crime effectiveness" of police. We would do studies looking at the differences across departments in terms of the amount of the budget allocated to "crime effectiveness." We never defined what it was police were actually trying to do when being crime effective, and we did not evaluate the impact of specific crime effectiveness strategies. I think we have learned from that unfortunate experience.

As we start to evaluate community-oriented policing, we know much better that our job is to identify what the strategy is, in response to what problem and to measure the impact of a specific strategy on the targeted outcome. I hope we will meet our mission in this.

MR. KELLING: Before we proceed on, any quick questions, comments, boos, hurrahs? If you cheer, give us your name though.

MS. WYCOFF: Address, phone number.

MR. KELLING: Neal? How can community policing be more effective in reducing crime and disorder than traditional policing?

MR. BEHAN: The difficulty I have with that question is that reducing crime is only a small portion of what we engage in. Police work today in my area is 70 percent non-crime and 30 percent criminal. In the

larger cities, I think it is even larger non-criminal. So it is hard to focus on that, but actually when you talk about community policing, you are talking about a number of things that we are familiar with--Neighborhood Watch, crime prevention, differential police response, a whole host of things, and by letting our imaginations run over the gamut of what is possible, we look at crime quite differently.

The secret is getting behind the symptom and back down to the cause, not concentrating on the call that we are responding to but why were we called. What is behind it? If we are having a series of burglaries, what is behind the burglaries? Is it kids in the neighborhood? Is it lack of security on the part of the public? Are they inviting it? Are there more burglaries at tax time than there are at non-tax time? There is just a whole host of things to look at.

Specifically, now we have a rash of burglaries in rectories and convents in our area, both in the city and in the county, and we are asking ourselves, does the Archbishop have a role to play in it? Does he have something he should be doing within the church to help them bolster their resistance to these burglaries? How about the priests and the nuns? What are their obligations to protect themselves and how can we help them get to that if we can convince them that there is a relationship?

So it is just, when you talk about community policing and crime, it is open to the wildest kind and the widest kind of imaginations that we can put together in order to try to take a particular project in tow.

MR. KELLING: Mary Ann?

MS. WYCOFF: That is certainly the case, and while the people I

know whose organizations I am familiar with who are focusing on community oriented policing are talking in terms, very broad terms, of improving the quality of life for their communities to encompass the whole range of issues to which Neal alluded, I think we can also talk about some rather crime specific effects of community oriented policing programs.

Just to give you some examples, a project I am familiar with was the Houston fear reduction studies. Our objective was to look not at crime reduction specifically, but to look at fear reduction which we did with surveys in the community. We also talked to the officers about what was going on in the field and what they felt they got out of these strategies and just documenting what was happening in the course of them. One of the things that happened during this project in a storefront strategy in Houston was that they started--amazingly clever, creative people--began to conduct all kinds of community activities, one of which now is an annual, incredibly big Halloween party that takes place at the community station.

The first year that happened, just a few months into the development of this community station, one of the kids at the party, finding an officer accessible and friendly and willing to play with the kids, came over and tugged on the officer's coat. He said, "can we talk? I have something to tell you." So they walk off, and the kid tells him about a warehouse in the neighborhood that contains about \$10,000 worth of stolen property and then they began to work back from that and so undoubtedly in that way had a major impact on crime in the neighborhood. They can tell you about the number of instances in which citizens have come to them with similar kinds of information or have been made aware

through community meetings of a patterns of crimes happening and then began to watch specifically for the elements that the police described to them and were able to call and say, "Hey, you know that pick-up that you said you thought you wanted? I just saw it over on this street." And that led to an arrest.

In the case of the door-to-door strategy, this was a strategy in which the officers were doing something quite simple. Literally, going door to door in the neighborhood, introducing themselves, saying, "I work here, just want to get acquainted. Anything you want to tell us about, that you think we ought to know about what is going on in this neighborhood?" Very simple, with no emphasis on "Tell us about the crime, tell us who the bad guys are."

At the end of this strategy, when I was interviewing an officer, he said, "Well, I will tell you what I got out of that. I got me 83 good informants." And he began to talk about the number of citizens who call him directly and are willing to give information. They did not know who to give it to before or whether it was appropriate information. They felt awkward about it. They are not awkward now because they know this officer. So those kinds of things can happen in addition to opportunities to help citizens learn how to be better self-protectors in terms of avoiding criminal kinds of environments. That may just be checking their garage doors or reminding them that they are open, reminding them to lock their windows, whatever, those kinds of things.

In addition, what we have also seen is the involvement of police in community-oriented strategies can give citizens confidence to come back and take over areas that they may have physically abandoned and in

abandoning them, given them over to rowdier or criminal elements. In a park in Houston, which the good people had essentially left, the officers moved back in and began to organize occasional athletic activities with the community, making it known that they were simply walking the park occasionally, and they did see the ordinary citizens who used to use that park come back and use it again.

An unobtrusive measure of the effectiveness of that was that the soft drink distributor who had months before moved the soft drink machine from the park because it was vandalized so frequently, brought it back because this was now a revived area. So those are all crime specific things that I think it is appropriate to talk about.

MR. KELLING: Question? Yes, ma'am.

MS. COHEN: Jacqueline Cohen, Carnegie Mellon University. All of you have talked about community oriented policing as a philosophy and not a strategy or a program or a process. But it seems to me that there are enormous organizational and structural changes that have to go on within a police department in the way the policeman on the street gets to do his job and is allowed to do his job, that would allow community policing to go on and it is not just a philosophy. There are all sorts of structural changes that have to happen in order for the policeman on the streets to be able to do policing differently.

MR. BEHAN: Yes, I misled you if I made you believe that philosophy is the beginning and the end of it. Once the philosophy is ingrained, a lot has to take place in order to bring it about. It requires retraining of the basic police officer. You have to take what you did in the academy and undo it and then redo it again because we taught them to respond to



911 and to get the job done. Now we are talking about problem solving. Now we are talking about a new approach, so that had to be done.

You also have to train your executives. In our case, we brought in Herman Goldstein from the University of Wisconsin and he taught every executive on problem solving and community policing in weekend retreats. Then you had to reinforce it over and over again, and then you have to give them the opportunity to perform and fail and then pick them up again. We created a survey instrument that Mary Ann talked about that they used in Houston. Well, we did it and we let our rookie policemen test the survey instrument by going out into hundreds of homes and trying it out. They got familiar with it and then we had police officers go in with that, and then they had to overcome getting the door slammed in their face. "Why did you bother me?" Whack. Well, cops do not like to have that happen to them. The tendency was "Well, I do not want to go back and do it again." So you had to go back with more training and more encouragement. You had to get them to back into it.

Yes, a lot has to happen and it will not happen instantly. It will take a lot of time. The police will resist this tremendously. They consider, this is not cop work. They want to put the lights and siren on and go and get that robber and all those wonderful things and this is less than that and it only happens after a considerable amount of reinforcement.

MR. KELLING: More than that.

MR. BEHAN: Thank you, and it is considerably more than that. It is good to be working with a professor, he always corrects you on the spot.

There are just so many, many things that have to go into it, and I am sorry if I misled you to think it was easy. It is not.

MR. KELLING: Mary Ann, do you want to comment on that?

MS. WYCOFF: Just to follow up on that, George made the point in opening that this is not a program that gets inserted into the business's usual organization. We have a long history of watching those things happen and disappear. One of the things we are seeing happen in organizations that truly seem to mean it for the long run is a great deal of the kind of organizational preparation that Neal was talking about.

We are working right now with two departments, Madison and Houston, where an enormous amount of organizational preparation has gone over a long period of time in terms of recruiting personnel, training personnel, promoting people, relocating them so you have the right people with the right attitudes in the right place to start implementing this kind of program. Bringing to the fore officers who want to get involved in it, letting them be leaders for the organization. Both departments committed to decentralizing both the physical as well as decision making elements of the organization--all very important elements of bringing this about. One the most important elements in terms of the organization's readiness is something we are starting to see happen in police departments around the country. Bob Wadman in Omaha has a mission statement for the organization. Both Madison and Houston have developed mission statements. The role of leadership in these kinds of programs is to make very clear what the rhetoric, the philosophy, the mission of the organization is, and to keep giving that message out again and again and again, to bring in new people under that message so they know from day

one, this is what their police life is going to be about.

The other job of management and leadership is to get the whole organization to sit down together and work as a whole to say, "Okay, how is my piece of it facilitating or hindering this mission? How do we have to make changes here to facilitate changes here?"

The problem with so many of the programs initially was you put in a separate program, a separate unit or whatever, and it spent all of its energies fighting the rest of the organization which was all still oriented toward this other goal. In Houston, Lee Brown, in getting ready for the neighborhood oriented policing that they are implementing there and in the west side station, had a series of meetings called executive sessions. It sounds like you bring together all the brass in the organization, but in fact over a period of six sessions, there were 30 people who came together representing every rank in equal proportion and every different major bureau in the organization. And they kept coming back and coming back to the questions of what do we need to do here, what do you have to give? What do you have to change? How does that affect you? What do you have to do? So that the whole organization was coming along together in terms of its thinking and its grappling with these kinds of problems. That kind of organizational preparedness, preparation, I think lays the ground work for the survival of that program better than I have seen anywhere else.

So, yes, all of those things are there when it comes time to operationalize that philosophy.

MR. KELLING: Neal wanted to have another comment.

MR. BEHAN: I just want to say you are so right. Mary Ann

mentioned quickly a decentralization. If this is to work, the organization has to be truly decentralized in its use of power. The decision level must be put down as far as it can to the public or to the community in order to make it work. You cannot order it, you cannot say I am going to have it and then order from the top. It has to be worked all the way through the system. That takes time. In the larger organizations of this country that are just filled with all kinds of problems, of corruption and militant press, there is a tendency to control the power because you are trying to control these outcomes which are always hitting you in the back of the head out of nowhere. Community policing is very difficult in that environment. It has to be where you trust police officers, where you trust your system, where you believe that they will respond sensibly if given an opportunity to do so.

Added to that, in my view, you must involve police officers in decision making. They must be cranked in. With a unit I established before we started to spread into the department, that was built right into the process. You must sit down and brainstorm problem identification, problem analysis and then ultimately implementation strategies. And implementation will have to be developed with the police officers involved and not by any brass or by any planning unit or anything else. I think that is essential to community policing.

There were two areas that I think--as we look back at the history of policing--that created quite a constant challenge for the practitioners, the leadership. One of them is this fear of corruption. We get these police officers so close to the community that corruption becomes a serious issue. You see back in municipal police administration,

looking at the organization of narcotic and vice-related activities, these should be right under the police chief, and the early texts indicating the worry that those kinds of close community interactions raise. Informant development, and all the regulations that we put on that. Police corruption.

The other side of the coin is the term Police Review Board--the rattlesnake thrown on the table that causes every police organization to jump to the walls and throw up all the defenses. Police Review Board. Within my own shop I hear "Well, this Neighborhood Watch, this is just a Police Review Board developing in another form."

I mean, there is always that constant concern that the Police Review Board is this flame that we are going to have to dance with and surely get burned. I think that they are not issues that are going to resolve themselves, but they are issues that I think if looked at realistically in the bright light of day are not--we need to put them aside. They are not issues any more. We need to go forward with it.

MR. KELLING: Marisa?

MS. JONES: I just wanted to say, on the lighter side, with community policing comes creative problem solving. For example, in the Boston area, there was a particular street that had a problem with two juveniles and a strong amount of drug trafficking, drug dealing. The group tried to work with the police department as far as making some type of arrest, and unfortunately they could not do so. They met with the deputy of their particular district and informed them of the problem, how they went to the parents of these two juveniles. What the group came up with was a letter that will go to every resident on the street, stating

that we understand that there is a strong amount of drug trafficking coming from this particular street, and we are going to be looking for that.

What had happened is that after the letter went out, after a couple of days, the drug traffic automatically stopped. So it is a point to consider, that the community now can work with the police department on a stronger basis.

MS. WYCOFF: Wait, it did not automatically stop. What was the dynamic involved?

MS. JONES: Well, I think the thing is, I am sorry, I should not have used that term. It moved, but the problem was, the situation was that it did move off of the street and the situation also was that the juveniles that were involved in this drug trafficking got the message that the police department was looking at this particular street and that the neighborhood was watching as well.

MS. WYCOFF: That is what I was wondering if you were going to say. Because you know, there have been all kinds of programs where police have moved in very proactively and been very visible in areas where they knew there was a lot of traffic on the street. But the dealers knew that all they had to do was move back in the shadows for a few minutes and come back out again because the cops were going to go around the corner and be gone but the citizens stay and I hope that is what it is.

MS. JONES: Exactly.

MS. WYCOFF: Since now they know the neighborhood is watching them too.

MS. JONES: Exactly. But I think it was the factor, too, that the

neighborhood worked with the police department to come up with the creative solution to get this problem off of their street. They felt that the police department was accessible to the needs that they had.

MS. WYCOFF: Then did they go tell the people on the next street how to do it?

MS. JONES: Unfortunately, what had happened is it was these two juveniles that were just dealing with this drug trafficking and it did stop after the letter went out. It did stop on the street.

MR. KELLING: I must encourage you again to use your names. I am sorry, I am not meeting my responsibilities. In the corner.

MS. JERGENS: Felice Jergens, New York City. Part of our anti-crime program is I am a trainer, an instructor as a citizen for the New York City Police Department in their Community Control program. I am the only person who conducts community training. I have gone to all 50 precincts that have the community program, CCOP we call it, Community Control Officer Program and I do all day classes. I do about 10 to 15 hours of classroom instructional interactive training in working with community. I just want to pick up on what the woman from Boston said and throw this back to you as panelists who look at the national experience, and for anyone considering the program.

The program has been enormously popular in New York City, probably the most politically popular program ever instituted by the police department. Our private agency did a survey of 450 organized community groups that had this program in their neighborhood. It was an anonymous survey on what they thought. They loved it, but, here is the but. Beside those things we have said which I think are so important, the structural

questions from the police department side, the commitment they make, how they set themselves up, etc., from the community side there was one area where all the surveys indicated a potential for growth that you could build into the program from Jump Street. That is to figure out how to systematically promote this problem solving, this creative problem solving, this working with the community to do strategic planning.

The officers that do community policing come out of the same police force under the same commanders, the same bureaucracy that they have always worked under. There is no inherent, magical thing that is going to make them approach their job any differently unless there is some training and some systematic reinforcement. I think the community needs training when this program is set up, they need personnel who go and talk about what are realistic expectations, how to work with this new unit. They need people out there as trouble shooters to promote better dynamics in the program, to push for a problem-solving orientation, and within the department, the personnel need training in that area of work. Otherwise, I think that the success story that was just told is very rare. In New York now there are about 750 officers. I am concerned that the program should not water down into the empty-holster, grin-and-wave squad. That is another thing that these kind of programs get called.

In the housing authority they have had sort of a community oriented police concept for 20 years. There is one thing worth noting about it in New York City. I have to research and check if this is true. I was told by the head of tenant relations in the housing authority in New York City, they do not have one reported incident of a police brutality case or bias incident by a police officer against a resident in the housing authority.



That is a phenomenal outcome in 20 years, and I am sure everybody is dealing with that problem in their area. It is very big in New York.

I think there is a lot of potential, but without the training and reward system, and to work with community, I do not think the program lives up to its potential. I think it does become something that is good because the officer is out on the street. It breaks down the alienation and distance but the thinking and the problem solving does not happen naturally.

MR. KELLING: Mary Ann wants to comment, but first of all this gentleman. But something about a group process just happened that is very interesting. You notice Jacqueline asked the second question, how do we implement community policing, and now the next question is, once you implement it, how do you maintain it and how do you strengthen it so you are leading us. You do not need a moderator at all. The group is just naturally taking it through a cycle. Mark and then Mary Ann.

MR. HOWARD: Mark Howard of Seattle. I guess it is two questions. One of them, what kind of acceptance has been seen with community policing around the country, and the second one is what reluctance, what is the major reluctance from being accepted all over?

MR. KELLING: Mary Ann, do you want to respond and then add on what you wanted to add and then we will go to Neal with the next response?

MS. WYCOFF: Well, in terms of, when you talk about acceptance, are you talking about in policing generally or within an organization that starts to get into it?

MR. HOWARD: Policing in general.

MS. WYCOFF: Policing in general is. I think we are seeing a very

rapidly increasing interest in this concept, and it is not a new concept as you are well aware. This is very much the kind of thing that the Presidential Commission reports were pushing hard 20 years ago and so I am very fascinated and the question of why are so many people interested in it now.

Part of it is, as John and Bill point out, in the problem oriented report is that we have got a history now of looking at a lot of things that do not work very well. We have got the evidence that some of the things that were sort of precious tenets in the field really, tenets do not really work like we thought they did. I also think we have got coming to the fore now, a group of police leaders who cut their young teeth on the Presidential Commission reports, leafed through those ideas or were interested in those ideas 20 years ago. They are now in positions of leadership where they can start doing something about it, and so as these people come in to leadership in the organizations, they are getting very interested in these ideas.

We have got great enthusiasm. The Police Foundation used to, as Alan, George and others know, a few years ago, go out and bang on locked doors of police departments and say, if we give you \$4 million will you please let us come in and do research? Last year, we had four different police organizations come to us saying they wanted research done on this concept, would we please come do it. For me that is an enormous sign of interest in the concept. So I really think it is there. I think one of the things you want to look at and probably we do not want to spend a lot of time on it now is how it is you develop enthusiasm and interest within the organization. How do you sell it once you get it going. I would just

like to throw out something we have seen succeed in three or four departments now and that is the people who do it and do it well and like it become the spokespeople to the rest of the organization.

Again, to hark back to the executive sessions in Houston. Lee Brown took the patrol officers who had been very effective in the fear reduction projects and some other projects they had implemented there, and let them talk to the rest of the department about it. Managers can kind of buy it in their head, but they have not done it and they cannot sell it well because they have not done it. It is in their head but it is not their heart, but you take the cops who have done it and have it in their heart and they are the spokespeople.

But I think what keeps it in their heart goes back to the question you were raising about how it is you reward and reinforce these kinds of behaviors. The Santa Ana Police Department has been long known for promoting the philosophy of community-oriented policing, and they recently went on a retreat with some of their people who are committed to it, who have been trying to do it. When they were willing to get out in the woods and really talk about things, they were saying to their managers, "Damn it, you say this is what you want us to do. We are trying, but what you keep measuring in terms of our performance is the same old stuff over and over again. If this is what you want us to do, how come you do not reward us for doing it?"

And from my standpoint, one of the brightest things on the horizon is the project NIJ has just funded with Houston and Houston's commitment is to develop performance measures that fit what it is they are asking community or Houston neighborhood oriented officers to do. There is that

recognition that you have got to do it. I frankly think it is going to be one of the hardest things that anybody has tried to do, but I think there are a lot of departments around the country that have experience with this that Houston is going to be turning to, and I think when they pull together that collective experience about how you do this, I think we are going to see a real leap forward in that in the next couple of years.

MR. KELLING: Neal, to you want to respond?

MR. BEHAN: Just briefly, and we might want to talk about the question from New York about what do we do with the rest of the department. Mary Ann says the police are not changing, but you cannot tell the cop that. He thinks they are taking his life and twisting it inside out, and he is saying just the opposite. He is resisting it like crazy, the average police officer.

Elected officials, somewhat because political careers hang on what the public thinks and I am not sure it is acceptable. When they see the public reaction, this tremendous public positive reaction, the elected officials come on very quickly. The police do not. They do not come on very quickly. Largely, in my agency and in what was said here about New York, community-oriented policing works because we have a dedicated group working on it rather than the whole agency. The other cops think those who are working on it are doing less than the cop whose orientation is respond to the 911 tyranny, go to the call, and he wants plenty of back-up when he gets there, and he does not want to hear that anybody else is doing anything else but helping him on that call.

Community policing flies in the face of all that. It is an entirely different approach to how we are going to enforce the law from

now on, how we are going to deal with the public from now on. That police resistance internally has to be worked out, and can be worked out, but it takes time. It takes a tremendous amount of effort and a tremendous amount of time. Anyone starting this program, even if you start it department-wide, I would suspect, initially--and Darrel would be more knowledgeable than Mary Ann and I because I did not start that way, I am doing it now but I did not start that way--unless you start it department-wide, or even if you do start it department-wide, the cops are going to think this is kind of strange. This is not why I was hired. I want to put those lights on, I want to get that siren on, and I want to go. And to have someone say, "Wait a minute, there is something else you can do"--is kind of different so there is resistance, and it will continue for some time. But the program, community policing, is increasing all over this country. There is no question about it. Small departments--we do not even hear about--are trying it out in a variety of ways because it works.

MR. NIEBUR: David Niebur with Minneapolis Police. This morning Professor Street touched on it, and I would like to ask Chief Behan if he agreed with this because he was not in the room at the time because we have certainly found this in Minneapolis. In several aspects of the problems that we ran into in our retail project, the key to community policing, the key to getting a reinforcement process going and the key to maintaining all of these programs was with the middle managers, with the sergeants and the lieutenants. Because until we got their cooperation, we were going nowhere no matter how hard we try with the patrol forces. I do not think the top executive is the answer because we even tried that and

Tony Bouza is a very strong leader, but he was not the key in the particular issues and he would agree that that is the key, the middle managers.

MR. BEHAN: Middle managers are in a very difficult position in any agency, particularly police agencies. They are trying to respond to the people below them who are demanding of them many things, and to the people above them who are demanding things. They are in a crunch, and what they usually do is they hunker down, they go and hide, they try to be as invisible as possible because they do not want their careers jeopardized by any event in the agency that could possibly hurt them.

You are absolutely correct. You have to concentrate on these folks. You have got to get them out of their shells, you have to let them know that risk taking is not fatal, that risk taking will allow you to make a certain number of mistakes, understandably so, and then you pick those marbles up and you go and you play the game again. Leadership is essential at the top. You will never change your middle managers unless the top leadership will work hard with them, but you are right. You must get to them, and they in turn have to have the courage to go down and talk to their police officers, who they are trying to make happy with scheduling and making their lives tolerable on days off and giving them proper support and back-up. They have to go down and say, "Hey, guys, girls, we are going to do it differently from now on and that takes a lot of courage." So you are absolutely correct. That is a big problem.

MR. KELLING: Mary Ann --

MS. WYCOFF: I just wanted to follow up on the middle management thing. When you think about middle managers, you really need to think of

them as people who have really started to move and make a lot of progress in their careers. But they have made that progress on the basis of the old game and the old rules and so what is very hard for them is the rules that they were succeeding by and that have reinforced them for years are being changed. So it impacts on them much harder than it impacts on people at the bottom of the organization who had not already been getting lots of rewards under the old system. I think what we have seen happen in a few departments when, as Neal describes them, they hunker down--that is exactly the right phrase, you know, it is happening again and again--the chief, who is very committed to the vision and wanting to move, is suddenly very frustrated that these people are not coming with them so what he does is step over them and reach down to the bottom of the organization and abandons these people who then become less effective.

They do not sabotage the program, they become less effective as administrators. Then the rest of the department starts to feel that things are slipping and awash. They start feeling that the organization is out of control and they associate that sense of things being out of control with this new thing that they are trying to get us to do here, and so everything starts to move like Jello. You have got to keep those people comfortable doing their job and you have got to keep them on track and so you have got to sell them the vision and you have got to spend a lot of time with them, even though it is frustrating and you really feel if you jump them and go to the bottom, you can get this done now. You are right. They are absolutely critical and one of the things you do as a leader, if you have any latitude for giving highly visible rewards to managers doing that kind of thing is you do what Lee Brown did in Houston,

and you take a Captain Tom Koby who is doing a wonderful job of community-oriented policing and you make him an Assistant Chief and suddenly people say, aha, I see now how you succeed in this organization.

MR. KELLING: Let me exercise the prerogative of the chair. We will take two more comments now and then let us move on to the question of how do community oriented police relate in a different manner to community groups.

MR. KLEIN: Sid Klein, Clearwater Police Department. I would like to share with you my experience of what to do and what not to do. My agency, I think, has really become a living laboratory to test both of these concepts. We got into community policing perhaps back before there was such a term or before it was really popular, and I took the exact opposite approach of what Neal has very accurately described. I tried it or implemented it on a very compartmented, very small segment of the agency to deal with specific problems and specific neighborhoods. Although it was very successful within the neighborhoods, doing what it was designed to do, a tremendous amount of resentment arose throughout the rest of the department. We spent an inordinate amount of time in trying to convince the other segments of the department that it would work.

But a strange thing happened. Along came problem-oriented policing and, believe it or not, but we decided to go department-wide eventually with this concept. I think as a result of that experience, you cannot separate the two concepts of problem-oriented policing and community-oriented policing. The problem-oriented policing approach in many fashions can solve the departmental organizational problems of the implementation of community oriented policing and I learned it the hard way.



MS. WYCOFF: Because that does refocus officers.

MS. MOCK: Would one of you kind of give a definition of what the two of them are, and how they differ? I think maybe it is a problem. Sometimes they are used as synonyms for each other.

MR. KELLING: Let us go quickly, Neal. A quick definition of problem solving.

MS. MOCK: No, the difference between problem-oriented policing and community policing.

MR. BEHAN: Problem oriented policing? Earlier I said it is difficult. The way I see it is that community policing is the larger term for all that we can fit under it that deals with the community to help them resolve their problems. Problem-oriented, problem solving is a part of that. In other words, there is a portion of the kinds of things you can do to help a community.

MS. WYCOFF: What is the goal of the others, the methodology?

MR. KELLING: I would put it, when I begin, I would call problem solving a tactic, and community policing a total organizational strategy. I think you can have the tactic without the organizational strategy. That organizational strategy I do not think you can have without the problem solving tactic.

MR. LINSTER: Dick Linster, NIJ. Let me speak as one who knows much of the rhetoric and almost none of the reality of all of this, and as a civilian. My view of the thing is that what the civilians expect of the police does not change. The strategic goal has not changed, and that is crime control. That is the prime thing. You can spend 90 percent of your

time doing something else, but if you have got a crime problem in your city, or if you are a victim, you expect the police to do something. I do not believe the strategic goals are changed. I think that community oriented policing or problem solving is a tactical approach. I think, though, the approach has to be evaluated in terms of your crime. By the year 2000 we will go on to something else.

MR. KELLING: Let me respond to Dick on this. I think that in a sense you are right, in that crime will continue to play a central role. Yet, my own experience is that when you go to community crime control groups--and you start dealing with community because where there are crime control groups or whatever, the experience and captains will tell you this. The people who went out, they go to printouts about the problems of crime and citizens say, well, that is interesting but what are you going to do about those whores. Then they have gone and they say, well, what are you going to do about that gang, and what about parking?

Right now I am doing some work in Chelsea. When you put it all down, the biggest problem in Chelsea is the way the streets are built and the fact that they now have triple-decker housing. What you have now is Asian families moving into the top floor and there are 20 people in that family and seven cars and all of a sudden, there is not a place for any cars and as soon as it snows, the fire trucks cannot get through the city streets. That is the major problem affecting Chelsea right now from Chelsea's point of view.

My own belief is, and we can debate about this, is that what we have going on was a little bit of the law as the instrument in terms of the police dealing with citizens and they say, "Hey, we have this package

of solutions for this problem of crime." Citizens did not necessarily think that that was a bad idea but at the same time there were all these other areas, again, the disorder, etc., that were probably, for most citizens, much more of a problem than crime and which resulted in a lot of fear. So my own view of this is that the police narrowly defined their function, and it seemed reasonable and it seemed logical. But if you listened carefully to citizens, whether you surveyed them or talked to them or whatever, they were identifying a different set of problems. Yes, sir.

MR. ALPERT: Geoff Alpert, University of Miami. We were asked by Metro Dade Police to do just that, and we went out and surveyed people in the community and responded to the police department and also surveyed police officers who were working those areas and found the communities to have different goals, different wants, different desires, and the cops to be doing the same thing everywhere and I think--I am sorry Chief Dolan left because he could speak to what has happened, the next stage--but I think that is a problem that I have heard over and over again here, that the communities are linking some of the other departments that might serve us also.

MR. KELLING: I think I was trying to imply that when I said "Blanket the community with a monolithic strategy, where, as a matter of fact, it turns out that problems are different within various communities."

MR. ALPERT: Worse than that, some of the homes--Miami is a strange place you will find if you are here a couple of days. Some of the homogeneous communities were very strong and very direct and in very high

agreement. Some of the heterogeneous communities, there is nothing you could do different. But if you could target certain neighborhoods--I guess I will use neighborhoods as opposed to communities--there are some solutions.

MR. KELLING: And you have taken us right into our next question. And that is, what do you do with conflicting demands when you get, not only different demands from different segments of the community, but within the same area of the community when you have got conflicting groups and conflicting demands? When, in fact, does it matter that that's the primary problem in some neighborhoods? Right now the primary problem in South Boston is that they are going to integrate public housing and certainly there will be interest in the police keeping the strangers out of the community as part of their function. Mary Ann, do you want to begin that?

MS. WYCOFF: No. I want to finish the last one. George, to take your Chelsea parking issue a little bit further though, I very much like in Al Reiss's paper on why are communities important, the notion that we do environmental impact statements for wildlife and plants and so on, but we do not do it for communities, we do not do it for people. We take a longer range view of what happens when you start to get that kind of parking problem. People with cars then start moving out of the community. They have to go someplace else where they can park their cars. So you get more and more of those housing units converted into complexes that accommodate lots of people who do not have cars and then the whole neighborhood starts to shift. It loses its stability. All kinds of things start happening, but then, indeed, they link back to causes for crime and other kinds of problems in the community so it looks

today like a parking problem, but you have got to think about it in terms of what are all the environmental and social impacts of that kind of problem.

MR. KELLING: Neal, do you want to sum that and then talk?

MR. BEHAN: I will just make a comment on it. What you said is so accurate. In the arrogance of policing, there is so much of the arrogance of the medical profession. Holistic medicine is coming on the scene. It is not there yet, but they often have trouble hearing the patient and what is wrong with them. They know the symptoms and they know the cure and they go and they prescribe.

We have been the same way. We know what burglary statistics are. We know what robbery statistics are, we know how many rapes there are in every neighborhood, and we put our strategies around those statistics. It did not occur to us that we ought to ask the folks if that is what they really wanted to be treated for. When we went in and asked them, that was not the case. There was just a whole bunch of other things that they were more concerned about than those crimes we obviously thought they ought to have addressed so you are absolutely right. We have to get in touch with our community to find out what do we have to do to make them feel comfortable in their homes and their workplaces? It does not mean we stop robbery, burglary, rape investigations but it does mean that we add to it a dimension that we address what really and truly bothers them and put our resources into that, and that is what makes a difference in the quality of life.

MR. WADMAN: I agree wholeheartedly with what both Mary Ann and Neal are saying, but we live, and our police organizations have grown up

and our communities have grown up, under this idea that we elect people in a representative democracy, whether it is city council or a state legislature or a Congress; that they are going to pass laws that we all agree to live by; and that lo and behold some people do not. Then the police department comes along and arrests them and brings them before the bar of justice where they are going to pay their debt to society and after they have paid their debt to society, they kind of come back amongst us to go forth and sin no more. Now, simply, is that what is happening and is that working?

MR. BEHAN: They do sin again, Jim.

MR. WADMAN: I mean, if you look at it, the report to the nation on crime shows very clearly that two-thirds of the serious crime committed in America is unreported. Of the third that is reported, the police solved 21 percent last year, but it is 21 percent of a third which means we are talking about seven percent of the total and yet the communities we serve have this idea that when the guy breaks the law the police are going to come and catch him and they are going to bring him into this system that will in fact have these end products and that if we do that well, if we catch enough bad guys and we prosecute them successfully and they are punished soundly, that that will in fact prevent crime. That has been our mindset. A very simple question: is it working?

MS. WYCOFF: One of the points you are making there has to do with the amount of crime that goes unreported and it is at least theoretically possible that if more crimes were reported and you could respond to more of them and bring more people off the street if they are multiple offenders, then you might have more of an impact on crime. We do not

know, but that is certainly one model.

I think one of the things that happens with community oriented policing--well, let me back up. From surveys, we know that one of the reasons people do not report more crimes is they think the police cannot do anything. They do not believe in the effectiveness of police, and with the kinds of programs we are seeing in the community oriented operations, people are able to see police being effective about things that impact their daily lives. You know, they may not get raped once every year so they do not see you responding effectively to that, but they see you getting other kinds of things done. Oh, they can get things done, and in addition to seeing that police can get things done, in these kinds of programs they find police much more physically as well as psychologically accessible to them. One of the things we need to look at is the reporting rate as a consequence of community oriented programs.

MR. WADMAN: I just wanted to make an editorial comment on the idea that how many of us heard about prison overcrowding? I mean, we are talking about this small, six or seven percent, and yet we are going to increase the number of arrests through Neighborhood Watch, we are going to increase and do more of these things more effectively.

MR. KELLING: I would add, though, that one of the elements, at least that I see about community policing, is also that you increase the amount of regulation that citizens and police do of minor kinds of behavior. The hope is that there is increasingly a backing away from law enforcement to solve problems and more emphasis on regulation and other kinds of things. I have got a quick example. Ridership is up on the New York subway system 10 percent. The number of cars that are completely

covered with graffiti is down to 1,000 from 4,000. The number of police officers have declined, and the number of arrests for vandalism have decline. It was not a law enforcement problem, it was a maintenance and leadership problem. To accept arrest solutions for that was simply a mistake.

MR. SIPES: Getting back to the increasing demands on the part of police and citizens, I think you are absolutely right. There is a certain point, at least in the beginning, that you are going to get more reported crimes into the police and your crime rate is going to go up. The same thing happens with crime prevention programs around the United States, and I fear that as we get into this wonderful concept of community based policing, we are going to find a greater increase in reported crime. I think politically that is going to be very difficult to deal with so I think whatever prescriptive package we all put together in the future to promote the concept, I think that is something that people have got to be warned about. That effect has killed a couple of good crime prevention programs. Hopefully, we are getting into more of a survey research capability on the part of the police departments to be able to track whether crime is indeed one up or one down.

MR. KELLING: Sir, and then Darrel for the last question.

MR. BRADSHAW: Bob Bradshaw. I have one editorial comment on Mary Ann's comment. She said the people see police as being effective and successful and I think we have all talked about it today but equally important, the police see themselves being successful and that is what makes the changes in the organization and the assistant chiefs.

MR. KELLING: Darrel.



MR. STEPHENS: Darrel Stephens, Police Executive Research Forum. I just wanted to pick up on what you had said and that concern that you all can hear about: "Well, if we get closer to the community and crime goes up, we are going to be politically in trouble." I do not really buy that. I think if you establish a relationship with the community and the community recognizes that you are working with them, and in that process, there is a much clearer and better understanding of the conditions that create crime and the problems in the ways that you deal with it, then if it does go up, if you have got that relationship then politically you are not going to get hurt too badly. As a matter of fact, you might get helped along the way.

MR. KELLING: Mary Ann?

MS. WYCOFF: I simply want to reaffirm your point about what it does to the police officers. This is one of the things that we are going to have a chance to look at in Madison where we have more people involved. But I think we saw lots of evidence in Houston of the tendency to become more self-policing in terms of their own behaviors and their peers' behaviors--the sense to respond to the rewards they got from the community by doing more and better work and being more creative. I think if there were no other benefit out of all of this, what it does for personnel is justification alone.

MR. KELLING: Neal?

MR. BEHAN: In my 15 seconds, I would hope that police strategies would never stop because politicians will be afraid that crime would go up. I hope we never get into that, but as far as community policing is concerned, we did not really cover it here. Community policing goes

beyond crime. It goes back into the heart of a neighborhood in saying, how did we make their life reasonable and well, and what can we as police do about it and get everybody involved. That has to make a difference.

MR. KELLING: I want to thank the group. I especially want to thank Jacqueline and the woman in the corner for kind of keeping us to our agenda. My panelists accepted your leadership, rejected mine, but we got through the first two questions at least, and I thank you very much.

(WHEREUPON THE SESSION WAS ADJOURNED)

Group 2: Community-based Crime Control Programs

Moderator - John A. Calhoun

Presenters

Lloyd Street

Robert Sampson

Dennis P. Rosenbaum

MR. CALHOUN: NCPC's basic philosophy is that the core definition of crime prevention is dual: Watch out and help out, unleashing community building/citizen activity such as that Lynn Curtis talks about (family, community, employment opportunity building). We work with high school students and teenage kids--some very war-torn high schools--via a violence reduction curriculum called Teens, Crime and the Community. The curriculum addresses ways to reduce crime, crime by crime but the last chapter says "Okay, kids. What can you do to make your schools not only safer, but better?" The results? An incredible array of student-run projects ranging from peer counseling through student courts, cross-age tutoring, etc. At one high school, Miami South, metal detectors were removed and police were removed from all three floors because of student involvement activities, students saying, "we can do something about the crime problem. It is our responsibility, too," The interesting thing is that this began to generate some policy changes, too, which the literature mentions.

I do not mention the above for our self-aggrandizement, but for providing some hope, hope which has to do with the combination of self-protection strategies with rolling up our sleeves to tackle the larger issues we will look at this morning. What do we know about community efforts to reduce crime and disorder? Do we know as much as we think we know? What have communities tried? Have they made a

difference? What about other groups? Businesses, churches, tenants in public housing projects? Do federal, state, and local policies make a difference? What of Housing policies, jobs policies, welfare, etc.?

We have three incredibly able and talented people here, leaders in the field, one of whom we have already had a preview of--Lloyd Street. Robert Sampson, on my right, is from the University of Illinois, and Dennis Rosenbaum, on my immediate left, is from the University of Illinois in Chicago. So, Lloyd, if you would lead us off, we would appreciate it and I will try to hold each panelist to about 15 minutes each.

MR. STREET: Okay. I think what I would like to do is to not try to present some kind of framework for what I have to say, but to present a series of small bullets and to say only that I think these are strategies that are worthwhile considering within the context of the particular community which you are working in and to sort of look at them, modify them, throw them out, whatever you are going to do with them, on the basis that if they make sense, it is because there is always some overlap between communities as well as diversity between communities. I do not want to stress the particularities in an over strong fashion so I will first give you the sort of question, some notion of how I came to these ideas, and then just give you what I think is a proposition as opposed to the truth or proposition that might be worth trying.

I want to speak to three sort of larger kinds of questions that are opposed to this, the kinds of organizations and strategies that might effectively be used to organize local anti-crime programs, and in what kind of communities might such organizations or organizational strategies make a difference, and how might such organizations relate to the police.

Let us go first to the effective organization questions. My view here came from looking at 392 organizations that worked in local

communities, the eight local communities that we studied. What I wanted to know is what do they really do, and so what we did was we asked these questions, a large number of questions, to these organizations. Sometimes we did not even know why we asked the questions, just sort of intuitive, and other times we followed the more traditional kind of literature for shaping and framing out questions. Then we analyzed this information, basically in three ways. We did a cluster analysis, we did an ordination analysis and then we did one-way ANOVAS using a number of local variables.

What I would like to do is give you sort of the classifications of agencies that we found working in the different communities. The different kinds of communities were white communities, Chinese communities, Mexican-American communities, primarily but not exclusively Hispanic, and general black communities. We found that most organizations did not do much about crime, did not care much about crime, made the claim that they worked with crime. But when you examined it, it was not very deep and was not very real, even when you got to those organizations that had a firm connection to crime. For example, one cluster of agencies we called the de-toxers who worked with people who had drug problems and these people who had drug problems also had problems with the law, and also brought issues of crime right to the doorstep of the agency. They did not do very much with them. They were strictly client-centered.

If you summarize all of this work, what it does, we come back to a very old principle, organizations do what they are set out to do, it is as simple as that. If you are set up to deal with crime, you deal with crime. If you are set up to do detoxification with clients, you do de-tox with clients. They can be pulled over, and that was one of our

interesting findings. We found a small class of agencies that regardless of what their mission said, were, as a function of local pressure, pulled over to work on crime. But the organizations which engaged in crime and stayed engaged in crime for a period of about one year were those that were organized for crime. That is the first finding. Only a bullet. I want you to think about it and say, "Hey, there is a simple kind of lesson here. If you are going to fight crime, build an organization designed to fight crime." Which runs counter to the notion that multipurpose organizations are the ones that are the most likely to get involved in crime. We found that multipurpose organizations were pulled into crime by local pressures.

Okay, second bullet. Local ties are terribly important. If you were to choose an organization to work with crime, do not pick a regional organization, do not pick a city-wide organization. Pick a local organization. That local organization has two pieces to it that are very, very powerful. One is the ability on the part of the membership group to convert the agency to those tasks which are of interest to the members and the second one is it has staying power.

You may not like the way it looks, it may not look very fancy. It may not be very stable, but participation on the part of members as opposed to clients is long term. The average tenure for participation of organizations of this type was 5.5 years, 5.5 years before people drop out. Do not be disconcerted by the numbers because the numbers are small. The number of people who do any kind of community work is fairly small. It can be increased by a variety of strategies so the second bullet is use your local ties. They are very powerful. Use your city-wide organizations for awareness issues. We found the city-wide

anti-crime organizations most frequently reported that they had good educational and awareness results, not program results. By the way, we did not check whether the results that were reported to us were real or not. We simply took them for their face value.

What are the effective strategies for crime fighting? Okay, there has been some back and forth as to whether or not communities exist to all the rest of it. I would say simply go by what people are saying. We had no difficulties in finding that people in the place that we studied knew what their communities were, knew their name places, knew their histories, knew their cognitive boundaries, and at the same time, if you talked with them about community, did not even know what community was. So there is this sort of contradictory thing.

If you go up and ask an academic kind of question, do you have a community here and what is the name of it, we say, no. Or are we always pulling each other apart? No. Or other people say, oh, yes, this is a great community. But by and large, if you ask questions that tap into, maybe provide some kind of indicators of the existence of community, I believe that there is a lot more community out there, where it is needed. In my view, community as an organizational device, appears and disappears according to the need and according to the willingness of people to put it together. It is not something you match, it is another organization.

What kind of ties do you want as a strategy? Tie up with politicians if you want noise and problem definition. Tie up with the administrators of these agencies if you either want firm revenues or firm people, and especially tie up at the administrative, middle management level of police if you want to do anti-crime work. We found that those organizations which had the strongest push in anti-crime work had either

an information or formal connections with sergeants or lieutenants. We also found two assistant D.A.'s busy in this kind of work, entirely on an informal basis, and absolutely no judges. My bullet on judges would be they are kings who do not care about what happens anyplace except in the courtroom. That is harsh but in terms of the actual performance in the community, we found only one judge even speaking regularly in the community. So if you want ties, tie it in to the people who are out there in the street or only one level removed from the street.

I am overstating the case, deliberately so, but you also have the largest part of imagination, guts, and interesting perspectives on middle management people. You do not find it on the young people, and I am sorry to say I do not find it descriptively in the data, or in explanatory fashion in the data, on the part of top leadership. I think the reason is simple. When you get to be a professor or you get to be a president of a university, you already know what the rules are so you are not going to do much shaking, and I think that is particularly true with respect to many of the people who are working in law enforcement.

You have to identify this style in the community. We found two overlapping styles. Otherwise, we found distinctive styles in each one of the communities. This is what we are talking about, the particularistic thing, just some bullets on that.

Chinese and Hispanic communities were avoiders, pure and simple. The personal strategies and the organizational strategies were to get out of the way of the trouble so that the Chinese communities neither participated with the police nor did they participate organizationally nor did they deal, as the rumors were, with trouble inside the community by organizational devices like family associations and the like. They stayed



at home at night. They said, I do not know anything. They got the hell off the streets where most of the street crime was occurring and the city burglary was occurring in Chinatown. They did not have much to say to strangers, and if it were not for our Chinese speaking interviewers, we would not have even gotten in to talk to them. Even when they spoke English.

Hispanics are the same way. Here, I think it is a different picture. I think that there is much more risk, and especially because of the youth of the community, the Hispanic youth especially are very big avoiders in the communities we looked at because the risks are great. You take a protective action, you are likely to get zapped. So the best way to get along is to go along in a Hispanic community, and the organizations reflected this. The black and white neighborhoods, at an individual level, were very protectionist. Twenty-five percent of all the people in Oakland bought guns and learned to use them to deal with crime. One way of interpreting this is, hey, it is a darn cat, people against people. What we found is the protectionists were more likely to be the collectivists also so the guy who buys a gun is also the guy likely to participate in Oakland in the black community in anti-crime activities. In regressions, being Hispanic predicts avoiding; being black predicts taking action at both the collective level and at the individual level and blacks and white stress collective action over all other kinds of activities that you might do to take on crime. It is stressed more than improving the police, it is stressed more than solving the underlying social problems, all these kinds of things. Collective action is what nearly 40 percent of these two communities say when you ask them, what you should do, they say take collective action.

Next bullet, types of communities. Local communities reside inside larger politically active districts, especially in the black community. What we have found is that when you had distinctive communities--like one of them we looked at was a very poor community called Elmhurst--it was surrounded by this larger thing called Elmhurst District. And we could find little replications of Elmhurst all over the place, as well as interstices where very little was going on. What we discovered was that the larger unit was the unit in which political action could stir up interest and involvement on the part of the local community and their organization. Middle class working versus working class we found in Oakland. Working class people were as likely or more likely to take protective action than middle class people, and interestingly, especially arming. Thirty-seven percent of all the black household reported that they bought a gun and learned to use it over against 25 percent for the city as a whole. It is very interesting but it is not an isolated screw your neighbor kind of prospective.

Next bullet. It has to do with isolation. When communities get too ethnic, they fold in on themselves, the case of the Chinese community and the case of the Hispanic community. You must have a certain amount of intergroup relations to open yourself up to cooperative movement so that there are a lot of alliance, coalitions between blacks and whites, very little between blacks and Asians, blacks and Hispanics, Hispanics and Asians. You cannot be too ethnic. If you are too ethnic, you become tribal. South Africa. If you are not at all cosmopolitan, multi-cultural, skilled with other people, you are not going to solve your problems because you do not even have the political tools to reach the people who have the resources.

Finally, white areas do not put much emphasis on day-to-day organizations inside their community because they have one enormous ability, the ability to instigate and move larger structures. So if there is a crime problem in white neighborhoods, you will not find a large number of organizations. The smallest number of anti-crime or other organizations were in white communities. I think that is a simple answer. They do not need them. You have got your line straight to the city. You have got your lines elsewhere, and even black leadership in the city has not changed that. What is developing is that black communities are not beginning to develop lines to political organization within the city.

Organizational ties to the police? I believe that there are three bullets. One, you have got to work with the police, and you will always find in every city, police who are very, very closely tied to the community. This is a fake name. We found a sergeant who spent more time policing junk cars, garbage cans, incivilities, than traffic violations or other things that he saw. His principle was quite simple. He was saying, I am showing the people in this community that I believe in their community and it is worthwhile in keeping up, and I would rather let a speeder go by than to have a junk car sit on the curb. And do you know, when you ride with him, he cannot ride a block without somebody waving at him?

Another bullet, police as organizers of the platform. We have a great deal of concern about what police can do, and there is a danger here. Cops can run away with a community oriented program. They can become such politicians because they already are politicians. They can give you a headache and a pain elsewhere as well, but it is a major

resource. The police can put something into a black community organization that nobody else can. Authority and legitimation as law abiding people as opposed to being born a suspect. That is terribly important in the black community, and you can find officers all over, even in bad departments who will do that but the rules for this are clear. They have got to be deliberative. If you just set police and citizens free to deal with crime, you are in for a mess.

You have got to set down a set of rules that say, here is what the limits are, here is what the warrants are, here is what we will give you, here is what we will not give you, here is what you will do, here is what I will do, and if you do not, I will break your neck, and the neck breaking occurs with a third party. That is why I think that the structure has to be formal, has to be spelled out, and it has to be carefully built and it has to be tested before it even goes into action. That is why I say, with an old, old paper, that the time schedule for devising community based work is not immediate. Funders say, give me some results in a year. Politicians say give me some result in 60 days that I can use but the work says be patient with two or three years as long as the people involved in it believe they are making headway. You will not begin to see programs for 10 years or so. In fact, most communities did not get to be high crime communities just like that. It took a while. I will stop there.

MR. CALHOUN: Terrific. Thank you very much, Lloyd.

MR. DOBROTKA: What was your third point?

MR. STREET: I am sorry?

MR. DOBROTKA: Work with police, police as community organizers, and I missed the third one under organizational types of police.

MR. STREET: Oh, I am sorry. It is simply to use the administrative ties that I talked about before rather than political ties and the deliberate quality of the organization that you build as opposed to the salutary, ethnic, you know, good feeling kind of organization. Make it a hard, tough, legal, corporation. Build General Motors.

MR. CALHOUN: Does that answer your question, Dennis? Except for clarifications like that, if we could hang on to questions until the end, terrific. Okay? Robert Sampson. You do not have a mike.

MR. SAMPSON: I'd like to talk briefly this morning about what might be termed the "Crime Effects of Non-Crime Policies." As is evident in this conference, crime control is often considered a policy problem only for criminal justice agencies--principally the police--or community crime prevention organizations (e.g., neighborhood watch). But while CJS agencies and other community groups are crucial, a broader community or structural perspective points out the roles of other federal, state, and local government sectors not directly concerned with crime. In this regard not enough attention has been paid to issues such as housing, code enforcement, family disruption and child care, employment, and welfare, and how they may indirectly affect crime. My interests as a researcher over the last several years have focused on the community-level determinants of crime rates, many of which are related to these basic policy areas. Drawing on this research and that of others, the question I'd thus like to address is the following: Is there any evidence where non-crime policies have adversely affected crime or at least well-known causes of crime?

In trying to answer this complex question in a short time space, I'd like to focus on one of the most important factors related to serious

urban crime--public housing projects. Public housing is an issue that affects all units of government--from the federal to city level, and that is implicated in many of the underlying causes of crime. To take but one example, the most violent neighborhood in Chicago is Wentworth, which is dominated by the Robert Taylor homes. This project consists of 28 16-story buildings housing over 20,000 people. But while these residents accounted for only about 1/2 of one percent of Chicago's population in 1980, 11 percent of the city's murders, 9 percent of its rapes, and 10 percent of its aggravated assaults were committed in the project. Other projects such as Cabrini-Green in Chicago share a similar fate, as do countless projects in our major urban areas. And in research I have conducted at the national level, the density of multiple-unit, poor, rental units (a proxy for public housing) is one of the strongest predictors of robbery and homicide--independent of other commonly accepted correlates of crime. What is so criminogenic about public housing, and how do political decisions at the local level exacerbate this situation?

One factor linking public housing and crime is neighborhood instability. If we trace the history of housing policies in major urban areas we find that many neighborhoods were drastically altered based on political decisions that were not directly concerned with crime. Indeed, at a very general level we are all familiar with urban renewal and its wholesale uprooting of poor urban communities. In addition, the freeway networks driven through the hearts of many cities in the 1950s destroyed viable, low income, minority neighborhoods (Skogan 1986). In this sense the planning and construction activities of government often created "artificial neighborhoods" that upset the stability of city areas.

A good example of this overall process is shown in a recent study of Chicago public housing by Bursik (1987). Under Section 8 of the 1974

Federal Housing and Community Development Act, three programs were initiated to improve housing for the poor. One of these provided subsidies for existing housing that required extensive rehabilitation. The second provided funds for subsidizing cost of living in units that didn't require such work--and more than half of these were single family homes. The third was the construction of public housing projects. Each city was allowed to choose among the alternatives.

In Chicago, as in many cities and as in the 1960s, much of the money went to construction on public housing projects rather than rehabilitation of existing units or subsidies. According to Bursik, the result was a marked relationship with the subsequent degree of instability in an area--neighborhoods experiencing construction were characterized by a large increase in population instability. The construction of public housing thus accelerated patterns of instability that existed in Chicago neighborhoods. This instability in turn strongly increased delinquency rates.

It should not be surprising that the creation of instability would impact on crime. From the classic research of Shaw and McKay (1942) in Chicago in the 1920s to the present day, criminological research has shown that residential instability is an important predictor of crime rates. In fact, my research using both cities and neighborhoods as units of analysis has shown residential instability to be one of the most powerful predictors of crime--in most cases more important than standard sociological variables such as poverty and racial composition (Sampson 1985). This is understandable--since assimilation of newcomers into the social fabric of local communities is necessarily a temporal process,

residential mobility operates as a barrier to the development of extensive friendship networks, kinship bonds, and local associational ties. In particular, housing projects with high turnover rates impede local social control--residents have difficulty recognizing their neighbors and are therefore less likely to be concerned about them or engage in reciprocal guardianship behavior.

In short, by uprooting residents and increasing instability in selected neighborhoods, governmental decisions to build public housing has contributed to increased crime rates. Indeed, Bursik notes that in areas where existing housing was subsidized and rehabilitated (hence preserving the community), residents did not feel abandoned by city government. In these areas stability was maintained--despite low income--and consequently low crime rates ensued. On the positive side this shows that it is possible for government to create conditions conducive to stability.

Another major factor related to public housing is what William Julius Wilson (1987) terms concentration effects. Opposition from organized community groups to the building of public housing in their neighborhoods, and the decisions to neglect the rehabilitation of existing residential units (many of them single family homes), have led to "massive, segregated housing projects, which become ghettos for minorities and the disadvantaged." In other words, Wilson argues that the social transformation of the inner city has resulted in a disproportionate concentration (or critical mass) of the most disadvantaged segments of the urban black population in a few areas (as opposed to disbursement). Indeed, census data show that while only 7 percent of poor whites live in poverty areas, 40 percent of blacks do--and that is stunning.

These changes have drastically altered the character of urban black neighborhoods. For most of American history until the 1960s, black urban



communities featured a vertical integration of different income and family groups. That is, middle class blacks and intact families resided in the same areas as lower income blacks. But with the concentration of poor blacks in housing projects the social transformation of the ghetto became profound. More specifically, Wilson (1987: 56) argues that the exodus of middle and working class blacks from many ghetto neighborhoods removed an important "social buffer" that could deflect social problems. This argument is based on the assumption that the basic social institutions in the area--churches, schools, stores, recreational facilities, etc.--would remain viable because much of their support came from economically stable and secure families.

However, in the public housing areas of our major cities the concentration of the disadvantaged is clear. Virtually all households in projects fall below the poverty line. And an undeniable fact is that family disruption in the black community is concentrated in public housing. In 1980, of the 27,178 families with children living in Chicago Public Housing Projects, only 11% were married couple families (Wilson 1987). Teenage pregnancy and out-of-wedlock births are similarly high.

The same is also true for black communities nation-wide. My own research on the 171 largest cities in the U.S. confirms that racial differences are so strong that the worst urban contexts in which whites reside with respect to poverty and family disruption are considerably better off than the mean levels for black communities (Sampson 1987). Thus, regardless of whether a black juvenile is reared in an intact or broken home, or a poor or middle class home, he/she will not grow up in a community context similar to that of whites with regard to family

structure and poverty. The point, then, is that regardless of individual characteristics, blacks live in ecologically very different areas than whites--namely, areas characterized by a concentration of low income housing projects with elevated levels of social dislocations. This speaks to the importance of a community perspective as opposed to "kinds of people" perspective (Reiss, 1986a).

The concentration of family disruption in black communities, especially housing projects, brings us to a third "non-crime" policy arena. Indeed, there are good theoretical reasons to expect that the concentration of family disruption in poor urban environments is a potential disaster as far as crime is concerned. In recent research I have argued that marital and family disruption may decrease informal social controls at the community level (Sampson 1987). The basic thesis is that two-parent households provide increased supervision and guardianship not only for their own children and household property, but also for public activities in the community. A century of criminological research has demonstrated that most delinquents have delinquent friends and commit delinquent acts in groups. The territorial concentration of young males who lack familial social controls thus facilitates a peer-control system that supports group offending by simplifying the search for accomplices (Reiss 1986b). Indeed, a central fact underlying Shaw and McKay's (1942) classic research was that the majority of gangs developed from the unsupervised, spontaneous play-group. Residents of stable family communities are better able to control such peer-group activities as street-corner congregation (e.g., hanging out) that set the context for delinquency, especially gang-related. Hence, the awareness

and supervision of peer group and gang activity is not simply dependent on one child's family, but on a network of collective family control.

Overall, my analysis of large U.S. cities supports this hypothesis and shows that rates of black violent offending, especially by juveniles, are strongly influenced by variations in family structure. Independent of the major candidates supplied by prior criminological theory (e.g., income, region, size, density, age and race composition), black family disruption has the largest effects on black juvenile robbery and homicide. Family disruption also has a significant positive effect on black adult homicide and robbery (see Sampson 1987).

Perhaps most interesting, the results also reveal that despite a tremendous difference in mean levels of family disruption between black and white communities, the percentage of white families headed by a female has a large positive effect on white juvenile and adult robbery offending. In fact, the predictors of white violent crime are in large part identical in sign and magnitude to those for blacks. Therefore, the evidence strongly points to the conclusion that the effect of family disruption on black crime is independent of commonly cited alternative explanations (e.g., poverty, region, urbanization), and cannot be attributed to unique cultural factors within the black community (e.g. a black subculture of violence).

A fourth non-crime policy that appears to have contributed indirectly to crime is municipal code enforcement and governmental policies toward neighborhood deterioration. In an important recent study entitled Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960, Arnold Hirsch (1983) argues that lax enforcement of city housing code played a major role in neighborhood deterioration. During the height of public housing construction and slum clearance, Chicago had roughly ten

inspectors. Responsibility for inspection was fragmented and many serving as inspectors acquired their jobs because of political connections. Moreover, a metropolitan Housing and Planning Council study of the city's worst housing code violators revealed that it was more profitable for slum operators to go to court even if they lost than it was to repair their properties. And even in New York City today things appear much the same--inadequate city policies with regard to code enforcement and repair of city properties have led to the systematic deterioration of the housing stock, and consequently, entire neighborhoods (Daly and Meislin 1988). When considered in conjunction with the practices of "red-lining" and disinvestment by banks, and "block busting" by cagey real estate agents, local policies toward code enforcement have contributed to neighborhood deterioration.

As we know, neighborhood deterioration has important negative consequences for crime. Neighborhood conditions provide readily observable evidence of the extent of local decline. Visual signs of physical deterioration and social disorganization--what has been termed "incivilities"--include junk and trash, boarded up housing, stripped or abandoned cars, etc. Incivilities and disorder may actually spawn more serious crimes because of a perceived reduction in local social control by residents (Skogan 1986). Hence, while city code enforcement may seem to be a policy arena far removed from crime, the evidence suggest otherwise--lax enforcement of municipal codes leads to neighborhood deterioration, which in turn encourages crime.

There are other policy areas that could be talked about if there were time (e.g., welfare, joblessness in the inner city). But the general point I hope to have made is that what seem to be non-crime

policies--e.g., where (or if) to build a housing project; enforcement of municipal codes; rehabilitation of existing residential units; family policy--can have important effects on crime. And unlike so many criminogenic factors we often hear about, many of these factors are policy manipulable. I of course do not have time nor expertise to detail such policies. But at a minimum they would appear to include:

- \* resident management of public housing (increases stability)
- \* tenant buyouts (increases home ownership and commitment)
- \* rehabilitation of existing low income housing (preserves stability)
- \* disbursement of public housing (vs. concentration)
- \* strict code enforcement (to fight deterioration)
- \* increased family planning and child care facilities (to reduce out-of wedlock births and family disruption)
- \* training in parenting and youth monitoring skills (e.g., to encourage collective family supervision of local peer groups)

Fortunately, inroads are being made in these areas. Indeed, the excellent examples of the Bromley-Heath project in Boston on resident management and the Beethoven project in Chicago give cause for hope. Tenant management and buy-outs in Boston appear to have increased community stability, while the Beethoven project provides for parental assistance in child care and family planning. Moreover, there is evidence that such policies increase family stability as well. As the report on the Kenilworth-Parkside Management Corporation in Washington emphasized, resident management was associated with fathers returning home and participating in child rearing. These trends suggest that family disruption and housing projects need not be synonymous.

And there is also evidence that new funds for public housing are being spent in a creative and "crime-wise" manner. Just this week the New York Times carried an article on new community-based efforts to improve housing (Flynn and Kennedy 1988). The aim of these efforts is to unite local governments, private foundations, financial institutions, and religious organizations to rehabilitate low-income housing. For example, the Boston Housing Partnership--a consortium of 10 neighborhood-based community development corporations, private sector institutions and state and city governmental agencies--just completed the renovation of 700 low-income apartments (a 38 million project) and has begun rehabilitation of another 950 units. Instead of destroying existing communities and concentrating low income persons in projects, efforts such as these serve to revitalize and preserve a sense of community. This speaks to a need for continued or more coordinated efforts of community crime prevention and CJS agencies with policy makers in the so-called "non-crime" area.

MR. CALHOUN: Thank you very much. I know you have got a rich array of other facts and anecdotes there, and I know that in the question and answer session, you will find a way of working them in. Okay, Dennis, who is at the University of Illinois at Chicago, and has done a lot of writing and thinking on this and other subjects. Dennis?

MR. ROSENBAUM: All right, I will try to crush this into 15 minutes here real quickly. I will probably be following my text more than I normally do.

I was planning to give an overall assessment about what we know about all kinds of different strategies to organize communities and whether they work or not. As I was going back through the literature to do that, I got sort of aroused and upset by what I saw as I think a

general acceptance by practitioners and advocates for community crime prevention that these programs are highly effective. I was concerned by that because the data in my opinion are not there. Okay, so I am going to spend some time talking about that today because I think if I get nothing else across, I can make at least one or two points. Let me first say, though, I was and still am to some extent an advocate of community crime prevention. I have developed, designed and implemented many programs. I've worked in police, but now I am a social scientist and my job is to pursue the elusive "truth," if you will, and sometimes that means also going after falsehoods. The problem is not always falsehoods, but the idea that we can mislead ourselves about what we know and do not know about given problems.

So the main question is whether we know anything about the effects of these collective citizen actions on preventing crime or not. We have seen a lot of good efforts over the last decade.

Let me first put the central argument out. There are several arguments that supposedly underlie this effort of community organizing. I will list the points. The first basic tenet here is that serious urban problems such as crime stem from the decline in traditional structure of neighborhoods. Families, churches, schools, ethnic groups that once held the community together are eroding, thus weakening the informal social controls that are operating. The next point is that these weakened informal social mechanisms lead to social disorganization, lack of shared norms, and lack of social pressures to engage in appropriate behaviors. All of this leads to criminal activity. This is a quick analysis of neighborhood decline which other people have already talked about, and there are many other stages that I will not mention.

So, if social disorganization is a problem, the solution is to let us organize the neighborhood, and if traditional structures and institutions have broken down, let us create structures, let us create community organizations, let us do something about it, both so we can have a greater sense of community, as well as direct responses to crime. So this collective citizen action is viewed as the new solution to the old festering problem of social disorganization, the new strategy for creating a sense of community when informal social control has eroded.

Now--how do we restore informal social control? By vigorously encouraging the types of behaviors that research has shown underlie this sort of maintenance: Territorial behaviors, such as surveillance of the community, directly intervening to help people, and reporting crimes. Also social interaction--if we can get residents to start talking, communicating, interacting, we can then recreate a sense of community. This is an empirical question to me. Can it be done? I refer to this in my work as the "Implant hypothesis" because the question is can we implant order where it is weak or non-existent? Can we implant the processes and the behaviors that we think are needed to create a sense of community in areas where those behaviors do not exist or are weak?

How have we gone about doing this, practically speaking? Neighborhood Watch has become a big vehicle for doing this in the United States. There are lots of behaviors associated with watch-type programs, as the national study has shown. The research done by Garofolo and McCloud for NIJ, indicates that people do everything from posting signs and stickers on their streets to engaging in Operation Identification, home security surveys, holding meetings to plan and exchange information, passing out newsletters. These are the dominant five or six things that



Americans do when they participate in collective anti-crime activities. There are many other behaviors that they engage in but they are not typical of what Americans are doing, and also there is little research on these other activities. Therefore, I want to focus on some of the dominant activities for a moment and point out that this is how we, as citizens, have translated this knowledge into practice.

The fundamental question is have they been effective in restoring a sense of community, in reducing fear and in reducing crime? Those are the three big areas where people continually claim success. There are many claims of success. For one, I know that the National Crime Prevention Council (NCPC) has done a great deal of positive work toward helping to get people to recognize that crime is a problem and engaging in crime prevention behaviors. Their work and others has pointed out, though, that they feel strongly that these programs are highly effective. Let me quote from a recent NCPC publication--"an array of evaluations provides evidence that reducing opportunities for crime reduces crime and lessens the fear of crime and builds stronger neighborhood among other benefits."

Several more quotes: "Formal evaluations testify to the success of Neighborhood Watch in reducing crime and fear of crime," and their closing comments are: " that community crime prevention works should not be in doubt." I personally cannot accept this conclusion as I am not as confident about these data. Now, what data are people using?

Lots of people and not just the National Crime Prevention Council, but other people who have been advocates for these programs have argued several things. One basis for their strong conclusion is that people out there in the field say it works. They mention 3,000 programs that claim that they have helped reduce or have caused a reduction in crime and

fear. To me, this does not count as evidence. But even the national evaluation cites the pervasiveness of Neighborhood Watch as evidence that it must be working. This is not a criteria for success either, except to suggest that it is of interest to the community, but the question is--should they be doing it?

Now, there are evaluations. There have been literally hundreds of so-called "evaluations." There are many serious problems with most of these evaluations. The majority have been conducted by law enforcement agencies looking at, say, residential burglary over six months or a one-year time frame, and most of them do not even have a control group. They just say that burglary went down in this area during this period, based on reported crime statistics.

There are many problems with the evaluations. I do not know if I have time to go into all of them. Survey data are rarely used so we cannot deal with unreported crime. Most of them use crime as the only outcome. The other kinds of quality of life indicators, such as fear and social cohesiveness, are not measured. We are also looking at people who are willing to stand up and say their program was a success. We do not hear about the unreported findings that were not successful because people are not as likely to hear about failed programs. I can tell you what happens when you report nonsignificant or even counter-intuitive findings because I did it myself.

For the evaluations that do not have control groups (which is most of them) we can make note that there was a national crime trend clearly downward during the period that most of these studies were done between the late 1970's and early 1980's, and this is a problem. Regression artifacts are plausible. This technical research term refers to

measurement error, but in reality what it means is that crime goes up and down over periods of time as far as fluctuating and we know that Neighborhood Watch in particular is responsive to perceived changes in crime rates. People do organize, do get together at times when the crime seems to be going up in their community and it may have gone down by itself without the intervention.

The biggest problem for most research in this field is selection bias. We do not have random assignment, whereby some groups are randomly assigned to get the program and others are not. The reality is that often times we do not have control over who is going to participate in these programs, where they are going to be implemented. In effect this means that communities tend to select themselves as participants in these crime prevention programs. This self-selection problem makes it very difficult to draw the causal inference that the activity is what caused the reduction in crime and not the fact that these groups, these individuals and these communities were different to begin with on a number of dimensions.

Let me summarize my comments regarding the evaluations, I am going to advocate social science for a moment which is to say that we have certain canons of research that we believe in and follow regarding how one conducts "good" research and what constitutes "bad" research. When you follow this set of standards or accepted procedures, we have greater confidence in the reliability and validity of your results. If we accept everything, every study that comes along at face value, what kind of knowledge and policy direction will we have? None. We will be responding in a random fashion, but we will have the freedom to choose studies selectively that support our own preconceived notions of what works and

what does not work. If we believe in research at all as a means of generating knowledge about what works and what does not work, and plan to use research guide, then we have to begin discriminating between "good and "bad" research.

Are there any good studies? I think there are a few in this general area, quasi-experiments. The old one in Seattle that you have all heard about years ago which did show some effects. There are three others. One that I did in Chicago, one that is just coming out from Minneapolis, and one that you may not have heard of completed in London, England last year.

What do we know from these studies? Only one of the four shows any reduction in crime. The Seattle evaluation showed a burglary reduction but it was only among participators and households that participated, not in the experimental versus the controlled neighborhood (which was not significant). On the other hand, two of these four evaluations show significant increases in crime in the target areas relative to the control areas.

MR. CALHOUN: To report information?

MR. ROSENBAUM: This is survey research, yes. So it is reported and unreported. Chicago and London. Now, in terms of the quality of life, Seattle had very few measures. They did measure fear but it was a long time ago before we developed sophisticated quality-of-life measures. They did measure fear and in the footnote report a marginally significant increase in fear of crime in the target area among participaters. In Chicago, I found significant increases in three out of four of the neighborhoods in fear of crime. The residents who got the programs became more fearful relative to the control groups, contrary to expectation. Minneapolis found no difference in crime, no differences in fear.

In terms of social cohesion, the results are mixed. No differences were observed in Minneapolis. One increase in cohesion was noted in London and one of the areas experienced a decrease in social cohesion in Chicago. What is my best summary? Over a multitude of measures (many, many measures were employed), the general conclusion must be that the overall quality of life was not affected by these programs and in some places was not negatively affected. All these programs were able to achieve significantly improved levels of participation but the hypothesized effects on preventive and criminal behavior did not emerge.

In sum, I disagree with the "majority opinion" in this field. Even in the national evaluation of Neighborhood Watch, the authors give credence to this opinion: "The sheer number of positive results convinces us that Neighborhood Watch are having some preventive effects on crime in some places, although the effects are probably not nearly as large as they are often touted to be." Again, sheer numbers do not constitute knowledge. One good study is worth 200 bad studies in my opinion because they can, and often do, make the same methodological errors.

What am I saying? That we should throw community crime prevention out the window? No, I am just saying we do not know at this point that it works and I am not convinced by these claims of success and I think we have to be careful about what we call "knowledge." Where do we go from here? I think we need to lower our sights a little bit. Well, let me just say we need to look more carefully at causal relationships, we need data on all of these assumed relationships. We could draw big models on the blackboard of how organizing the community causes all these effects--gets people involved, creates a sense of community, reduces fear

of crime, etc. We do not have data to support those linkages. We need to do that. For example, can we even get people to attend meetings on a regular basis in neighborhoods that have significant problems? What data do we have to show that local residents will engage in more territorial and helping behaviors as well as crime prevention behaviors after they are exposed to these programs rather than because of who they are or where they live? That is the implant hypothesis.

Do we have data which will show that the level of social integration improves as a result of these organizing activities, data which show that fear of crime, perceived responsibility, feeling of efficacy and satisfaction with the neighborhood are improved as a result of specific interventions? In sum, I think we need less attention to crime reduction for the moment and more focus on some of these social processes that we claim are needed in order to set this whole thing in motion. We need to open up the black box of community crime prevention and test some of these components of the model.

Let me give you a simple example, and Garofolo and McCloud point this out in the Neighborhood Watch evaluation. The deterrence assumptions that underlie the simple behavior of posting a sign in your neighborhood. This action assumes a lot of things. The posting of signs which claims that you are a Neighborhood Watch community, (1) assumes that potential offenders will see the signs, (2) assumes that they know what Neighborhood Watch is; maybe they do not even know what it is, (3) assumes that potential offenders believe that residents practice Neighborhood Watch, (4) assumes that they believe that Neighborhood Watch actually increases their risk of detection, (5) assumes that they view this risk of detection as a sufficient problem to be deterred from criminal activity, as opposed

to "I could care less" or "I am too impulsive to stop what I'm doing." If any one of these assumptions is false, the entire strategy is flawed. We have not empirically tested very many of these assumptions. We have very little research on offender perceptions of deterrent and opportunity reduction strategies.

Some quick conclusions. We need to lower our sights, and stop talking so much about fear, crime and social integration and begin to bite off smaller pieces of the puzzle, i.e. begin identifying what is inside the black box. More attention should be paid to the intermediate effects rather than the long term effects of the social interventions. We need to be more patient and that is how good science proceeds, if we believe in science at all. We need to study small group processes. We need to study the police-citizen partnership and how we can best develop that to co-produce public safety. Well, I have a lot of suggestions here, but I am going to stop.

Let me make two final points. Theoretically, I think we need to stop thinking about Neighborhood Watch and these organizing approaches as having anything to do with changing the level of informal social control in the community. We are setting ourselves up for failure. Realistically, they are about preventing victimizations, primarily in middle class neighborhoods, not altering patterns of social behavior that have been developed over many years to create "community in crime". It is time to look at the match between program characteristics and community characteristics, rather than advocating these prepackaged programs that we are trying to implement. In other words, what strategy or set of strategies is likely to maximize citizen participation and produce results in what type of neighborhoods? We must begin to recognize that the

victimization prevention strategies that citizens have generally adopted are supported by what we call preservationist community groups seeking to protect property from outsiders and freeze the status quo in middle class, homogeneous neighborhoods. These strategies are very difficult to implement in poor, high crime, heterogeneous areas characterized by distrust and high levels of fear.

This brings me to my last point, which is that citizen participation which we are trying to encourage here (i.e. self-help through voluntary efforts) is a very difficult animal to tackle in some of the tougher, crime ridden neighborhoods. The challenge ahead is to develop strategies that are appealing to these neighborhoods and I think we are beginning to do that. Mobilizing people in these areas will require a lot of support and resources. Being "disadvantaged" is not just an individual characteristic. It is a community characteristic, which means the community will need considerable support and cooperation from the police, as well as technical assistance on a variety of matters. Thank you.

MR. CALHOUN: Thank you very much, Dennis. This really tested my soul as moderator since you were quoting from some of our material. I let you have your full 15 minutes and I did not pull the plug.

MR. ROSENBAUM: I was hoping you were sitting over there.

MR. CALHOUN: I did not step on your toe or anything! This is terrific. All three of you have raised not only some helpful paths on which to proceed on but also, Dennis, you have provided sobering and important caveats. When I took over the National Crime Prevention Council, one thing I realized that most of the Neighborhood Watches assumed two or three things: One was ownership of property; two was a



certain confluence of values; three was some homogeneity. But where was most of the crime? It was where all of the converse of the above three were.

It was collision of values, high mobility, and low ownership. Subsequently we wrote a book on preventing crime in urban communities, oases of hope in areas which shouted despair. Our stories were more anecdotal than research based but they represented little pockets of citizenry, of caring, of efforts to assert control. They were extraordinary for everything shouted "rotten," "bad."

Well, a lot is out on the table, and the three panelists are poised with pieces of their speeches they did not say. So if you have got any straight men here, go ahead, ask questions and first introduce yourself.

MR. HOWARD: I am Mark Howard and I am Director of the Block Watch Program in Seattle. I am really not going to take an issue with what was just said and I am really probably more supportive than anything else. As indicated, a lot of you are probably very familiar with the evaluation that was done in Seattle in 1976. We have been funded and lived with that program since that time, and honestly I cannot say that if they went back and did an evaluation again whether they would find the same results. I think that is one of the big problems that we have with programs like this is there are no ongoing evaluations.

There are no continuous evaluations, to not only assist the practitioner in the field to say whether or not what we are doing is it still effective. But also I think most programs are not set up to be evaluated and I think that is one of the things as practitioners, people involved in this, we have to take a look at from the very beginning. When we set up a program, can it be evaluated, and if it can, are we willing to

take a look at that evaluation and decide if it is working or does it need to be changed. A lot of places have turned to Neighborhood Watch as a panacea that was said to be the solution of the problem. In a lot of neighborhoods, that may not be the case, and also, what is the Neighborhood Watch? It is going to vary in every community you go to. Some programs, like ours, we work on a block by block basis and we set up block watches, not neighborhood watches. Others go out and have a community meetings with 20 people and they go out and post signs and say we have a Neighborhood Watch. So there is such an inconsistency around the country in what we are doing you are going to find inconsistencies in finding out whether we are effective or not. And that is, I think, what we need to look at from the very beginning as a practitioner is what are we trying to do.

MR. CALHOUN: Can we turn that into a question, Mark, to see if there are any programs that are in their genesis or I think what you are really asking that when they get going, are we asking for reevaluation questions?

MR. HOWARD: Are we willing to ask them?

MR. CALHOUN: Are we willing to ask them.

MR. WADMAN: Could I even expand that?

MR. CALHOUN: You are please?

MR. WADMAN: Bob Wadman. I am Chief of Police in Omaha, Nebraska. We asked, you know, of the Neighborhood Watch program that we are, going through this process, see more criminal behavior and therefore make more arrests and therefore are going to resolve the problem but the simple premise that arresting these people has any impact whatsoever on the crime problem is how we measure police effectiveness. We keep track of the

number of people who are arrested, how long we incarcerate them, all those kinds of things. But whether those measures in and of themselves, I mean, are even foundational to the development of Neighborhood Watch, has not been answered.

MR. CALHOUN: Comments from any of the panel on that?

MR. ROSENBAUM: My first reaction is that there are all kinds of assumptions. We could sit here all day and start spelling out, which I have argued that we need to do, we need to start spelling out all the assumptions that underlie all these strategies we do. We could stand here and talk about Operation Identification, any of these things--and some of them along the way are pretty silly and ridiculous actually--and we should ask ourselves, "Why should we think that that is going to make a difference?" But some of the real basic questions you are asking are empirical ones, and we need to try to test them if we can. Those are hard ones to test, some of them.

MR. SIPES: Leonard Sipes from the National Crime Prevention Council. I was the Project Manager of the piece that Dennis was working from, so I would like to respond to several of Dennis's points. I think the best issue when we are trying to come to the issue of whether a program works or not--and here I would disagree with Dennis--is whether the people in community accept it as being a workable solution. One of the things about the Neighborhood Watch program, and when I say Neighborhood Watch, I am not talking about simply a crime reduction focus from the standpoint of target hardening or watching out or reporting crime, but from a community solidarity point of view, from a sense of going way beyond the crime issue, a block organization to improve whatever it is the community feels like they need to improve.

The point is that community people around the United States seem to like this concept, and I disagree with Dennis. Where we have tracked about 150 Neighborhood Watch programs that have reduced crime, we have looked at others that we feel are better evaluated, and the consistent finding keeps coming back that people like this concept. I think from the practitioner's point of view, and I have spent the vast majority of my life as a practitioner working in the field, I have a great amount of respect for that. You know, if the people who reside in that community, whether they be low income or upper income, if they feel that improves the quality of their lives and protects their children and accomplishes certain things, I think that that indeed is the most powerful indicator as to whether or not it works.

Now, we can argue the research question back and forth. We should recognize there are a lot of people who consider themselves to be professional researchers who have made very supportive statements of the concept. Just pulling off the top of my head, the California legislature, their research body, looked at the Neighborhood Watch program in California. Now it was under a sunset provision and they said it has become part and parcel to crime prevention and community stability in California so they lifted the sunset provision in California.

I mean, there is a lot of people who consider themselves professional researchers who do make very supportive statements. I mean, even Dennis's own research you could criticize. It gives my report from a research point of view. The Minneapolis study of the people involved said that they were forced from the communities where there were not wanted. We have said that the police have got to be intricately involved. But the police were not intricately involved in the organizing and the day-to-day

operations of the Chicago study. So even what we considered the best research projects out of Seattle, I will be more than happy to say that there are some inadequacies there.

But, again, we can go on and on about this, back and forth. There is target-hardening research that seems to be fairly solid that community crime prevention programs advocate. That seemed, in my best estimation, pretty solid. There are spender surveys that say that one of the things that they were most concerned about is the Neighborhood Watch program where the research came out and said you have not talked to us, the offenders, and based upon what they said, it seemed that Neighborhood Watch or community based crime prevention is an effective way of going at it.

MR. CALHOUN: Maybe the point has been made that there is a lot of controversy and different opinions about the different research, if I can just stop you there, Len, because there are other questions. Dennis, do you want to respond?

MR. SIPES: I just want to follow up on one more thing, Jack, that I agree with them that we need to look at them closely. I agree that we are making an awful lot of assumptions that we should not be making. I agree that we should be looking at this from a variety of points of view and challenging all the assumptions and bring the best that we have to attack the problem. It is not a cookie cutter approach. It is not going to work in every other community.

MR. ROSENBAUM: Okay, let me just quickly respond to the idea that people keep coming up with: that people like this and that they can claim it works. You know, I am glad that we no longer use popularity as a scientific method because we would still all believe that the world was

flat. I think that that is the problem with that kind of thinking. Those studies that I have seen, I mean, if we break them down, we cannot do it now, one by one, they just have serious methodological problems. They cannot be counted in my opinion as meaning much, and the cumulative numbers do not add up that way. Unless the methodologies are quite different.

But what it means is that people are, we are all buying into this and we are saying we agree this is the best way to fight crime so let us devote our resources to that, and not think about other possibilities and then that is one of the concerns I have with it.

MR. CALHOUN: Could I just break in there and say you are in a unique position, having been the beneficiary both in the academic community as well as setting them up. Based on your view of the research, were you to dive into a turbulent neighborhood, what would you do differently, based on your perspective, both research as well as kind of existential, having done this?

MR. ROSENBAUM: Well, first I would not come in with a preconceived notion that we want to set up block watch. I mean, when Len referred to this idea that in Minnesota they went into neighborhoods where they were not wanted, that is the whole point. The theory is wrong, and those neighborhoods do not want Neighborhood Watch. They have other problems. First you have to define the problems that are tailored to that community. Communities have other problems that they think are more pressing, and I think earlier people today have already said, let us take these problems one at a time, even if they do not prevent crime in the long run, and show that we can have success. Build some sense of efficacy, even if it is tearing down that building across the street, we

will all feel like we did something. I do not care if it reduces crime. It is like, how do you look out for a suspicious person in a neighborhood where everyone looks suspicious, and you do not know your neighbor? It does not make any sense. There are fundamental theoretical problems with the cookie cutter approach, as you said.

MR. CALHOUN: Okay, there was a hand here.

MS. COHEN: Jacqueline Cohen from Carnegie Mellon. I think that the two of you were not necessarily disagreeing with one another and the issue that underlies the difference was that these are different criteria of success. What you (Dennis) were talking about is real objective measures that crime has been reduced, and you (Len) are talking about a totally different measure of success, namely a community feeling that this program has done something for the benefit of the community. Not necessarily that it actually reduced crime in that community, it may have reduced the fear of crime in that community, it may have reduced the perception that the community was dangerous but it may not have had an objective effect on crime. So there are a lot of different criteria of a successful program and you have to set out what are the criteria you are interested in when you then look at programs and decide whether they work or not.

MR. CALHOUN: Which gets back to this part, what was the problem you were looking at?

MS. COHEN: Yes.

MR. CALHOUN: Yes, hand in the back?

MS. JERGENS: Felice Jergens, Citizens Committee at Crime Center. I am not a researcher or a scientist so I just speak as a community organizer. I think that Mr. Rosenbaum's studies do identify some pretty

important points for organizing. One of the questions is what is organizing and who is defining it. Personally, I do not think that setting up a Neighborhood Watch is organizing. I do not think that any effective law enforcement person would want to be in the position of deciding or saying for a neighborhood what they should do to organize themselves.

Some of the questions you raised were about the efficacy of that and the policy of that. But I do think that this point of tailoring the strategies to the particularities of the neighborhood cannot be emphasized enough. For the next discussion, community policing, I think it is very much the point that it is very easy to tag things that are popular and say, because this is liked and has been popular, do it, it works. I think it is harder to say that we as interveners in a problem in a community do not have an answer to tell you. We ask you to go through a process of analyzing what your community needs and lacks, what the underlying problems are related to your crime situation and deal with that stuff, start dealing with it, get organized around those issues. The issues are obviously going to be very different, based on the economics of that community, politics, whether it has been a franchised community or a community that is cut out of the system or people are organized who do not have friends at city hall like you said. Organizing around those issues is beginning to solve some of the problems.

I think it is very valid that if you are running a program, you cannot go against the tide in a community and advocate things that people do not want to do, that is not good organizing either, but I also think that anybody who is in a policy position, especially from a law enforcement bureau should not be in a position of telling the community



what strategies the community should employ. It is very useful to be able to identify studies that have been done, but I think mechanisms to let the communities decide based on what they are dealing with is very important.

MR. CALHOUN: More of what Chips says has been bubbling up on the importance of process in all of this. The identification of the linkage.

MS. JERGENS: Yes, yes, yes. Have you found that? That what people did had some bearing on the particulars of what they did? How much they tailored their strategy to the particular conditions in the community? How much needs assessment they did before they addressed strategies around that?

MR. ROSENBAUM: Well, the program--is anyone going to talk about the Eisenhower?

MR. CALHOUN: Could be.

MR. ROSENBAUM: Lynn Curtis is. That whole program in 10 cities is designed around a bubble-up strategy, as they call it, to tailor it to the needs of the individual community as opposed to impose particular programs, and they can tell you about the different degrees of success they have had in those neighborhoods.

MR. CALHOUN: Group 4, 1:45 this afternoon.

MS. JONES: My name is Marisa Jones. I am community liaison for the Neighborhood Justice Network, and I have two points. First point is there is a great deal of frustration within the community, and the Neighborhood Watch program gives the opportunity for the community to organize and rally around particular issues and to change the quality of life within their particular neighborhood. The second point I would like to make is what is the definition of a Neighborhood Watch actually? A Neighborhood Watch can entail a great deal of things. For example, if

there is not a major problem of crime within your community or within your neighborhood at a particular time, there are other issues that you can concentrate on. For example, abandoned cars, debris in a particular lot. As long as the community is organized, and I would like to make that point, what this woman said in the corner, as long as the community is organized and they deal in issues that are changing the quality of life, I think that is the major point.

MR. ROSENBAUM: It is not. Then it is not a watch. You can call it something. I know what you are saying. They are calling it watch and it is a nice vehicle. It could be anything but they are not in the business of just watching out for strangers.

MR. CALHOUN: A hand here?

MR. HOETMER: Gerry Hoetmer with ICMA, International City Management Association. My viewpoint is from a public administration point of view. I am not a sociologist.

MR. CALHOUN: You are the noise makers?

MR. HOETMER: Yes, we are the noise makers. We look at things from a budget point of view a lot of times. It is kind of interesting. We have got a group of people here who are focused on crime prevention. However, our budgets, whenever I look at a city budget and I look at the police budget, I tend to see most of our funds going into response as opposed to mitigating or preventing or even recovering. Yet, then we have a lot of social scientists who look at that very small amount of money that goes into these very specialized programs and then they spend all of their time focusing on what works. But all of these programs are sort of tangential to where most of our money goes which is into response, this vast bulk of money that is sitting there.

Now I see a study like this, "crime study finds recent drug use in most arrested." You know, we tend to sometimes confuse cause and effect, and I think this may be one of those instances. This seems to me another way of hardware fighting drug, putting more hardware and looking for this thing, this drug epidemic which is causing our crime problem. In other words, another reason for us to put more hardware than manpower into fighting this insidious thing here that is causing our problem. It is perhaps something else, that the drug problem perhaps is more of an effect than a cause.

MR. CALHOUN: We had a line here. I had one more hand here and then back here.

MR. BRADSHAW: Real quick comment. Bob Bradshaw from Reno, Nevada. I am going to take a cynical approach to Dennis's comments because I think the reason that local government, police, city councils, get into these programs is not for the crime prevention. It is because we are trying to get the community to understand we have a service to provide, and we do not have a good acceptance of that. I think, as an image approach to it, is the problem you ought to test because it is a mechanism, it is a tool, any of these programs are.

MR. ROSENBAUM: It is a P.R. Most police departments count the number of blocks they organized.

MR. CALHOUN: Is that what you meant?

MR. BRADSHAW: Yes, I think we try to do that. First we got into Neighborhood Watch because LEAA funded a lot of it, and most of us were having trouble in our communities getting people to even accept the fact we were out there trying to do a job. And I suspect, in my community we are in a lot better position than most because we do not have a lot of

motivation. We do not have the crime problems or the ghetto problems that other communities do have, but we still have a problem with the community accepting the effects. So whatever program is a vehicle to accomplish that means.

MR. CALHOUN: Let me double a question back to this woman here for a minute and then we will get to you, David. I think one thing that has come out and one perhaps positive thing that can be said about communities feeling better about themselves with the Neighborhood Watch approach is that they begin to get into other things. Now, have you seen that translated practically in terms of either better x or better transportation, better letter pick-up, better x, better y?

MS. JONES: Yes, I have.

MR. CALHOUN: Have you seen the sort of systemic translation that Bob was talking about?

MS. JONES: Yes, I have, in the Boston area. Basically our agency concentrates on the urban crime-related issues in Roxbury-Dorchester. After the crime issue has been controlled to some degree within their neighborhood, they tend to go on to other issues because the group is basically organized strongly and there are other issues in the community. This is an opportunity for them to use the Neighborhood Watch as a tool.

One group in the Roxbury area had a problem as far as low income housing. They worked through the mayor's office and bought an abandoned building within their community and it is being rehabbed for low income housing. That is one of the particular issues that they concentrated on. Another, smaller issue was abandoned cars in their community. They worked with the Boston Police Department and the mayor's office to do that, just for the problem that there were so many.

There are so many other issues that the Neighborhood Watch groups do get into, just to develop some form of maintenance, and then when the crime does head back into the community again, fortunately they are already organized. They already devote those ties with administration or with other contacts within the community, and they can work on that.

MR. CALHOUN: So you are saying that this can translate into some political power to gain services that are needed.

MS. JONES: Most definitely.

MR. DOBROTKA: David Dobrotka, Deputy Chief in Minneapolis. I work for the infamous Tony Bouza. He is a wonder man, and you can all tell him I said so, I spoke very highly of him and you can quote me on that. There was a comment in the back that I heard earlier talking about how someone from law enforcement would not want to tell communities about the issues that are important in the communities. I think I would disagree with you. We in law enforcement do a wonderful job telling people the kind of services we are going to provide to them whether they want it or not, and I think we have done a very bad job in doing that. We are the professionals and we tell people exactly what police work should be.

Chief Wadman spoke about the assumptions or the measures, if you will, of police work, and I think if you look from coast to coast, you would see an amazing similarity in police departments. We arrest people, we arrest misdemeanants and felons, we write tickets, we answer calls. I guess in my mind, I am asking, are we really doing what we should be doing? I would ask Professor Street, are you not suggesting perhaps that the current model of police work is not necessarily what it should be? Is there not a different model or something that is dramatically changed that we should be looking at, and if so, how do we get there? What are we looking at as far as law enforcement?

MR. CALHOUN: Just before the break, you have a rather large question.

MR. DOBROTKA: By the way, I am not convinced we are doing that right. In fact, in a lot of areas I am convinced we are doing it completely wrong, and I am very curious to hear your comment.

MR. STREET: I am a very strange mixture of traditional and non-traditional so that for example, with respect to one traditional approach in the role of research, I am not so keen on that. I am not sure research gives us, especially social research, gives us what we think it gives us. I would raise many questions about this as a strategy for finding out things. There are a lot more ways of knowing things, and perhaps especially in relationship to social science, there are better ways in finding out things than by research. I know that is heretic, but I do believe that.

Secondly, I also do not believe in throwing out the baby with the bathtub. I believe that there are obviously a number of functions that are performed by police departments that are essential and must continue to be performed. I have no question about that at all. I would also say that if we are really serious about using communities as a base for making changes, we are going to have to see some changes in police and in police work and even counting. I agree that one of the things we do is we set up ourselves by the way we measure things, and maybe we are counting the wrong things. Certainly, Inspector Campbell of the British police was making a very strong argument that we absolutely count the wrong units, but I do not think we would know what that is until we get there.

The other thing is I really would also caution the business about time. I do not know how many times within three or four years of Head Start we have pronounced it to be a failure and within two or three years it was pronounced to be a success, within three or four years it was pronounced to be a mixed blessing and now we are coming back and looking at it again. We do not know. I think, even such basic questions as multiple criteria for setting up the programs we are evaluating, we do not even know what time span to look at. What is the time span that we should expect to start changing people?

I also agree with you. If we do not tell people what we think we should be doing, how do we ever get anywhere? That is a little bit like saying we have a goal, but we are not going to tell you what the goal is. I believe that people not only are ready to listen, to be told, but sometimes they come up to you and say, tell me what to do.

MR. WADMAN: Can I add an editorial to my comments? The thing in the comments that Mr. Ordmeier made regarding our budgets, you know, what we look at. We measure our ability to react, to respond as has been indicated. Sir Robert Peale, back in 1830's, said prevention is the goal of law enforcement, but yet it is like Trans World Airline keeping track of the number of times its planes crash rather than the dollars that it makes for its stockholders. That is exactly what we are doing in police work. We measure all of our failures, reacting to a crime that has already been committed. But I feel real apprehension right now in that I feel like I am the emperor who has no clothes or the master of a group of placebos. I mean, for example, is the Operation Identification the key to the door or is it Neighborhood Watch? Which of these placebos do police chiefs reach for when, as I did last week, talk about the increase in

crime in Omaha? What are you going to do about that? Well, we do have the community interaction but the police department finds itself on that point, trying to choose which of these programs. We have no knowledge as to how they have an impact or do not and often were afraid to stand up and say, well, we really do not know.

MR. CALHOUN: Two more before the break. This is the hand I missed and then Gwen.

MR. KLEIN: Sid Klein, Chief of Police in Clearwater, Florida. I want to build very briefly on a comment that Mr. Street made that I believe is true. If you are going to have any measure of success in inviting crime in a high crime area, then you have got to build an organization with staying power, specifically designed to fight crime. So often we have to go into a high crime area where there is no sense of organization, there is no power structure and if there is any, it is often very fragmented. Now, whether Neighborhood Watch really works or not, it often becomes a catalyst that the police can use to make the changes to impact crime in the neighborhood. If it accomplishes nothing else, we know that works.

MR. CALHOUN: Thank you. Gwen, last one before the break.

MS. HOLDEN: Yes, I am Director of the National Criminal Justice Association and we do surveys for the Governors Association. I am calling up on Rod's time and also the gentleman from ICMA. I have a real concern about representation of what it is that we are trying to do. We are representing some of these programs as reducing and preventing crime, and I therefore agree that one of the things we have to deal with is what we want to be telling governors and city managers and police chiefs about these programs that somehow support that contention.



We are in a real prevention role right now. There is money for drug prevention and fire prevention and crime prevention, but it is going to be very short lived. I am not a real research person by any means, but if we are telling them we are reducing crime and these things and we are telling them we are preventing crimes, we have got to do more than talk about expanding understanding and awareness of whatever issue it is that we are dwelling on. We are not doing a very good job of that. We never have.

MR. CALHOUN: Well, we could go on for days. I want to thank you. This has been great.

MR. ROSENBAUM: Can I say one thing in response to what she said? I think that problem oriented policing is a new vehicle, new in a sense, that will integrate community crime prevention with what police do in the response mode in order to bridge the gap and deal with problems.

MR. CALHOUN: You know, one thing that is striking me about what is coming out of this so much is this process issue of Neighborhood Watch as (a) a lever or springboard to which you can refer some sort of sense of cohesion and, (b) a program which can serve as a community legitimizing function and an access to some political power in some of the issues that Bob raised. So we have a day and half to continue it. Thank you very much.

(WHEREUPON THE SESSION WAS ADJOURNED)

THE EXPERIENCE WITH COMMUNITY-ORIENTED CRIME CONTROL PROGRAMS  
(BREAK-OUT SESSIONS)

Group 3: Community-oriented Police Programs

Moderator - Darrel Stephens

Presenters

Chief Jay Carey  
Sgt. David Niebur  
Deputy Chief Thomas Koby

MR. STEPHENS: My name is Darrel Stephens, I am the Executive Director of the Police Executive Research Forum, and I have been asked to moderate this session which is a pleasure because of the quality of the people that are on the panel and the types of programs that they are going to be describing that they have been working with in their departments. Before I introduce them to you and before we actually get into the specific programs, there are a couple of things that I would like to focus on.

One is the kind of programs you are going to hear about, and I use the word program in kind of a loose way because from my perspective and from the perspective of bringing the people that are involved with these community oriented policing, problem oriented policing efforts, view it as a philosophy of policing. We view it as a way of providing police services that we have not really been involved in before--a reorientation of the way the police approach the community and the way the police approach the responsibilities that they have to that community. So we call it a program but I think once you hear some of the people from police departments that are involved in that, I think you will quickly recognize

that it is not a program to them, that it is a philosophy and it is almost a way of life as to their views as to the way police departments ought to operate.

The other thing I would like to share with you just came to me recently in the most recent issue of the Harvard Business Review. There is an article in there by Peter Drucker who is my most favorite author on management and management issues. He wrote an article on what he calls the new type of organization, an information based organization of the future, and there are several things that I would like to read to you from that article to kind of get you to thinking about this philosophy of community oriented policing and the impacts that it is likely to have on the organization itself and where that is going to take us in the future.

His article is about business and about the future direction of business, but I think it is very, very important and appropriate to the discussion that is going to follow. Drucker says that the typical large organization of the future will have fewer than half the levels of managements of its counterpart today, and no more than a third of the managers that they have today. Businesses, especially large ones, have little choice but to become information based. Demographics, for one, demands the shift. The center of gravity in employment is moving fast from the manual and clerical workers to knowledge workers who resist the command and control model that business took from the military a hundred years ago. That statement is very appropriate to the police officer of today, and the type of programs that we are going to hear about.

In the information based organization, the knowledge will be primarily at the bottom, in the minds of the specialists who do different work and direct themselves. The information based organization will also

pose its own special management problems, and there are four that he highlights as being the most critical. Those of you in police organizations and those of you that look at them and observe them and work with them--I think some of these problems you will begin to see or maybe have seen already in the organizations that are moving from a reactive type of just responding to calls for service to a proactive, involved community organization.

He says the most critical are developing rewards, recognition and career opportunities for these specialists; creating a unified vision in an organization of specialists; devising the management structure for an organization of task forces, ad hoc groups coming together to deal with problems and issues and then dissolving and going on back to what they were doing before; and perhaps most critical, insuring the supply, preparation and testing of top management people in this kind of environment. We are going to go to organizations in the future that are flatter. Some have gotten flat already, not by design but by necessity but that is the type of business feature that we are looking at and I think the organizations and policing that are involved in these kind of efforts are probably for once well ahead of the curve and on the cutting edge of just organizational development and organizational management. Well out ahead of the businesses who, like many of the police departments that are not involved in this kind of thing, still rely on the command and control system. The information that they gather is basically designed to control, not to make decisions on what we ought to be doing to serve our communities.

We are going to go through the presentations from each one of the people that we have on the panel, and then we will open up the floor. We can discuss and have the opportunity to pursue whatever questions about

the particular programs or the concepts or your observations that you can share with the group and we will open it up for general discussion. We will start with Jay Carey, who is the Chief of Police in the city of Newport News, Virginia.

MR. CAREY: Thanks. A traditional approach to law enforcement has been responding to incidents. We get the call for service, we take the report, somebody investigates the crime. Problem oriented approaches to police focus more on things in the aggregate. Not just responding to what I would call the symptoms, the individual calls, but beginning to look at the underlying issues.

Within our city, we wanted to do several things. That is, to identify and to solve the problems, to be cost effective in the approach that we took, to see if the process can be institutionalized, to see if it can be transferred from one jurisdiction to the other, and also in this whole process, to see if we cannot not only use information sources that are beyond the traditional scope of information that law enforcement utilizes but go beyond to the outside community, obtain information from other places. Traditionally we get information from incident reports and we get crime by day and location and things like that.

Also in the application of responses can we look at new and innovative ways of responding to the difficulties at hand. Within our city then we had a twofold process. One, identify and solve problems. Two, develop a mechanism or a process by which we could do this and have it become institutionalized. We did identify problems that have been well reported in the literature that you have available to you. The process that was developed, what we call the problem/crime analysis model, gave the officers a methodology by which they could more aptly begin to bring

to bear resources that they might not ordinarily consider. For instance, part of the process that we have is scanning, and that is really the heart of this analysis. Scanning is to go in and look at the problem using approaches differently than we have before, and then to utilize the information that we have. Without the visual aid ability, it is hard to draw the schematic but if you have got your book, you will be able to refer to it, not right now, but later.

Recognize that the crimes and problems are a series of events, not necessarily just one single event, but a series of events related either by time or location or other means. You will find that there are different role players. There are the actors who might be the victims, the offenders, or the third parties, the witnesses. You have the incidents themselves. We begin to look at them in a different context than we have before and in the model it is called the social context and the physical context and we find there is a sequence of events. Then we have responses that you devise or that result.

Now, we could spend two hours just talking about the model. I do not want to focus on the model. What I want to focus on is the attitude or the philosophy or the approach that we actually use. What has been significant for us in our city is that as problems are identified, either by the police officers on the street or through the management process that we have and our goals and objectives process, we look at problems. Not in the sense of "I respond to this domestic call or we have gone to this 7-11 because we have had civil disorder calls there. "But we begin to look at the issue in aggregate, and we say, "Okay, we have had to go to this 7-11 so many times or we have this number of burglaries over here or we have this problem over there." What has happened is police officers

have become deeply involved in not only identifying problems but actually seeking out methods to resolve the problems, which goes beyond the role of policing as has been thought of in the past. So the police officer says, "Okay, I think I have a problem here." A problem is identified and he goes in and he does his analysis part or she does her analysis part. And we begin to use resources other than just the reports. We begin to go talk to people and get involved in the community policing concept and we seek solutions that are not necessarily traditional.

I want to give you one example because time is short, and that is coming from our report that we have just done. We do an annual report anyway. We have 15 problems that we are working on within the department. We have a mobile home complex called Worth Mobile Homes. A couple of officers were assigned to look into the burglary problem there because in a semiannual analysis that we did of particular crimes in our city, that one came up sort of like an exception report. They went in there, and they said, okay, we will apply the model to it. In applying the model and beginning to focus on the problem and not just the symptom which were the burglaries, they found in talking with the community residents that there were other difficulties that had to be dealt with.

The residents felt, and this is in communication directly with the residents, the residents felt that the following were the most serious crime problems. Remember, we thought burglary was. Reckless driving, juvenile problems, drug, burglaries, dogs at large, larceny, management, talking about the Worth Mobile Homes management, drinking in public, destroying property, and loud music. We found that by becoming involved that there were a whole wide range of issues that needed to be dealt with, not just going out and trying to solve burglaries which would have been the traditional police response.

The bottom line result was that the police officer is the catalyst in much of this. The bottom line is that the officer worked with the management of the Worth Mobile Homes who worked with our city's Codes and Compliance Departments, the traffic engineering and the local Boys' Club to address the problems and concerns identified. These initiatives resulted in a letter and response from Traffic Engineering which ended up requiring the street lights they did not have. City Council passed an ordinance granting the police authority to enforce traffic violations on the private property for which they had no authority previously, and a summer youth program to sponsor 38 boys for membership in the Boys' Club was paid for by the police officers of that particular patrol station and subsidized by the Boys' Club.

The initiatives, of course, resulted in great publicity for the police department. But what was most important was we found out we ended up resolving a whole wide range of issues and problems, and not just the burglaries because many of the problems took care of themselves by having the youth involved--the reckless driving, of course, with the greater enforcement; and the street lighting, and reducing the opportunity for crime. That is one example.

We feel confident that that is the approach that can be of great benefit to law enforcement. It is a tool, one of many tools, and it does not mean that we no longer arrest people and take names and do those traditional kinds of things that law enforcement has had to do in the past. We still do that. It is successful in our department because the police officers become motivated through success. They are involved, they are seeing things from the beginning to the end, and they are actually



becoming project managers as it were, in resolving those issues. There are a whole lot of other things that we could talk about but we can, I think, cover them in answering questions.

MR. STEPHENS: We are going to. Sgt. David Niebur from the Minneapolis Police Department is going to share the experiences with the RECAP unit.

MR. NIEBUR: The RECAP unit is the Repeat Call Address Policing Unit. Its concept came from a number of places. Some of it was based on a study in Newport News, but primarily it was the idea of Larry Sherman and the Crime Control Institute in Washington, D. C. It was a one year experiment funded by the National Institute of Justice. Let me preface my remarks by saying that I am 25-year veteran of law enforcement, having served in both the suburban department and big city department and been involved in a lot of jobs, including being the head of the robbery-decoy unit. So I have been involved in a variety of assignments, but never have I been so excited about something as I am about RECAP.

Initially, when I was asked if I wanted to be interviewed for the job, I said "Absolutely not! It would be too boring." But I was very, very wrong. What RECAP wanted to do was gain control again of the police department, have the managers manage it again because the running of the police department had been taken over by a 911. Police respond to 911 calls immediately and the managers, no matter how many orders they may give, really have no control over the police department. Sure, they institute rules and regulations which are followed usually, but really the managing of it has been taken over by 911, and the number of calls to 911 are increasing in more systems. So, it has become a Dial-a-Cop system where the citizens of any given city really have taken over the management of the police department.

In Minneapolis, we found that while some homicides are put on the back burner, when the people called up and were locked out of their cars in 1986, the police immediately went to that location and got them out of their cars to the tune of 15,000 police calls for lock-outs in Minneapolis in 1986. By looking at our calls, we were able to convince the city council, and even Tony Bouza who believes in great public service, that it was just too expensive for the cops to do it. Locksmiths are now doing it, and their names are given from a randomly selected list.

But in 1986, five percent of all police calls were for lock-outs. Four percent were for noise complaints, and one percent were for picking up already arrested shoplifters. RECAP officers were given a list of all police calls. We went through the top 2,000 addresses, and the RECAP unit was given 250 addresses to work with, which were the top addresses out of the 2,000. Eliminated were police precincts, city hall, hospitals, children's shelters, because for the most part, these were the places where crime was reported and not where crime was occurring. We were dealing with 125 residential and 125 commercial addresses.

Roughly, the threshold for working on the residential addresses was 38 calls in 1986, but the average was much higher and in commercial addresses, the threshold was 75 calls. The top address had 812 calls in 1986. That was a department store, and primarily for already arrested shoplifters. That will give you some idea of the numbers. These 911 calls were answered immediately because that is policy, when, in fact, National Institute of Justice research shows that people do not necessarily demand that the police respond immediately. People really do not necessarily care if the police come at all, as long as they are told

when they call in just exactly what is going to happen or what will not happen. But, we go on being dictated to by the 911 system, so RECAP wanted to take a look at this policy.

We found out that there were 321,000 calls for the police in Minneapolis in 1986. Originally our unit was comprised of four officers and a commander. I was not the original commander. The original commander won a Bush Scholarship and is now in graduate school at Harvard, so I was asked to take over his job. We subsequently added a fifth officer for a shoplifting program. What we found was that 68 percent of all shoplifting arrests took place at just 24 stores in Minneapolis; and to bring that in even narrower, we found that one-third of all shoplifting arrests took place at just eight stores. So the RECAP unit used the power of Tony Bouza to gather all these people, the owners of the eight stores, at a breakfast meeting, where we made them a proposition.

The proposition was this. We will set up a program. We will train your people. When you apprehend a shoplifter, we do not want you to arrest them. We want you to give them a letter. We want you to identify them, and take their picture. If they are not identifiable, call the squad car but otherwise phone the report in over the telephone. We will look at these people in a six month window, because we also did research which showed that none of these people were doing jail time because judges did not consider misdemeanor theft a serious crime. In Minnesota, we have a law which allows us to aggregate the theft amounts over a six month period, anywhere in the state. The total amount of money can be added up. Once it reaches \$200, they are charged with a gross misdemeanor. Once it reaches \$500, they are charged with a felony. In just four months, we were able to charge 24 people with felonies who normally would

have been charged with a misdemeanor. After the six months were up, we charged the other people by complaint--sent them a letter telling them to come on into court for your shoplifting. The program has worked so well that we are going to adopt it city wide next month.

The officers went out to a RECAP address, and prior to going out they analyzed the 1986 calls, see what type of calls they were. They would then go to the location, diagnose the problem. Sometimes we had to do that two or three times because we misdiagnosed the problem, but then, in a joint effort to reduce the calls, we worked with management. This was very foreign to many of the police officers. Some of them were 25-year veterans. They were burned out working on the street, but they found this work very enjoyable. They had to deal with slum landlords, irresponsible business owners. For the most part, historically, the police have been on the side of landlords and business owners, but this all changed, at least for the officers of RECAP.

You will be surprised at just how effective the small cost of a registered letter is to the results that it will produce. We sent landlords letters who would not even return our phone calls. We sent them letters on department stationery saying that unless you contact this office within 48 hours upon receipt of this letter, you will be charged with ordinance such and such. It was different because landlords never before had been dealt with on a criminal level. They were always dealt with on the civil level, the housing inspectors and so on. Every one of these letters has worked.

One person that we went a registered letter to was out of town. Before I got to work at 8:00 in the morning, he already had three phone calls on our office recorder saying "Please do not arrest me, I am in

Tennessee. I will contact you as soon as I get back." This was because we went from the civil field into the criminal area in my opinion.

One of the things that I was told when I was interviewed for the job of RECAP Commander was that one of the biggest obstacles that I was going to find was the housing authority, public housing, because no one could even get them to answer their phones. I could not believe this. They are political animals. They have to answer their phone. But, Larry Sherman was right. They were the toughest to deal with. I went to Tony Bouza after about two months and said, I would like you to call the head of the housing authority for the city and tell him unless there are some changes made, some action, some phone calls returned, that we are going to tell the press that the Minneapolis Housing Authority is the biggest slum landlord in the city. Needless to say, before I got back to my office from Tony's, there was a phone call from the head of public housing.

We did not get results right away, though. Even Tony Bouza's power, and he is very, very well respected in Minneapolis, by the way, even that did not work. What we had to do finally was go to the media. When it appeared on a front page story, we got results. They are changing the authority that they had given their housing guards. They were not previously armed, so if they did get a call to a housing establishment, they had to wait for the police to come there because they were not armed. They could only answer a very, very small percentage of the calls. So the housing authority is finally coming around, and they were a late bloomer, by the way. This has only really happened in the recent months. They are going to put their own people in the high rises. They were paying a private agency \$650,000 a year to basically do nothing but be window dressing at these places.

So that part has worked very well. We have used the press. But one of the toughest things in a RECAP process I found, was to instill in these police officers who primarily were street cops that they have a lot of power, they really do. They have the power of the city behind them and they have the power to make a lot of changes. In all my career, this job has shown to me that I really make a difference in the city that I work more than any other thing I have done in law enforcement. You really have a bottom line in RECAP.

We found, one of the biggest resistances was within our own department. We found by analyzing all of these calls that even after the 1979 domestic violence study in the city of Minneapolis by the Police Foundation, after a rule change in the department that mandated arrest and reporting procedure in domestic violence cases, that the cops were still not following this policy at all. I was not a very popular guy around the department for a while because we insisted that this be followed to the point where the brass were called in, and after a lecturing by the Chief and the Deputy Chiefs, they said, "What do you want?" We told them, and in the following 30 days, our arrests doubled and our reports also doubled and that has continued to this day, and that was back in August.

But, we had to go a step further. All the way up the ladder in the criminal justice system, we asked committees of the people from the court systems and corrections for help because we were going to start sending them lots of numbers. Unless you take the domino effect into consideration, just arresting them is not going to be a panacea. So we did use the power of the Chief of Police and the power of the press.

We tackled such people as Ashland Oil Company who, I am sure you have read, is responsible for the oil spill in Pittsburgh. They

originally would not return our phone calls. They would not make any changes at their convenience store. They were not arresting shoplifters. They were letting them go out the door with their merchandise and then after they were two blocks away, they would call us and we could not do anything about it. There were curfew violations at one of their stores. We sent them a letter. "Unless you call us within 48 hours, we are going to have your license revoked by the City Council." It cost us \$2 to send a registered letter.

The next day, we had a meeting. They had four of their executives there because this was one of their most profitable stations. They told us that their surveys told them that their customers did not want this. We insisted and they were back to us within a month saying you people were absolutely right. Our national surveys were wrong. Our customers have written us letters already saying they like the security there. Our employees have a higher morale. So their information was erroneous. I would just like to close by saying that the final results of RECAP are not in right now. All the officers in the unit are writing a book. We are spending a month and a half writing about what we have done in the last year, and hopefully it is to be published by the West Publishing Company. It will be available through them or the Crime Control Institute. But that is something different for cops to do, too, to write a book about what they have done.

We closed a couple of bad bars in the city. Larry Sherman talked about that this morning. One of the places, the city officials had accepted as an open sore for 20 years and expected us to accept it. Well, we did not accept it and it is going to soon be closed. We have more than enough evidence to close it.

In conclusion, I just might say that RECAP officers have to justify their existence. A lot of cops do not. They really do not. In fact, as long as they show up for work and do not make any waves, in many cases that is okay. We have a lot of hard working cops, but in this particular unit, we have a motto. You have all heard this saying, "the buck stops here." RECAP's motto is, "the calls stop here." We think it works very well. Maybe RECAP really is the reinvention of police work. Thank you.

MR. STEPHENS: Moving right on to Assistant Chief Tom Koby from the Houston Police Department.

MR. KOBY: Thank you. I was intending to do this presentation using overheads but that did not work out because of the set-up so I will wing it.

On behalf of the Houston Police Department, Chief Lee P. Brown, I would like to thank you people for having me here and putting up with me for the next 20 minutes, 15 minutes or so. It is an honor for me to be here, especially in the presence of such great people as Al Reiss and Behan and Kelling and some of the other people that I have looked up to for a long time. I asked Chief Brown why he was going to send me to this particular conference and he said, "Quite frankly, Koby, because I cannot go."

I said, "Beyond that, though, why are you sending me?"

He said, "Because of your role in the implementation of neighborhood oriented policing. You have got to understand, we have this whole problem with definitions and the differences between some people calling it community based policing and problem oriented policing. We just developed a new name. We call it neighborhood oriented policing."

But he said, "I am sending you because of your role in the implementation of neighborhood oriented policing."



I said, "That is strange because really, my role as assistant chief is just that I know the guy that knows the guy that knows the guy that knows the guy who actually does the work. So why don't you send the guy who actually does the work, and that is the patrolman on the beat? That really is an indication of the emphasis, the change in emphasis of the management philosophy of the Houston Police Department that will support neighborhood oriented policing. Instead of controlling police officers, which is the way most systems are designed, our system is designed to assist police officers in accomplishing what it is that they need to accomplish.

Now, when I was asked to come here, I was asked to address several things. The program, the goal, the strategies, the problems, the current goals, activities, evaluation, impact on crime, continuing challenges and transferability, all in ten minutes. We have been about the development of this process for six years so I cannot do it in ten minutes but I will hit some highlights and I will use the handout in just a moment to get through the explanation of what we are doing in Houston.

Let me first give you some key characteristics of the Houston model. Number one, neighborhood oriented policing is not a program. It is a process. A program by the definition implies that there is a beginning and there is an end, that is what programs are. We have had our share of programs, probably as many programs as any department in the country. Right now, at this moment, I have 38 programs in my command. I am the commander of the field operations command, that is, the patrol force of the Houston Police Department. We have school task forces, we have storefront programs, we have cantina squads, on and on and on.

What we did in Houston is we took all of these programs and reevaluated them, and we tried to determine what it was in each one of these programs that we liked and what was successful about it, and we took all of that and developed what we are now calling neighborhood-oriented policing: How are we going to do the job we are responsible for doing?

Neighborhood oriented policing, as much as a new way of doing things, is a new way of thinking about doing things. We are not trying to reinvent the wheel but what we are saying is we are going to change the culture of policing, that is, the way that our people think. Beyond that we are saying that if you want good policing in a community, we accept the fact that we cannot do it all and the community has responsibilities that they have to live up to and roles that they need to play in order to have a successful policing program. So as well as trying to change the thought processes of the officer we are trying to deal with the community and that requires education, a lot of education in both of those areas.

The third key characteristic that I would like to point out is that in neighborhood oriented policing, the effort is to make us a part of the community, not apart from the community.

Now, I will go into the handout that you have to describe how that is going to work. Looking at it all at one time, the graph gets kind of busy, but what we have done here is we have tried to demonstrate a couple of things. First, these interconnected circles are one circles out of focus. And the idea is to bring the circles together so that everybody is focused on the same thing. At this point in time in the Houston Police Department, the responsibility for the implementation of neighborhood oriented policing falls on the field operations command, and we accept that responsibility. But along with that, there are a lot of issues that

we need to address. There are training issues, what kind of person do you recruit, how do you train him in the Academy, how do you put him in the field in the field training program and what do you teach him. What do you do in in-service training, first line supervisory training, middle management training, middle management training, executive training? What are the linkages between those training programs? How does it all tie together to accomplish your objective?

Command operations management system. In the field of policing there is no such thing that we have really been able to find as a management system. We have seen a lot of good managers, a lot of styles of management, but we do not see a management system. What we are saying is that the Chief has goals and objectives that are passed on to him from the Council and Mayor, he has his own agenda. How does that information get down to the bottom, and the bottom in the Houston Police Department, as well the patrol officer, is the community. How do you take that information at the top and break it down and dissect it at each level of the organization so that people at each level of the organization know what it is that they are responsible for, and what their role is, and then when you get the message clearly communicated from the top to the bottom of the organization, how do you get results? In policing today, we have random preventive patrol and that gets you random results, and the Houston Police Department does not want any more random results. We want planned results and we want to know when we get results, we want to know, at the top, what those results are. So the system not only has to drive the information down, and there is a lot of things pushing the information down. But how do you get the results accurately communicated all the way back up through the chain so that people know how they fit into the

picture and what they have succeeded in doing and what they did not succeed in doing? So that is very important to us.

Communication networking, that involves turf fighting, things that come up about that. Evaluation, we have got to start evaluating what we do. I have got 32 programs. I cannot tell you that they are all successful or not successful, achieving their goals, not achieving their goals. I can tell you that everybody likes them because we just tried to cut one out because of losses in manpower. My desk is stacked that high with letters and petitions and all those things, but I cannot say that that program is really accomplishing its objective so field operations is dealing with all these issues, and traditionally things have been left to patrol. That is where we are responsible. Everything ends up in patrol. That is where it has got to be done. But we are saying "No, folks, everybody has got a part in this."

We will move over to the internal systems, and that applies to every other command in your department, including the Chief. There are a lot of things the Chief has got to do. Policy issues, if you are saying you are not going to control officers, you are going to support officers, what does that do to your policies.

The investigative operations commands. For us that is our detectives. What is the role of the investigator in neighborhood oriented policing. What is that role? How do you tie that investigator into the community? Training issues related to that, technical issues.

Professional standards. For us, that is internal affairs, that is inspections, that is personal, and that is the training academy. I have touched on a couple of those things.

But one key issue is performance evaluation. Not only do you have the system of the department that now you have to look at it a little

differently and try to determine how you are achieving your objectives. But individually you have to determine you are asking officers to do new things a different way and it is just not going to satisfy them that you are doing a lot of bean counting. You have got to go out and give them credit for what it is you are asking them to do, and if you do not change the performance evaluation system, you are not going to get where it is you need to go so that is an issue that still needs to be resolved.

Support services. For us its dispatch, and anybody who is involved in operations knows that that includes jail dispatch records, but primarily for neighborhood oriented policing, it is dispatch. If you do not get things lined out and dispatched, then you are just not going to get things done right in the field. Such things as supervisory override, 911.

The issues of 911. If you have got a call that is put out over the air, and that district manager--we are calling our first line supervisors district managers, they are responsible for managing the resources that they have available to them--determines that there is no purpose or that there are other things going on that are more important than that call, then he has the ability to override that dispatcher. There are not many departments that right now have that capability. At least we do not. I should not have said that most do not, but at least we do not and that is an issue for us.

Then you move over into the external systems. We are saying, folks, in a community everybody knows that it is to your benefit to have a first class, top notch police department. Houston recently, the Houston Oilers wanted to move. I would have been glad to see them move, but there are a lot of people that said, we will spend \$50 million, no, we will

spend \$100 million to keep the Houston Oilers in Houston. It is nice to have an NFL football team, but if you do not have a class act in your police department, it hurts you a whole lot more than losing a football team when you are trying to attract new business and all of those other things that cities want for themselves. So there are a lot of things in the external system that have got to address that.

A lot of people have got to get on board and have got to know what their role is, what their responsibility is. They have got to know what the department is trying to do and how they fit into that picture. So we have done a pretty good job in a couple of areas, most departments have, and that is in the schools and the city clubs, but what about corporations? It is to their benefit to have a good police department. They acknowledge that. So we are trying to develop partnerships with corporations where they understand what they can do for us, and they try to do it for us. Human welfare and human service agencies, a lot of the things that we are doing is really going to increase the workload, the need for those people, because we are going to have a lot more referrals, and we have done some things to address those issues. We have made a lot of contacts with those people. We are working on that.

Elected officials. Think of the benefit that you have in the department if your state and local representatives know what you are about, understand you and trust you, what you are doing. In the local media, if you have problems, I mean, the media can destroy you. If you have developed a bond with your community, a real high level of trust in your community, when you have problems, they will accept the fact that you have problems. The test is, will they let you deal with your problems or do they expect knee jerk reactions in order to put quick fixes on things that develop?

We recently tested that because we had a major problem and, in fact, it worked. The community, instead of being up in arms, sat back and basically their attitude was "We are content with letting you identify the problem, you made the problem public, you did not hide it from us, and we are confident that you are going to fix the problem so that is a real change instead of just being slammed."

I will move on from that, but one last comment on the model. You will see West Side Command Station. The West Side Command Station is a new command station in Houston where we are actually implementing the process of neighborhood oriented policing. There has been a lot of discussion about the definitions. What is it? The definition of neighborhood oriented policing for Houston is as follows. Number one, it is an interactive process between police officers assigned to specific beats and the citizens who either work or reside in those beats. Number two, to mutually develop ways to identify problems and concerns. Number three, to determine viable solutions to address those concerns, and number four, to provide both department and community resources necessary to resolve identified problems. Lastly, and I will conclude with this, we have done a lot of orientation sessions in the department. We have spent a lot of time orienting our people, mid-level, managers, to the concept of neighborhood oriented policing.

We begin training or orienting the officers week after next, and in one of the orientation sessions, after the session was over, one of the supervisors, a sergeant, came up to me and said, "You know, Chief, it is real simple. It works like this and you have got a good title there." And I thought, "I like simple things." So he drew this out for me and said,

"Here is what you have got. You have got neighborhood oriented police, police oriented neighborhood."

That is what happens, folks. It is very simple. Thank you.

MR. STEPHENS: Thank you, Tom. Okay, you have had three different approaches, different organizations as to how they have accounted. Are there any questions?

Three approaches to becoming more proactive, more involved with the community, less reactive. The floor is open. Pin them down, pursue them, make your observations. The time is yours but be gentle.

MS. JERGENS: This morning they talked about community oriented policing and some emphasis of some of the speakers here was problem oriented. I think that one of the speakers this morning was asked to clarify the differences and I think that the presentation of what is going on in the three cities helps for me to get a point, and I want to see what the gentlemen think about this.

It seems that if we could have the entire police force in a city approach police work in the field the way you describe and the officers had a reward system that kept them able to perform with this orientation and not leave the field for other career opportunities, that the problem oriented approach would be adequate. But one thing that concerns me is building some stability in the community. Then something is there and the officer moves on. The approach to the work needs to also include, and I wonder if you include this in your training for officers or what experience you have with it, that institutions get built in the community that can keep addressing all the problems.

In fact, the workshop that just left here, the speakers that just left here before you walked in were these three community models of



dealing with problems in the community. It is like we have two worlds there. We have community leaders who have said, "We went and did these things because the police department could not solve the problem in our neighborhood, and now we have police officers come and say the Police Department is doing these things because there are gaps in how the community is addressing its problems." There has got to be a connection.

It seems to me that the officer can make that connection by creating some place where everybody regularly talks to each other and makes agreements, has an action plan that does not hinge around the officer making the phone call but teaches community people how to make the phone call where the politician had to hear his community or whatever. The police chief had to hear the community. So I just throw that back to you. I am running over anyway.

How do you bring the two together? It is not just the role of officers who are very dedicated doing a great job.

MR. STEPHENS: Jay, do you want to answer?

MR. CAREY: I wish I had a photographic lip reader. Maybe those guys, we ought to get the same workshop together. We perceive problem-oriented policing where we can actually be a part of community or neighborhood oriented policing. Ours is a method of carrying out a philosophy and the philosophy is community-oriented policing. Police in my opinion are the most visible public agents in the community. They are the folks that citizens have the greatest contact with or at least see the most often. Therefore, they're the most accessible by the way. Because you call the cops and the cops come out generally. Therefore, we can be agents for change and catalysts for causing things to happen within the community and that is why we are about doing what we are doing.

MR. NIEBUR: I can answer that. In Minneapolis, we already have started moving in that direction. Kay Storey, sitting at the table over there is the Director of Whittier Alliance. We worked together on one of the problem addresses. In fact, it is one of the worst apartment buildings in Minneapolis. Their organization and RECAP worked together to get rid of a crack house by documenting the trouble there, bringing pressure not only on the landlords but with the backing of the police administration in Minneapolis, got help from the precinct involved where we did a saturation on the building.

And in addition to working with such groups as Whittier Alliance which I think is one of the best groups in the country, we now have a program called SAFE. I think Lucy Gerold may have addressed you earlier about SAFE or she is going to address you tomorrow. In SAFE, 15 police officers are working with 15 civilians. It is a team, and both members of the team are paid. We had a meeting just last week, jointly, RECAP and the SAFE program. We are going to work together because many of the problems are alike. So I think we have a long way to go, but at least in Minneapolis, we have started that process.

MR. KOBY: Good comments. It is very simple. It is not a program. It is a process. One leaves, you have got another one just the same, the same process that he is using comes in behind him. You have got to remember the key points of the communication process. You have got contact. You have got communication, you have trust developing and then you have an information flow. That works every time if you can establish the contact and the trust. So your comments apply to programs, and when programs change, what we are talking about is a philosophy. It is a process that is going to be the way business is done in the department so there is a difference there. I think you are absolutely right.

MR. STEPHENS: There is another observation I would like to make on that comment. I think, in some communities or some cities, the impetus for the police becoming more a part of that community comes from the community. In other places, the impetus comes from the police department. In both of those--depending on the nature of the problem, sometimes it is identified by the community, sometimes it is identified by the police--but however they get together, they begin to get together and work in understanding that problem and trying to deal with it.

MS. WYCOFF: I think it helps when you institutionalize something with a structure that stays in place even when people move on as the police suggest is a problem. One of the structures that I think helps accomplish this is something that one area in one of the districts in Los Angeles is doing in Hollenbeck. They use their senior lead officers, who are the third advance level patrol officers, to be the community officers. They, in turn, in that area, have organized their block captains, neighborhood block captains, into a similar system so that they have a senior lead block captain who is in charge of calling regular meetings of the other block captains and keeping things organized. That senior block captain is the liaison with the senior lead officer for that area so those are positions that exist. They are viewed by the community and by the police department as significant positions as people come and go, either in the community or in the department. Those positions keep being filled and people always know who the contacts, what the positions are that are their contact points and so they have had a fair amount of turnover like any organization would through those positions but the process stays in place.

MR. HOETMER: Gerry Hoetmer with ICMA. How has training changed or even getting the kinds of individuals that we are drawing now to the police service changed, with problem oriented policing or neighborhood policing?

MR. KOBY: Nobody has the answer to that yet, quite frankly.

MR. HOETMER: Are you trying different types?

MR. KOBY: What we have done or we are in the process of doing right now is we have ripped every system in the department apart. The disciplinary process, the recruiting process, the training process, the performance evaluation process. You have to get all of those in sync if it is going to work. The difficulty is that there is no place to go to look for the model and so you have to bounce off the curbs, and we know we want to be down there, right there. That is the vision, but how do we get all of those things in place to support that? We know the traditional way of doing it is not going to be it, but we have got it all in place.

You have got the four roles of the police officer. I mean, we look at it as there are four roles of a police officer. There is a traditional law enforcement role. Now you have the role of a planner. You have the role of a community interacter and you have the role of a problem solver. So what kind of a person do you need that can develop skills in all those areas, still doing the traditional stuff because we are never going to get away from that, but who now has human interaction skills that can be developed, communication skills that can be developed but also can be analytical and do those kinds of things? So we do not have all the answers.

MR. CAREY: In Newport News, the approach that we have taken in terms of institutionalization of the process, I think that is what we are

all about. It is a part of the department's policies and procedures so it is codified in effect. It is a part of our annual action plan, our goals and objectives which involve all levels of the department from the chief through the police officer. It is a part of what we call the Field Training Officer Program. When a police officer cycles through, after he gets out of our regional academy--we have a number of police departments that use the same academy--he is going through working with people in the department and getting all those little blocks checked off. He is given an exposure to this process then. Then we have actually a model, a checklist, by which the officers can go by to help go through the problem solving effort.

We are in the process of developing and getting signed off on what we call a fourth level police officer. Incorporated within the job description of that fourth level police officer, which is an administrative promotion process open to all the police officers, will be a great deal of emphasis on the ability to utilize problem oriented policing. So we are doing what we can to have everybody involved. In addition, we have brought it up and had schooling and in-service training and for the supervisors an in-service training.

MR. STEPHENS: Yes.

MR. ALPERT: I had a comment that I am enjoying listening to this, and especially being a sociologist and we are getting criticized by the police as being vague and conceptual. I want to turn the tables a little bit. I can agree with all three of your programs and all three of your ideas in the neighborhood. Which to me is a little bit more homogeneous than a community, which is more homogeneous than a city. In a smaller area which is homogeneous, these things may all work, but how do you deal with the dissension. If you make one group happy, you may make another

one unhappy. I guess it is a political question. How do you direct your energies and attention if you have conflict in your neighborhood, community or area?

MR. CAREY: We have not had that in a long time quite frankly, where dealing with one community or one neighborhood problem is going to disenfranchise somebody else.

MR. ALPERT: Within the neighborhood, within that small group you are looking at.

MR. KOBY: It is a matter of communication and trust. Nobody is saying that they have got a panacea for this whole thing. What we are saying is that you come together and you communicate and as far as the police are concerned, you have that beat officer that works in that area that helps develop the discussion, and then there has to be some prioritizing of the issues and what is it that is going to be addressed, and there has to be some consensus.

MR. ALPERT: Are you not assuming that a lot of people are going to come forward with their problems and their questions?

MR. KOBY: No, in some cases they will not. There is not, we are as diverse as any city. We have a large Hispanic, a large Asian, a large black population, and there are going to be times where there are going to be clashes. So what does that mean, we do not go forward? We will just address those issues as we come to them.

MR. STEPHENS: Dave?

MR. NIEBUR: I would just like to preface my answer by saying that the only reason we were vague was because of Darrel's two minute sign. But in Minneapolis, under the RECAP concept at least, it is just a matter

of setting priorities. In the experiment we had 250 addresses, far too many, far too many. Under operational RECAP, we will have 50 addresses. I think it is just a matter of addressing your priorities. You cannot please everyone.

MR. STEPHENS: Bob?

MR. BRADSHAW: I guess I have a general question on the other side of that issue. I have run into the experience where people are accusing us, both internally and externally, of overstepping our bounds, and Jay's example is good. You identified a lot of things in that trailer court, some of which fall within what people would agree are police responsibilities but some of them do not. How are you responding to some of the other city organizations, and your own internal traditionalists, that are saying, "Why are we doing this? We cannot get our regular job done." Does that make sense?

MR. STEPHENS: Mark and then Susan.

MR. HOWARD: Mark Howard from Seattle. I guess my question is how, as departments, did you come to the decision you wanted to try this approach?

MR. STEPHENS: Before you answer that, are you going to, are you responding to Jeff?

MS. MOWERY: I am also with Newport News. One of the ways that we do it is it is not a small separate unit. Everybody works problems. Every officer from the street level we have had deputy chiefs that have worked a problem utilizing the smaller one. Because an officer is working in one neighborhood on a specific problem does not mean there is going to be another officer working a different type of problem on that same street, which we have had. We work problems that are citywide. We utilized this model on DUI enforcement.

We can go as small as one, a half of a neighborhood block, or as large as citywide. So we have 32, 35, 40 problems working at the same time and the officers are usually from the community that identify the problem itself. If it is abandoned vehicles, then we will just go to the abandoned vehicle officer, but if it is on private property, we will go to code compliance. Nine times out of ten, codes compliance will say, "Yes, we know that is a problem and we just have not gotten around to doing it. "Or when we took a look at an apartment complex that had problems, five or six agencies got together. Everybody had the same problem but they were at a loss because they did not want to attack it separately. They all got together, looked at the problem and solved the problem. So we do not isolate a specific problem. That is the only thing that has worked in that area. In one neighborhood there may be three or four problems being worked, and if it is identified, yes, we will work on it then.

MR. STEPHENS: Bob?

MR. WADMAN: I do not want to interrupt Mark's comments, but in Omaha it is the idea that is stronger than our Army. It is an idea whose time is come and we have all been beaten to death with the failures of the system over the last decades and now all of a sudden as this idea is presented to the community, I do not think there is any way we can turn them back to the past. It has got to just go forward no matter how we want it.

MR. STEPHENS: Frank, could you comment on the first comment?

MR. PALUMBO: I am Frank Palumbo from Clearwater, and I have had the unique experience of working in a homogeneous environment where everybody agreed on their problems and agreed on the solutions. Then I



moved to an area where they all agreed on the problems but nobody could agree on the solutions. Our approach is to break the overall problem down into smaller problems, more manageable problems. We had 17 civic organizations in this one area. They all had their own viewpoints and their own approaches to the situation, and part of our goal was to pick out problems that they could agree on a solution to, and also solutions that would not only address the problem but be beneficial to the community in other ways that they could all agree on. Once we showed success in those particular areas, made the problems smaller, then they started seeing other points. Now, we have not succeeded yet because we have got a long way to go but we have gotten less and less and less resistance and more and more and more cooperation as we proceeded through this process. We have a long way to go. It is an interesting point. It is not easy to do.

MR. STEPHENS: Let me go back to Mark's question which was why did these departments --

MR. HOWARD: Yes, what did you see that led you to this or why did you make the decision to progress into this type of policing?

MR. KOBY: That is easy. Lee Brown said so.

MR. HOWARD: What happens if you do not have a Lee Brown or somebody like that?

MR. KOBY: Lee Brown came to the Houston Police Department roughly six years ago, 5.5 years ago, and he had a vision. He will acknowledge he did not know how to implement it but he had a vision of what he wanted to do. We started out, went through this development phase of doing all these programs, and it was genius on his part. Whether it was intentional or not I do not know. But what happened by going through that process was

that everybody in policing was discontented with the process that they now operate under. I mean, the patrolmen do not like it, the supervisors do not like it, the management. Everybody is saying it does not work, but they are just afraid to step out and do something different. What this did for us was it exposed us to the possibilities. We brought in OASIS, we did fear reduction, we did this, we did that.

Young people in the organization got a taste of what the possibilities were and a very appropriate comment. Then we went into the executive session and Chief Brown said, "Okay, now what have we learned? Let us put it together into a package that we can then work to implement department-wide, across-the-board, from top to bottom." And we are going about doing this.

MR. DOBROTKA: Where are you in the process?

MR. KOBY: There was a comment in the other session that this is tough, this is work. This is not where you walk in and everybody is happy. We have done it. For instance, we just got through doing a series of 11 one-day orientation sessions for every lieutenant and sergeant in my command. That is about, roughly 680 people met with the Chief, myself, my panel--Tim Oettmeier was on the panel, some of you might have met him--people in the department that had been involved in this process and truly believed in it. We sat there and we explained the history of the development, some of the successes, the concepts and where we are planning to go. The Chief sat there all day long, I sat there all day long. We hammered it out with these people, lieutenants and sergeants. That was one of the things. We went through that 11 times.

We have just finished going through that. We plan to move in stages. We are not going to jump out and say that the whole organization

can get into this at one time because the systems are not in place to support it. But in one area of our town, the systems are in place to support it. That is the new West Side Command Station. We have just completed a series of three-day orientation sessions with every sergeant and lieutenant out there to give them a real in-depth overview of what it is--the one day session expanded, but also, how we plan to go about doing it. The last day was spent doing nominal group techniques with them, answering the questions or dealing with the questions of how does this concept impact your job, where do we go from here, that sort of thing. Then we did another three day session which we just finished two weeks ago with my whole command staff, all my Deputy Chiefs, all my Assistant Chiefs, I mean, all my Deputy Chiefs, all my captains and everybody that is on a training task force that has ripped apart our training programs, giving them that whole dose. So that is where we are.

I have a lot more speech that I can give.

MR. NIEBUR: It was started in Minneapolis by the Crime Control Institute of which Tony Bouza is Chairman. Larry Sherman, doing some preliminary investigative work, having a vision that there had to be a better way for the cops to answer calls, was able to document it to the city council. Tony Bouza then made us an offer we could not refuse, and, as Chief Wadman said, believe me, now that the city council has seen how it works, there is no going back. They would not let us go back, but it took some work on the part of the Crime Control Institute but not that much. Documentation, and I think that is the name of the game, documentation, that is how our program started.

MR. STEPHENS: Let me answer Frank's question, and then we will go on to Keith and then come back. Jack?

MR. CAREY: Okay, with respect to Newport News, very quickly.

There were three people in my opinion that had the vision of what things could be like. One person at NIJ, Bill Salisbury. Gary Hayes then, Director of PERF. And Darrel Stephens, who was the Chief of Police in our city. Those three got their heads together and created something that could be looked at, and there was a climate ripe for change in our department, with people really excited about doing something different than the traditional orientation of policing. That is what has happened.

MR. STEPHENS: Okay, Keith?

MR. BERGSTROM: I would just like to reinforce what Tom Koby said, and perhaps I can say it more strongly than he did because he is the one who brought it up and he is a little bit modest. The incredible commitment that Lee Brown's staff made for that in terms of the Chief and Assistant Chief sitting in the meetings day after day, that is taking it out of their hide. Because all the other problems keep stacking up, the union problems do not go away, the crises on the street and the media, they are stacking all those problems up and coming back to them, and it takes an extraordinary commitment to do it on that side. On the other side, to argue and fight and confront and debate with your sergeants and lieutenants day after day, psychically will get you down, too. So it is an incredible commitment and that is probably what it gets through, that incredible commitment. Short of that, it will not work.

MR. STEPHENS: I think Bob was next.

MR. WADMAN: Just for trying to explain this, I found a little package that works well. It is this idea that the medical model has three parts, reacting, prevention and wellness. If a heart attack victim had a heart attack, we used to race to the scene, cover them, and get them to

the hospital--where all they could do was thin their blood. Look at what they can do today. But now for prevention, we have stopped smoking, stopped drinking excessively, --

MR. STEPHENS: Take an aspirin every other day.

MR. WADMAN: Yes, take an aspirin every other day. And finally to this idea of wellness. I mean I crow in the morning, I have had so much chicken over the last 30 years. I did not even know what cholesterol was 10 years ago, and now look where we are. The easiest way to describe the system is to say, expand the organism. We are moving from reacting to an individual's health problems, to preventing an individual's health problems, to creating a wellness concept of a perfectly healthy person who has never had a moment's ill health. Expanded to a neighborhood, the same things fit, ideally. We are talking about how to create a healthy neighborhood. Are there unhealthy neighborhoods in Houston? Unhealthy neighborhoods in Omaha? What are the differences between healthy ones and unhealthy ones?

MR. STEPHENS: Jeff, that is a hard question.

MR. ALPERT: It is a simple comment. You folks were dealing with the wellness and prevention. We had the heart attack here in Miami, and with the riots here and everything had not changed. On the one hand, as you were saying, it was easier because something had to be done. But on the other hand it was disaster. Congratulations to you folks who have changed without the heart attack.

MR. STEPHENS: Susan?

MS. MOWERY: I wanted to ask the gentleman from Minneapolis, is this a separate unit? Do you have any intentions of going department-wide on it?

MR. NIEBUR: Not in the immediate future. We are going operational, but at this time, no. We did call in all of our sergeants, and I have to say that this gentleman in the back here is absolutely correct. You have to have total commitment from your administration because without it, RECAP never would have survived and never would have been successful. We called in all of our sergeants for a training session on just exactly what RECAP was going to do for them and what they can do for RECAP. So we do have RECAP people of sorts out in each precinct. But at the present time, no, we are not going city-wide because we work city-wide. We are going to try it that way for a while.

MS. MOWERY: The reason I asked is that I can see, as a police officer it would look exciting. It would be exciting to work in a district and find an area that you know has a lot of calls. Do they come to you and say, "Should you look at this area?"

MR. NIEBUR: Yes, they do. And last year, we could not do something for them on every address because we were limited to our experimental addresses. We will not be now, so we encourage that from the officers. We are now going to have, in this coming month, we will start in our in-service training program, telling every officer about what they can do so every officer in the department can find out what they can do and what we are doing.

MR. STEPHENS: Dennis?

MR. ROSENBAUM: Is anyone going to say anything bad or do I have to do it? I think it is a great idea. I think that problem oriented policing is here to stay. It will spread across the country the way Neighborhood Watch did five years ago, but it is much more difficult. My own opinion is that it is very exciting and we cannot turn back at this

point. But there are going to be lots of issues that need to be resolved, that will be raised over the years. How are we going to keep track of these officers and evaluate their performance? Is the police chief going to lose control over the police department? Who is making the decisions? I mean, there is a lot of issues, but I think it is very exciting. This issue, especially in big cities of lots of conflicting--they are going to referee conflicting groups arguing about what the problem is. A lot of times it is one group against another and it could get rough. But it does not mean we should not do it. It has to be done, it should have been done years ago. It is exciting to see it.

MR. STEPHENS: And it may not be any rougher than it is today.

MS. HART: What were the reactions from the police associations or unions, can anybody comment on that?

MR. CAREY: We do not have one. We have a social organization, we do not have a union.

MR. WADMAN: Maybe I could comment. You know, I have heard both sides and I am really excited about the things that Lee is doing and Tom has talked about in trying to get everybody up to speed. But I worry whether they're going to slip back. There is always that chance. I mean, you take the hard line, old homicide detective who has been trained as a homicide detective, who has been patted on the back as a homicide detective, who has style and commendations and reputation. It's all housed in that old charisma, and now all of a sudden, we are going to say, "No, we still need that, but that is not a value in the department any more."

I think that sometimes if you do not have some of the structures in place to sustain it, there is a tendency to want to fall back in that

trench. But I just think the community sees the idea so clearly. It is cost effective. I mean, you can ask the citizens, "How many of you would like this idea?" And most of them will raise their hand.

You ask them, "How many of you would like to have your taxes raised?," and none of them will raise their hand. This can have a cost effective impact and I just think that it has got to be sustained. But from a union standpoint, it is scary. Police officers are traditionalists. They want to keep the ideas of law enforcement and sustaining tradition as synonymous. So we are taking these tradition-sustaining people and asking them to change. The very organization whose responsibility it is to keep things the way they have always been is the paradox.

MR. KOBY: I would disagree with that. The reason I disagree is that it makes sense. The reactions that we are getting from the patrolmen, and the unions are different. The unions they are basically standing back and saying "We will see what happens," but the individual patrolmen are saying "It is about time you guys figured this out." Because it makes so much sense and they are miserable in their jobs and they welcome the opportunity to be creative, to do some other things.

The problem comes in -- I do not totally disagree -- the problem comes in at the middle management, upper management level. Those are the people who have bought into the traditional system. They are not real happy with it either but they are comfortable in it, they know they can survive in it. That is where the problem is. The patrolmen are using it. They really are. They want the change. They will go right along with it.



MR. STEPHENS: Jackie?

MS. COHEN: I thought what you said did not seem to ring true because the example you gave, maybe the example was bad, the homicide detective. It seems to me that this new kind of policing is an augmentation to it. You are always going to need homicide detectives and what you are doing is extending the kind of autonomy, creativity, initiative, that the homicide detective has always been able to exercise to other problems and to other officers.

MR. WADMAN: I think Tom said it more clearly really. It is that there are those people for whom, this is fearful. I mean, the old charismas are now in jeopardy. What they used to be commended for, what they used to be looked up to, both in the community and in the department, are now in question. So new, bright lights and the young patrolmen shine now. It is that old salt and maybe mid-level management in most organizations that--they are not saying not to do it because the good sense of it is so obvious--but there are those tendencies to want to hold on to the past.

MR. STEPHENS: Dave?

MR. DOBROTKA: Well, I agree with both of them. We have officers that are totally in favor of the RECAP concept. But we did have one particular union board member who was especially a visionary. RECAP was designed to reduce calls for police service, and his fear was that if you reduce calls for police service they will cut cops. I mean, that is the kind of resistance you see.

MR. STEPHENS: Keith?

MR. BERGSTROM: With respect to the union issue, I agree. Maybe the hardest group to really get along with is mid-management. But with the unions, the point was made at the Wingspread Conference this summer

and Kelling made it this morning, sooner or later we have got to have the union leadership sitting in the same room with us, talking about community policing. Because if we do not do it, we could inadvertently have problems, even if the individual officers might see it as an advantage.

We are not sure how the unions as institutions are going to respond to this and that was brought up in August. It is now January. Kelling is right, and I really would recommend that sometime in the next six months or year there be a workshop involving union leadership, police leadership, and representatives of community policing. Get them together so we do not have a problem and maybe just stop.

MS. JERGENS: I will throw one other resource into that which is the community. In New York City, I think that the community control officer program too often has left the education of the community to the individual beat officer who is new to the job. They have brought in community people at a more influential level. You have very tiny units of government called community boards, with district managers and heads of community organizations getting several hours-long workshops like you are doing in Houston for your own management people.

They are fantastic fighters and defenders of the concept, not just the officer. They are just one piece of the pie but I think they are really important. Community leaders will understand the potential of this type of police work and not just see it as another nice officer. They do not see it as foot patrol which is what their community tends to see it like in New York. They tend to think it is just an officer who is more accessible and not the whole approach of problem solving.

MR. STEPHENS: Mercer?

MR. SULLIVAN: Mercer Sullivan from the Vera Institute. I wanted

to try to get to that same kind of question of liaisons with the community. I see a lot of exciting consensus about the internal departmental tasks that have to be performed. But it seems to me that for this idea to work, to stretch it all the way, the police officer almost has to assume the function of a community organizer. We have heard from some of the community organization people that where this works best is where there is some established base in the community where people know that they can go and talk to a local person who is influential--where they can initiate some kind of regular contact, where there will be a channel of information both ways. But then thinking back to some of the things that Lloyd Street and Larry Sherman were talking about this morning, unfortunately a lot of the places that need this the most are the places where that is going to be the hardest to find--where it is going to be necessary to create it where it does not exist.

So my question is that it seems to me that you need the expertise of community organizers. Have you thought about where to go for that and how to get that kind of training?

MR. KOBY: I think you are talking about community interaction, not the police department going out and organizing communities. I cannot think of a community in Houston where there aren't pre-existing organizations of one sort or another--either religious or community or business or something. It is very rare that we have encountered the need to go out and organize. Now, coordinate is a different issue. You might have to coordinate some efforts but going out and organizing, being the 1960's with community activist organizers--I do not see that as the need.

MR. SULLIVAN: I do not mean that they have to solve all the problems of education and everything else in a community, but that there needs to be some kind of regular forum, some kind of regular meeting.

MR. KOBY: Well, what we are saying is we do not expect our people to be re-inventing the wheel. It is there. Use what is there.

MR. STEPHENS: Go ahead, Sid.

MR. KLEIN: I would like to comment on that. Perhaps I can add some insight. Our department is one of three in Florida that have agreed to participate in problem oriented policing. The reason we did it is because Darrel bribed us. I think one of the measures we have been able to accomplish is that when we agreed to participate in the program--having been convinced that it can work in other communities and being sold by the street officers in the other departments because they showed us the degree of enthusiasm--the mechanism that did it for us in starting to work is that the media in a community needs to thoroughly understand what the police department is trying to do. There needs to be a thorough explanation to the media of what you are trying to accomplish.

Then the existing institutions in a community--the business community, the church community and the homeowner associations--would seek you out. Naturally, they will seek out the police and ask them to participate, using this model.

MR. STEPHENS: Okay, two more comments. Howard and then I think Dennis had a comment and then we have got to go.

MR. HOETMER: Two incidents recently, which most of you have read about in the paper over the last week. One, a raping and sodomy of a young black girl in the Poughkeepsie area of New York. The second the shooting of a white police officer in Dallas. Racism and the kinds of things that Lloyd Street mentioned this morning. What is different about police work, problem oriented policing, neighborhood policing? I realize

the interaction with the neighborhood is clearly important, but are we addressing this up front, that there is a problem of racism in this country? Are we being clear about that? Is there a difference here than the old, traditional way police used to be?

MR. STEPHENS: I think the points that Lloyd made this morning were very real and very important. From my observation of this whole movement around the country, from the police perspective, the people that are involved in it, they are making a much stronger and more sincere effort to engage the community in problems that both the police and community experience and deal with. The issue of racism--I am not sure anybody is dealing with it with any kind of effectiveness, up front and sitting down at the table and talking about the issues in the way that Lloyd was talking about. But I think the beginning of the dialog with the community, they interaction on trying to solve the problems, puts you at the stage where you get to know people a little better. You get to understand the situations that people deal with from the police perspective, from the community perspective. The foundation is beginning to be laid where maybe some of those issues can be dealt with.

MR. WADMAN: I am chomping at the bit.

MR. STEPHENS: Thirty seconds.

MR. WADMAN: It is just that we are ducking the race issue in law enforcement. I think we have ebbs and flows of dealing with it, but we have a serious problem facing us. This long, hot summer is a word I heard a decade, two decades ago. I still hear it, and it is an issue that we need to recognize the challenges of. Right now, those people that can afford to buy security are buying it. Alarm systems, condominiums, all the things in residential places for people to live. So are public

housing units. Shopping malls have their own security. So do inner city business areas. The security issue is really one that we are not recognizing in full view. As people buy security, do they increase their calls for service or decrease them? I think they decrease them because they have better security. As they decrease them, the police force is shrinking to the inner city. So we have this increasing municipal service in the inner city.

Right now, how are we dealing with that? We look at the black-on-black crime issue from a really distant perspective. The population of black people in penitentiaries is something that I think we police chiefs have often been under the table about. One of the things that was very unique in Omaha through our replication of the Minneapolis study: in domestic violence, we found that 33.6 percent of our calls for service--not the times that people are involved in criminal activity but calls for service--come from the black community.

We have used a pluralistic approach in dealing with affirmative action, that we ought to be representative. In Omaha, the work force is 9.5 percent black. We have 11 percent black police officers. That is not the solution. I think the solution is 33.6 percent so that those that are using the service are replicated in the service.

MR. STEPHENS: Okay. Dennis, last comment, and then I get the last word.

MR. ROSENBAUM: Okay. As problem oriented policing continues to expand full blown to entire police departments, I think we are going to begin to see new demands on the job for the officers. I just hope that we begin for once to start thinking about, not three day training sessions, but what it is going to mean for the selection and training and police

academies. For the kind of officer who has the public relations skills, the mediation skills--whatever it takes, especially in some of these tougher areas--the problem solving skills, that you do not teach to someone who came to this job because he likes taking names basically.

MR. STEPHENS: Thank you for your participation. I apologize if I overlooked somebody or got to you a little bit too late, but it was a good discussion and I appreciate it very much.

(WHEREUPON, THE SESSION WAS ADJOURNED)

Group 4: Community-based Anti-crime Programs

Moderator - Lynn A. Curtis

Presenters

Robert Jagers

Scott Jeffery

Milton Cole

MR. CURTIS: Good afternoon. My name is Lynn Curtis. I am from the Eisenhower Foundation. I am sorry I was not here this morning. I got in late last night after a long plane trip. I am glad to see everyone here, so many of my friends, so many new people. I think we have got three very good presentations this afternoon. We are just going to take them in the order in which they are on the agenda here. Each person will speak for 20 minutes. I will have some follow up remarks and then we will open this up for questions. It is 2:22 now so I figure, we are supposed to run until four.

MR. REISS: The schedule is moved up a half hour.

MR. CURTIS: So roughly 3:45-3:50. All right. So our first presentation this afternoon is by Robert Jagers who is listed as Center for Successful Child Development. But he is really with the University of Chicago. He is the evaluator, and we know it is important to identify the evaluator as someone from a separate institution from the institution that is getting evaluated. So Robert Jagers will make our first presentation.

MR. JAGERS: Good afternoon. The Center for Successful Child Development is an early intervention program designed to provide intensive and comprehensive services to children born in a very high risk community of Chicago. We serve families from the time the mother becomes pregnant until the children enter kindergarten. While it may seem odd to hear



about a program for young children and their families at a conference such as this one, as some of you know, there is a growing body of evidence suggesting that certain types of early intervention are very useful in assuring that children at high risk will resist participating in delinquent behaviors later in life. For instance, the Perry Preschool Project in Ypsilanti, Michigan, offered 68 low income children, ages three and four, either a teacher-initiated or a child-initiated preschool curriculum. It was determined, at age 15, that children offered the child-initiated curriculum reported only one-fifth the acts of property violence and one-half the number of acts of personal violence, drug abuse and in-family offenses as those assigned to the teacher-initiated curriculum.

Relatedly, at age 19, program participants had also apparently increased the number of persons who were literate, employed and enrolled in post-secondary education. It seemed to reduce the percentage who were school dropouts, labelled mentally retarded and on welfare. A cost analysis of this program has shown that by age 19 every dollar invested had already saved another three dollars for taxpayers.

Another program worthy of mention is the Syracuse University project. Eighty-two children from low income families were enrolled in daily, high quality child care beginning in early infancy and lasting until they entered kindergarten. In addition, program staff had weekly home visits with the families. During these sessions, families were assisted in coping with issues in child rearing, family relations, employment and community function. This component of the project was seen as particularly important, as such things like lack of parental and child

involvement, parent-child conflict and family disruption have been related to juvenile problem behavior.

When children were between the ages of 13 and 16, data were collected from court records on the incidence and severity of delinquent behaviors. Only 4 out of 65 or six percent of the program children had been placed under supervision of the Probation Department, while 12 out of 54 or 22 percent of the control children have required such supervision. Moreover, for eight out of the twelve control children involved in crimes, the nature of the crime was serious or chronic delinquent behavior as compared to one out of four of the program children. It should be pointed out that the cost to taxpayers for the legal problems of the control children have already paid for the program.

These are not the only examples of the successes of early intervention. Evidence is rapidly accumulating from follow ups of children in Head Start programs, family support programs, and the like, which indicates that early intervention can have some socially desirable impact on children and families who are at risk. Today, I would like to briefly describe a program that is beginning in Chicago called the Center for Successful Childhood Development, or more commonly known as the Beethoven Project.

The notion to create the Center for Successful Childhood Development originated with Mr. Irving Harris, who is our speaker at the luncheon tomorrow. He is a Chicago businessman and philanthropist who firmly believes in the importance of the first years of life to the development of healthy and productive individuals. He had challenged the federal government to match his financial support for this project, and

has since been successful in attracting additional private funders to assist in this effort.

The program has been developed by a coalition of individuals at the Ounce of Prevention Fund (a statewide organization that sponsors preventive intervention programs), the Chicago Urban League, and the University of Chicago. The Center for Successful Childhood Development is located in the Robert Taylor Homes, a public housing project on Chicago's south side. The Taylor Homes is reported to be the country's largest project, with 20,000 official residents, all of whom are black. Thousands of other unofficial residents also live within the 28, sixteen-story buildings. Residents are relatively isolated from the rest of Chicago as the Taylor homes are backed against an expressway and bordered by other abandoned neighborhoods as well as other public housing complexes.

Within the community, there is considerable unemployment and few employment opportunities. As you might guess, many of the symptoms associated with urban poverty like a high incidence of street crime, substance abuse and single parent families are also prevalent. There is minimal building upkeep and/or maintenance so gang graffiti, trash, broken elevators, windows and lack of hot water and heat are also common occurrences.

Certainly children in this community are at high risk. The infant mortality rate is one of the country's highest. Over 20 percent of the infants are born at low birth weight and roughly 20 percent are born to teenage mothers. On standardized educational tests, children score at least a year behind at first grade. Gang activity in this area is so pervasive that gang recruitment of children begins as early as seven to

eight years of age. Once, this was seen only as a problem for young men but local police say that gang activity among young girls is also beginning to increase. So, when taken together, with the adult street crime and local violence, it is not surprising to hear a program mother say that there are days when she insists that her children sit on the floor to eat as opposed to sitting at a table because of stray bullets..

Despite the rather grim picture I have painted of life in the Robert Taylor Homes, we at the Center for Successful Child Development (CSCD) are convinced that positive change can be brought about using the best of what is already known about early intervention and building on the integrity of families in the community. Our enthusiasm notwithstanding, however, the program was not well received initially by other community based social services, nor by people in the community.

Among the other agencies, there was the perception that CSCD represented competition for the participants, funding, media attention and the like. Therefore, it became important to develop lines of communication and to reassure these agencies that the intent was not to duplicate efforts but to supplement what already existed. Indeed, many of the service agencies in question were designed to assist with existing problems while CSCD's mission is primary prevention. However, because there was a need for ongoing collaboration as well as community growth, agencies in the community are frequently invited to training sessions and other formal events at CSCD.

In terms of the community residents, many were subjected to or aware of the social experiments that occurred in the 1960's. As such, there was a lot of resentment and anger generated by yet another "well

intentioned" program being introduced into their neighborhood. Despite their impoverished surroundings, it is important to note that people and families in such communities have some a sense of integrity which should not be ignored or underestimated. Because of this, and because we are purported to be a community based program, it is essential that the community be treated with respect and that comments and criticisms about the project and their daily life experiences be heard and responded to accordingly.

In full operation for only a month now, CSCD serves six buildings in the Taylor complex. These six buildings all feed into a common elementary school. Approximately 90 children are born a year in these six buildings. The program intends to reach every child with at least some portion of its services which include family support, a drop-in center, early childhood education, and maternal and child health services. We feel that the heart of this program is the family support component.

Some of the greatest problems in the community are isolation, fear, and lack of skill in advocating for one's own interest. As such, we have hired six women and one man from the community to serve as family advocates. These persons were selected from a pool of hundreds of applicants. All of the current advocates are in their late 20's and have had limited work experience. More family advocates will, of course, be selected as the program develops and expands. Each has been trained in some basic social service skills and in child development.

Family advocates regularly canvass the buildings to identify pregnant women and to enroll them in the program. Roughly 80 women have been recruited through this process. The main role of the advocate is to

be a social support to the mother. They work to make sure women are receiving whatever public aid benefits they are entitled to, as well as to address issues like lack of heat, hot water, and broken elevators.

They also offer a specific curriculum in which they help parents interact with their children in ways that will help the child develop social and cognitive skills and a sense of self esteem and competence. Recall that a lack of such involvement has been associated with juvenile problems in various research. Finally, advocates link families with other parts of the program.

The family drop-in center is a 13,000-square-foot facility located on the second floor of one of the buildings. It offers parents a convenient place to relax while their children are provided a safe and stimulating environment in which to play. Two full- and one part-time staff in the drop-in center were hired from the community. Therefore, they understand and anticipate many of the problems that occur with mothers in the community. Moreover, program mothers are encouraged to express their concerns and interests. The staff then uses these ideas for self-improvement and parenting classes and for recreational activities. With staff guidance, parents handle most of the center's daily functions.

Parents select and prepare lunch menus for the children while also handling child case duties. This process helps give parents a sense of personal efficacy and appears to help motivate them to attend regularly. This regular attendance seems to foster growth. For instance, a single mother with five children, all of which were a year apart, came into the center and was having considerable trouble handling her children at nap time. The Center staff, of course, came to her aid. But because the

woman had seen other mothers working more effectively with her children, she began to shy away from participation in the drop-in center. The family advocates then followed up and invited the mother back and encouraged her to join the parent classes where she was able to discuss some of her problems and hear other parents discuss their problems. She subsequently learned that she was not alone. Many of the problems she was having were shared by other parents.

Cases like this suggest, at least to us, that the warm, family-centered environment afforded in such a drop-in center helps parents to have a sense of ownership and some control which could result in emergence of social support groups.

CSCD also offers infant and toddler care for those mothers who are still enrolled in school. This is seen as important as many of the mothers in the community are teenagers. It is also necessary that these young mothers are assisted in understanding how to care for and to nurture their children, though many still require similar nurturance themselves.

Children three and four years of age can enroll in CSCD's Head Start program which features a child-initiated learning activity program and uses parents as volunteer teacher aides. Finally, we also offer maternal and child health care clinic. The staff includes a physician, a registered pediatric nurse and a nurse mid-wife, and we also have a referral service so that more serious or complex medical problems can be addressed quickly and effectively.

Some of the unique features of this program include a comprehensive approach to child development--addressing family, health, and the individual social cognitive needs of children. Secondly, the community

and family-based nature of the program translates into young adults from the community taking a lead role in providing support and encouraging families to support one another for the betterment of themselves as well as the community. This strategy is thought to help develop a sense of community identity for the program. The program also attempts to serve the entire community so that by the time the child reaches kindergarten, his cohort is also developmentally on schedule. Teachers will be better able to serve the children since they do not have those lagging behind the rest of the class.

Some of our more recent activities include: 1) a drug awareness program which will begin in mid-February. The theme of this program is to help families present children with viable options to drugs and drug-related behavior; 2) an effort is being made to more fully incorporate fathers into the project. While we originally had no explicit programmatic goals or services for fathers, there is a growing concern that without this component, lasting effects for children cannot be assured. It should be pointed out that a lot of this realization came from the men of the community who were quite vocal about playing a central role in the lives of the child, particularly around the issue of jobs and job opportunities.

Project evaluation is being handled by Dr. Sydney Hanes and myself. We are attempting to identify variables relevant to children's aggressive and delinquent behaviors and, in addition, to direct observations of parent-child interaction. We are also using parent as well as teacher interviews to assess the significance of these persons to delinquent behaviors as well as to other developmental outcomes.



Consistent with this effort, we are also trying to design father interviews to explore child rearing values and beliefs, and perspectives of criminal and delinquent activities. These efforts are designed to actually get some snapshot of how fathers can contribute to or precipitate delinquent behavior in their children. As you imagine, inquiring into the informal economy and other criminal behavior can be difficult. But we view this information as essential to understanding factors that contribute to later problem behaviors in the children.

It is acknowledged that the evaluation of the center's impact on juvenile and problem behavior, as well as other developmental outcomes, is complicated by the fact that all of our children are to receive all of the services. This makes it difficult to discern the contribution of individual aspects of the program.

We realize that one possibility is a comparison treatments design where an individual is selectively given treatments. But because the program is skewed toward service delivery and not research, research activities are not a priority. Further there are some ethical concerns which all researchers must consider. Thank you.

MR. CURTIS: Thank you. We will move right on and hold questions until the end. It is an interesting balance between the program and evaluation issues there. Our next speaker will be Scott Jeffery who heads the East New York Crime and Fear Prevention Program in East Brooklyn, New York, which I have always thought is a tougher place to work than even the South Bronx. It has not yet become as fashionable as the South Bronx, but you have got your work cut out for you. I know you have done a great job, so, Scott?

MR. JEFFERY: The East New York Crime and Fear Prevention Program is a part of a larger umbrella organization that is the Local Development Corporation of East New York. That services a portion of East Brooklyn. I will give you a few of the demographics. We have roughly a population of about approximately 185,000 people, 92 percent of which is black, Hispanic or other non-white. We have 34 percent of the families in that area below the poverty level. We have the high school in New York City with the highest dropout rate--approximately 61 percent of students drop out before the age of 16. We have the largest territorial police precinct in all the city of New York with the same proportionate number of officers assigned to any other area. All of our crime statistics are on the rise, despite the efforts of our program. Which would lead one usually to ask why they would feature someone like this at a conference like this, but we have made strides forward and I hope to work to that end by the conclusion of my 20 minutes.

The East New York Crime and Fear Prevention Program generally was designed to improve the quality of life. Not so much in making gains but more in the stabilization of the socioeconomic conditions of this neighborhood. Our goals, at the outset, which was approximately four years ago, was to reduce the opportunities for crime, thus minimizing the fear of being a crime victim with a special focus on the elderly people, and simultaneously reducing the causes of crime. We hoped to work with the youth population, ages eight -- yes, as young as eight -- eight to eighteen who were historically committing the largest percentage of crime in that portion of New York City.

Our strategies at the time we set out were, number one, to do a good educational awareness program and we thought that block organizing

was the best way to go. Our original territory was a 105 block area. We had set out to establish block watches of at least 25 percent in each block, citizen patrols on each block, and a youth program council focussing on the program development for better uses of the youths' time. We had set out to do World of Work employment training and career counselling. I should tell you that the unemployment rate at the start of this in our area was 19 percent. It is now 13 percent, still the highest in any community planning board in the city of New York.

We wanted to increase the coordination and cooperation and communication between the New York City Police Department and the residential community that we were targeting, with a recognition on both parts that they should be advocates of one another rather than adversaries of one another. There was this hostile relationship between the two.

Besides the problems, the conditions and negative environmental factors that I have already mentioned, which are pretty devastating in and of themselves, we were a typical ghetto. We had a large amount of disinvestment by property owners, abandonment of property, both residential, commercial, and industrial. The police were viewed as not doing their job, as Lloyd Street put it earlier today, oppressing the people rather than protecting the people. This was only from the residential side, and that created a certain hostility on the police department side because they could not think of what more to do. Quite frankly, they were doing everything they could, and we realized that but our role then, we decided, was to be the liaison between the two groups and work to bring them together.

We had a lack of belief on the part of the residential community that things could ever change. They could not imagine, the only thing they could imagine being worse was to have a nuclear bomb dropped on it. That is really how people came into our office and told us they felt. Jobs leaving the area. The whole industrial exodus problem in the city of New York was very devastating to East Brooklyn, and it created this air of desperation in middle aged people who had only known one job their whole life. All of a sudden they were unemployed and there was no opportunity for them to become reemployed with any other industry in the area.

We had a substantial drug problem which has only gotten worse since crack has become a phenomenon in the city of New York. We had a high number of dropouts which continues to grow, much to my dismay. The ethnic makeup of the community--race is a big problem now. We are the community that borders--if you are all familiar with the Howard Beach incident, East New York borders the Italian-white Howard Beach community, and I already told you what the demographics were of our community planning area. There is also a language barrier with the high Hispanic population. You had needs for this communication with the Spanish-speaking population that nobody could address. In many instances, not even the police department had someone on staff that could relate to anybody who had a problem in the Spanish population.

We had low wage levels. As I mentioned, 34 percent of the people live below the poverty level. Most of them are on public assistance of some type. But also the median income for a family of four in East New York at the time was \$15,700, and you just cannot make it in New York City alone, let alone with four people, on that kind of wage. We had the

general breakdown in family structure which has been kind of lingering throughout all the discussions here. Of the families in East New York, about 36 percent are single parent families with primarily just a mother involved in most cases.

Also, to further comment, we are consistent with the rest of the city of New York in having a housing crisis. The available housing stock in East Brooklyn is the high density projects for housing--federally and state and city subsidized project housing.

What we did to motivate the people to get involved as an organization was to hit them with the cold, hard facts right in the face. We went for it all right up front, and it was either a make it or break it situation. We told them, frankly, as an organization, we had nothing at stake other than the fact that the Eisenhower Foundation and New York City partnership so graciously gave us some grants because we had convinced them that we could make a difference. But aside from that, the individuals that actually worked in our organization had no stake in the community. They did not live in the community. They did not previously work in the community. I am just sorry they did not grow up in the community. They had no family in the community. They had no investment in the community. But our staff did work here and they cared. It was up to the locals. If they wanted to see a turn around, they had to do something themselves. It was time for them to pull themselves up by their bootstraps because, quite frankly, the city of New York had politically turned its back on that area and just said that the ghetto has got to exist somewhere. It already exists there so let us just leave it there. "It is never going to get better," was the mentality at the city and state level at the time.

So we just laid it right on the table with people and added that we wanted their children to have an opportunity to receive an education, and to work locally if they so chose, upon completing their education. We added that it was not going to be done if things did not improve.

If they wanted the ability to come and go as they pleased, they needed to increase the local safety, and most of those people wanted that. They wanted jobs and they realized that we had done a substantial survey of both the residential and business population that existed in East New York and also a survey of companies that contacted us. (We are unlike most areas of New York City in that we have got literally hundreds of acres of vacant property, zoned for both residential and industrial development. We get a lot of contacts on a regular basis from developers of housing and industrial property who are interested in locating there. Upon entertaining potential developers and giving them a tour of the area, each and every one of them identified two problems that would have to be rectified before they would consider permanent location there--the need to improve the security of the area and the image of the area. That is, the amount of illegal dumping and garbage accumulation throughout the area had to change.

Lastly, we told community residents that our whole program was designed to help the people that really did care to come together and work together and represent a large enough majority of the voting population in that area to attack the political forces that had turned their back on them, and get them to make a difference.

We succeeded, obviously. Our funding went from two years from the Eisenhower Foundation and the New York City Partnership for Neighborhood

Safety which over a 30 month period of time gave us approximately \$58,000. We went out and leveraged an additional \$92,500 to put together our program. We just received an unprecedented fourth contract from ACTION to have 10 VISTA volunteers, who serve as the block organizers and coordinators for our program. We are in our second year of funding from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services. We have fund raisers that we now have organized over the entire 105 block area. We just chose to expand our target area by another 150 blocks so we are starting all over again right now.

We have the block associations paying dues now to us. We are looking to become fully self-sufficient. We have created a Federation of East New York Block Associations which eventually will represent the 250-plus block associations and will be able to carry its own staff, only to be supported by our larger umbrella organization. We have received recently from the New York City Board of Education some in-kind contributions in the way of tutorial services for our youth and provision of space for an after school and summer youth training program.

Our current goals have changed. I want to go through this and go back to our accomplishments again. Our current goals have changed slightly now because we realized that the youth are the key to the whole rebuilding of this community. So we have gone away from Block Watch, which has snowballed on its own.

When I came to East New York, this program was two years old. That was in August of 1986. We had 68 block associations. Today, we have 108, and it is not because of me, believe me. It is because of the 10 VISTA volunteers and the other people in the block associations who came, who

surrounded those who were not cooperating, and who pushed them into organizing and setting up Block Watch programs and getting their youth enrolled in our after school program and getting them to participate.

So we have now targeted our program at the youth with an anti-graffiti program which has been very successful and also a new program that we are working on called Adopt a Student. We are bridging the gap between the business community and the residential community by having the local businesses adopt a student in their ninth grade year of high school. As inducement for them to improve their attendance and educational performance, the company offers them part time employment throughout their school year, full time employment through the summer, and upon their graduation, if they so choose, full time employment with the company and also an educational component--paying part of their way to go to college. We just completed our first full year of that. Our target project started with only 15 youths, and they are only in the 10th grade now, so I cannot give you too many of the statistics. But I can say that the students who entered into the ninth grade with grade averages between 65 and 68 left the ninth grade at around 75, so there was some positive impact certainly in their educational performance.

We have also localized something unique in the city of New York and maybe even nationwide. I do not know that much about the Crime Stoppers Program nationwide, but we have localized a Crime Stoppers Program now. The New York City Partnership, the New York City Police Department, and WABC in New York City together have this city-wide program where they typically choose some violent, unsolved violent felony and advertise it throughout. We do that on a local basis. Once a month, with the input of those three groups as well as our community block associations, we select



our own unsolved violent felony in East New York. We advertise it through our mailing flyer. We advertise it and have signs posted throughout the business communities. We are in our third month of that. It is a little bit more difficult to set up than we originally thought because of the reward system, but we are in our third month. One of the three cases is now going back to court so we are well on the way to solving one of those felonies which had been outstanding for about 2.5 years.

We have established drug education and AIDS education awareness programs for our youth, both of which are problems of epidemic proportion in our part of the city of New York. We have now just started to work with public transportation as obviously the cheapest and best way to commute around the city of New York. We have got an excellent transportation system but it is so run down that nobody even wants to use it so we are now undergoing with the Metropolitan Transportation Association an improvement program, and we are going to be establishing a Train Station Watch which will be done collectively from the Block Association Watches that surround that subway station. So that is another one of our current goals that we are working on.

Again, to continue, right now we are at a fairly good standing between the residential community and the police department. There was a severe shake-up throughout the city police department that everybody knows about. That brought in a new Deputy Inspector to our precinct. He fully adopted our programs and our ways of doing things, and we continue to work very well together.

The impact on the crime and fear that we have had and the evaluation that has been done--number one, there is the Eisenhower

Foundation Report which is included in the package from the conference. It says that the people told them that yes, we have succeeded in reducing the fear and the crime in the area. Fear, yes, I will buy. Crime statistics, no. We have not impacted on those but what we have done--and this has been done by our office and by the people themselves and I think it shows in what we have been able to accomplish as an organization--is that the people that do care now do act together and are working together and they are taking over their community. They are collectively closing down crack houses themselves. They are not dependent on the police department to do it. They are identifying people who are negative factors on that block or in that part of that community themselves and putting these people out and doing it in a very cold-hearted way, but it is a way that works.

These people have their life savings tied up in their property, the ones that do own property. What they have got in possessions inside there home, they want to protect because they cannot get insurance for their properties. (It is still a community that is red lined and those things are not going to change until the image in the area and the security issues change in the area.)

So from a statistical standpoint we are on the increase. From a community standpoint we are overwhelmingly successful and I think that the fact that we were able to continue to get funding shows success. We are certainly evaluated on a regular basis by ACTION and, as I said, we have got our fourth year of VISTA contract. I would love to get a fifth year. I just do not think it is realistic, but we have already made the arrangements for the Federation of Block Association dues to make the

monies available to continue the volunteer programs. The 10 women who have been so committed to the program have decided that they will stay on, even though they will no longer get subsidized.

We have increasing requests for youth participation in our after school and summer youth programs. We have factored in these training tutorial programs. Hobbies--I could not imagine the kids, 15 or 16 years old, they never had a hobby in their whole life. Their hobby was how to survive in their neighborhood and now they are learning how to sew and knit and play recreational sports, etc.

Our continuing challenges are that within a one mile radius of our target area, we have four shelters for homeless. They range from homeless women to homeless men to homeless families and homeless veterans of the Vietnam War. We have a methadone clinic, which is above and beyond the four homeless shelters. That is 1,400 people that I can only tell you are a negative impact on what we are trying to achieve on both the business and the residential side of things. But it is a problem that is being dealt with and we are doing it through different means--trying to make these people productive parts of society by working with them and having the businesses adopt a homeless individual and work through that.

We have got the educational problems, the housing crisis in New York City, the problem of AIDS, the problem of crack, all of which are being addressed through entrepreneurial skills. We are trying to teach these single women how to set up their own small businesses in their home if necessary. We have convinced the city of New York to invest in some buildings and do some residential rehabilitation, industrial rehabilitation. They have done so. That has moved forward.

We were just designated an economic development zone by the state of New York. That is similar to the enterprise zone which has a lot of positive effects. We are continuing to link the businesses and residents together and we have just in general increased the awareness and what it takes throughout the business and residential community. Thank God it is successful, and God willing, it will continue to succeed and I think that that is where we are at.

Our fact sheet is in the back which will talk a little bit about our accomplishments in general that we have made. Thank you.

MR. CURTIS: Thank you, Scott. God is, I am sure, willing, but I think you folks are doing it yourselves.

I had some experience with HUD a few years back, and learned how disempowered tenants are, and that is why I was interested in all Milton Cole had to tell me a couple of years ago when we were at a conference at the Kennedy Library out at Columbia Point. So, Milton, I am glad you were able to be with us today. I know you came up at short notice, but we would like to receive you and are looking forward to what you have to say.

MR. COLE: Thank you, Lynn. You are quite right on this short notice. I was notified yesterday morning that I had to be here and do this presentation. At the same time asked me what time did I want to catch a flight. So I am here, to talk about the Tenant Management Corporation (TMC), which is public housing development managed by the tenants. That is not an advisory group. It is the policy group. We have a contract to manage the development with the housing authority. One of the reasons I do not put very much stock in what evaluators have to say by and large about statistics is that prior to TMC, we received a three-year

grant from OEO for tenants to run public housing developments. In the three year study, the consultants told us it would not work, that we should abandon the idea.

But we went ahead with it because we had an idea of what we wanted to do and how we wanted to do it. We had decided some time back that nothing was happening for the residents of public housing in our city, and the only way things were going to happen is if we made it happen. We were victims of not having snowplows come through our development so we had to clean the streets and sidewalks the best we could. Even the employees who worked for the housing authority did not want to do it too much.

We had a very high crime rate but that was indicative of what the community was. The community surrounding us had a high crime rate. So it was not because of the housing development that crime was high, although they used the housing development as an escape route to get away from the police because the police were not familiar with the area. With the scissor stashed stairways, they could come in one building, go to the roof and if they wanted to, they could go across the roof, into the next building and down or they could go to the top floor and go around and come down the other stairway and they passed the police coming up on one side and they were going down on the other side.

One of the things that we did not have in that development was a voting block. So we organized what we call the United Voters League and we taught people how to vote, what was meant by a ballot vote, and how they could make their vote count as far as electing both city and state officials. That whole organizing process got us to a position where we knew certain people. Certain people came out and became a core of our leadership, and we began to recognize other types of things that were

happening or not happening to our community, and we began to do something about it.

We had a community center, a beautiful building, and a large playground adjacent to it. There were workers there in the winter while school was going on and there were some programs going after school. In summer vacation, when the kids were all out of school, they closed down so there was absolutely nothing for kids to do in that center in the summer. We met with the board through some very, very heated discussions and arguments and we managed to get one person on the board. The Board of Directors of that Agency--some of them did not even live in the state, much less the city. The Board came down and met once a year, and they came in and they sat in the building and they said, "Oh, you have got beautiful lights!," and that was the end of it. They went on back to where they came from, and that was the end of it.

So we organized and we took control of the program. We talked to the funding agency, and they said "Okay, you create something that reflects what you want to do and what the makeup of the community is." So we created a Board of Directors and got incorporated and we received the money through another agency first and then we incorporated ourselves.

I must say that this was in the early 1960's. As most of you can remember, it was in the 1960's when we had the riots and Boston was not immune from the riots. As a result of the riots, and we were a predominantly black community then, any time the police responded to any type of situation in that development (and this was after they received the LEAA funds for helmets and all the other kinds of protective equipment for police departments), they responded to that development, no matter

what the problem, sometimes with guns drawn, with dogs, attack dogs. I remember very vividly once, they were responding to a fight in the development with some kids and a lot of the kids ran to the roof of the buildings. So while the police were all gathered around down on the ground with the dogs and so forth, kids started throwing these little pebbles that were covering the roof, started throwing them off by the handfuls at the police. And they started scrambling out of the way, and one of the dogs got loose and attacked one of the people on the ground.

It was there that I decided we needed to do something to protect ourselves from the police so we formed a volunteer community patrol. Our function as I defined it then was to listen to police calls. Whenever we heard a police call with an address in our community, we would hasten there, break up or take care of whatever it was unless it was obviously a gun or something like that, and the situation would be in control by the time the police arrived. So we developed a relationship with the sergeant and the captain of the district. Instead of coming into the development, they would come to the perimeter of the development, and only the supervisor with one vehicle would come into the development to see what the problem was, and we would talk to them and tell them it was in control, and they started to respond in that manner all the time.

There were problems with the fire department coming into the development. Kids would always throw rocks and things at the fire department, at the engines when they would come in. We worked out a deal with them where when they come into the development--turn the sirens off before you come into the development. You can see the fire if there is a

fire going on by the time you get there so there is no need for the sirens so once they did, they would come in unmolested because the kids were not aware they were there and they were able to take care of their job.

We also had a health center. It was a well-baby clinic which also operated out of that community center, on the second floor. What it consisted of was a chair like a dentist's chair and in the auditorium where the kids normally ran a woodwork shop, they would clean off the table, put a sheet on it, and that was where they did their examinations. We decided that this was not a place for a pregnant mother to come to be examined. It was not a very sterile place. We went to all the powers that we could think of, the anti-poverty agency, the city government, and we finally got money from the anti-poverty agency to open up a health center about the same time we were opening up an anti-poverty agency right across the street. So the Housing Authority gave up two buildings, one three-story low-rise walk-up building for the health center, and two floors in a seven-story building, the first and second floor, for the anti-poverty agency.

A lot of things began to happen out of those facilities. The volunteer patrol was still operating. At night, when they closed down, the health center used to let us use a white van that they used to transport the patients back into the clinic. They would let us use that in the evenings, and we tore up sheets and pillow cases and tied white streamers all over it. We wore white arm bands when we were on patrol and everyone recognized us as the community patrol. We had very good success in that community, respect for the police and everyone.

We found that people started calling us to get involved in other types of issues: kids racing up and down the street with stolen cars



burning rubber, break-ins, all kinds of things. So we got more involved in dealing with crime problems and we would confiscate stolen cars. When there were kids burning rubber up and down the street, we would confiscate the car, call the police and tell them to come and pick up the car, compliments of the Bromley Community Patrol.

Our program was so successful that the Housing Authority applied for LEAA funds to fund the patrol. They were turned down because they were not a municipality. So the city and the Housing Authority jointly applied, and they got funded to fund us. We never asked for a dime, but one thing did happen. There were patrols that had formed all over the city, and the mayor wanted to give each of these patrols a couple of hundred dollars for arm bands and some equipment. I turned down the money. We had already established ourselves with the anti-poverty agency and bought walkie-talkies and a citizens band radio and they gave us a telephone so we were pretty well equipped.

I turned down the money from the mayor because I did not the situation to occur that when they needed the equipment in some other part of town, they would come and get it. We already had the equipment, we did not need their money, and the only way I would accept it is if they gave it to us no strings attached. So they did not give us any money. But when we got funded, a strange phenomenon took place. We used anyone in the community that wanted to work with the patrol, and some of these kids who were stealing cars and doing other kinds of activity in the development--once we caught them, if we found out that they were habitual offenders, we had a little gym and we had about six pairs of boxing gloves and we would take them down in the gym. We would put a pair of boxing gloves on them, and about four or five of us would put on one glove and we

would put the person in the middle and say, "Now you are going to defend yourself, or we are going to beat the hell out of you." That was our system of justice and it was accepted by the community, so much so that these individuals, once they got caught and suffered our wrath, they wanted to join our patrol.

So there was never a shortage of people to work the patrol except during the day when most of us were at work. Then the women in the community did the patrolling during the day. They were more severe than the men. They carried spoons, the big spoons, rolling pins, anything they could get their hands on when they patrolled. Nobody did anything when they were out there because they gave no mercy.

When we got the money, it took me a year before we actually started spending it, because of one of the things that I recognized. The Police Patrolmen's Association had always argued against community patrols that worked the parks, the neighborhoods, and whatever. They argued that it was their job and if they got the money, they could do it. I negotiated with the Patrolmen's Association, gave them a proposal and said, "You look over the proposal, and you bring it back to us with the things that you have any disagreements with." They looked it over so when they came back, they had an objection to us using night sticks or any kinds of weapons. So I asked them about handcuffs and they looked at each other and they said we couldn't use those either.

I said, "Well, I tell you, if we catch somebody doing something wrong, they are naturally not going to go along peacefully. So we will have to restrain them, and we cannot guarantee you the condition they will be in when you get here." So they said we could use handcuffs.

There was a representative from the Patrolmen's Association. He was a Sergeant. He worked the district. I made him Chairman of the Personnel Committee because in the hiring process, we could not hire those individuals who had been working with the patrol all this time because a lot of them had criminal records. That was the other thing. They did not want us to hire anybody with a criminal record, so it kind of changed the type of person we could hire. The type of person that really wanted to work and really wanted to see something done even though they had committed crimes themselves in an earlier part of their life--that wanted to see the community stable, they could not be hired.

All the people we hired were accepted by the Patrolmen's Association. We got flak one time when we were asked to respond to the junior high school when there was a problem going on in the school. There was one of the kids who had a couple of dogs and he wanted to bring the dogs up. After I saw the dogs there I made him put the dogs in the jeep (We had a jeep after we got funded so I had him lock the dogs in the jeep). Well, someone saw the dogs in the patrol jeep, and the news got out that we had dogs out there. The Patrolmen's Association came to our rescue. They were on our side, and they gave statements that we did not have dogs because they were a part of us because they had a voting member on our Board, on our Monitoring Committee. So whatever came from the news media or from the public, they shared in it because they were a part of us and we were the only successful group that patrolled in Boston. We are still in existence today and still funded. We have gone over some rough sledding over the years in trying to keep it funded, but now it is funded out of monies from the development, called Protective Services, and also

some money from Housing and Urban Development which comes through the Housing Authority.

So they are still funded, even though the force has been reduced from 15 patrolmen to six. Over the years since the patrol has been in operation, there has been a generation of kids that have come along and moved on. The results of having the patrol and having the leadership in the community has changed the whole atmosphere. When we first started, it was like every kid in the development had to be involved in some kind of crime or he would not be accepted. So if you did not commit a crime or if you did not snatch a pocketbook or something, you were not accepted. Now all of that has changed. The kids no longer participate in those kinds of activities. They are thinking more about what school they will be going to, and how they can help the teen center.

We also developed a teen center, which is a part of the development. When we first took over that community center, the kids wanted some area they could call theirs and we set up a place on the second floor for the teens and week after week, they did their programs. They set their rules and they did what they thought was good for themselves. But periodically they were preempted because the adult population was having a meeting or something in their space, and they were very angry and volatile about that.

Out of that, we took over a basement that was always being broken into and vandalized, and the superintendent of maintenance let us clean out the cellar. He gave the kids paint, brushes and brooms and all the stuff to clean out the basement which was loaded with trash. They cleaned out and painted the floors and the walls and it was their center. There were very few lights in there and we had to go down the stairway into the

basement so the kids nicknamed it the cave, and it worked real fine. We painted the walls white and we let the kids do their murals on the wall. They did all kinds of their own artistic stuff on the walls which really made it theirs and it is still existing today. They run different programs out of there, but part of our modernization program gave us enough monies to renovate it. Because they were trying to throw the kids out of there because there were no toilet facilities in the basement and it was unsanitary, we installed toilets down there. There is a snack bar they built down there, a dark room, conference room, a sewing room, arts and crafts room, and a game room with pinball machines and different other kinds of videos.

We bought a color television set, had the antenna run from the roof. It was a seven story building. It went from the roof all the way to the basement with a color television. I kept the television in a box until we were able to get it secured but one of the youth workers said the kids were anxious to look at their television. So I said to go ahead and take it out. He took it out of the box, set the TV up and the kids were watching it one night. The place was broken into and the TV was taken after one night in there. So we went and bought another TV. This TV, I told the kids, I said, "paint it." So they painted the TV red, black and green. Everything was painted except the screen. This was 1967. The TV is still there.

It is a place where they created their own rules and everything. All of this, most of this took place prior to the Tenant Management Corporation. When the program was originally written, it was written for Columbia Point. Columbia Point was riddled with agencies who wanted to do good but they did not coordinate anything between themselves. They were

always fighting, different people in different agencies. So when something came down, they kind of fought each other for power. It destroyed the Columbia Point Development. I know you have heard a lot about Columbia Point. Columbia Point was destroyed by all the agencies there who did not coordinate what they were doing. One was always trying to do more than the other or trying to do the same thing better than the other as opposed to putting all their energy into one agency that was responsible for doing one thing and letting them do it and assisting them. Instead they were in competition with each other.

One of the things that we did in Bromley was to form an interagency council where the citizens invited all the agency directors to come to the interagency council. We did this over three Saturdays and did different things on different Saturdays. We told the agencies what we wanted them to do after they had described that they were all about. We said to them that if someone approaches you with some monies to do some innovative educational programs, we have an anti-poverty agency (APAC), which is dealing with Head Start--an educational program. You turn them on to the APAC and let them develop that educational program. If someone approaches the anti-poverty agency about how to deal with drugs and mental health programs with monies, you send them to the health center and let the health center develop the program and let them run it.

So that kind of philosophy from the tenants has really helped the community. When Columbia Point refused the tenant management concept, it went up for bids. The Housing Authority said, "Well, we will let all the other developments bid on it." Well, Bromley-Heath was accepted because of the organization that we already had and because of some of the things that we were already doing. So we took the program and based on what we felt we needed in our community, that is how we went about it.

If anyone asks me about a tenant management program and whether it can work, that is why I am against Jack Kemp's program of wanting to sell public housing. I think if people are willing to organize in the development, those things can work. But you cannot take the tenant management program and look at a development and say "This development is run down, let us see how they can do it if they are tenant managed." Because it takes a great amount of organization in that community prior to even presenting the idea to them. They have to feel that they want their community to be a viable community before you can do those kinds of things with them. You cannot just pick up one program and move it to another place and expect it to always be successful.

My role is kind of correlated with the tenant management corporation in that I work for the Housing Authority in the Public Safety Department. It is our money that funds the community patrol, and I am kind of responsible for it even though I still live there. But I do keep hands off and I let them run their program the way they want to.

So why did the volunteer patrol work? I think it worked because, for one thing, I started it. But prior to that I ran movies in the community for small children and a lot of the mothers used to send their kids down there on Saturday. I ran a four hour program. So they would send their kids down there and they used to tell me I was the best baby-sitter they had ever seen. But we had a four hour program for children on Saturdays. On Saturday night I would show the same movies for the adults so I was a well known individual in the community and well respected, and I think it was because of the respect the community had for me that they accepted the patrol and my leadership.

Why did the health center and the APAC work? It is because we had other people in the community who were interested in the community. People who had made up their minds that if anything happened for the community, for their good, it was only going to happen because they made it happen. So there was a core of people who were involved. I will tell anyone the story of the success of Bromley-Heath, the success of the TMC, the health center, Head Start and all the other programs. They are successful and it is a story of people. It is not necessarily a story of programs. It is a story of people, people who have banded together to do something good for the community.

This past Christmas, we were having some drug meetings systematically. We put information out in the newsletter about drugs and we were saying to the parents that you are the problem as far as the kids on drugs. You are the one who taught the kids how to sniff cocaine. You are the ones who taught the kids how to smoke pot because you were growing pot on your window ledges. How can you effectively deal with that? The kids are only emulating you.

A lot of them are recognizing that and want to turn it around. So during the Christmas season, we went around the community singing Christmas carols and reciting some poems about the effects of drugs. Those kids see us on the street now and they speak to us. But in the meantime, if they are doing something wrong and they see anyone walk up that they saw in that group singing Christmas carols, they turn their back and walk away. We made a pledge that we are not only going to deal with our own kids, but if I see your kid out there, I am going to ask him what he is doing out there--"Why don't you go home because you are hurting your mother by being out here?" So those kinds of things are happening in the



community and people are out there to protect the community. We no longer have to protect ourselves from the police because we are very much involved with the police and the police are very much a part of us. As a matter of fact, we have one police officer that lives in the community now and he does his job there. So we are very much involved, the police are very much involved, the community is looking at what these problems are and dealing with them.

Thank you very much.

MR. CURTIS: Thank you, Milton. I know I have a lot of questions of you. Maybe we can get to some of them later. Bromley-Heath is such a well known program. I hope other people do as well. I think we are going to run a little over. We started a little later than even 2:15. We would like to do some questions. I would like to sort of make some comments--prearranged, thank you to the National Research Council, for letting me have this opportunity to build on what has been said and some of the themes that have come up in this afternoon's sessions.

A few months ago, the Washington Post described how, in Operation Clean Sweep, the police tried to push drug dealers out of a northwest D.C. neighborhood. The dealers had been employing very young women to sit on the doorsteps with walkie talkies and they would tell the dealers when the cops were coming. The police action, the Clean Sweep, was successful in the sense that the action was displaced to another street. It did, though, not do much about the fact that the women sitting on the steps were single teen mothers who had nothing else to do and who had dropped out. Clearly, those women needed Beethoven project type programs to provide a fair and head start for their kids. I think maybe also the drug

dealers might have been single fathers. Based on existing evidence, I will bet some of those fathers and some of those mothers could have benefited from the kind of remedial computer based training that Robert Taggart has shown can be very dramatic in getting kids out to job skills that are really needed on the market.

Perhaps all of this training could have been run by a community development organization which weatherized and rehabilitated houses in the same neighborhood and then employed these kids. Such economic development might have created an additional demand for even more high risk youth in the neighborhood. And as a result of that demand, the organization might have applied to a foundation or to the federal Office of Community Services for a capitalization grant to really make the business cook.

As with Darnell Bradford-El's Around the Corner to the World Program, the employees of such a business could be high risk kids, ex-offenders who might give one another peer support in the evenings when times got rough. I think the business could also be--people employed in the business might serve as role models for younger people in the neighborhoods. The eight- and nine-year-olds who might be going on to drugs or the 13-year-olds who might be about to become teen mothers. Certainly, the police in this kind of situation could help by teen policing as long as it was realistically done in a way to not so much reduce crime but to serve as a kind of a stabilizing influence to help the empowerment of the people in the neighborhood as Milton has suggested. Off-duty police might even help in the business as was done in the Bronx when Tony Bouza was a captain there and had policemen actually working in businesses with the kids. Certainly, the police could work as a center or actually as advocates. That is, the police could work with the community

organization to create advocates for young people who are in trouble with the law.

Now, all of these elements of the little scenario that began with the young mother sitting with the walkie talkies to me illustrate the principles not of crime control programs, but of crime prevention programs. I think the latter addresses the causes of crime and seek true social reconstruction and empowerment of people in a neighborhood and they are what Elliott Curry calls in his piece in the readings that you have, true second generation community crime prevention initiatives.

The common and underlying principles that I am referring to here are really to create through peer support and mentors and extended family environment with strict rules and nurturing, it is the stripped grooves we saw in Bromley Heath through which self respect is instilled, community based education and employment are pursued and youth are targeted on high risk youth who may be dropping out, committing crime, becoming substance abuse or become teen parents.

Now, certainly we need more evaluation even though people can question evaluations but the best available evidence at least as I see it, suggests that programs like th Argue community in the Bronx, the Center's Sister Isolina Ferre in Puerto Rico, the House of Umoja in Philadelphia and, importantly, the Federal Job Corps are among the most important community crime prevention programs so defined in terms of success and really the first generation of successful programs.

In the process of turning kids around, I think that self esteem is the key in many if not most of these programs. Self esteem is what the researchers would call the key proximate or intermediate variable before you get to reducing crime. I think it is whether it is preventing

13-year-olds from having babies or 16-year-olds from robbing, improved self esteem is perhaps the best contraceptive that we have around.

The objective of national, private and public sector policy I think now today as we approach the 1990's as to why we replicate these successes and their underlying principles and to create the financial mechanisms by which we can actually fund them to let thousands of these programs blossom. This replication is important. I think how enlightening it will be at some forum if we have Sister Falaka Fattah and Sister Isolina Ferre telling us about the replications of their two programs, well known programs which are now having full fledged replications. That would be fascinating. We could hear from Ozi Lee Hall, the ex-armed robber in Wilmington who is now busy acquiring and rehabbing housing in Wilmington for a full fledged replication of the House of Umoja. Will he succeed? Will he be able to do it? Big question. How do you evaluate that? And then we would listen to Sister Isolina Ferre who has done another one of her miracles by bringing together very recently the governor of Puerto Rico and the mayor of San Juan in one place to open her replication. That is another program which we need to watch very carefully to see if the successes in San Juan can follow the successes in Ponce.

For an evaluator for those programs, we might look at Jeffrey Fagan who has done the evaluation of the OJJDP violent juvenile offender program. He really has been most innovative in new, less costly approaches to evaluating. I think that such an approach is needed to recognize the great waste of victimization surveys.

I think we need to move away from community victimization surveys. I think Jeffrey Fagan, if he were here, would tell us that we need to follow more individual high-risk youth over time in such evaluations and

that we need to build in more process observations, the kinds of things that Mercer Sullivan and the Vera Institute have been doing. To observe people in communities, which is nothing more than the kind of things that Elliott Liebow did, the Joyce Ladner did, that Lee Rainwater did, all the good observers of the 1960's. That is the direction that evaluation needs to go in part, I suggest.

The kind of discussion of replication that I am thinking about in future forums would also need to talk about the programs like the one Darnell leads and the one Kate Story leads--Kate in Minneapolis, because they are already partially replicating some of the principles of the first generation of successes. They are the second generation. We have a lot of second generation successes here and we have to compare them.

I think the economics of financing community crime prevention seldom have been addressed. We need to do so here at this forum and in future forums. I think we need to document the kind of striking breakthroughs that were suggested by Scott in terms of the financing in his program. He started with a few thousand dollars. He has leveraged about a hundred thousand dollars, two to one leveraging ratio. This is important economics by a community organization. There has been a group of organizations very recently which have done similar work, two to one leveraging ratios. Collectively a group of eight organizations which have done community crime preventions have started with about \$450,000 in demonstration monies and have ended with over a million dollars in newly generated funds.

How do they do it? How can that be replicated? That is cutting edge stuff in community crime prevention, the process by which community

organizations leverage bucks. I think because we already have the formula for substantive success, for how to increase self esteem and reduce crime and empower the disadvantaged, financial development and diversification has to be one of the issues in the future as we develop the field of community crime prevention.

The kind of future forum I envision would certainly be planned with the Justice Department, the Department of HHS and the Department of Labor at the federal public sector level. I say that because we need to acknowledge that federal HHS and the federal Labor Department have funded more community crime prevention programs at higher levels than any other federal public agencies. For example, the replication of the House of Umoja in Wilmington is completely being financed by the federal departments of Health and Human Services and Labor right now, and I think we need these perspectives as well because some of the philosophy of these agencies. For example, federal HHS has published, in an RFP, the statement that there is a relationship between employment and reducing crime, a point that is still debated in the field.

Based on evaluated successes, then, I think that community crime prevention must be pursued within the interrelated web of American dilemmas. They all cause and affect one another: teen pregnancy, crime, drugs, dropping out, unemployment. Two societies, which government statistics show now are even more separate and less equal than during the 1968 Crime Commission. In 1981, the American Enterprise Institute had a conference on some of the issues before us today. The Institute organizers talked about more volunteerism. Most of the community leaders at the conference talked about more money. I think today, even the hard

nosed CEO's who have written Children in Need, the report that has been passed out here, recognized the need for significantly more money for new spending on those programs which have proven themselves over the last 20 years.

Let us be clear about this. Darnell Bradford-El capitalized his weatherization business with \$250,000 and not with 700 volunteers. This does not play down the role of volunteers in organizations and the role they have in empowerment, but we do need money, we do need capital and we have got to face it. We must also not fall into the well laid trap that says the budget and trade deficits present today prevent new inner city spending. In fact, there are almost an infinite number of creative fiduciary solutions and all we really need to do is talk about our priorities.

For example, a one-percent increase in the employment rate nationally reduces the federal deficit by \$30 billion. A \$100 billion more in revenues can be raised through new gasoline taxes and we still will have gas prices lower than in Europe. Preschool as an entitlement for all poor kids as suggested perhaps by the CEO's in the report you have had distributed--for all of those kids all over the country, as an entitlement, that would certainly cost less than a new aircraft carrier.

I say all of this as a Polish American who has travelled to the Soviet Union and Red China and totally reject those systems and as a person who is quite cynical about glasnost. In his new book, Yale and Oxford historian Paul Kennedy has convincingly shown how the more nations increase their power, the larger proportions of their resources are devoted to maintaining that power. If too large a proportion of resources

is directed to military purposes, national power weakens in the long run. We have seen it over and over again. You can take all the great nations in the last 500 years. The result is internal decay. It has happened to the Netherlands, France, Spain, Soviet Union, and today in the United States I suggest.

I will not go through all the evidences of internal decay, but they begin with our flagging economic growth rate. They go on to the fact that we have a 20 percent illiteracy rate compared with less than one percent in Japan. Certainly with relevance to this conference, they go on to the reality that crime rates here are much, much higher than any of the industrialized democracies. In this book, Paul Kennedy suggests that what we require is a more reasonable balance between military and non-military expenditures. That is important to us because some of those non-military expenditures need to be directed at the problems that we see all over. The problems that we can go look at: a devastated Liberty City in Miami, all the other devastated inner cities like it around the country. As the recent forums in Cambridge and Barcelona have shown, Great Britain and the Council of Europe also are in the process of passing by the United States in their acceptance and implementation of community crime prevention programs. We really are being passed by by the Europeans in this, and it is just part of the general trend.

I think, by contrast, in spite of the evidence that it usually does not work to reduce crime, opportunity reduction still is the norm in the United States, whether it is by block watches or team policing. Some say that even if crime is not reduced, opportunity reduction proceeds in the right direction by increasing social cohesion. I think in some ways that



is important as Bromley-Heath again shows. On the other hand, I wish to point out that the Howard Beach community in Queens was very socially cohesive and remains so. So let us watch out about this measure of social cohesion and let us not necessarily think that it is going in the right direction.

I think that opportunity reduction fosters a we-versus-they mentality, a sense that we need to circle the wagons against the invaders who are often seen as, if not native Americans, then certainly minorities. I think there is little sense in opportunity reduction when often the problem is from within. A kid who is next door, the husband who abuses the wife. These internal kinds of things are not really addressed by opportunity reduction. In the words, I think, best expressed by Elliott Currie, real communities thrive or fail to thrive, become healthy or pathological, mainly as a result of the strength or weaknesses of basic institutions. Work, family, kin, religious and communal associations, a vibrant economy, capable of generating stable livelihoods--when these are weak or shattered, says Currie, all the Neighborhood Watches or all the hassling of street kids on the corner, or for that matter, he says, all the king's horses and all the king's men, are not going to put that community back together again.

Because of the not uncommon failure of opportunity reduction to lessen crime, there has been some trend to see the goal of opportunity reduction as lessening fear. In part, the reasoning may be that it is easier to reduce fear than to reduce crime. This can allow budgets to be maintained because you can show that fear is down. I think fear reduction is important as a means to stabilizing a neighborhood but we cannot really see it as an end all.

In some demonstrations, fear has gone down while crime has remained unchanged or gone up. What does it mean in such situations if that happens? Are we not saying something to the public? Are we not using fear reduction as a kind of public relations gimmickry that betrays the fact that crime is really high or going up?

Houston Police Chief Lee Brown has concluded that the plain truth of the matter is that the police and other agents of the criminal justice system will never by themselves do much significantly to reduce crime in America. Yet the emptiness of opportunity reduction need not make the police defensive as so many police often are. We must make sure that police are involved. Their role is absolutely essential, but their involvement is a supportive one to community organizations and other institutions which are about the notion of social reconstruction. The Eisenhower Foundation is now embarking on a third generation of programs through funding from Japanese corporations in which we will be involving police in this way. I encourage police in the audience to approach us because we will be making new partnerships in this program.

I want to conclude by saying in community crime prevention, I think we have too many problems that are poorly stated. There is a big difference in labelling a community crime conference community crime control rather than labelling a conference community crime prevention. We must pay much closer attention to narrow definitions leading to narrow public and private policy, leading to narrow research, leading to reinforcement of the original, narrow definitions of our policy. It is a kind of action-research collusion. It is the essence of what Pulitzer Prize winner Barbara Tuchman called the march of folly, and it is the disempowered over whom the march proceeds.

To conclude, I just want to say that in the speech the night before he was assassinated, President Kennedy quoted the Bible. He quoted from Proverbs: "Where there is no vision, the people perish." There is vision today and we can even pretty well implement that vision. The time, I think, has come to again start asking what we can do for our country.

Thank you. I guess we are running over. It is time for a break. Hopefully, you can ask questions of other people who have made presentations during the break.

(WHEREUPON THE SESSION WAS ADJOURNED)

## EVALUATING COMMUNITY-BASED ANTI-CRIME PROGRAMS

Moderator - Chief Anthony Bouza

### Presenters

David Weisburd  
Paul J. Lavrakas  
Warren Friedman

MR. BOUZA: Good morning. My name is Tony Bouza from Minneapolis and I come here to you this morning not as Jeremiah or Isaiah but as Augustine, a common sinner and a confessed one. My own view is that we are living through the dark ages of criminology. Never has there been a greater need for knowledge nor a greater paucity of knowledge. We few, we happy few are gathered here on St. Crispin's Day, a band of monks, trying to keep the flickering flames of the light of knowledge bright. We have a need--fundamentally a partnership--in my view, of practitioners, experimenters and funders. We have seen practitioners like Darrel Stephens and Neil Behan behind the experimental approaches. The experimenters like Al Reiss and Larry Sherman and others, and funders such as NIJ, Chips Stewart, who has got more bang for the experimental buck than anybody I have ever known, and who has not catered to the hardware obsessions of my colleagues but has spent money on experiments and studies, and Lynn Curtis and the Eisenhower Foundation.

The whole idea of experimentation, the search and quest for knowledge, is a very interesting one. It is like motherhood and we can all be for it, but there are risks involved. We are playing with peoples' lives. You do have to subject yourself to public scrutiny. The media does ask difficult questions. You are engaging in experiments. But do

not forget that neglect is treatment; that doing the same dumb things over and over is treatment, that making mistakes is treatment, that doing nothing is treatment, so let us at least err on the side of trying to find out what we are doing and why we are doing it. I am getting a little bit impatient with the supe school graduates who know so much in their buttocks but not elsewhere in the anatomy.

We have got to extend the frontiers of knowledge. If we love our profession as we profess to do--and I am especially critical of my colleagues, other chiefs of police in this area--we have got to take risks. Instead of being mere survivalists and panderers to the worst instincts of our employers, extend the frontiers of knowledge and take those risks. Know-nothingism is not going to get us anywhere.

In the area of experiments, we need to know what to measure, which numbers to count. How do you establish whether you are impacting the morale of the community or improving the psychology of neighbors, and how do you measure the willingness of neighbors to come to the defense of other neighbors? How do you evaluate the levels of social glue that lend cohesion to a community? These are real questions and we cannot just establish it with numbers, but we do need data. But we must not be defeated by the tyranny of data.

In three experiments conducted in Minneapolis, we saw the problems graphically illustrated. In the domestic abuse issue, police officers, without being given an option, were assigned, in some cases, to arrest the batterer, in other cases, to exclude the batterer for eight hours and in other cases, to mediate; no choice, no discretion. You can imagine the questions to the practitioner. My God, you mean, I am ordering an arrest

mindlessly? I am ordering exclusion mindlessly? I am ordering mediation mindlessly, without regard to the circumstances? Yes.

And the answer is we are doing mindless things now; not knowing why we are doing it, and with corrosive and negative effects in patterns of escalating violence. So the answer is yes, we do play with peoples' lives. And if you develop a cure for cancer, you would be playing with peoples' lives and consigning 500 people to death, 500 with placebos, and 500 people to cure, even if you were certain the pill you had worked. So the reality is that we do play with peoples' lives, but hopefully not irresponsibly.

In the RECAP program, I have to admit mistakes. The city that presumably, putatively, led the way in a domestic abuse cases, was not recording. Police officers responding to domestic abuse cases were not even recording the darn things--much less making arrests--leading us to admit our own flaws. Socratically--self-examination, self-criticism. It is a tortured search, and an agonizing exercise where we have to admit that we are cretinous little worms, making lots and lots of mistakes, and trying to learn and trying to expand the borders of knowledge. It is not easy.

In RECAP, should we or should we not release the 10 worst locations in Minneapolis? My answer is--the public has a right to know. Extend the boundaries of truth. Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make ye free. We love to mouth such platitudes but it is quite another thing to live by them as we have to take our daily risks. In community crime prevention (the report that is still to be published by the Police Foundation, having produced it only after we initiated a lawsuit. Now

they have produced it and therefore extended the borders of knowledge. I love it, and I am criticizing them publicly because I think an occasional Jeremiah does not do our profession the least bit of harm). A community crime prevention experiment in Minneapolis had us organizing communities that did not especially want to be organized, had us refusing organizational modes to communities that insisted on being organized. We had to establish buffers between these units of measure and could not do it. It would have been nice to do, in order to keep the issue pure.

Then we had to decide what it was that we wanted to measure, burglaries, robberies, the incidence of crime. Was it going up or down? Is crime a constant so that when it goes up you have done something wrong and when it goes down you have done something right? That is a lot of rubbish. It is not a constant. It is a wave on the social fabric and we have got to understand the complexities that move that wave up and down and what it is that we are measuring. So we must not be overcome by the tyranny of data, but we must be measuring something. We must know more. How do we know what it is that we do know, and how do we establish data?

So today we have three panelists that will be talking about how to evaluate these programs; how we can tell they are working, what data to measure, what makes sense, what does not, and trying not to forget the importance also of subjectivity, of instinct. Of subjective, impressionistic evaluations as well as the gathering of data, because if this is going to succeed, the effort of experimentation and the furtherance of knowledge, we are going to have to marry the funders. And let me say that there are funds out there. Not just the National Institute of Justice, the most visible and active of the lot, but there

are foundations. There are foundations represented here, and there are foundations in your community. You can raise money. And there are experimenters out there and social scientists ready to work.

What is lacking in my judgment is leadership from my colleagues. I think the police chiefs in the United States are notably pusillanimous when it comes to the ideas of experimentation and the search for knowledge. They have got to learn the bitter lessons of experimentation and the search for the truth, and that is just what it is, the noble search for the truth. Today, we and the panelists will be discussing the subject for 15 minutes each. Then I would like to see people who have not said anything participate. I am sick to death of sitting in rooms with people who engage in Jeremiads and diatribes and repeatedly shower us with their wisdom--and of the silences of so many who should be saying something. So think hard about what you are going to say; make your points in a disciplined fashion and get out there and say something. And if you have not said anything, at least this once in your lives, say something.

So, first will be David Weisburd of Rutgers University. Second will be Jeffrey Roth giving the desiccated remarks of the dead hand from the grave of Paul J. Lavrakas, Northwestern University, and third and finally will be Warren Friedman, and I will rely on them to discipline themselves to 15 minute diatribes.

(APPLAUSE)

MR. WEISBURD: The best way to introduce my discussion of the conflicts that underlie the evaluator practitioner relationship is with an actual experience related to me by a colleague. He was coming to the end



of an evaluation of an innovative community-oriented policing program. While he was very excited about the program and felt he was supportive of his goals, he found himself in constant conflicts with the program manager. Yet, one thing appeared clear throughout the initial research period (and this served in his view to keep these conflicts under control): there was strong community support and recognition for the program, and its effectiveness.

He had just completed the computer runs from a large community survey. They showed that only 15, or at most 20, percent of citizens in the affected areas had even heard of the program. There was no noticeable impact, either on citizen perceptions of crime or their fear when walking in the neighborhood. This was, my colleague thought, quite a blow. Especially given early statements of the goals of the program and press releases heralding its success. My colleague now dreaded a meeting in which he was going to have to describe the "negative" survey results to the program manager and his staff and his Institute's research directors. He expected a torrent of criticism of his methods and credentials. When he got there, he presented the data with great trepidation. As I already noted, they contradicted, in his view, both claims of the program's wide recognition in the community and its effectiveness in making citizens feel safer.

To his surprise, the program manager, who had from the outset looked very tense, turned to the Institute's director and said, "That's great. Twenty percent translates to 4,000 people in those areas - that's a success in my view." Moreover he argued that he did not really expect any major changes to show up so soon. In any case, in his view, the

program did not set out to reduce fear. Its goal was to carry out successful problem oriented policing.

This story illustrates the potential conflicts that arise between evaluators and practitioners and the effects of lack of cooperation and communication of the research process. The core questions in this evaluation were clouded as were definitions of program success. Ultimately, the program manager and the evaluator viewed each other with suspicion and distrust. This is obviously not an effective way to run an evaluation.

I think my colleague could have avoided many of the difficulties he faced if he would have begun his investigation with a clear view of the inevitable conflicts that exist between program evaluators and practitioners, and the extent to which these are exacerbated in the context of community based anti-crime programs.

Today I would like to begin by outlining the source and nature of some of those conflicts and conclude with some suggestions of how to minimize their effects on the evaluation process.

#### The Source of the Conflict

At the outset, it is important to recognize the role conflicts that divide practitioners and evaluators. Program managers, sponsors, and staff are likely to react with hostility to negative evaluations for the understandable reason that their work is judged by how well the program is doing (Rossi and Freeman, 1982: 310). In some sense, if the program fails, they fail, regardless of what they might be told to the contrary. They can't afford to be skeptics on the sidelines. Indeed, their own enthusiasm often contributes to the successful operation of the program.

Evaluators on the other hand, can be rewarded as much for negative as for positive evidence. Indeed, many university-trained researchers have a learned antagonism toward enthusiasm. They are skeptics at heart. As Lamar Empey has noted, "their primary commitment is to knowledge, not to the success of some program" (1980:146).

#### What Should the Focus of Investigation Be?

Now these very different perspectives in the research process have a direct effect on the quality of cooperation between practitioners and evaluators. Problems begin immediately with the focus of investigation. The practitioner would like evidence to emphasize the successes he or she has wrought in what are often stubborn and difficult-to-influence organizational environments. The program manager wants the extraordinary efforts of those who succeed in an emerging community oriented anti-crime program to be carefully documented. He or she knows how difficult it is to enact or implement such programs and wants to understand how successes are created. He does not want there to be a focus on program failures--or indeed upon aspects of the program that may reflect negatively on its whole operation. In community policing programs for example, program managers want to avoid such "red flag" issues as abuses of authority and corruption. Merely their introduction into research view may threaten the future of the program.

The skeptical researcher on the other hand, wants to document the wider story. He or she wants to uncover processes that lead to failure as well as those that lead to success. He or she may want to open up investigations in areas that are sensitive - but important - especially given the controversy surrounding these very new programs.

### The Threat of Bad News

Now this same role conflict influences attitudes toward good and bad news that come from the evaluation itself. It should be noted that the powerful protection of confidentiality given to subjects does not apply to program managers. They are directly influenced and threatened by the statements of the evaluators. They have a vested interest in manipulating news to make it good. In statistical terms we would say that they have a bias towards the alternative hypothesis, a bias towards the program's success. Indeed it is only natural as my colleague discovered that a program manager with a "gut" sense of the success of a program, would turn to the evaluator.

The practitioner, on the other hand, is biased towards the alternative hypothesis. They want to be biased towards yes, it does work. They want some evidence it does not work. In this sense, it is easy to understand why my colleague discovered in his evaluation, that a program manager with a gut sense of the program's success (and I am not saying it is disingenuous here) is going to take evidence and turn that evidence to his own benefit.

The evaluator, on the other hand, is naturally skeptical about presenting so-called good news. The evaluator's bias is toward the null hypothesis - towards program failure. The evaluator does not want to be seen as "going native" of becoming too much a part of the enthusiasm of the program process. From the perspective of practitioners this skepticism is often irritating. It appears that the evaluator doesn't appreciate the difficulty of getting any changes to occur in the real world. Yet the evaluator is merely following the rules of good science.

He or she wants to be fairly certain that effects are not due to sampling bias or other chance occurrences.

### Defining Cooperation

Now, it would seem that effective cooperation as the research develops would break down some of these conflicts. But importantly even the definition of what good cooperation means is steeped in controversy. Practitioners want to know everything they can about the program's operation. The more information they have, the more effective they can be in correcting program flaws or changing program personnel. Just as they would feel free to discuss program participants and problems they hoped to correct, they expect the same feedback from evaluators.

But evaluators are caught in a serious bind. In the first case, they are constrained by promises of confidentiality. Those promises facilitate data collection and are required by professional norms. Unlike the practitioner, they cannot openly discuss many aspects of their findings. They especially are constrained in their ability to use interviews or observations in identifying program troublemakers.

A second and perhaps more important constraint on cooperation comes from the evaluator's need to fairly evaluate treatments. If the evaluator constantly interferes with the program, an artificial research environment is created that is often impossible to replicate in other settings. Is the evaluation part of the program? Will future programs enact a very expensive research effort to provide the same feedback? Most likely not. Accordingly, if the evaluator provides feedback to the program manager, he or she may make it effectively impossible to generalize from this program to others that might be developed.

### Who Will Disseminate and Interpret Research Findings?

Finally, we come to conflicts over dissemination and interpretation of the research findings. These are twofold. In the first case, there is the problem of who is to make statements about how the program is doing. In the second, there is the question of how results are to be interpreted and evaluated.

Both of these problems are exacerbated by the political nature of community based anti-crime efforts. Community groups and the media focus tremendous attention on such efforts - an attention that makes the dissemination and interpretation of data a political problem that may have important ramifications for practitioners and public officials. It also provides a degree of celebrity that is a bit intoxicating to those who are directly involved in such programs, and may thus lead to competition over dissemination of information about the program.

In this highly charged environment people are looking for unambiguous results--something that is quite foreign to the skeptical researcher. And in this sense, the most serious danger to an evaluation may be as Ward Edwards has noted, "not inaccuracy but irrelevance" (1980:179). The fact that evaluation results are often complex and equivocal--that they often do not provide a clear bottom line--may lead to a vacuum in "actual evaluation" of the program, a vacuum that is all too easily filled by those with very strong vested interests in the program's success. Indeed in many programs, program managers also produce reports. Naturally, these are not hindered by the skepticism of the researcher. Thus program reports can leave a more lasting impression on outsiders than the evaluation itself.

There is, as already noted, often little agreement over what success and failure actually mean in a community oriented anti-crime program, and this fact has serious implications for the interpretation of research findings. The colleague I spoke of earlier naturally weighed his evaluation against previous statements about what the program had hoped to achieve. The program manager viewed these early statements as publicity to generate enthusiasm for the program. When the evaluation was done, he could say that 4,000 was a lot of people because he did not feel constrained by the initial publicity he had helped generate for the program. In his view the evaluator did not distinguish between program hopes and hoopla and the reality of making any changes in the real world.

#### Resolving the Conflicts

Now, I noted at the outset that I would conclude with a discussion of ways to minimize the extent of conflicts between practitioners and evaluators. Yet, it is important to state that we cannot get rid of these tensions altogether. Indeed, if there is no tension then one of the parties is not carrying out his role very well. Rather, there are processes that can be enacted at the outset of an evaluation that can reduce tension and produce a more effective and better managed evaluation in the long run.

In the first case, it is necessary to communicate clearly the essential conflicts inherent to these roles. Practitioners and evaluators should begin with their eyes open. Their roles are in conflict! They should begin with an eye to opening communication, but realize that there are limits imposed by their responsibilities. For example, in the case of evaluators, there are significant constraints created by confidentiality or the necessity for not confounding the research design.

In this regard, the research design must be carefully mapped out at the start, and in this process practitioners should be heavily involved. When will intervention be allowed? When not? How will confidentiality be defined? Good fences make good neighbors in research, as well as communities. A clear definition of the research design--of the boundaries that lie between evaluators and practitioners--will allow the evaluator to avoid the label of being uncooperative or uninterested in the project's success later on.

Practitioners and evaluators should clearly define what project success or failure means. How is it to be measured? What variables are most relevant to its measurement? As in experimentation generally, the rules must be set at the outset. Importantly, evaluators should make sure that realistic standards are created. They should get beyond the necessary rhetoric that accompanies new program development. Practitioners and evaluators should make sure they are in fact speaking the same language.

Finally, evaluators and practitioners should clearly define at the outset how evaluation results are to be disseminated. What types of program reports should be presented? What type of cooperation should there be between practitioner and evaluator in developing such reports? What data should appear in them? How are program reports, if they are to be produced, to differ from research reports? Much like agreements over authorship in professional publications, practitioners and evaluators should clearly stake out their claim over how the project will be viewed by outsiders.



## Conclusions

Overall, the suggestions I have made demand a degree of communication at the outset of an evaluation that is time consuming and difficult to carry out. But attention at the outset to these details will avoid the much more difficult, destructive conflicts that can arise from the tensions that are inherent to the practitioner/evaluator relationship. You will not have a good evaluation if the practitioners and evaluators have strong disagreements over the research. The most persuasive evaluations, in turn, are those in which the practitioner and evaluator agree at the outset upon the rules that will underlie the research process. Thank you.

(APPLAUSE)

MR. ROTH: I come to you this morning as Paul Lavrakas. Paul had several emergencies come up at once and was unable to make it. He did send down a limited number of copies of his prepared text. We have them up here if you would like them after the session. I will not be as passionate as Tony since I am reading somebody else's words, but bear with me.

Having engaged in community anti-crime evaluation research during each of the past 14 years, I have had the opportunity to spend a considerable amount of time applying social science methods to investigating this topic area. I base the observations given in this paper on my direct experiences in conducting this research and in discussing my experiences and the experiences of others with numerous scholars, practitioners and policy makers concerned with the role of the citizenry, both as individuals and as collectives. That is, as groups of

neighbors in trying to control and reduce the incidence of crime.

As in practically every other area of social research and evaluations, work in this topic area has been greatly underfunded. Why is it possible to contemplate spending over \$100 million to study the effects of diet on the incidence of cancer over a ten year period as NIH is currently doing, when at the same time, evaluation researchers in the field of crime prevention have to struggle to gain even a few hundred thousand dollars to measure the effects of community anti-crime efforts--efforts in which the demonstrations themselves most often are vastly undersupported?

Leaving this concern behind, though, what can be done with the resources that are available? First, all evaluations in this area should ideally be planned with some theoretical model in mind. This model should be the reasoned product of the practitioners implementing the program. But in the absence of such explicit planning on the part of practitioners, the evaluator should make the effort to discover and document the reasoning behind the anti-crime program, and to develop the theoretical model which in turn should identify what types of data will be gathered to test for what effects.

Second, in developing this model, the evaluator should be cognizant of what level or levels of crime prevention are being aimed at by the program. Is it primary crime prevention in which the root causes of crime are being attacked? Or is it secondary crime prevention in which opportunities for committing crimes are being lessened? Or is it only tertiary crime prevention in which the severity of criminal incidents are trying to be minimized? If the practitioners planning the program have

not thought about their work in this way, it behooves the evaluator to make the apparent rationale underlying the anti-crime program explicit.

Third, to the extent that funds permit, evaluation researchers in the area of community crime prevention, must gather a robust set of data, recognizing that any one measure is likely to be inconclusive about program effect. Regardless of the strength of the evaluation design, I have never worked on a community anti-crime evaluation in which only one measure of outcome could confidently be used to discuss program success or failure or theory success or failure.

Now I would like to go on to make some comments on some of the specific discussion issues provided in the program. First, the practitioner's need to adapt and modify programs versus the evaluator's need to hold things constant. There are two approaches to dealing with this problem area in social program evaluations. The preferred approach is to supplement an ongoing evaluation so that new program efforts can be assessed without compromising the integrity of the original evaluation. Otherwise, any attempt to simply redirect resources away from measuring what they were originally planned to measure and towards measuring something new is likely to end in learning very little of value about anything. That is, everybody loses.

I suggest that practitioners owe it to themselves to document the validity of the basis on which they feel the need to adapt and modify before an evaluation is complete. What is the evidence that they have that things should be changed? What was the purpose of the evaluation if not to provide some confident sense of whether the program, as planned, was working?

Practitioners must recognize the paradox and possible hypocrisy of deciding that a program should be radically changed before an evaluation provides any valid evidence of what is working and what is not. At the same time, evaluators should remain flexible in their willingness to supplement their research, and in most cases there will be some opportunity to negotiate the reallocation of at least some existing resources to accommodate reasoned modifications of the program. Evaluators also must work harder to demystify research so that practitioners can fairly appreciate the trade-offs that are being requested.

Second, the need for trust and a cooperative relationship versus the threat of bad news to practitioners. I believe it is primarily the evaluator's responsibility to demonstrate to practitioners that they can and should be trusted. In other words, the evaluator needs to get the ball rolling. The need to demonstrate personal integrity is no different here than in any successful interaction but the challenge to the evaluator is to do this in a non-defensive manner, especially in those common instances where program personnel are minority citizens and evaluators are white.

It is also in everyone's interests that the practitioners decide to trust the evaluator's objectivity. They must, of course, have reason to believe in the evaluator's objectivity. To the extent the practitioners can come to understand that ideally there is no such thing as bad news providing it is accurate news, the possibility for tension will be lessened although not eliminated. No practitioner should be expected to completely divorce his or her ego from negative findings. But at the same

time, an enlightened view for practitioners is to welcome the accurate information that an evaluation should provide regardless of whether it is positive or negative so that progress can be made.

Again, from my experience, I place the burden on the evaluator to convince the practitioner that the evaluation will not be a hatchet job and that the work has been planned in a manner that is likely to yield solid and accurate results. As has been observed many times before, trust between practitioners and evaluators is most likely to develop in an environment where the practitioner is given an opportunity for input into the evaluation design and the data collection instruments. Input, not censorship. I recommend to evaluators that they make the effort to gather a reasonable amount of additional information that may be of interest to the practitioner even if it does not have direct benefit to the evaluator.

If for no other reason than self-interest, evaluators need to remember that they are likely to be dependent on the cooperation of practitioners to secure access to certain types of information. Obviously, if the evaluator does not simply take, take, take, he or she should find practitioners more receptive to requests for help. Other techniques that can develop a shareholder feeling on the part of the practitioner should also be considered by the evaluator.

Third topic, the allocation of limited funds between the program and its evaluation. As stated earlier, I believe the greatest issue here is to question why work in this area, both programmatic and evaluative, is so vastly underfunded. For example, why is the National Institute of Justice provided with such a meager budget? Until this fiscal reality changes, I am not optimistic that significant gains can be made in the

areas of concern to this workshop. Apart from this pessimism, I would like to note that too often, debates about the high costs of community anti-crime evaluations miss an important point.

My argument here starts with the premise that successful, community based programs often are ones that somehow tap the volunteer power of the citizenry in their community. Voluntary resources of both time and money from the local community reflects a program that is in touch with the concerns of its residents. Thus, I believe that the funding that is allocated to a community anti-crime program that is likely to be successful is only a small part of the resources that were, in fact, allocated to the program. A program that receives \$50,000 in funding is not likely to be successful if it does not also raise many times that amount in volunteer resources from its citizenry.

Therefore, for example, comparing \$50,000 in hard money given to funding a local anti-crime program with \$50,000 in hard money to fund the program's evaluation is comparing apples to oranges. If this reality were recognized more often, the rhetoric around this issue of viewing evaluations as too expensive would properly lessen.

Another concern that continues to fuel this debate is the general failure of the scholarly community to convince the public that good research is valuable and that good research is not inexpensive. Until this educational effort is waged with more success, we will continue to find practitioners and evaluators feeling that they are forever competing for each other's part of a very small pie.

That is the end of Paul's remarks. I would like to take a couple of minutes to try to put this in the context of our workshop.

First, I think Paul's paper ties in to what the researchers will recognize as the Heisenberg principle, that you cannot measure something without disturbing it. Darnell Bradford-El put it a little differently to me last night when he said that people in the community sometimes feel they are under a microscope when the researchers come in, and that feeling is likely to change their behavior, or their responses to surveys. And I have heard police administrators voice a similar kind of concern: why let a researcher in to add to the burdens of the already overworked officers, to disrupt procedures and make general nuisances of themselves? So I think Paul's paper ties in to some remarks that have come up here.

Second, his paper ties in, I think, to the notion that came up several times yesterday of coproduction. The researcher, the practitioner and the community must all believe they are producing the evaluation together if the evaluation is to be successful.

Since I know nothing about this area, I would like to turn the usual tables and toss out two questions to the audience for the discussion. First, to the police administrators and community leaders here, what can researchers do specifically to seem less like general nuisances or like invaders with microscopes? Second, to the seasoned evaluators here, and we have several, what are some of the approaches that you have used successfully in police departments and community organizations to foster the spirit of sharing or of coproducing the evaluation without destroying the integrity of the evaluation? Also what have you tried that has not worked? I hope we will hear something on those questions later on in the discussion period.

(APPLAUSE)

MR. FRIEDMAN: I was told by a couple of community practitioners before coming up here that I probably should indicate to people that we respect evaluation. That we want to know the impact of what we are doing, that we are not bound to keep doing what we are doing even if it does not work. So I wanted to start out with that. I wanted to indicate that most of the people I know who work in this field in Chicago are in it because they believe in it, are in it because they want to improve communities and are not in it to keep doing bad things that do not work. Now, that does not say we do not have a stake in success stories, and it does not say that in the face of bad news we will not look for good news. But it does say that we want to learn; and it does say, I think, that our connection with the community depends long term on us producing results and not just imagery.

I am going to go through what I have learned from being involved in two evaluations. I do not think that is an experience base that allows for a lot of generalization. But as somebody who has been under that microscope a couple of times, it does say that if the opportunity presents itself again, what I would look for. I think, in effect, I am going to be mostly focusing on two of the issues, trust and money, that were mentioned. I also wanted to say that we used research produced under funding by NIJ and others, the Police Foundation. Our community groups are learning what the term incident driven means because as we have done work with them, we have come to understand that that is part of their problem and part of their discontent. We have read the DTR studies, we have read Calling Police, we use and respect research. I think we believe in bringing that research down to the very grassroots level interpreting



it however we can, and going over and over it again with people--what it means and making sure they have the arguments down. So we come out of a deep respect for research and we try to guide our behavior and our programs by that research.

I basically have five thoughts. The first one, I think, speaks to the question of how you define what the evaluation is. My experience thus far is that it has not been a deeply collaborative effort, and I do not feel like an expert myself and I am sure the rest of my staff is not expert. I am sure as we get closer to the community organization there is no deep expertise in statistical survey instruments, in what the implication of a question is on a survey instrument.

I would, in a future time, look for a much more collaborative effort in defining what we are measuring, what the implications of the questions on the questionnaire are, because there is this gap. The evaluators have in their mind a whole body of literature and a whole body of outcomes that they are expecting and looking for. And with the best of faith, their communication to somebody who does not come with that literature as a background, so it is an incomplete communication. You can walk away from a meeting with a feeling that we agree: that is a good question, that is a good measure. But if the people being evaluated do not understand the background of the question, the two worlds have not come together and that is an important gap.

It has consequences, not understanding what you are measuring. And for the people evaluated, it is very often funding consequences. Foundations, the source of money out there, like to fund successful programs and an evaluation bound thickly has a lot of weight. People read

the summaries, it gets in the foundation circuit, and that has a very negative impact if there is bad news in it. So understanding where you are going and what is the meaning of what you are doing seems real important.

In the dissemination of the findings, I would insist the next time that our position, if we had differences with the findings, also be bound and sent around. There is a national network of researchers, of academics, of professionals, through which information passes much more easily than among community practitioners. I am delighted to be here. We have been working in Chicago in such isolation and this is very stimulating. I mean, just to see all your faces and hear all the disagreement and agreement is really wonderful. We do not exist in a network. So any bad news (any news whatsoever, but, of course, what concerns the people evaluated is bad news) travels much faster through established networks. And the academics and the professionals have the established networks. So a condition of participating would be that our word got out if there were differences with their word.

I think, obviously, that implies that I think the conflicts are built in and they can either be creative or destructive but they are just different roles. We have to try one to smooth them out by good understanding but, too, to allow for an equal dissemination.

I would also like--and in neither of my experiences with evaluations did I get--the kind of feedback on what was working and what was not working. What kinds of presentations inspired fear and what kind of presentation did not inspire fear? Where did an organizing strategy in one community end up empowering people and where did it not? That is

terribly important feedback for somebody who is a practitioner. What is working and what is not, and those kinds of distinctions have to be made to serve our needs I think.

The time frame. It seems to me that we are all caught--practitioners, evaluators, and funders--in a kind of conspiracy. That seems to me, I guess, as good a word as any. There is not a lot of money. With short resources, you cannot fund something for a long time. So you have to convince yourself that there is a quick result you can look for. And looking for a quick result builds in the possibility of bad news more assuredly than a long term view, and it does it much more heavily for basically volunteer oriented organizations. If you have got a year time frame and a key person gets ill, and that removes from the organization for three months that expertise, that is a large percentage of the time that is going to be evaluated. It is just not real, to expect to have a lot of measurable impact in very difficult communities in very short times. But everybody is caught in this and in order for community groups to get funded, they buy into it because it is a source of funding in a world not full of resources. Evaluators buy into it because they are under pressure at their universities or institutes. They have got to produce in their own ways and bring in the contracts in somewhat the same way that we do, and the funders are also buying into that. What I think we have is the production of more bad news than is necessary because we are working on unreal time frames.

There is a context question also that I think in another evaluation I would be very sensitive to, and I was not. I was sensitive to the idea both times but not to its operationalization in the survey instrument.

Maybe there was no way to get that in. I am delighted at the focus on communities and the idea of coproduction of safety, communities are not isolated. What is going on in a city, the connection that community organization makes with other organizations, the national tone, the sense that they can take something on comes from lots of places beyond the community.

We had a meeting a week before I came here. We are talking about releasing a report in Chicago that will begin to advocate for community oriented policing and restricting dispatching of cars to 911 and so on. The people at the meeting from the community groups--I could feel some sense that I am starting to lose them. It was not on the question of the program we were trying to advocate and trying to educate them to. They have bought into that and they have. But it was a sense--look at us, we are small, we are grassroots and there is this enormous institution which takes 40 percent of the city's budget, the Chicago Police Department. How can we possibly have an impact on such a giant institution. How do you mobilize people, mobilize people to change things so they are better served in their community? A key factor was the research that a lot of you were doing. That is, folks, you are not alone.

This is happening here and there. The changes have been researched. They work, there are people at the National Institute of Justice who think this is a good idea, people in Houston, people in Minneapolis. To the degree we can cite those connections outside communities, small groups of people do not feel isolated. So part of the empowerment process is, and part of what needs to be measured is, did they connect with somebody else that is building a bigger base to get a change or to make them feel more empowered to do something?

We constantly run up against the question of crime. My God, that is huge. How can we do it? If we cannot provide links to a larger context, we cannot keep people going, and that has got to be measured in research. I am not sure what proportion of a good local organizer is leadership--what input that makes in proportion to a context which makes a reform or a step forward believable. But I know that both elements have to be there. You cannot push only from the grassroots. You have got to have a context which makes people feel it is possible and it has got to be measured. If we only focus on communities, we are going to miss a whole lot about what affects those communities that are not in the community but are in peoples' minds.

I guess the last thing I want to say, number five, is the allocation of scarce resources. I think Paul joined the question in his remarks. Research is expensive, and community groups, community efforts should be relatively cheaper because they are largely volunteer efforts. He did say we were underfunded, and I appreciate that. But we have got to understand the major theme that I have heard here: community involvement, community coproduction, community focus. You cannot have coproduction without a community that is active, empowered, organized, understands what the goals are, and that does not happen free. We always work, in every case, in every evaluation, all two evaluations, we have been at the bottom of the pyramid. We have been working with a third of a full time person, a half of a full time person. I have worked with volunteer organizations for 20 years, and I will tell you that good, successful volunteer organizations have good, experienced staff. If they do not have good experienced staff, they cannot be sustained, and if they cannot be

sustained, then you cannot have an evaluation over a meaningful timeframe. I mean, block clubs go in and out of existence because they are usually totally volunteer operations. If the main leadership gets sick or dies or moves away, you may have a dormancy period for months, years, until you have a crisis and what can you evaluate if you cannot count on activity?

You cannot count on activity without adequate funding. We need adequate funding. We need the evaluators who are under pressure I understand to fund themselves and to fund their institutions to be advocates for us and to say that that is an unreal amount to bring into the community. I feel empowered now to say no to money. I do not want to get a few bucks and risk a failure, because I know what it meant in our organization when we had to deal with some bad news. I am perfectly willing, and I think the organization is, to take the risk of failure when we have a shot at it. But it has got to be adequately funded.

I skipped over something and I want to go back to it and then I will quit. I would like, next time, to have an advocate. That is, I would like somebody on our payroll, under contract, part time, who plays a liaison role, who understands survey instruments and statistics and regression to the mean and construct validity and all of that. There is an eloquent argument for having somebody like that because unless we know what we are getting into, it is just foolishness. It is just going after dollars and setting ourselves up for failure. We need someone who can say this question means such and such in the literature, or we need to press for these other questions in the survey instrument because otherwise there is missing information. We need to press for this because that is what is going to tell you how you are doing.

I have been through two evaluations. I do not understand that well enough. I do not want to take that on. The more grassroots you get, if you pass from the level of our alliance down to the community organizations, you are passing to a level where people do not have college degrees, whether it is in English or Geography or whatever. That is, there is not the general educational level to even self-educate on these questions.

I am the only one on our staff with a college degree. I am the only one on the staff with any shot at understanding what this is about, and it is very hard stuff for somebody -- my background is in English and American Literature -- who comes from the humanities. It seems to me that the next time I did it, I would want somebody on payroll, responsible to the organization, to bargain with the evaluator and say, these questions, these are the pitfalls, these are the strong points, this will give you what you want to know.

(APPLAUSE)

MR. BOUZA: Thank you, Warren. I want to thank all three panelists, David Weisburd, Rutgers; Jeffrey Roth, National Research Council, soon to go with the Sentencing Commission; and Warren Friedman for their discipline.

There are three things I want to say. One, being police chief is like being the grass mower in the cemetery. You have got a lot of people under you, but very few of them are paying any attention. But those who are under you remind me of a brilliant movie with Peter Sellers. I think it was his last movie, and I urge you to see it, called Being There. Brilliant movie. He always said, "I like to watch." You know, we are the passive, watchful generation, television. I like to watch.

I am going to tell you something about cops. They like to be watched. In being watched, there is a Hawthorne effect. You are creating organizational excitement. When you bring experiments into the police world you are telling cops that what they are doing is important and worth measuring and you are creating a lot of excitement. I do not subscribe to the idea that they are overburdened and overworked. I subscribed to the idea that they are underburdened and underworked and that they are happy when they are working harder. So the more you pile on, the better I like it, the better they like it. They like to be watched.

Finally, since I am not native to the English language, it has kind of made me a language freak, and I have discovered in these deliberations two fascinating things that I want to share with you. At least I think they are fascinating. One, the most depressing words in the English language are, "Later on in my remarks I will be addressing the following points." The sweetest words, "In conclusion." Jeff Roth raised some questions about penetration--how do you get along with folks, how do you get into a police environment, how do you avoid the status of the intruder, all of that. Let us, over the next half hour, generate some comments, discussion, perseflage, a wonderful little word. Get the troglodytes out. Anybody?

MS. WYCOFF: I would like to respond to some issues that you raised as well as some that Warren raised.

MR. BOUZA: This is Mary Ann Wycoff.

MS. WYCOFF: Warren was saying that when researchers come into a group of practitioners, the practitioners are at a disadvantage because the researchers come with all their history of the literature behind them. I would suggest that particularly in terms of what we are dealing



with now, the community oriented programs, the crime reduction programs, it is a baggage. It is a heavy baggage that we bring with this, but not necessarily as useful as you might assume that it is, particularly with respect to crime prevention programs. The literature sticks us with some measures that really may not be very appropriate any more. Those programs were begun some years ago, or theoretically conceived.

I think we are starting to recognize that there are some pretty naive notions about what the effects of those programs can be, about how quickly they concur, about what the dynamics or processes are. We need a lot of help in terms of getting beyond our own literature, and I think you are on the brink. You are raising the issue about practitioners needing to give us that help. But we recently have been working with some organizations to whom we have said "Okay, what do you expect? What should be the outcomes here? What ought we to be measuring?"

They look back at us like, "Wait, we thought that is what you were here for. We thought you guys knew how to do that."

We do not really know how to do it either. So the point is yes, indeed, we need this collaboration and I think it is, we are on the cutting edge of being able to do that, and I say this not only because I am sitting next to Chips and want to start looking for more money but --

MR. BOUZA: Not a bad thing to do.

MS. WYCOFF: I think one of the most --

MR. STEWART: See the patches on my arms here?

MS. WYCOFF: One of the more remote programs to be funded by the NIJ recently has to do with simply developing measures. We are going to be working with the Houston Police Department. Not only to develop performance measures that help us document what police officers are doing

when they go out and attempt to do community oriented policing, but with an aim toward helping the organization develop reward structures and helping evaluators come up with good performance measures.

Also as a part of that grant, we are going to be trying to develop measures of impact on the community, new things that really have not been there before. This is the time that we need input from the Tony Bouzas, the other people who have seen evaluations that did not capture what those programs were about. This is a chance to do that, and this is the time when it is needed. So for all of you who feel that you have got something to say about this, come talk to us now because Chips has got the money to involve you in this project.

MR. BOUZA: Let us move faster.

MR. MOORE: I just wanted to make a statement for the record. My name is John Moore from Spokane, Washington. The organization that I represent has delegates in 20 countries of crime prevention practitioners in public and private sectors. Annually, for the last five years, we have not only discussed what research has been available or made available to practitioners in the United States. But we also realize that the research that has been presented to us as operational program managers in different parts of this country and elsewhere--that it can have a wide, lasting impact on future development of programs or continuation of ones that are in existence now.

For the researchers who are here, we support the work you have done and while we realize that potential conflicts may exist on the sites being evaluated, let us also not miss the point that there is a bigger picture out there for a lot of us who were running operational programs who stand

to benefit and learn from the results of this research. The thousands of members that we have from around the world, again, want to line up behind the work that is being done. We will support, at least in this country, to this group, continuation of research. We offer our membership to provide different programs to be evaluated to each one of you and any other assistance that we can. Thank you.

MR. BOUZA: Good. Go on. Anyone else?

MR. SIPES: Len Sipes from the National Crime Prevention Council. I just wanted to offer sort of a personal note. There is, I think, sort of a mid range between great research and poor research. I think there are a lot of things that practitioners can do to help evaluate their own crime prevention programs or community based programs that do not involve the full blown statistically significant, randomized research that you are going to find in a lot of research organizations. A lot of crime analysis units have the capacity of doing good research, of doing longitudinal research, of comparing one group against another group or one community against another community. But they do not do it. You can take a look at arson data available from the fire department. You can look at business data available from business associations if you have a business crime prevention program, and the only thing that I am suggesting is that there are a lot of mid-range evaluations that you can do that do not require ten tons of money.

MR. BOUZA: Good. Thank you. Lucy.

MS. GEROLD: I am from Minneapolis and I have been involved in two evaluations in the last ten years. I think that we have had good working relationships with the evaluators and I would like to mention two things that I think are important. One is that expectations are everything. It

is important that everybody understands from the beginning what each other's expectations are and whether they are or are not going to be fulfilled and how. That I think develops an element of trust throughout.

The other thing is having a common language. It is even more mundane than understanding regression to the mean. Just understanding what everybody means by Neighborhood Watch or whatever the other measures are. You can go through the evaluation and find out that what the evaluator thinks the measure is, you are using the same language, and you think it means something else. So I think a common language in discussing what all your terms mean is going to be as crucial as understanding each other's expectations.

MR. BOUZA: Good. That is Lucy Gerold, Community Crime Prevention, Minneapolis. Please identify yourself so we will know.

MR. SNIDER: I am Paul Snider. I am from Salem, Oregon, and I am here for two purposes. One of which is to comply with Tony's demand that the couch potatoes get up to say something.

MR. BOUZA: All right. You look like a couch potato.

MR. SNIDER: I am getting ready for the Super Bowl tomorrow. The second one has to do with flexibility. Yesterday, I heard the Chief of Newport News say that when they went into a community to deal with burglary, they discovered in discussing things with members of the community that that was not the community's priority, that their priorities had to do with other issues. What I heard yesterday in discussion of the RECAP program was that the primary goal of the program was to reduce the number of calls from particularly targeted areas.

Nonetheless, when they got into the program, they discovered a lot of other benefits that they had not anticipated: the capacity of the

police officers to deal with people in the community, to solve community problems, to focus on the stores that had the highest rate of theft and to deal with those issues. Had, for example, an evaluator come into Newport News and looked at that program simplistically--just were the number of burglaries in that community reduced, or had they come to the RECAP program to evaluate it on the number of calls that were reduced--they would have had too narrow a perspective. They would not have evaluated the program in my estimation fairly from the more global standpoint of "Did it do something good? Was something beneficial accomplished?"

In a sense, it is saying, we are going to go out and see if we can find a cure for hangnails. Maybe we do not find the cure for hangnails but in the process we discover a cure for cancer. Is it appropriate for the evaluator to come in and say that they created this project to discover a cure for hangnails and did not do it so the program is a failure. There ought to be some ability to be flexible enough to recognize things that happen that are beneficial but nonetheless were not incorporated in the original concept.

MR. BOUZA: That is right on point. Couch potatoes of the world, take heart. Right on point.

MR. KLEIN: Sid Klein, Chief of Police, Clearwater, Florida. I would like to comment on what Jeff Roth said earlier on what can be done between researchers and practitioners perhaps to make our lives a little bit better. One of the duties, I guess, of a police chief, is to answer surveys, questionnaires on research, that we receive in droves typically every day, from all over the country, from all different types of organizations.

I answer those surveys. I feel it is important to do so. But in doing so, I consistently see that there does not seem to be a centralized network between researchers because the subjects are oftentimes duplicated and I have often wondered why there cannot be a central clearing house in this country in this profession. If the researchers want data out of law enforcement, they would go to one place, and that place would then disseminate it to law enforcement agencies within the United States. I think that would be a benefit both to the practitioners and the researchers.

MR. BOUZA: Jeff?

MR. ROTH: The problem is not so much a lack of clearing houses because there are such, the National Criminal Justice Reference Service and various data archives. I think part of the reason that you get multiple questionnaires that seem to be going over the same ground is that there are very few interesting questions that can be answered with a single study. So what happens, and has to happen to establish findings, is that multiple researchers come at the same questions from different perspectives. Certainly, to the people who have to answer the questionnaires, it looks like they are just covering the same ground. But it is very necessary because replications and new data collection efforts grounded in different theories, are a really necessary part of scientific validation of promising findings. At least, we see it that way.

MR. BOUZA: And organizations like PERF are beginning to serve that function. Are you a couch potato?

MS. GRANT: No. Jean Grant from Indiana University. I wanted to follow up on a methodological point, and that is that in one of the evaluations Warren referred to, there was also 16 months of field

observations. I think that any good evaluation really needs to have both kinds of measures. We had the hard, quantitative measures, but we also had people observing what was going on, and --

MR. BOUZA: And reporting subjectively?

MS. GRANT: Observing how the organizations met, what they did, who got involved. This, on the one hand, helped us to understand what happened and it also helped us to understand what did not happen, and I think that that was a very important part of the evaluation. I do not think that we have to give up on one set of measures, but it is good to have supplemental observations.

One of the things we did observe was that the organizations accomplished other things that were good for the organization, so I think that should not be forgotten about.

MR. BOUZA: Thank you. David?

MR. NIEBUR: David Niebur, Minneapolis Police. I have a question that I would like to have anybody up there comment on. Yesterday I heard Chief Carey from Newport News say that the police perhaps are working on problems that they think should be worked on while they are not necessarily the same as the community wants them to be working on. Playing the devil's advocate here, is one of the reasons that community crime prevention is sometimes so hard to evaluate because they are trying to do too many things? Because they are trying to police too many people, are there so many people making decisions that perhaps they are spreading themselves too thin? Perhaps they have too many bosses.

MR. BOUZA: Why don't we get each of you to make a brief statement anyway on anything.

MR. FRIEDMAN: All right, well, I will make a brief statement. I am going to rephrase our question a bit and if I lose the heart of it, then call me back. I think that what is typical of community organizations is that are multi-issued community organizations. Let me go back a moment. We had originally eight groups that were long standing, multi-issue groups, firmly organized. And we had one group, this was seven years ago, that was organized specifically for an LEAA grant and was only a crime prevention group. What we found was that it was very unstable, that it did not survive. That was our experience. Our preference has been, out of that and other experience, that crime prevention work fits in a context of a total concern for the community on the community group's part. It will sustain itself better, people will be less likely to be negativized by a focus on crime. They will have other things to focus on when there is not a crisis.

I think those are a lot of strengths. I think the weakness that that brings is organization. It puts a stress on people. Everybody is always recruiting people. If there is not something to do internally at this moment on crime prevention, the person dealing with utility shut-offs is liable to come and say, "Hey, why don't you get involved in this?" Or the person dealing with housing code violations: "Come on down to Housing Court with us. I think that is what you are are getting at: there is a spreading effect in this kind of organization. There is built into it a danger of pulling volunteers off focus because at this moment, what you want them to do, the crime prevention stuff, is not real active and the housing question is. So yes, I think that is a problem.

But I also think that on a volunteer level, on a staff level, typically, all staff members are responsible for some of the general



operations of the organization. You are having a convention? Nobody on staff escapes working for that convention so that everybody does some general organizational work. A danger in a poorly funded marginal organization like a small business or like a community organization is that the pull to the center in the absence of general operating funds for central staff pulls staff off program. That also, I think, affects crime prevention, utilities stuff, whatever. I think that is a serious problem, and it is getting more serious as foundations become less and less willing to provide general operating funds. As more and more of a community organization's income becomes restricted funding, you have fewer and fewer people to take care of what any organization has to have going to be an organization, to sustain itself.

MR. BOUZA: Thank you. Jeff?

MR. ROTH: Let me be a couch potato on this one.

MR. BOUZA: All right. David.

MR. WEISBURD: I would like to answer this question by answering one other that came before as well, or at least responding to it, and that is that we have to be very careful. There is an element of research, of description, and I remember Alvin Goulden remarked that researchers can be great white hunters going out into the African jungle and just sort of having a good time, seeing what they see and describing it.

But there is a difference between description and evaluation. When you go in to do an evaluation and you walk in, you cannot do everything. It is just as hard to implement an evaluation as it is to implement the program. And if you spread yourself too thin, just like if you spread yourself too thin in terms of programs, you are not going to do a very good job. You are not going to come out with results that are strong and

powerful. When you walk out of this evaluation, you want to come out with results that are not just nice and pleasant, you want to come out with something tough that can stand up against criticism, and to do that you cannot just focus everywhere. You have got to, at the outset, define clearly what you are going to focus on, and evaluate that.

Now, it may be that many of these programs are not up to evaluations yet. It may be that many of these efforts need to be watched, understood, described in great detail before you can get to that point but evaluations take that kind of toughness. You cannot get around it.

MR. BOUZA: Right on point. Great. Larry?

MR. SHERMAN: I never say anything so I thought I would say something now. I think we have got to confront a key point. Mercer just alluded to the fact that the foundations are not going to pay for operating funds, and when we talk about evaluations, we have to distinguish police departments and these marginal, unstable, hand-to-mouth community organizing groups. The fact is that no matter how negative an evaluation of a police department is, the police department is not going to go out of business. But there are an awful lot of both governmental and private community organizing groups that may well go out of business in the next ten years.

The foundations typically do not see themselves as sustaining things long term, and the only way volunteer groups are going to survive is to be picked up on tax dollars. Evaluation may hurt that possibility. I do not see how it is going to help, and I think that at some point somebody has to confront this question: Do we want to continue the community organizing function? Not just which strategy they should use--place-by-place or Block Watch clubs or whatever--but who is going to

pay for it? Do we want to keep that capacity present as part of the fight against crime in our communities? As a member of the planning committee, I was hoping that we could get more interest on the part of foundations in talking about this subject. Their general disinterest, I think, is further support for what I am saying. We are facing a crisis of institutionalization, of voluntary efforts in community fights against crime, and regardless of what the evaluations show, perhaps because of the mixed results of the evaluations, maybe we need to make a decision. Is this effort worth saving? If it is not, then let us forget about it and let us not bother to study it any more. But if it is worth saving, let us figure out how we are going to keep it going so we can study it better to perfect it. But the bottom line question is, is it going to keep going?

MR. BOUZA: The discussions are right on point. I will go off point for a moment. The McKnight Foundation in Minnesota distributed and will distribute for a number of years about \$8 million to eight different geographical groups throughout the state, and they set up an advisory committee and decide how that money is going to get spent and they can spend it on anything they want. It was in response to the farm crisis, but it does not have to relate to farms. The community just decides how it is going to spend the money. They are going to get a million bucks, and how they spend it is a project that Nancy Lattimer, the St. Paul mayor's wife, devised. Any other? Yes, Richard.

MR. LINSTER: Dick Linster, NIJ. One of the dilemmas, I think, in this whole discussion is the implied notion that evaluation and research are the same thing. If you go back to the literature of the 1970's, Marsha Gutentag's stuff, evaluation is very different from research. It need not be the same thing as research. Evaluations, in their terms, are

set up to make specific decisions. What you are doing is gathering the information that would inform the decision maker about a set of options that he has in mind at the beginning of the evaluation.

Research, on the other hand, is aimed at generalizability. That is, can this particular project that worked in Chicago, can it work in Cleveland? You know, Tony spoke about the tyranny of data. Well, when one looks at some of the social science literature, one could almost talk about the tyranny of the Chi-square test. That is, the Chi-square test is really telling you what kind of odds you are going to ask for if you are betting on this particular project succeeding in another place. That may be very different from what the project director himself wants to know in order to improve his project. I think this was alluded to a number of times by everyone on the panel. Maybe David or Warren would like to comment.

MR. WEISBURD: My only comment to that is that I do not think NIJ would be--well, perhaps NIJ would, but I doubt it--would be interested in supporting expensive evaluations that would only be useful in improving a program in one particular place. I think that to a great extent, the hope is that programs that get enacted and are carried out well in certain places will be enacted and carried out well in others.

But let me say this, there is one other thing. That is not to say, as I think Jeff brought up in his discussion, that you cannot build into evaluations or programs, elements of feedback--research feedback that comes directly to help those programs develop.

MR. LINSTER: I just wanted to comment that in my terms, NIJ does not sponsor evaluations. We only sponsor research under the definition.

MR. WEISBURD: Okay.

MR. BOUZA: Who has not said anything in two days? There is the man. Come forward, sir. Confess.

MR. COLE: Speaking from the practitioner's point of view and the community person, by and large when the researchers and evaluators come in, we feel like we are either teachers or consultants. Yet we do not get faculty appointments, and we do not get paid for the information we pass on. Then in the future, we see where this person who may have come to us as a researcher or an evaluator has then become the expert for the type of programs that we taught them about.

MR. BOUZA: That is really strange because when the researchers and the experimenters come to my office, they always feel like a microbe.

MR. SNIDER: You look like a microbe.

MR. BOUZA: Any final comment? Yes.

MR. ROSENBAUM: As an evaluator of research, I have been involved with the sins that have been identified here today, but I have heard a great deal over the years, and have done a number of evaluations. One thing that I have learned is that one of the best ways to do evaluations is to do what we call a stakeholder discussion. Everyone that has a stake in the outcome, including the funding agency, the people that are being assessed, the researchers, has input, like stockholders, into the design of the research and the way it is disseminated and how it is handled. I have not always done that myself in the past. I have learned that over the years. You need to do that. Also, there does not always have to be just one report that comes out and tries to be all the reports. This is based on my own experience.

But, the other thing. Some people have implied that if you can just have mutual expectations right in front on what this should be, everything will be fine. I think we all could be mutually satisfied and

ignorant about what might happen. The other thing is that we still want to talk about community cohesion and reductions in fear and reductions in crime. We are going to talk about adding others things, which I think is great. We do need to expand the realm of imagination considerably. But I am warning against placing too much emphasis continually on the ones that we have already assessed because even if we agree on them, I am not optimistic. In some of those areas we are going to find that we are tackling too much.

We need to lower our sights a bit, I think. That is part of what people are saying, but I think there are just so many things we can assess, and there is a great deal of damage that can be done to local groups by saying that. I think we have to learn as evaluators how better to say the right thing--say something that is honest but not destructive to anybody unless it has to be. Because the approaches alluding to evaluations oftentimes are considered as decision making processes. I disagree. I think we need to get rid of that word altogether and use research because, just like the Institute is saying, we can do research and understand better how to improve programs without having to say "Should we axe this, should we get rid of that?" This all or nothing thing is one of the biggest problems.

MR. BOUZA: First let me say I am astonished that you, Mr. Rosenbaum is it, would think that a stockholder has anything to say about how a corporation is run. Let me disabuse you of that idea. The point is you never bought a share of stock. Secondly I am astonished, even surprised, that the discussion has been as on point as it has been. Why don't you have a break and convene promptly at quarter to, and remember checkout time is at 2:00 p.m., not at noon? Have a nice break.

(WHEREUPON, THE SESSION WAS ADJOURNED)

MAKING IT HAPPEN: GENERATING AND SUSTAINING  
COMMUNITY-ORIENTED PROGRAMS

Moderator - Lucy Gerold

Panelists

David Chavis

Chief David Couper

MS. GEROLD: Good morning. My name is Lucy Gerold. I am the Director of Community Crime Prevention in Minneapolis and this session is going to be on generating and sustaining community programs. I first want to say that I have really enjoyed all of the discussions and involvement of people that are here, and thank you for your contributions because I think it has been quite stimulating.

I am going to make a few comments, and then David Chavis and Chief David Couper are going to each speak 15 minutes, and then we are going to open for questions. If we have time, there is a video that David Chavis would like to show. I think it is under ten minutes.

Not that many years ago, we would have been discussing the validity of community involvement in this field. Period. At this workshop, it is not even a question. We are, in fact, talking about how to sustain community programs. That is progress. We have gone beyond, I hope, thinking that to involve others might eliminate our jobs. I think if you remember early on, that was a fear and still is a fear in some communities. Conversely, community involvement usually gives us more work. This added work also trades away other work, however, by redistributing the work to those who do it best.

When we try to do the job alone, I believe we are usually trying to do the work of others. When we build cooperative relationships and alliances, all parties can do the work that they do best. And additionally, we will have greater ownership. This increases the quality of the results.

We generate and sustain interest by involving those with the greatest self-interest--which builds ownership, whether that is the community or housing inspections or public works departments. With the community, we can spread the workload and get more done. What takes one person two hours, will take four people a half hour each. There is a much greater chance I will find four people with a half hour than one person with two hours.

We must also plan for the change that is inevitable with programs and tailor programs for the specific needs of the community with that community's input and total involvement. I have been in this field for 10.5 years. Most of those years, it has been the community on the one side and the police on the other, building bridges to each other. It is just recently that it has felt like a true partnership where each really understands the value and crucial role of the other. I think that is real exciting and I think it is that understanding of the vital role of each other that is going to sustain quality programs.

Money has been mentioned in terms of funding community-based programs, but it is not only money to fund those programs that I think is at issue. As the community is involved, whether it is in community-based crime prevention programs or in problem or community oriented policing, we are raising issues that are structural and economic and if we are going to



solve problems, it is going to take money to solve some of those problems. I think we have often looked at community involvement in crime prevention as a way of having an additional resource that does not cost us any money. But as we raise issues and problems to be solve, that is going to cost money.

As Warren said this morning, it also is not free. Our volunteers are not free because it takes a lot of staff resources to manage them. I think these are a couple of key issues in sustaining programs, and I think they are common themes in some communities. How we translate those common themes in our community are going to be described by two people, as I told you earlier. I am going to give each of them 15 minutes, starting with Chief David Couper from Madison, Wisconsin.

MR. COUPER: Thanks, Lucy. I have enjoyed being down here. Leaving the land of the sub-zero to running topless on the streets this morning. I will not try to comment further on that.

I have been in this business of policing now going on 28 years. I have been a chief for 20 of those years. I started in Minneapolis, Tony Bouza's inherited department. I see some old friends here from many years back.

I want to start out by saying that something is going on in policing today. In 1968 we thought something was going on. It was 20 years ago. At that time, things were going on in this country: the Civil Rights movement and pressure being put on the police about community orientation. Then the war came along, LEAA folded, and the "guns and butter" doctrine did not work too well. All of us college cops in 1968 thought this was going to be the big change. We hoped that cops would be

professionals, equal partners in the community and the criminal justice system. It did not happen.

There have been a lot of screw-ups. I have been around Madison for 15 years and I want to tell you about my screw-ups. I can do that now. I could not tell you that 10 years ago. A lot of us Police Chiefs cannot tell you about our screw-ups because the "macho-ness" of being the Police Chief prevents us from doing that. We always have got to be right, and that is the trouble with an expert. As Tom Peters says, the expert has got trouble because he thinks he has got all the answers. The old saying is "I used to have all the answers and now I have trouble determining what the questions should be."

I want to tell you about some things that happened in Madison when I went there. In 1972, I spent three or four years hanging on to my posterior. I fought with the union for years. I loved to tell people what to do. I loved to control things. I absolutely loved hierarchy and made it work for me. I was successful. I knew how to step on peoples' faces to get to the top.

Well, that kind of managerial behavior has its toll. Most chiefs do not survive long enough to think about it. In Wisconsin, around the turn of the century, the legislature decided to pass a Police and Fire Commission Statute because the city of Milwaukee was about to be controlled by the Socialists. The incumbent police chief was a Republican, and Milwaukee ran to the state legislature in Madison. They enacted a statute that gave the Republican chief, and other chiefs in the state, tenure. A radical socialist would later comment that this legislation permitted the police to continue to harass the workers who were attempting to organize the factories in Milwaukee.

So, thanks to the Socialists, I am in Madison today. Or I could say, thanks to the Republicans, because of an interesting turn of events in the last 80 years, it is the Republicans now. Such irony is unmistakable in this case. A Reagan appointee, James "Chips" Stewart, took a chance on a place called Madison, which was known to be just about as kinky and crazy as Berkeley. He decided to authorize funding for the evaluation of our experimental police district about which I will talk in just a second. Such irony.

Most police chiefs "bite the dust" after about five years. The average tenure of police chiefs in America is under five years. Half of us do not last five years. And all of a sudden, after years of being the young kid on the block, a 30-year-old chief of police in a suburb of Minneapolis, I find myself five years later being the police chief of a fairly large American city. I am now almost 50 years of age. One of the grand old men of policing. There are a few chiefs who are more senior, but they are few. Police chiefs have fallen like flies throughout the years.

After all those years of fighting, nine years of battling, trying to control my employees, I took a leave of four months. Gary Hayes was at PERF and encouraged me to write something. At that time I put together How to Rate Your Local Police. I came back to the Department, went to the employees and said, "what do we need to do to improve this department?" They said, "better communication" -- they always say communication. Right? -- you have all heard it. Now what do we do about it?

That group of employees put together an elected employees council that would be available to give me input. The first years were horrendous. The officers wanted to see if I was serious or not, so they

elected some of the most vocal employees in the department to come in there and give me their input at least once a month. At first I would have to steel myself to go to that meeting. But now, seven years later, it takes priority, it is that important to me right now. Now the meetings are extremely productive. The officers have just completed a couple of days of group process improvement, strengthening teamwork, and improving their work. Because of them some interesting things are happening in the department.

1984 was another major year. In 1984, we put together the Committee on the Future of the Department. The membership consisted of officers who had at least 15 years left in the department. We could say to them, "You will be here in the year 2000, what sort of department do you want to have? They put in a year's work, published a report and gave us three important future themes: 1) The need to get closer to the people we serve; 2) The need to make better use of technology in our organization; 3) The need to develop ways to have health and wellness in our workplace.

These themes drove the mission of the department. We have 3 X 5 cards that we pass around which state our mission. Our mission statement was really important to us because we started to take some of those themes and capture our dominant values. Such as "we believe in the dignity and worth of all people" and "we are committed to providing high quality community oriented police services with sensitivity." The statements drove our community programs. They were employee generated themes for tomorrow and we started putting them into practice. Our mission helped establish a vision for the organization, a vision of this department as a "customer-driven" quality organization. We see one of our roles as

providing leadership to the police profession. We can do this because we can think in the long-term because I have tenure.

In 1985, we established the idea of neighborhood policing. It is not a new idea. The reason this idea has not worked before is because we tried to implement this change from the top. The leader's new role of implementing change in the organization is to provide a general framework of ideas. Then they should stop, stop and say, "Okay, here is the framework. You fill it in. Does the framework meet your needs? If it does then tell me how to do it. If you tell me how to do it things can happen because there is no more powerful event in an organization than when an idea from an employee can be implemented." If they buy into it you can forget about it; forget about it because it will be implemented if you give them the resources and the abilities to do it.

We then put together the Neighborhood Bureau, eight districts of the city in which we put one officer on foot in one area responsible for all primary and secondary police services. The officers decided what they wanted to do--to meet everybody, to handle problems, to do problem-solving policing, to get to know the people that they serve. Their work, to date, has been astonishing in terms of community support.

What happened when we opened this kind of job? Who was interested? Seven of the eight positions went to female officers; they wanted that kind of work. It is interesting. They took a chance and they made it work.

In 1986, we took the things we learned in the Neighborhood Bureau and said, "We want to try some of these things out on a larger scale. How do we best do that?" The idea that I threw out was the concept of a field

laboratory, a place where we could try stuff out, test it, foul it up, improve it, and work on it again. We must say it is okay to make mistakes.

Police departments have problems because they believe that we make zero mistakes: a zero mistake organization. The problem with "zero mistakes" organizations is that they also have zero creativity. If you do not tolerate honest mistakes in your organizations, you simply will not get creativity.

When the Experimental Police District (EPD) idea came up, we had a department meeting. Over 50 people came (from a 300 member organization) to that meeting and said they were really excited about this idea. We asked a group of interested employees to select a project team to make this idea a reality. They set criteria, conducted interviews and selected a 10-person project team. The project team worked for a year and a half. Six months into their planning effort we gave them a National Institute of Justice grant application. They got excited about the possibility of getting funding to conduct an evaluation of the EPD. They sent Chips Stewart a letter which all of them signed. They said, "We think we have got something going on here. We are going to do it, but we will not be able to evaluate it. Can you help us out?"

Toward the end of the project, we got the word that Chips had awarded a grant to the Police Foundation to evaluate our efforts. In December, Chips and Hubert Williams, President of the Police Foundation, flew to Madison to meet with the employees who put this project together. Picture this, the directors of two large Washington-based organizations coming to Madison to meet and talk with rank-and-file officers about something that they thought was important.

As part of the planning effort, the project team started looking at our customers. We did this because we had been looking at what is going on today in the business world: the literature of Dr. Edwards Deming, Tom Peters, Pat Auberdene, and John Naisbitt, to name a few. We wanted to try to apply this to government.

For the first time, we allowed the EPD project team members (rank and file employees) to ask all employees of the department about what their needs were, and what needed improving. We receive some strong feedback about our management style.

At the same time, these team members went out and made inroads into the community. They conducted community meetings at which 50-70 people attended. You do not get that kind of attendance, at least in my town, unless there is a crisis. There wasn't a crisis -- only people interested in being asked about their needs. We sent letters to people and said, "We want your input." The district alderman and I signed the letter and people came. They asked us, "What do you need?" They endorsed much of what we were doing in the community. They reinforced our commitment to community orientation, foot patrol and about wanting cops to work with them. They wanted, to pick a Naisbitt term, "high touch" policing. They wanted to see and touch and feel cops. To us community oriented policing is police officers who are community workers as well as community organizers.

We had officers in the police department who had been through the Midwest Academy in Chicago, a school for community organizing. We see community organizing techniques as ways to teach cops to organize communities to better resist crime. To take another Naisbitt theme, we are shifting from "institutional help to self-help." Citizens do not want

experts telling them how to run their communities and how to protect themselves against crime and other disorders within their communities. They want to do it themselves with the experts' "assistance." We see ourselves as advisors. We do not say we alone are going to do something about crime. We do say we are here to help you do something about crime.

In order to respond to what we were hearing about our management style, we developed the "Twelve Principles of Quality Leadership." We just recently finished training all of our supervisors and managers on these principles. Six days of training on systems, group and interpersonal skills, the nature and use of statistics, depicting statistics graphically and statistical variation. The one thing that is different about this movement is that it has a strong human relations orientation, as well as a strong data-based task orientation. Take a look at Naisbitt's Reinventing the Corporation, Mary Walton's book on The Deming Management Method that clearly explains Deming, John Naisbit and Pat Aberdene's book, Reinventing the Corporation, and Tom Peters' books, A Passion for Excellence and Thriving on Chaos.

The other thing we do is survey our customers. We do an ongoing customer survey. It comes directly to my office. Tom Peters talks about Mr. Marriott of Marriott Inns. He is 80 years old and every day he reads every customer's comment. That got me going. Why can't we start doing that? Every person in every 50th case number is sent a survey. We have been doing that for over a year now.

What are we looking for? Customer satisfaction. Are we looking to reduce crime? Not directly. We are looking for long term, total customer satisfaction, the same thing an automobile company is, the same thing the airlines is, the same thing any type of manufacturing concern is looking



for. If we address customer satisfaction, the control of crime will follow.

These are some of the things that we are doing. I am excited about them and the possibilities they present to improve my profession.

(APPLAUSE)

MR. CHAVIS: I guess I get to do my own introduction. I am David Chavis. Right now I am Director of Research at the Citizens Committee for New York City. For the last 14 years I have been a specialist in community development. I am a community psychologist academically and I have worked as a director of a community development corporation, neighborhood housing services, and my uniqueness here is that I never would claim to be, and probably never will be, a specialist in crime prevention, criminal justice. My career is not invested in this area.

My career and my life has been invested in the area of community development and what I would like to do it to try to present another picture. One thing is to applaud, first of all, the vision that I have seen here in community policing. With Felice Jergens, who is over there in the corner who directs the Neighborhood Anti-Crime Center for Citizens Committee, we have worked with the Community Patrol Officer program in New York City over the last three years since its inception and since its pilot program in Brooklyn, to train police officers in the way that Chief Couper has begun to talk about. We have found that from the community point of view and a community development point of view, community policing is the most exciting thing that we have seen coming out of professional law enforcement as far as we can remember. It is an exciting and a very important vision. What I would like to try to do in my comments is to push that vision a little bit farther.

One of the reasons why I want to do that is because we have to realize that law enforcement and criminal justice is just another in a long, long history over the last 25 years of social service agencies, human services, and governmental agencies who have reached a point where they realize they cannot do it themselves--that they need to rediscover the community. They need to be able to find help within the community, they need to work on the community.

What I have noticed in the last 24 hours is that the discussion that I have heard is very much like ones I have heard over the last 14 years in the area of health, mental health, housing, economic development. All these areas are struggling with the same issues that you are. What is most disturbing about it is that you are having to deal with this without a lot of the benefits of the school of hard knocks that these different human services, these different agencies, have taken on, have had to face, and have very often overcome.

So what I am trying to do is to urge on both the police professionals and researchers in this area, not to try to reinvent the broken wheel. Go and look at the history and experiences of other systems that have tried to engage the community in their development, to try to solve the most serious of our social problems. We all know that a community, unlike bureaucracies, are not segmented into law enforcement day, human service day, and so on. They are interdisciplinary in nature, and the development of a community and of problem solving within a community needs to involve all the actors. Not just the community, not just a few leaders, not just the police, but everyone that has some sort of vested interest in solving the problem whether is be a human service professional or not.

Because I am basically retarded in being able to handle time especially when my mouth starts going, I want to make my points real quickly and then hopefully I will get to clarify them in the remaining time.

The first point is that community development is crime prevention. It is not crime control. It deals with changing the environment that people live in. Those environmental causes--a lack of community, a lack of control, and poverty, a lack of funds--can be dealt with, and are dealt with, through community development programs like Scott Jeffrey talked about in East New York. But there are hundreds of examples in your cities and in cities around the country that are doing this successfully in varying degrees, different models. It is very important to realize that this is not a separate thing. This is not beyond the reach of people in the criminal justice field. The criminal justice field can become an even more valuable resource for the development of communities, particularly low income and minority communities.

Through the development of community organizations and the development of competence, community competence, we can create more competent individuals, more competent families, and more competent neighborhoods. We do not get into what is often called the social service mentality that we find the New York City police officers are hit with and that Chief Couper just talked about--where they are so excited they can finally do some good for the community and they just say let me help you, and they become even more overwhelmed than they usually are with all the different things that they have to do as a servant for the community. People must learn how to fish. You cannot feed them. Taking a community development approach develops the skills and the leadership indigenous

within the community to be able to have them take care of their problems, especially in those so-called harder neighborhoods. There is not a neighborhood that does not have a basis of an organization within it. There is not a building that does not have, or a city block that does not have, the foundation in any of the worst neighborhoods. The goal is to be able to tap those resources and that is as much technology and skill as police work.

The thing that frustrates me in talking to police officers in New York and police management people is that they expect that a one-hour lecture on community organizing is going to make a community organizer out of a cop. That is wrong. Community organizing, community management skills, community development skills, are as complex and intensive as police work. I would not say to you that I can become a police officer if I just sit down and have lunch with you one afternoon, and I would not like you to think that you can become involved in community development by just having some good intentions, reading a book, or maybe even just going out and sitting in a couple of meetings.

It is just not enough and that is one of the lessons that they have learned in mental health, and that we have to learn if we are going to be effective. There are people in your communities who have the experience. A partnership with them, a citizens committee and an organization that works independently that was started by Senator Jacob Javits in New York, has helped to develop over 3,500 block and neighborhood associations in New York. Organizers have experience in developing and maintaining these organizations and helping them engage in problem solving.

We have worked successfully in the New York City Police Department, and I will talk a little bit about that and hopefully we will have time

for a video that shows some of our work in community problem solving where the ownership of the solution and the problem lies not in the police department, not in the human service agencies, but with the community themselves. They set the agenda, they work with the different resources to establish an action plan. Very much like what we are talking about in problem oriented policing, except that the agenda is set by the community. The police have a productive and valuable role in solving the problem, doing what they do best, having to learn ways to do that stuff in a new way. It is not a "just the facts, ma'am" kind of approach. It is a much more cooperative approach, but they are not the center of attention. The center is the community and solving the problems.

The result of that is an investment and a sense of power. Not just a sense of power, actual power to change the most debilitating and aversive conditions. That is the fact. That is not some academic proposal. What has been shown in cities across the country is that when people get the sense of power, they can change the worst of situations. History has shown that, and the police can be part, a catalyst for that type of action.

Part of that is going to take investment in training. I would like to go back one point just to say again that it is important to work with these organizations that are providing technical assistance and training. There should not be the fear that we have seen in a lot of police departments, a number of people that we have talked to here, of non-police personnel. At least we know this is a problem in New York city. There is a basic them-and-us attitude in a lot of urban areas, at least I know in the Northeast, where the civilians--there is a problem with that word--are

relegated to relatively powerless positions. The whole, empty holster mentality that comes out within the police department has to be worked on by you people who are in leadership and police work.

Civilians, people like myself, with as much experience as a police chief has in policing, can work together because we are as concerned about those communities as you are. We generally believe that police do provide an important role in the community, but you are not going to be able to reinvent the wheel on your own--to really make the kinds of advances that are essential if you are going to deal with prevention and not just controlling the crime, but preventing criminals and the type of behavior that destroys our communities and destroys the people and the young people that live within them.

With the Citizens Committee, we have been working with the policing community. We have a Police and Community Training Program that Felice has been running that involves training police officers. The investment in training in this area, again, cannot be too much. I really think it is wonderful what Chief Couper just said about going to the Midwest Academy and other organizations like that. There is a lot to learn. There is a way. You can do it effectively.

I think you have to question and be a little critical of the roles of police as organizers in minority and low income communities. Particularly because one of the roles that society has given the police department is one of social control, and very quickly in that you immediately will find that sometimes the system has to be roughed up. As we found in New York, unfortunately, that same officer who started roughing up the system is then called out to enforce the rules of society, and that is cruel to the officer and unfair to the relationship. That is

what is important about a third party, an organization that is invested in facilitating the development of communities like Citizens Committee (independent from city government), or like Lucy's organization (a part of city government) or Warren's organization, which has both connections with community groups and connections with the police and criminal justice field.

In the policing community training program we are able to work with the police and human service professionals by sitting down and having the community leadership decide on the problems, learn who they need to get involved in the process, analyze the process, also work with the police independently on teaching them. The question was raised the first day: who do you go to, how do you work with these groups, how do you identify leadership, how do you feel comfortable with these people you have never socialized before from different races, classes, and cultural organizations? By having them analyze the problem, by sharing the results of this analysis between the two parties, by preparing them to work together, by developing an action plan that is followed up over a course of several months or years that we help facilitate, by getting the written commitment from all parties, by involving, when appropriate, human service agencies, housing, police, the district attorney's office, whoever is needed to solve the problem. Somehow this interdisciplinary approach needs to be focused upon the neighborhood.

The last thing I want to talk about is to just reflect quickly on a research that we had done, funded by the Ford Foundation, on how to maintain and develop these organizations. At Citizen's Committee, I have some literature. Some of you have gotten it as I was passing it out. There is some more up here. We provide incentive grants to develop these

multi-purpose organizations because the environment is multi-purpose. We provide incentive grants to get them going, technical assistance, training, workshops, books that we can make available. There are order forms up here, books that you can develop and many organizations have their own set of literature that helps develop neighborhood leaders.

Our focal point has been the block associations and these smaller groups because they are the immediate level between the family and the larger communities, those intermediary structures. One of the problems with these organizations, as with many neighborhood organizations, is that they have a high inactivity rate. They become inactive, usually a 50 percent research has shown that 50 percent of them become inactive after their first activity and then over this next year or two years, there is these increasing 50 percent cuts in the level that become dormant.

Our research, which is based on research in Nashville that looked at how these organizations developed, looked at that second cut. After an organization takes on the first activity, how do you maintain them? What separates those that become inactive, stop meeting, stop performing services for the community, from those that are basically vital? They continue to grow, they develop new programs, continue to meet the different economic and social needs of the community.

One of the most important things is a sustained and proactive relationship with some sort of organization, either a federation, coalition, where the leadership can be trained, the problems can be shared, and resources can be distributed. One point that I want to get across on the maintenance of these organizations is that we have to think of them as a system and that we must connect them to resources--both financial resources and educational resources and other factors like that.



By using models of technical assistance and training we were able to reduce--and we studied 60 programs in a controlled experiment with adequate comparisons and longitudinal follow-up--we were able to reduce the rate of inactivity of our blocks by 50 percent. That is very important because this is a long haul. This is not a one-year pilot program. This is a societal mission. Our ability to maintain these indigenous neighborhood organizations and to have them develop and grow is essential if we are going to really take a bite out of crime. Thank you.

(APPLAUSE)

MS. GEROLD: I would like to just briefly describe what we are doing in Minneapolis, which is somewhere between the two models that both David Chavis and David Couper have described. Minneapolis has had a crime prevention program for about 10 years. Last year we added a new component which has been identified here as community oriented policing and problem oriented policing. We divided the city of Minneapolis into 12 districts. Each one of those districts has a team, and the team consists of a police officer and a community organizer. We are trying to use both the community organizing skills of a civilian and the unique skills that a police officer brings to that kind of problem solving.

These 24 individuals work within the organization that I direct, which is an independent or separate department in the city of Minneapolis. We are not a part of the police department but are a part of city government, and I think that that combination provides some of the best of both worlds that both David Couper and David Chavis have both described. One of the things that I think has been most important about making that successful is that while we need to concentrate on identifying with the community what the problems are and how we are going to solve

those--that is kind of the content portion--the real critical part is providing people the management, planning, communications skills in order to do that job.

I would like to open the floor for questions at this point, and remember, if you want to be on the record, there is a mike in the back of the room.

MR. FRIEDMAN: David, that study on maintaining block clubs, is that available?

MR. CHAVIS: Yes, we have the long version of the report for the Ford Foundation which we can make available to people here if you contact me at Citizens Committee. It will give you the initial analysis. It was just finished in April of last year, the actual data collection, so that we have a first cut at it. We have just begun to look at the longitudinal data. Looking at the structural factors, we were able to predict 18 months later, which were 95 percent of the time, which organizations were going to be still meeting and which were not. That information is available to anyone who wants to contact me either after this or in New York. And the materials that we used are also available as well.

MS. GEROLD: Yes.

MR. WOLLEN: My name is Dale Wollen. I am the Assistant Director of the Metro Dade Police Department, here in Miami. One of the things I have heard out of the conference over the last couple of days (I have certainly enjoyed it) is what the community is looking for from its police department, and is there in fact a common thread. One thing that we can link to and maybe tie our research and evaluation to. My comment on that would be that I had an interesting thing in the Scott Carver project here in Dade County. It was the center of all our riots and our violence, and

people were being burned alive and so forth during our riots. I was a District Commander at the time and it was interesting to me that while the media said that police brutality brought on all this problem and it was a problem of police brutality that united people's passions and so forth, from inside my office and talking to the police officers that worked for me, I just did not see that.

I ran a survey using some independent people from the Community Relations Board, asking them just the simple question, "Why aren't the police getting along with the people in your neighborhood?" The people in Scott Carver were saying, "The police are impersonal. They come here. They speak in legalistic terms that many times we do not understand. They want to conclude their interaction with us. They, in fact, do not show an interest in our problems."

It has been interesting to me, over the past subsequent years to find out that the Cuban people feel like that, the Mexican people feel like that. So I say if there is a common thread, it is that we have to start linking the police back with the community in an understanding that the number one thing the customer wants is a personal level of service from the police that come out to their neighborhoods.

In talking to the employees within the district who serve these people, of course, we had 10 percent poor employees. That is probably like any police department. But 90 percent of our employees, the police officers, wanted to link up and be successful with the people that they were, in fact, serving. They were very frustrated because they in fact could not do that and were getting this feedback from the media and so forth and people in the community. So in this survey, the people in the community--in Scott Carver, the toughest of all housing projects across

the nation as identified in the media--the people were not saying anything about police brutality, they were talking about strangers who came up and talked about their problems.

This, I think, then goes back to the dilemma of how you satisfy a police officer in this situation who is caught with people who they, I think, are unable to serve successfully. I have come to believe, and some of the research I have done down here supports it, that it is almost as if a police officer has to engage in a great deal of situational behavior. In one instance in this community, he is dealing with someone who is well thought of, who is a decent person. In the other instance, he is dealing with a very violent domestic disturbance, and it is very hard for a police officer to shift gears in these situations. So they begin to take on a style of behavior that seems to be in the long term successful for them. It leads to cynicism and this breach between themselves and the community. So I would say that if research wants to look into something, it may be in terms of how does a police officer develop a style of leadership because that is what he does in the community. That is successful and situational, and leaves him able to shift gears and does not cause him that type of stress, that it makes okay to be compassionate. It is okay at the scene of an accident where someone has been killed to show some compassion. It is all right to be emotional, and at the same time, it is just as okay to be very forceful when you have to.

So I guess where all of this is leading in terms of the bridges you were talking about earlier is that there is one common thread as I see it. The one thing the customer wants from us is a personal style of service and a personal level of service and interest.

MR. COUPER: I want to thank you very much for those comments. You are really on target. James Baldwin adequately captured, I think, that type of style of policing in Nobody Knows My Name. He talks about police officers in twos and threes walking down the street away from the community, apart from the community. It is not surprising. Let me just make the last comment. We are testing the theory that if you empower officers, if the leadership in the organization empowers officers, they can in turn empower the community and deliver service. That is, within every one of our police departments today, we allow an enormous amount of human resources. The budgets show it. Eighty-some percent we pay to people. People are our most important resource. They are the officers. The men and women in our organizations that are out there doing the job. They do not want to fail. They do not want to be unsuccessful. But it is not surprising that they act the way they do to their communities when we, as leaders, treat them the way in which we do. We treat them as if they are not responsible adults. We control them. We do not give them a lot of latitude in their jobs. It is not that we have abused the employees for all these years, but we use the top-down coercive leadership style and then we wonder why they go out and do the same thing to their communities.

The theory is if we treat them as human beings and we treat them with some respect and dignity in their jobs, and empower them, that they will use the same things they see from us as their leaders and do that within the community. That is, if we ask them what their needs are and attempt to run our organizations, based on that, it is a logical conclusion that they will say yes, and I also need to ask my citizens out there what they need. And they will hear that I want contact with you, I want to know who you are, I want to know your name.

MR. WOLLEN: I agree with you. One of the interesting things--I think where we are causing problems for our police officers is in the performance evaluation area. For example, you eat up a lot of numbers back there, and it was interesting to me that one of my police officers went out and he wrote a ticket for a gardener. A black gardener out in an area that obviously did not have a lot of money but he had bald tires on his vehicle. Not only did he have one bald tire, he had four bald tires. So he got one for each tire. The pressure was being applied by us in management to say if you are good in traffic enforcement, you will write more tickets in numbers than the next officers.

On the other side, the community is saying, wait a minute, slow down. Who are these people? We would like to know you. So I think that we cause a lot of our own problems maybe just in the evaluation process, by protecting the numbers through procedures. In many instances we say that we must act like this in this situation and we must use these exact words, and of course we all can see things like that but it is interesting to me that police officers want the same thing the public does but we do not seem to be able to bridge that gap.

MR. COUPER: Let us not forget what the Curran Commission told us in 1968, that America's police see their communities through a windshield of the car and listen to the community's activities over a police radio--both really distorted views.

MR. CHAVIS: I just have one comment. I think one of the issues is teaching police on a community level. The individual situation I think is important. On the community level, it is to learn how to read the community in a different way. I think it is one of those skill areas. Walking down the street, that stress level is high--looking for the gun

out the window, the perpetrator about to emerge, a decaying neighborhood. And that, especially if a person is not from that neighborhood, gives a sense of weakness, of stress, and I think that is a big level of stress for police officers. They are alone, on the streets or every time they leave their car, they are in danger.

One of the things that needs to be involved in training is how to read the community's strengths. Even in the worst neighborhoods, there are signs of strengths, there are signs of organization, that police officers can capitalize on, and learn how to capitalize on it.

MS. GEROLD: Yes, Jack.

MR. CALHOUN: Lucy, I wanted to sharpen the previous gentleman's question a little bit in terms of this. Is it an inherent conflict in the roles--you were very eloquent, David, about the role of the officer, and yesterday the chief from Virginia talking about the listening ear, the catalyst, really the enabler. That is very, very exciting to me, but then of course, there is the warrant to control when forced and control needs to be exercised. Are these really compatible in an individual officer's psyche, and if so, how do you address that in training and in your policies?

MR. COUPER: Mary Ann, do you want to answer for me?

MS. WYCOFF: Yes, just this point of view that I have been thinking about for a couple of years now. We have been talking about how expecting those different kinds of responses from the police should be somehow conflictual and stressful. But is it any different from what we expect from good parents every day?

MR. COUPER: I think that is a good analogy. I do not think they are. If they are, then that means we have got to have two separate kinds

of police, and I really resist that. I think that the police can be this specialist-generalist. I think that we can teach police to do that. Most of their job is not being the tough guy. Most of being the parent is not being the tough guy. Most of the parent is being the nurturer and helper and those kinds of things, and I do not see it as a dichotomy, and I do not see that as a role conflict. I have been in the job for a while and I can do both, and I am fairly comfortable with that. Somebody that has to go to jail or something, goes to jail. Most of the time the community supports that. What they do not support is activities that do not make much sense like the four tickets. We have always done that, but we train people to do those kinds of things, and that is kind of scary.

MR. CALHOUN: Has that ever affected your training though?

MR. COUPER: Yes, well, we figure that people approach the job with the enforcer attitude, and so we hold that from them for most of the seven months of training. I think that is so important, the job of a cop today, that we do not put out people out in the street, until they have seven months training. Most places it is three, four weeks out there and away you go. But we start out with a very strong community orientation and training. The guns and the accoutrements and all that stuff comes much later because we want to turn that thing around so it is a symbol of what the organization is, and what your leadership is, and your vision for the organization.

MR. BERGSTROM: I would just like to make a point. Some years ago I did some writing dividing up police departments between the sort of crime fighters and community service officers. Looking back on it, I am sure I was overreacting to what we had gone through in the 1960's and 1970's. That leads to the point that I now have had an entirely different



experience, having been asked by the IACP to take over a very small police department for a few months while they sort out some problems. The department is much smaller than any one I have ever been in before by far, and I realized after I had been there a month that they just do community policing naturally. They do not know how to do policing any other way. They provide all the services the citizens want, they talk to the citizens all the time, and it took me a while to get used to the fact that the secretary could not buffer me from the community. Everybody has to talk to the chief about something. It takes a lot of time, but I realized I was in this laboratory of community policing and I began my remarks with an interesting story that I am sure Mary Ann remembers.

A few weeks ago we came up with a policeman on a Sunday to get something and there was a male and a female standing outside the station talking to an officer who had been called in to talk to them. They had a sack, and everybody was looking in the sack. The debate was whether that little snake in that sack was a coral snake, and this was a pretty serious question for those of you who know something about snakes. If you had the wrong answer you could be in great difficulty. But they did not think anything at all about coming to the police department on a Sunday morning to get the answer to those questions because they needed to know if they had to look further in their yard for another coral snake. The police officer did not think anything about talking to them about a coral snake.

That is community policing without any formal training, just a natural approach.

MS. GEROLD: Do you want to identify yourselves when you speak?  
Darrel?

MR. STEPHENS: Darrel Stephens, Police Executive Research Forum. I think a part of the role conflict that you can see in this kind of policing comes from a very strong and long-time tradition: that the only way we can solve problems is through the use of the law as an arrest mechanism, and an important mechanism as opposed to a tool. Once you begin to sort that out and see other alternatives to solving the problem, conflicts are not really there.

MS. JERGENS: I think that it is not clear.

MS. GEROLD: Can you identify yourself?

MS. JERGENS: My name is Felice Jergens. I am the Community Implementer of the programs David discussed, and I do the police training in community development for the New York City Community-Police Program. I think that there is a potential for conflict. Because this program is so new across the country, I do not think that all the wisdom has been tabulated yet or is even out there. I think the questions are going to emerge city by city according to how the program is run. Perhaps what is key that I have learned from this conference is how much of a vision and how much leadership there is, and how much this program is institutionalized within a police department versus just a little operation in the field that someone does. I have heard tremendous creativity on how these programs are being run. Your concept of this team approach would certainly solve the problem that I have experienced in New York. If we had the kind of vision that Chief Couper discusses, maybe the problem would not come up. I wonder how Houston has handled it.

We have had incidents in New York that are very taxing for an individual officer. I do not think that the leadership is there to assist them. I think in each incident they have had to wing it, and because they

are some of the best officers and highly motivated and they are given a great deal of trust and confidence, they have handled it well. I will give you one for instance that taxes any good officer.

Some officers who had received our training and the police department orientation for this program began working very closely with a group of block associations that were fighting drug dealing in the buildings and on the streets of their neighborhood. They were community activists from an organization very similar to the Saul Alinsky model. They did not believe in really working for anybody. No politician could control them, they were very independent. The premise of their organization is building strong neighborhood leadership by the people taking direct action, and they were demanding good anti-drug enforcement. They had never had worked closely with the police department, and this program linked the two, the police officers and the community, in a strategy planning session. They had very good rapport and they decided to have a mass community meeting and discuss the issue. The community evaluated their prior experience with the local precinct. They felt that they had never gotten an adequate response from the captain, that there just were not enough resources being allocated. And on the spot with the officers on the dais as the authority figures from the police department, they planned a mass march on the precinct.

The officers were looking at me. They were in this horrible situation. There they were in front of a community meeting while the community is going to march on their captain. That is quite a role to be in. They handled themselves very well, and got out of it, but it can be there and how are you going to handle that. It is a real situation. I do not think it has to always come up. I do not think the answers are right

here on the table. I just think that it might be naive to state that the problem will not present itself. It is not the worst problem in the world.

MS. GEROLD: David, do you want to comment?

MR. CHAVIS: Quickly, I think that I want to emphasize what Felice is saying, because the conflict is not only within the individual officer, but the conflict is going to emerge within the department as an institution. It is a healthy struggle and a healthy conflict because it is going to lead to what we are seeing here and the vision here--a realignment of the purposes of police and society. I think the thing that is really key--at least places to look, the jury is out and it is going to need to be worked on--but one place to look is how we socialize officers. That process of making it a separate segment, that community policing is a unit, the career track issues, the rewards, the machismo that is tied to policing--all of those issues are going to have to be done.

Should all rookies and cops be involved in community work before they even get involved in traditional law enforcement? Do they get a head set about the community? One of the things we find in New York, and we have found similar when we have talked to some of the police chiefs here, is that for whatever reason, because of the schedule, the training, the nature of who goes into police work, generally police officers are less involved in their own communities and do not have the experience with voluntary associations--with the Lions Club, with whatever, not just with neighborhood groups. That may or may not be true, but it may need that kind of process as part of police training for all officers in order to somehow deal with this. The rewards have to be built in for this work, but you have to be able to be a captain and do this work.

MR. KELLING: George Kelling. Actually, in that situation, the police have a very traditional function to play. They are the guarantors of the rights of those citizens to march on the police station, and they perform a consistent function there. Inherently, I do not see that as very conflictual at all if police understand their role as a guarantor of constitutional rights.

MR. CHAVIS: Tell it to the captain. Tell it to the captain.

MR. COUPER: But the culture, as you well know, George, the culture says that your job as a police officer is to protect the tail of your captain. When that becomes dominant over protecting the constitution, we have got a problem.

MR. KELLING: I agree with you there.

MR. WADMAN: One of the things--in our training, how many of us as police chiefs have trained our people with the idea that we have the right to remain silent? You have the right to not talk to me. I mean, are we afraid in that arena? Now we are all of a sudden breaking that mold and we need to recognize it. Not only is it just in the police, but it is in this broader criminal justice area that these rules exist that we are going to have to live by. As I think the chief earlier indicated, I get to feeling kind of like a fly dancing with an orange, as a police chief trying to really have an impact. I do not want to throw a bucket of cold water but to recognize that we have legal constraints in a variety of these other behaviors that are yet to be overcome in the course of this.

MR. CURTSINGER: Curt Curtsinger from L.A. David, I would like for you to share with the group if you can--and I know you did not in your opening comments and maybe it was purposeful and if that is the case, I apologize in advance for putting you on the spot--but it seems to me in

all the conversations that I have had not only with you, but with everybody who is involved in this kind of a situation presently, the key problem is a change in middle management and upper management philosophy. That is the problem, and it was really borne out by the thing that you said. You basically advertised it, and you got nine out of ten were females, who had to be very new employees, I suspect. Which is clearly indicative of the problem. Can you share with us some of the things that you have had to endure in terms of trying to change that philosophy at middle management?

MR. COUPER: Yes, that is a good question. Curt is a captain of the only PD in the Wilshire District doing a lot of community orientation stuff and we are happy to have him as part of our research management team for the NIJ project.

The employees buy into this change in leadership style because they see something is happening, a chance for a more rational, democratic workplace. They see a chance for better decisions being made, and they say, let's chance that sort of customer approach towards citizens, so that we can get even better support.

Now, first line supervisors see that because they work in the system as much as on the system. They are out there on the street. We can even buy lieutenants, the next line up, into this because we do not empower them a lot. We say we do, but they do not. You have got to check it with your captain and on up into the organization so they see themselves being empowered by having more ability to make decisions and work with their people in ways that they would like to.

The problem is above that. The problem within my organization is that of the ten top commanders, I probably got four or five on board.

Okay? Four or five on board. I have had some fragmentation. I mean, I appointed them all. I have tremendous power in the organization to make promotions. They are all my people. After 15 years of fighting the early wars, now they are saying, "My God, what are you doing now? You are going to lose control of this organization." They want to go out there and abuse the community because we do not have tight controls on them.

You cannot run the organization this way. It is agonizing to the point of spending a lot of my time trying to work through these things and trying to organize my command staff to let loose and to have them as advocates of this. Because the one thing the employees say is, "I am willing to buy into this, Couper, I only need one thing from you. I think I have got your total support. You are the monomaniac with a mission. You are impassioned on this thing, but what about the next layer of bosses? What about them?"

I do not see them doing it. They are not working against this, but they are frozen. They are frozen with fear because they are so comfortable in this hierarchical, bureaucratic organization. It is like a warm fuzzy for them because they know how this thing works. I am asking them to get out from behind their desks, to go out there and work with the employees. I am asking them to go out there, to put a uniform on and get out there and see what the nature of work is and then talk to people. That is scary because they might hear some bad things from the employees that we spent a lot of time abusing for the last decade and a half. That is heavy duty stuff. We want to sit behind the big desk there and we want to control police operations and tell the boys and girls how to do the work because we are the experts.

We have got to get out there, get out there and talk to the people. We cannot serve the community as bosses. They do not buy this

fear either. Do they say, "Larry, what about the community?" No, no. They say, "What about your employees? I want to hear what you are doing with your employees." Their job is to serve the community. You cannot go out and write traffic tickets when citizens say they have got a speeding problem in a neighborhood by a school. You cannot go out there and solve burglaries. You cannot go out there and deal with abandoned cars and animals running loose and noise complaints. You cannot do that.. Only your men and women can. Empower them to do that and do that effectively and listen to people.

The rub in the system is top management. How ironical because that is the reason we have got unions today, 20 or 30 years later.

MS. GEROLD: Len?

MR. SIPES: I think a part of the problem is that a lot of communities are putting too much emphasis on the police and they are giving up too much power to the police. A lot of communities around the country are going to the police and saying, help us with our crime problem. You are the legitimate crime fighters within our community. I think some communities are giving up too much power. I am not quite sure if the New York experience is typical for the entire country. I believe in the total function of justice and the citizen involvement and the citizen leadership. Too many times the citizen groups give up their power too easily to the police departments because they do not know what they are doing and they think the police department has the answer.

MS. GEROLD: In the back and then Dr. Street.

MR. SNIDER: Lucy, when I first came to this conference yesterday, I was under the impression that what we were going to talk about was developing partnerships between community and law enforcement and



enhancing the ability of the entire social structure in the community to deal with crime. I still think that, but what I am hearing in the last couple of hours is that in order to make that thing really work, we need to discuss really fundamental changes in the perceptions that people hold as to the role of police departments in the community. Organizationally within a police department, we talked about changes from a militaristic structure, a military structure, to a corporate structure delegating more line authority to the people who go out to the community. Changing the functions that police perform from just law enforcement to more social structures, human services structures, integration within a community and running into the kinds of problems that you discussed a few minutes ago.

My sense of it is that in order for that to work and for that to work well, that understanding needs to be addressed, understood and accepted by the people within the police department as well as by the people within the community, or we are going to run into those conflicts farther on down the road. It is easy on one hand to say that we ought to get out into the community more and get to know the people and their needs more. But when you get down to the day-to-day decisions and what that means in terms of the structure of the department, the attitude that the officers have, the training that they get from the police academy, we are talking about some real, major change.

MS. GEROLD: Lloyd?

MR. STREET: Lloyd Street. My questions are somewhat in the same vein as the last comment. They are related. First, it seems to me that I got the thrust of the comments of both of the speakers, and I wonder if there is not some overstatement involved. Or did one of the speakers really mean what he said: that what he wanted his police department to do

was to have a long term good relationship with the community. Now, whereas I believe that policing is about people, I also believe it is about crime. My question would be why should I or any other citizen pay you if all you want to do is establish good relationships with the community. What are you going to do about crime?

And then on the other side of the issue, in terms of organizing, I would ask a parallel kind of question. Aren't you overselling what the skills are to do good community work? Don't we all do that? We say it takes more special skills than what it really takes. We push research up into making it something very esoteric when it may be at heart as simple as asking good questions and using a practical kind of approach to answering those. Is it really the case that the people own these organizations that you are talking about? In my own work in community organization, I think the argument that I would promote is the last thing organizers do is turn the organization over to people, that most of them own them themselves after four or five years. Those would be the two questions I would pose.

MR. COUPER: I can answer the front part of that. What about crime? I would say that if we officers are just talking about satisfaction, to me that is crime. People are concerned about crime. When they cannot use their streets, when their children are being victimized by gangs and drugs, that is foremost on their mind. So how do you get satisfaction from a community when the community feels that the police are not doing something about gangs and drugs and crime in their neighborhood? That is incredibly important because it has to do with the very basic things about people's survival. Very first level kinds of things. That is essential--how the people and the police address that

problem is important. People are not going to be satisfied with the police if they are not doing that. That is what I think. They have got to address that because they do not have any respect for the police.

MS. GEROLD: David.

MR. CHAVIS: Yes, I want to respond to that. You know, it should make sense, what you are saying. Aren't we talking about fundamental things? It is like saying it is all common sense. Right? But we know common sense is not that common. What is the big deal about teaching. Right? That is why we do not have any problems in our schools because it is just common sense. Right? Anybody can teach. It is not true. It is basically not true, that good organizers and good leaders have unique skill. I do not think all of you are doing it. Not to its fullest potential. You are doing some of it and going through some of the motions, some excellent, some okay. But I do not buy that because there are skills involved. Adult education skills are good organizer skills. Not everybody innately has that ability but you can train people as we found in our experiences.

So I think there are discreet skills. Otherwise, why are you investing in police training? Is it not just common sense or is it not just a matter of just being a good person? I do not buy it. There is not evidence of it. That is how we got to this mess in the first place. That is why we are here. Because we just let things go and assumed without really thinking critically of these issues, these things are going to happen.

The last thing is that it is not good organizing if the community organizer as an outsider is running it. I have experiences as an organizer and working in this area and in neighborhood development, not

this limited area. Remember this is a limited subset of the whole neighborhood development movement that has been going on, depending on how you want to gauge, for 100 to the last 20 years.

Basically indigenous community leadership emerges more times than not, organizers facilitate the development, and questioning the leadership is a very effective tactic of city government in undermining the legitimacy of indigenous leaders. We cannot overgeneralize this leadership issue and the role of organizers in it. It is another skill that needs to be developed further. It is not complete. We do not have the angle down completely on it, but it definitely is better than just giving somebody an hour talk from the JC's about how to work with the community and sending them off.

MS. GEROLD: Larry?

MR. SHERMAN: I just wanted to say that so far the score is police, 10, community, 1, and I would really like to hear more about community organizing. I would like to hear more from community organizers -- we have Sister Falaka Fattah and Isolina Ferre and I would really love to hear some of their comments. Plus this whole session was supposed to address the resource issue of how community groups can maintain funds to keep their programs going. I have not heard anything about that and I know Warren Friedman, who is a community organizer, wants to say something about communities.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Yes, I would like to respond to those questions also. In my experience, there is a problem with the organizing staff beginning to take over and run an organization, and that comes from a lot of things. It comes from everywhere: from bad intentions (and I think that is the three percent or the five percent as in the police), from

overload so you stop talking to your board, you stop talking to the people in the community. Just think about the issue we are talking about here and how it gets down to a community level, and the grassroots level so that people begin to understand what the hell incident-driven policing is.

Well, first of all you have got to talk about how the police actually work in the community, what 911 is. Well, 911 is my tie to safety. Think about it and you go through an educational process that is pretty complicated, which you have had to go through yourself. I mean, my field is first of all, English and American literature, and then it has been working in a bunch of other volunteer organizations. I have become a mini-expert on utility rates and rate structures because that was the only way that people in the community could begin to get a handle on what was happening. I have done the same thing on the question of policing for an organization that does not have somebody who can digest what researchers are producing. So they begin to get an alternative view of what is happening, then begin to turn that over to people so they can understand that, and that is a slow process. You have to sit down with a leader, somebody who is going to be a spokesman on an issue, somebody who has a following on the block or in the neighborhood and you have to go over that again and again until they understand it and reproduce it and they can ask you the questions. That is just one programmatic line of teaching, digesting, thinking, and conveying to people.

Now you want them to get the idea out. Well, how do you get the idea out? Well, you get it out door to door. That is one way. What happens to people who go door to door? They burn out. In the canvassing, most of you have had someone knock on your door, "Hi, I am from such-and-such an organization. Will you give me money for this cause?"

In that profession, it is called turfheaded. You get the door slammed on you once, and that grows in your mind until everybody out there is your enemy and you cannot any longer go door to door. So then you have got to build some system so that people can talk about what happened to them so they can stay useful and not burn out. Well, that is a whole other thing.

An organization has to be administered, right? It has to have a public, and so on and so forth. I think organizing and administering community organizations is no less complicated than any other organization, although they are smaller, which means one thing: there is not as much to administer. It means the other thing: you are always administering a crisis for your own existence. I do not want to make that sound monthly, but you are always dealing with people's fears of where we are going to get paid from a year from now.

A sociologist came to me and said, "I have this suspicion about community organizations in Chicago. Can you tell me how far in advance they know they are going to be funded?" And I started thinking about our own organization. This was three months before the end of the fiscal year, and I did not know for sure in writing that a single piece of income was coming in next year. A month later, it all fell into place. But that meant that I had to deal with all those funding sources out there, and I had to deal with employees who I am honest with. I want them to participate democratically so I have got to talk to them.

In my experience, it is when the funding base shrinks that people begin to do too much in their organization, and they cannot talk with the board and they cannot talk with the community, that they begin to become all-purpose activists and not trainers and delegators and educators. And then you have a captive organization so I have said my say.

(APPLAUSE)

MS. GEROLD: We have a couple of minutes. Does either panelist want to address the issue of resources?

MR. FATTAH: Good afternoon. My name is David Fattah. I am from the House of Umoja in West Philly and I have been a community organizer over 20 years and I am pleased to be here with you. I did not really want to get involved in this discussion because I am learning quite a bit. Being a community organizer for over 20 years, it is enlightening to see the police take a positive attitude and that is why I have not said anything. Most community organizers who have been around for my time came on the set in the 1960's. At that time, the police and the community were not getting along as well as we might hope, and as a result of that, a whole lot of attitudes started developing.

I have had an opportunity to reflect and move around this country, and I noticed when you were asked Lloyd's question, you responded by saying gangs and drugs, which happen to be my specialty. I know a little bit about both. Take the gangs. I think we need to talk about types of crime when we talk about community groups. And I think, in all honesty, if we are going to get the best results, we need to talk about the racial compositions of these neighborhoods as it reflects off the police department when we get to talking about interacting and interfacing.

For instance, in Philadelphia, at one point in time, we had a whole lot of problems with the police. I really could not see anybody sitting down in good faith discussing community crime with them. People saw police as the cause of the problem and not the solution. So half the time we were out in the street, we were watching the police and I am glad to see that that has changed. It has changed in Philly. As you know, we had the police department in court. The entire department.

But let us take a problem such as gangs. I have seen it dealt with most effectively throughout this country, from Los Angeles to Chicago and New York, when the police are able to work in conjunction with the community. Unfortunately, in most instances, with that type of problem, you have the community meetings and they do not march on the captain unless he is marching with the gangs and what people want are more police. They usually want a policeman on every corner, out in front of their house, walking their kids to school and sitting down at the dinner table with them. And then they get kind of mad when the police bill goes up.

In order to facilitate that, I think that is where the community organizers come in. The main problem right there is the street worker, to have a good working relationship with the police so that we all know where our boundaries are. In other words, you would not want the street worker to be grabbing people on the collar and dragging them down to the police station--locking people up, which is one of the problems you have.

The other problem you have many times is that the police who are working in the street feel that the street worker is getting in the way. They have information that if they gave it to the police, they would have to leave town. So it is a delicate kind of situation there where it comes together. But I believe that where you have got to work with gangs particularly or drugs, particularly here in Miami, that we ought to be meeting downtown. But we are here, that is the first step. I think we ought to be kind of getting together on that.

The House of Umoja developed a thing called a case study. We did this in conjunction with about three or four different kinds of groups and I feel that maybe we can get a copy of that to somebody that might need that, that has that particular kind of problem. That is the kind of



problem that I can see us really coming together on, maybe before we leave Miami. Thank you.

MS. GEROLD: Mark and then Tony and those will be our final comments.

MR. HOWARD: Mark Howard from Seattle. I guess my comment is more of a statement. What we have been talking about this morning is almost seeing a competition being put up between community organizers and police departments, and I am very concerned about that. You know, our goal is to gain community involvement and I would state that if, as a police agency you are looking at trying to gain community involvement, if you are looking at using strictly police officers to do that, that you need to get them some training in community organizing or else look at hiring community organizers to assist the police officers in getting that done. I say that from a background of being a civilian in a police department, organizing communities in a Block Watch so you can work hand in hand.

From the community organizer's standpoint that are not in police departments, you have to do the same thing. You involve the police department in working with your community organizers in training and anything else you do so that there is a clear understanding. But both of them, regardless of where you are coming from, remember that the goal is to gain community involvement in crime prevention or anti-crime activities or whatever you are doing, to reduce crime--but not setting it up as a competition but working together.

MR. BOUZA: I would like to say something very unpopular and I am sorry about that --

MR. COUPER: Sorry, Tony, it is time for lunch.

MR. BOUZA: It may not even be on point. You may have anticipated that I would be saying something that goes against your views. I want to say a word about control.

Democratization of the workplace makes a great deal of sense, listening to your employees, letting them participate in the action. But let us not forget that the police officer has more power over the citizens of this country than the President of the United States in their daily workings, and we have to hold them accountable for use of that power and make certain it is used responsibly. I believe in control. I believe when you get police officers to organize themselves, they organize themselves for their own convenience very frequently and not necessarily for the public good. I believe that they have to enforce rules that are unpopular, make arrests, respond to more calls, issue more citations, promote traffic safety, and they have to be held accountable.

We have a perfectly wonderful physical fitness system in the city of Minneapolis, compulsory physical fitness program. I exhorted them, pleaded with them, begged them--36 percent compliance was the high water mark. Then when I got a mean junkyard dog to really begin to monitor it, it was 96 percent. There is a difference. They were not filling out forms relating to domestic abuse when we thought that they were doing wonderful work. The reality is that Maximilian Robespierre, who died badly, was right: virtue without terror is powerless. We do need to call to the strong and to democratize and to include. We also need to control and I think it is madness to think that just letting the workers organize themselves and go out and do good they are going to do well.

I am not so sure they will. They will do good for themselves but they will not do well for the community.

MR. COUPER: Tony, I think we need a broader forum to get involved in a point-counterpoint. You and I have been fellow travellers for many years. I think on this you are absolutely wrong. I think that you are getting old, and I think that you need to think about these things. I think that those are short term results, extremely narrow short term results of using terror in the workplace, and that in the long term, with the development of our police organizations as coworkers with the community, we cannot use terror to accomplish our means.

MR. CHAVIS: Could I just quickly answer the resource question because, Larry, I feel bad because I was trying to make it clearer. The resource question cannot be answered in 45 minutes for maintaining these organizations except for one point. In most cities there are community development organizations and community organizations that have those linkages to the resources that will foster community organizations and community development officers' efforts. The important thing is to link up, as has been said repeatedly. The idea is not the competition but as with Lucy's program, the partnership between the people who are involved in this: the community, the police and everybody working together on sharing those resources.

Nationally, there are organizations, the Eisenhower Foundation, the National Association of Neighborhoods, a whole slew of stuff, the National Crime Prevention Council, that do have clearinghouses to link you with groups that may be in your area, national groups that can help with the resource question because it is a big question.

MS. GEROLD: Thank you all very much for your participation. Jeff, do you have a final?

MR. ROTH: Just that we need to go right to lunch. We have run a few minutes over and we want to leave plenty of time to hear our luncheon speaker and to have discussion this afternoon.

(WHEREUPON, THE SESSION WAS ADJOURNED)

LUNCHEON SPEAKER IRVING HARRIS

MR. REISS: I am going to be very brief in introducing our luncheon speaker today. I met Irving Harris through a mutual acquaintance of ours, Professor Norval Morris at the University of Chicago, who had drawn my attention to the Beethoven Project. My first reaction to the Beethoven Project was that it's a very daring adventure. I would like to know a little more about it. So Norval, by some means not entirely clear to me since what Norval does is not always clear to me, by some minor miracle, arranged for me to come to Chicago and meet Irving Harris and to look at the Beethoven Project and to talk about it.

What I found was not simply a very interesting project that was underway but a most fascinating human being, and I use the words human being with deliberateness in the sense that Irving Harris is just a remarkable person. I did not know at the time that he had gone to Yale University from which I came. I knew something of his generosity to Yale. I learned that he is so modest that he does not usually talk about these things, but he has been without a doubt one of the major people in Chicago to try to do something about what we think of as social problems, including crime.

But I also learned that Irving along the way sort of flipped the problem over and decided that he had spent a lot of time thinking about intervention, but he decided it was too late when we had to intervene at the level of the problem of reducing crime. I may be exaggerating a bit, but he had shifted his philosophy very much to one of prevention. Being a prominent and successful business person in Chicago, he, unlike many others in Chicago, decided to devote a great deal of his time to trying to

do something about prevention. And among other things, with his foundation, the Harris Foundation, he proceeded to found a number of organizations or to work with others in founding them. One of them is the Ounce of Prevention Fund which has since had rather remarkable success and he tells me that one of the things he has been doing here in Florida is helping a former member in Illinois whom he knew found an Ounce of Prevention Fund here in Florida.

The Ounce of Prevention Fund does many things, and I will not try to describe all of them, because when I asked Irving again briefly this morning what it did, it did so many things that I was unable to retain them in my mind. But basically, it began with trying to do something at the level of infants and small children. That is to say, to deal with crime, it had to deal with the mothers. And then as he said, by the time they came up to teenage pregnancy and all of the things that go with it, after dealing with teenage pregnancy, they had the infants again so they were back and had come full circle in the kind of programs that they were dealing with.

I found the talk that Irving gave last year at Yale about the many things he has tried to work on over the years and how he came to his message and his work so inspiring that I thought you all would like to hear him today. So without being biographical, Irving, I give you the opportunity to tell us about that.

MR. HARRIS: If I am not speaking audibly, please yell early on. Can you hear me all right back there?

Al asked me share with you the history of how we came to put together what we call the Beethoven Project, which three years ago seemed

to me like the logical step resulting from our efforts to try to prevent school failure. When we started, our aim was not particularly prevention of crime, but practically, what can you do to prevent a whole set of problems? If you are successful in prevention, you really prevent them all and you prevent problems which otherwise first show up before birth and anywhere from then on until the end of life.

I was first introduced to the concept of prevention very recently, six years ago. We were trying to get funding from the state of Illinois as part of setting up a drop-in center for young mothers in Aurora, Illinois, where our company, Pittway Corporation, produces First Alert smoke detectors among other things. I had been a member of the board of Family Focus for some five or six years before that. We had six different locations, and it seemed to us with all the difficulty of raising funds and all, we still ought to have one in the back yard of our plant. We were the largest employer at that time in Aurora, Illinois. Aurora has a Hispanic population which is poor and really very unwelcome in the community. They are not going to do anything about getting rid of them, but they do not do anything to help them.

We wanted to set up this drop-in center. It was going to cost about \$100,000 a year we thought, and we thought that the state of Illinois might be induced to give us maybe \$25,000 a year for that for a few years until we could get other corporations in the community to help with the funding, and Berniece Weisborg, who was the president of Family Focus, said incidentally, in our conversation with Gregory Koler, who was the director of DCFS at the time, we will accomplish a certain amount of primary prevention. That really caught his attention.

He said, "Look, if you will set up a program for primary prevention, I will give you not \$25,000 but I will give you \$400,000 if you will match it, and we will set up a program. In the second year, we, the state, will fund the whole \$800,000 and also in the third year and we will see whether primary prevention really works."

So with that, we said that our company was willing to do that, and we gave the \$400,000, and matched the state. We sent out an RFP and got some 100 requests and picked out the six that looked most likely, two of them in Chicago, and four of them downstate. I then began to wonder what was primary prevention. I learned a little bit about secondary prevention and tertiary prevention and in any case, we started out. We have a hunting license, I figure, to try to prevent.

Incidentally, there is an awful lot going on now in the way of prevention. It seems to have caught on. We talked about it in the first place, not preventing child abuse and neglect but preventing family dysfunction which we understood was at the heart of not only child abuse and neglect but all kinds of other things. As you look around now, here is what you see. There is now a National Commission on Prevention of Infant Mortality. Again, one of those things that can be prevented. In our state, we are now in the second year of a program called IMRI, the Infant Mortality Reduction Initiative, using state funds. Illinois is committed to trying to prevent child abuse, child neglect and sexual abuse through the Ounce of Prevention Fund and Parents Too Soon.

Incidentally, the Ounce of Prevention Fund now gets about \$5 million a year from the state of Illinois. Pittway Corporation continues to contribute to it, although we are not obligated to. We have been



putting in \$250,000 a year. All in all, the Ounce of Prevention Fund, in the last six years, will have raised and spent \$31 million, of which \$22 million came from the state, \$2 million has come from Pittway, a million has come from the Harris Foundation, a couple of million have come from other foundations, notably the Chicago Community Trust, Joyce Foundation, Commonwealth Fund of New York. The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation has been very helpful to us. We have about 10 or 15 other foundations in Chicago and we also have some \$4 million in federal money. We have received out of that \$31 million, but I think the Ounce of Prevention Fund is alive and well. The Governor is crazy about it and he is a Republican. The Democratic House and Senate seem to like it and I think that we may be able to continue. We hope so, and as a matter of fact, we hope it will gain.

There are other efforts being made. The Commonwealth Fund has a program called Career Beginnings which is an attempt to try to work with juniors in high school to try to get those kids set on a course that will lead either to college or a better career choice. That I also include in the notion of prevention. Last year, federal public law 99-457 was passed. Formerly, funds for the handicapped could only be used to help children when the handicapping condition could be clearly identified. Public law 99-457 states that for children zero to two who are at high environmental risk of handicapping conditions, those funds now may be used to prevent such handicapping conditions. I heard of a case just yesterday. I went out to Fort Lauderdale, to Nova University's center, the Melman Center out there. They can take a child now who has hearing loss, 90 percent loss in one ear, 100 percent loss in the other ear, and

by working with that child very early on, from two months on, they can help that child speak. So the child will speak. Without the kind of help, hearing amplification and all kinds of training, that child will never learn how to talk. There is an awful lot of prevention that can be accomplished.

Scholars tell us that most profound mental retardation can be prevented by early treatment. In our state, we spend \$700 million a year on developmental delays and mental retardation, most of which can be prevented. Preventing school failure, of course, is a matter of national concern. I guess every state and many cities have programs which try to address this. The best known program is Head Start. These prevention programs are more or less unsuccessful or more or less successful, depending on how you look at them. Most recently, in September of 1987, the Committee for Economic Development announced its concern and its recommendations in a powerful booklet entitled, Children in Need: Investment Strategies for the Educationally Disadvantaged. I brought some of those booklets down. I think most of them are gone now but there also are still executive summaries available out there.

I think what is important about the CED report is not only their recognition, which they came to the hard way, that you have to start very early. They started out six years ago in a big meeting. CED is a very prestigious business organization, for those of you who may not know it, but they started out six years ago asking themselves a question, what can we do to improve our competitiveness compared to international competition?

They got through talking about investment tax credits and everything else and they decided that the biggest single problem that they

had was human resources. They said, therefore we have to do something about our schools. They got into the schools. They figured that it is too late in high school, it is too late in elementary school, it is too late in kindergarten. In a report they issued two years ago, they said we have to start as early as age four. Now they have just put out this report in September and said, you know, we were wrong about that. We have to start much earlier. We have to start with prenatal care, nutrition, prenatal care and very, very, very early infancy. This is really what has been learned in the last many years. You have to start very early.

As a matter of fact, many of you know this, but I have learned it recently. We have the benefit, all of us here, of something like 10 billion neurons in our brains. That is what you start with. That is what our computer system is, and then the wiring takes place and all the connections are made. Those 10 billion neurons are in place three months before we are born, three months before normal birth. Now, that assumes that those neurons and the neurological development has not been impeded by drugs, alcohol, smoking, poor nutrition on the part of the mother or premature birth. All of those are very, very hostile to that development. If that development takes place well, the child is going to have a very good chance of making it, making it in school, making it with his mother and father and really becoming a human being.

With all kinds of handicaps, that child is going to be very difficult for the mother. It is more likely to be subjected later to child abuse, it will have all kinds of problems in school, and all in all -- the CED came to this point -- they say, not because of compassion but because of hard dollars-and-sense reasoning that you have to invest in

these children if we are going to have a society which is going to work. They point out that 25 percent of our kids today will not graduate from high school. One million out of four million will not graduate from high school. In Chicago, it is much worse. In Chicago, a study was done recently: out of 40,000 kids who start high school, 18,000 will graduate, 45 percent. Of the 18,000, 6,000 will read at the 12th grade level. That is 15 percent of the kids who start high school.

Now, that is an average and as someone said earlier today or yesterday, you know all the jokes about statisticians. Statistics can mask reality. The fact is, we have 58 high schools in Chicago. If you take the 11 worst of those, those high schools, instead of having 40,000 kids ending up with 15 percent reading at the 12th grade level, those high schools have 10,000 kids of whom 200 will read at the 12th grade level 12 years later. Two out of 100; 98 will not read at the 12th grade level. Those kids cannot get jobs. They are unemployable and, of course, they also do not get married, and so you have the whole cycle of out-of-wedlock births. It is a very, very great problem and we have to address that by trying to work with these kids so that we can get them started better.

The other thing we learned, we learned from the Superintendent of Education in Minneapolis who has now just been tapped, as you know, to take his experience to New York which may or may not be comparable. I gather a lot of people here are from Minneapolis. My home was St. Paul for the first 40 years of my life, and I am very chauvinistic about what goes on in the Twin Cities and in Minnesota generally. But in any case, he decided that he wanted to upgrade the schools in Minneapolis. I should say parenthetically, Minneapolis has been compared very recently, in a

study by Harold Stevenson at Ann Arbor to schools in Taipei in Taiwan, and also in Sandei, in Japan.

The schools in Minneapolis, while they are very good for American schools, are very, very poor as early as fifth grade compared to Japan and compared to Taiwan. In this country, we have been brought up to believe that Americans can do everything better than everyone else and we have got an awful lot of unlearning to do before we can start addressing the problems that we are not really doing very well with.

But nonetheless, in Minneapolis, he wanted to upgrade the schools so he decided that he did not want any kids getting into 10th grade unless they could really do the work. He tested them all to be sure that they could pass because he knew that if he took kids into the 10th grade who were not able to do 10th grade work, they would slow down the rest of the kids in the 10th grade. He also tested kids leaving 7th grade, 5th grade, 2nd grade and also kindergarten. Much to his surprise, and everyone's surprise, including the New York Times, 10 percent of the kids flunked kindergarten. They were considered, "not ready to go on to first grade."

I talked to a friend of mine in the Chicago Public School system who had taught kindergarten and I said, "What would that number look like in Chicago?" And she said, "It would be much higher." I said, "What does that mean, 'not ready' to you?" They gave a simple test, by the way, in Minneapolis, whether a kid could make change for 10 cents, whether a kid knew four colors or something of that sort.

She said, "I know what 'not ready' means. It means low span of attention, hyperactive, prone to violence, learning disabled, hearing disabled, development delayed in all kinds of ways. When I have one child

in my class of 30 in kindergarten like that -- and I am a skilled teacher -- I can handle that one child and not shortchange the rest of the class. If I have two or three kids like that, there is no way I can avoid shortchanging the whole class."

I said, "How many do you have?"

She said, "Always six, eight, ten."

I talked to four other kindergarten teachers. They all told me exactly the same thing. The range was six to fifteen out of 30 kids were "not ready," and they all used the same phrase, interestingly: "I am a skilled teacher. I can handle one child like that, but if I have two or three, I am licked, I shortchange the whole class."

So I said to myself, you know, this must be hyperbole. You cannot really say that you are shortchanging the whole class. And then you look at what happened and the fact is that out of 100 kids who entered the Beethoven Elementary School, one of those elementary schools, if you follow them through, after the consistent shortchanging she described, you find that 12 years later, only two of them can read at the 12th grade level. It is not an exaggeration. You cannot believe that as you sit here I am sure. I could not believe it. It is just exactly what the facts are.

We all say that 15 of our 58 schools have kids who remain in high school. More than half of them flunk two or more courses every year. We have two schools, Crane and Marshall, where more than 75 percent of the kids flunk two or more courses every year. Those are not schools. They are sort of holding pens. You know, what goes on there is absurd, but it is not teaching.

In any case, it seemed to me that we ought to be doing something about that. About that time I was invited by Dorcas Hardy, then the Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary of HHS to attend a meeting in Princeton where 60 people were brought together to try to look forward to the year 2000 and answer the question, "What will the needs of HHS be in the year 2000?" They talked about the problems of aging, all the problems that are attendant to having more people over 65 and over 80 and so forth, and then we came back to the proposition that we still are going to have, as problems, teenage pregnancy, infant mortality, infant morbidity, special education, drug addiction, alcohol abuse, all the kinds of problems we now have.

I asked the question, and got some affirmation, "Why don't we run some experiments to see if we cannot prevent a lot of this because you never can treat it all?" You cannot treat all the kids who are now old enough to cause us problems. At the Desable High School, for example, we established a school-based comprehensive medical clinic. The year before we set up the clinic, the principal told us, out of 1,000 girls and 1,000 boys, 2,000 kids in the school, they have 300 births a year. Now, there is no way that we can cope with that. Our Department of Children and Family Services has a hot line for reporting alleged child abuse and neglect, 90,000 calls a year. That is over 300 a day. There is no way in the world that any society can cope with that number of calls, to try to go out, have a social worker go out and determine whether or not this child is really in danger of child abuse, physical abuse or neglect or sexual abuse. There is just no way of doing that. The social worker has to go out there and make a judgment. The social worker may not be trained well. The social worker is going to have a lot of burnout in any case,

but when they get all through, they have to make the determination of whether or not to try to take that child away from the family. And then where do they place the child? The foster care system is not going to be very good either. So it seems to me that everything indicates that you really have to prevent.

We do know some things about how to prevent. We can improve the likelihood of girls in high school getting better prenatal care with our clinics. We can also reduce the number of children, the subsequent births, to a teenager who stay in high school. The first clinics like this that I knew of were in St. Paul. I guess there was one antedate to that in Dallas. You have them in Minneapolis now, too. Altogether I guess there are about 100 such clinics in the country out of what, 16,000 schools or 20,000 schools. Very few, really.

But in any case, we do know how to prevent some of these things. In our Ounce of Prevention Program, we fund some 40 community based organizations, including these three school-based medical clinics, but also programs where we work with young mothers, primarily adolescent mothers of children. We try very hard to work with them, to encourage them to go back to school, encourage them to be better parents, know what to expect from their children and not be as punitive as they customarily tend to be. These programs work, more or less successfully. We are learning how to do them better right along.

One of the naive assumptions we had when we started the Ounce of Prevention Fund was, Director Koler and I agreed, that we ought to have an evaluation program right from the start. We ought to have the evaluators come in and help us choose the six locations so we will have real,



meaningful research data. Well, the research data we got was absolutely valueless. It was a combination of the fact that the evaluators were quite incompetent.

They were incompetent for several reasons. We took the normal procedure -- to get a person with a good academic degree who, when he signs his proposal, he says he will contribute 10 percent of his time or something like that to the program, and then he will hire other people to do the research. Then what we found is, the two principal investigators were interested in having something more that would carry their name on their own specialized kind of research, which had nothing to do with our project, but was a facet of it that would look good on their own bibliographies.

Quite aside from that, the biggest problem was there is no way in the world to start a new program and have it work in the first year or the second year. It takes a long, long time. And one of the problems, of course, with foundations, generally, is they love to fund things for three years and figure that after three years it will take care of itself. You are very lucky if after three years you are started. And after another three years, you are lucky if your program is going along well enough so that maybe then it can get evaluated. I think that you have to get past subjective judgments about whether these programs work or not, but it is naive to think that anything that is innovative can be judged quickly. I think the handicaps, the problems, are much, much greater.

In my business career, at one time I was involved in advertising, the Toni Company. We would bring out a new product, advertise it, we could cover the town. Take Peoria, we could have every drug store in

Peoria have the new product, put a new commercial on the air and within six weeks tell whether or not that commercial was working or not by finding out how many shampoos we were selling over the counter. It was very simple.

That is easy research. But if you try to do what we started to do in the Beethoven Project -- we have a grant of \$600,000 from the federal government which originally was supposed to be \$900,000 but by the time they get through, they pared all their grants down. This was in response to the Princeton meeting that I described earlier, where there was an agreement on the part of HHS that they would fund three programs nationally to make an investment in prevention of school failure and all the other kinds of prevention that would come along with it. They funded one in Hawaii in partnership with the Bishop Foundation, one in Pittsburgh in partnership with Heinz, and the one in Chicago in partnership with us. Originally, they said they would be able to put \$300,000 a year into this for three years. In the event, they pared that down to \$200,000 a year for three years, and we started.

We went out and looked first of all for a location. We decided to do this in the Robert Taylor homes, which we were told by the participants are as tough as I guess any place in the country. They may not be the toughest, but they are tough enough. Lots and lots of gun fire, lots and lots of gangs, lots and lots of vermin, elevators are busted all the time, the heating plant is busted. We had to quit operation after we had been in operation for a month. We had to stop for a week because there was no heat in the building, and when you have sub-zero weather as we had a few weeks ago in Chicago, that becomes a very real handicap.

In any case, we have a woman who runs the project, Gina Barkley, who is excellent at community development. She is really a very talented woman, and as is true of most people who are talented, they are talented in many ways but not all ways. That constitutes a problem. You cannot ever get anybody perfect to run one of these program, and she is pretty damn good.

In any case, she got the community well organized, which was absolutely essential. And they told her that whatever she did, she should not put the headquarters of our little project in the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) buildings because our program was going to comprise six adjacent buildings and each of the buildings was under the control of a different gang, they told her. Therefore, if any woman should walk in the wrong building, she would get killed.

Well, our director believed that. She was convinced of this by the mothers and we looked for four months for a location nearby, even though that would entail a lot of rehabilitating plus the fact that we would have to have transportation. We would have to pay, and the notion of trying to get mothers with infants who are doing a great job if they can get downstairs 16 floors without an elevator -- to get them to take transportation at a certain time and go to another location, particularly in weather that may include snow and cold and rain and all that sort of thing, it seemed pretty impractical. In any case, they could not find a place. So after four months, we finally made a deal with the CHA to take over 10,000 square feet of space on the second floor, space that had been vacated five years earlier by Catholic Charities who had given up the ghost there. And the building, that floor was absolutely a shambles. It took us \$280,000 to rehabilitate it for which there was no budget.

Nonetheless, other problems arose. We shook hands with the CHA before the first of January last year, 13 months ago. It took more than eight months before we had a signed lease. We could not begin to spend the \$280,000 for rehabbing until we had a signed lease. There was not a bit of argument about any term of the lease. This was not a long, drawn out negotiation. The negotiation consisted of their saying, "We will give you the space at no rent," our saying, "Fine, we will take it." And there was nothing after that except delay. The last couple of months, HUD got involved in it because of a separate argument they were having with CHA on other matters. But the nut of it all was that on August 1 or August 10 or something of that sort, we finally got a signed lease. That was 14 months after the project was supposed to start.

We finally opened on the first of November. We had a meeting, we brought in our participants and we brought in about 100 people to celebrate the opening. We had -- those of you who live in the South will not know what this means but there are days in the North when, in particularly terrible weather, blizzard or whatever it might be, whether you walk or drive, sometimes it is an enormous achievement simply to get to work one morning. It does not happen often, but it happens. Anybody who has lived in the North knows how this feels -- when you realize that you have had an enormous success because you got to work, nothing yet in the day of work has happened, but you got there.

That is the way I felt when I addressed these 100 people who had helped us start. Nothing had happened yet but we had 100 people in the room, including people from the police department, people from the

building, presidents of each of the buildings, we had the contractor, we had people from the Ounce of Prevention Fund and from several agencies in the state, several of the agencies in the city, 100 people in the room, and I could not help but think, "Gee, what a great accomplishment we have had. We have started."

Now, after we started (I am not telling this chronologically correctly) -- from the start of the program, July 1, 19 months ago, we did go out and hire six people from the community, we hired them and trained them as home visitors. We call them family advocates. We found out immediately we would have to send them out in pairs, and we did send them out in pairs. They tried to contact every woman in the buildings who was pregnant and to get them to come in. In order to try to get them, we thought we could be an ombudsman and get them over to the Chicago Public Health and get them into much better prenatal care than they otherwise would have.

Well, that simply did not work. The Chicago Public Health is a shambles. They are underfunded, and they are always in crisis, coupled with the fact that we had trouble getting the mothers to keep appointments. When they got there, they could not really see anybody, and the nut of it all was that we have done a terrible job in our first year of trying to improve prenatal care. Of the first 63 babies born, 22 were low birth weight. Again, averages are deceiving. Averages tell you that in poor communities you will have as many as 14 out of 100 births born at low birth weight, and I just want to repeat earlier what I said, low birth weight is a very, very bad indicator. So it is an important thing, and many of these kids are below 5.5 pounds. They are two pounds, one pound,

three pounds. Terribly damaged kids by the time they get born, but nonetheless we have not been very successful.

I went to a meeting of the staff about six or eight months ago and I was told that we now were going to apply for a grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation -- \$30,000 they wanted to apply for, and we will demonstrate with that grant, in the next three months or four months, that the present system does not work and cannot work. Therefore, what we really need is \$200,000 so we can set up our own medical facility on premises and have our own nurse-practitioner, pediatrician and obstetrician and all that sort of thing so we really can make it work.

So I said, "Now, what are you talking about? How long?" They said, "Well, if everything works well and we get the first \$30,000 grant, we run the test and prove it does not work. Then we apply again for \$150,000 or \$200,000 and get that. It will be two years."

I said, "We do not have two years. You cannot get there from here. If we need that, let us start now. We will try to find the money one way or another."

That is what you have to do, and then you go to foundations and they say, "Well, look, we do not want to help you if you are going to do this anyway, because we want to fund projects that otherwise would not happen."

In this case, we were very fortunate because Robert Wood Johnson is an extremely good organization. They saw the problem generally of people who were poor getting such bad medical attention and they are going to fund it. I am almost certain they are going to fund it. They were supposed to meet on this within a couple of weeks now, and they have given us preliminary indication they are going to help fund it.

But those are some of the problems we have had. There is a good side to this too. I do not want to make it sound all negative. The mothers who are coming in are exhibiting the kinds of problems we thought they would. They come in very skeptical and when they find that they have nice surroundings and people who are really attentive and people who really understand children, they are very, very responsive. We had a case of a mother who came in with an infant in her arms and a two-year-old daughter. She was interested in some of the handicrafts that we have there, and she wanted to work at this and the two-year-old started bothering her, pestering her. Gina Barkley, who was there that day, said, "Let me take your daughter and see if I cannot take her in the playroom, in the other room, and you go ahead with your handicraft."

"Well," the mother said, "you cannot do anything with her, she is a bad seed. She is a terrible girl. Nobody can get along with her. She is going to come to no good. Do not even try."

So Gina said, "Well, let me try." She got all this negative stuff again. She persisted and she finally took the girl by her hand and tried to lead her maybe 30 feet away to where the toys were. One the way and after she got there, the kid kicked her and hit her and yelled at her. In any case, Gina was persistent and she showed this child a doll and she got the child interested in the doll and how to unbutton and button and fasten and unfasten the little coat that the doll was wearing, and after about five minutes, she had quieted down and she was really quite intently interested.

Her mother could not believe it, and that mother has come back now every day and that child is in a different kind of a framework. If you

want to be sure that a child will run away at age 12 or 14 or 16, and end up in trouble, just do consistently what that mother was doing with that child. The same thing is true of a little boy that was brought in by a mother. Any time the child did anything, expressing curiosity or whatever, the back of the hand. There was a man there that day. Gina's husband happened to take one of his two days of vacation off to come and look at the project, and he told this woman, "Well, you do not want to do that. That boy is not bad. Let him do that." And a few minutes later, he noticed that she was about to slap him again, and she looked up at him and she withheld her slapping. He winked at her and she sort of liked that. The point is that there is conduct that is going on in those places that can be changed, and I think it can be very effective. We have seen it work in other places. We know that historically.

Sally Province at Yale, 20 years ago, worked with 17 poor black kids, every one of whom graduated later from high school and not a one of those [kids, who are now] mothers is on welfare. We have a Dr. Stanley Greenspan in Washington who has worked with 48 kids and 46 of them have made it. It takes a lot of intensive work. It is not clear at all that it will be able to work in that kind of a hostile environment and make it work.

But I want to close by talking to you about a program like this in Syracuse. If you talk about evaluation, it is very important that we get the longitudinal history of these programs, to find out what really happened. In Syracuse, 15 years ago, a large, federally financed program worked with 80 kids, poor, black, and they had a control group of comparable kids which they picked up three years later, 80 kids there



too. And they worked with these -- these were all healthy kids by the way -- which is, of course, not going to help us in our project. Our project is much more difficult than that because we are going to have a lot of kids who are not healthy. They worked with these kids, and by the time they were five years old, the kids in the experimental program were doing fine compared with the control. Very, very obvious, great improvement had taken place.

By the time the kids were seven or eight years old, they found that most of those cognitive gains had gone down the drain, which is very much what Westinghouse found with Head Start. The social gains and the psychological gains were much more difficult to measure, but the cognitive gains were, for the most part, lost, particularly for the boys. When they did this study again, at the end of 15 years, they found that the major difference -- well, first of all the girls did retain considerably greater cognitive skills and had done better in school, the boys not at all.

But when they checked for the number of cases of probation that had come to the attention of the Syracuse police courts, they found that only four of 65 respondents that they could find in the experimental group had had any trouble with the police, and those cases were all relatively minor: ungovernable, ungovernable, ungovernable, and juvenile delinquent. Those were the four. They found 54 of the 80 in the control group 15 years later. Of the 54, 12 of them had had trouble with the police, and here is what the offenses were: juvenile delinquency, petty larceny, juvenile delinquency, petty larceny, ungovernable, criminal mischief, violation of probation, sexual abuse, attempted assault, second offense, robbery, assault second offense, robbery, assault second offense, robbery second offense, burglary, juvenile delinquency, an enormous difference.

The cost to the city of Syracuse was 10 times as much for the control group as it was for the others. Now, this was before these kids got to prison. As we all know, prison costs are much, much higher.

There is not any question in my mind that early childhood development is enormously important in preventing later delinquent conduct. You can say it the other way around. I think we know exactly how to produce a delinquent or a kid who is going to be violent. You handle that kid violently enough when he is young, do not let him do anything. If he will just get big enough and strong enough, by the time he is 15 years old he can be a pack of trouble. And he can be a pack of trouble in the school, he can be a pack of trouble when he is six years old in the school, and one of the problems these teachers are talking about is these kids who are prone to violence. They do not know any way to handle things except violently.

In any case, I will close with a quotation from a book written by Gilbert Kliman, entitled Responsible Parenthood. He said it makes a real difference to you whether my child turns out to be, say, a dedicated teacher or a narcotics peddler. If my child is retarded or delinquent, you, without having any vote in the matter, help foot the bill or could be one of his or her victims. All children are everyone's children, or should be, and all adults, in addition to being the specific rearers of their own biological offspring or those they choose to adopt are in a very real sense, surrogate parents for all children. Thank you.

(APPLAUSE)

(WHEREUPON THE LUNCHEON WAS CONCLUDED)

FOCUSING RESEARCH AND ACTION IN COMMUNITY CRIME CONTROL

Moderator - James F. Short

Panelists

James K. Stewart

Harold Rose

MR. SHORT: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. This is the last session. I am Jim Short. I am a sociologist who has spent some time involved with both sides of the communities and crime picture, and I am delighted to be here. Jeff Roth asked me to announce something that you are probably already aware of, but might want to be reminded of. Cassette recordings of the plenary sessions will be available and there are order forms up here in front. You might want to use them for training sessions or for your own edification, or to remember what happened while you were asleep before Tony Bouza woke you up.

We have a panel, a busy panel this afternoon. I have been asked to say a few words summarizing some themes that have emerged. The first theme which has never been stated in quite this way in this conference, I am sure you will recognize immediately: that is that no good deed goes unpunished. We had better all remember that because there has been a lot of enthusiasm shown for some innovations in police work and in community work, and we need to bring ourselves down to reality just a little bit because the honeymoon is always too short.

Another sociological generalization which we should also remember, is that "it always takes longer." One of the things that I want to do is

to try to get us to focus on the long run as we think about what has gone on here.

Al Reiss, when he began these sessions yesterday morning, took us back in history and it is well that we think about history just a bit more. Quite aside from the probability that those who do not understand history will be sure to repeat its mistakes, we sometimes have a tendency to reinvent the wheel and if we can avoid that, perhaps that will be of some assistance to us.

The Wickersham Commission focused 60 years ago on many of the same sorts of problems that have brought us together this week. I want to discuss briefly some of the differences between then and now. The Wickersham Commission did not focus on community-oriented policing. The Wickersham Commission did not focus on community organization, although a good many community organization efforts came out of the research that was reported there and out of related research.

The Wickersham Commission was more concerned with police corruption, with a lack of efficiency. This audience surely knows this history quite well: the movement from reform to professionalism to some of the innovative programs that have been discussed in the last couple of days.

These innovations have a great deal in common with some of the things that developed out of the Wickersham Commission, particularly in the area of community organization. As an old Chicagoan, I of course have to go back to the Chicago Area Project for some of the ideas that seemed to be quite innovative then and which now are considered to be innovative but which are at least that old and perhaps even older. For example, the

notions of focusing on indigenous community leadership, and trying to help communities help themselves.

What is different? We certainly have more active and more sophisticated police involvement with communities today than we did 60 years ago. One cannot listen to what has been going on these last couple of days without being tremendously impressed by the level of sophistication with which police are addressing problems which would have been almost totally foreign 60 years ago or maybe even 20 years ago.

There is more sophistication among community workers as well. We are guided by some of the same goals of participation, indigenous leadership, helping people to help themselves. But there is more understanding of "what makes communities tick," about how it is possible to create more functional communities, more functional families, more functional institutions of all sorts, and of how to get them to work together.

There are more opportunities today as a result of legislative changes over the past few decades, more opportunities to gain leverage on economic and political power than there used to be, and there is more sophistication among community workers as well as among police in how to manipulate those things, how to gain access. There has been a good deal of talk at this conference--more in the corridors perhaps than in the meetings--about an issue that Lloyd Street raised for us yesterday, and that is how issues relating to race impact what we are trying to do.

One of the legacies of the riots of the 1960's and of the various Presidential Commissions that came out of those riots and other events, (assassinations, etc.) and out of the related civil rights activity, is a

fear of addressing such issues head-on. We fear discussing them frankly. There has been some pretty frank discussion upon occasion but we still have not learned how to face those problems very realistically. Lloyd Street reminded us of that. Several other people have as well.

Now, what are some of the problems? Again, I try to draw a thread through some of the discussions that I have heard in the last couple of days. The paper that was given yesterday by Rob Sampson on macro level forces affecting crime and police-community relationships, has received less discussion that it deserves, perhaps because we all feel rather helpless in the face of macro level forces. Yet, many of those changes have effects at the community level which we ignore at our peril. What happens to a community, for example, when a large segment of that community consists of single parent households or of children set adrift. We also know that there has been some experimentation in helping individuals, families, businesses, and communities, and that some programs seem to work.

We have heard reference to the House of Umoja, and to Sister Isolina's program in Puerto Rico. But how can we build upon those programs, upon that knowledge and that experience? Among both community and police programs that have been discussed, the problems of institutionalizing programs, procedures, and philosophies arise. How can we institutionalize and keep doing what is most productive of good communities and good police work, and most of all of good police-community relationships and more effective crime control, without losing the values and the inspiration that lie behind success?

With regard to the problem of conflict between researchers and practitioners, two things ought to be said. Number one, there is going to be conflict, no matter how well we prepare for it, and we had better face that. More importantly, to echo Tony Bouza's words, programs should be evaluated not so much as to whether they make a department look good, but in terms of what can be learned from the process of experimentation. The important point for both police and community is to be open to experimentation, to be willing to change and look at what we have done for years and taken for granted. Only in this way can problems that still remain be identified, studied, and remedied. Research, you see, much like problem- or community-oriented policing, also is a philosophy quite as much as it is a collection of techniques of data gathering, analysis, and interpretation.

Just a couple of other points. Let me make a plea for a type of research that has not been much discussed at this conference. There are two things to be said. One, that we can learn a lot from little quasi-experiments. The tight research designs required for rigorous evaluations are not always possible, especially during the early phases of problem solving. We can learn a lot along the way by simply being open to trying new things and evaluating them as a prelude to more rigorous implementation and more rigorous evaluation. Doing so requires that we be open to criticism and to learning.

So often our experimental designs do not find out why something went wrong or right. I have often learned more from mistakes than from successes. Think about that in your personal life and I think you will agree. Praise makes us feel good but we do not learn much from it. We learn by being open to constructive criticism.

Secondly, every project that seeks to evaluate itself rigorously ought to have an ethnographic component. Once the before-and-after measures are taken, and all the designs have been met, we are often disappointed because research comes up with equivocal or negative results. Now, what are we to make of them?

We do not learn a whole lot if that is all that the research says. One of the things that ethnography can do is to help us understand what went wrong in the "black box." Why program implementation did not work the way we thought it should, what contingencies arose, what happened that did not permit program implementation to be carried forward in the beautiful way that we had first envisioned it. There is much to be learned from ethnographic research in this respect.

There is a need to look at the micro-level as several people have noted. Another theme that has emerged from the conference concerns the need for flexibility in relationships between researchers and program people. Still another theme that one might have expected from the community organization folks has also emerged among the police, namely empowerment: empowerment of officers well down in the command level.

There are other themes that we can perhaps return to toward the end of this session. We have two more presentations here and then we will have discussion from the audience.

The first presentation is from Chips Stewart from whom we have already heard. Chips has been an active participant in the discussion sessions that I have attended and I am sure we all appreciated that very much. He is going to wrap up all this knowledge for us right now. Chips?



MR. STEWART: Thank you very much, Jim. I do not want to build expectations I cannot meet so I want to tell you the unexamined life is not worth living. I think Socrates said that but let me just say how pleased I am, how well the conference has gone. I think that all of us have made new friends and realize we did not travel this path alone. Somehow, we did not get here because we just discovered it ourselves, but we have a linkage to the past and the heritage. We also have a linkage to the future, and that is in the year 2000. Where are we going to be as a country and a community? That is what this conference is really about, about how we go on from here.

All of you may have heard me tell this quick anecdote, but I would like to do that again because I like it so much and that is that we were doing some studies back in the early 1970's about school vandalism and we gave out considerable amounts of grants to try to stop the school vandalism. In a place in Missouri and Kansas City, they had applied for a grant and had gotten some money, a considerable amount of money to try to stop the school vandalism which took the form of lip prints on the mirror of the ladies restroom in the high school. They said, "This is a serious problem. The girls cannot use the mirror. Could we have \$100,000 because we want to study the root causes of self esteem problems and we want to go in and try to alter this?"

They did that, and they brought consultants in and they hired people like me and Jim and Lloyd and all of us, and Al Reiss, and then about 1980 that that grant stopped, and the lip prints continued persistently. Nobody could understand why. About 10:30 in the morning, the Dean of Women Students finally went in because she had no more grants, no more experts. She came in with a pail in one hand and a sponge in the

other. She said, "You know, in a high school, we dispense knowledge and knowledge ought to change the way we behave. So ladies or girls as the case may be, I want to give you some knowledge, and that knowledge is how we clean the mirrors every night."

She went over with the sponge into the toilet and got the water and she began to take care of the mirror. The lip prints began to drool right off that mirror.

Well, let me tell you this. We still do not know what the root causes were. We still do not understand the relationship between lipstick and mirrors, etc., but the one thing that we know is that there has never been another lip print on those mirrors so I think it is important to go to the people who have to confront the problem. I think that is where we ought to take a look.

We ought to say that knowledge ought to change the way that we work, the way we carry on, and it just worked so well in that high school, I hope that it works well here in our coming together and then leaving. I think that the most important thing that I can leave you with is that you have before you a network that ought to be tapped into. You now know each other in a way that you never knew before.

All of you ought to be able to correspond, and I think that is very important to share our experiences because when we do get into trouble alone and when we are facing with community problems, funding problems, police problems, legislative problems, where do we go? Who do we look to? Who can give us that kind of help? Right here in this room I think there are people that you can share those kinds of things with and ought to. You now know of other academics, you now know of other community professionals, you now know of other consultants, you now know of other

police and you know a variety of other kinds of issues that are present, and I think that is extraordinarily important.

I would also like to say that this workshop highlighted the important link between the community safety and security and the viability and growth of a community. The issues that I would like to highlight were very similar to Jim Short, but his list was longer than mine. But I would like to say that many times we have written off the community or an inner city community because we considered it too dangerous or not a place worthy of investment.

I focused on the issues that were brought up by Irving Harris, and theoretically by Al Reiss and Lloyd Street and others. They have talked about the value of the people that we talk about as the community, and I think there are very strong reasons to believe that it makes good economic sense to invest in the community. The private sector ought to make those investments as well because they can do better by an investment in the community than they can by neglecting it and I think we can prove that today.

Some additional points. It should not appear that it is either community run or police run or academically run. I think that the major point that we have to make is that whatever works is going to work because it is comprehensive, because it integrates -- it does not separate. It brings together a whole range of these rich and vital resources. A turf war can go on because institutions fight but a turf war has to stop when the community gets involved and says, "We want this kind of service."

I also think -- and I want to emphasize this very, very strongly -- that as Lloyd Street said, community people do a good job organizing the

community and police do a good job in actually dealing with crime. We should not go around saying, "Well, I think I can do your job better because I am stupid at mine, and you ought to take mine over." Okay?

I think that one of the things that is very important is that crime and crime prevention ought to be one of the major emphases that we look at. Any kind of intervention that we make, any kind of investment, has got to have an anti-crime component, a crime reduction component. Fewer victims, a sense of safety so you can build a sense of community. I think that is very important theoretically as well because I think that all the money that we put into welfare and into education and into health care is money that sometimes is down the drain when in fact, the biggest risk of disease is because of narcotics or because of physical assault or sexual abuse. We have not gotten the word out. We have not done a good job talking about what crime does to us in our communities. Instead, we say, let us invest in parks. Instead, we say, let us invest in recreation for the kids. I think that is important, but if the kids cannot go to the playground because the drug dealers are there and they are having a turf war, then our investment is not worth anything.

I also think that the theoretical basis that both Al Reiss and Lloyd Street brought out is how long it takes. It is not going to be a six month intervention. This is not a quick fix. I mean, in the 1960's, we loved it. Right? We said, "Hey, listen, we can solve this in 30 minutes with two commercial breaks. We have got Mission Impossible. Right? Light the fuse, we go out there, get the four guys, come in and fix it."

We expect it, but now we have heard from the community people that have been here. They have been in the trenches for a long time, a long time, 20 years, 25 years, 30 years, before they begin to see the kind of benefit we are looking at.

I like Rob Sampson's theoretical piece. I agree with Jim Short very much. That is, many urban renewal policies and family policies and health policies, have contributed to the crime problem and we have not spoken about that very much. We ought to be consulted as a group when you decide to redevelop an area. Take the unlivable houses that Al brought up. It is beautiful -- big, tall places but no place for a kid to play. Who are the permanent residents? Who are the neighbors? What do we do about that? That is why I have to charge all of you that this is an investment in your action.

I think we have created crime opportunities, and I think on a macro level we have to look at that. No longer can we say, "Sanitation, take care of yourself." Sanitation has a big problem. No longer do the streets and buses departments get to do their own thing. I think that the police and community people need to be consulted regularly and I think that evaluations and research can give you the leverage so that you can make the argument.

One of the insights that I got out of this was from all the complaints about the system not working. And the insight that I have come up with -- it may not be as insightful as I think it is -- but it seems to me that our system of government and institutions is forced into operating the way it does. It does not do that by its own choice but it is forced to do that because that is how it gets paid, that is how it gets credibility. Until we can all work together to put in local control and

local accountability, we are going to have systems that are essentially auto-directed. That causes some of the things that you heard today about the need to try to get them responsive to local control, but they are not going to listen to you unless you make yourself known.

A couple of other things that the National Institute of Justice is involved in and I am very proud about. This is something we have talked about: what do we do about these influences in crime, and what makes a difference? Well, we are now investing in a really exciting program of longitudinal study. It will take place in five cities. It is going to be a \$3 million a year effort. We have entered into a partnership with the MacArthur Foundation, and we have some of the greatest scholars and other people to come and help advise on this project. We do not want to be here in 20 years asking what we are going to do about crime. Right? Many of us have been here in the 1960's saying that we have got to do something about crime. So we are going to try to invest this money into a way to see what helps people into crime careers and what helps people out of crime careers. We are going to look at prenatal clear through the young adult years.

That longitudinal study is a risk but it is something that will give us the information we have all wanted to know. We are going to look at all the poor people, all the middle class people, all of them in the same group so we can get a good sense of what it is because I am tired, and I hope that you are, of having people say, "Well, it is poverty. Poor people are going to be thieves and so you cannot trust them."

Because it is not true, it is not true. For political reasons, some people have said that, but it is not true a bit. I think that if we perpetuate that kind

of slur, and if we are involved with that, we foreclose lives and opportunity for many, many outstanding people.

Also, the RECAP project that is going on in Minneapolis with Larry Sherman and Tony Bouza. (Incidentally, I notice Tony has taken his tie off, and our good friend over here from Madison has put his on. I see there has been a certain change in position here.) Let me say that for the Assistant Chiefs, both Tom and Tim from Houston, I think your project is extraordinary. All of us are taking a look at how you remanage a system, create a new philosophy, a sense of values. You can measure your process, whether it makes a difference or not. We are very excited about helping to fund that, and also in Madison, Wisconsin.

Many of the comments about defensible space -- Oscar Newman's work, the National Institute of Justice was in there in the beginning. Giving people a sense of ownership of an area I think is very important. Also, one thing that was not talked about so much that I think ought to be talked about more is the relationship between soft crime, incivilities, etc., and hard crime. You know, if you want to concentrate on the robberies, do you concentrate on robbers or do you concentrate on the environment in which people feel they can commit robberies with impunity.

I think that in the future we need to focus more on community oriented policing. Community based anti-crime programs have to be more closely coordinated with citizen and community groups and municipal officials. We have learned from research that efforts to enhance public safety are more likely to be effective if they are comprehensive in nature, involving all the different resources in the community.

The key issue that was not described today is one that concerns me

greatly, and I hope you will think about it when you go back home. Before we turn the keys of the city over to the community, before we allow the community to run the police or the police to run the community, let's ask ourselves who is the community. I come from Oakland, California. You know Oakland. Fortunately, Lloyd knows Oakland. Oakland is a famous city, a great world headquarters for a number of corporations. We had the back-to-back World Series Oakland A's, we had the great, famous Oakland Raiders, now the L.A. Traders, and we have also had -- it is the home and birthplace of the Black Panthers. It is the world headquarters for the Hell's Angels. It is also the center of drug cartels that own, operate and employ, from cradle to grave, everybody in a housing project. We have Hell's Angels that have bought four blocks of property on which they put a cyclone fence. They call it their compound.

Now, what sort of community kinds of policing do you expect to do there in that area? You go to the Black Panthers. You say, what sort of community policing would you like? They say, "We can take care of it ourselves. Thanks, pig, see you later."

Okay, you have to ask yourself, who is it, so while this term sounds very good and attractive I expect you all to be very alert about that and to make a decision about where you are going. Also, I think there's a need to encourage greater collaboration in organizing community efforts and in maintaining these programs.

We have got to create -- we, the people in this room, have got to create -- the opposite of the vicious cycle. We all know about the vicious cycle. I would like to move to the virtuous circle: organizing the community against crime has a self-perpetuating effect. It has a holistic benefit on the quality of life in that community. The circle of



virtue continues to build a sense of community. What lives in our heart is not our address. It is our feelings about each other. It is about our sense of where we are going. That is what builds a community, and our sense of law and justice and fairness. The people in this room have more to do with a sense of justice and fairness. As Tony said, it is the community policing. The President of the United States, your Congressmen, and your Senators want to help in these terms. But you have important knowledge and understanding to share with them.

Research has the value of discovering what works and what can be used in other areas. When we talk about evaluation, we are essentially talking about policy issues. That happened during the 1960's and 1970's -- people said let us do policy research. I am not doing that kind of evaluation. We are trying to do research to discover and give us better options. Let me say that one of the things that came up here was about resources and funding. I have an agency that is really just a pimple in the budget. It is so small it is not even a decimal point. When we are talking billions and billions of dollars in drug trafficking, we are talking in dimes and nickels for research. To give you a sense of what we are talking about here, we have spent on medical research in this country about \$38 per capita per year for the last 30 years. That is a pretty good chunk on money, and what do we get for that? We have about a 10 year longer life expectancy. We have eliminated polio. We have taken care of a number of other medical problems. We spend about nine cents per capita on all criminal justice research. What do we do? We have about 25,000 murders a year. We have increases in robberies. We have social disorganization that is going on each year. Then the question might be, do we get what we pay for?

I am here to say for the nine cents, I think you get what you pay for. Who is going to make the difference? We are always saying that we have got to fund a program. What I am saying is that we have got to fund some ideas. We have got to have some new ideas on what works. We have got to invest in some research to make the cents go further. I will give you an example. We do not spend a lot of money in dental research--just \$124 million a year. We spend \$16 million in criminal justice research. Nobody ever died of tooth decay. They have a much more effective lobby for the \$124 million. Dental research has a much more effective group that meets together and is able to educate the people who make the decisions.

What I want to leave you with is the idea that crime is a much bigger story than we have ever let anybody tell. It is not just a smoking gun. It is really liberty and justice in our communities. I want to be sure you understand that and ask yourself which community you are talking about.

This meeting we had is an investment in change. You have a network, and I think that that network needs information. The one thing that I want to try to give you is more information. So I want to take another couple of minutes and show you a couple of audio-visuals. The first one is going to be "Report, Identify, Testify" which is a series of television public service announcements. We tried to take research and put it into a 30-second message that gives your community all they need to know -- not to tell them to call for further information, but to present everything they need to know. If you like these, go to your TV stations

and tell them they ought to play these once in a while in their public service spots. The National Sheriffs' Association and Carey Bittick and a number of others have been helping with these. Paul, let us go ahead and roll these. You have to watch to see if you get the message here.

(VIDEO TAPES SHOWN)

MR. STEWART: Okay, what do you think? Are those great? Are those good?

(APPLAUSE)

Let me just say that it is not just that I think are good, but they were nominated for Clios. Two of the spots were nominated for Clios, the advertising industry's equivalent of the Academy Award. I have never heard of a crime commercial or even a political campaign given this kind of credibility. If you would like to have a copy to show in your communities or take them to your TV stations let us know because local action is the base.

The next thing we want to give you is a quick promo for a series called Crime File. Crime File is now on 88 Public Broadcasting System stations across the United States. The series, which explores critical issues, is on video cassettes, which you can buy for about \$17 apiece. They are more expensive for us to produce but the benefit is that you can use these and the accompanying study guide at your community meetings or when you meet with people. Each tape takes 27 minutes and it really identifies an entire issue and gives you information so you can debate that issue or get information on it. It makes criminal justice research available to you. It is a tremendous resource that you can use.

MR. HARRIS: Do you have those in Spanish?

MR. STEWART: We do not have a Spanish translation yet but we have sold about 50 or 100 sets all across the world. We sold them in Spanish and Italian countries and non-English-speaking countries, but it could be done. Watch this. I want you to get a sense of what this is so you will know what kind of resource is available.

(VIDEO SHOWN)

MR. STEWART: I wanted you to get a little glimpse of this because you can then bring Crime File to your community or community discussion group and say, here are five or six different approaches to key concerns that can be used. Each tape usually includes a round table debate with a series of experts who take different perspectives. That is the kind of thing that would be very enlightening, particularly when you are trying to mobilize your community and trying to use research on the strongest point.

You can look through these. You can order them. The series comes with free study guides which raise the issues, give you additional reading as well. It is not just for you personally, but you can sit down with your groups, you can talk to your people, and it gives you a way of sensing what the research looks like, what the practitioners think about it. It may help you with your police, it may help you with your community. And researchers, it may help you conduct more experiments.

I have very much enjoyed this conference. One of the delightful things about being the director of the Institute is we have such fine people at the Institute. A number of our Institute people here today have made this all possible. We are grateful to Richard Linster, who you all know has done an outstanding job; to Fred Heinzelmann and Lois Mock and Richard Titus and certainly to Paul Cascarano, who has put together the

Crime File series and has done so much to be sure that you get the information that is important to you.

We live in a better society because we are able to talk in sessions like these. In the 1960's and 1970's, meetings like this did not happen. We have all come together for, I think, candid and frank discussions in the best way. As we have shared our ideas, and I think my ideas have been modified, I hope some of you go away with the best that we can ever give, and that is a little new insight, the belief that the dialogue ought to go on. Thanks very much.

(APPLAUSE)

MR. SHORT: Next we will hear from Harold Rose who is chair of the Department of Urban Studies at the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee and then we will have time for some discussion. I know that you must have a lot of questions, at least I do. Harold?

MR. ROSE: Thank you. When I was asked to appear in this role, and I saw the schedule of activity, I came to a quick conclusion that I was miscast. It is not unusual to be miscast, so I will go ahead as if I were the appropriate person.

As an academic, I have great pleasure, again, great pleasure, from coming to gatherings where people are out on the front line, both the police and community organizers. What I will do, I presume, more than anything else, is simply reflect on what has been said here. I have been scribbling here for the last couple of days, trying to take down some points made by everybody, but I will not recount those. I will simply try to, in some crude fashion, organize my perceptions of what was said or where you say you are going, where you are actually going, where you want

to go, these kinds of things. I was extremely attracted to the notion that the emphasis was on the community. I am a geographer by training and I function both as a professional geographer and an urbanist of some sort so I am not totally a passive academic. I am in some ways an active academic.

On arriving I found that there seems to be a lot of confusion about how one is defining community and, I presume, community policing efforts. I think one of the things that you are going to have to do, at least operationally, and probably conceptually, is come to grips with what it is you mean by community because I think the label as it is being used covers a broad expanse. One can use that label and do almost anything one chooses to do, and I am not sure that you are going to make a lot of progress unless you begin to think seriously about how you are going to conceptualize what the community means. I think in every instance, the implication was that you are going to organize at some microlevel, but that microlevel will vary from community to community. On the one hand, there are those who say that looking at the calls for assistance or calls indicating criminal behavior occurring at some single address or set of addresses represents a form of community policing while others take a very different point of view.

I think you can expect very different kinds of things depending on how you define community, and surely evaluation, measurement, whatever, is going to be influenced by how you do this. As a researcher, I was very interested in the idea set down by some of the researchers, although most of the emphasis, it seems, was placed on evaluation research. I think if you are going to do community policing, you need a lot of

conceptualization and so you need the input of non-evaluation researchers prior to the initiation of your efforts and then evaluation research at the end of the process. Otherwise, you might simply go helter skelter off into whatever you feel is the right thing to do without having thought seriously through the whole process. So conceptualization seems to be something that was not given a lot of attention here, and it is something that I think one should look strong and hard at.

Professor Sampson did indeed talk about the kind of research that I have reference to and so did Professor Street. But even there, you have to be able to distinguish between the various kinds of research, the various kinds of orientations and perspectives -- whether or not for your operation ecological research is very important or organization research is very important. I think both are, but you are going to have to know how make use of the input from these various research perspectives so even before you get to the sticky notion and the conflict-ridden something-or-other that tends to exist between evaluation researchers and community organizers and possibly the police, these other kinds of things need to be taken into consideration.

Once again, I am going to point out, while I think micro orientations obviously have a lot of payoff, one should not overlook the role of the macro environment because what one is responding to frequently is the impact of the macro environment at the local level. If you want to be able to anticipate the kinds of problems you are going to have in local areas, you have to know what kinds of things are going on externally that influence behavior locally. I think that would enable one to establish much more effective guidelines, plans, and whatever to come to grips with the kinds of problems that vary locally.

Another point that caught my attention was that one did not seem to make distinctions between types of communities and the kinds of difficulties that community policing might encounter in specific environments. Surely the kind of program that has been developed in Madison, Wisconsin, may or may not be the kind of program that one would develop in New York City. Or it may be one that would be developed in one subcommunity in New York City, but in many others, it would simply be inappropriate. So what we have is examples of the kinds of programs that exist in individual communities but I think we have to think seriously about the unique character of individual communities, because what will work in one place may simply not work in another. You know best the character of your community. But even in a very large community like Los Angeles or New York, when we begin to look at the subcommunity, very different kinds of programs might have to be developed in order to be effective.

On this matter of what is effectiveness, I am not sure that that issue was adequately addressed because I was never sure what one was attempting to do: reduce crime, prevent crime, prevent feelings that crime was a serious problem -- that is, peoples' attitudes about crime. All of these things were suggested by various commentators, and obviously these are problems from community to community. Surely the simple reduction in the number of criminal acts is not necessarily evidence of a reduction in crime because this would imply that you have a static population. Now, communities are dynamic and one must have some kind of grasp of the dynamic changes that are going on in communities so that a reduction in



the number of incidents of crime cannot be misconstrued as lowering the risk of being victimized. It is surely not in and of itself a good indication, and yet that seems to come through. If the numbers this year are smaller than last year, by some critical number, then we are being successful or our evaluation researchers might possibly think that the program was successful.

But these are the kinds of things that kind of jumped out at me after all I have heard, and many more. But these are the things which captured my attention -- which made me think, "Are we going to be able to come to grips more effectively with problems of crime?"

First of all, I think we are going to have to say what it is we are trying to do in a much more precise fashion because some kinds of crime may lend themselves to community policing while others may not. So I would think that some kind of criminal activity may better be handled within the framework of, say, a non-community policing effort while other kinds of criminal activities may lend themselves perfectly well to community level policing.

So as an academic who does not have any responsibility for any of this, I can sit back and say, "Well, let me see, what are these people saying and does it mean anything?" Well, I think it surely represents a very fine start, for it has brought together the two groups of people who are on the front lines -- those who are representative of some local population and those who have the official responsibility for making life safe for people in local areas. I am pleased that you are doing this because I am reminded of the movie that I saw recently, Robocop -- old Detroit I presume in the year 2010 or something or other. If you can

prevent this kind of thing, the decay of communities to such an extent that the only people who live there are those who have no other alternatives -- and of course, in some places that is already the case -- but as a first step, as a start on a very difficult process that has all sorts of built in kinds of conflict, I must applaud you.

(APPLAUSE)

MR. SHORT: Thank you very much, Harold. I am certainly glad you brought up the point about community variation because that was one high on my list and I had skipped right by it. On the one hand, that is a comfort to us because we can always say, "Well, you know, it all depends, I know my community." On the other hand, show-and-tell is no longer sufficient. We need to be a little rigorous in the way we look at these things.

Now we are open for questions, Sister Isolina.

SR. FERRE: Sister Isolina from Puerto Rico. I just have to say a few words before it all ends, and I want to thank you for having invited me because I have had a lot of new insight and I have learned a lot about policing, about community, about getting together. But I want to say what we are doing in Puerto Rico. I am not going to explain the whole thing, I am just going to tell you that it has taken 17 years to be able to move a community to work by itself, and the important thing about it is that we believe, and that is our motto, that the glory of creation is man and woman fully alive.

We believe in the self-worth of the person, and therefore we have tried to work with the community, not with the young people in trouble, but with the whole community from the little babies to the old

grandparents and grandladies like me. We have tried to help them to understand that we have to show all the possibilities and potentials that we have inside. We believe in this, that the glory of creation, the glory of God is man and woman fully alive. I want to just quote a little thing we wrote in the Annals (of the American Academy of Political and Social Science) in November. It says that this project is based on the principal that a community made aware of its own resources, with the confidence in its capacity to use these resources for its own fulfillment, will come alive and create a life more humane and more satisfying for itself and the development of its children.

I think we have to be aware, when we go into a community that these kind of people are there. They are the same muscles, they are the same worth because they are human beings, and therefore we have created the bone and embodiment conducted to achievement rather than delinquency and violence. Thank you very much.

(APPLAUSE)

MR. SHORT: Thank you. Sister Isolina referred to the November, 1987, issue of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, whatever it is called, edited by Lynn Curtis. There is a paper in there that she has written, another one is by David Fattah, and papers describing a number of other programs which offer great promise, it seems to me, if rigorously pursued and rigorously evaluated. All we can do right now is to say there is promise, and we need to look at it carefully. That was another good talk about some points that I had neglected. Yes, sir.

MR. CURTSINGER: I was just going to make a point that in the last couple of days we have heard from a lot of researchers, and the essence of much of that was that we look at data differently and even though we make an observation, the interpretation of the data gives us different outcomes, we move in different directions. And Chips, this really is for you. You made an observation that Bouza took his tie off and David put one on. Kind of a narrow scope, because the reason why he took his tie off was because David needed one and did not have one.

MR. SHORT: Hear, hear. Other questions, comments, please, for the panel or for anyone else. This is our last crack at each other before we go our separate ways.

MR. HUNTSMAN: My name is Craig Huntsman, and I am the original couch potato. I am from Boise, Idaho. I do not want to disappoint the chief here. I have sat through this quite fascinated with the information that is being put out, and just wanted to make just a couple of comments. I guess I come from a completely different perspective. I sit in this group, and I am glad I am getting back on my plane and going back to Boise. We have different problems. You talk about housing problems and gangs and turf fights and these kinds of things. We do not deal with those kinds of things, but yet crime is still a major part of our community. I guess my question would be, is there much research available for smaller -- you know, Boise is a city of 100,000 people, so to Idaho, we are the big city. I deal with a lot of small departments around the state, and they just do not have a lot of the resources that are available to many of the departments that are here. My question is is there research available for small departments, and are some of these studies and some of this research going to go to the smaller departments in the

future so that we can identify our own problems and know if we are doing the right things, just as these larger cities are getting the fundings and the research made available to them?

MR. SHORT: Good question. Chips?

MR. STEWART: That is a point that is acutely important. Most of our departments in the United States are essentially small departments. I think that out of the 17,500 departments, 17,100 have less than 100 officers and probably -- go down to about 15,000 who have less than 20 officers. I mean, it is quite small, and that is where the resources can be very helpful. If you take the NIJ Reports, much of that research is available and printed in very readable form.

The other thing is we try to work with medical examiners and county coroners to try to help establish information and death investigations in places. Many of you may say that Idaho does not have much trouble. I know that when I was out here, they took all the police because they had some motorcycle gang holed up someplace and were having some war between one motorcycle gang or whatever, and it took 100 officers. It required four towns to supply that so you do get involved in some pretty hairy experiences as well. I know there are probably some people here that would not want to go to Idaho.

I was thinking, when you said that, it reminded me of a little story. Once I was teaching affirmative action to the rangers in California and they were saying, "Well, gee whiz, we cannot get anybody in the inner cities to come up here because they do not understand about being up here. They are afraid of bears. That is crazy. They will not come up here."

I said, "will, you come down to recruit in Oakland?"

He said, "Oh, yes, we do.

I said, "Come on down on Saturday night."

He said, "Oh, heck, we would not come down on Saturday night. That is really scary."

I said, "Well, what scares you does not scare them a bit, does it. So it depends on your perspective."

So he said, "Aha, they are afraid of bears and the other guys were afraid of coming into the inner city." And I think that much of the research we are doing I think really does apply across the board.

I know that Neil Behan, Chief Behan has been here the entire time, and he has been doing an amazingly fine job in supplying information and getting that out, and we would be delighted to be a resource. We have not forgotten the small departments that are not necessarily represented in the metropolitan statistical areas.

MR. SHORT: Many people thing of northern Idaho as the home of the neo-Nazis, you see, and I am closer to northern Idaho than you are in Boise. The comment this morning was that small communities do community oriented policing sort of naturally. In a sense that does occur, but that really is not an answer to your problem. Anyhow, Harold, would you like to address that?

MR. ROSE: Yes, one of the things I should have emphasized was the need for greater collaboration between researchers and the organizations which use the products of research. Since you have a major university in Idaho, the University of Idaho, it would seem a logical step for you to make demands on the appropriate disciplinary units at the University of Idaho where people understand the local problems much better than, say, a

researcher from Yale. I think in that way you could develop a partnership which could be mutually beneficial to both your department and to the researchers who may be looking for something to do.

MR. SHORT: Yes, sir.

MR. KLEIN: Sid Klein from Clearwater, Florida. I wanted to build on the gentleman's comment from Idaho, and I will address this to Chips also. In terms of local law enforcement agencies, unless we are in receipt of a grant either from NIJ or from other foundations, the results unless we have the resources on our staff to do it ourselves, were seldom ever published. I have to assume that probably one of the reasons I am here is that my agency is doing something in the area of community policing. Yet the size of the agency -- we are probably in the least likely position to have the staff do the writing and the research, and I am sure a lot of my fellow practitioners would benefit if we had that type of resource available to us at the front end, not when it is done. What I am proposing to you, at least conceptually, is to think about the idea of a core of researchers or writers, perhaps under contract to NIJ, so that if we called you, and convinced you that we had an idea that might work, you could send that support group to us.

MR. STEWART: I think it is a good idea, Chief. Two things come to mind. One is that the Police Executive Research Forum -- and Darrel Stephens is here -- they have done an outstanding job of producing a small handbook about the principles of research and the practical applications of that. I think that is outstanding and it gives chiefs and people on staff a chance to look at that and maybe do some experiments.

I would also like to echo what my colleague has suggested and that

is that you get close with the local university to see whether you could form a partnership or work with one of the national organizations to do that. We frequently get a lot of proposals to come in that are great ideas but they have lousy test sites. We look for people that we could try for test sites. This is very good, you are doing problem oriented policing, and I think it is outstanding, and I think that your attitude is tremendous and we would like to back that up. I think it is an excellent suggestion.

MR. SHORT: Dennis Rosenbaum?

MR. ROSENBAUM: Just one more point about the Boise thing. My reading of the research is that a lot of it would apply even better in a place like Boise than it would in some of the inner cities. I think the difficulty we have, one of the questions we keep raising, is how to tackle the most difficult areas. Problem oriented policing I think is -- even though we have had a couple of moderately large police departments starting to deal with it now that are here, it has been well tested I think in places more like Newport News, so that I would have more confidence generalizing to Boise, than to drug problems and that kind of thing in the inner city. I think it is an empirical question.

But the other part is community crime prevention, given the inverse relationship between the level of effort organizing and the level of participation we have, depending on the neighborhood. I think we do have a number of studies that would show that some of the basic kinds of community crime prevention stuff probably will work in a lot of the neighborhoods like you have in Boise. I know something about Boise. So I think a lot of it is applicable.



MR. SHORT: Thank you. David Fattah I believe was next.

MR. FATTAH: I want to say one thing. Once again, I would like to thank you for inviting us here. The reason I am doing the talking is that my wife said, "David, you have got to earn your keep today," and I have already had lunch, right?

One of the main things I would like to put on the table is that I am hoping that the researchers do two things. One is that they go beyond research to the next step. By that I mean this. At one point in Philadelphia, we started a thing called Crisis Prevention network, and I had the distinction of being its first team leader, and when I called the team together, our main purpose was to try to stop the reoccurrence or altogether eliminate gang warfare in the streets of Philadelphia.

I called my team when we first started, and I explained to them what the objective is. I said, "We have got one objective here. We are going to work ourselves out of a job. In five years you are not going to be doing this because this problem we are going to take care of."

So I suggested that they all go to school or begin to develop some other skills because this here is leaving town. I say that to say that many times in travelling around the country and talking to different people about different problems, that in itself becomes a problem. The program becomes so institutionalized within the problem that serious efforts to eliminate the problem also means you are going to eliminate the program, which means somebody is going to lose their job.

So I am hoping that in approaching different situations that we look beyond the problem. In other words, we know that once you eliminate crime and crime goes down, there are some other kinds of things that are

going to have to take place that the same kind of people can do so we should be about identifying those kinds of things.

Secondly, I would appreciate it, I am in Philadelphia at the House of Umoja, that is 1410 North Fraser Street, 19101, if you would send us copies of your research. One of the problems that practitioners have is to understand exactly what the researcher wants. So many times since the researchers do not have practitioners on their teams, they see a lot of things that we are doing as crazy and we kind of see some of them being crazy coming in the door, so right away we have got a communications problem. If we could kind of follow the line of research and you could take us on some of your missions before you got to see us, I believe that a lot more effective evaluations could be accomplished. Thank you.

MR. SHORT: Thank you.

MR. ROSE: I would like to comment on that. I think Mr. Fattah has raised a very important issue, and one that needs more attention. I think that researchers need to become more familiar with the life of the community while at the same time I presume the representatives of the community have to become more familiar with researcher goals and objectives. Frequently the research which is done -- particularly the theoretical research -- has a great heuristic value but little practical value. If you want this research to have practical value, you practitioners are going to have to interact with researchers in such a way that the results that can be used in a practical way come forth. The results which the researcher is interested in is often that which has heuristic value, and that may be of little or no concern and might even be counterproductive in terms of its interpretation for local use. At least that is one person's opinion.

MR. SHORT: Yes, Chief Couper.

MR. COUPER: I have to say something about the full issue of research. If this is coming here, there will be over 100,000 dissertations and masters theses written by graduate students in this country, of which 98 percent of them --

MR. SHORT: I think you ought to be on tape when you say that because I like that, Dave.

MR. COUPER: What I was trying to say is that this year probably there are 100,000 or more graduate students that will be putting out various dissertations and theses on various subjects, especially in the social sciences, of which 98 percent of them will be worth a slight bit more for the typist who had to do this at \$1 to \$2 a page, slightly more than the paper that they are printed on. I am sorry my couch potato left here for Boise because I wanted to talk to him specifically about establishing a relationship with a university or college. I think it is our job, if we are going to have lifetime learning institutions and the people are going to come to work with us -- whether or not we are going to be able to attract the best and the brightest and keep them in policing, we are going to have to have a relationship with a university. And that means that we have got a fertile field. Being a sociologist by training from the University of Minnesota, and also being a detective at the same time, I found with my colleagues who were in graduate school that I was in the fertile field.

My gosh, I had access to police records at the Minneapolis Police Department at that time. I could do my thesis on violent crime and have

access to records and that was very important. I think we can do that, but we have got to go out and beat the brush a little bit and say, "Look, we have this fertile field here for you as a graduate student, under one condition. You are going to do something the way we agreed to that is going to help us. You are not going to go out there and have access to our records and talk to our people and muck up our organization. You have got to enter into a contract, relationship, contract with a small c with us, that is going to say 'Yes, this is something that is going to benefit our police department.'"

And I think in the area of applied research, that means something and it is important for us to do that.

MR. SHORT: Very good. Thank you.

MR. SHERMAN: Just the other day, the Surgeon General was talking about how we are going to solve the problem of AIDS in this country and he said, "Gee, we really ought to get some more master's students to write their theses on it."

I think that this is a critical problem. I have supervised a lot of dissertations and master's essays. Most of them are not worth the paper they are written on because the people who are doing them do not really have the skills necessary to do important research and to do it in a responsible, sound way. I think all this discussion about getting universities involved with voluntary help to police departments is ducking the main point that Chips Stewart made earlier -- that funding for crime control research in this country is a pinhole in the budget. We cannot get around that fact by trying to bootleg incompetent, voluntary labor from universities.

MR. SHORT: And I read Larry Sherman's master's thesis.

MR. SHERMAN: Then you know what I mean.

MR. SHORT: That is all right. I have cited it many times. It was a good one.

I supervised Geoff Alpert's Ph.D. dissertation. It did not cost the NIJ a nickel and it was a pretty darn good evaluation of the program, too. It was a Legal Aid program, and we found out some things about Legal Aid. So, I am glad to have the academic catch a little flack here. We deserve it. We have been knocking on police and we have been knocking on community organizers. The academics need a little goosing on this, let us face it, but it is partly your responsibility, too.

MR. STEWART: Let me just say that we are all here talking about a couple of things, and we ought to come together on the issue. For a long time, people were saying, "Gee, whiz, the academics were spending all this money and not ever addressing the issue."

The community people were saying, "Well, gee, whiz, the police have been in here, cost us lots of money and they never face the issue."

And the police and the academics are saying, "Gee whiz, the community people have never sort of gotten to the issue."

I think this is where we are beginning to get together. We have sort of surfaced the issue and now it is up to us to tip off other people about the issue. I think we all have our self-interest. The academics do, the practitioners do, the police do, and the thing is that we do have a confluence of self-interest when it comes to what we are talking about now, and I have to congratulate the National Academy of Sciences and the panel for bringing such a prestigious group together to begin to elevate the debate in this nation about this.

I think it is real important, and I want to get that on the record. Like I said, I want to goad you a little bit about this because we have all been doing our own thing and dancing to the wrong tune and we have found out that we do not have that kind of money. They are making decisions all over this country that are based on the wrong information, and if we are so small-minded -- none of us in this room -- but if we are so small-minded that we have to argue about whether this guy's research is this way or this person's style is that way, we will not talk to them -- we say, let us get to the truth. The truth will make you free, and that is the thing we want to look at. We want to find out the truth, and that is why we are funding projects like this. We try to mine a vein and not go all over the place. We are trying to do that in this area -- the communities and crime field and the academic research are all maturing. We are all coming of age and I am really proud of that.

MR. SHORT: Thank you. We got started a little late so perhaps we can go on a little longer. Let me throw out a question if there is no one who is anxious to speak just now. Let me throw out a question for those of you who have been describing your programs and maybe thinking about other programs as well. The problem has to do with institutionalization. David Fattah raised it. I have heard it discussed many times in the last couple of days. The point is usually made, however, quite differently from what David Fattah made -- namely, that when we have innovative procedures, we need somehow to institutionalize them so that they have some continuing effect so that we do not lose the lessons that we have learned as we innovate. The problem that he addressed, however, was what sociologists oftentimes refer to as the dark side of institutionalization:

namely, that when the initial enthusiasm has faded, when the honeymoon is over, then we get invested in programs for their own sake rather than for the original goals that guided them initially.

Now, how do you guard against that on community oriented policing? Neighborhood oriented policing? Problem oriented policing? How do you keep from getting so invested in what you are doing that you get just as wedded to procedures that maybe ought to be changed but are not changed as time goes by. How do you adjust to change? How do you face that? Let us let the Madison Chief here talk for a minute.

MR. COUPER: Let me make a small comment. I think that there is something going on in the country and we are starting to talk about it right now in terms of the nation's quality and productivity movement. There are techniques in management that keep us from getting wedded to programs. That is, that the purpose of an organization is constant improvement and if we look at community-oriented policing and problem oriented-policing -- and as my friend Chris Braden at the Edmonton Police Department talks about, other-adjective policing, that is a great term, other-adjective policing -- that what we need to do is to take some of the quality improvement things. One part of that is a set of thinking that goes plan, do, check, act. If we plan to do something, we check on how it goes, we then do it, or first we plan, we do it, then we check on the effectiveness of it and then we act on improving the system, it will prevent us getting wedded to programs and get even wedded more to philosophies. A philosophy of a constant state of organization improvement allows us to go beyond popular programs to listening to the customers out there and improving the process.

MR. SHORT: Thank you. Yes.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That was my whole idea. The whole idea is the satisfaction -- rather than doing Neighborhood Watch and community based policing or whatever it is that you are trying to do -- is basically from reaching out to the citizens and finding out how they feel about the service. I think that is the key issue.

MR. SHORT: They will remind you.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: The citizens can feel it, touch it. If they just feel that it has improved the quality of their lives then we are moving in the right direction. I agree with Chips in terms of crime control. We have got to concentrate on crime control. If the average citizen feels that his life or her life is no more safer, that they cannot shop and they cannot do the recreational activities, then we have failed, and we cannot influence that quality of life. So that to me is what we should guide all research on.

MR. STEWART: You know, Jim's question is one which Darrel Stephens has done a fine job answering in this book he has had out, Problem Oriented Policing. It talks about scanning, always trying to find out what this means, and looking for the areas in which it is, and then seeing what you can do to solve it and not trying to solve all the problems, and I think that is very important. I think that kind of philosophy -- that the customer is right, but you do get conflicts between customers. You have got one customer on one side of the street who says, "I do not want to have this happening." The other customer says, "I like rock and roll music so I want to do this." And then how do you decide that when one community lines up against the other? It gets



very touchy.

But the problem orientation and the integrative approach, I think, is the key that we ought to take out of here. It keeps us from essentially saying, "Well, we are a professional police department or we are a law enforcement style police department." But this kind of thing that is going on in Houston, Texas, with the value orientation of Lee Brown, I think, is a very important movement. It says we have certain values that are expressed in our policies and orders and things like that that do integrate the kinds of ideals that we have talked about today.

MR. SHORT: Tony?

MR. BOUZA: I think it is important once again to reflect my ignorance. It is an irresistible impulse here. But we have to understand the distinction between pleasing the community and serving it effectively. I have spent a large part of my professional life serving the community and yet creating a lot of anger and anguish in the process because I was not giving them what they wanted but giving them what I thought was more useful to their lives. And ultimately, they sometimes discovered that to be the case. The doctor who tells you you have some gas in your stomach and to dispel it and have a good time when you are about it is pleasing you. But the next doctor who tells you what you have got is cancer and he has got to operate on you in 30 minutes or you are going to die is serving you, and there is a distinction that we have got to be sophisticated enough to understand.

MR. SHORT: Thank you. Harold, did you want to comment on this? No. I have heard a lot of talk in the last couple of days about community oriented policing involving perhaps being an ombudsman, perhaps being a

ward boss. Somebody said yes, a ward boss, "I can kick ass." Now, are these things mutually compatible? Are there not some problems here? How do we solve problems like the inherent conflicts in our conceptualization here? Yes, sir.

MR. WADMAN: You know, a couple of things, and then Tony sparks me again to step up here. I should avoid him. I think it is contagious. I use this little analogy of what I call Bronc Rider management as I view my peer police chiefs. It's the idea that we are often more concerned about the time in the saddle than we are the quality of the ride, and inherent in that is the challenge that if I wait, as Dave mentioned earlier, to be the zero-mistakes organization through research, my chances of being a zero-mistake organization is enhanced. If I wait for research to be completed then go with the valid findings, I limit the number of mistakes. But if I wait that long, what is going to happen between point A and point B? I think that really we need to get to that point where through experience, intuitiveness if nothing else, we stand up and take some of these risks and get willing to pay the price. Then in the course of developing this community-police relationship, you develop the kind of confidence in the community where when you are taking these risks, they stand up with you and say, "Hey, we made a mistake, but do not run the guy out of town on a rail, go forward with it." Until we get to that point where we have confidence in ourselves as police administrators to take risks, even though we do not have that package of research in our hand, these projects are not going to become a reality.

MR. SHORT: Thank you very much. That is a good comment. Any comment from the community organization folks on these sorts of problems here? We have been hearing mainly from police. How do you guard against institutionalization there? You see, as an old student of the Chicago area project, I know that some of those community projects became more interested in themselves and in their institutionalization and really ran counter to the original vision of Clifford Shaw, for example. I know that can happen. Now, how do you prevent that in the new community organization that is going to save communities?

MR. FRIEDMAN: I am feeling a little spaced out, it has been long and it has been stimulating. But one thing, I think that if you look at some of the community organizations that are longer lived, they have gone through periods where they are not in touch. And the same corrective exists for community organizations that exists for -- well, it may in fact be a stronger message -- because for a police department, you cannot set up an alternative police department. But what happens in communities is that since community organizations themselves are not such capital intensive ventures, you find very often that out-of-touch community organizations find themselves in competition with new community organizations. And then either you are back on track or you have a dinosaur that loses membership and that happens all around Chicago. We have old name organizations that really are ossified. And so I think there is a market out there that is a little more flexible than with a government agency.

MR. SHORT: I think that is a good reflection. I think probably we have just about worn everybody out. It was not your fault. We have one more comment. Denny?

MR. ROSENBAUM: Having been on many sides of the fence -- many of you may not know I was once a police commander and director of research in a police department so I have been on various sides of the fence here. One point I want to make that I think we forget -- as we all come here and those of us who are critical social scientists say we do not know anything and nothing works -- there is a whole group of people that study what we call knowledge utilization. People like Carol Weiss at Harvard, there is a bunch of people who ask how do we use knowledge for social policy and for program development in the real world and why it is not used more often and all of that. It is a whole science now in and of itself, and there is just a great deal of research in many, many fields, that is never used for anything. One of the most utilized sets of data is criminal justice research in my opinion.

I can document and other people have, actually, Joan Petersilia and others have actually documented the extent to which criminal justice research has influenced policy and decision making and policing course corrections, etc., over the last 20 years -- major, major influences. I am pleased that the people in the field are responsive. It would not happen without them, and everybody is working. There is a lot of progress that has been made, I think. I do not think it is all circular, random behavior. So anyway, before we end, I wanted to say that it is nice that people are here to try and improve that. There are other fields where people do not even talk, and I think that we are trying to refine that process. It has already been established and I appreciate that.

MR. SHORT: I think that is a probably a good note on which to  
end. Thank you all. Have a good trip home.

(APPLAUSE)

(WHEREUPON AT 3:39 P.M. THE CONFERENCE WAS ADJOURNED)