





## INTRODUCTION

The fortunes of correctional industries have fluctuated over the decades, changing as public opinion has shifted and as correctional theories have evolved. Although correctional industries seemed assured of an important role in corrections, the exact nature of that role will probably remain in flux, given the problems that beset corrections today.

Most people—legislators, governors, corrections department officials, and members of the public—agree that inmates should work during their incarceration. As will be discussed, work conditions, types of correctional industries management, and private sector involvement have evolved over the last century as theories of corrections and the related role of correctional industries has changed. This paper examines current models of correctional industries and related policy questions that face state legislators and corrections officials.

The essential policy question that confronts state legislators who examine the role of correctional industries is how to be explicit in defining objectives and then recognize the tradeoffs that result when some objectives conflict. The most important stated objectives of correctional industries include:

- Reducing idleness and, thus, inmate disruptions, which is a key correctional objective;
- Generating income through the sale of goods and services, which is an economic objective;
- Teaching the work ethic while providing job training and work experience to enhance an inmate's employability after release, which is a rehabilitation objective; and
- Saving costs by providing inmate services (work ethic and work experience, job training) less expensively than through other inmate programs, such as vocational training and basic education.

The potential conflicts among objectives of state correctional industries contribute to the confusion that surrounds this issue in some states. Some of the major policy questions that confront legislators include:

- Are correctional industries really inmate programs, such as basic education and vocational training, or are they "businesses behind walls," whose purpose is to make a profit? Most correctional industry officials now accept the latter definition. What the basic mission of a prison industry is affects the way a program is run. Operating a prison industry in a business-like manner with an emphasis on cost reduction may lead, for example, to the adoption of labor-saving, automated manufacturing processes. The result may be fewer inmates employed. By contrast, operating a prison industry with reduction of inmate idleness as a primary goal may lead to overemployment, or "featherbedding," in the industry.
- What compromises have to be made to partially attain conflicting objectives? For example, to what extent should the objective of maximizing prison industry profits be compromised to meet that of maximizing job training and work experience for inmates?
- Does the work experience and job training that inmates who work in correctional industries receive really help them find meaningful jobs after release and thus lower the recidivism rate?

In addition to these policy questions, policymakers need to recognize that the daily administrative requirements of a prison may conflict with the efficient operation of a prison industry. For example, lockdowns, callouts, meal schedules, security considerations, and staffing can adversely affect such operation. When inmates are prevented from working by

such interruptions, a correctional industry's fixed costs—for civilian staff, administrative personnel, and equipment and machinery—still must be covered.

Some see one of the purposes of prison industry programs as providing inmates with a "career ladder." In an institution, a newly arrived inmate may begin his "employment" in maintenance or support work in a facility and, after he has satisfactorily demonstrated his abilities, advance to a correctional industry. In an institution that offers "private sector correctional industries" or federally certified private sector correctional industries, which will be discussed later in this paper, the inmate could then advance to that program after working in a traditional correctional industry. Increasing levels of responsibility, job skills, and rewards may be provided to the inmate as he advances. The ultimate "advance" would be for an inmate, after his release, to find and hold a job. (Correctional industries should be clearly differentiated from work-release programs where inmates are employed away from the institution in regular, private sector jobs.)

The policy questions that surround correctional industries should be placed in the larger context of corrections. State legislators are concerned about policies and programs that alleviate prison overcrowding, reduce inmates' idle time, lower the rate of recidivism, promote efficient management of institutions, provide education and job training for inmates, and decrease the cost of the corrections system. Correctional industries have offered states a way to meet, at least partially, these objectives.



## HISTORY OF CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIES

A brief review of the history of corrections, changing theories of criminal behavior, and the role of corrections and correctional industries provides a valuable context for state legislators to understand the issues that today surround correctional industries. [1, pp. 1-12]

Inmate labor has a long history in American corrections and can be traced back centuries to English jails and workhouses. By 1860, about 24 states had instituted correctional industries. By 1900, the private sector had become involved in some correctional industries and shared in the profits and goods produced by inmates. Business and labor criticism of the private sector's benefits, however, resulted in states' restricting the sale of inmate-produced goods to only state and local governments.

Under continued private sector political opposition that argued that correctional industries were unfair competition, Congress from 1929 to 1940 passed a series of laws that eventually banned the shipment in interstate commerce of prison-made goods. The result was a dramatic decrease in prison industries: in 1900, 85 percent of inmates worked in correctional industries; 40 years later, 44 percent of inmates worked in correctional industries. [2, p. 1]

After the Great Depression, a new approach to prisoner rehabilitation emerged in corrections. The "medical model" viewed an offender as someone suffering an illness and requiring counseling and psychological treatment to "cure" criminality. Education—which before had taken a back seat to corrections' emphasis on work—was stressed, and diagnosis and inmate classification were introduced.

By the 1950s, a correctional reform effort, which was precipitated by prison riots in the early part of that decade, focused on the role of correctional industries. The private sector became increasingly involved again with corrections, and private sector advisory groups to correctional industries were created.

In addition, other events encouraged a return to the emphasis in corrections on the work ethic in correctional industries. A 1963 study by Daniel Glazer revealed the link between a lower rate of recidivism and prerelease preparation and postrelease employment. By 1967, several programs had been initiated to provide realistic job training for inmates.

In 1967, President Johnson's Commission Task Force Report on Corrections marked a watershed for correctional industries. The report (1) downplayed the importance of the medical model and (2) emphasized a work-based approach to reintegrating inmates into society. As in the decades before, the "moral value" of work was stressed, along with the goal of reducing idleness, which the task force saw as a primary goal.

The "reintegrative model" had major implications for the role of correctional industries. In addition to stressing the rehabilitative aspect of work, this model also meant that inmates needed help to develop attitudes and job skills and to gain work experience to allow them to survive after release without running afoul of the law. The reintegrative model, in turn, laid the groundwork for the private sector to become more deeply involved in correctional industries.

In addition, if prison industries were run effectively and efficiently, the task force noted, then the state should receive an economic return. The main conditions for economic return include adequate scale of operation to be competitive, a sales team to market the goods and services produced by prison industries, and an incentive system for inmates that involved wages. The active involvement and advice of business and labor were viewed as essential to meeting these three conditions.

By the beginning of the 1970s, therefore, correctional theories and research had provided the rationale for inmates working in correctional industries as part of the rehabilitation of the inmate and his reintegration into society.

A business-like approach to correctional

industries underlay the enactment of the federal Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, sponsored by U.S. Senator Charles Percy (D-Ill.). Among other things, the Percy legislation allowed goods produced by a federally certified state correctional industry to be entered into interstate commerce. The U.S. Justice Department, meanwhile, played an instrumental role in promoting the reintegrative model. By the late 1970s and afterwards, a growing number of states were embracing this new concept.

In 1983-84, Chief Justice Warren Burger moved the prison industry debate to a higher conceptual level when he returned to his theme, first expounded in the early 1970s, of "factories with fences." Burger's basic concept was that prisons should be a self-sufficient model of the outside world. The chief justice's approach brought the reintegrative theory together with holding offenders accountable for their crimes and making them responsible for supporting their families as well as for compensating victims. From these objectives was deduced the policy of providing inmates with adequate wages, which led, in turn, to the need for increased private sector involvement.



## OPERATION OF CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIES

In providing an overview of correctional industries, this section discusses the operations of correctional industries; organizational links to corrections departments; management, and personnel; purchasing and marketing; inmate wages and incentives; budgeting and financing; economic competition with the private sector; and the role of the private sector advisory councils.

### Overview of Correctional Industries

In 1987, according to the Institute for Economic and Policy Studies, 42,579 inmates worked in state correctional industries in the 50 states; the goods and services that they produced resulted in more than \$550 million in sales. (Table 1 provides a state-by-state breakdown of these and other categories.) Total state prison inmate population at that time was 511,328; thus, 8.3 percent of state prison inmates were then employed in correctional industries.

Traditional state prison industry products are sold almost totally to state and local governments. The goods and services produced by correctional industries range from brooms and office furniture to aquaculture and graphics. (See Table 2.) The number of products and services produced in a given state varies from one in Hawaii to 37 in Florida. (See Table 3.)

Half the states have legislation that specifies that correctional industries be self-supporting or reduce the costs of corrections, or both. (See Table 4.) Moreover, about a dozen states have statutes that specifically mandate business-like operations for correctional industries, according to Neal Miller of the Institute for Economic and Policy Studies. In addition, the type of products produced by some correctional industries requires that they be operated in a business-like fashion, Miller notes.

### Organization, Management, and Personnel

As correctional industries have risen in importance in the last two decades, the relationship between correctional industries and correctional departments and facilities has

changed in several ways that concern state legislators because of policy and budgetary implications.

Before the reintegrative movement, correctional industries usually operated under the supervision of the warden and within each correctional facility's budget. The trend in modern correctional industries is toward semiautonomous status under a central management authority. The benefit for correctional industries has been increased flexibility, independence, and uniformity among facilities in marketing, customer relations, purchases of raw production materials, and pricing. California and Georgia are examples of states that have established a semi-independent authority, with correctional industries reporting to a board that is separate from, but linked to, the state corrections department.

Many states have raised the position of the correctional industry director to that of deputy commissioner or equal to that of a facility's warden. In almost 30 states, correctional industry directors attend the top level staff meetings of the corrections department.

Two recent changes in correctional industries personnel systems reflect the growing emphasis on business-like operations. First, an increasing number of experienced, private sector personnel have been recruited to work as correctional industry staff. Second, in about half a dozen states, sales staff operate on commissions.

### Purchasing, Marketing, and Financial Accountability

Some legislatures have relaxed statutes for correctional industries that govern the purchase of raw materials and the expenditure of funds. And in an effort to break out the real costs of operation for correctional industries and ensure financial accountability, states have allowed correctional industries to charge the corrections department for goods and services that in the past were provided free, although some "trading" remains. Consequently, legislators, in seeking to determine the real costs

of correctional industries, should examine whether the correctional facility or the correctional industry should pay for operational categories such as security, maintenance, transportation, and so forth.

State agencies have often sought exemptions from purchasing correctional industry products or services because of concerns about poor quality and late deliveries. To expand their sales to the "state-use" market, an increasing number of correctional industries have sought to improve quality and delivery dates by stressing that correctional industry management is responsible for enforcing quality control on the shop floor. In an effort to boost sales by correctional industries, legislatures have reduced the unwarranted use of purchasing exemptions by state agencies.

### Inmate Wages and Incentives

A key factor in the trend to the business-like operation of correctional industries has been the role of incentives—especially wages—for employed inmates. Adequate wages and incentives for inmates have been stressed as necessary to motivate them to turn out quality products. Consequently, the average daily inmate wage rose from 60 cents in 1972 to \$3 by the mid-1980s. (Observers say that part of that increase is due to experimental efforts by some private sector prison industries that pay minimum or prevailing wages.) Some industries provide inmates with higher pay for higher levels of skill and responsibility. In addition, more states are providing performance incentives.

### Financing and Capitalizing Correctional Industries

Legislatures have approved establishment of revolving funds for correctional industries to manage finances on a long-term basis instead of on an annual basis tied to the legislature's budget and appropriations cycle. This allows correctional industries flexibility in financial matters.

In some states, however, prison industry facilities and equipment are now old and out-

**TABLE 1.  
OVERVIEW OF CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIES**

State	Number Inmates Employed	Rank	Correctional Population	Rank	Employ Percent of Correctional Population	Sales Industry Total	Rank	Inmate Sales	Rank
Alabama	2,126	5	12,600	12	16.87%	\$12,341,746	13	5,805	41
Alaska	187	41	2,150	38	8.70	2,425,000	36	12,968	26
Arizona	780	17	10,641	18	7.33	6,000,000	25	7,692	36
Arkansas	300	34	4,800	28	6.25	2,469,905	35	8,233	34
California	5,497	1	67,178	1	8.18	75,935,397	1	13,814	22
Colorado	480	26	4,492	30	10.69	8,246,000	19	17,179	16
Connecticut	483	24	6,534	24	7.39	4,430,873	29	9,174	33
Delaware	129	46	2,400	35	5.38	324,583	46	2,516	45
Florida	1,925	6	32,000	4	6.02	44,347,000	4	23,037	4
Georgia	795	15	18,310	8	4.34	12,034,287	14	15,137	19
Hawaii	20	50	2,300	37	.87	550,000	45	27,500	1
Idaho	208	39	1,437	42	14.47	2,788,895	34	13,408	25
Illinois	814	14	19,918	7	4.09	11,677,078	15	14,345	20
Indiana	857	12	11,419	15	7.51	18,068,258	8	21,083	11
Iowa	273	36	2,750	33	9.93	6,090,167	24	22,308	8
Kansas	360	31	5,800	27	6.21	7,667,000	20	21,297	10
Kentucky	558	23	4,675	29	11.94	7,235,000	22	12,966	27
Louisiana	774	18	11,627	14	6.66	9,674,000	16	12,499	28
Maine	429	28	1,312	43	32.70	1,243,445	40	2,898	44
Maryland	772	19	12,081	13	6.39	17,102,165	11	22,153	9
Massachusetts	409	29	7,377	21	5.54	5,807,048	27	14,198	21
Michigan	1,137	10	20,000	6	5.69	25,790,160	6	22,683	6
Minnesota	482	25	2,400	36	20.08	6,507,979	23	13,502	24
Mississippi	753	20	7,000	23	10.76	680,000	44	903	46
Missouri	890	11	10,238	19	8.69	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Montana	100	47	950	45	10.53	1,755,000	39	17,550	13
Nebraska	183	42	2,100	39	8.71	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Nevada	205	40	4,200	31	4.88	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
New Hampshire	234	37	850	47	27.53	1,170,000	41	5,000	42
New Jersey	661	22	16,500	10	4.01	7,288,507	21	11,026	30
New Mexico	307	33	2,643	34	11.62	3,831,000	31	12,479	29
New York	2,474	4	40,000	2	6.19	56,303,000	2	22,758	5
North Carolina	1,430	8	17,764	9	8.05	33,563,182	5	23,471	3
North Dakota	166	43	452	50	36.73	3,757,000	32	22,633	7
Ohio	2,714	3	23,218	5	11.69	17,863,043	9	6,582	39
Oklahoma	680	21	7,900	20	8.61	4,276,000	30	6,288	40
Oregon	380	30	4,200	32	9.05	2,986,197	33	7,858	35
Pennsylvania	1,867	7	16,125	11	11.58	20,077,729	7	10,754	31
Rhode Island	212	38	1,500	41	14.13	930,887	42	4,391	43
South Carolina	831	13	10,721	17	7.75	5,859,302	26	7,051	38
South Dakota	151	44	900	46	16.78	2,390,000	37	15,828	17
Tennessee	793	16	7,321	22	10.83	14,269,300	12	17,994	12
Texas	4,612	2	38,500	3	11.98	44,598,015	3	9,670	32
Utah	298	35	1,800	40	16.56	5,212,000	28	17,490	15
Vermont	129	45	700	49	18.43	2,017,000	38	15,636	18
Virginia	1,286	9	11,000	16	11.69	17,508,367	10	13,615	23
Washington	472	27	5,892	26	8.01	8,269,884	18	17,521	14
West Virginia	95	48	1,200	44	7.92	711,000	43	7,484	37
Wisconsin	345	32	6,000	25	5.75	8,275,000	17	23,986	2
Wyoming	75	49	805	48	9.32	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Source: Randall Guynes, Institute for Economic and Policy Studies, Inc. Data is for 1987.

dated in terms of modern manufacturing technology. This raises the question of how relevant the work experience will be for an inmate after release. Adequate capital investment is needed to modernize correctional industries in order to operate in a business-like manner and offer quality products at a competitive price.

In a reflection of the structural changes that have taken place in the last decade in the U.S. economy, correctional industries have been shifting away from capital-intensive manufacturing operations to service industries that are more labor-intensive and require less capital investment. This trend has developed because of two forces within corrections: the pressure to employ more inmates and the lack of funds to start up new industries.

To raise funds for additional capital investment, correctional industries have been directed by some legislatures to become profit-making, not just self-sustaining. Although most correctional industries pay for themselves, they do not make enough profit to fund a modernization program. Legislatures, therefore, must decide whether to appropriate funds for facility modernization and the acquisition of up-to-date equipment.

## The Private Sector's Role in Correctional Industries

The private sector's reinvolvement in correctional industries since the 1950s has already been mentioned. Substantial changes in state and federal laws that govern the marketing of prison industry goods and services reflect and encourage this new relationship. As will be discussed, the involvement of the private sector through private sector correctional industries represents the purest, or ultimate, form of involvement. The relationship between state correctional industries and the private sector, however, is not always harmonious by any means. As in the earlier part of this century, labor and business sometimes argue that correctional industries present unfair competition with the private sector.

The re-engagement of the private sector in

correctional industries can be divided into two categories. The first category is the indirect involvement of the private sector as corrections departments try to operate correctional industries like business operations. Private businesses serve as the role model for correctional industries, thus encouraging private sector involvement. The second category is the experimentation of direct private sector business operations within a prison, which will be discussed later.

A prison industry's economic impact on particular firms, on an industry, and the net effect on a state's economy is sometimes a source of intense political debate in state capitols. Legislators may receive complaints from constituents about being adversely affected by competition from a prison industry. Such opposition to correctional industries usually comes from organized labor and small businesses. Labor argues that when prison inmates perform meaningful jobs and receive substantial wages, they are performing jobs that should be held by workers in the private sector. Small businesses may oppose what they see as an unfair subsidy of their competition, which also has guaranteed access to the state use market of state and local government. Critics charge that correctional industries enjoy an unfair competitive advantage because of low wages.

Supporters of correctional industries counter that correctional industries usually account for only a small portion of the market; they compete with private firms for such sales; the industries are self-supporting; and they save money for taxpayers by selling to the government market. They argue that correctional industries create more jobs in the long term than they may eliminate in the short term in private firms that compete against the correctional industries. In addition, say supporters, a correctional industry creates and funds jobs for civilians in the corrections department as well as in the private sector firms that supply raw materials to a correctional industry.

Recent studies have attempted to shed light on the economic impact of correctional industries. A summary of four studies—in Illinois, Louisiana, New York, and Wisconsin—found

that correctional industries in each state had a positive economic effect on the state's economy. In addition, prison industry sales were found to be a small fraction of total sales in the four states. [2, p. 1]

As correctional industries make a more concerted effort to market to the private sector and as private sector firms become more involved in correctional industries, however, opposition may increase. Prison industry officials, by choosing goods and services not currently produced or supplied within a state, can head off such criticism.

To encourage cooperation and lessen conflict between the private sector and state correctional industries, many states use public-private advisory or policy boards to oversee the operation of the correctional industries and to provide outside advice, business involvement, and expert assistance. (See Table 5.) Advisory boards usually provide input to a prison industry and work with other relevant organizations. Policy boards, on the other hand, are much more active: they provide broad-based public and private sector support, initiate and monitor prison industry programs and program expansions, and oversee and approve policies and budgets. Such boards may also choose to draft legislation.

Membership on these boards typically includes representatives of the following: corrections department, correctional industry, labor, business, trade associations, inmates who work in the prison industry, research consultants, wardens and superintendents, other government agencies, and private citizens representing communities. [3, pp. 21-22] Moreover, in such states as Maryland and Louisiana, state legislators have served on advisory councils, thus providing a formal link between the legislature and the operation of the prison industry.

## CHOOSING OBJECTIVES AND ACCEPTING TRADEOFFS

As discussed, the history of corrections—the ascendancy of new theories and the falling from favor of established concepts—has affected the role of correctional industries over the years. Today, factors such as overcrowding, tremendous increases in corrections costs, inadequate prison space and conditions, the issue of inmate rights, and inmate recourse to the judicial system affect correctional industries.

The degree to which a state can explicitly articulate and then reconcile and integrate the different objectives that correctional industries serve should determine the extent to which confusion about correctional industries can be minimized. A second issue is how to devise indicators by which correctional industries and legislative program evaluation offices can measure whether correctional industries are, indeed, accomplishing the objectives that have been set forth. Randall Guynes and Robert C. Grieser of the Institute for Economic and Policy Studies, Inc., have provided a helpful typology of goals for correctional industries: [1, p. 21]

### GOALS OF CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIES

Offender-Based	Institution-Oriented	Societal
Good work habits	Reducing idleness	Repayment to society
Real work experience	Structuring daily activities	Dependent support
Vocational training	Reducing the net cost of corrections	Victim restitution
Life management experience		
Gate money		

"Offender-based" goals emphasize the value of work for the inmate by concentrating on attitude, work habits and experience, and job training, all of which can help rehabilitate inmates and prepare them for reintegration into society after release. "Institution-oriented" goals focus on how placing inmates in correctional industries can assist an institution in controlling the

inmate population, with the most important goal being reducing idleness and preventing inmate disruptions. Finally, "societal" goals concern how inmates can repay society for the costs of their offenses.

This section discusses the major objectives of correctional industries and presents some information from various states as to how the objectives are being met. (See Table 4 for the results of a survey on the objectives of state correctional industries.)

### Institutional Objectives

The objectives of correctional industries that center around the corrections institution involve reducing idleness, lowering the cost of corrections, and structuring the daily activities of inmates. These three objectives are perhaps the most important policy questions from the viewpoint of legislatures today.

The 1970s-1980s crackdown on crime has meant higher incarceration rates and longer sentences, thus contributing to overcrowding and inmate disruptions. At the same time, resources have been inadequate to meet the increased demands for prison space and the rapidly rising costs of corrections. Consequently, corrections administrators and legislators in many states have turned their attention to correctional industries as one avenue whereby institutions could at least partially offset increasing costs and alleviate, to some degree, idleness. At least 12 states say preventing idleness is an objective of their correctional industries. Since judicial rulings on prison overcrowding have been partially determined by the amount of time an inmate spends in his cell, corrections officials have regarded inmate participation in correctional industries and facility maintenance as a way to lower time spent in cells.

Costs and related financial considerations are a major factor in correctional industries for several reasons. First, as mentioned, correctional industries are seen as a way to partially reduce the cost of corrections by (a) providing goods and services at reduced cost to cor-

rectional facilities, (b) providing inmates with daily activity at less cost than alternative inmate programs, and (c) requiring that a portion of inmate wages offset their cost of incarceration. At least 25 states make cost reduction an objective of correctional industries.

Correctional industries provide inmate services (job training, work habits and experience, for example) to inmates at little or no cost to the taxpayer, thus reducing the cost of incarceration. Even if a state's correctional industries are not entirely self-supporting, the cost borne by the state is usually substantially less than that of providing alternative inmate services—vocational training, basic education—that otherwise would occupy the inmates' time.

In California, for example, the Prison Industry Authority, which employs more than 5,000 inmates, says it saves taxpayers \$17 million annually in housing and alternative program costs. By 1991, this savings is projected to increase to \$55 million. [4, p. 116] A study of New York's Corcraft Correctional Industries found that providing alternative programs for the more than 2,600 inmates who work in Corcraft would cost \$12 million annually on top of start-up costs of \$6 million. [5, pp. 2-3]

Problems during the daily operation of a correctional facility can have a negative effect on the efficient operation of a prison industry. Problems include frequent interruptions and "featherbedding." Corrections analysts say that featherbedding will probably continue because of the pressure on correctional industries to employ more inmates because of overcrowded conditions. Interruptions, such as lockdowns and callouts, are a problem for correctional industries. Several procedures—such as returning inmates to their prison industry jobs quickly after a lockdown—have been tried to lessen the effect of the interruptions.

### Objectives for Inmates

This objective centers around the inmate and providing him with goals such as good work habits and experience, real-world job and vocational training, experience in "managing" and



organizing his life, and "gate" money to be used after his release.

Guynes and Grieser note that these specific goals constitute the reintegrative model, but they are rarely found in the formal objectives and goals for a given state's correctional industries. The researchers point out that legislatures often reject funding for policies and programs to carry out these goals. Since a portion of the public views inmate work as punishment and not rehabilitation, lack of political support and funds explains why this objective receives relatively little emphasis. Nonetheless, about 20 states make rehabilitation of the inmate and his reintegration into society an objective of correctional industries, at least in theory.

Supporters of correctional industries assert that inmates who have gained job skills and experience in a prison industry are more likely to find employment once they are released. Although recidivism studies are difficult to conduct, several states are trying to collect data on this issue. For example, Maryland's State Use Industries (SUI) has adopted a system to monitor the employment experiences of its inmate workers after they are released. [6] The Texas Employment Security Department and Texas A&M University recently launched a five-year study to examine the effect on recidivism of inmate participation in prison industries. [7, p. 2]

The central question about inmate wages is the purpose. Compensation to inmates historically has been regarded as a "gratuity"—not earnings for work performed—that was exempt from state and federal laws that required taxation and benefits such as unemployment compensation. As mentioned earlier, increased compensation of inmates has been seen as a way to motivate them to produce higher quality goods and services.

Legislatures have also set aside a portion of inmate wages to reimburse the corrections department for part of the cost of their incarceration. This is seen as a way for inmates to partially repay society for the costs associated with their offenses and incarceration.

**TABLE 2.**  
**TYPES OF PRODUCTS AND SERVICES**  
**REPORTED BY STATE PRISON INDUSTRIES**

Acoustic Screens	Key Punch
Asbestos Removal	Knitting
Assembly Subcontracts	Laundry
Aquaculture	Letter Press
Auto Repair/Refinishing	License Tags
Auto Validation Decals	Machine Shop
Bedding (Linens)	Mattress and Pillow Manufacturing
Beef Herd (Livestock)	Meat Processing
Binders (3-Ring)	Metal Products
Body Fender	Micrographics
Book Bindery	Microfilming
Booklet Printing	Mop Manufacturing
Box Factory	Name Plates
Braille Transcription	Office Supplies
Broom Factory	Optical Lab
Brush Manufacturing	Orchards
Bus Reconditioning	Paint Manufacturing
Canning Plant	Park Furnishings
Chemical Products	Plant Nursery
Chewing and Shredded Tobacco	Playground Equipment
Cigarette Manufacturing	Pork Products
Coffee and Tea	Poultry and Eggs
Community Service Crews	Printing
Concrete Products	Purchasing
Construction	Restaurant
Cordwood	Safety Vests
Dairy	Sales and Customer Service
Data Entry	Sewing
Decals and Seals	Shoe Factory (Repair)
Dental Prosthetics	Silk Screen Shop
Desk Accessories	Sign Shop
Die-Cut Letters	Slaughterhouse
Drapery	Soap Plant
Dry Cleaning	Sod Farm
Dump Bed Bodies	Solar Energy
Engraving	Survey and Grad Stakes
Ethanol Production	Swine Herd
Feed Lot	Telemarketing
Flag Making	Telephone Reconditioning
Forestry/Sawmill	Textile Products
Foundry	Timber Management
Freight Trucking	Tire Recapping
Furniture Manufacture and Refinishing	Truck Modifications
Garment Factory	Typewriter Repair
General Labor	Upholstery
Graphics	Vegetable Farming
Hay Production	Vinyl
Hosiery and Gloves	Warehousing
Institutional Services	Welding
Janitorial Products	Wood Products (Refinishing)

Source: American Correctional Association, *A Study of Prison Industry: History, Components, and Goals* (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Corrections, U.S. Department of Justice, January 1986), pp. 83-84.

Since most inmates are unskilled and undereducated, training them for work in correctional industries presents a challenge for managers of correctional industries. For many inmates, a prison industry job may be their first legal employment, and, in general, they learn on the job.

Several states have explicitly linked correctional industries to educational and vocational training programs. This concept, called TIE (training, industry, and education), relies on close cooperation among different inmate programs—which, prior to the mid-1980s, was not widespread. Under the TIE model, three components—literacy, work ethic, and a marketable skill—are seen as critical to postrelease employment. This model has expanded significantly in recent years, with at least a dozen states enacting bills to coordinate such programs with correctional industries. Notable examples include Maryland and Ohio.

Some correctional industries face a problem of high turnover rates for various reasons, which inhibits the amount of experience and job skills that inmates can gain from working in the industries. Inmates who exhibit the greatest ability to learn new skills tend also to be those who are the least disruptive. This contributes to a turnover problem for industries in higher security facilities because such inmates are usually first in line to be reclassified downward and transferred to lower security institutions, although such inmates are a small percentage of the total number who work in correctional industries. Most industries are located in medium-security facilities, however, where transfers for other reasons are more of a problem. In general, correctional industries face an 80 percent to 100 percent annual turnover rate. In private sector manufacturing, by contrast, the annual turnover rate is 20 percent.

## Objectives to Benefit Society

The "victims' rights" movement, which argued that offenders should compensate society and their victims for some of the costs of their offenses, also has affected correctional industries. Paying inmates a wage has been seen as a way to at least partially offset the costs to corrections and to society through deductions for purposes such as victim restitution, family support, and "room and board." (See Table 6 for such a breakdown for private sector prison industries.)

## Summarizing the Discussion About Objectives

The debate over the objectives of correctional industries has been summed up by Guynes and Grieser:

It is by no means clear that all the goals targeted for correctional industries can be met simultaneously. Certainly they cannot all be maximized at once. Choices must be made—by allocating goals among prison industry and other programs, rejecting some goals as inapplicable, or by selecting a sequential, optimizing strategy for goal implementation. Choosing among these alternatives requires more precise specification of industries' objectives. [1, p. 20]

On the one hand, as Guynes and Grieser note, the objectives are not mutually exclusive: attaining one may also fulfill, at least partially, others. In fact, the objectives may be mutually supporting. On the other hand, the objectives may be in conflict with each other or with other objectives of the corrections system. Emphasizing one objective—say, reducing idleness by employing as many inmates as possible in prison industries—may mean that other objectives—say, making a profit—may not be attained, or only partially reached. In short, the challenge for legislators, governors, correction officials, and prison industry staff is to determine which goals are most appropriate for a state and its correctional industries and then specify how the state will attempt to meet them while remaining clear about the tradeoffs.

**TABLE 3.**

### NUMBER OF DIFFERENT INDUSTRIAL OPERATIONS BY STATE

Number of Industrial Operations	State*
1	Hawaii
2	Alaska
3	West Virginia
4	Maine, Wyoming
7	Alabama, Arkansas, Idaho, Nevada
8	Delaware, Louisiana, Oregon, South Dakota
9	Kentucky, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont
10	Kansas, New York
12	Arizona, Georgia, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, Wisconsin
13	Nebraska
14	Iowa, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Tennessee, Texas, Washington
15	Illinois, Minnesota
16	Virginia
17	Ohio
18	Indiana, Michigan
19	Colorado
20	California, Massachusetts, North Dakota
21	North Carolina
22	Connecticut, Oklahoma
34	Pennsylvania
37	Florida

\*Data on Mississippi not available.

Source: American Correctional Association, *A Study of Prison Industry: History, Components, and Goals* (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Corrections, U.S. Department of Justice, January 1986), pp. 83-84.

## PRIVATE SECTOR CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIES

An interesting development in recent years has been the small number of states that have experimented with allowing private sector firms to hire inmate workers and operate their businesses within correctional facilities. Known as "private sector prison industries" (PSPI), these efforts provide inmates with realistic work settings and experiences and further increase the chances that they will successfully find employment when released. By late 1988, 16 states possessed PSPI, which employed about 2,500 inmates, or about 6 percent of all inmates employed in state correctional industries. A July 1988 estimate by the Philadelphia-based consulting firm of Criminal Justice Associates (CJA) found that about 2,500 inmates were working in 65 PSPI projects in 30 prisons and two county jails. CJA noted that 29 states have legal authorization for prisons to implement such partnerships with the private sector. [8, pp. 7-8]

The main difference between PSPI and traditional correctional industries is that PSPI goods and services are sold on the open, or private sector, market within a state, instead of being sold in the restricted state-use market. Within PSPI, there are two models. Under the first, the employer model, inmates work as employees for a private firm within a correctional institution. The second, the customer model, involves a private sector firm buying a major portion of the goods or services, or both, from a state prison industry.

The employer model of PSPI entails, among other things, private sector financing, management, incentives, hiring practices, compensation, and real-world work experience, along with sales on the open, private sector market. Correctional institutions recruit private sector firms, sometimes providing incentives such as rent, tax credits, job training, and utilities. In addition, because PSPI inmates earn prevailing or minimum wage, inmates usually reimburse the corrections department for a portion of the cost of their incarceration, pay state and federal taxes on their wages, contribute to the support of their families, and pay into victims' compensation funds.

**TABLE 4.**  
**OBJECTIVES OF PRISON INDUSTRIES—PURPOSE SPECIFIED<sup>1</sup>**

State	Reduce Correctional Costs/Self-Supporting	Training/Work Experience <sup>2</sup>	Benefit of State	Goal of Rehabilitation/Reintegration	Idleness Prevention <sup>3</sup>
Alabama	X	X		X	
Alaska	X	X			
Arizona					
Arkansas	X	X			
California	X			X	X
Colorado	X	X	X	X	
Connecticut		X			
Delaware					
Florida	X	X	X	X	X
Georgia		X		X	
Hawaii					
Idaho		X			X
Illinois		X			
Indiana		X			
Iowa	X	X			
Kansas			X		
Kentucky	X		X	X	
Louisiana	X		X		X
Maine		X		X	
Maryland	X	X	X	X	
Massachusetts		X	X <sup>b</sup>	X	
Michigan	X	X			X
Minnesota		X			
Missouri		X		X	X
Mississippi	X	X		X	
Montana	X	X	X	X	X
Nebraska	X	X	X		
Nevada	X	X		X	
New Hampshire					
New Jersey	X	X			
New Mexico		X			
New York		X		X	
North Carolina	X	X	X		
North Dakota		X	X		
Ohio		X			
Oklahoma		X	X		
Oregon	X		X	X	
Pennsylvania			X		X
Rhode Island			X		
South Carolina	X		X		X
South Dakota					
Tennessee	X	X	X	X	X
Texas	X	X	X	X	X
Utah			X	X	
Virginia			X		
Vermont	X	X	X		
Washington	X	X	X		X
West Virginia	X		X		
Wisconsin		X	X	X	
Wyoming	X	X	X		
<b>Total</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>12</b>

1. In addition to the state goals listed here, Maine has legislated that industries' goals include public restitution; Iowa, dependent support; New Mexico, commission to assist with postrelease employment. Negative goals include: California, minimize negative impact on private industry or labor force. Montana has two industries programs with overlapping goals.

2. For prison industries to implement their training goal program, the Department of Corrections may be required to modify its activities, i.e., Kentucky, DOC must classify for prison labor; Tennessee, must classify for industries and provide training for each industry; Nevada, *ibid.*; Illinois, training related to prison industries must be available, as well as training after work day; change in work assignment for disciplinary reason requires due process procedures; Colorado, DOC to set aside an industries' area.

3. South Carolina requires reduction of idleness and minimal occupation in marginally productive pursuits; many states prohibit the employment of inmates when not physically fit, e.g., Vermont.

Source: Robert Grleser, Neal Miller, and Gail Funko, *Guidelines for Prison Industries* (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Corrections, 1984), pp. 57-58.

**TABLE 5.**  
**PRISON INDUSTRY POLICY AND ADVISORY BOARDS**  
**January 1988**

State	Policy Board	Advisory Board	Both Boards	Neither Board	Combination
Alabama				X	
Alaska					X
Arizona				X	
Arkansas				X	
California					X
Colorado		X			
Connecticut				X	
Delaware				X	
Florida			X		
Georgia					X
Hawaii		X			
Idaho			X		
Illinois					X
Indiana				X	
Iowa		X			
Kansas			X		
Kentucky				X	
Louisiana		X			
Maine				X	
Maryland		X			
Massachusetts		X			
Michigan				X	
Minnesota		X			
Missouri		X			
Mississippi		X			
Montana				X	
Nebraska				X	
Nevada		X			
New Hampshire				X	
New Jersey				X	
New Mexico					X
New York				X	
North Carolina				X	
North Dakota		X			
Ohio					X
Oklahoma	X				
Oregon				X	
Pennsylvania				X	
Rhode Island				X	
South Carolina				X	
South Dakota				X	
Tennessee					X
Texas			X		
Utah		X			
Virginia				X	
Vermont				X	
Washington		X			
West Virginia				X	
Wisconsin		X			
Wyoming		X			
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>7</b>

Source: American Correctional Association, "Proceedings," National Conference on Prison Industries, Chicago, Ill., November 21-23, 1987.

The number of inmates employed in PSPI remains relatively small, compared with the swelling prison population, CJA notes, for several reasons. Private firms remain seemingly unaware of the potential to use inmate labor. Businessmen who see greater risks with such a venture may require greater incentives than prisons can offer. Within correctional departments and institutions, advocates of PSPI may face bureaucratic opposition as well as insufficient development of an effective way to market a prison's inmate labor force to private firms. Finally, the fact that PSPI generally involves small numbers of inmate employees—only 20 to 25 per firm—raises the issue of whether the costs of PSPI outweigh the benefits to the prisons.

Another development in correctional industries in the last 10 years has been the experimentation by a small number of states with PSPI through a federal government program known as the Private Sector/Prison Industries Enhancement (PS/PIE) certification program.

PS/PIE, a product of the federal Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, allows goods produced by a certified correctional industry to enter into interstate commerce. The federal Justice Assistance Act of 1984 permits up to 20 jurisdictional projects or corrections agencies, or both, to be certified by the federal Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). (A "jurisdictional" certificate allows multiple projects to be operated under one certificate by a particular jurisdiction.) By November 1988, BJA had certified 24 projects in 12 states involving industries such as reservation systems, garment manufacturing, and metal fabrication. (See Table 7.)

Most states have had to change state laws to participate in the program and to meet its requirements. For example, states are required to pay inmates prevailing wages, or at least the federal minimum wage, with portions of inmates' incomes diverted for purposes such as victims' compensation, income taxes, room and board at the correctional facility, and family support. (See Table 6.)

**TABLE 6.**  
**PRIVATE SECTOR/PRISON INDUSTRY ENHANCEMENT CERTIFICATION PROGRAM**

Period Covered: Cumulative to March 31, 1988

State Agency	Average Monthly Wage	Gross Wages Paid	Contributions to Victims' Programs	Room and Board	Family Support	Taxes
California Dept. of Youth Authority	\$345	\$ 724,804	\$ 94,578	\$117,568	\$ 280,565	\$109,906
Idaho Dept. of Corrections	452	70,077	10,512	21,023	0	260
Kansas Dept. of Corrections	559	1,237,377	9,421	331,720	126,738	200,288
Minnesota Dept. of Corrections	399	3,276,809	94,137	0	802,375	200,126
Nebraska Dept. of Corrections	499	38,094	1,898	10,616	4,179	3,989
Nevada Dept. of Prisons	546	1,246,956	62,317	289,839	212,000	212,096
Strafford County Dept. of Corrections Jail Industry (N.H.)	370	36,514	1,831	20,138	0	0
Utah Dept. of Corrections	457	830,795	4,979	121,996	136,245	24,286
Washington Dept. of Corrections	301	191,499	13,166	28,538	9,289	22,282
<b>Total</b>		<b>\$7,652,925</b>	<b>\$292,838</b>	<b>\$941,439</b>	<b>\$1,571,391</b>	<b>\$773,232</b>

Source: National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

State corrections agencies are required, among other things, to work with organized labor and private sector industries prior to starting a project, determine that the project will not displace workers in the private sector, provide workmen's compensation, involve the private

sector in the project's operation, and ensure that inmates contribute between 5 percent and 20 percent of gross wages to victims' compensation programs.

After seven years of operation, the financial

results of the program include \$7.65 million in gross wages; \$770,000 in tax revenues; room and board payments of \$940,000; family support of \$1.15 million; and \$292,000 contributed to victims' compensation programs. [9, p. 6]

## LEGISLATIVE EVALUATION

Most legislatures normally examine the operation of correctional industries through the appropriations process when the legislature reviews the budget of the corrections department. Few legislatures, however, have conducted performance evaluations or program audits of state correctional industries. A recent example, however, offers insight into how correctional industries meet—or do not meet—legislative and program intent.

The New York Legislative Commission on Expenditure Review (LCER) in early 1988 examined the Corcraft Correctional Industries of the state Department of Correctional Services. [10] In 1987, Corcraft employed 2,630 inmates (6.7 percent of the total inmate population of 39,171) in 14 correctional institutions and manufactured 18 products, including fur-

niture, garments, mattresses, license plates, as well as office landscaping. In 1987, Corcraft sold \$55.5 million worth of goods and services to New York state and local governments. LCER summarized its findings:

Corcraft is partially meeting the objectives necessary to achieve its program and business goals. The goal of providing a real work environment to inmates is not being fully met. While inmates are arriving at work on time and doing a quality job they are not working seven hour days. Inmate employment levels have not kept pace with sales growth. Inmates do not appear to be learning any skills that would assist them in finding employment upon release. Corcraft has achieved a self-sustaining basis, but if

there is a decrease in sales, the effect could be an almost immediate adverse change in this situation. Customers' needs could be more effectively met.

Although several of these findings relate largely to issues involving management of correctional facilities and correctional industries, others are relevant policy problems that are of concern to state legislators across the country.

Perhaps the most important issue involved Corcraft's mission. "Corcraft is trying to determine what its primary goal should be," LCER reported. "The choices appear to be either a correctional program or a business behind walls. This is a determination other correctional industry programs around the country either have made or will have to make." Because

Corcraft lacks a primary objective, it is "trying to meet both goals on an equal basis," LCER said.

The legislative audit office acknowledged that Corcraft was operating under legislative intent that combines both goals: "... providing inmates with employment and the opportunity to develop marketable skills in a real work environment while operating efficiently and with fiscal accountability." These two goals are not necessarily incompatible with profit maximization, LCER pointed out, but "... the goals of teaching marketable skills have a greater tendency to conflict with making a profit especially if Corcraft were to experience a decline in sales."

Because Corcraft had decided to place a greater emphasis on business operations and profit, confusion and contradictions arose in trying to reconcile legislative and program intent. As recently as 1982, keeping inmates busy was seen as the objective of Corcraft. In recent years, however, the budget of the Department of Correctional Services stated that the main objective of Corcraft was to provide a "real work environment" for inmates where they would learn marketable job skills and obtain work experience to "enhance their employability upon release." LCER pointed out that Corcraft's business plan is aimed at its customers and stresses its business nature; Corcraft's budget request to the legislature, however, emphasizes programs aimed at inmates.

## CONCLUSION

Legislators and other state policymakers who want to examine the role of correctional industries within the larger correctional system should bear in mind the necessity of clearly specifying the priority policy objectives of correctional industries: institutional goals, inmate goals, and society's goals. Policymakers should understand clearly which correctional industry model—or parts of models—their state has adopted, either explicitly or implicitly, as they discuss goals.

**TABLE 7.  
LIST OF CERTIFIED PROGRAMS**

As of November 1988, the following is the most current listing of certified programs by state:

<b>California</b>	TWA Reservation Center ADS Management Svc., Inc. Olympia Tool & Equipment Co. Work-Rite Company El Pollo Loco	flight reservations microfilm/data entry wood boxes fire retardant coveralls utensil packets
<b>Idaho</b>	The Rock Shop	rock cutting
<b>Kansas</b>	Zephyr Products, Inc. Jensen Engineering Company Hearts Design, Inc.	metal fabrication drafting children's clothing
<b>Minnesota</b>	Metal Production Operation	metal products
<b>Nebraska</b>	Jade, Inc. TGS Marketing, Inc. Irwin Wood Products Marketing Professionals, Inc. telemarketing Third Coast Design, Inc. Tel-E-Promotions (2)	garment sewing telemarketing wood products wood products telemarketing
<b>Nevada</b>	Furnico, Inc. Wood Dimension Stock Mfg. Limousine Manufacturing	bedroom furniture wood products stretch limousines
<b>New Mexico</b>	No certified industries in operation	
<b>Oklahoma</b>	No certified industries in operation	
<b>South Carolina</b>	Vacuum Pump Assembly	vacuum pumps
<b>Stafford Co., New Hampshire</b>	GFS Manufacturing, Inc.	out-pit chokes
<b>Utah</b>	The Sign Shop Inspection, Assembly and Packaging Operation	signs, decals, and safety barriers inactive
<b>Washington</b>	Inside-Out, Inc. Redwood-Outdoord, Inc.	garments garments

Source: *CI-Net News*, January 1989, p. 6.

If these various objectives collide, then lawmakers and correctional officials must realize that it is unlikely that correctional industries will maximize all their goals. Instead, state policymakers may seek an optimal solution by directing correctional industries to attain, at least in part, several conflicting goals.

The involvement of the private sector with correctional industries in recent years has been increasingly linked to the trend toward busi-

ness-like operations by correctional industries. Nonetheless, small business and labor opposition to economic competition from correctional industries remains in some states. Meanwhile, the recent experiment of some states with private sector correctional industries raises a whole set of new issues for state policymakers.

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2. Institute for Economic and Policy Studies, Inc., 815 King Street, Sixth Floor, Alexandria, VA 22314, (703) 549-7686. Contact: Randall Guynes, president.
3. Criminal Justice Associates, 48 East Chestnut Hill Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19118, (215) 247-1390. Contacts: George Sexton and Barbara Auerbach.
4. Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, 633 Indiana Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20531, (202) 272-4605. Contact: Nick Demos. For information on PS/PIE, contact Louise Lucas.
5. National Institute of Corrections, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20534, (202) 724-7995. Contact: George Keiser, director, Community Corrections Division.
6. National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, 633 Indiana Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20531, (202) 272-6041. Contact: Tom Albrecht for information on private sector correctional industries.
7. National Conference of State Legislatures, 1050 Seventeenth Street, Suite 2100, Denver CO 80265, (303) 623-7800. Contact: Program manager for Criminal Justice.

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