


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Disruptive Maximum Security
Inmate Management Guide

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Disruptive Maximum Security Inmate Management Guide

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National Institute of Corrections

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FOREWORD

The National Institute of Corrections is pleased to provide you with this guideline for the management of disruptive maximum security inmates.

Violence within the nation's prisons has become almost commonplace. The incidence of assaults--inmates against staff, and against one another--has grown increasingly severe, particularly among maximum security inmates. The effect of violence and other disruptive behavior has exacted a heavy toll on correctional resources.

The **Disruptive Maximum Security Inmate Management Guide** was prepared as a resource for correctional administrators who must deal with the practical day-to-day management of this segment of the prisoner population. The **Guide** profiles the disruptive maximum security inmate population, assesses existing practices for controlling this population, and presents ideas and concepts for improving disruptive inmate management.

Raymond C. Brown
Director
National Institute of Corrections

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The **Disruptive Maximum Security Inmate Management Guide** is the result of an 18-month study funded by the National Institute of Corrections. Conducted by Correctional Services Group, Inc., of Kansas City, Missouri, this study was designed to profile the disruptive maximum security inmate population, assess existing practices for controlling this population, and suggest strategies to improve disruptive inmate management. Neither **The Guide** nor the study itself could have been completed without the assistance of numerous individuals.

Correctional Services Group staff participating in the study were Karen L. Whitlow, who analyzed responses to the national questionnaire survey, helped write and edit **The Guide**, and drafted the sample evaluation questionnaires; Russell D. Mazouch, who managed all technical support services and prepared **The Guide** for publication; and Peter Harakas, who typed all study materials and correspondence.

A number of consultants assisted Correctional Services Group staff in delineating study objectives and developing survey instruments: Dr. Randy Atlas, American Institute of Architects; Dr. F. Warren Benton, Professor, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York; John Irion, Operations Consultant, Georgia Department of Corrections; Dr. Peter Nacci, Director of Research and Evaluation, Federal Prison System; Dr. T.A. Ryan, Director, Criminal Justice Planning, University of South Carolina; Donald Stoughton, Operations and Security Consultant; and Dr. David Ward, Chair and Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Minnesota.

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Thanks are also due the numerous correctional staff who took the time and effort to complete the national questionnaire survey on disruptive inmate management.

Finally, Correctional Services Group wishes to express its appreciation for the guidance, insight, and support provided by the National Institute of Corrections. Special thanks are deserved by Dr. Susan M. Hunter, Project Monitor; Aaron Brown, Program Specialist; and William K. Wilkey, Chief, Prisons Division.

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HOW TO USE THIS GUIDEBOOK

The **Disruptive Maximum Security Inmate Management Guide** has been prepared as a resource for correctional administrators who must deal with the practical day-to-day management of this segment of the prisoner population. The **Guide** is grounded in the common experiences of correctional agencies throughout the nation and builds upon specialized management strategies that agencies have found to be effective with disruptive inmates. The resultant guidelines and recommendations are aimed at improving management of disruptive inmates.

The **Guide** is not necessarily intended to be read cover to cover. Rather, its organization into broad groups of management issues allows the reader to concentrate on chapters that are of particular importance or interest: general management, architectural design, classification, inmate supervision, programs and services, or management assessment. However, the **Guide** is also designed to provide a recommended set of comprehensive management practices for disruptive inmates, addressing issues ranging from identification of these prisoners through provision of supervision, programs, and services and on to criteria for release back into general population. Whichever option the reader selects, it is strongly advised that special attention be afforded to Chapter 3, which discusses issues fundamental to any approach to disruptive inmate management, and Chapter 8, which presents means of assessing existing and future management practices. The case studies included in Appendix B should also provide valuable ideas for modifying current policies and procedures pertaining to disruptive prisoners or developing new ones.

Finally, it must be emphasized that an individual agency may not be able to implement all of the guidelines, even those within a single chapter, at the present time. Existing physical plants, for example, may preclude the adoption of unit management, or insufficient staffing may necessitate the use of both indirect and direct supervision of inmates. Nevertheless, given the continuing increase in the prisoner population, the growing need for new or renovated facilities, and the ever-changing nature of correctional policies and procedures, those guidelines beyond an agency's current capabilities are likely to be useful in the future.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

It is our finding, after a year and one half of close observation, that...the management of a relatively small group of adult male inmates who exhibit dangerous, assaultive... behavior of a chronic or intermittent nature...threatens to become of crisis proportions in every state. Failure to deal effectively with this problem will seriously impair efforts in the states to reform the correctional system in all aspects.¹

This foreboding conclusion, contained in the final report of the New England Regional Prison Study Commission, although made more than a decade ago, remains just as true today. Violence has grown increasingly severe, particularly among maximum security inmates. Weapons have replaced fists as instruments of assault; fights that once ended with beatings now lead to stabbings and murders.

A national survey of 31 state and federal correctional agencies, conducted for this study, points up the severity of the problem--prisoners killed 8 staff and 69 inmates in 1984. Agencies also reported 5,350 inmate assaults on staff during that year.² Statistics show the number of violent incidents has remained relatively constant. Nationwide, during 1986, 6,194 non-fatal assaults on staff occurred; 39 state and federal correctional agencies reported 102 prisoners and 2 staff were killed by inmates.³

Deadly assaults within the nation's prisons represent the most serious forms of disruptive behavior, the kinds reported by the media and familiar to the public. While such incidents are certainly alarming and deserving of attention, correctional operations are much more likely to be hampered by less violent acts. These acts--the bulk of disruptive incidents--also exact a tremendous toll on correctional resources and must be effectively dealt with in order to ensure safe, secure, and orderly facilities.

Not surprisingly, the extent of violent and disruptive behavior has had a substantial effect on corrections. A major concern has been the safety of staff and inmates. Consequently, internal controls have been tightened, more and more disruptive inmates have been placed in restrictive housing units, measures to control contraband have been strengthened, security equipment and monitoring devices have been augmented, group activities among inmates have been reduced or eliminated altogether, and programs and services have been restructured and brought to inmates' housing areas, or in some instances, discontinued.

Such measures have taxed correctional resources already strained by prison overcrowding and conservative fiscal policies. And, all too often, attempts to better manage disruptive prisoners have provided the impetus for lawsuits by inmates and inmate advocacy groups. Besides placing an added burden on agencies' resources, this litigation has directly affected management practices.

Aware of the increasing level of violence in maximum security institutions--and its effect on correctional operations--the National Institute of Corrections decided to fund a study that would examine both the disruptive inmate population and existing means of managing it.

The result of this study is this document, **The Disruptive Maximum Security Inmate Management Guide**. The **Guide** is organized into chapters based upon broad groups of management issues so that administrators can readily locate and review issue groups of particular interest or importance. Each chapter includes findings from a questionnaire survey and guidelines for improving disruptive inmate management. Not all of the guidelines will be appropriate for every correctional agency. They afford an overview of contemporary management strategies, emphasizing those that appear particularly effective with disruptive inmates. In considering the merit of the many strategies presented, it is essential to evaluate them within the context of the correctional system's needs and resources.

The **Guide's** major findings and recommendations are presented below, organized by chapter heading. Chapter 1 introduces the problem, describes the study methodology, and outlines the remaining seven chapters. (Recommendations appear in bold face type style.)

Chapter 2--National Profile of the Disruptive Maximum Security Inmate Population

A major objective of this study was to answer two fundamental questions about the nation's disruptive maximum security inmate population.

- Who are these inmates creating such management problems for correctional administrators, while consuming disproportionate amounts of corrections' limited resources?
- In what ways, if any, do these inmates differ from those housed in the general population?

In order to obtain a comprehensive picture of the disruptive maximum security population, and the means used to manage it, a questionnaire was sent to the 50 state correctional agencies, the District of Columbia Department of Corrections, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons. To ensure the collection of comparable data, disruptive maximum security inmates were defined as those housed in an agency's restrictive housing units (excluding protective custody) that have been assigned as a result of one or more major disciplinary violations which have substantially endangered the safety, security, and operation of the institution. (The list of disciplinary violations provided as examples may be found in Appendix A.)

The survey findings do not depict the complete disruptive maximum security inmate population because not all of the nation's correctional agencies participated in the study. However, 35 agencies (71%) did complete questionnaires, rendering the survey findings representative of this population and, thus appropriate as a foundation for the recommendations presented in this **Guide**.

The following profile of the disruptive maximum security inmate population is drawn from agencies' responses.

Number of Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates

- A total of 12,194 disruptive inmates were confined in restrictive housing units, in 31 correctional systems, at the time of the questionnaire survey.
- Disruptive inmates constituted 3.8% of the overall prisoner population and 54.8% of the maximum security population.
- California reported the largest number of disruptive inmates (2,562) and North Dakota, the smallest (13).

Age

- Nearly 60% of disruptive maximum security inmates, on average, were under 30 years old.
- The largest proportion of disruptive inmates (30.6%) were between 25 and 29 years of age. Only 3.5% were 45 or older.

Race

- Disruptive inmates were more likely to be white than black or Hispanic.
- Compared to percentages for the general prisoner population, blacks and Hispanics were slightly overrepresented among disruptive maximum security inmates.

Criminal History

- Just over two-thirds of disruptive inmates had been incarcerated due to conviction of a violent offense, compared with one-half of general population prisoners.
- Disruptive maximum security inmates were almost equally as likely as general population inmates to have a history of prior commitments--47% versus 43%, respectively.

Length of Sentence

- Almost 75% of disruptive inmates were serving sentences of 6 years or longer.
- In contrast, slightly more than 50% of the general population prisoners had received sentences of two to five years.

Escape History

- Approximately 25% of the disruptive inmate population had a history of escape or attempted escape compared to only 11% of general population prisoners.

- Both Iowa and New Mexico reported approximately 50% of their disruptive inmate populations had histories of escape.

Educational and Vocation Level

- Disruptive inmates were more likely than general population prisoners to have inadequate academic and vocational skills.
- 60% of the disruptive maximum security inmate population had not completed high school.

Special Management Categories

- Nearly 5% of the disruptive inmate population were perceived to be mentally retarded.
- Approximately 4% of the disruptive inmate population were characterized as mentally ill.

Chapter 3--General Management Issues

Conditions Affecting Management of Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates

The growing and wide-reaching importance of legal issues is borne out by the questionnaire survey--responding agencies specified inmate litigation as the predominant factor affecting disruptive inmate management. Two-thirds of the respondents cited involvement in litigation pertaining to the management of disruptive inmates. Among the most frequently reported areas of dispute are general conditions, recreation, access to legal materials, inmate safety, and disciplinary procedures. One-fourth of the respondents are under court orders and nearly one-third are under consent decrees affecting disruptive inmate management.

Other influential factors affecting disruptive inmate management cited by respondents include changes in sentencing laws (42%) and changes in departmental policies and procedures. Other factors cited include overcrowding, gang activity, recent crackdowns on drug dealers, and alternative to confinement programs, particularly early release programs.

Punishment Versus Opportunities Management Model

In general, responding agencies indicated that they segregate disruptive inmates from the general population and provide them with basic services, while restricting privileges and programming. (All but one respondent stated they maintain a special unit or units for disruptive maximum security male inmates; the percentage for females is 42%.) More specifically, agencies tend to use one of two basic management approaches: a punitive model or an opportunities model.

The punitive model is based on the belief that negative, disruptive conduct should be met with punishment, e.g., isolation from the inmate community and loss of privileges. Further misconduct may increase the term of punishment, but good behavior will not decrease it.

The opportunities model, on the other hand, recognizes the necessity of segregating troublemakers, but also acknowledges the need to provide offenders with opportunities to adopt more acceptable conduct norms. Such opportunities may employ behavioral contracts, a phase or level program, or a combination of both.

Dispersal Versus Concentration of Disruptive Inmates

Given the decision to segregate disruptive inmates, correctional administrators must also address the question of where, within a limited number of facilities (concentration model) or throughout the correctional system (dispersal model)?

According to some respondents, dispersing disruptive inmates throughout an agency's facilities provides the following advantages:

- Disruptive inmates have access to the types of programs and services afforded to the general population.
- General population prisoners, who have more privileges, often serve as an incentive for disruptive inmates to improve their conduct.
- It reduces staff stress because personnel are not in continuous contact with difficult-to-control prisoners.

Drawbacks cited include:

- Maintaining numerous special units for these inmates is expensive.
- The disruptive segment of a facility's population may sometimes upset operation of the entire institution.

Respondents who endorsed the concentration model gave the following reasons:

- Concentrating disruptive inmates in a limited number of facilities creates a safer, more orderly environment in other institutions.
- This model eliminates much duplication of programs, services, security, thus decreasing the cost of handling this relatively small portion of the overall prisoner population.
- Such facilities can specialize in managing disruptive inmates, using high-security construction, specially trained staff, and exclusively tailored policies and procedures.

Drawbacks of the concentration option included:

- The range of programming is more restricted.
- Transporting disruptive inmates to the restrictive housing units creates additional expense and increased security concerns.

- Staff experience higher levels of tension.

Among responding agencies, the concentration option is the more common approach for housing disruptive inmates. Slightly over 80% indicated that they place male disruptive inmates in only a few facilities. Only Florida, Illinois, Maryland, and Tennessee reported using the dispersal model.

Given that most agencies have decided to place their disruptive inmates in just a few facilities and that concentration appears to be more cost-efficient and to promote development of specialized management practices, this approach would seem the more effective of the two options.

Centralized Versus Decentralized Institutional Management

Correctional agencies have traditionally used a centralized approach to management operations structured along classical bureaucratic lines. Increasingly, however, agencies are following the lead of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and reallocating authority among "functional units" within their institutions.

While centralized management clearly delineates responsibility, promotes specialization, and generally enhances rational decision-making, it also has several important disadvantages. For example, this kind of bureaucratic structure tends to result in ineffective communication, poor morale, frustration, and alienation among lower-level staff. In addition, centralized management is often characterized by rigidity that stifles valuable input from those who work most directly with inmates--correctional officers.

In response to such problems, correctional agencies have begun to decentralize their institutions into functional units. The cornerstone of this approach is one or more relatively small, self-contained inmate living and staff areas that operate semi-autonomously within the hierarchy of larger facilities. The unit management approach is unique in placing teams of staff members involved in the unit's operation within the immediate area where inmates are housed.

A number of respondents to the questionnaire survey--including Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, and South Carolina--reported employing or converting to unit management in their disruptive maximum security inmate facilities.

The following benefits of unit management recommend utilization of this approach for the management of disruptive maximum security inmates.

- It divides inmates into small, well-defined, and manageable groups.
- It increases the frequency of staff/inmate contacts, which results in better communication and understanding, enhanced classification decision-making, program planning, and review, and improved observation of inmates' behavior.
- It makes effective use of the multidisciplinary backgrounds of unit staff, which enhances communication and cooperation with other institutional departments.

- It promotes staff involvement in the correctional process and management decision-making.
- It improves administration through decisions made by unit staff who work closely with inmates, increasing the quality and promptness of decision-making.
- It increases program flexibility because special areas of emphasis can be developed to meet the needs of the inmates in each unit. Conversely, unit programs can be eliminated or modified without affecting the entire institution.

Disruptive Inmates with Special Management Needs

The need for special management services within the disruptive maximum security population appears to vary greatly. Among agencies completing the study questionnaire, the percentage of disruptive inmates who are considered mentally ill ranged from a high of nearly 32% in Nebraska to a low of 0%, which was reported by 52% of the respondents. In many agencies, departmental policy does not permit housing mentally ill prisoners in disruptive inmates' units. Partly due to such policies, both disruptive inmates and general population prisoners, on the average, were reported to include about the same proportion of mentally ill cases--3% and 4%, respectively.

In regard to disruptive inmates who are categorized as mentally retarded, survey responses ranged from 41% in Virginia to 0% in 13 jurisdictions. Again, approximately the same proportion of mentally retarded inmates (5%) were found in both the disruptive inmate and the general prisoner populations.

The questionnaire did not ask about chronic health problems among disruptive inmates, primarily because the pretest of the survey questionnaire indicated that agencies do not routinely keep this type of information.

Disruptive inmates who have chronic health problems or serious mental health problems appear to profit from assignment to special housing units that provide the appropriate medical and mental health care resources.

Disruptive Inmate Data Base

This study identified few correctional agencies that had comprehensive information about their disruptive inmate populations.

Good data, properly used, can tell administrators which management practices are working, and why. What constitutes good data depends upon both the individuals using the data and the uses envisioned for the data. In this case, correctional administrators will be the users and the data will be used to develop policy and procedures governing the management, care, and treatment of disruptive inmates and to monitor and evaluate the management practices used with this population.

To support management decision-making, correctional agencies are urged to develop comprehensive information on disruptive inmates that can be incorporated into an automated data base management system.

Chapter 4--Identification and Classification of Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates

Identifying Disruptive Inmates

Approximately 80% of the agencies responding to the questionnaire said that their initial classification systems have the capacity to identify inmates who are likely to be disruptive. The criteria employed to identify potentially disruptive prisoners are remarkably similar in many jurisdictions. For instance, over 50% consider prior institutional adjustment and assaultive history. Other common factors are current offense, escape history, criminal history, and psychological test results.

Once inmates likely to be disruptive have been identified, nearly 20% of the respondents stated that they routinely assign these potentially disruptive inmates to special housing units. Only 11% reported that they typically place these inmates in the general population. An intermediate observation unit is used by approximately one-half of the responding agencies.

The principle of least restrictive custody⁴ does not support placing newly admitted inmates, considered likely to become disruptive, in restrictive housing. It does support assigning these inmates to an institution that provides a level of custody and security commensurate with the agency's classification system. It is recommended, however, that potentially disruptive inmates who are not assigned to restrictive housing units be closely monitored by security, program, treatment, and classification staff. Examples of close monitoring include more frequent interaction with security staff; more stringent monitoring of their program and work assignments; more intensive treatment opportunities; more frequent contacts by casework staff; and more frequent reviews by classification staff.

Assessing Disruptive Behaviors

Respondents listed two behaviors as of primary importance in determining disruptive status--murder and hostage taking. Slightly over 90% also indicated that deadly assault is of utmost importance, and nearly 90% placed similar emphasis on manufacturing, possessing, and/or smuggling firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, or poison gas.

Study results support the use of written, standardized, behavior-based criteria for assignment of disruptive inmates to restrictive housing. Before adopting one or more of the criteria cited in the report, it is advisable for an agency's counsel to review pertinent legal cases at the Federal District and State and Federal Supreme Court levels.

Managing Through Internal Classification

Most respondents (81%) use an internal classification system to manage inmates categorized as disruptive. Typically, this system is based on a phase or level program in which prisoners earn increasing amounts of freedom and privileges through good behavior.

Internal classification based upon a structured behavior management system is recommended for use with disruptive inmates in restrictive housing units.

Formal Review Process

As a component of an internal management system, a formal review process not only provides prisoners with feedback regarding their behavior but also assists staff in determining whether reductions in status are warranted. Just under one-half of the responding agencies stated that they conduct formal status reviews for disruptive inmates every 90 days. Slightly over 8% conduct only annual reviews.

In many jurisdictions, assignment to administrative segregation status is an open-ended placement. Inmates may remain in this status until classification staff determine they are ready for release to general population. The length of time they spend in administrative segregation is not predetermined as it is for inmates assigned to disciplinary segregation. Established, regular reviews are important safeguards to ensure that prisoners are provided with feedback regarding their behavior and that staff consistently consider status reductions.

According to ACA standards, agency staff--either a classification committee or other authorized personnel--should review inmates assigned to restrictive housing every seven days for the first two months of confinement and then every 30 days thereafter.

Release from Restrictive Housing

Agencies employ several criteria to determine when inmates are no longer considered to be disruptive. Only one-half of the respondents consider the incidents which led to placement in special housing unit. They are much more likely to examine evidence of general cooperation (97%) and continued misconduct (78%). Nearly 70% of the responding agencies also use psychiatric or psychological evaluations.

According to survey respondents, the identification of disruptive inmates for release is not always systematic or based upon written criteria. Since the continued imposition of segregation implies a liberty interest, it is in the agency's best interests to develop objective release criteria that can be applied to an inmate's records while in the restrictive housing unit to help select those inmates best suited for release into general population.

Transitional Release Programs

At least two of the responding agencies--South Carolina and California--operate transitional release programs to help disruptive inmates effect a more permanent return to general population.

A transitional release program gives the facility administration the opportunity to observe inmates' adjustment to conditions approximating those in general population but which are still controlled.

To reduce the likelihood of disruptive inmates engaging in further misconduct, the development of transitional release programs are recommended to facilitate the return of disruptive inmates to general population. Experience suggests that transitional programs would work best as the final step in structured behavior management systems.

Chapter 5--Supervision and Staffing for Maximum Security Disruptive Inmates

Supervision Approaches

Agencies participating in the survey were asked what type of supervision approach they use with disruptive inmates. Approximately 28% of the respondents reported that they monitor behavior primarily through direct contact with inmates. Two respondents--Alaska and California--said that they indirectly supervise disruptive inmates, and nearly two-thirds of the respondents stated that they use both direct and indirect supervision approaches.

There is no consensus about which supervision approach works best for disruptive inmates probably because there is such diversity within the disruptive inmate population. Direct supervision, for example, is not appropriate for that segment of disruptive prisoners who are continually assaultive. Most correctional security experts would agree that assaultive inmates should be housed in units that provide indirect or remote supervision, where surveillance is provided through control rooms physically separated from prisoner housing via secure glazing. On the other hand, there are disruptive inmates, such as those nearing release to general population, who do not represent a clear and present danger to themselves, staff, or other inmates. These inmates may be supervised by the direct approach if the restrictive housing facility has this design capability.

Supervision Principles

In carrying out either the indirect or direct supervision approach for the management and control of disruptive inmates, there are several principles and objectives that are applicable to the management of disruptive inmates. While these principles of supervising disruptive inmates have historically been used for general population inmates, they still, with certain modifications, have merit for the special management inmate population which this Guide addresses.

These objectives and principles include:

- Demonstrate effective and total control of the disruptive inmate population.
- Maximize the inmates' inner controls through the structure of the unit environment.
- Ensure inmates perceive the control which officers exert in the restrictive housing unit.

Surveillance Devices

Regardless of the approach used, respondents reported problems in supervising their disruptive inmate populations. For example, almost 64% said that their monitoring devices are inadequate. Slightly over one-third stated that their security equipment is inadequate, with a like percentage adding that their security equipment malfunctions on a consistent basis.

Recent years have witnessed the emergence of electronic surveillance devices, namely closed-circuit television (CCTV), paging systems, two-way radio, and staff body alarms.

Closed-circuit television (CCTV) has serious limitations, such as blind spots, when used to monitor inmates in their cells and activity spaces and is not recommended as a sole or primary method of supervising disruptive inmates. CCTV is not recommended, under any circumstances, as a substitute for adequate staffing. It is invaluable, however, in improving the surveillance of areas where inmate movement is not authorized such as fence lines, roof tops, and corridors.

Paging systems are useful in units housing disruptive inmates. A listen-in/talk-back feature is recommended because it facilitates the more effective monitoring of staff entering sally ports by requiring both visual and voice identification of staff and enables staff to communicate with inmates in their cells without shouting.

Two-way radios are not considered essential within restrictive housing units unless the inmate activity, program, and service space is located some distance from the housing units. If radios are used by restrictive housing unit staff, accessibility and accountability would be ensured by storing them in the control center where they may be checked out by staff as needed.

Body alarms are used in several jurisdictions primarily by staff who are moving particularly violent and dangerous disruptive inmates out of the housing area or unit, supervising an outside recreation yard, or supervising more than one disruptive inmate. The ACA's Design Guide for Secure Adult Correctional Facilities recommends use of body alarms capable of specifying the location of the alarm as well as the identity of the alarm.⁵

Internal Security Procedures

A small proportion of respondents (11%) reported that their disruptive inmate policies and procedures are not adequate. Unit policies and procedures governing unit intake, release, and inmate movement within the unit have been singled-out by this Guide as particularly important components of internal unit security.

Adequate procedures for unit intake, release, and inmate movement are necessary to ensure the safety of the escorting officers and the humane treatment of the disruptive inmates. Specific procedures recommended to meet these interrelated objectives address:

- Escort procedures
- Restraints--waist, leg, handcuffs
- Digital examinations
- Protective vests
- Videotaping
- Use of force

Staffing Levels

Given the nature of the disruptive inmate population, agencies were asked how many staff are needed to perform necessary correctional functions. Agencies' responses yielded an average ratio of one staff member for every seven inmates. This figure is interpreted to be the optimal staff-to-inmate ratio for the day shift, using indirect supervision.

Most respondents, 79%, indicated that they have sufficient supervisory personnel, but just 64% thought that they have enough line staff, to manage their disruptive inmate populations. Nearly one-half cited the need for more educational, counseling, and/or casework staff.

The number of personnel needed to effectively operate a correctional facility has long been the subject of debate, primarily between the correctional agency and the legislature. The answer to this question is even more important for the management of restrictive housing units, due to the serious violence and management problems that can surface if sufficient personnel are not available.

The ACA's Design Guide recommends that the number of personnel for any housing unit be based on the security level, type, and rated capacity of the institution. As a base guideline for segregation units, five officers should be assigned with additional officers being added incrementally as the unit's inmate population increases.

Staff Selection

Routine roster management is used by 37% of the respondents to assign staff to work in restrictive housing units. If routine roster management is not used, agencies most often looked at personality characteristics, prior experience, and whether the staff member has volunteered to work with disruptive inmates.

The selection of staff to work in close contact with disruptive inmates is a vital ingredient in the successful operation of a restrictive housing unit. To identify qualified staff, agencies are urged to develop a well thought-out recruitment and employment program based upon realistic standards or qualifications consistent with the ever-present pressures resulting from constantly working with disruptive inmates.

Many agencies (75%) rotate security staff assigned to work with disruptive inmates to lessen stress and prevent burnout. Slightly over one-half rotate program staff. Whether or not rotation of staff who work with disruptive inmates is effective has not been evaluated. As a result, it is recommended that agencies continue with current practices, if they appear to be effective, until further research has been done.

Staff Training

Pre-service training components on disruptive inmate management, typically of four hours' duration, are provided by approximately two-thirds of the respondents. An even larger proportion (81%) incorporate disruptive inmate management into their in-service training (16 to 20 hours in length).

A majority of respondents (58%) also said that they provide program and/or security staff with specialized training prior to assignment to disruptive inmate units. Of these agencies, 95% train security staff and 76% train program staff.

Because correctional officers have the most contact with disruptive inmates, their training and resultant skills and knowledge are relied on by both management staff and inmates for interpretation of administrative directives, supervision and escort of inmates, and control of disruptive behavior. Consequently, it is in the best interests of the public and the agency that restrictive housing staff be well trained to professionally fulfill these responsibilities. Agencies are urged to review their training programs to ensure that the training curriculum meets or exceeds the demands placed on these staff.

Staff Incentives

Only four agencies indicated that they offer special incentives to staff working with disruptive maximum security inmates. This lack of special incentives may be one factor that accounts for the finding that for over 40% of the respondents, turnover rates for staff working with disruptive inmates are higher than those for staff working with the general population.

While few jurisdictions report using incentives to motivate staff either to seek assignment in a restrictive housing unit or to remain there once assigned, this does not discount the advantages an incentive system can have in reducing staff turnover and increasing job satisfaction. Incentives are thought to increase morale and prestige and reduce agency costs for sick pay, training and transferring new staff to restrictive housing units to replace departed, disgruntled personnel.

In addition to such incentives as increased pay, additional recognition, and distinctive uniforms, other options exist for motivating staff to work with disruptive inmates, including:

- Additional time off duty;
- Accelerated promotions;
- Advanced training opportunities;
- Supervision of staff in off-site activities ancillary to normal disruptive inmate programming, e.g., transportation of disruptive inmates to and from court;
- Special recognition ceremonies;
- Shift schedules tailored to officers' off-duty time requirements; and
- Trophies denoting the unique duties involved in disruptive inmate management.

Chapter 6--Provision of Inmate Programs and Services

Program/Service Access

Not surprisingly, agencies responding to the questionnaire reported that disruptive inmates often are afforded less access to programs than are general population prisoners. Three-fourths of the respondents stated that their disruptive inmate populations receive less academic programming, often because inmates are limited to self-study courses. Slightly more than one-half also stated that disruptive inmates, usually due to departmental policy, cannot participate in vocational training. Nearly 75% of the responding agencies reported less recreational programming for disruptive inmates. Other commonly limited areas of programming are work assignments, arts and crafts, and entertainment.

The findings related to inmate services tell a different story. Nearly 38% of the respondents stated that disruptive inmates have greater access to psychological and psychiatric services when compared with general population prisoners. On the other hand, a slight majority indicated that disruptive inmates have fewer opportunities to use the telephone and commissary or participate in formal religious services.

Limited programming for disruptive maximum security inmates is necessary, if not essential, for their effective management. While the relationship between programming and reduced disruptive behavior has not been proven to everyone's satisfaction, the absence of programming results in idleness and boredom, which have been shown to be significantly related to disruptive incidents.

Likewise, the provision of services to disruptive inmates is an essential component of their management albeit for different reasons. In many jurisdictions, the level and types of services are mandated by courts and/or state correctional standards. To comply with evolving standards, it is important that agencies provide disruptive inmates with essentially the same services as those provided to the general prisoner population. However, the frequency, nature, and delivery of inmate services may be altered to encourage acceptable behavior and to discourage unacceptable behavior.

Recommended guidelines for the delivery of programs and services include:

- Programs and services tailored to the special requirements of disruptive inmates and the limitations of facility design;
- Coordination of the development and delivery of all programs and services with security staff;
- The use of a behavior management system to regulate levels of programs and services, including work assignments, third- and fourth-class mail, telephone use, personal property, and the privilege of small group participation in such activities as worship, education, recreation, and dining.

- Prohibition against the participation of disruptive inmates in prison industries or regular vocational training programs, due to the security risks entailed;
- Noncontact visiting, except with authorized attorneys.

For each program and service that would be provided or offered to disruptive inmates, the Guide provides recommendations that address:

- The scheduling of the program/service;
- The optimal location for providing the program/service;
- A description of suggested program/service components;
- The supplies and equipment needed, if applicable; and
- Sample policies and procedures.

Chapter 7--Design of the Confinement Environment for Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates

Facility Adequacy and Design

Agencies completing the questionnaire expressed mixed reactions about the adequacy of their facilities for disruptive inmates. Respondents were asked about the adequacy of their physical plants, in general, and specifically about space for administrative, program, and service functions. In terms of the general physical plant, approximately 64% said that their physical plants create problems in supervising disruptive prisoners. Regarding space, only 37% of the respondents indicated that their facilities have adequate space in all areas. Among the areas respondents cited most often as having inadequate space are programs, indoor recreation, and visitation.

Asked whether they have initiated any innovative approaches in the environmental design of their facilities for disruptive inmates, most agencies responded they have not. Some, however, noted that they house such inmates in "new generation" facilities. Respondents indicated that this type of design enhances inmate management and lessens much of the dull, monotonous environment found in institutions with cellhouses or ranges.

In addressing the physical confinement problems presented by disruptive inmates, the first step in the planning process, for a new or renovated facility, is to develop a detailed architectural program. In preparing the architectural program, the following information is invaluable:

- A definitive statement of the unit's purpose;
- Number of inmates to be confined;
- Security and custody needs of these inmates;
- Type of management and supervision approach to be employed;
- Type and number of programs to be provided and the level of inmate access to programs and services;

- Anticipated movement of staff, inmates, and visitors within the facility;
- Use of internally and externally provided support services;
- Number of inmates entering and leaving the unit on a weekly basis;
- Number and level of staff to be provided; and
- Type of security system and features to be used.

While the optimal method for developing disruptive inmate housing is to plan, design, and construct completely new space, physically separate from other housing units within the institutional complex, many agencies will not be able to take this approach as a result of limited resources. The guidelines included in this chapter apply, as much as possible, to a range of options such as the utilization of an existing facility or renovation of available space, as well as the construction of an entirely new unit.

Site Location

A basic issue in planning a restrictive housing unit is its location. Disruptive inmates must be separated from the general population, and particularly from those inmates they have victimized. Consequently, if circumstances permit, it is advisable for restrictive housing to be situated away from major circulation paths, general inmate housing, and parking areas. If the unit is part of another facility, its location within the prison complex perimeter will increase security. Placement near the medical facility, which typically is not on a major inmate traffic path, will make it easier for medical staff to treat and monitor inmates in restrictive housing.

The orientation of the building is also important. It is recommended that individual inmate rooms face away from the center of the compound, where the general prisoner population frequently crosses, or the "front" of the institution, where visitors enter. Proper placement of the restrictive housing unit minimizes opportunities for harassment and introduction of contraband into the unit.

Environmental Considerations

The comfort level achieved by the physical environment of the restrictive housing unit involves lighting, color, noise, temperature, humidity, and air movement. The comfort level, in turn, may affect the management of disruptive inmates. Adequate light, for example, is necessary for the reading and writing comfort of inmates and to the surveillance requirements of security personnel. Satisfactory lighting levels of 20 footcandles at desk level and the personal grooming area are recommended. The positive psychological effects attributed to natural light may be obtained through the extensive use of skylights.

The colors used in restrictive housing units have been shown to be important in creating an environment conducive to improved staff and inmate morale. ACA standards recommend a light color for cells. Accent colors have been used for interior cell decoration and to color code doors, units, equipment, circulation spaces, and safety and emergency items.

Noise is one of a prison environments most persistent problems making normal communication difficult, often disturbing sleep, and generally increasing stress and discomfort. Recommendations for reducing noise levels include: distributing radio and television head phones or ear jacks, utilizing sound absorbing materials, and limiting metal on metal contacts of the structure, equipment, and furnishings.

Thermal comfort requirements, humidity, temperature, and air movement, are difficult for correctional facilities to achieve, even in new construction, given the variations in volume of space, exterior exposures, and occupant load. Standards that apply to thermal comfort are normally based on building code requirements; for example, ACA standards require 10 cubic feet per minute of fresh or purified air per room and suggested temperatures of from 66 to 80 degrees in the summer and from 61 to 73 degrees in winter.

Restrictive Housing Unit Image

In the planning and design of a new restrictive housing unit or in the renovation of an existing one, the overall image and perception of the unit by inmates, staff, and the general public is important. The unit's image, for example, can communicate what kind of facility it is and can establish expectations for what will happen there and how individuals can expect to be treated. This Guide recommends that the image of a restrictive housing unit reflect, foremost, the control and restrictive nature of the facility. As much as possible, there should be an attempt to lessen the trauma and stress of continued confinement in a closed environment by reducing the "institutional" feel of the unit.

Unit Security

One of the most important components of a unit for disruptive inmates is perimeter security. Recommended components of an effective perimeter security systems for restrictive housing facilities include:

- Two chain link fences, a minimum of 14 feet high, spaced 20 to 30 feet apart.
- At least one roll of barbed security tape, placed at the top inside face of the inner fence.
- Nine or ten additional rolls, placed between the fences, located so that some are hung on the inside face of the outer fence.
- Other rolls, stacked on the ground between the fences.

It is also advisable to use a reliable electronic perimeter "intrusion" detection system and to supplement guard towers with a vehicular patrol.

After the facility perimeter, the security of the unit is the second line of inmate control and containment. The integrity of the building exterior and the building "envelope"--the walls, ceilings, and floors of the housing unit and the support core--is crucial in this respect. Recommendations for ensuring the security of the unit address the construction materials and architectural

specifications for walls and openings in walls; ceilings; floors; openings for utilities and maintenance functions; and windows and window frames.

Restrictive Housing Unit--Design and Space Requirements

Recommendations are provided for the design and space requirements of the following functional components of a restrictive housing unit:

- Inmate housing;
- Reception and release area;
- Staff offices;
- Visiting--family and attorney;
- Medical and health care;
- Programs;
- Support services;
- Recreation;
- Food service; and
- General storage.

The space requirements recommended for each functional area are based upon a 200-bed restrictive housing unit, divided into four 50-bed housing pods.

Special Guidelines for Existing Facilities

Antiquated, substandard, and overcrowded restrictive housing units may, in part, be a contributing factor in the continued misconduct of disruptive inmates. Significant physical improvements to an old facility can be accomplished by effective planning, even with a fairly limited budget, and they could represent a significant preventive measure against disruptive behavior. Recommended low cost strategies for minimizing the negative behavioral impacts of existing physical plants include:

- Painting;
- Retrofitting toilet and shower facilities;
- Improving lighting ;
- Reducing noise pollution; and
- Ensuring adequate ventilation.

Renovation of an existing facility is an option in lieu of planning, designing, and constructing a new restrictive housing facility. General issues to be considered include:

- Compliance with standards and legal requirements;
- Capacity projections;
- Facility goals and objectives; and
- Future needs.

Specific issues that arise in the renovation of an existing facility include:

- Building soundness and adaptability;
- Fire and life safety;
- Security and safety;
- Separation capabilities;
- Comfort and humane conditions;
- Appropriate spaces for programs and support services;
- Sanitation;
- Efficiency; and
- Building scale.

Chapter 8--Monitoring and Evaluation of Management Practices

The purpose of this Guide is to identify, for the consideration of correctional administrators, contemporary and emerging trends in the management of disruptive maximum security inmates based primarily upon the experiences of state and federal correctional agencies. While an agency can implement new or revised practices to enhance the management of disruptive inmates, change in and of itself does not guarantee improved operations.

With only a limited amount of resources to work with, an agency needs to know whether its efforts are actually having a positive impact. Thus, the monitoring and evaluation of strategies intended to control disruptive inmates becomes crucial to determining the success of these practices. To this end the following guidelines are recommended:

- Development of an effective system for monitoring disruptive inmate management practices.
- Systematic collection of information useful to improving disruptive inmate management (e.g., daily population of restrictive housing units, inmate demographic characteristics, institutional adjustment history, disciplinary infractions, and staff turnover).
- Appointment of an administrator to oversee the monitoring system and its uses.
- Implementation of procedures for ongoing performance evaluations of management practices in restrictive housing units.
- Analysis of official records in assessing the effectiveness of existing or new disruptive inmate management practices.
- Surveys of staff and inmates to obtain their perceptions of management practices and to compensate for underreporting in official records.

Notes

- 1 "Findings of the New England Region Prison Study," 1973.
- 2 "Management of Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates Survey" conducted by Correctional Services Group, Inc., 1985.
- 3 "Survey: Prison Violence," Corrections Compendium (September 1987), pp. 9-15.
- 4 Larry Solomon and S. Christopher Baird, "Classification: Past Failures, Future Potential." In Classification As A Management Tool: Theories and Models for Decision-Makers. College Park, MD: American Correctional Association, 1982, pp. 5-10.
- 5 American Correctional Association, Design Guide for Secure Adult Correctional Facilities, (College Park, MD: American Correctional Association, 1983), p. 168.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE DISRUPTIVE MAXIMUM SECURITY INMATE MANAGEMENT GUIDE

It is our finding, after a year and one half of close observation, that...the management of a relatively small group of adult male inmates who exhibit dangerous, assaultive...behavior of a chronic or intermittent nature...threatens to become of crisis proportions in every state. Failure to deal effectively with this problem will seriously impair efforts in the states to reform the correctional system in all aspects.¹

This foreboding statement, contained in the final report of the New England Regional Prison Study Commission, was made more than a decade ago, but it remains just as true today. In fact, it may be even more valid, for the violent, disruptive behavior plaguing American corrections in the 1980s is unprecedented in its frequency and contagiousness. Moreover, violence has grown increasingly severe, particularly among maximum security inmates. Weapons have replaced fists as instruments of assault; fights that once ended with beatings now lead to stabbings and murders.

A listing of just a few of the major disruptive incidents that have occurred in recent years points up the severity of the problem:

On March 16, 1986, an inmate was surrounded and stabbed to death by fellow prisoners in the Isolation Unit of the West Virginia Penitentiary; the knifing occurred in the special unit confining 68 inmates who had led a major riot at the penitentiary on January 1-3, 1986; three inmates died during that riot.²

On October 24, 1986, approximately 100 inmates were involved in a racial disturbance at the Arizona State Prison Complex-Florence. One inmate was killed and eight were injured during the fighting.

On December 6, 1986, twelve inmates in the maximum security unit at the Mississippi State Penitentiary flooded cells and attempted to burn mattresses. No one was injured, but the incident caused \$2,000 worth of property damage.³

On September 28, 1987, a "free-for-all" erupted at the Menard (Illinois) Correctional Center after one inmate tripped another. The fight, involving two gangs, resulted in the death of one inmate and injuries to 30 others.⁴

A national survey of 31 state and federal correctional agencies, conducted for this study, found that prisoners killed 8 staff and 69 inmates in 1984. Agencies also reported 5,350 inmate assaults on staff during that year.⁵ Statistics show the number of violent incidents has remained relatively constant. Nationwide, during 1986, 39 state and federal correctional agencies reported 6,194 non-fatal assaults on staff occurred; 102 prisoners and 2 staff were killed by inmates.⁶

These statistics represent the most serious forms of disruptive behavior, the kinds reported by the media and familiar to the public. While such incidents are certainly alarming and deserving of attention, correctional operations are much more likely to be hampered by less violent acts, particularly those committed by individual inmates. Nearly every correctional institution has had to contend with prisoners who refuse to obey orders or who verbally abuse staff. Some inmates also throw food, urine, or excrement. Others will not leave or return to their cells, evoking the need for forced movement. And there seems to be a never-ending supply of inmates who manufacture drugs, smuggle contraband, and threaten other inmates. These acts--the bulk of disruptive incidents--also exact a tremendous toll and must be effectively dealt with in order to ensure a safe, secure, and orderly facility.

Impact of Disruptive Behavior

Not surprisingly, the rise in violent and disruptive behavior has had a substantial effect on corrections. A major concern has been the safety of staff and inmates. Consequently, internal controls have been tightened in many maximum security facilities. More and more disruptive inmates have been placed in restrictive housing units, where their conduct is closely supervised and their movement is sharply curtailed. Measures to control contraband have been strengthened. Security equipment and monitoring devices have been augmented, while direct surveillance by staff has been decreased in order to minimize safety risks. Group activities among inmates have been reduced or eliminated altogether. Programs and services have been restructured and brought to inmates' housing areas or, in some instances, discontinued.

Such measures, however, have also taxed correctional resources already strained by prison overcrowding. For example, more personnel have been required to supervise and escort disruptive prisoners, with many restrictive housing units employing one staff member for every two to three inmates. Delivery of programs and services has frequently been duplicated in an attempt to restrict inmate movement and association. And monitoring devices have been expensive to purchase and maintain. Ultimately, it has cost some agencies \$70 to \$90 a day to confine a single disruptive maximum security prisoner.

And all too often, attempts to better manage disruptive prisoners have provided the impetus for lawsuits by inmates and inmate advocacy groups. Besides placing an added burden on agencies' resources, this litigation has directly affected management practices. In some instances the courts have acted to limit the management options available to correctional administrators. More often, the courts have reached varying, or even contradictory, findings in regard to such important issues as conditions of confinement, search procedures, and use of physical restraints, thus complicating--and muddling--the development of legally sound approaches to controlling disruptive behavior.⁷

The Management Dilemma

The need to find ways to better manage disruptive maximum security inmates has raised a number of questions:

- Is there a valid and acceptable means of identifying such inmates?
- Should they be concentrated in one facility or dispersed systemwide?
- Is there a housing design that can enhance supervision of disruptive inmates?
- Is it more effective to supervise them directly or indirectly, or perhaps combine both approaches?
- How many staff are needed to manage disruptive inmates effectively and efficiently?
- How much access to programming should these inmates be afforded?
- When is it appropriate to return them to the general population?

There are no easy answers to such questions. Correctional practitioners disagree about whether particular strategies or management philosophies really work. Studies of prison violence and its control have yielded divergent findings, offering little guidance in dealing with this crucial problem. As a result, correctional administrators have been left in something of a management void as they struggle to cope with disruptive inmates and maintain secure, safe, and orderly institutions.

Purpose of This Study

Aware of the increasing level of violence in maximum security institutions--and its effect on correctional operations, the National Institute of Corrections decided to fund a study that would examine both the disruptive inmate population and existing means of managing it. Specifically, the study was to address the following areas:

- **A Profile of the Disruptive Maximum-Security Inmate**--including an analysis of the disruptive inmate population (those inmates with a demonstrated propensity for violence and major breaches of security). Who are they? What are their numbers, demographic characteristics, and identified needs?
- **Physical Plant and Confinement Environment**--including perimeter security, housing, offices, recreation, programs and services areas, visiting space, and control stations.
- **Security and Control**--including security policies and procedures, security equipment and monitoring devices, type of security personnel, and problems associated with security in disruptive

inmate management units.

- **Inmate Programs**--including program planning; types of programs available in recreation, education, vocational training, counseling, library (legal/leisure), etc.; inmate access to programs; and restrictions on inmate programming.
- **Inmate Services**--including service planning; types and extent of services available in medical and health care, food services, social and religious, barber shop, laundry, commissary, work programs, telephone, showers/ hygiene, and visiting; inmate access to services; and restrictions on inmate services.
- **Classification/Screening**--including classification policies and procedures, intake screening, reclassification practices, release practices, and due process issues in these areas.
- **Staffing**--including numbers and types of personnel assigned to the units, pre-service and in-service staff training, rotation of staff to other assignments, staff attitudes toward assignment to the units, and staff matching issues.

In order to obtain this information, three major activities were undertaken. The first was a review of available literature related to prison violence, disruptive prisoners, facility design, restrictive housing units, risk assessment, security operations, inmate programming, and legal issues. The second activity entailed the development of a detailed questionnaire pertaining to demographic characteristics of disruptive maximum security inmates and current practices for managing these inmates. This questionnaire was sent to all 50 state correctional agencies, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and the District of Columbia Department of Corrections. The last activity involved on-site visits to four maximum security facilities reported to have successful approaches to disruptive prisoner management, thus affording a first-hand look at the effectiveness of these operations. Comprehensive case studies on these facilities were also prepared.

The data acquired through these activities provided a basis for assessing current strategies to control disruptive maximum security inmates and formulating guidelines for more effective management.

The Disruptive Maximum Security Inmate Management Guide

The end-result of the 18-month study is this document, **The Disruptive Maximum Security Inmate Management Guide**, which presents correctional administrators with practical recommendations concerning the day-to-day confinement and management of inmates who threaten the safe, orderly operation of high security institutions.

The remaining chapters include:

- Chapter 2--A National Profile of the Disruptive Maximum Security Inmate Population;
- Chapter 3--General Issues Related to Managing Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates;
- Chapter 4--Identification and Classification of Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates;
- Chapter 5--Supervision and Staffing for Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates;
- Chapter 6--Programs and Services for Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates;
- Chapter 7--Design of the Confinement Environment for Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates; and
- Chapter 8--Monitoring and Evaluation of Disruptive Maximum Security Inmate Management.

Chapter 2 summarizes the questionnaire's major findings concerning demographic characteristics and criminal history of the disruptive maximum security inmate population. Chapters 3 through 7 address key areas of disruptive inmate management. Each of these chapters discusses issues crucial to effective correctional operations, presents related findings from the questionnaire survey, and provides recommendations for improving management of disruptive inmates. Chapters 3 through 7 also contain a summary of low-cost recommendations. Chapter 8 highlights the need to monitor and evaluate disruptive inmate management practices and suggests two methods for assessing management effectiveness.

The **Guide** concludes with a bibliography, organized by management area, and appendices containing findings of the questionnaire survey, the four case studies on disruptive maximum security management, and sample questionnaires for use in evaluating the management of disruptive inmates.

Specific guidelines and recommendations for disruptive maximum security inmate management are provided throughout the **Guide**. For the most part, these suggestions are not unique. In one form or another, nearly all of the recommended policies and procedures, programs and services, and so forth, are currently in place in one or more correctional systems. What is unique about this **Guide** is that it is based upon survey results from the first national study of disruptive inmate management and that it brings together, in one document, contemporary strategies for better managing this difficult and diverse population.

The guidelines and recommendations contained in this document are presented for the consideration of correctional managers. They were developed by Correctional Services Group staff, who have experience in correctional administration, training, planning, and evaluation. These guidelines and recommendations are based upon research findings; the survey results; the

professional and consultant experience of project staff and consultants; case law, ACA standards, and other applicable authority; and real-life examples from the four case studies included in the Appendix.

Notes

- 1 "Findings of the New England Region Prison Study," 1973.
- 2 "West Virginia Inmate Killed." Corrections Digest (March 26, 1986), p. 1.
- 3 "Survey: Prison Violence," Corrections Compendium (September 1987), pp. 9-15.
- 4 "Gang Fight in Illinois Prison Leaves Inmate Dead, 30 Hurt," Corrections Digest (October 14, 1987), p. 6.
- 5 "Management of Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates Survey" conducted by Correctional Services Group, Inc., 1985.
- 6 "Contact Center Survey on Prison Violence."
- 7 E.g., in Fulford v. King (5th Cir. 1982), the use of physical restraints while inmates are out of their cells was upheld. However, in Spain v. Procunier (9th Cir. 1979), the court specified provisions limiting the use of restraints.

CHAPTER 2

A NATIONAL PROFILE OF THE DISRUPTIVE MAXIMUM SECURITY INMATE POPULATION

A fundamental objective of this study was to describe the nation's disruptive maximum security inmate population. Who are these inmates creating such management problems for correctional administrators, while consuming disproportionate amounts of corrections' limited resources? How many disruptive inmates are confined within the nation's highest security correctional facilities? In what ways, if any, do these inmates differ from those housed in the general prisoner population? Answers to such questions are essential to developing effective strategies for managing this segment of the inmate population.

In order to obtain a more comprehensive picture of the disruptive maximum security population, and the means used to manage it, a questionnaire was sent to the 50 state correctional agencies, the District of Columbia Department of Corrections, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Thirty-seven of these agencies completed all or part of the questionnaire, depending on the availability of data requested. Responses were received from all regions of the nation, from agencies with relatively small prisoner populations and those with very large populations, and from systems with several high security facilities and those with only one maximum security institution. As a group, respondents were responsible for managing 347,214 prisoners, with the average population being approximately 11,000 inmates.

This chapter summarizes the major findings of the questionnaire in regard to characteristics of the disruptive maximum security inmate population. Subsequent chapters will present findings pertaining to management of these inmates. While this information does not depict the complete disruptive maximum security population, it is believed to be sufficiently representative to serve as a foundation for the recommendations presented in this Guide.¹

Number of Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates

Prior to determining the number of disruptive maximum security inmates confined in the nation's federal and state correctional institutions, it was necessary to define the prisoners in question. Developing this definition was a critical activity since it would profoundly affect both the quantity and quality of data obtained. Several definitions were drafted, each emphasizing the element of maximum security since inmates in this classification status present the greatest potential for violent behaviors. As each successive definition was refined, its scope was narrowed to facilitate data retrieval and ensure as comprehensive a profile as possible. After field-testing, the following definition was formulated for use on the questionnaire:

DISRUPTIVE MAXIMUM SECURITY INMATES are those housed in an agency's restrictive housing units (excluding protective custody) that have been assigned as a result of one or more major disciplinary violations which have substantially endangered the safety, security,

and operation of the institution. This would normally refer to the following types of disciplinary violations:

- Murder;
- Deadly assault (armed or unarmed);
- Aggravated sexual assault;
- Sodomy;
- Organizing or leading gang activities;
- Organizing, instigating, or causing a riot;
- Organizing a work stoppage, slowdown, or other major disturbance;
- Hostage taking;
- Manufacturing, possessing, and/or smuggling firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, or poison gas;
- Participating in drug distribution, manufacturing, sales, continued use, and/or smuggling of controlled substances;
- Major property damage; and/or
- Escape/attempted escape from inside secure perimeter.


Protective custody inmates were intentionally excluded from this study because it was believed that respondents would have difficulty in distinguishing between institutional disruption that is inherent in managing protective custody inmates and disruption that truly does threaten or endanger the safe, secure, and orderly operation of the institution.

That maximum security protective custody inmates can also be disruptive was not overlooked, however. Maximum security protective custody inmates housed in restrictive housing units other than protective custody, whose assignment was due to one or more major disciplinary infractions (listed in the study's definition) were included in this analysis.

It should be noted that this definition resulted in a "snapshot" of the disruptive maximum security inmate population. Agencies responding to the questionnaire were likely to have had other prisoners in their maximum security facilities who had previously engaged in disruptive behavior but were not in restrictive housing when the questionnaire was completed. Consequently, the findings reported in this guidebook may underestimate the presence of disruptive prisoners and the problems associated with their management.

The agencies responding to the questionnaire reported confining a total of 12,194 disruptive maximum security inmates in restrictive housing units at the time of the survey. These inmates, overwhelmingly male, constituted 3.8% of the agencies' overall prisoner populations and 54.8% of their maximum security populations. As shown in Figure 1, California reported the largest number of disruptive inmates (2,562) and North Dakota, the smallest (13).

Figure 1



Age

Figure 2 reflects the relatively young age of disruptive maximum security inmates. On the average, approximately 60% of this group was under 30 years old, compared to just over 50% for the general population. The largest proportion of disruptive inmates (30.6%) were between 25 and 29 years of age. Only 3.5% were 45 or older.

Race

As can be seen in Figure 3, most agencies stated that more of their disruptive prisoners were white than black. The average for whites was nearly 46%, while the average for blacks was approximately 39%. Hispanics, the next largest group, constituted an average of 8% of all disruptive inmates. Comparable figures for the general prisoner population were 53%, 35%, and 9% respectively, indicating that blacks were slightly overrepresented among disruptive maximum security inmates.

Criminal History


Slightly more than two-thirds of the entire disruptive maximum security inmate population had been incarcerated due to conviction of a violent offense. Among respondents, the proportion ranged from just over 12% in Delaware to 100% in New Mexico and the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Despite such variation, Figure 4 indicates that disruptive inmates, as a whole, were more likely to be imprisoned for a violent crime than were general population prisoners, only half of whom had violent commitment offenses.

However, as Figure 5 reveals, both groups were almost equally as likely to have a history of prior commitments. Nearly 47% of the disruptive inmates had been previously incarcerated, compared to approximately 43% of the general population.

Length of Sentence

The largest proportion of disruptive maximum security inmates (20%) were serving sentences of six to ten years. In contrast, slightly more than one-half of the general population prisoners had received sentences of two to five years, undoubtedly reflecting the less violent nature of their commitment offenses. As shown in Table 1, disruptive inmates were proportionately more predominant in every sentence length category except 0-1 year and 2-5 years.

Figure 2

Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates and General Population Prisoners by Age^{a)}

a) Unknowns averaged less than 2%.

Figure 3
Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates and
General Population Prisoners by Race




Figure 4


Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates and General Population Prisoners
by Most Serious Commitment Offense^{a)}

Figure 5


Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates and General Population Prisoners
by Number of Commitments

Table 1

Sentence Lengths: Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates (DMSI) and General Population Inmates

	<u>0-1</u>	<u>2-5</u>	<u>6-10</u>	<u>11-20</u>	<u>20+</u>	<u>Life-- Release Possible</u>	<u>Life-- No Release</u>
DMSI	4.8 (N=28)	20.1 (N=28)	20.8 (N=28)	17.6 (N=28)	16.4 (N=28)	12.5 (N=26)	4.2 (N=22)
General Population	10.9 (N=25)	55.5 (N=24)	19.7 (N=24)	12.8 (N=23)	9.3 (N=23)	6.4 (N=23)	1.3 (N=19)

This finding is not very surprising given prior studies of institutional conduct, which indicate that long-term inmates tend to commit fewer but more serious disciplinary violations.²

Escape History

Just under one-fourth of the disruptive inmate population had a history of escape or attempted escape. As Table 2 indicates, this figure is more than double that for general population prisoners (11%). Both Iowa and New Mexico reported that approximately one-half of their disruptive inmates had previously escaped or attempted escape from adult correctional institutions.

Table 2

Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates and General Population Prisoners by Escape History (Average Percent)

	<u>History of Escape or Attempted Escape</u>	<u>No History of Escape or Attempted Escape</u>	<u>Escape History Unknown</u>
Disruptive Maximum Security	24.1 (N=26)	74.1 (N=24)	7.6 (N=26)
General Population	10.9 (N=14)	87.6 (N=13)	9.0 (N=14)

Educational and Vocational Level

Figure 6 presents another anticipated finding: educational levels for both disruptive maximum security and general population inmates were relatively low. On the average, however, more disruptive inmates (60%) than general population prisoners (50%) had not completed high school. Nearly 6% of the disruptive population was reported to have less than a sixth grade education.

Respondents generally had less information available in regard to the vocational skills of inmates, especially those in the general population. However, responses to the questionnaire indicate substantial differences between the vocational abilities of disruptive inmates and general population prisoners. For example, Table 3 indicates that 48% of the disruptive population was characterized as having no vocational skills, compared with just 27% of the general population. At the other end of the continuum, close to 20% of the general population was described as possessing substantial skills versus approximately 9% of the disruptive inmate population.

Table 3

Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates and General Population Prisoners
by Level of Vocational Skills (Average Percent)


	<u>Substantial Skills</u>	<u>Limited Skills</u>	<u>No Skills</u>	<u>Unknown</u>
Disruptive Maximum Security (N=19)	8.6	30.1	48.0	13.2
General Population (N=10)	18.5	32.5	26.7	24.7

Special Management Categories

Data regarding special management categories for respondents' general population were limited. However, agencies were able to provide some useful information concerning disruptive maximum security inmates. On the average, slightly more than 50% had been assigned to administrative segregation, approximately 31% were in disciplinary segregation, and just over 6% had protective custody status.³ In addition, nearly 5% were perceived to be mentally retarded, and approximately 4% were characterized as mentally ill.

Figure 6

Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates and General Population Prisoners
by Educational Level^{a)}



Notes

- 1 Principal findings for the questionnaire are detailed in Appendix A.
- 2 See, e.g., T. J. Flanagan. **Long-term Prisoners: Analysis of Institutional Incidents**. Working Paper 21. Albany, NY: Criminal Justice Research Center, 1980.
- 3 While maximum security inmates housed in protective custody units were excluded from this study, maximum security protective custody inmates housed in restrictive units other than protective custody were included, provided they met the other requirements of the definition.

CHAPTER 3 GENERAL ISSUES RELATED TO MANAGING DISRUPTIVE MAXIMUM SECURITY INMATES

Introduction

Management of disruptive maximum security inmates is, at best, an extremely difficult and complex task. Correctional administrators must deal not only with a defiant, violent population but also with legal constraints, changing policies and procedures, and overcrowding--with only limited resources at their disposal. Frequently, administrators also find they have minimal information about their disruptive inmates that can be used to develop and monitor specially designed management strategies. This chapter presents an overview of some basic issues that should be considered in formulating a comprehensive approach to disruptive inmate management. The suggestions offered here also provide a framework for other, more specific issues and guidelines addressed later in this guidebook.

Conditions Affecting Management of Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates

A wide variety of factors, often external to correctional operations, affect the management of disruptive inmates. In recent years, for example, the courts have played an increasingly influential role in corrections, including disruptive inmate management, as more and more prisoners and inmate advocacy groups have filed suit against correctional agencies. The decisions in these cases sometimes strengthen existing policies and procedures, often complicate management practices, and all too frequently hamper effective operations with contradictory court findings.

In general, the courts have upheld the use of segregation to prevent misconduct or other violations of security and order. Virtually every court that has considered the issue has found that segregation for this purpose does not violate Eighth Amendment guarantees against cruel and unusual punishment.¹ Arguments that segregation offends evolving standards of decency, constitutes psychological punishment, and exceeds the severity necessary to maintain safety and order have routinely been denied by the courts.

The courts have shown considerably less agreement on what length of confinement and types of conditions in segregation units do run contrary to the Eighth Amendment. In Hewitt vs. Helms, for instance, the Supreme Court stated that "administrative segregation may not be used as a pretext for indefinite confinement."² However, judgments have varied widely in determining what length of segregative confinement constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; for example, both 400 days and 2 years have been upheld.³ In one case, the Supreme Court linked length of stay with condition of confinement: imprisonment in a "filthy, overcrowded cell...might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel after weeks and months."⁴ The Court then upheld a 30-day limit on segregative confinement, largely because of extremely poor conditions.

With regard to conditions of confinement themselves, the courts have ruled that the Eighth Amendment is violated by:

- Deprivation of the basic elements of hygiene;
- Poor heating, ventilation, and noise control;
- Inadequate toilet facilities;
- Intrusive or unnecessary surveillance;
- Presence of insects and vermin;
- Inadequate lighting;
- Lack of meaningful activities;
- Use of closed-front cells; and
- Insufficient opportunity for exercise.

But for each case that holds one or some combination of these conditions to be Eighth Amendment violations, another case can be found that holds just the opposite. There appears to be very little definitive case law in this area, leaving correctional administrators walking a thin line between constitutional and unconstitutional conditions.

Rulings concerning due process protections contained in the Fourteenth Amendment have also had a substantial impact on disruptive inmate management. The courts have generally acted to restrict the scope of these protections, prescribing only minimum due process safeguards in imposing segregative confinement. These safeguards include conducting an informal nonadversary evidentiary review, notifying an inmate of the charges against him/her, and providing an opportunity for the inmate to present his/her views to the officials charged with responsibility for transfers to a segregation unit.⁵ The Supreme Court has also required "some sort of periodic review" of segregative confinement to justify its continuing use for a particular inmate.⁶

The growing and wide-reaching importance of legal issues is borne out by the questionnaire survey--responding agencies cited inmate litigations as the predominant factor affecting disruptive inmate management. Two-thirds of the 36 respondents stated that they are involved in litigation pertaining to the management of disruptive prisoners. Among the most frequently reported areas of dispute are general conditions (18 agencies), recreation (15), access to legal materials (14), inmate safety (13), and disciplinary procedures (13).

One-fourth of the respondents also said that they are under court orders affecting disruptive inmate management. Nearly one-third are under consent decrees. Slightly over 8% are subject to both forms of legal action.

Clearly, agencies should have legal staff review any changes in disruptive inmate management practices. It would also seem prudent to assess existing policies and procedures in light of recent case law in this area.

Another influential factor, according to 42% of the respondents, is changes in sentencing laws. Recent legislation has mandated longer prison terms for violent crimes and recidivism. Such legislation has had several detrimental implications for correctional administration. For instance, a recent study of long-term incarceration in Louisiana found that inmates sentenced to a life term with no chance of release exhibited higher rates of violence-related rule infractions than did lifers eligible for release.⁷

Moreover, lengthier stays often result in overcrowding. Overcrowding has had numerous negative effects on prison operations, straining the ability of correctional systems to provide for the legal, safe, and humane custody of confined persons. Numerous studies have demonstrated a strong relationship between overcrowding and disruptive behavior. For instance, Megargee measured overcrowding in terms of density and found that reduced living space for inmates significantly increases both the number and the rate of disciplinary violations.⁸ Similarly, Nacci et al. found that overcrowding in the Federal Prison System was highly correlated with assaults, particularly those involving attacks on other inmates.⁹ In a study of conditions within the Georgia prison system, Carr determined that overcrowding has an adverse impact on serious disciplinary infractions, especially in institutions housing younger offenders.¹⁰

Nearly 40% of the respondents also said that changes in departmental policies and procedures have affected management of their disruptive inmate populations. For example, New Mexico stated that recently it had substantially modified its classification and disciplinary policies. Nebraska reported a policy change requiring all intensive management and administrative confinement offenders to be housed in one facility. In Tennessee, additional reviews for segregation inmates had been instituted in order to meet ACA standards.

Other frequently cited factors are increased gang activity, increased prosecution for drug offenses, and changes in alternatives to confinement.

The finding that gang activity has affected disruptive inmate management is hardly surprising. With increasing frequency, organized inmate gangs are cited as important contributors to prison violence. For example, a recent survey conducted by the Criminal Justice Institute (CJI) found that gangs exist in at least 33 state or federal correctional systems, with a total reported membership of 12,634 in 114 gangs. Many of these gangs are relatively new. Just over one-half of the respondents indicated that the gangs in their jurisdictions originated in the 1980s. And while gangs represent only 3% of the nation's total prisoner population, the CJI survey found that they account for a large proportion of prison violence--nine agencies attribute at least 50% of their inmate problems to gang activities.¹¹

In response to the growing incidence of gang-related violence, especially among young inmates, correctional administrators have initiated various strategies to deal with prison gangs. For instance, efforts have been made to identify gang members, use informants, conduct regular shakedowns, house inmates in small units, and thwart membership recruitment. Some agencies--such as Florida and Kentucky--believe it is more effective to separate and isolate gang leaders, lock up gang members, or transfer some members to other institutions or states. In any event, it is clear that increased gang activity and efforts to control it are helping to shape disruptive inmate management practices in many jurisdictions.

Similarly, recent crackdowns on drug dealers have had a dramatic impact on institutional violence. As more and more offenders have been confined for drug sales or other drug-related offenses, drug trafficking within prisons has increased. The growth in drug activity, in turn, has contributed to the higher incidents of violence and disruptive behavior within the nation's prisons. For example, between 1982 and 1985 the Arizona correctional system experienced a 280% rise in inmate violence that was directly attributed to drug trafficking.

A variety of alternative-to-confinement approaches have also appeared in recent years, primarily in response to overcrowding. These approaches work on both the front end of the criminal justice system--by reducing the number of offenders entering the prison system--and the back end--by enhancing the early release of eligible inmates. However, while these alternatives have reduced somewhat the rise in prison populations, they have also increased the severity and incidence of inmate violence by diverting from confinement many nonviolent offenders who are traditionally considered to be stabilizing influences in the prison environment. Thus, early release efforts have left many correctional institutions populated primarily by prisoners ineligible for early release due to the nature of their offense. The questionnaire survey, for example, found that the average percentage of general population inmates committed for violent offenses was 48%; the average for disruptive maximum security inmates was approximately 68%. Inmates excluded from early release programs may become increasingly frustrated with their situation, and vent their anger through disruptive behavior.

Punishment Versus Opportunities Management Model

Confronted with these conditions, how are correctional administrators approaching the management of disruptive maximum security inmates? In general, responding agencies indicated that they segregated disruptive inmates from the general population and provided them with basic services, while restricting privileges and programming. (Nearly 98% of the respondents stated they maintain a special unit or units for disruptive maximum security male inmates; the corresponding figure for females was 42%.) More specifically, agencies tend to use one of two basic management approaches: a punitive model or an opportunities model.

The punitive model is based on the belief that negative, disruptive conduct should be met with retribution. Simply stated, it represents the conventional judicial system operating within the microcosm of the correctional facility: rule violators are "tried" in disciplinary hearings and, if convicted, sentenced to a fixed term of punishment. This punishment generally consists of isolation from the inmate community and loss of privileges. Further misconduct increases the term of punishment, but good behavior does not decrease it. Such retribution is also believed to serve as a deterrent both to "recidivism" and to serious violations by other prisoners.

The opportunities model, on the other hand, recognizes the necessity of segregating troublemakers, but also acknowledges the need to enhance offenders' daily living skills. Thus, while disruptive inmates are confined in a separate unit or facility, they are provided with opportunities to adopt more acceptable conduct norms. These opportunities typically are afforded through (1) a contract that gives inmates increasing responsibilities and privileges for achieving specific objectives, (2) a phase system that gradually expands privileges and programming based upon standardized measures of good conduct, or (3) a combination of both.

Each of these models is sound, depending upon an agency's inmate population and overall institutional environment. However, more respondents

favor the opportunities model, which seems to better complement prevailing correctional philosophy and yield more positive results. For instance, the Minnesota Correctional Facility-Oak Park Heights has found that its policy of providing an environment conducive to constructive programming and behavioral change has decreased inmate grievances and litigation, diffused inmate anger and channeled their energies into programs and job assignments, and reduced disruptive behavior.

Dispersal Versus Concentration of Disruptive Inmates

Given the decision to segregate disruptive inmates, correctional administrators must also address the question of where. Within a limited number of facilities or throughout the correctional system? Many times this question will be answered by factors beyond administrators' control. For instance, an agency may operate just one or two facilities capable of securely confining such prisoners. Or perhaps available bed space will dictate housing for disruptive inmates. (Twelve respondents said they lacked sufficient beds for these inmates.) Sometimes, however, correctional administrators find that they have a choice about where to confine their disruptive populations and can select the option that best meets their needs.

Dispersal of Disruptive Inmates

Advantages

- Programs and services provided to general population are available to disruptive prisoners;
- Privileges afforded general population prisoners serve as incentive for disruptive inmates to improve their conduct;
- Staff stress is reduced because personnel are not in continuous contact with difficult-to-control prisoners; and
- Limited interaction with general population inmates provides a stabilizing influence on disruptive prisoners.

Disadvantages

- The maintenance of numerous disruptive inmate units is expensive; and
- The disruptive segment of an institution's prisoner population may sometimes upset operation of an entire institution.

Concentration of Disruptive Inmates

Advantages

- Duplication of programs and services is minimized;
- The cost of managing this small portion of the prisoner population is decreased; and
- Facilities are able to specialize in disruptive inmate management, e.g., high security construction, specially trained staff, tailored policies and procedures, and so forth.

Disadvantages

- A more restricted range of programming is usually available;
- The transportation of disruptive inmates to a special unit entails security concerns; and
- Staff may experience higher levels of tension from almost constant exposure to the most disruptive segment of the inmate population.


According to some respondents, dispersing disruptive inmates throughout an agency's facilities provides distinct advantages. Disruptive inmates have access to the types of programs and services afforded the general population. Moreover, general population prisoners, who have more privileges, often serve as an incentive for disruptive inmates to improve their conduct and as a stabilizing influence. Dispersal of disruptive inmates also reduces staff stress because personnel are not in continuous contact with difficult-to-control prisoners. Maintaining numerous special units for these inmates, however, is expensive, and the disruptive segment of an institution's prisoner population may sometimes upset operation of an entire institution. This last disadvantage was one factor that prompted the Washington Department of Corrections to construct an Intensive Management Unit within the perimeter of the Washington Corrections Center.

Many respondents stated that concentrating disruptive inmates in a limited number of facilities creates a safer, more orderly environment in other institutions. They also pointed out that it also eliminates much duplication of programs, services, and security, thus decreasing the cost of handling this relatively small portion of the prisoner population. In essence, such facilities can specialize in managing disruptive inmates, using high-security construction, specially trained staff, and exclusively tailored policies and procedures. Respondents note the drawbacks of the concentration option include a more restricted range of programming, the need to transport disruptive inmates to the restrictive housing unit(s), and, frequently, a higher level of tension among staff.

Among responding agencies, the concentration option is the more common approach for housing disruptive inmates. Slightly over 80% of the respondents stated that they place male disruptive inmates in only a few facilities. The Federal Bureau of Prisons, for instance, assigns its most difficult-to-manage

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Dispersal Versus Concentration of Disruptive Inmates

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Advantages

- Programs and services provided to general population are available to disruptive prisoners;
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- Limited interaction with general population inmates provides a stabilizing influence on disruptive prisoners.

Disadvantages

- The maintenance of numerous disruptive inmate units is expensive; and
- The disruptive segment of an institution's prisoner population may sometimes upset operation of an entire institution.

Concentration of Disruptive Inmates

Advantages

- Duplication of programs and services is minimized;
- The cost of managing this small portion of the prisoner population is decreased; and
- Facilities are able to specialize in disruptive inmate management, e.g., high security construction, specially trained staff, tailored policies and procedures, and so forth.

Disadvantages

- A more restricted range of programming is usually available;
- The transportation of disruptive inmates to a special unit entails security concerns; and
- Staff may experience higher levels of tension from almost constant exposure to the most disruptive segment of the inmate population.

According to some respondents, dispersing disruptive inmates throughout an agency's facilities provides distinct advantages. Disruptive inmates have access to the types of programs and services afforded the general population. Moreover, general population prisoners, who have more privileges, often serve as an incentive for disruptive inmates to improve their conduct and as a stabilizing influence. Dispersal of disruptive inmates also reduces staff stress because personnel are not in continuous contact with difficult-to-control prisoners. Maintaining numerous special units for these inmates, however, is expensive, and the disruptive segment of an institution's prisoner population may sometimes upset operation of an entire institution. This last disadvantage was one factor that prompted the Washington Department of Corrections to construct an Intensive Management Unit within the perimeter of the Washington Corrections Center.

Many respondents stated that concentrating disruptive inmates in a limited number of facilities creates a safer, more orderly environment in other institutions. They also pointed out that it also eliminates much duplication of programs, services, and security, thus decreasing the cost of handling this relatively small portion of the prisoner population. In essence, such facilities can specialize in managing disruptive inmates, using high-security construction, specially trained staff, and exclusively tailored policies and procedures. Respondents note the drawbacks of the concentration option include a more restricted range of programming, the need to transport disruptive inmates to the restrictive housing unit(s), and, frequently, a higher level of tension among staff.

Among responding agencies, the concentration option is the more common approach for housing disruptive inmates. Slightly over 80% of the respondents stated that they place male disruptive inmates in only a few facilities. The Federal Bureau of Prisons, for instance, assigns its most difficult-to-manage

prisoners to the U.S. Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois. Similarly, the Washington Department of Corrections confines disruptive inmates in its Intensive Management Units at the Washington Corrections Center and the Washington State Reformatory. Only Florida, Illinois, Maryland, and Tennessee reported using the dispersal option. A majority of respondents also reported housing female disruptive inmates in one or two facilities, primarily because most states have only one or two facilities for women.

Given that most agencies have decided to place their disruptive inmates in just a few facilities and that concentration appears to be more cost-efficient and to promote development of specialized management practices, this approach would seem the more effective of the two options.

Centralized Versus Decentralized Institutional Management

Whether or not an agency concentrates its disruptive inmate population in a limited number of facilities, it must still address another fundamental administrative issue: Should management operations be centralized or decentralized? Correctional institutions traditionally have taken the former approach, structuring management along classical bureaucratic lines. Increasingly, however, agencies are following the lead of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and reallocating authority among "functional units" within their institutions.

In the centralized approach to correctional management, institutions are organized according to a military-style chain of command. At the top of the chain is the warden, who is usually appointed by the agency's director. Next in line are deputy or associate wardens, who are responsible for such divisions as custody operations and treatment. These are followed by several levels of security personnel, with supervisors at the top and line staff at the bottom. Program and services personnel are something of an adjunct to the institutional organization, typically falling under the authority of the deputy warden for treatment. Thus, these staff are responsible for serving an institution's entire inmate population.

Within this administrative structure, authority and communications flow from top to bottom. That is, all decisions regarding the jobs of line staff are made at the upper levels and then transmitted to line staff. Line staff traditionally do not make decisions, either alone or with other staff. Similarly, information is passed down the chain of command according to the need of staff to know particular information.

While centralized management clearly delineates responsibility, promotes specialization, and generally enhances rationale decision-making, it also has several important drawbacks. For example, as many commercial businesses have concluded, this kind of bureaucratic structure tends to result in ineffective communication, poor morale, frustration, and alienation among lower-level staff. Moreover, centralized management is often characterized by a rigidity that stifles valuable input from those who work most directly with inmates--correctional officers. In addition, program staff typically deal with so many prisoners that they find it difficult to get to know inmates individually, thus reducing the effectiveness of programs and services.

In response to such problems, correctional agencies have begun to decentralize their institutions into functional units. This approach, commonly referred to as unit management, was first employed during the early 1970s by the Federal Bureau of Prisons. It is designed to improve control of inmates and delivery of correctional services.

The cornerstone of this approach is the functional unit, which can be defined as a relatively small, self-contained inmate living and staff area that operates semi-autonomously within the hierarchy of a larger facility. The unit management approach is unique in placing most, or all, staff members involved in the unit's operation within the immediate area where inmates are housed. A special team, composed of a unit manager, case workers, counselors, clerical staff, and correctional officers, is directly responsible for the welfare of inmates in the unit. In addition, space is usually provided for part-time support personnel involved with medical and mental health care, education, recreation, food service, maintenance, laundry, and commissary. Thus, the organizational chart for a decentralized facility would look similar to the one shown below in Figure 7.


Operationally, unit management is based upon the following principles:

- A manageable number of inmates (50-100) housed within one area, which can be further subdivided into still smaller areas;
- A permanently assigned, multidisciplinary team of staff members with offices located near and adjacent to the living areas;
- A manager with administrative authority and supervisory responsibility for the unit staff;
- The administrative authority for all intra-unit aspects of inmate living and programming; and
- The assignment of an inmate to a particular unit based on security and/or programmatic needs specific to the management capabilities of the particular unit.

A number of respondents to the questionnaire survey--including Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, and South Carolina--reported employing or converting to unit management in their disruptive maximum security inmate facilities. Whether this population occupies an entire institution or is housed in a portion of the institution, this approach offers several practical benefits to the management of disruptive inmates:

- It divides inmates into small, well-defined and manageable groups, whose members develop a common identity and association with each other and their unit management staff.

Figure 7
Organizational Chart -- Decentralized Facility



- It increases the frequency of contacts, along with the intensity of relationships between staff and inmates, resulting in better communication and understanding; enhanced individualized classification and program planning and review; and improved observation of inmates and their problems.
- It makes effective use of the multidisciplinary backgrounds of unit staff, which enhances communication and cooperation with other institutional departments.
- It promotes staff involvement in the correctional process and management decision-making.
- It improves administration through decisions made by unit staff who are closely associated with inmates, which increases the quality and promptness of decision-making.
- It increases program flexibility because special areas of emphasis can be developed to meet the needs of the inmates in each unit. Conversely, programs in a unit can be changed without affecting the whole institution.

Disruptive Inmates with Special Management Needs

Within the disruptive maximum security population are prisoners who are not only defiant and violent but also in need of special services. These include inmates who are mentally ill or retarded and those who have chronic, serious medical problems. While the proportion of disruptive inmates with special management needs is generally small, their presence has a substantial impact on the operation of restrictive housing units. These inmates generally require more staff time and attention, as well as additional or increased services. Moreover, they may thwart strategies designed to manage the disruptive inmate population. The bottom line is that they are a further drain on already strained resources.

The need for special management services within the disruptive maximum security population appears to vary greatly. Among agencies completing the questionnaire survey, for example, the percentage of disruptive inmates who are considered mentally ill ranged from a high of nearly 32% in Nebraska to a low of 0%, which was reported by 52% of the respondents. However, many agencies also indicated that departmental policy does not permit housing mentally ill prisoners in disruptive inmates' units. Partly due to such policies, both disruptive inmates and general population prisoners, on the average, were reported to include about the same proportion of mentally ill cases--3 and 4%, respectively. These findings are surprisingly low, given that some experts believe that between 10 and 35% of state and federal inmates have serious mental problems. A study in Michigan, for instance, found that 20% of all state prisoners have some serious mental disorder, and at any one time one-third of those are in an "acute episode" requiring intensive treatment.¹²

In regard to disruptive inmates who are categorized as mentally retarded, survey responses ranged from 41% in Virginia to 0% in 13 jurisdictions. Again, approximately the same proportion of mentally retarded inmates (5%) were found in both the disruptive inmate and the general prisoner population.

The questionnaire did not ask about chronic health problems among disruptive inmates, primarily because the instrument pretest determined that this type of aggregate data is not routinely kept. Based upon the limited physical mobility that accompanies many chronic health conditions, however, it is likely that the percentage of disruptive inmates who also have chronic health problems is lower than for the prisoner population as a whole. Few restrictive housing units, for example, have facilities for handicapped inmates. Previous studies have identified from 2 to 5% of inmate populations as having chronic health problems, depending upon the definition of chronic health problem used.¹³

Despite the varying proportions of disruptive inmates with special management needs, individual agencies should take some basic steps to ensure that such inmates are provided with an adequate level of appropriate services. Chronically ill disruptive inmates, for example, may suffer from a variety of illnesses, including diabetes, seizure disorders, asthma, cardiovascular disease, and orthopedic disabilities. To ensure that these inmates continue to receive the level of care they require, a recent article in Corrections Today recommends that an agency institute the following procedures:

- Standardized entries on medical forms.
- Transfer of medical records with the disruptive inmate to the restrictive housing unit.
- Use of a medical form that lists the inmate's name, number, the transferring institution, medical diagnosis, listing of medications for care en route, special instructions, housing assignment, physical restrictions, and food service qualifications and restrictions if the disruptive inmate must be transferred from one location to another within the correctional system.
- Interview of the disruptive inmate by a health professional within three hours of admission to the restrictive housing unit. At that time the health professional initiates a plan of care. An inmate who requires continuing medication is given starter dosages of prepackaged unit dose drugs so that treatment continues uninterrupted. An appointment is also made at this time to have the inmate evaluated by either the physician or physician assistant.
- Use of medical care follow-up cards, maintained on each disruptive inmate who has a significant chronic disease or who otherwise requires regular follow-up. These follow-up cards provide: a readily available visible listing of all patients requiring follow-up; a flagging system to provide visible information regarding diagnosis and next scheduled appointment; a quick procedure for reviewing and acting on patients who have missed appointments; an ongoing count, as well as specific identification, of patients with chronic diseases in the disruptive unit; a means of periodic, quick review of the status of patients with chronic

illness; and a tool for auditors to identify and review chronically ill cases.¹⁴

The literature supports placing mentally ill disruptive inmates in forensic units capable of controlling and treating their violent behavior rather than all-purpose disruptive inmate units. While behavior management as it is used in a level or phase system is generally suitable for use with disruptive inmates, this kind of system may not be particularly effective with disruptive inmates who have been diagnosed as mentally ill. Consequently, it appears that a separate program that stresses mental health intervention and treatment would better serve these inmates. A system of monitoring and follow-up within the forensic unit which is continued when mentally ill disruptive inmates are released from the unit would provide helpful data for program planning and evaluation. The unit's psychiatrist and other mental health staff are the best sources to use in determining the level and type of programming and services that should be available to mentally ill disruptive inmates. The diversity of mental illness and its manifestations suggest this determination be made on an individual basis according to the diagnosis, prognosis, treatment regime, and treatment response reported by mental health staff.

McGee, Warner, and Harlow also cite the following elements as components of effective programs for mentally ill disruptive inmates:

- A secure unit, within the prison system, that provides professional psychiatric care and transitional units to help conserve acute care resources and smooth the transition to general population.
- An effective means of identifying and diagnosing serious mental health problems at admission to the correctional system.
- Staff trained to recognize and handle the mentally ill and to refer those who need professional help.
- Recognition of the role of security staff as human service providers.
- Long-term care for those disruptive inmates who require it; an emphasis on periodic and short-term crisis care that rations hospital-style resources.
- Programming for the mentally ill that recognizes their strengths as well as their weaknesses; treatment oriented not only toward relieving symptoms but also toward overcoming behavioral and social deficits that work against these inmates in general population.¹⁵

In a similar vein, study consultants recommend that mentally retarded disruptive inmates be housed in small, highly controlled units that emphasize education and treatment and are staffed by treatment personnel. Georgia's experience, for example, suggests that the disruptive behavior of mentally retarded inmates may be prompted by a lack of understanding, the inability to communicate, or the influence or goading of other inmates. Georgia has recently instituted a special program for mentally retarded disruptive inmates in a unit that is adjacent to the institutional medical facility. This unit's objectives are to isolate these inmates from other disruptive inmates who manipulate them,

to teach them more appropriate responses to anger and frustration, to help them understand agency rules and regulations, and to teach them how to communicate with others.

As with disruptive inmates who are mentally ill, a system for monitoring and following up on mentally retarded disruptive inmates for use in the special housing unit and in the general population upon release would provide useful data for program planning and evaluation.

Disruptive Inmate Data Base

Few correctional administrators would question the value of a good data base on disruptive inmates, especially those administrators charged with developing and/or implementing agency policy regarding disruptive inmate management. Unfortunately, the gap between the recognition of need for good data and the possession of good data appears to be vast. This study identified few correctional agencies that had comprehensive information about their disruptive inmate populations.

What constitutes good data depends upon both the individuals using the data and the uses envisioned for the data. In this case, the users will be correctional administrators who have day-to-day responsibility for the management and care of disruptive inmates. In most cases they will be interested in the utility of the information contained by a data base. One way correctional administrators will use such a data base is in the development of policies and procedures governing the management, care, and treatment of disruptive inmates. Other uses include monitoring and evaluation of disruptive inmate management practices.

Good data, properly used, can tell administrators which management practices are working, and why. To achieve this objective it will be necessary for correctional agencies to develop data bases to describe their disruptive maximum security inmate populations. The following data elements form a solid basis for developing a data base that will support management functions:¹⁶

- Number of disruptive inmates currently and historically for the last five years;
- Sentence length;
- Commitment offense;
- Time remaining to serve;
- Offense history;
- Escape history;

- Disciplinary infractions/rule violations by type, date of occurrence, and disposition;
- Segregation history;
- Age breakdown;
- Racial breakdown;
- Educational achievement level at time of commitment;
- Reading level;
- Mental ability;
- Special health care needs;
- Mental health history;
- Number of developmentally disabled, including mentally retarded, learning disabled, physically handicapped, and emotionally maladjusted;
- Employment history;
- Vocational training experiences;
- Substance abuse history;
- Visitation patterns; and
- Family history.

Low-Cost Recommendations

Perhaps the most important recommendations contained in this chapter may be described as low-cost. While changes in correctional operations are not without cost, either in real dollars or opportunity costs, there are many possible alternatives that are quite inexpensive, especially when compared to the costs of adding staff or constructing new facilities.

For example, many of the recommendations in this chapter are based upon sound policies and procedures. Agencies are urged to set up a review system that provides for regular scrutiny of all policies and procedures that relate to disruptive maximum security inmates. To help protect agencies against court challenges, this review would be significantly enhanced by the inclusion of a comprehensive legal review.

Further, many agencies reported negative impacts on current disruptive inmate management stemming from changes in laws and agency policy and procedures. One way to combat this is to form an ad hoc core group of administrative staff who would be responsible for analyzing the impacts of

proposed policy and law changes and for making pertinent recommendations for necessary revisions before their implementation. The Missouri Department of Corrections and Human Resources has used this strategy with other issues with much success.

Agencies that employ a punishment model of management for disruptive inmates may wish to consider changing to an opportunities model because of the potential positive benefits. Resources that would be required are limited to revised policies and procedures and possible changes in staff deployment. The Minnesota Correctional Facility-Oak Park Heights credits the opportunities model of inmate management with decreased inmate grievances and litigation and reduced disruptive behavior.

The benefits of decentralized inmate management recommend this approach for disruptive inmates. A relatively low-cost option for agencies that would like to study decentralized management before committing large funds to a wholesale conversion is to pilot test the approach in one housing unit for a 6- to 12-month time period. This recommendation would require planning and evaluation time, tailored policies and procedures, and staff redeployment. The Missouri Department of Corrections and Human Resources implemented and tested the unit management approach first at the Missouri Training Center for Men before it was replicated elsewhere within the system.

The provision of separate specialized housing for special needs disruptive inmates would be an expensive proposition for most jurisdictions. A less expensive option is to design comprehensive screening and treatment programs for these inmates that are individualized and delivered in subunits of the larger disruptive inmate unit. If staff resources permit, it might be possible to form a "special needs" treatment team from existing personnel to staff these special cases. The treatment team would be composed of representatives from medical, mental health, education, and security. The Georgia Department of Corrections currently employs this model at the Georgia State Penitentiary (Reidsville).

The development of a data base on inmates housed in disruptive inmate units is recommended because it would greatly enhance inmate classification, program and service delivery, and the documentation of services provided to this population. An investment of a few thousand dollars in hardware, software, and staff training can repay itself several times over in improved staff efficiencies and defending possible court challenges.

Notes

- 1 See, e.g., Hewitt vs. Helms, U.S. , 103 S. Ct. 864 (1983), Gregory vs. Wise 512 F2d 378 (10th Cir. 1975), Gates vs. Collier 501 F2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974).
- 2 Id. at n. 9.
- 3 See Knuckles vs. Prasse 435 F2d 1255 (3d Cir. 1971) and Graham vs. Willingham 384 F2d 367 (10th Cir. 1967).
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- 8 E.I. Megargee, "Population Density and Disruptive Behavior in a Prison Setting" in Experimental Behavior: A Basis for the Study of Mental Disturbance, John H. Cullen (ed.) (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1974), pp. 135-46.
- 9 P.L. Nacci, H.E. Teitelbaum and J. Prather, Violence in Federal Prisons: The Effect of Population Density on Misconduct (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, 1979).
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- 11 G.M. Camp and C.G. Camp, Prison Gangs: Their Extent, Nature and Impact on Prisons (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. vii-xi.
- 12 R. Wilson, "Who Will Care for the Mad and Bad?" Corrections Magazine (February 1980), p. 8.
- 13 See, e.g., C.A. Unger and R.A. Buchanan, Managing Long-term Inmates: A Guide for the Correctional Administrator (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Corrections, 1985); and Clifford S. Nakata & Associates, P.C., et al., Five-Year Master Plan for the Colorado Department of Corrections (Colorado Springs: Colorado DOC, 1986).
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- 15 R.A. McGee, G. Warner, and N. Harlow, The Special Management Inmate (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 89-90.
- 16 This list was compiled by the report authors.

CHAPTER 4

IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF DISRUPTIVE MAXIMUM SECURITY INMATES

Introduction

Classification is a core component of correctional operations. As a process, classification takes many forms within the nation's correctional agencies, but the primary objectives of classification are remarkably similar: to better manage the disparate inmate population and to maximize the use of scarce resources.

According to Clements, classification is defined as:

The process by which prisoners are subdivided into groups based on a variety of considerations, which include: (1) determination of and assignment into appropriate custody levels; (2) program placement based on inmate needs and available services--medical, mental health, vocational, and educational; (3) designation to the housing placement within the institution; and (4) scheduled review of the placements to reassess inmate needs and progress.¹

Classification is an important management tool in the identification and control of disruptive inmate behavior, particularly when the process employs objective criteria. Objective classification systems, which are being adopted by more and more agencies, are based upon the following principles:

- Use of instruments validated for prisoner populations;
- Distinction between security (internal and external physical facility) and custody (staff supervision);
- Assignment of inmates to custody levels consistent with their behavior;
- Inclusion of an initial classification and reclassification component; and
- Promotion of similar decisions among classification analysts on comparable offender cases.²

Using objective systems, administrators can identify potentially disruptive inmates for placement in facilities that provide a high degree of internal security and staff supervision. Objective classification also aids in the identification of the most suitable disruptive inmates for release from restrictive housing units. Regular classification reviews ensure that changes in inmates' behaviors and needs are documented and appropriate actions are taken.

In the context of this chapter, classification is used in its broadest sense to mean the identification of disruptive inmates, their assignment to a

restrictive housing unit, their review while in the unit, and their release from the unit.

Identifying Disruptive Inmates

Approximately 80% of the agencies responding to the questionnaire said that their initial classification systems have the capability to identify inmates who are likely to be disruptive. Although no classification criteria have consistently proven valid predictors of institutional behavior, many respondents indicated that they employ similar criteria to identify potentially disruptive prisoners. For instance, over one-half consider prior institutional adjustment and assaultive history. Other common factors are current offense, escape history, criminal history, and psychological test results.

Once inmates likely to be disruptive have been identified, agencies reported taking one or more proactive steps. The majority (70%) stated that they assign these inmates either to a special housing unit or to the general population, depending on the extent of risk posed by each individual prisoner. If an inmate is placed in the general population, staff are notified to monitor him/her. Nearly 20% of the respondents stated that they routinely assign potentially disruptive inmates to special housing units. Only 11% reported that they typically place these inmates in the general population, usually instructing staff to closely monitor them. Approximately one-half of the responding agencies also said that they sometimes assign potential troublemakers to an intermediate observation unit.

Restrictive housing is a scarce resource for most correctional agencies. Its allocation should be governed by specific criteria; otherwise it will not be effective, either in terms of cost or management capability.

Classification is an effective tool for identifying inmates who are likely to be disruptive, as well as categorizing inmates as disruptive. For example, upon admission to an agency, correctional administrators should review prior institutional behavior, assaultive history, and escape history to identify inmates who are likely to be assaultive in an institutional setting. The "least restrictive" principle recommends that newly admitted inmates who are considered likely to become disruptive not be initially placed in restrictive housing.³ Instead, it recommends they be assigned to an institution that provides a level of custody and security commensurate with the agency's classification system. There are exceptions, however. Inmates who have particularly violent backgrounds while in custody would warrant assignment to restrictive housing units where staff can monitor their behavior under controlled conditions.

Potentially disruptive inmates who are not assigned to restrictive housing units do require close monitoring by security, program, treatment, and classification staff--for example, more frequent interaction with security staff; more stringent monitoring of their program and work assignments; more intensive treatment opportunities; more frequent contacts by casework staff; and more frequent reviews by classification staff.

Assessing Disruptive Behaviors

Identifying prisoners as "likely to be disruptive" is not the same as actually categorizing them as "disruptive." Many inmates, for example, may be classified maximum custody due to the nature of their commitment offenses, but their behavior in prison may not endanger institutional security, safety, and operations. Others may be incarcerated for nonviolent offenses, yet may "act out" once they are inside a correctional facility.

What types of conduct do agencies deem threatening to an institution's safety, security, and operation? What behaviors justify assigning inmates to restrictive housing units?

Respondents were asked to rank a list of institutional behaviors according to perceived importance in categorizing inmates as disruptive. All of the respondents agreed that two behaviors are of primary importance in determining disruptive status--murder and hostage taking. Slightly over 90% also indicated that deadly assault is of utmost importance, and nearly 90% placed similar emphasis on manufacturing, possessing, and/or smuggling firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, or poison gas. Other behaviors frequently receiving high rankings were:

- Organizing, instigating, or causing a riot;
- Assaulting others with instrument capable of bodily harm;
- Physical confrontation with staff resulting in injury to staff member;
- Escape or attempted escape;
- Sexual assault;
- Organizing, instigating, or causing a work stoppage or other major disturbance.

Interestingly, approximately three-fourths of the respondents accorded little importance to conviction of three or more minor disciplinary infractions during one year.

Study results indicate that the decision to utilize restrictive housing, once inmates are in a prison system, is usually based upon inmates' behavior as documented by disciplinary reports. This decision may be made by a single individual--for example, a hearing officer--or by a committee. According to respondents, conviction of one or more of the following institutional behaviors constitutes reasonable cause for assignment to restrictive housing:

- Murder/attempted murder;
- Deadly assault;
- Assaulting others with instrument capable of bodily harm;

- Physical confrontation with staff resulting in injury to staff member;
- Sexual assault/attempted sexual assault;
- Organizing, instigating, or causing a riot;
- Organizing, instigating, or causing a work stoppage or other major disturbance;
- Participating in a riot or disturbance;
- Hostage taking;
- Manufacturing, possessing, and/or smuggling firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, or poison gas;
- Escape/attempted escape;
- Arson.

Before adopting one or more of the preceding behaviors as the basis for restrictive housing assignment, it is advisable for the agency's counsel to review pertinent legal cases at the Federal District and Supreme Court levels. In Arizona, for example, Black, et al. vs. Lewis, et al. mandates that certain actions require classification to administrative segregation while others may result in classification to administrative segregation.⁴

Managing Through Internal Classification

Most respondents (81%) also have developed an internal classification system to manage inmates categorized as disruptive. Typically, this system is based on a phase or level program in which prisoners earn increasing amounts of freedom and privileges through good behavior. Those respondents without an internal classification system rely upon adjustment committees, administrative segregation boards, or departmental rules and regulations in controlling disruptive inmates.

Internal inmate management is facilitated by a structured behavior management system that rewards acceptable conduct with increased service access and more varied programming. Of course, acceptable conduct must be defined in objective terms understandable to inmates and staff alike.

The following conditions would increase the effectiveness of an internal disruptive inmate management system:

- A multi-level internal classification system based upon written criteria for initial assignment, promotion, demotion, and release;
- A system of classification reviews and hearings that support the management levels;

- A physical plant that is capable of separating inmates assigned to the different management levels; and
- Management policies and procedures that permit flexible activity, program, and service delivery schedules to achieve observable differences, by management level, between the privileges offered.

The Washington Department of Corrections makes effective use of behavior management by employing a four-level system. The four management levels differ primarily in terms of inmate classification status, location of the housing assignment (by tiers), movement restrictions and requirements, available programs and services, and length of stay required at each level before promotion to a higher level is considered. Inmates subject to the management level system are those assigned to the following statuses: isolation, disciplinary segregation, administrative segregation, and a special category designated intensive management. Figure 8 depicts the level of programs and services available to each management level.⁵

The Special Management Unit operated by the Arizona Department of Corrections, also known as Cell Block 6, has made effective use of a graduated level or phase system in the management of that state's most disruptive inmates.⁶ Utilizing three levels, the Cell Block 6 administration is able to reward compliance with unit rules and regulations by promoting inmates from one level to the next where additional privileges are available such as additional telephone calls and personal property while discouraging noncompliance by level demotion and corresponding reduction of privileges.

In addition, the South Carolina Department of Corrections is currently implementing an internal classification system that will be fully operational in early 1988. The classification system, required under the terms of a court settlement, includes: (1) a plan for separating violent and nonviolent offenders; (2) a plan for double-celling inmates; and (3) a plan for the initial, reclassification, and internal classification of inmates. The classification plan combines a rational approach to inmate housing and programming assignments with the concept of unit management. The internal classification system is of particular interest because it shows promise as a proactive method for managing the majority of disruptive inmates in lieu of traditional segregation. The system has been termed Adult Internal Management System (AIMS) by its developer, Dr. Herbert Quay.

Quay has designed AIMS to classify male offenders by sorting them into five behavioral categories, which may be collapsed to form smaller groups of inmates. As shown in Figure 9, this system relies on the inmates' behavior rather than demographic characteristics and criminal history data to describe five offender groups and place inmates into these categories. AIMS enables staff to identify potential problem prisoners upon admission to the system rather than respond to inmates after they have engaged in disruptive behavior.

By clustering inmates in groups according to their behavioral characteristics, staff can plan more appropriate programs for each of these groups. Figure 10 presents the differential program offerings for each inmate group.⁷

Figure 8
Washington State Programs and Services by Management Level

	Management Levels			
	<u>Level I</u>	<u>Level II</u>	<u>Level III</u>	<u>Level IV</u>
Shower	x	x	x	x
Store Order Stamps/Correspondence Material \$10	x	x	x	x
Access to Legal Materials	x	x	x	x
Recreation		x	x	x
Visits (90 Minutes)		x	x	x
Visits (150 Minutes)			x	x
Visits (210 Minutes)				x
Library Access		x	x	x
Eligible for Radio			x	x
Eligible for Personal Property			x	x
Eligible for Work Assignment			x	x
Eligible for Academic Courses			x	x
Receives 3rd and 4th Class Mail			x	x
Store Orders \$15		x	x	x
Store Orders \$20			x	x
Store Orders \$30				x
Multi-Man Recreation 5 Maximum				x
Choice of Yards (Inside/Outside)				x
Multi-Man Meals				x
Extended Yard Times				x
Restricted Movement Out of Restraints				x
Eligible for Television in Cell				x

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Classification is a core component of correctional operations. As a process, classification takes many forms within the nation's correctional agencies, but the primary objectives of classification are remarkably similar: to better manage the disparate inmate population and to maximize the use of scarce resources.

According to Clements, classification is defined as:

The process by which prisoners are subdivided into groups based on a variety of considerations, which include: (1) determination of and assignment into appropriate custody levels; (2) program placement based on inmate needs and available services--medical, mental health, vocational, and educational; (3) designation to the housing placement within the institution; and (4) scheduled review of the placements to reassess inmate needs and progress.¹

Classification is an important management tool in the identification and control of disruptive inmate behavior, particularly when the process employs objective criteria. Objective classification systems, which are being adopted by more and more agencies, are based upon the following principles:

- Use of instruments validated for prisoner populations;
- Distinction between security (internal and external physical facility) and custody (staff supervision);
- Assignment of inmates to custody levels consistent with their behavior;
- Inclusion of an initial classification and reclassification component; and
- Promotion of similar decisions among classification analysts on comparable offender cases.²

Using objective systems, administrators can identify potentially disruptive inmates for placement in facilities that provide a high degree of internal security and staff supervision. Objective classification also aids in the identification of the most suitable disruptive inmates for release from restrictive housing units. Regular classification reviews ensure that changes in inmates' behaviors and needs are documented and appropriate actions are taken.

In the context of this chapter, classification is used in its broadest sense to mean the identification of disruptive inmates, their assignment to a

restrictive housing unit, their review while in the unit, and their release from the unit.

Identifying Disruptive Inmates

Approximately 80% of the agencies responding to the questionnaire said that their initial classification systems have the capability to identify inmates who are likely to be disruptive. Although no classification criteria have consistently proven valid predictors of institutional behavior, many respondents indicated that they employ similar criteria to identify potentially disruptive prisoners. For instance, over one-half consider prior institutional adjustment and assaultive history. Other common factors are current offense, escape history, criminal history, and psychological test results.

Once inmates likely to be disruptive have been identified, agencies reported taking one or more proactive steps. The majority (70%) stated that they assign these inmates either to a special housing unit or to the general population, depending on the extent of risk posed by each individual prisoner. If an inmate is placed in the general population, staff are notified to monitor him/her. Nearly 20% of the respondents stated that they routinely assign potentially disruptive inmates to special housing units. Only 11% reported that they typically place these inmates in the general population, usually instructing staff to closely monitor them. Approximately one-half of the responding agencies also said that they sometimes assign potential troublemakers to an intermediate observation unit.

Restrictive housing is a scarce resource for most correctional agencies. Its allocation should be governed by specific criteria; otherwise it will not be effective, either in terms of cost or management capability.

Classification is an effective tool for identifying inmates who are likely to be disruptive, as well as categorizing inmates as disruptive. For example, upon admission to an agency, correctional administrators should review prior institutional behavior, assaultive history, and escape history to identify inmates who are likely to be assaultive in an institutional setting. The "least restrictive" principle recommends that newly admitted inmates who are considered likely to become disruptive not be initially placed in restrictive housing.³ Instead, it recommends they be assigned to an institution that provides a level of custody and security commensurate with the agency's classification system. There are exceptions, however. Inmates who have particularly violent backgrounds while in custody would warrant assignment to restrictive housing units where staff can monitor their behavior under controlled conditions.

Potentially disruptive inmates who are not assigned to restrictive housing units do require close monitoring by security, program, treatment, and classification staff--for example, more frequent interaction with security staff; more stringent monitoring of their program and work assignments; more intensive treatment opportunities; more frequent contacts by casework staff; and more frequent reviews by classification staff.

Assessing Disruptive Behaviors

Identifying prisoners as "likely to be disruptive" is not the same as actually categorizing them as "disruptive." Many inmates, for example, may be classified maximum custody due to the nature of their commitment offenses, but their behavior in prison may not endanger institutional security, safety, and operations. Others may be incarcerated for nonviolent offenses, yet may "act out" once they are inside a correctional facility.

What types of conduct do agencies deem threatening to an institution's safety, security, and operation? What behaviors justify assigning inmates to restrictive housing units?

Respondents were asked to rank a list of institutional behaviors according to perceived importance in categorizing inmates as disruptive. All of the respondents agreed that two behaviors are of primary importance in determining disruptive status--murder and hostage taking. Slightly over 90% also indicated that deadly assault is of utmost importance, and nearly 90% placed similar emphasis on manufacturing, possessing, and/or smuggling firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, or poison gas. Other behaviors frequently receiving high rankings were:

- Organizing, instigating, or causing a riot;
- Assaulting others with instrument capable of bodily harm;
- Physical confrontation with staff resulting in injury to staff member;
- Escape or attempted escape;
- Sexual assault;
- Organizing, instigating, or causing a work stoppage or other major disturbance.

Interestingly, approximately three-fourths of the respondents accorded little importance to conviction of three or more minor disciplinary infractions during one year.

Study results indicate that the decision to utilize restrictive housing, once inmates are in a prison system, is usually based upon inmates' behavior as documented by disciplinary reports. This decision may be made by a single individual--for example, a hearing officer--or by a committee. According to respondents, conviction of one or more of the following institutional behaviors constitutes reasonable cause for assignment to restrictive housing:

- Murder/attempted murder;
- Deadly assault;
- Assaulting others with instrument capable of bodily harm;

- Physical confrontation with staff resulting in injury to staff member;
- Sexual assault/attempted sexual assault;
- Organizing, instigating, or causing a riot;
- Organizing, instigating, or causing a work stoppage or other major disturbance;
- Participating in a riot or disturbance;
- Hostage taking;
- Manufacturing, possessing, and/or smuggling firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, or poison gas;
- Escape/attempted escape;
- Arson.

Before adopting one or more of the preceding behaviors as the basis for restrictive housing assignment, it is advisable for the agency's counsel to review pertinent legal cases at the Federal District and Supreme Court levels. In Arizona, for example, Black, et al. vs. Lewis, et al. mandates that certain actions require classification to administrative segregation while others may result in classification to administrative segregation.⁴

Managing Through Internal Classification

Most respondents (81%) also have developed an internal classification system to manage inmates categorized as disruptive. Typically, this system is based on a phase or level program in which prisoners earn increasing amounts of freedom and privileges through good behavior. Those respondents without an internal classification system rely upon adjustment committees, administrative segregation boards, or departmental rules and regulations in controlling disruptive inmates.

Internal inmate management is facilitated by a structured behavior management system that rewards acceptable conduct with increased service access and more varied programming. Of course, acceptable conduct must be defined in objective terms understandable to inmates and staff alike.

The following conditions would increase the effectiveness of an internal disruptive inmate management system:

- A multi-level internal classification system based upon written criteria for initial assignment, promotion, demotion, and release;
- A system of classification reviews and hearings that support the management levels;

- A physical plant that is capable of separating inmates assigned to the different management levels; and
- Management policies and procedures that permit flexible activity, program, and service delivery schedules to achieve observable differences, by management level, between the privileges offered.

The Washington Department of Corrections makes effective use of behavior management by employing a four-level system. The four management levels differ primarily in terms of inmate classification status, location of the housing assignment (by tiers), movement restrictions and requirements, available programs and services, and length of stay required at each level before promotion to a higher level is considered. Inmates subject to the management level system are those assigned to the following statuses: isolation, disciplinary segregation, administrative segregation, and a special category designated intensive management. Figure 8 depicts the level of programs and services available to each management level.⁵

The Special Management Unit operated by the Arizona Department of Corrections, also known as Cell Block 6, has made effective use of a graduated level or phase system in the management of that state's most disruptive inmates.⁶ Utilizing three levels, the Cell Block 6 administration is able to reward compliance with unit rules and regulations by promoting inmates from one level to the next where additional privileges are available such as additional telephone calls and personal property while discouraging noncompliance by level demotion and corresponding reduction of privileges.

In addition, the South Carolina Department of Corrections is currently implementing an internal classification system that will be fully operational in early 1988. The classification system, required under the terms of a court settlement, includes: (1) a plan for separating violent and nonviolent offenders; (2) a plan for double-celling inmates; and (3) a plan for the initial, reclassification, and internal classification of inmates. The classification plan combines a rational approach to inmate housing and programming assignments with the concept of unit management. The internal classification system is of particular interest because it shows promise as a proactive method for managing the majority of disruptive inmates in lieu of traditional segregation. The system has been termed Adult Internal Management System (AIMS) by its developer, Dr. Herbert Quay.

Quay has designed AIMS to classify male offenders by sorting them into five behavioral categories, which may be collapsed to form smaller groups of inmates. As shown in Figure 9, this system relies on the inmates' behavior rather than demographic characteristics and criminal history data to describe five offender groups and place inmates into these categories. AIMS enables staff to identify potential problem prisoners upon admission to the system rather than respond to inmates after they have engaged in disruptive behavior.

By clustering inmates in groups according to their behavioral characteristics, staff can plan more appropriate programs for each of these groups. Figure 10 presents the differential program offerings for each inmate group.⁷

Figure 8
Washington State Programs and Services by Management Level

	Management Levels			
	<u>Level I</u>	<u>Level II</u>	<u>Level III</u>	<u>Level IV</u>
Shower	x	x	x	x
Store Order Stamps/Correspondence Material \$10	x	x	x	x
Access to Legal Materials	x	x	x	x
Recreation		x	x	x
Visits (90 Minutes)		x	x	x
Visits (150 Minutes)			x	x
Visits (210 Minutes)				x
Library Access		x	x	x
Eligible for Radio			x	x
Eligible for Personal Property			x	x
Eligible for Work Assignment			x	x
Eligible for Academic Courses			x	x
Receives 3rd and 4th Class Mail			x	x
Store Orders \$15		x	x	x
Store Orders \$20			x	x
Store Orders \$30				x
Multi-Man Recreation 5 Maximum				x
Choice of Yards (Inside/Outside)				x
Multi-Man Meals				x
Extended Yard Times				x
Restricted Movement Out of Restraints				x
Eligible for Television in Cell				x

Figure 9

Characteristic Behaviors by Group

I ————— Heavy ————— II		III — Moderate	IV ————— Light ————— V	
• Aggressive	• Sly	• Not excessively aggressive or dependent	• Dependent	• Constantly afraid
• Confrontational	• Not directly confrontational	• Reliable, cooperative	• Unreliable	• Anxious
• Easily bored	• Untrustworthy	• Industrious	• Passive	• Easily upset
• Hostile to authority	• Hostile to authority	• Do not see selves as criminals	• "Clinging"	• Seek protection
• High rate of disciplinary infractions	• Moderate-to-high rate of disciplinary infractions	• Low rate of disciplinary infractions	• Low-to-moderate rate of disciplinary infractions	• Moderate rate of disciplinary infractions
• Little concern for others	• "Con artists," manipulative	• Concern for others	• Self-absorbed	• Explosive under stress
• Victimizers	• Victimizers	• Avoid fights	• Easily victimized	• Easily victimized

Source: H. Quay, Managing Inmates: Classification for Housing and Programming, College Park, MD: American Correctional Association (1984).

Figure 10

Differential Programming by Group Assignment

	<u>Education</u>	<u>Work</u>	<u>Counseling</u>	<u>Staff Approach</u>
Heavy (Groups I & II)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Individualized • Programmed learning 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-repetitive • Short-term goals • Individual goals 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Individualized (behavioral contracts) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • By-the-book • No-nonsense
Moderate (Group III)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Classroom lecture plus research assignments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High level of supervised responsibility 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Group and individual (problem orientation) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Hands off" • Direct only as needed
Light (Groups IV & V)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Classroom lecture plus individual tutoring 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Repetitive • Team-oriented goals 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Group and individual (personal orientation) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highly verbal • Supportive

Source: H. Quay, Managing Inmates: Classification for Housing and Programming, College Park, MD: American Correctional Association (1984).

Research on the effectiveness of AIMS has shown that it reduces the incidence of inmate-on-staff violence, inmate-on-inmate violence, and overall inmate misconduct in those institutions where it has been adopted.⁸

Formal Review Process

An important element of any internal management system is a formal review of inmate conduct. This process not only provides prisoners with feedback regarding their behavior but also assists staff in determining whether reductions in status are warranted. Just under one-half of the responding agencies stated that they conduct formal status reviews for disruptive inmates every 30 days. Approximately 14% review disruptive inmates every 90 days. Slightly over 8% conduct only annual reviews.

It is important that agencies have written policies and procedures governing the review of inmates assigned to restrictive housing, particularly those placed in administrative segregation. For many jurisdictions, assignment to administrative segregation status is an open-ended placement. That is, inmates remain in this status until classification staff determine they are ready for release to general population. The length of time they spend in administrative segregation is not predetermined as it is for inmates assigned to disciplinary segregation. Set, regular reviews are important safeguards to ensure that prisoners are provided with feedback regarding their behavior and that staff consistently consider reductions in status. According to ACA standards, agency staff--either a classification committee or other authorized personnel--should review inmates assigned to restrictive housing every seven days for the first two months of confinement and then every 30 days thereafter.⁹

Release from Restrictive Housing

Agencies employ several criteria to determine when inmates are no longer judged to be disruptive. It is interesting that only one-half of the respondents consider the incidents which led to placement in special housing units. Respondents are much more likely to examine evidence of general cooperation (97%) and continued misconduct (78%). Nearly 70% of the responding agencies also use psychiatric or psychological evaluations.

One study finding that bears addressing is that restrictive housing units in many jurisdictions have fewer beds than are sometimes needed to house disruptive inmates. The response of these jurisdictions is not to crowd these units but rather to release select inmates to general population in order to free up the needed beds. According to the respondents, the identification of disruptive inmates for release is not always systematic or based upon written criteria. What is needed are objective criteria that can be applied to an inmate's records while in the restrictive housing unit to help select those inmates best suited for both "early" and normal release into general population. Project staff suggest these objective criteria include:

- Number of rule infractions;
- Severity of rule infractions;
- Recency of rule infractions;
- Time served in unit;
- Number of previous segregation confinements;
- Nature of infraction resulting in segregation confinement;
- Cooperation with staff;
- Performance of work assignments (if applicable);
- Voluntary program participation;
- General adjustment in unit;
- Documented affiliation with subversive groups;
- Nature of infraction(s) resulting in previous restrictive housing assignment; and
- Presence and/or extent of threat inmate poses to safety, order, and security of institution.

Based upon the agency's policies and procedures, available information, other resources, and needs, these criteria will require elaboration to provide a concrete basis for decision-making.

The use of eligibility criteria, alone, may not be sufficient to determine whether inmates should be released from restrictive housing. Some prisoners who meet the eligibility criteria may not be suitable candidates for status reduction. Such inmates include those who are suspected of committing violations within the restrictive housing setting but who, for various reasons, have not been caught. They also include those who adjust well to the highly controlled and supervised environment of restrictive housing but are unable to conform to institutional rules while in general population. Judging suitability for release from restrictive housing is a much more subjective process than determining eligibility. However, this process would still need to conform to agency policies and procedures and be fully documented.

The final release consideration, after eligibility and suitability are determined, involves the concept of acceptability. Used this way, acceptability is generally based upon sensitive and nonsensitive considerations. For example, an inmate meets eligibility and suitability criteria for release, but he/she is a gang member. The only general population beds available are within housing units controlled by rival gang members. In this example, the inmate is not an acceptable candidate for release from restrictive housing until suitable space becomes available within the correctional system. Another example might be the inmate who requires specialized treatment programming in order to adjust to the pressures of general population. If this treatment programming has no available slots or if the institution where this program is located has no open beds, the inmate is not an acceptable candidate for release.

In all cases, good correctional practice dictates that written policy and procedure specify the review process and the objective and subjective criteria that are used to release an inmate from restrictive housing.

Transitional Release Programs

Disruptive inmates who have been confined in segregation for lengthy periods may have difficulty adjusting to life in general population. Transitional release programs help inmates who have experienced long periods of segregation effect a more permanent return to general population.

The California Medical Facility at Vacaville has a Special Housing Decompression Unit that accepts inmates from long-term segregation units at other California institutions. These inmates must meet certain criteria: a violent background but no serious disciplinaries for a year; no gang involvement; no background of racism or overt homosexuality; and demonstrated motivation to change. This unit is in general population and consists of five six-man dormitories and 18 cells.

When candidates for the decompression unit arrive at Vacaville, they are placed in regular lockup for 90 days. During this period they are evaluated for program suitability. Those determined unsuitable are returned to the sending institutions. The program for these inmates involves a combination of group sessions (two hours a day four times a week) and individual goal-setting. Every inmate learns how to set goals, to solve problems, to deal with people, and to avoid or handle conflict without violence. The average stay is six months, but some inmates are asked to remain for up to 24 months to work with new program participants and provide program continuity.

The California Department of Corrections believes this program has achieved success in moving high-risk inmates back to general population, but cites some understandable resistance from administrative and line staff outside the unit. Resistance stems primarily from the practice of placing these inmates in Vacaville's general population after the 90-day evaluation in lockup. A few violent incidents have occurred, mostly after participants have left the decompression unit, but the number is small considering the disruptive histories of the program participants.¹⁰

The South Carolina DOC also operates a transitional unit at its Central Correctional Institution. The unit provides a structured environment and intensive programming for disruptive inmates who volunteer for the unit. Key elements include multi-man housing, peer counseling, negotiated contracts, a level system, self-awareness and skill-building, and unit management.¹¹

To reduce the likelihood of disruptive inmates engaging in further misconduct, correctional agencies may wish to devise release programs to facilitate their transition into general population. The following are suggested components of a transitional release program:

- Behavioral criteria for program placement and termination;
- Increased privileges, including participation in programs usually reserved for general population, and greater service access;
- Less restricted movement;

- Classification review to determine suitability for program placement and successful termination;
- Greater opportunities for association with other disruptive inmates in the release program (e.g., eating, recreation, academic classes);
- Individual performance/behavior contracts; and
- Job assignments.

These guidelines are elements common to several transitional release programs described by study respondents.

Experience suggests that such a transitional program would work best as the final step in a structured behavior management system, but it could also be effective as a "stand-alone" program. For reasons of safety and security, the restricted housing area should be capable of segregating, at all times, the inmates in the release program from other disruptive inmates.

A transitional release program gives the facility administration the opportunity to observe inmates' adjustment to conditions that are similar to those in general population but which are still controlled. It also affords disruptive inmates the chance to readjust to conditions approximating those found in general population.

Low-Cost Recommendations

With the exception of the recommendation concerning an internal (housing) classification system based upon the Adult Internal Management System (AIMS), all recommendations included in this chapter are low-cost.

Notes

- 1 Carl Clements, "Towards an Objective Approach to Offender Classification," Law and Psychology Review, 9:45, 1985.
- 2 Correctional Services Group, Inc. An Evaluation of Objective Prison Classification Systems, (Washington, DC: National Institute of Corrections) (publication in 1987).
- 3 Larry Solomon and S. Christopher Baird, "Classification: Past Failures, Future Potential." In Classification As a Management Tool: Theories and Models for Decision-Makers. College Park, MD: American Correctional Association, pp. 5-10 (1982).
- 4 Black, et al. vs. Lewis, et al. CIV 84-111.
- 5 See Appendix B, for another example of a behavior management program used with disruptive inmates.
- 6 Robert A. Buchanan, Cell Block 6: Management Recommendations, (Kansas City, MO: Correctional Services Group, Inc., 1986)
- 7 Herbert C. Quay, Managing Adult Inmates: Classification for Housing and Program Assignments, College Park, Maryland: American Correctional Association, 1984.
- 8 Ibid., pp. 19-21.
- 9 ACA Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions strongly support these guidelines:

2-4218: Written policy and procedure provide for a review of the status of inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody by the classification committee or other authorized staff group every seven days for the first two months and at least every 30 days thereafter.

2-4219: Written policy and procedure specify the review process that is used to release an inmate from administrative segregation.
- 10 Richard A. McGee et al., The Special Management Inmate, U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Office of Development, Testing and Dissemination. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office (March 1985), pp. 69-70.
- 11 Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

SUPERVISION AND STAFFING FOR MAXIMUM SECURITY DISRUPTIVE INMATES

Introduction

The mission of every correctional system focuses on protecting the safety of the public, staff, and inmates. The rationale for maintaining restrictive housing units for disruptive inmates stems directly from this mission, for the nature of this segment of the inmate population requires that it be managed in a more secure and controlled manner than the general population. This additional security usually translates into more staff to ensure closer supervision, greater use of physical restraints, highly restricted inmate movement, and more in-cell time for inmates.

Although departmental philosophy, architectural design, operational policies and procedures, and security devices play vital roles in the management of disruptive maximum security inmates, the importance of staff who work with these inmates should not be underestimated. The adequacy of an agency's personnel substantially affects its efforts to manage disruptive inmates. Staff are the backbone of inmate management, for it is they who implement policies and procedures, operate security equipment, assess prisoners' behaviors, control disturbances, and deliver programs and services.

The selection, assignment, and training of staff who work with disruptive inmates are especially critical. Improper identification of staff who are qualified to work with difficult-to-manage inmates can result in serious, if not tragic, consequences. Many staff are either afraid to work with disruptive inmates or view such an assignment as a test of their egos. In either instance, the quality of supervision is likely to be poor, characterized by assaults on staff, vandalism, and increases in violent behavior.

Similarly, staff who are not properly prepared to supervise and manage disruptive inmates will quickly experience violent and disruptive situations no matter how qualified they are upon initial assignment. Adequate pre-service training and in-service training are necessary prerequisites. The ability to know how to react immediately and appropriately to problems created by disruptive inmates means the difference between a chaotic unit and an orderly one.

In addition to these issues, study results indicate there is considerable need in many correctional systems to provide incentives to staff to promote interest in working with difficult-to-manage inmates and to reduce staff turnover.

Supervision Approaches

Agencies participating in the questionnaire survey were asked what type of supervision approach they employ with disruptive inmates. Approximately 28% of the respondents reported that they monitor behavior primarily through direct

contact with inmates. Two respondents--Alaska and California--said that they indirectly supervise disruptive inmates, and nearly two-thirds of the respondents stated that they use both direct and indirect supervision approaches. It is likely that these findings reflect the close relationship between architecture and security operations. Some traditional cell-house designs, particularly those of a linear structure, make it impossible for staff to directly supervise inmates.

An agency's approach to supervising disruptive inmates depends on numerous factors, including general management philosophy, facility design, staffing patterns, and available monitoring devices. From a broad perspective, however, most approaches to inmate supervision fall into one of two categories: indirect or direct.

Under the **indirect supervision** approach, staff are assigned to secure observation (control) booths, where they have little contact with inmates but are in a position to observe behaviors and request assistance when prisoners "act out." Supplementing these control booth officers are roving floor officers who intermittently supervise inmates directly. The indirect approach, which is frequently employed in facilities with podular designs, also controls prisoner movement and behavior via security doors that are operated automatically from the control booth. Cells and day rooms are usually equipped with vandal-proof fixtures and furniture. This approach lends itself to a reactive management style because it encourages staff to respond to problems rather than facilitating their ability to anticipate and prevent them.

The second approach, **direct supervision**, is considered proactive because it places staff in a position to prevent or minimize misconduct. The direct approach relies on staff capability to supervise inmates face to face. At the line officer level, each staff member is responsible for controlling prisoners' behaviors in the unit, while also minimizing tensions. At the administrative level, management is responsible for structuring both the design and the environment to facilitate proactive control. Direct supervision units in general inmate population facilities are typically equipped with commercial grade fixtures and furnishings. However, in units housing disruptive inmates, vandal-proof equipment is generally employed.

No single supervision approach works for all disruptive inmates. Direct supervision, for example, is not appropriate for prisoners who are continually assaultive. These inmates must be confined to their cells for up to 23 hours each day, and when they are permitted to leave their cells, they must be escorted and restrained. Assaultive inmates should be housed in units that provide indirect or remote supervision, where surveillance is provided through control rooms physically separated from prisoner housing via secure glazing. On the other hand, disruptive inmates who are nearing release back into general population and those who adjust well to the tightly controlled and supervised atmosphere of restrictive housing may be effectively supervised by the direct approach if the restrictive housing facility has this design capability.

The direct supervision concept has a number of benefits applicable to the management of disruptive inmates. They include:

- Creating staff efficiencies by maximizing programs provided within the larger unit versus constant escort of inmates from smaller units to activity centers;
- Minimizing vandalism and assaultive behavior through the reduction of stress and the ability of the officer to manage proactively versus reactively;
- Increasing substantially the quality of officers' job performance as their professional skills and duties become more involved in inmate management and less in observing alarm buttons and monitors;
- Reducing officer turnover, due to improved job satisfaction;
- Reducing inmate-on-inmate rapes, assaults, suicides, and other violent acts; and
- Reducing lawsuits resulting from violent acts and denial of programming.

Supervision Principles¹

In carrying out the proper supervision requirements for the management and control of disruptive inmates, there are several principles and objectives which should be considered for use with disruptive inmates in restrictive housing units. While these principles of supervising disruptive inmates have historically been used for general population inmates, they still, with certain modifications, have merit for the special management inmate population which this Guide addresses.

One important principle is the effective and total control of the disruptive inmate population. A restrictive housing unit should be a controlled environment for confining and managing prisoners classified not only as maximum security but who have demonstrated a history of being disruptive and a threat to the safe, secure, and orderly operation of a correctional institution. As such, the staff assigned should be in total control at all times. Total control means never sharing any element of the unit's management with inmates. For example, when inmates are even temporarily unsupervised, they are, in effect, left in control of each other. This happens whenever an officer is reluctant to enter any part of the unit or fails to provide constant and effective supervision of the assigned inmates. In these instances inmates can be said to be in control of that area, if even for a short time.

One of the most significant components of the principle of effective control is to structure the unit environment so that the inmates' inner controls will be maximized. It is understood that disruptive inmates represent that portion of the inmate population who have been least effective in the control of their aggressive and violent behaviors. However, these same inmates learn early in their confinement to manipulate their environment to their best advantage. In the traditional prison environment, just as they have the capacity for disruptive behavior to achieve their ends, they also have the ability to conform to institutional roles, if this will meet their needs as

well. One method for structuring the environment so that inmates' critical needs are best achieved through compliant behavior is the introduction of a phase or level system of behavior management, such as that described in Chapter 4. This type of management approach not only rewards positive behavior and compliance with unit rules and regulations but also ensures that negative acts consistently result in frustration.

Effective supervision of disruptive inmates depends on their perception of the control an officer exerts in the unit. To be effective, supervision must involve more than just visual surveillance. It should also include interpersonal interaction that draws upon all human senses. If an inmate challenges an officer's authority by failing to comply with unit rules, there must be not only a fair and equitable system for disciplining that inmate, but also a behavioral management system, such as the phase or level system, through which offending inmates lose privileges according to a predetermined schedule. Prompt discipline that corresponds to the severity of the infraction ensures that the unit continues to be viewed as the "officer's space" and that disruptive inmates assigned to the unit are there only temporarily while being prepared for return to the general population or release.

There are, unfortunately, numerous instances that have resulted in violent and tragic ends when there has been a struggle to assert leadership when a leadership void exists. In order to avoid a potentially violent and disruptive struggle between inmates attempting to fill this void, officers must assume this role so the void never exists. Moreover, management should structure the housing unit environment to ensure that the officer remains the undisputed leader. This structure is exemplified in the unit management concept discussed in Chapter 3.

Surveillance Devices

Regardless of the supervision approach used, respondents reported problems in supervising their disruptive inmate populations. For example, almost 64% said that their monitoring devices are inadequate. Slightly over one-third stated that their security equipment is inadequate, with a like percentage adding that their security equipment malfunctions on a consistent basis.

Recent years have witnessed the emergence of electronic surveillance devices, namely closed-circuit television (CCTV), paging systems, two-way radios, and staff body alarms. Each device has its advantages and disadvantages.

Closed-circuit television (CCTV) is often promoted as a cost-effective alternative to staff. While CCTV is very cost-effective for many applications, it has serious limitations when used to monitor inmates in their cells and activity spaces for two reasons. First, the technology hinders effective supervision. The images generated by CCTV are two-dimensional, making it difficult for staff monitoring the screens to understand what they are observing. In addition, staff may become habituated to CCTV monitors and fail to observe them as frequently and closely as dictated by facility procedures. Second, CCTV may be used by staff as a substitute for personal interaction between staff and inmates. Overreliance on CCTV to supervise inmates could lead

to inmate alienation, increased frustration, and further disruptive acts. However, as noted earlier, CCTV is useful for areas where inmate movement is not authorized such as fence lines, rooftops, tunnels, and corridors. In addition, CCTV is often used effectively to identify persons requesting passage through sally ports.

Paging systems are also useful, allowing authorized staff to make general and emergency announcements and summon staff. Because institution-wide paging tends to interrupt unit operations, zoning is helpful. A listen-in/talk-back feature adds the capability to monitor the identity of persons entering and exiting sally ports more effectively by requiring both visual and voice identification. This feature also enables staff to readily communicate with inmates in their cells.

Two-way radios are probably not needed within a restrictive housing unit unless the outdoor recreation area is located some distance from the facility. Portable radios provide instantaneous two-way communications, but an agency must obtain authorization from the Federal Communications Commission before operating on any radio frequency. If radios are used by restrictive housing unit staff, accessibility and accountability would be ensured by storing them in the control center and instituting a formal "check-out" procedure.

Body alarms are used in several jurisdictions, particularly by staff who are moving particularly violent and dangerous disruptive inmates out of the housing area or unit, supervising an outside recreation yard, or supervising more than one disruptive inmate. The ACA's Design Guide for Secure Adult Correctional Facilities recommends use of body alarms that are capable of specifying the location of the alarm as well as the identity of the alarm.² The Delaware Correctional Center and the California Youth Authority endorse these dual-purpose body alarms.

Internal Security Procedures

A small proportion of respondents, 11%, indicated that their inmate supervision policies and procedures are not adequate.

Internal security policies and procedures affect the ability of the unit to effectively manage disruptive inmates. Key elements of security procedures include unit intake, release from unit, internal movement, use of force, use of restraints, key control, and inmate counts.

Procedures for unit intake must ensure the safety of the escorting officers and the humane treatment of the inmates. The Washington Department of Corrections accomplishes these two interrelated objectives through the following procedures.

Inmates are individually transported to the restrictive housing unit in waist restraints; each inmate is accompanied by two officers trained in escort procedures for disruptive inmates. Leg restraints are used only if an inmate is considered particularly dangerous. The inmate becomes the responsibility of unit staff once he/she is inside the perimeter of the restrictive housing unit.

Two unit officers then escort the inmate to a search cell, where they remove the restraints. A medical professional then conducts a skin search and digital exam of the inmate in the presence of the two escort officers. After the exam, the inmate is issued clothing, instructed to dress, and placed in waist and, if applicable, leg restraints. Finally, the shift supervisor orients the inmate to the unit, issues the inmate the unit handbook, assigns the inmate to a cell, and completes the necessary paperwork.

The procedures Washington uses to release a disruptive inmate from the restrictive housing unit include: completing the necessary paperwork the day before the scheduled move; moving inmate property to a holding cell and securing it there; applying waist restraints to the inmate; removing the inmate from his/her cell; escorting the inmate to a holding cell; removing restraints; escorting the inmate to the sally port; turning the inmate and his/her property over to an outside escort officer; and completing the necessary release paperwork. If the inmate is not being released to general population, the restraints are not removed.

In the experience of many correctional agencies, inmate movement represents the greatest threat to the safe, secure, and orderly operation of restrictive housing units. To minimize the threat of disruptive behavior during inmate movement, the Arizona and Washington Departments of Corrections, for example, follow these procedures. All inmates housed in restrictive housing units are handcuffed prior to being moved from their cells. They remain handcuffed for all activities except recreation and visitation. (Washington handcuffs disruptive inmates within the shower stalls.) During all inmate movement, escorting staff maintain physical control of the inmate by taking hold of the handcuffs to ensure the inmate's safety, security, and control. As an added measure of escort staff safety, unit officers in Arizona put on protective vests before entering the housing unit where the most violent and dangerous disruptive inmates are confined.³

Videotape equipment is used by the Federal Penitentiary at Marion and the Minnesota, Arizona, and Washington Departments of Corrections to film all special movements, especially when it is evident or anticipated that the use of physical force may become necessary. In the event of a forced movement, these agencies call in a team of specially trained staff. Marion staff credit the use of a specially trained team and videotaping with a reduction in the number of forced cell movements and inmate litigation alleging staff abuse.

The use of force in managing disruptive inmates within correctional facilities has recently come under the scrutiny of the Federal District Courts. (See, for example, Black et al. vs. Lewis et al.)⁴ Written policies and procedures governing the use of force are necessary to protect the agency and its staff from successful inmate challenges. To help agencies develop improved written policies and procedures governing the use of force, the following policy and procedural statements have been excerpted from relevant case law, agency regulations, and applicable ACA standards.

- Physical force is used only as a last resort and only to the extent necessary to accomplish its purpose.
- Agency policy states the conditions under which staff are authorized to exercise physical force. Examples include: prevention of escape; self-defense; prevention of inmate self-injury; protection of property; protection of the public; protection of staff; protection of other inmates; and enforcement of justifiable orders necessary to ensure institutional safety and security.
- Agency policy specifies the types of physical force permitted and the staff authorized to use each type of force. The following list provides an example of such a policy:
 - Arm, leg, hair holds, and restraints: Without prior authorization, staff may use these methods for self-defense; to prevent inmate self-injury; to protect the public, staff, and other inmates; and to prevent escape.
 - Fire hose: The unit administrator/designee may authorize the use of the fire hose to protect the public, staff, and other inmates and to prevent escape and inmate self-injury.
 - Batons, chemical agents: The unit administrator/designee may authorize batons/chemical agents to protect the public and state property and to enforce justifiable orders necessary to maintain institutional safety and security.
 - Firearms: The unit administrator/designee may authorize the use of firearms to prevent escape, to prevent loss of life or grievous bodily harm, and to protect state property.
- Medical staff examine inmates subjected to use of physical force and submit a medical report.
- Videotape records the use of physical force, if at all possible.
- Agency policy specifies the rank of officer who is to supervise the exercise of physical force. Most jurisdictions require the supervising officer to hold the rank of sergeant or higher.

The following elements of a forced or special movement procedure have been taken from the written policies and procedures provided by the correctional agencies participating in the attached case studies:

- Additional staff, trained in forced movement, are available to supplement the specially formed team. This will ensure a quick, efficient, and effective response to a call for assistance during any shift.
- Team members are given designated responsibilities prior to initiating any action.

- The shift supervisor records identifying and background information on the videotape before it is used. This information includes: the inmate's name and number; the date and time of movement; the names of staff involved; and a brief reason for the move.
- Videotapes are reviewed by the unit administrator.
- The videotapes are used to train officers in properly conducted forced movements.
- Written reports, supplemented by videotape, if available, document the action, the staff involved, and the circumstances that justified the use of force.
- Agency policy identifies responsibility for the use, control, storage, and correct application of restraints--including handcuffs, waist restraints, and leg irons.

According to ACA standards, an essential element of institutional security is the proper control of and use of keys. Good key control is particularly critical in a restrictive housing unit where even a brief and temporary lapse in control can produce life-threatening consequences. To minimize the likelihood of a breach in security, the following procedures are recommended:

- Upon arriving at the work site and just prior to being relieved, the restrictive housing unit control booth officer conducts a visual inspection and inventory of unit keys.
- The control booth officer is solely responsible for issuing unit keys. Some restrictive housing units use a chit system for issuing keys. A chit identifying the staff member who receives a key is used to replace the issued key on a master key issue board. Other units use a log system that requires the control booth officer to record the number of each key issued, the location of the lock, the number of keys to that lock, and the names of all staff possessing the key.
- Keys are returned to the control booth officer during shift changes. Other necessary key transfers prior to shift changes are also logged by the control booth officer.
- All keys are numbered; fire and emergency keys are color-coded and marked for identification by touch in the event of power failure, heavy smoke, or other emergency that obscures visual identification.
- The institution maintains at least one duplicate key for each lock within a restrictive housing unit.

Counts are a very critical function in disruptive inmate management. An example from the case studies of how one agency performs counts is illustrative. To maintain accountability of disruptive inmates, the Washington Intensive Management Unit maintains a picture card of each inmate in the applicable control booth. Formal counts are held at the shift supervisor's discretion. Prior to initiating a count, the responsible officers make a physical search of

all inmate access areas. All counts require two staff to account for all inmates present in the unit by observation of "a living, breathing body and human flesh." A picture count is initiated whenever a count cannot be reconciled. Officers visibly check the inmates in the unit against their photographs and the physical description provided on the picture cards. If it is necessary for an officer to enter a cell to verify count, the shift supervisor is notified. Only one officer enters the cell while the other officer remains outside to provide assistance if necessary. Shift supervisors are required to observe all cell entry by counting staff and ensuring complete and accurate documentation at the end of all counts.

Staffing Levels

Given the nature of the disruptive inmate population, agencies were asked how many staff are needed to perform necessary correctional functions. Respondents to the questionnaire varied widely in their opinions on staffing for disruptive inmate housing units. New Mexico, for example, stated that the ratio of total staff to these inmates should be 1:12, while Ohio and Arizona placed the ratio at less than 1:2. No doubt this discrepancy reflects differing conceptions of "disruptive maximum security inmates" and diverse approaches to their management. Taken as a whole, however, agencies' responses yielded an average ratio of 1:7. This figure is interpreted to be the optimal staff-to-inmate ratio for the day shift, using indirect supervision.

Most respondents, 79%, indicated that they have sufficient supervisory personnel to manage their disruptive inmate populations, but just 64% thought that they have enough line staff. Overall, respondents reported needing an average 18% increase in correctional officers. Moreover, nearly one-half stated that their program staffs are inadequate in both number and area. These respondents typically cited a need for more educational, counseling, and casework staff.

The number of personnel needed to effectively operate a correctional facility has long been the subject of debate, primarily between the user agency and the funding agency. The answer to this question is even more important for the management of restrictive housing units, due to the serious violence and management problems that can surface if sufficient personnel are not available.

In a prototypical facility of podular design that facilitates direct supervision, a staff-to-inmate ratio of 1:3 is considered optimal. In other facilities, the staffing ratio will depend upon the physical plant design, the type of disruptive inmates housed there, the type and number of available programs, and the level of inmate services. While ratios provide a starting point in estimating staffing needs, they may prove unreliable given the numerous variables that impact disruptive inmate management and supervision.

Determining the number of personnel needed to properly supervise a restrictive housing unit can initially be estimated by answering the following key questions:

- Are the operating policies and procedures sufficiently specified to permit a determination of the number of employees required to carry

them out? The number of employees required for all disruptive inmate management functions should be determined by the frequency and duration of the tasks involved, the response capacity necessary for unusual incidents (which may not be so unusual in a restrictive housing unit), and the nature of the physical environment for the post or position. Examples of typical tasks include supervision of feeding, checks of cell, distribution of mail, escort of inmates, responses to inmate requests, and distribution of store orders.

- Is an accurate coverage or relief factor being used to determine staffing levels? If not, then the number of employees needed will also be in error. A coverage factor is the ratio between the number of hours a post is open and the number of staff hours required to fill the post. Most staffing plans account for holidays, annual leave, sick leave, and time off for training obligations. However, agencies should also include such factors as military leave, unanticipated court appearances, authorized union activities, funeral leave, special assignments, unauthorized absences, and lag time in filling vacant positions.
- What impact does the physical design of the unit have on staffing needs? Often, housing units with similar capacities require dramatically different numbers of staff due to their layout. Unit design affects such areas as sight lines, inmate access to services, supervision strategies, and general capacity to operate the facility in a safe and secure manner.
- What risk factor does the disruptive inmate population present? Disruptive inmates are prone to creating numerous incidents and problems. Like firefighters waiting for an emergency, unit staff may not be busy at specific tasks at all times, but, when needed, are indispensable.

In addition, there are several additional factors which should be considered in developing a more accurate picture of staffing requirements including:

The number of inmates: Smaller restrictive housing units require somewhat higher staff-to-inmate ratios than larger facilities. This is generally true due to the economies of scale that may be achieved by larger facilities.

The responsibilities of staff: Administrators that permit inmates to participate in a large number of programs will generally require additional personnel for escort and supervision functions.

Length of program day: The time that inmates are out of their cells also influences the number of staff needed. If the program day overlaps two shifts rather than one, for example, more housing, escort, and program staff may be needed.

Location of program and recreation areas: Where these are located in relation to housing units influences staff numbers. If visiting and recreation are adjacent to housing fewer staff may be needed than if

correctional officers are required for escorting inmates to other parts of the facility.

Location of the restrictive housing unit facility: Where the unit is located has major effects on staffing. If transportation is required to outside functions such as court and hospital visits, the greater the distance and the more disruptive inmates requiring escort, the more staff that will be needed.

Use of inmates: While it is not recommended to use disruptive inmates as orderlies, cooks, maintenance workers, support workers, and so forth, trustees from a nearby institution may be used to reduce staff numbers with restrictions on communication and contact between the two inmates groups.

The preceding questions and considerations will help agencies to estimate the appropriate level of personnel needed for disruptive inmate supervision. However, periodic evaluations of the staffing complement are recommended to ensure its adequacy. To do this, evaluate each post/position by answering the following questions:

- Is each position or post scheduled so that appropriate coverage factors are used to ensure adequate staffing of the position or post during the hours that it is open? While some posts may be needed, it may be determined that a change in scheduling or coverage factor reduces the number of employees needed to fully staff the post.
- Is each position or post required as the result of the physical design of the facility, or is it the result of increases in general workload or changes in work methods? The administration may find that a post originally assigned due to the unit's design may be better utilized in another manner to minimize personnel needs and maximize the supervision capabilities of existing staffing levels. For example, many housing units include control rooms which monitor cells, secure corridors, entrances, and exits. It may be determined that during an inactive shift--generally the midnight or graveyard--when all inmates are confined to their cells, one or more control rooms can be closed and their monitoring functions transferred to another control station. This would either eliminate a post, which would free up staff to establish a new post that could provide direct supervision via a roving officer, or simply reduce the overall workforce.
- Has the function and operation of the unit changed so substantially as to warrant reassignment of staff? Administrative personnel may determine, for example, that additional security staff are required as a result of increased emphasis on inmate program participation. Such a decision has an obvious impact on the need for professional staff, including counselors, educators, and psychologists. Not so obvious, however, is the effect it will have on the need for additional security staff to escort inmates to and from the program area and also to provide supervision during program delivery.

Staff Selection

With respect to staff selection, respondents were asked about the criteria that they use to select staff who work with disruptive maximum security inmates. Slightly over 37% said that they rely on routine roster management. Among the remaining respondents, 90% examine personality characteristics and 86% look at prior experience. Nearly 60% also consider whether a staff member has volunteered to work with disruptive inmates.

All too often, staff who are neither qualified nor motivated are assigned to work with disruptive inmates. Agencies need to emphasize selectivity to ensure that staff assigned to disruptive inmate units are both capable of and interested in working in a facility that is stressful and continually threatens their personal safety.

The selection of staff to work in close contact with disruptive inmates is a vital ingredient in the successful operation of a restrictive housing unit. Of principal importance in identifying qualified staff is a well-thought-out recruitment and employment program.⁶ For example, staff assigned to the Federal Penitentiary at Marion are selected for their high supervisory performance evaluations at other Federal facilities. At Connecticut's Somers Institution, where the state's disruptive inmates are confined, staff who have demonstrated a past history of managing aggressive inmate behavior with a minimum of physical constraints are recruited from the facility's security complement. The two intensive management units operated by the Washington Department of Corrections both utilize a selective process to screen and select correctional officers who have displayed those supervisory and interpersonal skills associated with positive inmate control. At Marion and both state's institutions, assignment to the restrictive housing unit is viewed by other personnel as a reward and staff selected are considered the elite of agency correctional personnel.

Staff who are recruited and assigned to the unit on the basis of realistic standards or qualifications consistent with the ever-present pressures resulting from constantly working with disruptive inmates are more likely to be effective in the performance of their duties and to experience job satisfaction.

In identifying staff to work with disruptive inmates, the following criteria are provided as guidelines:

- The employee is capable of responding to constant verbal abuse with a minimum of emotion.
- The employee is physically capable of assisting in the forced movement of disruptive inmates.
- The employee has a record of successful inmate interactions.
- The employee has demonstrated skills in working with minority inmates, particularly those from dramatically different cultural and ethnic backgrounds.
- The employee's files demonstrate a history of professional responses to emergency situations.

- The employee has not expressed any reluctance to working with difficult-to-manage inmates.
- The employee is on permanent status.

While most of the emphasis is afforded the selection of line staff, attention should also be directed at determining the qualifications and experience of the unit's administrator and ancillary management personnel, both in terms of skills and personal qualities needed and the expectations which inmates, staff, and the general public will form. Whether an administrator with a security or program-oriented background is selected is a question of great difficulty and importance. Personal skills and a proven capability to manage maximum security environments rather than professional identity should be the deciding factor.

In addition to the unit's chief administrator, it is important to support this individual with staff representing a variety of disciplines. While there is a strong need to provide effective supervision of security personnel there is also the responsibility to provide professional training, guidance, and supervision of noncustody staff assigned the day-to-day mandate of delivering programs and services to the disruptive inmate population.

Related to staff selection is the need to balance, as much as possible, the racial mix of staff assigned to the unit. Given survey findings, which determined that most restrictive housing units are comprised of inmates representing a variety of ethnic backgrounds, it is important to minimize the antagonism and aggression that can be created when staff from one predominant race are assigned to manage and control individuals from entirely different ethnic and cultural backgrounds.

To lessen stress and prevent burnout, many respondents stated that they rotate staff assigned to work with disruptive inmates. This is particularly true for security staff, who have the most direct and continuous contact with this type of inmate. Nearly three-fourths of the respondents indicated that security staff are rotated, while slightly over one-half rotate program staff.

Whether or not rotation of staff who work with disruptive inmates is effective has not been evaluated. As a result, it is recommended that agencies continue with current practices until further research has been done.

Staff Training

Because management of disruptive inmates differs in many respects from management of general population prisoners, it was expected that agencies would include a special component on disruptive inmates in their training programs. Approximately two-thirds of the respondents stated that their pre-service training contained such a component, most typically of four hours' duration. An even larger proportion (81%) incorporate disruptive inmate management into their in-service training. Most of these in-service components range from 16 to 20 hours in length.

A majority of respondents (58%) also said that they provide program and/or security staff with specialized training prior to assignment to disruptive inmate units. Of these agencies, 95% train security staff and 76% train program staff.

While the emphasis on selectivity of staff to work with disruptive inmates is important, it does not usually compensate for inadequate training. As demonstrated by the limited training cited by survey respondents, staff frequently are not properly prepared to supervise inmates who will test daily their mettle with insults, thrown objects, and physical assaults. This lack of training can bring about a volatile situation in a restrictive housing unit.

Because correctional officers have the most contact with inmates, their training and resultant skills and knowledge are relied on by both management staff and inmates for interpretation of administrative directives, supervision and escort of inmates, and control of disruptive behavior. Consequently, it is in the best interests of the agency, staff, and inmates that those who work with disruptive inmates be well trained and thoroughly informed to professionally fulfill these responsibilities.

An employee trained in the necessary technical and interpersonal skills is able to respond to disruptive situations quickly, with minimal emotion and few wasted motions. Training combined with experience enables staff to react appropriately to the variety of situations created by disruptive inmates. With specialized training, line staff can be expected to develop the highest levels of skill in handling disruptive inmates and the problems they manifest.

It is outside the capability of this guidebook to provide a comprehensive development program for personnel working with disruptive inmates.⁷ However, project staff recommend the following topic areas be included in an 80-hour training program for all staff who have daily contact with these inmates:

- Inmate Rights, Use of Force, Access to Programs, Confinement Conditions (12 Hours)
- Causes of Disruptive Behavior (10 Hours)
- Dealing Effectively with Difficult-to-Manage Inmates (8 Hours)
- Inmate Discipline and Control (8 Hours)
- Escort Procedures for Violent Inmates (4 Hours)
- Stress Awareness and Control (8 Hours)
- Interpersonal Skills and Communications (8 Hours)
- Minority and Race Relations (4 Hours)
- Report Writing, including Incident Reports and Segregation Logs (6 Hours)
- Disruptive Inmate Custody Procedures (12 Hours)⁸

Staff Incentives

Only four respondents indicated that they offer special incentives to staff working with disruptive maximum security inmates. Arizona and Georgia provide higher pay and special recognition, Virginia offers these staff special recognition, and Texas allows staff to wear distinctive uniforms and have five consecutive days off every three months.

This lack of special incentives may be one factor that accounts for the finding that for over 40% of the respondents, turnover rates for staff working with disruptive inmates are higher than those for staff working with the general population. Surprisingly, one-fourth reported lower turnover rates among staff in disruptive inmate housing units.

There is some question as to whether agencies should provide additional incentives for staff assigned to work with disruptive inmates. A few correctional systems appear to view their restrictive units as "war zones" where staff are afforded "combat pay." Other jurisdictions believe that working with disruptive inmates is substantially no different from working with other, less aggressive inmates, thus, these agencies provide no extra incentives. Still others assert that there is a certain esprit de corps in supervising and managing the most violent and disruptive inmates and that such an assignment should, in itself, be considered a reward similar to the prestige enjoyed by the U.S. Army's Special Forces.

While few jurisdictions report using incentives to motivate staff either to seek assignment in a restrictive housing unit or to remain there once assigned, this does not discount the advantages an incentive system can have in reducing staff turnover. Incentives are thought to increase morale and prestige, improve inmate-staff relationships, and reduce agency costs for training and transferring new staff to restrictive housing units to replace departed, disgruntled personnel.

In addition to such incentives as increased pay, additional recognition, and distinctive uniforms, other options exist for motivating staff to work with disruptive inmates. These include:

- Additional time off duty,
- Accelerated promotions,
- Advanced training opportunities,
- Authority to supervise staff in off-site activities ancillary to normal disruptive inmate programming such as transportation of disruptive inmates to and from court,
- Special recognition ceremonies,
- Shift schedules tailored to officers' off-duty time requirements, and

- Plaques or trophies denoting the unique duties involved in disruptive inmate management.

Low-Cost Recommendations

A low-cost alternative to adding more staff is to utilize existing staff more effectively and efficiently. This chapter contains many such suggestions, including:

- Implement three principles of supervision: (1) effective and total control of the disruptive inmate population; (2) a unit environment structure that maximizes inmates' inner controls; and (3) inmates' perception of officers' control within the unit.
- Utilize the direct supervision approach to managing nonassaultive disruptive inmates.
- Add a listen-in/talk-back feature to the unit paging system, which facilitates remote communication between staff and inmates locked in their cells, reduces the noise levels in housing units, allows staff to monitor unusual periods of silence, destruction of property, and so forth. This type of system also facilitates emergency reporting by the inmates.
- Use staff body alarms that are capable of specifying the location and identity of the alarm, which also identifies the vulnerability of that particular staff member.
- Review the adequacy of internal unit security policies and procedures. Revise those found to be inadequate.
- Videotape forced movements and other uses of force by staff, when possible. Use these videotapes for staff training purposes.
- Develop a well-thought-out program to recruit and select staff to work with disruptive inmates.
- Develop an 80-hour training program for all staff who have daily contact with disruptive inmates.
- Offer special incentives to staff who work with disruptive maximum security inmates.

Notes

- 1 W. R. Nelson, The Principles and Dynamics of Jail Administration Essential to New Generation Jails (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Corrections, 1983).
- 2 American Correctional Association, Design Guide for Secure Adult Correctional Facilities, (College Park, MD: American Correctional Association, 1983), p. 168.
- 3 This determination is made through the use of an internal classification system.
- 4 Black et al. vs. Lewis et al.
- 5 F. W. Benton, Planning and Evaluating Prison and Jail Staffing Patterns, Volume II, (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Corrections, 1981).
- 6 F. W. Benton, Ed Rosen, and J. I. Peters, National Survey of Correctional Institution Employee Rates, (New York: John Jay College of Criminal Justice, 1980).
- 7 For further information, see the Correctional Officer Training Guide (College Park, MD: American Correctional Association, 1982).
- 8 These training topics are a compendium of curricula selected from representative training programs, provided by the National Academy of Corrections and Correctional Services Group staff.

CHAPTER 6

PROVISION OF INMATE PROGRAMS AND SERVICES

Introduction

Although boredom and an absence of meaningful programming are frequently associated with frustration, anger, and misconduct among prisoners, there is little consensus regarding the extent of programming that should be afforded to disruptive maximum security inmates, besides that mandated by courts and legislatures or recommended by state or national standards.

Some correctional practitioners assert that disruptive inmates should be provided a reduced level of programming. They argue that many programs, such as vocational training and work assignments, create needless security risks since they offer inmates opportunities to fashion weapons, communicate with cohorts, and threaten other prisoners. In addition, movement of these inmates to program areas is costly and time-consuming for staff. Even when programs can be provided in inmates' cells, some activities still constitute potential threats to security; many arts and crafts supplies, for example, can be turned into deadly instruments or escape tools.

Advocates of reduced programming also contend that such activities are privileges that disruptive inmates have forfeited due to their behavior. And they rationalize that fewer program opportunities serve as a deterrent to future misconduct.

However, some practitioners believe that less programming does more harm than good. It not only tends to increase idleness and resentment, they say, but it also fails to get at the causes of disruptive behaviors. These individuals think that prisoners who "act out" benefit from learning and experiencing more acceptable forms of conduct. For example, they note the successes of programs designed to teach techniques for reducing stress and controlling anger. And they promote counseling and academic education as means of enhancing self-esteem.

Occupying the middle ground are those who believe that programming for inmates, including the disruptive population, should be available, but only on a voluntary basis. Neither learning nor change, they contend, can be forced. Consequently, correctional agencies should only offer opportunities for constructive programming and behavioral change; the responsibility for utilizing these opportunities lies solely with the inmates.

Compounding this debate over programming are security issues that must be recognized. With disruptive maximum security inmates, security always takes top priority among management concerns. Disruptive maximum security inmates have demonstrated a need for closer than normal supervision, and this increased security profoundly influences the delivery of programs and services. Restricted movement of disruptive inmates, for instance, limits their access to academic classes, work assignments, recreation, and library facilities. Many agencies require disruptive inmates to remain in their cells for a substantial portion of the day, thereby affecting the delivery of medical, mental health,

and food services. Moreover, assignment to special housing units is frequently accompanied by a reduction or loss of privileges: for example, commissary, telephone access, and entertainment activities.

Program/Service Access

Not surprisingly, agencies responding to the questionnaire reported that disruptive inmates often are afforded less access to programs than are general population prisoners. Three-fourths of the respondents stated that their disruptive inmate populations receive less academic programming, often because inmates are limited to self-study courses. Slightly more than one-half also said that disruptive inmates, usually due to departmental policy, cannot participate in vocational training. Nearly 75% of the responding agencies reported less recreational programming for disruptive inmates. Other commonly limited areas of programming are work assignments, arts and crafts, and entertainment. Respondents indicated that disruptive inmates are afforded greater access to counseling and casework, as well as non-contact visiting--almost one-third of the respondents said that disruptive inmates are not permitted to have contact visits.

The findings related to inmate services tell a different story. In general, court mandates and consent decrees, together with rights guaranteed by the Constitution, have resulted in equal access to many services, including laundry, medical and dental care, legal services, mail, and food service. Provision of these services, however, necessitates unusual measures. For example, hot carts are required to bring food to inmates in their cells or in their dayrooms. Some agencies have established satellite legal libraries in their special housing units. Health care professionals usually visit disruptive inmates in their units on a regular basis.

Nearly 28% of the respondents stated that disruptive inmates have greater access to psychological and psychiatric services when compared with general population prisoners. On the other hand, a slight majority indicated that disruptive inmates have fewer opportunities to use the telephone and commissary or participate in formal religious services.

Limited programming for disruptive maximum security inmates is necessary, if not essential, for their effective management. While the relationship between programming and reduced disruptive behavior has not been proven to everyone's satisfaction, the absence of programming results in idleness and boredom, which have been shown to be significantly related to disruptive incidents. Likewise, the provision of services to disruptive inmates is an essential component of their management albeit for different reasons. In many jurisdictions, the level and types of services are mandated by courts and/or state correctional standards. To comply with evolving standards, it is important that disruptive inmates be provided with essentially the same services as those provided to the general population. However, the frequency, nature, and delivery of inmate services may be altered to encourage acceptable behavior and discourage unacceptable behavior.¹

The stated or unstated goal of disruptive inmate management is to change behavior, more specifically to minimize the recurrence of misconduct with the

goal of returning the inmate to general population. To this end, it is recommended that correctional agencies permit varying degrees of program participation and service access, contingent upon the achievement and maintenance of specified behavioral objectives. Program offerings and service access, under this strategy, become an integral part of an internal inmate management system used for disruptive inmates. Examples are provided throughout the remaining sections of this chapter.

Program/Service Planning

Survey results indicate that too little is known about the needs, abilities, and limitations of disruptive inmates to determine whether current programming is appropriate. Most correctional agencies duplicate programs developed for general population prisoners within restrictive housing units. To determine the relevance of programs provided to disruptive inmates, agencies may wish to collect the following information about this population:

- Educational grade level;
- Reading level;
- Mental ability;
- Vocational training/skills;
- Developmental disabilities, including mental retardation, learning disabilities, physical handicaps, and emotional maladjustment;
- Academic/vocational interests;
- Psychological evaluations; and
- Sociological evaluations.

Program staff would then review this information, in summary form, asking themselves questions about the appropriateness of such program elements as:

- Teaching materials/supplies;
- Teaching methods;
- Program content;
- Treatment modality;
- Reinforcement(s)/punishments; and
- Program objectives.

Such an analysis would provide direction for modifying existing programs, developing new programs, dropping programs, or monitoring what is in place.

In developing new or revising existing programs for disruptive inmates, security and control are ever present concerns. As a result, it is important that programs for disruptive inmates:

- Require minimal or no inmate movement;
- Use equipment and supplies that cannot be converted into contraband;
- Be appropriate to the level of privileges afforded the intended users;
- Make judicious use of available space; and
- Complement the total management plan.

It is no less important to tailor services to both the needs of disruptive inmates and the limitations of the unit's (or facility's) design. Information for planning purposes would include:

- Medical and health care treatment needs, such as medication taken, dental care, physical disabilities or impairments, level of nursing care, general health;
- Mental stability, need for therapy, counseling, medication;
- Special diets for medical and religious reasons;
- Religious preference; and
- Visiting needs--historical patterns of visiting.

The involvement of security staff in the development and delivery of all programs and services will help ensure that safety and security are not compromised.

Staff, Space, and Facilities

Inadequate space, staff, or equipment and supplies can hamper the effectiveness of even the most relevant programs for disruptive inmates. One method for assessing the adequacy of a facility's resources, developed by Correctional Services Group for the Missouri Department of Corrections and Human Resources, employs a simple survey form that identifies and describes available staff, equipment, supplies, and space and solicits input from program staff as to what is needed in each area.²

Program/Service Recommendations

The following recommendations are concerned with specific programs and services.

Health Services

Pursuant to constitutional mandates and applicable ACA standards, the medical and dental services provided to disruptive inmates must be equal to those provided the general inmate population. Black vs. Lewis (an Arizona court case) provides the following guidelines for health care services:

- Full licensure, certification, and registration of all medical and health care staff.
- Medical screening upon admission to restricted housing. Medical screening may be performed by a physician's assistant, nurse practitioner, or other physician extender. Complete physical

examinations should be conducted when indicated by screening or when more than two years have passed since the last physical examination.

- Fully licensed, certified, and registered physician responsible for the medical and health care needs of the inmates confined in restricted housing. The physician should review, on a daily basis, the medical staff/patient contact, assessing both the quantity of patient contact and the quality of care provided.
- Clinic on the unit(s) at least once per week, conducted by the physician.
- Sick call--Disruptive inmates who wish to be seen by the physician should submit medical request slips to the floor officer. The physician's assistant, nurse practitioner, or equivalent should see the inmates requesting medical care and make the necessary referrals to the physician.
- Sufficient security staff coverage to ensure prompt, secure, and safe escort of disruptive inmates to medical and health care services when requested by medical staff.
- Eight hours of dental coverage one day per week for each 100 inmates; 24-hour on-call emergency dental care.
- Emergency medical drills on a monthly basis.
- Standard first aid training for security staff.
- One security staff member per shift trained in cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR).
- Nursing coverage (16 hours a day) five days per week unless the medical and health care needs assessment indicates more or less coverage is appropriate; 24-hour, on-call emergency care.
- Unit dosage of medication, preferably in liquid form.
- Accurate, comprehensive inmate medical and dental records.
- Medical examination of inmates subjected to forced cell movement.
- Semiannual physical examinations for disruptive inmates confined over six months. More frequent physical examinations are needed to monitor disruptive inmates' health due to the sedentary nature of confinement in restrictive housing units.

To the extent possible, all medical and dental services, except infirmary care, should be provided, under the observation of security staff, in a secure space within individual units or adjacent to them. (See Figure 11 for an example.)

Mental Health


Many questionnaire respondents reported that disruptive inmates have more access to mental health professionals than do general population inmates, and with good reason. Following assignment to restrictive housing, disruptive inmates may experience strong emotions--anger, helplessness, fear, guilt, futility, vengefulness. These emotions, in turn, may result in behavior that endangers the inmates themselves, other prisoners, or staff. Mental health staff can aid in identifying behavior symptomatic of underlying problems and in teaching disruptive inmates to deal with immediate problems acceptably and productively. In addition, many inmates commit disruptive acts because they are unable to control anger and frustration, cannot dissipate stress in healthy ways, or are under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol.

In many agencies, mental health services for disruptive inmates are comprehensive and include screening upon admission to restrictive housing, treatment within restrictive housing, and follow-up after release from restrictive housing. The focus of services provided ranges from short-term situational conflicts to long-term substance abuse problems. Project staff recommend the following mental health services be made available to disruptive inmates:

- Mental health screening upon admission to restricted housing, with referral to psychiatrist or psychologist as appropriate;
- Individual psychotherapy;
- Chemotherapy;
- Individual counseling;
- Problem-solving;
- Anger control;
- Stress management; and
- Frequent, regular reviews, including personal interviews, of inmates who remain in restrictive housing for more than 30 days.

Closed-circuit television is a particularly effective vehicle for providing problem-solving, anger control, and stress management programs, particularly for inmates who continue to exhibit disruptive behavior within the restrictive housing setting. Once disruptive inmates demonstrate improved behavior control, mental health staff may wish to form small treatment groups.

Figure 11
Housing Unit, Washington Intensive Management Unit (IMU)



The prevention of suicide is a particular concern within restrictive housing facilities. Washington's suicide prevention program incorporates the following elements:

- Training for security and program staff in the identification and referral of suicidal inmates.
- Completion of a suicide behavior report when staff observe or suspect suicidal behavior.
- Referral to a mental health professional when suicidal behavior is observed or suspected.
- Immediate examination and interview by a mental health professional to assess suicide risk. If a mental health professional is not available, the inmate is placed in a secure area and subjected to intensive watch. An intensive watch is a precautionary watch in which an inmate is deemed at risk to engage in self-destructive behavior. The inmate is observed no less than every 15 minutes. If the mental health professional designates the inmate a suicide risk, the inmate is placed on suicide watch. A suicide watch differs from intensive watch in that the inmate is admitted to a specially equipped psychiatric security room and is visually observed continuously by staff.
- Continuous log of the watch--intensive and suicide--including dates, times, and notations of relevant behavior. Entries are made at least every 15 minutes, with staff initialing their observations.
- Written assessment and management plan for management and treatment of the suicidal inmate prepared by the mental health professional. The management plan includes a problem description, goals, and treatment methods to be used. It also contains specific instructions to all staff involved in a suicide watch, as well as follow-up planning.

Education

At least three objectives may be gained by allowing disruptive inmates to take educational classes. First, educational programs help dispel the boredom and monotony of segregated living and make time pass more quickly. Second, some disruptive inmates may enroll in educational programs to relieve their boredom, only to discover something of value in the pursuit and acquisition of knowledge. And, third, time spent in educational programs is not time spent manufacturing weapons, concocting alcoholic beverages, agitating fellow prisoners or staff members, or plotting escape.

Educational programming does not have to be limited to academic classes (e.g., English, history, mathematics). These courses form the basis of educational programming but may be supplemented by programs that are entertaining as well as educational, e.g., travelogues, National Geographic specials, and wildlife films. The needs assessment described previously would help to narrow the available educational programs to a manageable number and to

ensure the inmates' interests are addressed. The use of videotape recorders and television sets is strongly recommended due to the availability of a wide range of educational subjects. Furthermore, closed-circuit television and correspondence courses are good sources of the more traditional academic subjects. Whether or not disruptive inmates are allowed access to video tape equipment is a question only correctional agencies can answer. Based upon the opportunity this type of equipment presents in the manufacture of weapons, this practice is questionable.

Small multi-inmate classes--from three to five inmates, depending upon available space--may benefit inmates who are nearing release from restrictive housing. The agency's classification system would be used to identify disruptive inmates who are suitable to participate in multi-inmate activities. The privilege of participating in these small group activities would be voluntary. As an additional benefit, these classes could be continued once inmates are released back to general population. To facilitate this process, the general population educational supervisor or inmates' counselors would interview disruptive inmates who are about to be released and set up a continuing program of education for those who express interest.

Vocational Training

The decision to offer vocational training to disruptive inmates in a restrictive setting offers a paradox. On the one hand, vocational training supplies and equipment present a very real security concern and can be dangerous in the hands of those inmates who have not demonstrated increased responsibility and self-control. On the other hand, those inmates who have demonstrated increased responsibility and self-control are usually on their way back into general population. Because vocational training is usually a long-term program, the disruptive inmates who would qualify for it would not be around long enough to complete the program. Given this situation and the security risks entailed, vocational training is not considered appropriate for disruptive inmates. However, agencies may wish to consider providing preparatory vocational training, which is similar to academic courses in its adaptability to self-study (closed-circuit TV) and the supplies used.

General Library

General library services are provided to disruptive inmates for the same reasons these services are provided to the general population: for in-cell entertainment; for self-study; for supplementation of formal educational classes; and for something to do.

In many jurisdictions, disruptive inmates are provided, on a weekly basis, with book lists from which to make a selection. The books requested are then delivered at a later time by security staff using a cart system. Subsequent book requests are honored on a one-for-one trade. Disruptive inmates are not usually allowed to have more than two books on loan at any one time.

Suspension of general library privileges is recommended for those disruptive inmates who vandalize or otherwise destroy library materials.

To promote reading as an acceptable leisure activity, agencies may wish to consider providing general interest magazines to all disruptive inmates during individual indoor recreation periods.

Legal Materials

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed inmates' right of access to the courts under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.³ This right includes access to legal materials and availability of sufficient legal materials to ensure that prisoners are able to file petitions that show some legal proficiency.⁴

Disruptive inmates, no less than general population inmates, are entitled to use legal materials provided by the correctional agency. Due to their violent and destructive tendencies, however, it would be judicious to designate secure space, readily observable by security staff, within the housing unit to be used for legal research. Allowing disruptive inmates to use this space by appointment only and only for two hours at any one time will help to ensure equal access by all disruptive inmates. (See Chapter 7: Design of the Confinement Environment.) If no other inmates are waiting to use the space, there is no reason why agency policy should not permit this two-hour time limit to be extended.

If no available space within the housing unit is adequate for legal research, alternative arrangements are possible. For example, the agency could develop policies and procedures to permit disruptive inmates to request legal materials for use in-cell.⁵ Reasonable limits would be set on the length of time these materials may be checked out, for example, 48 hours. To prevent vandalism, it is recommended that security staff monitor the use of legal materials in-cell. A cart system is a simple and efficient method for pick up and delivery of legal materials requested by inmates.

Religious Services

In observance of the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of religious expression, disruptive inmates have the right to request the services of an ordained minister of the religion of their choice. However, it is recommended that the faith specified by the inmate be recognized by the agency's ministerial coordinator. Case law specifies that inmates be allowed to correspond with religious leaders, subject to the same restrictions applicable to other disruptive inmate mail; to receive meals that conform to religious tenets; and be permitted to obtain religious literature, unless such literature is believed to incite disruptions or otherwise threaten institutional security. The wearing or possession of religious paraphernalia may be prohibited based upon the institution's need to maintain security.⁶

Disruptive inmates may request unusual or extraordinary religious rituals, observances, fetishes, diets, etc. Unless such requests are submitted to the agency's counsel for legal opinion before the request is approved or denied the agency may find itself the defendant in a suit alleging violation of First Amendment guarantees. For example, Banks vs. Havener⁷ held that a prison can not prohibit the practice of an established religion unless it can prove (by satisfactory evidence) that the teaching and practice of the act created a clear and present danger to the orderly function of the institution. The key here is the word "established." One court, while failing to provide a precise definition of what constitutes a religion pursuant to First Amendment protections, declared that such protection does not extend to so-called religions "which tend to mock established institutions and are obviously shams and absurdities and whose members are patently devoid of religious sincerity."⁸

The assembly of disruptive inmates for purposes of worship/religious services is a privilege⁹ rightly reserved for those inmates in transition back to general population.

In devising policies and procedures governing disruptive inmates' religious exercise, one overriding consideration must be equal protection. Courts have consistently held that when one religious group is permitted to engage in a particular activity, the same right must be accorded all other religious groups within the institution. Thus, although prison officials have the authority to regulate religious activity in order to promote and/or protect valid institutional interests, this regulation must apply equally to all religious faiths.¹⁰

Inmate Communications--Mail/Telephone

The United States Supreme Court has established guidelines for regulating inmates' personal mail under the auspices of the First Amendment. The right to correspond with the courts and attorneys is protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a result, all disruptive inmates must be permitted to send and receive personal and legal correspondence. While the restrictions correctional agencies may impose on legal correspondence are limited (e.g., opening to inspect for contraband without reading), more extensive restrictions may be placed on personal mail when necessary to protect institutional security and order. Such restrictions include:

- Limiting the number of persons with whom an inmate can correspond;
- Opening and reading incoming and outgoing material;
- Censoring both incoming and outgoing mail; and
- Refusing to mail material for an inmate or to forward correspondence to an inmate.¹¹

The receipt of books, magazines, packages, and newspapers is not protected by the Constitution. Receipt of these materials is a privilege afforded by correctional agencies to provide inmates with additional sources of entertainment and to help them maintain contact with the outside world. As

such, the privilege of receiving third- and fourth-class materials may be structured to reward disruptive inmates who have demonstrated satisfactory adjustment and increased self-control. It is important, however, for agency policy to specify the conditions under which disruptive inmates may receive such materials through the mails.

Inmates use the telephone for at least two important reasons. First, the telephone serves as an adjunct to or in lieu of visitation, helping to maintain family and community ties. It is also the communication method of choice or necessity, especially for inmates who are functionally illiterate. Second, inmates use the telephone to access the courts. The importance of the telephone as a primary link between inmates and the outside world cannot be overstated. Thus, it is recommended that all disruptive inmates be permitted to make personal collect telephone calls.

The number and length of personal calls is an issue best settled by individual agencies based upon the number and location of telephone facilities, the number of inmates in the unit, the number of staff available to supervise telephone usage, the daily activity schedules, etc. However, to maximize the use of the available telephone lines, it is recommended that personal calls be scheduled with security staff at least 24 hours in advance. Washington instituted this advance scheduling policy and staff are pleased with the results.

The frequency and duration of personal calls could be varied according to disruptive inmates' behavior, with longer and more frequent telephone calls permitted those inmates who have maintained infraction-free records for designated time frames.

Up to three telephone calls (of 30 minutes duration each) to law firms, legal aid societies, or private attorneys during a one-week time frame would help to ensure inmates' access to the courts. As with personal calls, it would maximize a unit's telephone resources if disruptive inmates were required to schedule legal calls 24 hours in advance. In this area, flexible agency policy is probably the best policy. For example, policy could permit disruptive inmates to petition for:

- Additional legal calls during a one-week time frame, if needed;
- Less than 24 hours notice; and
- Calls placed outside of the designated recreation period.

Visitation

Inmates maintain contact with the outside world primarily through visitation. It is also one of the few activities that inmates look forward to. As a result, it represents a powerful motivator. As with other activities, the frequency and duration of visits granted to disruptive inmates may be modified to reward positive adjustment.

The following visitation guidelines are presented for consideration by correctional agencies. Due to the violent and often unpredictable nature of much of this population, these guidelines emphasize security and control. The source for these guidelines are the visitation policies and procedures used by the agencies that participated in the case studies.

- All visitation, except attorney visits, are non-contact under the direct supervision of security staff. Contact visits for some disruptive inmates and not others affords the opportunity for some inmates to pressure others to smuggle contraband.
- Movement of all disruptive inmates to and from the visiting area is in restraints. These restraints are removed during the actual visitation for reasons of personal dignity. Prisoners who resist being cuffed before escort to or after visitation are required to wear restraints during subsequent visits as a disciplinary measure.
- All visiting, including attorney visits, are scheduled 24 hours in advance with the security supervisor to ensure maximum use of the available visiting space.
- An approved visitor's list is used to determine who may visit each inmate.
- Unit policy specifies the number of visitors per visit, the frequency and duration of visits, the schedule for visiting, and the disciplinary sanctions for violations of visiting rules.
- One visiting period each week is scheduled during the evening hours or on weekends to accommodate working visitors.
- Agency policy specifies that visitors and inmates may be searched both prior to and following the visit to minimize the smuggling of contraband into our out of the unit.

Recreation

Recreation provides mutual benefits to disruptive inmates and facility administrators. Recreational pursuits serve to break the monotony and boredom of in-cell confinement and counter the negative effects of sedentary daily life. The facility administration needs ways to motivate disruptive inmates to control their behavior and to keep them productively occupied throughout the long days of segregated confinement.

At a minimum, ACA standards recommend segregated inmates receive one hour of out-of-cell recreation per day, five days per week. This recreation may take place indoors or outdoors. Good security practice dictates that yards be searched before and after recreation periods and that inmates be searched with a metal detector upon leaving and entering the restrictive housing unit for recreation purposes.

A full range of out-of-cell recreational pursuits are appropriate since they are solitary activities:

- Weightlifting with heavy, fixed equipment that is regularly inspected, to work both small and large muscle groups;
- Calisthenics; and
- Basketball.

In-cell recreation activities are particularly important since disruptive inmates spend the greater part of their days locked up. Possible in-cell activities include exercise, closed-circuit television, cable television, video programs, and hobbycrafts. Hobbycrafts suitable for disruptive inmates include jigsaw puzzles and drawing with soft charcoal, pastels, and conte crayons.

The United States Penitentiary at Marion strongly endorses the use of television sets placed inside cells to entertain inmates. The television sets are 13-inch black-and-white models provided by the Federal Bureau of Prisons.

Washington and Arizona do not permit disruptive inmates to participate in any organized recreational activities or group functions until they are in the final stages of a behavioral management program designed to facilitate transition to general population. Even then, such gatherings are kept small--three to five inmates, depending upon the activity involved and the available space--and are well supervised.

Meal Service

To minimize the possibility of disruption to the security and order of the restrictive housing facility, disruptive inmates are generally fed in their cells. Agencies that utilize a release transition program allow inmates in transition to dine together in groups of five or less. Group dining permits staff to observe the ability of the participants to get along in a more normal interactive setting. If the area available for dining is small, the privilege of group dining is usually rotated among disruptive inmates who qualify, according to a predetermined schedule.

The questionnaire survey found that some jurisdictions substitute a single blended and formed food item, variously termed a diet loaf, nutrient loaf, or meat loaf, for individual meals as a disciplinary sanction for violations involving food and meal service. Agencies are cautioned to carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages of using food as a disciplinary sanction, particularly since this practice has come under increased scrutiny from inmate rights activists. Agencies that use nutrient loafs as a disciplinary sanction are in jeopardy if their written policy forbids the use of food as punishment. The Arizona Department of Corrections was forced by court order to discontinue using nutrient loafs for this very reason.

Commissary-Canteen

Most agencies permit disruptive inmates to purchase authorized items from the facility's commissary/canteen. Because of security issues involved, the type and number of items is more restricted for disruptive inmates than for the general population. A sample list of authorized items, purchased on a weekly basis, might include:

- Limit of five candy bars;
- Limit of two bags of candy;
- Limit of one four-ounce jar of coffee or chocolate crystals;
- Limit of one fruit drink mix;
- Limit of one writing tablet;
- Limit of one thesaurus, dictionary, or almanac;
- Limit of five envelopes;
- Limit of five first-class stamps;
- Limit of five legal envelopes; and
- Limit of two international stamps.

It is recommended, however, that security staff regularly verify that inmates do not accumulate items in excess of the limits specified.

Sample procedures for disbursing commissary items might include:

- An approved list of commissary items is distributed to inmates once per week.
- Inmates list those items they wish to purchase on an approved order form and turn it in to a security officer by a specified deadline.
- When filled, commissary orders are placed on a cart and distributed on a tier or unit basis by a security officer.
- To verify that the items being delivered match the items ordered, the security officer has each inmate sign his/her order form.
- The officer then initials the form and delivers the commissary items.
- Indigent inmates are provided with writing paper, regular and legal envelopes, and postage.

As a management device, the total weekly order amount and the articles permitted may be varied to correspond to inmates' behavior within the restrictive housing unit.

Property

A small amount of personal property allows inmates to retain some individuality in a highly impersonal environment and eliminates the time-

consuming daily task of passing out necessary hygiene articles and disposable food items.

For example, the Washington Department of Corrections uses a four-level behavior management system that allows disruptive inmates to retain the following property:

Personal Property by Management Level

- Level I--\$10 per week store order for stamps and correspondence material; legal material up to five legal books; items from issue bag received at intake process. No personal property authorized.
- Level II--\$15 in store items as limited from approved store list; five personal photographs; two personal and two facility library books, plus five legal books and one recreational (to include religious) book. No personal property authorized.
- Level III--\$20 in store items as limited from approved store list (items may be obtained from property if also on facility store list); three personal and two facility library books, plus five legal books, and two recreation (to include religious) books; two magazines and one newspaper subscription; five photographs from property (may receive more through mail); one radio and one set of earphones (earplugs) if purchased from facility store.
- Level IV--Same as Level III, except \$30 in store items; two magazines and two newspaper subscriptions (no more than two each of these items on a daily basis); one television with earphones in lieu of radio, if purchased through facility store (with proof of purchase).

State Property

- Mattress--one per inmate
- Sheets--two per inmate
- Blankets (wool unless cotton/synthetic authorized by medical staff)--two per inmate
- Towel--one per inmate
- Jacket (for outside recreation only)--one per inmate
- White coveralls--one pair per inmate
- Tennis shoes/thongs--one pair per inmate
- T-shirts--one per inmate
- Shorts--one per inmate
- Socks--one pair per inmate

Personal Property

- Wedding ring (no stones)--one
- Medical alert bracelet--one
- Approved religious medallion (one inch in diameter or less)
- Eyeglasses/contact lenses--one of each per inmate

- Personal and legal mail--no more than 20 personal letters, legal material is limited to current legal cases
- Store items from approved list--no accumulation of items over authorized amounts

It is recommended that security officers monitor inmates' cells to ensure that they do not accumulate personal items in excess of the authorized amounts.

Sanitation/Hygiene

Dirty, vermin-infested housing units, aside from exposing inmates to unhealthy living conditions, have frequently been construed by the courts as inflicting cruel and unusual punishment. Restrictive housing units by their nature are sufficiently oppressive without adding unclean living conditions.

One important issue in restrictive housing areas, where movement is necessarily highly controlled and curtailed, is responsibility for keeping cells and common areas clean.

The following procedures are recommended components of a comprehensive sanitation/hygiene program for disruptive inmates:

- A security officer conducts a written cell audit prior to an inmate's occupancy or reassignment.
- An inmate is not assigned to a cell that is unclean or has broken or otherwise damaged fixtures.
- An inmate signs a form certifying the condition of the assigned cell prior to occupancy.
- An inmate is held responsible for maintaining a clean and orderly cell:
 - Inmate sweeps cell floor and dusts with a hand broom provided by a security officer 10 minutes prior to scheduled daily shower. The hand broom, trash, and garbage from the cell are collected when the inmate is removed for escort (restrained) to the shower.
 - Bed is made daily; mattress is not removed from the bed frame.
 - Personal items are stored in the designated space;
 - No pictures or other items are placed on cell walls or window;
 - Window and door are kept completely clear of obstructing items; nothing is to be placed on light fixtures;
 - Graffiti is not permitted;

- No food, other than permissible store food items, remains in the cell after trays are collected;
- Toilet and sink are disinfected weekly;
- Towels, shorts, socks, and T-shirts are exchanged daily, during the inmate's shower period, by an escort officer.
- A security officer inspects the cell while the inmate is restrained in the shower and reports cell damage and any deviations from acceptable standards.
- The unit supervisor fills out a work order request for all cell damage prior to end of shift.
- Common areas are cleaned daily by inmates who do not reside in restrictive housing, if available. If not, common areas are cleaned by inmates who are in the final phase of transition to general population. Cleaning of common areas is under the direct supervision of a security officer.
- Security staff examine common areas for concealed contraband after cleaning crews have left the area, before any disruptive inmate movement takes place.
- Laundry is done by civilian staff.

Work Assignments

Work assignments that require minimal staff supervision and do not represent a security concern could be developed for select disruptive inmates who have maintained infraction-free records for a designated length of time, who are cooperative with staff, and who do not present a clear and present danger to themselves, staff, or other inmates. The Arizona Department of Corrections, for example, employs this practice. Examples of such non-sensitive work assignments include general maintenance and cleaning, in-cell clerical work, and assisting educational teachers. Primary candidates should be those inmates who are in the final stages of transition to general population.

Experience suggests that work assignment opportunities may be used as incentives when incorporated into a structured behavior management program.

Low-Cost Recommendations

The major low-cost recommendations proposed in this chapter include:

- The collection and assessment of program and service capabilities for disruptive inmates.

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- The collection and analysis of basic disruptive inmate demographic data for program and service planning purposes.
 - The tailoring of programs and services to the needs of the disruptive inmate population and the limitations of the unit's (or facility's) design.
 - The development of a mechanism for varying the degree of program participation and service access along a continuum that conforms to specified behavioral objectives.
 - The provision of comprehensive mental health services to disruptive inmates, to include screening upon admission to restrictive housing, treatment within restrictive housing, and follow-up after release from restrictive housing.
 - The development of a comprehensive suicide prevention program based upon the model used by the Washington Department of Corrections.
 - The use of closed-circuit television and videotape recorders to expand the scope of in-cell educational/entertainment offerings.
 - The provision of special privileges, e.g., small group activities, to disruptive inmates who are nearing release from the unit.
 - The prohibition of contact visiting between disruptive inmates and all visitors except legal representation.
 - The discontinuance of nutrient (diet) loaf as a disciplinary sanction.
 - The development of a comprehensive sanitation/hygiene program for disruptive inmate units.
 - The development of a work assignment program for select disruptive inmates.

For the most part, the preceding recommendations could be adopted by correctional agencies with minimal time and effort. Their most costly features are the development of the applicable policy and procedures, limited staff training, and a period of more intensive staff supervision after they are put into place to ensure the new policies and procedures are being implemented correctly.

The collection and assessment of the recommended data is somewhat more expensive since it would require the time of at least one knowledgeable staff member to design the data collection formats, analyze the data that is collected, and ensure the process is on-going.

Notes

- 1 These positions are consistent with ACA Standard 2-4233: "Written policy and procedure provide that inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody have access to programs and services, library services, social services, counseling services, religious guidance, and recreational programs."
- 2 Cindie A. Unger, "An Evaluation of Missouri Correctional Programs," (Kansas City, MO: Correctional Services Group, Inc., 1983).
- 3 See Mullame vs. Central Hanover Trust Company, 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) and Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
- 4 See, e.g., Morales vs. Schmidt, 340 F. Suppl. 544, 548 (W. D. Wis. 1972); Bounds vs. Smith, 21 Cr. L. 3017 (U.S. S. Ct. 1977).
- 5 See Gittle Macker vs. Prasse, 428 F. 2d (3rd Cir, 1970); McKinney vs. DeBord, 324 F.Supp. 928 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
- 6 Rowland vs. Sigler, 327 F.Supp. 821 (D.C. Neb. 1971).
- 7 Banks vs. Havener, 234 F. Supp. 27 (E. D. Va. 1964).
- 8 Theirault vs. Silber, 341 F. Supp. 578 (W. D. Tex. 1975), vacated and remanded, 547 F. 2d 1279 (5th Cir. 1977).
- 9 Morgan vs. Cook, 236 So. 2nd 749 (Miss. 1970) and Gunn vs. Wilkinson, 309 F.Supp. 411 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
- 10 John W. Palmer, J.D., Constitutional Rights of Prisoners, 2nd Edition. (Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Company, 1973), p. 85.
- 11 Palmer, p. 54.

CHAPTER 7

DESIGN OF THE CONFINEMENT ENVIRONMENT FOR DISRUPTIVE MAXIMUM SECURITY INMATES

Introduction

When an inmate engages in violent or disruptive behavior, three factors are generally involved: motivation, capability, and opportunity. Environmental design addresses all of these factors, for it can effectively alter a prisoner's ability, opportunity, and motivation to commit such acts. For instance, if a facility is designed to house disruptive inmates in a full-service unit that clusters single cells in small groups, inmate movement is reduced and more easily controlled, and supervision is more effective, thus minimizing inmates' capability and opportunity to engage in disruptive behavior. Environment also influences prisoners' motivation for acting out. As the American Correctional Association pointed out more than a decade ago, "...the physical inadequacy of an institution is a contributing factor which can lead to disturbances. Antiquated facilities which are large, drab, overcrowded, and isolated from the community are conducive to the development of frustrations and anger."¹

In developing guidelines that capitalize on the relationship between the correctional environment and the control of disruptive inmate behavior, two major issues must be considered. The first is the impact of the overall institutional environment on inmates' behavior in general population. As just stated, the majority of inmates have the ability and opportunity to become involved in a variety of disruptive activities, including threats and assaults, escapes and escape attempts, and contraband exchange. If the institution is particularly antiquated and oppressive, they may also have the motivation to do so. The problem facing correctional administrators is how to modify the prison environment to reduce the ability and opportunity of inmates to be disruptive. Similarly, administrators must also seek ways to lessen inmates' motivation to act on their frustrations and anger.

The second issue to be considered is the ability of the institutional design and physical plant to control inmates who have displayed behavior that correctional officials consider threatening to the safety, security, and order of institutional operations. Most of these inmates are assigned to a restrictive housing unit either in disciplinary detention or administrative segregation status. Placement in restrictive housing is intended to control their movement, enhance their supervision, protect other inmates, minimize damage to property, and, thus, reduce the effects of their violent and disruptive behavior.

When inmates require closer control and separation from other segments of the prisoner population, the confinement environment to which they are assigned must be considered very carefully. Whether a new institution or an existing facility is used, numerous philosophical, management, programmatic, and operational issues need to be addressed. These issues will vary from facility to facility and correctional system to correctional system. However, each is crucial in either the design and construction of a new facility or the modification of an existing physical plant.

The optimal method for developing disruptive inmate housing is to plan, design, and construct completely new space, physically separate from other housing units within the institutional complex. Cost efficiencies are achieved, though, when these separate disruptive inmate units share the larger institution's laundry, food service, and warehouse areas and program, health care, and recreation staff. Many agencies, however, will not be able to take this approach as a result of limited resources, availability of an existing restrictive housing unit, or lack of urgent need. Consequently, the guidelines included in this chapter apply, as much as possible, to a range of options, including utilization of an existing facility, renovation of available space, and construction of an entirely new unit.

The remainder of this chapter draws heavily upon the recommendations set forth by the Design Guide for Secure Adult Correctional Facilities, published by the American Correctional Association in 1983.

Facility Adequacy and Design

Agencies completing the questionnaire expressed mixed reactions about the adequacy of their facilities for disruptive inmates. Respondents were asked about the adequacy of their physical plants, in general, and specifically about space for administrative, program, and service functions. In terms of the general physical plant, approximately 64% said that their physical plants create problems in supervising disruptive prisoners. Regarding space, 37% of the respondents indicated that their facilities have adequate space in all areas. Among the areas respondents cited most often as having inadequate space are programs, indoor recreation, and visitation.

Asked whether they have initiated any innovative approaches in the environmental design of their facilities for disruptive inmates, most agencies responded that they have not. Several, however, noted that they house such inmates in "new generation" facilities. These facilities are typically composed of six to eight physically separated units inside a secure perimeter, with the individual units housing between 40 and 50 inmates in single cells. Each unit contains its own small dining, laundry, work, and indoor recreation areas, as well as offices for program staff assigned to the unit. The physical design of inmate housing calls for only one or two tiers to facilitate continuous surveillance of all areas in which inmates interact with each other and staff. In these facilities, it is possible to confine large groups of inmates within the same physical perimeter while housing them in small enough groups to allow activities on a unit basis.

Respondents indicated that this type of design enhances inmate management and lessens much of the dull, monotonous environment found in institutions with cellhouses or ranges.

In addressing the physical confinement problems presented by disruptive inmates, the first step in the planning process for a new or renovated facility is to formulate a definitive statement of the unit's purpose; the various procedures to be employed; and the anticipated movement of staff, inmates, and visitors within the facility. A detailed functional program not only provides

the designer with a well-thought-out statement of purpose, but also expedites planning while minimizing capital construction and life-cycle operational expenditures. To accomplish this, the operations must be conceptualized and the basic issues that will affect its design identified. In preparing the architectural program, the following information is of value:

- Number of inmates to be confined;
- Security and custody needs of these inmates;
- Type of management and supervision approach to be employed;
- Type and number of programs to be provided and the level of inmate access to programs;
- Use of internally and externally provided support services;
- Number of inmates entering and leaving the unit weekly;
- Number and level of staff to be provided; and
- Type of security system and features to be used.

Certain issues, such as site location, security systems, and program space, require in-depth analysis. These issues are discussed in the following sections.

Site Location

A basic issue for any restrictive housing unit is separation. Disruptive inmates must be separated from the general population, and particularly from those inmates they have victimized. Consequently, if circumstances permit, it is advisable for restrictive housing to be situated away from major circulation paths, general inmate housing, and parking areas. If the unit is part of another facility, its location within the prison complex perimeter will increase security. Placement near the medical facility, which typically is not on a major inmate traffic path will make it easier for medical staff to treat and follow up on inmates in restrictive housing.

The orientation of the building is also important. It is recommended that individual inmate rooms face away from the center of the compound, where the general prisoner population frequently crosses, or the "front" of the institution, where visitors enter. If the windows of inmates' rooms do face nearby inmate housing, activity areas, or visitors' entrances, an appropriate visual barrier may be integrated into the design; in an unusual treatment, earth berms were used for this purpose in the Minnesota Correctional Facility-Oak Park Heights. (See Figure 12.) Proper placement of the restrictive housing unit minimizes opportunities for harassment and introduction of contraband into the unit.

Figure 12
Minnesota Correctional Facility-Oak Park Heights



Environmental Considerations

The physical environment of the restrictive housing unit is important in reducing stress, frustration and boredom, particularly for those inmates who will be assigned for long periods, and confined the majority of their time to their cells.

Adequate cell lighting is necessary for the performance of visual tasks such as reading and writing, not to mention the surveillance requirements of security personnel. Satisfactory lighting levels of 20 footcandles at desk level and the personal grooming area are required by ACA standards.

Lighting can be made available naturally from windows and/or from artificial sources. The debate concerning the psychological effects of windowless environments is considerable and although there has been no definitive research completed on this subject, it is agreed by most practitioners and architects alike that natural light is required to reduce the stress and anxiety brought about by continued confinement in a closed setting.² One option, which appears to be a satisfactory compromise, particularly given the nature of the inmate population, is the extensive use of skylights in inmate housing units, such as at the Special Management Unit in Florence, Arizona. The skylights provide substantial natural light and contact with the outside world yet because of their location cannot be vandalized by inmates.

The colors used in the restrictive housing unit have been shown to be important in creating an environment to improve both inmate and staff morale. ACA standards recommend a light color for cells. For example, cells may be painted off-white with one bright accent wall. Brighter colors may also be used to code doors and units, equipment, circulation spaces, and safety and emergency items.³

Noise is one of a prison environments most persistent problems making normal communication difficult, often disturbing sleep and generally increasing stress and discomfort. A recent study of the prison environment found that noise, along with other invasions of privacy, resulted in substantially increased use of health services.⁴

In controlling "noise pollution," two major factors are at issue for both the facility planner and user. The first is the source of noise, including the clang of metal on metal, loud radios and television sets, and screaming inmates and staff. These sounds all serve to create an indeterminate, disorienting, and very high level of sound. The second factor is the historical use of hard, sound reflective building materials in prison construction. Standards promulgated by the ACA suggest that noise levels should remain under 70 decibels during the daytime and 45 decibels at night.

Recommendations for reducing noise levels include: use of radio and television head phones, utilizing sound absorbing materials such as carpet and acoustical tiles, and limiting metal on metal contacts of the structure, equipment, and furnishings.

The temperature, humidity, and air movement contribute directly to the comfort or discomfort of the restrictive housing environment. The ability to

control thermal conditions, the quantity and type of clothing available, and the amount of exertion by the individual all influence the eventual comfort level of the housing unit environment.

In general, thermal discomfort in existing facilities is quite common. A 1977 study of prisons found that staff and inmates often complained that conditions were too hot or cold, drafty, or stuffy.⁵ Irritability was often present in those institutions where the environment was excessively hot, making aggressive behavior all the more probable.

It is not surprising that correctional facilities have a difficult time achieving thermal comfort, even in new buildings, given that spaces vary greatly in volume, exterior exposures, and occupant load. Such complexity increases the difficulty of mechanical system design.

Standards that apply to thermal comfort are normally based on building code requirements; for example, ACA standards require 10 cubic feet per minute of fresh or purified air per room and suggested temperatures of from 66 to 80 degrees in the summer and from 61 to 73 degrees in the winter.

The final issue to be considered in planning the facility's environment is that of the sensory deprivation brought about by many correctional institutions housing units. Generalizing from other settings, sensory deprivation can cause "difficulty in thinking, a shortening of time perception, distorted impressions of the body, and hallucinations."⁶ It has been further determined that the monotony and boredom found in restrictive housing facilities contribute to the vandalism common in these areas.

The lack of variety that results from limiting an individual's experience to only a small housing unit for long periods of time has been questioned as being detrimental.⁷ Whereas most general population inmates are permitted much wider ranges of movement and greater access to the out-of-doors, disruptive inmates are subject to constantly enforced idleness and the suppression of individual expression.

While it is understood that disruptive inmates require constant surveillance due to their chronic aggressive behaviors, there is a competing need for privacy. The lack of opportunities for privacy increases stress. A study in a Michigan maximum security prison found that inmates assigned to open-barred cells and multiple-occupancy rooms had appreciably higher utilization rates for health services, an indirect measure of stress, while inmates confined in closed, single cells requested many fewer contacts with medical staff.⁸ Similarly, high security inmates whose bathroom activities were constantly monitored by staff reported a higher degree of stress because, it was hypothesized, they were unable to achieve socially accepted norms of privacy for bodily functions.

Restrictive Housing Unit Image

In the planning and design of a new restrictive housing unit or in the renovation of an existing one, the overall image and perception of the unit by inmates, staff, and the general public is important. The reaction of each individual will, in many respects, depend on the person's past experience and reason for being there. The unit's image will allow users to recognize what kind of facility it is and will establish expectations for what will happen there, and how individuals will be treated. The historical design of most such units is easily recognizable--hard and impenetrable, with steel bars, sally ports, and barbed wire. The message is clear and may be received with dread, regret, or relief, depending on who is interpreting it.

The recommendation of this **Guide** is that the image of a restrictive housing unit should be one which first reflects the control and restrictive nature of the facility. The efforts during the past decade to eliminate the symbols of incarceration and control for lower security institutions to achieve a more "normal" and humane environment have been shown to be effective in contributing to a variety of positive effects.⁹ As much as practical and possible, there should be an attempt to reduce the "institutional feel" of the unit for disruptive inmates to reduce the trauma and stress of continued confinement in a closed environment. However, again, due to the serious security concerns presented by this special management population, each attempt at normalization bears examination to determine the impact that the feature will have on inmate management and control. Any effort to create a "soft environment" that will impede inmate supervision and the management of disruptive behavior should be strongly opposed.


Unit Security

The most important component of a unit for inmates who continually threaten the safety and order of the overall institution is security. One method of ensuring that the appropriate security is provided is to establish a hierarchy of security needs, including electronic surveillance. (See Figure 13.)

According to the **ACA Design Guide**, the last defense against escape, in a typical correctional institution, is the perimeter security.¹⁰ The objective is to prevent escape by the persons housed there, and to prevent unauthorized persons from entering. Thus, perimeter security must be maintained while allowing legitimate access to the unit from the larger institution or the outside. Penetration of this perimeter is permitted through the pedestrian and vehicular sally ports, which are regulated by a centralized control center.

A perimeter security system is more effective if inmates perceive its effectiveness, particularly those with long sentences who might contemplate escape. Staff must also have confidence in the system in that the perimeter is not only the last security barrier available to control unauthorized inmate movement, but it also serves as a constant reminder to inmates that no matter

Figure 13
Hierarchy of Security Needs



how violent and disruptive their behavior becomes, it will be contained within the confines of the facility.

According to a noted prison security consultant, an effective perimeter security system for restrictive housing facilities would include:

- Two chain link fences, a minimum of 12 feet high, spaced a minimum of 25 feet apart, with electronic monitoring devices.
- At least one roll of barbed security tape, placed at the top inside face of the inner fence.
- Nine or ten additional rolls, placed between the fences, located so that some are hung in pyramid fashion on the inside face of the outer fence.
- Other rolls, stacked on the ground between the fences.

Additional escape deterrence may be obtained by placing 3/8-inch or smaller mesh at the top of both fences. This mesh may be integrated into the fence fabric or applied on top of the normal fence fabric. To prevent tunneling under the fences, sub-surface concrete barrier beams are placed beneath at least the inner fence.

It is also advisable to use a reliable electronic perimeter "intrusion" detection system. Numerous systems are available, and a careful investigation of the experience of other agencies with particular systems would be beneficial. Problems arise, for example, when the agency's intended application does not coincide with the designer's. In addition, severe or extreme weather conditions, large birds, and other such natural phenomena may trigger false alarms or deactivate the system, thereby rendering it all but useless. In some cases, agencies have not committed themselves to adequate maintenance of electronic intrusion devices, either because they are unaware of its importance or they lack the financial resources. Electronic intrusion devices are only as good as their proper application and adequate maintenance.

In planning a typical long-term custody institution, guard towers are usually provided outside the perimeter fence because most administrators believe towers are vital for adequate security. Prison security experts do not consider towers alone to be sufficient to provide adequate perimeter security for restrictive housing units. A vehicular patrol, equipped with two-way radios, that is capable of responding to the site of a perimeter breach within two minutes of alarm notification would serve as an adequate supplement.

The security of the unit is the next line of defense and second in the hierarchy of security systems. The exterior of the building, or the building envelope, involves the walls, ceilings, and floors of the housing unit, and support core. The integrity of these components is important for several reasons. First, during non-active shifts, when few staff are on duty, there must be the capability to contain inmates under minimal supervision. Second, in the event of a disturbance or widespread violence, the building envelope enables staff to confine inmates in their housing areas until the emergency is brought under control.

Recommendations for ensuring the security of the unit include:

- Walls for a restrictive housing facility should be either masonry or concrete.
- Masonry walls should normally consist of concrete block that is 8 inches thick. To ensure security, these walls should be reinforced with 1/2-inch round steel bars placed at 8 inches on center, both vertically and horizontally. Steel bars should overlap a minimum of 18 inches, and end bars should be adequately anchored to adjoining wall, floors, and ceilings to provide continuity of the security grid system.
- Each concrete block cell should be completely filled with 3,000-pounds-per-square-inch concrete grout.
- The security walls of control rooms should extend all the way to the ceiling and should be anchored.
- To prevent escape and introduction of contraband, openings in secure walls should not exceed 8 x 8 inches, or 5 inches in width if the length is longer than 8 inches. This specification is based upon the assumption that if the opening is small enough to prevent the passage of a person's head, the remainder of the body cannot breach the opening in question.
- Wall openings exceeding these dimensions require security bars or grids such as those placed in openings for heating and cooling ductwork.
- The building's interior walls should be constructed in a similar manner. This is not so much to reduce the likelihood of inmate escape as to minimize vandalism and make it more difficult to hide contraband.
- The ceilings and floors of a restrictive housing unit should also be reinforced to meet the security requirements of disruptive inmates. For example, any openings for ducts or other purposes that are larger than 8 x 8 inches must be fitted with suitable bars, grids, or equally effective barriers.
- A restrictive housing facility requires the most secure windows available, particularly for inmate cells, control centers, and spaces where inmates are not allowed access. No prison window system being marketed today is escape- or vandal-proof. However, the use of steel bars or security steel grilles does minimize the possibility of an inmate breaching the building's perimeter. An alternative to covering windows with steel bars or grilles is the extensive use of skylights to provide exterior lighting. While this approach does not enable inmates to directly view the outside landscape, it does substantially reduce their capability to damage the security integrity of exterior windows.

- A variety of security glazings for windows is available, but all have their limitations when it comes to confining disruptive inmates.
- The designer must also afford attention to the window frame and its anchorage in the wall. Particular emphasis should be given to locating window stops so that they are not accessible to disruptive inmates. This would normally involve placing them on the outside of windows in inmates' cells.

Inmate Housing

ACA standards stipulate that restrictive housing consist of individual cells or rooms, primarily due to the nature of the unit and the problems created by its inmate population. In addition, cell size should be at least 80 square feet. Additional requirements call for all rooms to be equipped with security light fixtures; ground-fault-interrupter electrical outlets; two-way intercoms; and combination stainless steel toilet fixtures. Ideally, all rooms would also be located on one level to facilitate handicapped access and staff observation. The next best cell arrangement is the split-level, two-tiered design.


Grouping the cells or rooms in a manner that allows similarly classified inmates (e.g., isolation status, administrative segregation status, disciplinary segregation status) to be housed in the same area would facilitate supervision and the delivery of programs and services. The most effective cell arrangement is one that can also accommodate various size groups. Good sight lines for staff observation and the number of staff required for proper supervision are also important considerations in determining the housing layout.

Figure 14 shows three examples of how a unit may be subdivided. The first presents a possible layout for the direct supervision approach discussed in Chapter 5. The second represents a comparably-sized design employing an indirect supervision approach. The final layout depicts the more traditional linear design found in most correctional facilities constructed prior to the early 1970s. Generally, it is recommended, based on survey results, that housing pods for disruptive inmates be planned for 16 or less in order to maximize control and inmate supervision.


The total number of disruptive inmates housed within one facility will vary, depending on agency staffing patterns, population pressures, and resources, but generally should not exceed 200.

Figure 14


Linear/Intermittent Surveillance



Podular/Remote Surveillance



Podular/Direct Supervision



Control Center

The design for a control center in a restrictive housing unit is usually similar to that for a master control room in a maximum security institution that houses general population prisoners. Good correctional practices dictate that it must provide good visibility of all the areas it monitors and be secure from outside assault. Its size will depend upon the type and amount of equipment it houses and the extent of the duties assigned to control center staff.

The control center for a restrictive housing unit may be located either inside or outside the unit, and it may or may not share control of the unit with interior control booths placed in the housing areas. In any arrangement, however, it is recommended that policy and procedure stipulate that the control center has the sole capability to allow access to and egress from the unit. To accomplish this, it must be located so that control staff can observe all unit entrances. Closed circuit television and two-way communication systems are two methods frequently used to monitor persons requesting exit from the facility.

Because the control center officer must remain in the center at all times, it is necessary that its design include a toilet and storage facilities for janitor's supplies and emergency equipment.

Control booths are recommended for each housing unit of the facility. The responsibilities delegated to the control booth officer are vital to the security of the unit. Recommended duties of the control booth officer include:

- Regulating access to and from the housing unit and other in-unit program and service space.
- Responsibility for opening and closing cell doors and doors between tiers.
- Monitoring fire and emergency communication systems.
- Monitoring corridors leading to the unit, all inmate and staff activities occurring within the unit, and all inmate movement.

A small sally port is recommended for both control centers and booths to provide entrance security by preventing unauthorized access. While the outer door operates through electrical control by the officer, the inner door should require manual operation to ensure that the officer visually verifies the identity of the person(s) requesting entry.

Likewise, the envelope that surrounds control centers and booths must be of secure construction to prevent a breach of security by outside assault. It is important, however, to provide staff entrances and exits for evacuation purposes. The inner walls (e.g., those between the toilet facilities and the control area) do not require secure construction.

Reception and Release Area

The layout and operation of the reception and release area is important to the overall management of the restrictive housing unit in that this area is the site for inmates' first and last contact with the facility. Thus, it is imperative that the reception and release area represent the degree of control associated with the remainder of the facility, while providing inmates with the opportunity to familiarize themselves with unit policies and procedures prior to formal cell assignment.

Staff Offices

It is recommended that offices for administrative, program, and support services staff be provided within the facility, especially if unit management is used. If space permits, these offices should be designed in a manner that allows staff members to visually supervise inmate movement and activities yet still afford some privacy for confidential discussions. Office space of at least 120 square feet, with sufficient space for secure storage, is recommended.

In addition, a centrally located hearing room of approximately 250 square feet would provide a good location for disciplinary reviews, parole hearings, and other small group activities.

Visiting

Contemporary standards advise that space for family and attorney visits be provided within the restrictive housing unit. Additionally, it is important for security reasons that the location of visiting areas accommodate easy access of visitors through the perimeter security and sally port without exposure to inmates within the unit and that inmate access to the visiting area includes control to and from the unit and provision for shakedowns to prevent the introduction of contraband.

Noncontact visiting space for family members is recommended with telephones as the preferred communication method. At least 30 square feet per inmate and per visitor should be provided.

Attorney/client visits are usually provided in areas designated for contact visits. Space in the multipurpose or programming room could be used for this purpose. This space should be secure and visible to staff supervising the area. The number of contact visiting rooms and noncontact visiting booths needed may be determined based upon an analysis of historical visiting patterns and the visiting schedule.

Medical and Health Care

In order to minimize inmate movement outside the facility, it is desirable for the clinic (sick call) function to take place on the unit. The functional areas recommended for the clinic are:

- An office of 100 square feet for medical and dental staff and for medical and dental records storage.
- A 20-square-foot pharmacy for storing drugs, both refrigerated and non-refrigerated, and for assembling medication for distribution; the pharmacy walls, ceilings, floors, windows, and doors should be sufficiently secure to prevent unauthorized access to stored medications.
- One examination/treatment room of 150 square feet for minor surgical procedures and emergency medical treatment.
- A bulk storage room of about 75 square feet for securing assorted supplies and equipment; this room should be constructed so as to prevent unauthorized access.
- A janitor's closet for secure storage of cleaning supplies;
- Two toilet facilities for use by staff and inmates; the toilets should be located adjacent to the examining/treatment room for use in diagnosis.
- A dental operatory of 175 square feet to include one dental station and a wall-mounted dental x-ray unit.
- A dental laboratory for preparing materials needed in dental treatment; in a 200-bed facility, 75 square feet is adequate.

Programs

Due to their previous institutional conduct, access to programs is usually limited for inmates in restrictive housing units. One 150 to 200 square-foot room for every housing unit should be adequate for delivery of educational programs, counseling, therapy, testing, and so forth. Locating this room within the housing unit minimizes inmate movement and thus, increases security. Regardless of where program space is located it is recommended that secure glazing be used for the top half of the front wall so that activities within the room are observable to the control booth and floor officers.

In addition, this space could be used for inmate legal work, in which case it would be equipped with a table, chair, and a typewriter. Use of this room for legal work will require close supervision to prevent vandalism of legal materials or office equipment.

Support Services

Inmates in restrictive housing units also require provisions for barbering, property storage, and commissary. Again, if possible, these functions should be provided within the unit, where they are easily accessible and observable. The multipurpose space or the program space incorporated into the housing unit could also be used for barbering. The storage of property and commissary may be combined in the same space, as inmates are not permitted access to either unit function. A combined storage area of 600 square feet should be adequate, given the restrictions traditionally placed on inmate personal property and permissible commissary purchases within restrictive housing units.

Recreation

Disruptive inmates will spend a considerable portion of each day in their cells. Given this substantial amount of inactivity, space is needed for both active and passive recreational pursuits. A secure outside recreation area of approximately 2,500 square feet with a security vestibule entrance should be adequate for a unit population of 200. The outside area may be subdivided into smaller activity areas to accommodate individuals or small groups of inmates at one time. If chain link is used, project staff recommend it be not welded. The outside recreation area should be located so that the inmates using this space cannot be easily viewed by the general population or by visitors. Correct placement of the recreation area minimizes harassment and opportunities for the introduction of contraband. A location that permits effective supervision from security posts is also recommended.

As shown in Figure 15, new designs, such as that used for the Washington Corrections Center-Intensive Management Unit (IMU), have incorporated space for outdoor recreation inside the building's perimeter, often in a courtyard-type setting. This approach affords a second security perimeter for the unit, while minimizing distances between housing and recreation yards.


The IMU design also includes inside recreation yards within the security perimeter of the unit. In more traditional facilities, it is recommended that the day room be used for passive recreation if it is possible to prevent physical contact between inmates in the day room and inmates in their cells.

Food Service

Unless the size of a restrictive housing unit justifies a full-service kitchen or the institutional kitchen is in a remote location, this component of the food service program may be provided through the main institution. When the small size of the unit precludes a separate food preparation area, special procedures should be developed for food handling and delivery by staff to ensure that food gets to the unit in the same condition it left the main kitchen.

Figure 15

WASHINGTON CORRECTIONS CENTER
IMU



FIRST LEVEL FLOOR PLAN

Diagram Prepared By:
Schlup, Becker & Brennan Architects
(Kansas City, Kansas)

It is recommended that each housing unit within the facility should be equipped with a secured meal distribution area of approximately 150 square feet. Food service equipment needed will include a small refrigerator/ freezer, microwave oven, counter space, sink, and storage. Food would then be transported from the main kitchen in carts and, if appropriate, reheated before being served. This is the practice at the Centennial Correctional Facility in Colorado. Another option is the use of prepared frozen meals, which can be heated in microwaves just prior to serving.

General Storage

It is important to plan a restrictive housing unit that includes sufficient storage space for the multitude of supplies and equipment necessary for the care and confinement of inmates. General storage requirements for a 200-bed facility include a 400-square-foot room located near the unit's loading dock.

Projected Total Space Requirements

An important activity prior to identifying the actual amount of space that will be required for each area is to provide comprehensive information about each space. In doing so, the following format is recommended:

- **Users.** List the primary users of the space, including an estimate of their numbers and perhaps the time pattern of their use.
- **Activities.** List the major activities that are expected to occur in the space.
- **Objectives.** Consider expected and desirable behaviors for the space, together with ideas about how the design can encourage or support desirable behaviors and inhibit undesirable ones.
- **Safety and Security.** Indicate specific users and conditions that generate concerns for safety and security along with the level of building performance necessary to respond to these concerns.
- **Linkages and Separations.** List required linkages or separations between this space and others, if not already developed above.
- **Ambient conditions.** List environmental conditions required in each area including heat, ventilation, view, and acoustics.
- **Materials.** Develop a statement of the performance required or of recommended choices for construction materials and surface finishes.
- **Furnishings.** State the performance required from or recommended choices for furnishings.

- **Equipment.** Consider special equipment needs, systems or services such as electrical, plumbing, security, communications, or computing.
- **Size.** State the area in square feet and critical dimensions or shape of the space.
- **Other.** List any additional or special requirements for the space such as adaptability, multiple/sequential use, and expandability.
- **Program Summary Sheet.** Record this information on a program summary sheet for each area or functional unit.¹¹

The types and amount of space recommended for a 200-bed restrictive housing unit, divided into four 50-bed housing pods, is shown in Table 4. The minimum space requirements are based upon those recommended by ACA's **Design Guide**.¹² Figure 16 on the next page is a schematic representation of how these various spaces can be located to maximize security while enhancing program and support services delivery.

Table 4
Disruptive Inmate Housing Unit Space Requirements

<u>Area</u>	<u>Number of Spaces</u>	<u>Space Standard</u> (Square Feet)	<u>Net Square Feet</u>
Inmate Cell	200	80	16,000
Shower	25	30	750
Control Center (Master)	1	300	300
Control Booth (Housing)	4	200	800
Sally Port	1	150	150
Staff Office	8	120	960
Multipurpose Room	4	250	1,000
Day Room	4	35/inmate	7,000
Outdoor Recreation	4	2,500	10,000
Reception/Release	1	300	300
Medical/Sick Call	1	621	621
Food Preparation	4	150	600
Visiting (noncontact)	12	60	720
Property Storage (commissary)	1	600	600
General Storage	1	400	400
Program Space	4	100	400
Subtotal			40,601
Net to Gross Percentage			145%
Gross Square Feet			18,270
Total Square Feet			58,871

Figure 16




Diagram Prepared By:
Schlup, Becker & Brennan Architects
(Kansas City, Kansas)

Special Guidelines for Existing Facilities

Antiquated, substandard, and overcrowded restrictive housing units may, in part, be responsible for the continued misconduct of disruptive inmates. In the absence of new facilities, however, such facilities have to be used.

Renovation of an existing facility is an option in lieu of the planning, design, and construction of a new building for the housing of disruptive inmates. In the consideration of a renovation as a facility alternative, a number of criteria should be addressed, many of which were also appropriate for review prior to new construction.¹³ These include, but are not limited to such general issues as compliance with standards and legal requirements, capacity projections, goals and objectives, and future needs and more specific to renovation, building soundness and adaptability, fire and life safety, security and safety, separation, comfort and humane conditions, appropriate spaces for programs and services, sanitation, efficiency, and scale.

General Issues

Compliance with Standards and Legal Requirements. In assessing an existing structure for possible renovation as a restrictive housing unit, an agency needs to determine its compliance with standards, laws, and codes that prescribe practices, conditions, and types and amounts of space. For instance, although there may be sufficient bed space for all projected disruptive inmates, the renovated facility may have too little space per person to meet minimum legal requirements. Or, while an agency may not view extremely low levels in housing areas as a problem, the standards specifying minimum levels should be complied with.

Capacity Projections. In reviewing an existing facility, it is important to determine whether the structure will be able to house the projected number of disruptive inmates for each classification type. If the answer is "no," planning is needed to determine what combination of renovation and new construction would meet future projections.

Goals and Objectives. A review of goals and objectives, including those identified in the mission statement for the restrictive housing unit, will determine which ones the facility apparently achieves and which ones could be satisfied by renovations or additions. For instance, one goal may be to provide surveillance from a single control point. To assess the facility's current performance, one must first determine whether all the cells in the existing structure are visible from a security post. If not, would surveillance be possible with renovations to an existing post or by relocating a post within the existing building? Or, while an existing building may provide adequate exterior orientation via secure windows, this orientation may allow the disruptive inmate population to visually observe the entrance and exit of staff, official visitors, and other individuals into the restrictive housing unit.

Future Needs. Future needs and flexibility are necessary considerations in renovating or providing an addition to an existing facility. Correctional programs and populations, laws, and judicial practices are likely to change considerably. Hence, the facility design needs to accommodate the desired programs and projected populations for a defined period after present changes are made. If the investment is to be large, the facility should serve as more than an interim solution.

In considering future needs, the examination of many variables is important. For example, can the existing facility grow or change? Are site, orientation, and building configuration compatible with conversion to passive or active solar energy systems? Could air conditioning be added by using the existing duct system or would major construction work and expense be necessary? Could intake, visiting, and/or program spaces be expanded without substantial additional funding?

Specific Issues

In addition to the general issues described above, it is important for an evaluation of existing structures to concentrate on nine focal areas. These are derived from laws and national standards, such as those promulgated by the American Correctional Association, as well as functional and design issues that are likely to reflect agencies' concerns. Agencies may wish to add other specific issues that respond to their local situations.

Building Soundness and Adaptability. The first task is to determine the adequacy, safety, and soundness of the facility's structural, mechanical, electrical, and plumbing (sewage and water supply) systems. Which walls are load-bearing and which are partitions that could be more easily moved? Can appropriately sized spaces be created within the existing physical constraints (for example, load-bearing walls)? Is the facility adequately braced to withstand earthquakes and windstorms? Is there easy access to critical parts of the plumbing system? Can the electrical system be added to so it can support future equipment requirements. The chief responsibility for answering these types of questions is best delegated to engineers and architects.

Fire and Life Safety. The second task is to examine the ability of the proposed renovated structure to provide for adequate fire and life safety. Are all the building materials and furnishings in inmate areas fire resistant? Does the facility meet codes concerning the number and location of points of egress, fire extinguishers, alarms, and smoke removal systems? If not, what is necessary to meet the codes? For example, are there at least two means of egress from all occupied areas? Could secure exits be added? The state fire marshal and agency engineers and architects should explore these fire and safety questions early on in the planning of the renovation.

Security and Safety. The third task is examining to what extent can the building provide for the substantial security and safety required by the disruptive inmate population? To what extent does the building facilitate order and control; prevent escapes, break-ins (to break inmates out), and mass riots; and minimize attacks on inmates and staff? Is there now, or is the building amenable to incorporating, an adequate communications system, an electronic

surveillance system, and a mechanical locking system for inmate housing areas? Could inmates within the restricted housing unit who are extremely disruptive, such as those prone to constant violence and/or escape attempts, be kept in separate, more secure areas? Are all intake, housing, activity, and circulation areas secure and easily observable? Is there a secure perimeter around all inmate areas? Are there provisions for physically handicapped inmates and visitors? What changes would have to be made to satisfy these concerns? Architects, security staff, electrical engineers, and correctional facility planners are in the best position to make these safety and security determinations.

Separation. Determining whether the existing building has sufficient space and flexibility within its structure to provide for the effective separation of various categories of inmates is an important task. Does or can the facility enable a classification plan to be carried out? Can special classes of disruptive inmates, such as those being disciplined or the mentally disturbed, be separated? Is the facility flexible enough to accommodate increases and decreases of each of these population types? How many inmates will the renovated facility permit to be housed by pod and what would be the effective area for in-unit dining, living, and shower facilities? Can "small" pods (of 6 to 12) be accommodated within the existing facility? Are physical and acoustical separations between areas adequate to facilitate management and control as well as to limit interaction between housing units in the case of a disturbance? These are questions for correctional staff, administrators, and classification officers, along with the architects and security personnel.

Comfort and Humane Conditions. The fifth task in determining the adequacy of an existing building relative to renovation and/or additions is determining its ability to provide for staff and inmate comfort and respond to the objective of providing humane conditions of confinement. How adequate are the heating, air conditioning, and ventilation (air flow, fresh air, air quality) systems? How sufficient is the artificial lighting for work, sleep, or surveillance? Is there natural light in all housing areas? Is there too much noise in the staff work areas, inmate housing areas, and program areas? How much space is there per inmate for sleeping, dining, and showers? Is there sufficient space to accommodate indoor and outdoor recreation activities? What are the conditions of the materials and furnishings of the spaces used by the inmates? These issues should be evaluated by engineers, architects, and correctional staff, with input from other staff.

Appropriate Spaces for Programs and Support Services. While the number and type of programs for disruptive inmates will be relatively minimal compared to the general population, ACA standards and accepted correctional practice still require that this segment of the inmate population, particularly those able to control their disruptive behavior while in the housing unit, be provided programming consistent with their disruptiveness. In examining an existing building for possible renovation, a number of questions need to be answered by correctional staff and architects. Is there adequate space for support services and restrictive housing unit functions such as intake, short-term holding, administration, food service, laundry, and general storage? If the facility must increase the housing unit area to accommodate more inmates, will other areas be adequate in size? Are the spaces appropriate, or can they be remodeled so that they are suitable for and supportive of their functions? (For instance, there may be adequate square footage in the day rooms, but if they are very long

and narrow, with a number of blind spots they may be impractical for disruptive inmates. Do the areas available for programs and services permit staff to maximize supervision?

Sanitation. The seventh task in assessing the adequacy of an existing building for housing disruptive inmates is determining how conducive it is to providing adequate sanitation. Are there adequate provisions for staff and inmate toilets in inmate housing, intake, program, activity, and recreation areas? What provisions are there for showering in short-term segregation areas? Can inmates obtain privacy from other inmates for hygiene purposes yet be effectively supervised by staff? Can inmate housing, day room space, food service, and preparation areas be thoroughly cleaned? Can vermin be prevented from infiltrating these same areas? The appropriate correctional staff, food service personnel, and sanitation engineers can help to address these hygiene concerns.

Efficiency. A critical concern in the renovation of any existing structure is how efficient it can be made in terms of managing and controlling disruptive inmate populations. Are the relationships and circulation paths between areas logical and efficient (for example, lobby near visiting, day rooms near cells)? Are the most frequently traveled routes relatively short and easily supervised? Could the facility utilize fewer staff if the layout were more efficient? How does the efficiency or inefficiency of the proposed renovation satisfy both short-term operational and long-term life cycle costs? Correctional staff, administrators, and architects should assist in answering these questions.

Scale. An important if not critical concern in the renovation of an existing building or an addition to a currently operated restrictive housing unit is the overall scale of the building. Is the scale of the housing areas oppressive and institutional? If so, could large areas be subdivided to better accommodate inmates in smaller groups? Can different areas reflect different security levels by using a variety of different building materials or configurations? Are the distances from staff control points and supervision areas so substantial as to seriously affect inmate surveillance? Working with correctional staff and administrators, architects would be able to provide answers to these questions of scale.

Low Cost Recommendations

Given these general and specific issues, there are a number of significant physical improvements to an old facility that can be accomplished by effective planning, even with a fairly limited budget, and they could be a significant preventive measure against disruptive behavior. The American Correctional Association, for example, suggests the following:

- Painting is an inexpensive improvement. Although it is a cosmetic approach, it can be psychologically significant. For example, careful color selections can change the apparent size of a cell and relieve the confining monotony it represents. Color also has security use as an aid in identification of location.

- The bathroom facilities in most older restrictive housing units also require urgent attention. The showers and toilets are in most cases obsolete and often have become repulsive with abuse and neglect. In addition to enhancing appearance, new epoxies and other plastic surfacings can be used fill cracks in these areas. Filling the cracks prevents the accumulation of filth and debris, thus reducing noxious odors, controlling insects and vermin, and also preventing concealment of contraband. Advice from fire code inspectors should be sought to determine whether these materials meet existing standards.
- Poor lighting is common complaint from inmates. The quality, which includes the surfaces which reflect it and the shadows it makes, is as important to consider as the quantity. A simple increase in intensity is not necessarily, from the inmate's point of view, an improvement. One relatively recent innovation in lighting technology is a source that provides the full spectrum of waves found naturally outdoors. Studies comparing full-spectrum artificial sources to the more common "cold," partial-spectrum tubes or bulbs have demonstrated that full-spectrum provides a number of mental and physical health benefits, including improved functioning of body organs and more positive mental attitudes.
- Noise pollution in many older restrictive housing units stems from their original designs and is another common source of complaints from inmates and staff alike. A whole range of relatively cheap soundproofing materials, such as sound-deadening paint, batten wall covering made from security cloth, and sound-absorbing materials, is now available for reducing noise pollution. Even simple rubber bumpers applied to doors and gates can drastically lower noise levels.
- Another factor affecting attitude and behavior in restrictive housing areas is inadequate ventilation for personal physical comfort. Thick exterior walls absorb solar heat, which is reradiated during the evening hours, creating temperatures well above the comfort level. With overcrowding and inadequate exhaust, body odors compounded by toilet odors create stifling conditions. The addition of fans to move air through exhausts and to exchange air at acceptable rates is an immediate remedy for these conditions.¹⁴

Fireproofing and fire protection are critical considerations for each of the suggestions listed above. Almost all new materials of this kind are manufactured in accordance with the most stringent fire codes, but this cannot be assumed. Therefore, safety ratings must be checked against applicable government codes. At the same time, an agency may wish to examine the amount of "fuel" materials already present in the restrictive housing unit, and initiate acceptable and reasonable means to reduce this amount.

Notes

- 1 American Correctional Association, Causes, Preventive Measures and Methods of Controlling Riots and Disturbances in Correctional Institutions, (College Park, MD: American Correctional Association, 1970). p. 11.
- 2 Belinda L. Collins. Windows and People: A Literature Survey. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of Commerce, 1975).
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- 4 Ernest Moore, "Environmental Variables Affecting Prisoner Health Care Demands." Research and Design '85. Proceedings of the American Institute of Architects. (1985).
- 5 Richard Wener and Nathan Clark. A User-Based Evaluation of the Chicago Metropolitan Correctional Center: Final Report. (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1977).
- 6 Claude Leroy, "Space in Prison", in Prison Architecture, ed. Giuseppe Di Gennaro, et. al. New York (1977).
- 7 Paul Silver, "New Directions in Correctional Design: Towards Humanization of Institutions", Environmental Design Research Association Conference, Tucson, AZ (1978).
- 8 Moore, p. 59.
- 9 Jay Farbstein, Correctional Facility Planning and Design, 2nd Ed. (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1986).
- 10 American Correctional Association, Design Guide for Secure Adult Correctional Facilities, (College Park, MD: American Correctional Association, 1983), p. 160.
- 11 Jay Farbstein, Correctional Facility Planning and Design, 2nd Ed. (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1986).
- 12 American Correctional Association, Design Guide.
- 13 Correctional Services Group, Inc., in association with CRS Sirrine, Master Plan for the Renovation of San Quentin State Prison, (San Francisco, CA: CRS Sirrine, 1986).
- 14 American Correctional Association, Design Guide, p. 12-13.

CHAPTER 8 MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF DISRUPTIVE INMATE MANAGEMENT

Introduction

The idea of systematically collecting and analyzing information to monitor and evaluate operations is not new to the field of corrections. Increased emphasis on assessment and accountability gathered momentum in the late 1960s and, by the mid-1970s, widespread development of planning and evaluation units had occurred within correctional agencies. What has prevented corrections from realizing the full potential of this management tool is the enormous task of converting manual records to automated storage and retrieval systems. In many states it has taken years to get even the most rudimentary inmate data "on-line." The result is that many correctional administrators are reluctant to propose the routine collection and automation of additional information.

The following suggestions for monitoring and evaluating disruptive inmate management generally do not require automated data systems although they would undoubtedly profit from the added capability to quickly retrieve, tabulate, and statistically analyze information on disruptive behavior.

While the terms monitoring and evaluation are often used in concert, they are not inseparable functions. It is possible to monitor operations and practices without evaluating their effectiveness just as it is possible to collect data to evaluate operations and practices without the aid of a monitoring system. The two are, however, complementary functions. The collection of pertinent data for evaluation purposes is certainly facilitated by a monitoring system, and the data obtained through monitoring is certainly more useful when it is carefully analyzed and employed to develop more effective management practices and facility operations.

The section that follows, on monitoring, was written for correctional administrators. Thus, the language is not technical, but employs everyday standard usage. Conversely, the section on evaluation was written for planning and research staff. To avoid ambiguity and confusion, this section does employ technical terminology and describes sophisticated statistical techniques which are usually familiar to staff in the planning and research fields.

Monitoring

As used in this chapter, monitoring is considered to be the systematic observation and documentation of the effects of agency policies and procedures on the management of disruptive inmates. The unstated purpose of monitoring, in this context, is to use its results to improve management practices. Monitoring is a particularly useful tool for correctional managers who have little, if any, training in correctional evaluation. Its results readily lend themselves to empirical analysis by experienced correctional practitioners. For example, an agency that implements a new policy requiring videotaped forced cell

moves and experiences a 50% reduction in formal inmate allegations of staff brutality does not require statistical analysis to prove the new policy has had at least one desired impact. However, it does need a monitoring system to ensure the relevant data are collected, presented in a form that is useful for empirical analysis, and available to the right staff, namely the agency's policymakers.

To achieve an effective system for monitoring disruptive inmate management practices, the following elements are recommended:

- The agency must have a clear purpose for monitoring its management practices and a plan for using the information generated by the monitoring effort.

This is important for two major reasons. First, the staff who develop the monitoring system must have an understanding of what it is trying to achieve in order to identify what information should be routinely collected. Second, information collected via monitoring may not be used effectively and appropriately, or more importantly, used at all, if there is no plan for its use. Information that is collected, but not used, very quickly becomes information that is not collected. Collecting information to no end ensures a monitoring system's quick demise.

- The system must be supervised by an administrator who has the authority to access the resources necessary to set up the monitoring mechanism, secure all the information needed to monitor management practices on a continuing basis, and act upon the information gathered through monitoring.

The creation, implementation, and maintenance of an effective monitoring system requires the cooperation of staff responsible for different agency/facility operations. These activities also require staff time and equipment and supply resources. As such, system supervision is a task to be delegated to someone who can make the necessary staff assignments and requisition the needed equipment and supplies. Most important, a staff member is needed to oversee the monitoring system who can recognize the utility of the monitoring information and, at a minimum, recommend needed changes in management practices.

- Staff must be available to develop, implement, and sustain the monitoring system.

Too many times correctional agencies attempt to complete important projects by assigning extra duties to staff whose primary responsibility is unrelated to the task at hand. The end result is either that the new project is not afforded sufficient attention to ensure its success or that the primary staff responsibility is neglected. If at all possible, carefully selected staff are the best candidates to assign to the monitoring project. Factors to consider in staff selection would include experience in monitoring correctional practices, current and projected workload, and relevance of monitoring to present duties. These staff will be asked to: specify the information to be collected; determine the schedule for its collection; designate the individual responsible for information collection; specify the frequency, content, and

distribution of monitoring reports; and develop the design for the necessary information collection/reporting forms.

- The information needed to support the monitoring system must be available in a form that facilitates its collection and analysis.

Most information needed for monitoring is available within an agency's records, generally within individual records (e.g., the inmate's master file). However, information collection that relies on the regular search of applicable individual records to extract pertinent information is not efficient. Such information is much more useful if it is incorporated into a greater data base at the time the source record is initially processed. At a minimum, a micro-computer could be used to store monitoring information in a data base management system for later tabulation and analysis.

Information recommended for monitoring purposes includes, but is not limited to, the following:

- Daily population of the disruptive inmate restrictive housing unit(s);
- Basic demographic characteristics of inmates assigned to the restrictive housing unit(s);
- Criminal history;
- Escape history;
- Prior institutional history/adjustment;
- Number, type, and outcome(s) of incidents on a monthly basis;
- Number, type, and outcome(s) of grievances on a monthly basis;
- Previous classification designation of inmates admitted to the restricted housing unit(s);
- Number of releases from the unit by destination; i.e., general population, medical/ mental health facility, other state or federal institution, etc.;
- Adjustment of individual inmates following release from the unit(s);
- Staff turnover, use of sick leave, other authorized, unauthorized leave, etc.;
- Staffing level, on a daily basis; and
- Disciplinary actions taken against staff by number, type, and outcome(s.)

Evaluation

While an agency can implement new practices to enhance management of disruptive inmates, change in and of itself does not guarantee improved operations. Ultimately, the agency must answer several fundamental questions: Are these new practices achieving their desired ends? Are they helping to improve the management of disruptive inmates, decrease violent behaviors, and enhance unit safety and operations?

With only a limited amount of resources to work with, an agency needs to know whether its efforts are actually having a positive impact. Thus, the evaluation of strategies intended to control disruptive behaviors becomes crucial to determining the success of these practices.

Given this objective, a useful and proven assessment tool is performance evaluation. Performance evaluation is designed to obtain data about how well a restrictive housing unit is operating. This type of evaluation does not assess unit operations themselves, but rather examines qualities or attributes of those operations. Evaluation of performance, or outcome, entails collecting and classifying information and then relating it to those qualities or attributes identified as important or desired in reducing disruptive behavior.

Thus, before any assessment can occur, an agency needs to identify which qualities or attributes are important or intended. In order to evaluate a particular management operation, these qualities or attributes must then be formulated as performance measures. Performance measures are descriptions of how well a disruptive management approach is working; for example, "number of inmate assaults on staff" or "number of grievances filed by inmates." To be useful, however, these measures need to be converted into performance measurements, statements reflecting data about the measures for a specified period. Using the measures above, for instance, an agency might arrive at performance measurements such as "7 inmate assaults on staff occurred during the first half of 1986" and "93 grievances were filed by inmates in 1985." The final activity in performance evaluation is performance comparison. Performance comparison enables an agency to assess measurements for a particular set of management practices in relation to measurements for other management approaches, measurements for the same set of practices during a different time frame, or objectives established for the unit operations. If the agency is evaluating a new management approach, it is best to use the first type of comparison. For example, "93 grievances were filed by inmates in 1985 following initiation of the new management practices, compared to 127 filings in 1984 under previous operations."

Two common approaches to performance evaluation can be used in examining the effectiveness of strategies to manage disruptive maximum security inmates:

- Time-series analysis of agency records to determine the impacts of new management practices and the extent to which any changes can be attributed to new management practices; and
- Surveys to assess whether staff and prisoners perceive differences in the level of disruptive activity and the degree of their personal safety following implementation of new practices. Surveys can also

be used to examine opinions regarding the effectiveness of specific management strategies.

Either of these approaches can provide some indication of success or failure. However, the most useful tactic is to combine the two. Time-series analysis provides documented evidence of any changes in behavior, while surveys of staff and inmate perceptions compensate for underreporting by staff and broaden the scope of analysis. Both of these approaches, for instance, are being employed to assess the impact of management practices implemented in the fall of 1984 at the Administrative Segregation Unit, Arizona State Prison Complex-Florence. (See Appendix B.)

Time-Series Analysis of Agency Records

An analysis of agency records before and after initiation of new policies and procedures is probably the most objective and practicable means of assessing their impact, particularly if the information required is automated and monitoring is ongoing.

The overall design for this type of analysis is traditionally referred to as interrupted time-series and can be graphically portrayed as follows:

O_1 O_2 O_3 O_4 X O_5 O_6 O_7 O_8

Each O_n represents an observation period either before or after the introduction of new policies or procedures (represented by "X"). In this example, O_1 - O_4 represent the before period and O_5 - O_8 represent the after period. If the introduction of the new approach has had its desired effects, a reduction in the rates of violence and other measures of inmate misconduct should be observed in the after period. If no changes are apparent or an increase occurs, an agency has preliminary evidence that the new operation has not achieved its desired objectives.

To conduct appropriate time-series analysis, a sufficient number of data points for a diverse array of quantifiable outcome measures (e.g., disciplinary infractions, inmate grievances, and staff turnover) must also be available. At a minimum, information covering a four-year period is required so that performance measurements can be constructed during the two years prior to the implementation of new practices and the two years after.

For instance, one recommended outcome measure in a time-series analysis is the incidence of disciplinary infractions, an important indicator of management effectiveness. If the agency has a relatively small population in its disruptive inmate restrictive housing unit(s), it is advisable to examine all major disciplinary reports during the four-year period. However, if the agency has a large number of disruptive inmates (more than 200) in its restrictive housing unit(s), it is better to prepare a sampling plan for each type of violation. The number to be included in the sample should depend upon the prevalence of the specific infraction. For example, in assessing the variance in staff and inmate deaths, which are relatively rare, a 100% sample

might be employed. The sample size can be reduced for violations such as verbal abuse of staff, which occurs much more frequently.

A sample data base on types of violations might include:

- Homicides;
- Suicides;
- Assaults on staff;
- Assaults on inmates;
- Destruction of state property;
- Sexual assault;
- Escape or attempted escape;
- Possession of contraband;
- Verbal abuse of staff;
- Disobeying a direct order;
- Loitering;
- Unsanitary conditions; and
- Disrupting count.

The following information, contained by most disciplinary reports, is also useful in this type of analysis: date of report, type of violation, location of violation, disposition of report, and disciplinary action taken. These data will allow a precise assessment of the frequency, type, and location of violations occurring within the unit(s).

To enhance the analysis, the agency may wish to collect data for each unit on the following variables:


- End-of-month inmate population;
- End-of-month bed capacity;
- Number of administrative staff;
- Number of security staff; and
- Number of program staff.

These data can be used to convert disciplinary incidents into monthly rates per 100 inmates and to develop monthly measures of overcrowding (population/capacity) and staffing/inmate ratios that can be integrated into the analysis.

Once the data have been aggregated, analysis can proceed with a simple plotting of the various measures of inmate violence over time for each unit.

The results of this analysis can produce some highly useful information. However, it is also possible that causal relationships drawn from these findings may be of questionable validity since new management practices do not operate in a perfect vacuum. As shown in Figure 17, new practices and their outcomes may be affected by external factors such as sentencing legislation, overcrowding, inmate characteristics, and tendency of violation rates to peak and recede independent of management intervention.

Figure 17
Influence of External Factors on Management Practices



Thus, as trends in time-series analysis emerge, more sophisticated multivariate analysis should be employed using a variety of linear regression models that incorporate independent variables believed to be associated with official misconduct. These models can be used to test the effects of monthly variances in independent variables such as overcrowding ratio, staff/inmate ratio, end-of-month population, and inmate characteristics. The models can help isolate the presumed effects of policy intervention from other forces impinging on misconduct. In addition to disciplinary infractions, a wide range of other performance measures that reflect on management effectiveness may be examined. Measures to consider include:

- Number of staff requiring medical treatment due to assault or use of force;
- Number of work days lost due to staff injury;
- Number of inmates requiring medical treatment due to assaults, fights, or use of force;
- Number and type of grievances filed by inmates;
- Rate of staff turnover; and
- Amount of good time lost by inmates due to disciplinary action.

Time-series analysis can also be used with these variables, enabling the agency to conduct performance comparisons for the before and after periods.

These analyses will provide an agency with answers to two key questions: (1) To what extent, if any, has the management of disruptive inmates in its restrictive housing unit(s) improved? and (2) To what extent can any change be attributed to new management practices?

Surveys of Staff and Inmate Perceptions

The second approach to evaluating disruptive inmate management is through personal observations. Staff and inmates can be surveyed to obtain a "reading" on disruptive behaviors and management practices. Such a survey is likely to provide information which is more comprehensive than that derived from an analysis of agency records. In addition, the experiences of many state correctional agencies indicate that disciplinary records are not completely accurate measures of disruptive behavior due to a variety of factors, including dependence on staff knowledge of such behavior, failure of staff to report infractions, ineffective information systems, and inadequate disciplinary procedures. Consequently, relying solely on disciplinary reports is likely to result in the underestimation of disruptive behavior.

In conducting an agency survey of staff and inmate perceptions, it is generally more effective to employ a questionnaire rather than a personal interview. While an interview affords more opportunities to elaborate on questions and answers, a questionnaire offers anonymity, and, thus, is more likely to elicit participation and reliable responses.

As in the time-series analysis procedure, an agency would first identify all important or desired outcomes of disruptive inmate management that should be addressed by the questionnaire. Possible performance measures include the proportion of inmates engaging in disruptive behavior, staff control over inmates, effectiveness of internal management procedures, and outcomes of placement and release criteria.

The measures identified for examination then form the basis for drafting the survey instrument. The questionnaires are easier to code and analyze if they use a closed-ended format; for example, simple yes-no questions, multiple choice questions, or Likert scales. In order to afford a more complete perspective on important issues, inmates may be asked the same questions as staff. It is recommended that the questionnaire also obtain basic demographic data (age, race, education, etc.) for each respondent. Also useful is information regarding correctional experience; for example, job classification and length of service for staff, and current offense, length of sentence, and prior commitments for inmates.

It is useful to pilot test the draft questionnaire on a small sample of staff and inmates. The pilot test can be used to determine understandability of questions, effectiveness of question sequencing, ease of administration, and time frame for administration. (See Appendix C for sample staff and inmate questionnaires.)

After the questionnaire has been pilot tested and modified to correct any weaknesses, it can be distributed to staff and inmates. To increase participation, it is recommended that managers at all levels inform their staff of the reasons for the survey's administration, the importance of their completing the survey, and the intended use of survey results. The questionnaire is then completed by all administrative, program and treatment staff and a sample of security staff (100% if they number 50 or less) working in the agency's restrictive housing unit(s). As in the analysis of agency records, it may be necessary to administer the questionnaire to a representative sample of inmates,

depending upon the number of units and their respective populations. (A 100% sample is recommended if the total population is 50 or less.)

To expedite coding and analysis, it is better to transfer answers to closed-ended questionnaire items directly to data summary sheets. Responses to open-ended items will have to be summarized before they can be further interpreted. This can be accomplished by identifying and categorizing respondents' most frequent statements.

Finally, the data sheets are analyzed to ascertain trends in staff and inmate perceptions of the extent of disruptive behavior and the success of management strategies to control it.

While the survey procedure yields only subjective evaluations of management practices and personal safety, it can also uncover attitudes and staff skill deficiencies that affect unit operations. For instance, security staff who believe that certain kinds of inmates are typically violent or disruptive may tend to supervise these inmates more closely, write them up more often for disciplinary infractions, or use force more frequently on them than on other prisoners. Conversely, inmates who perceive staff control as inadequate may be more likely to harass, threaten, or assault other prisoners, augmenting fears for personal safety. Questions that show a high degree of agreement between staff and inmates are usually those afforded special attention when assessing specific management strategies.

In addition, cross-tabulations constructed from data on demographic characteristics and correctional experience can reveal information that can be used to initiate, fine tune, or discontinue particular management strategies. If younger inmates routinely cite idleness and boredom as an important cause of disruptive behavior, intensive recreational activities for them might be increased. If most staff with considerable correctional experience believe that existing unit release criteria are inadequate, these criteria might be reviewed and revised.

Despite all the information that can be obtained from a survey of staff and inmates, this approach has one major drawback: it lacks a before-and-after time frame. Consequently, it affords no means of comparing conditions, or performance, prior to and following the introduction of policies and procedures intended to improve inmate management. When possible, a more useful and revealing approach would be to administer the questionnaire before any strategies are initiated. The questionnaire can then be re-administered after the new practices have been in place for at least a year. Differences in staff and inmate perceptions over time--a measure of effectiveness--can be derived through statistical methods like analysis of variance.

Use of Evaluation Results

Taken together, the time-series analysis of agency records and the survey of staff and inmate perceptions will provide a correctional agency with a reasonable assessment of how well disruptive inmates are being managed. A positive evaluation can reward many hours of research and planning. It can also help determine and justify priorities in resource allocation. And by providing

staff with feedback on the effectiveness of unit policies and procedures, along with their own roles in managing disruptive behaviors, a positive evaluation can serve as a source of motivation to maintain or even improve performance.

However, even findings of inadequacies can be useful. Such results can focus attention on particular problem areas and become starting points for the development of more effective management strategies. They can also point up the need for additional resources.

No matter what the outcome of the evaluation procedures, it is important to view them as the first step in an ongoing process of assessment and change. Thus, agencies that currently lack data on some of the measures listed in the discussion of time-series analysis are strongly urged to establish effective monitoring systems. Moreover, changes in policies and procedures, inmate characteristics, housing design, staffing requirements, or other factors influencing inmate management will probably require modification or revision of the performance measures used in survey questionnaires and analytical models.

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Appendix A:
Major Findings of Questionnaire Survey

Number of Adult Prisoners by Agency

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>Total</u>
Alabama	10,460	562	11,022
Alaska<a>			
Arizona	8,220	414	8,634
California	47,023	2,907	49,930
Colorado	3,604	147	3,751
Connecticut<a>			
Delaware	2,674	99	2,773
District of Columbia	4,530	0	4,530
Florida	27,500	1,306	28,806
Georgia	15,532	835	16,367
Hawaii<a>			
Illinois	18,152	707	18,859
Indiana<a>			
Iowa<a>			
Kansas	4,461	248	4,709
Kentucky	4,801	208	5,009
Maryland	12,285	426	12,711
Massachusetts<a>			
Michigan	17,151	812	17,963
Minnesota	2,400	85	2,485
Missouri	9,655	362	10,017
Montana	1,136	36	1,172
Nebraska	2,020	99	2,119
Nevada	3,673	237	3,910
New Hampshire	711	20	731
New Mexico	642	0	642
North Carolina<a>			
North Dakota	424	9	433
Ohio	19,182	1,117	20,299
Oklahoma	8,323	578	8,901
South Carolina	10,305	522	10,827
Tennessee	6,792	294	7,086
Texas	35,806	1,595	37,401
Virginia	10,406	367	10,773
Washington	6,527	190	6,717
West Virginia	1,665	63	1,728
Federal Bureau of Prisons	34,716	2,193	36,909
Total	330,776	16,438	347,214
Mean	11,026	548	11,574

<a> Not available.

Maximum Security Male Prisoners by Agency

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent of Total Male Prisoners</u>
Alabama	121	1.2
Alaska	28	<a>
Arizona	173	2.1
California	2,507	5.3
Colorado	189	5.2
Connecticut<a>		
Delaware	159	5.9
District of Columbia	477	10.5
Florida	10,422	37.9
Georgia<a>		
Hawaii	126	<a>
Illinois	5,605	30.9
Indiana<a>		
Iowa	544	<a>
Kansas	819	18.4
Kentucky	120	2.5
Maryland	1,193	9.7
Massachusetts<a>		
Michigan	1,019	5.9
Minnesota	147	6.1
Missouri	2,185	22.6
Montana	63	5.5
Nebraska	719	35.9
Nevada	120	3.3
New Hampshire	98	13.8
New Mexico	55	8.6
North Carolina<a>		
North Dakota	164	38.7
Ohio	1,062	5.5
Oklahoma	886	10.6
South Carolina	441	4.2
Tennessee	134	2.0
Texas	2,872	8.0
Virginia	3,209	30.8
Washington	368	5.6
West Virginia	102	6.1
Federal Bureau of Prisons	361	1.0
Total	36,488	
Mean	1,140	11.8

<a> Not available.

Maximum Security Female Prisoners by Agency

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent of Total Female Prisoners</u>
Alabama	2	0.4
Alaska	0	0.0
Arizona	7	1.7
California	55	1.9
Colorado	0	0.0
Connecticut<a>		
Delaware	10	10.1
District of Columbia		
Florida	418	32.0
Georgia<a>		
Hawaii	1	<a>
Illinois	150	21.2
Indiana<a>		
Iowa	0	0.0
Kansas	0	0.0
Kentucky	0	0.0
Maryland	8	1.9
Massachusetts<a>		
Michigan	18	2.2
Minnesota	4	4.7
Missouri	149	41.2
Montana	0	0.0
Nebraska	19	19.2
Nevada	8	3.4
New Hampshire	0	0.0
New Mexico	0	0.0
North Carolina<a>		
North Dakota	3	33.3
Ohio	15	1.3
Oklahoma	50	8.6
South Carolina	3	0.6
Tennessee	3	1.0
Texas	49	3.1
Virginia	32	8.7
Washington	30	15.8
West Virginia	0	0.0
Federal Bureau of Prisons	0	0.0
Total	1,034	
Mean	33.4	7.1

<a> Not available.

 No females under agency's jurisdiction.

Disruptive Maximum Security Male Inmates by Agency<a>

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent of Total Male Prisoners</u>	<u>Percent of Total Maximum Security Male Prisoners</u>
Alabama			
Alaska	28		100.0
Arizona	173	2.1	100.0
California	2,507	5.3	100.0
Colorado	189	5.2	100.0
Connecticut	82		
Delaware	125	4.7	78.6
District of Columbia	477	10.5	100.0
Florida	858	3.1	8.2
Georgia			
Hawaii	24		19.0
Illinois	876	4.8	15.6
Indiana			
Iowa	171		31.4
Kansas	43	0.9	5.2
Kentucky	16	0.3	13.3
Maryland	1,193	9.7	100.0
Massachusetts	100		
Michigan	1,019	5.8	100.0
Minnesota	42	1.8	28.6
Missouri	468	4.8	21.4
Montana	63	5.5	100.0
Nebraska	22	1.1	3.0
Nevada	103	2.8	85.8
New Hampshire	33	4.6	33.7
New Mexico	30	4.7	54.5
North Carolina	138		
North Dakota	13	3.1	7.9
Ohio	352	1.8	33.1
Oklahoma	72	0.9	8.1
South Carolina	272	2.5	61.8
Tennessee	134	2.0	100.0
Texas	1,840	5.1	64.1
Virginia	269	2.6	8.4
Washington	368	5.6	100.0
West Virginia	102	6.1	100.0
Federal Bureau of Prisons	49	0.1	13.6
Total	12,251		
Mean	360.3	3.8	54.7

<a> Disruptive maximum security inmates are those housed in an agency's restrictive housing units (excluding protective custody) that have been assigned as a result of one or more major disciplinary violations which have substantially endangered the safety, security, and operation of the institution.

 Not available.

Disruptive Maximum Security Female Inmates by Agency<a>

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent of Total Female Prisoners</u>	<u>Percent of Total Maximum Security Female Prisoners</u>
Alabama			
Alaska	0	0.0	0.0
Arizona	7	1.7	100.0
California	55	1.9	100.0
Colorado	0	0.0	0.0
Connecticut			
Delaware	5	5.0	50.0
District of Columbia<c>			
Florida	48	3.7	11.5
Georgia			
Hawaii	3		
Illinois	13	1.8	8.7
Indiana			
Iowa	0	0.0	0.0
Kansas	0	0.0	0.0
Kentucky	0	0.0	0.0
Maryland	0	0.0	0.0
Massachusetts			
Michigan	18	2.2	100.0
Minnesota	4	4.7	100.0
Missouri	16	4.4	10.7
Montana	0	0.0	0.0
Nebraska	0	0.0	0.0
Nevada	4	1.7	50.0
New Hampshire	0	0.0	0.0
New Mexico	0	0.0	0.0
North Carolina			
North Dakota	0	0.0	0.0
Ohio	0	0.0	0.0
Oklahoma	11	1.9	22.0
South Carolina	2	0.4	66.7
Tennessee	3	1.0	100.0
Texas	39	2.4	79.6
Virginia	0	0.0	0.0
Washington	30	15.8	100.0
West Virginia	0	0.0	0.0
Federal Bureau of Prisons	0	0.0	0.0
Total	258		
Mean	8.6	1.7	31.0

<a> Disruptive maximum security inmates are those housed in an agency's restrictive housing units (excluding protective custody) that have been assigned as a result of one or more major disciplinary violations which have substantially endangered the safety, security, and operation of the institution.

 Not available.

<c> No females under agency's jurisdiction.

**Race of Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates and General Population Prisoners by Agency
(Percent)**

Agency	White		Black		Hispanic		American Indian		Other		Unknown	
	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP
Alabama<a>												
Alaska	64.3	<a>	3.6	<a>	7.1	<a>	25.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>
Arizona	49.4	54.6	18.3	16.0	22.8	24.2	5.0	3.8	0.6	1.1	3.9	0.3
California	<a>	34.9	<a>	34.0	<a>	27.2	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>	3.9
Colorado	52.9	42.8	19.6	17.3	24.9	20.9	0.5	0.8	0.0	0.4	2.1	17.9
Connecticut	41.5	<a>	32.9	<a>	25.6	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>
Delaware	49.1	44.2	49.7	54.1	1.2	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
District of Columbia	1.2	<a>	98.3	<a>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	<a>	0.0	<a>
Florida<c>	44.9	45.6	50.0	46.7	5.1	5.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.7	0.0	0.0
Georgia<a>												
Hawaii	4.2	<a>	8.3	<a>	4.2	<a>	0.0	<a>	83.3	<a>	0.0	<a>
Illinois	17.9	33.6	72.0	58.9	9.6	7.2	0.6	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2
Indiana<a>												
Iowa	66.7	<a>	30.4	<a>	1.8	<a>	1.2	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>
Kansas	44.2	60.3	53.5	34.0	0.0	4.0	2.3	1.4	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0
Kentucky	62.5	68.4	37.5	31.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Maryland	15.4	27.0	80.8	72.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	3.8	0.6
Massachusetts<a>												
Michigan<a>												
Minnesota	43.5	65.4	43.5	23.2	4.3	3.8	8.7	7.2	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0
Missouri	30.0	55.3	69.8	43.2	0.0	<a>	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	1.4
Montana<a>												
Nebraska	68.2	61.0	31.8	30.9	0.0	3.0	0.0	4.3	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.2
Nevada	47.3	59.4	33.9	31.9	7.1	3.9	2.7	2.0	8.9	2.8	0.0	0.0
New Hampshire	84.8	90.8	3.0	2.4	12.1	6.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
New Mexico	30.0	31.2	6.7	7.5	60.0	55.4	3.3	3.9	0.0	0.2	0.0	1.8
North Carolina	40.6	43.5	55.1	53.8	0.0	<a>	4.3	2.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3
North Dakota	46.2	77.8	0.0	1.4	0.0	0.7	53.8	16.4	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0
Ohio<d>	42.3	51.2	57.7	47.9	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2
Oklahoma	69.9	62.9	19.3	29.4	2.4	1.3	6.0	5.7	2.4	0.6	0.0	0.0
South Carolina	39.8	39.7	59.8	60.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.2
Tennessee	67.2	40.2	29.9	53.3	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>
Texas	27.1	37.7	41.4	41.4	31.3	20.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.4
Virginia	27.5	40.0	72.1	60.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Washington	66.1	70.8	19.1	18.1	6.3	5.5	4.3	3.8	4.3	1.8	0.0	0.0
West Virginia	77.4	78.0	22.5	22.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Federal Bureau of Prisons<e>	<f>	54.3	<f>	25.7	<f>	15.4	10.2	1.6	2.0	0.7	0.0	2.3
Mean	45.6	52.7	38.6	35.3	8.1	8.6	4.4	2.1	3.5	0.5	0.4	1.2

<a> Not available.

 Males only.

<c> Community facilities excluded from general population data.

<d> Estimates for disruptive maximum security inmates.

<e> Estimates for general population.

<f> Data not available in form requested. Hispanics are classified as black or white.

Age of Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates and General Population Prisoners by Agency Percent

Agency	15-19		20-24		25-29		30-34		35-39		40-44		45-49		50+		Unknown		
	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	
Alabama<a>																			
Alaska	0.0	<a>	17.8	<a>	25.0	<a>	25.0	<a>	10.7	<a>	10.7	<a>	3.6	<a>	7.1	<a>	0.0	<a>	
Arizona	0.6	2.9	14.4	23.0	30.0	24.3	22.2	18.8	15.6	12.8	10.0	7.7	2.2	4.3	1.1	6.2	3.9	0.0	
California	<a>	1.9	<a>	26.5	<a>	27.7	<a>	19.4	<a>	11.8	<a>	6.0	<a>	3.2	<a>	3.7	<a>	0.0	
Colorado	0.0	0.4	13.8	18.8	31.2	22.8	23.8	16.2	16.4	12.7	10.6	6.6	2.6	3.5	2.0	3.7	0.0	15.4	
Connecticut	2.4	<a>	36.6	<a>	25.6	<a>	20.7	<a>	7.3	<a>	6.1	<a>	0.0	<a>	1.2	<a>	0.0	<a>	
Delaware	0.0	0.0	43.8	29.5	30.8	33.2	20.1	14.7	5.3	10.6	0.0	4.7	0.0	6.5	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	
District of Columbia	0.2	<a>	23.7	<a>	31.9	<a>	24.9	<a>	12.2	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>	1.9	<a>	5.2	<a>	
Florida<c>	4.1	5.4	25.5	23.0	36.9	23.4	18.2	19.6	9.2	11.5	3.2	7.5	2.0	4.2	1.0	5.5	0.0	0.0	
Georgia<a>																			
Hawaii	4.2	<a>	16.7	<a>	33.3	<a>	16.7	<a>	16.7	<a>	8.3	<a>	4.2	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	
Illinois	9.3	6.4	36.4	28.0	30.0	25.7	15.4	17.7	6.3	10.6	1.5	4.9	0.2	2.9	0.8	3.8	0.0	0.0	
Indiana<a>																			
Iowa	2.3	<a>	26.9	<a>	31.6	<a>	16.4	<a>	11.1	<a>	6.4	<a>	1.8	<a>	3.5	<a>	0.0	<a>	
Kansas	0.0	4.0	30.2	27.5	46.5	27.5	11.6	16.2	4.6	11.5	4.6	6.3	2.3	3.1	0.0	3.8	0.0	0.1	
Kentucky	0.0	2.0	31.2	22.4	31.2	25.7	31.2	19.0	0.0	12.4	0.0	7.6	6.2	4.3	0.0	5.5	0.0	0.0	
Maryland	2.6	4.2	20.5	24.7	32.0	26.7	23.1	19.3	10.2	12.5	2.6	6.0	3.8	3.0	1.3	3.5	3.8	0.2	
Massachusetts<a>																			
Michigan	<a>	5.3	<a>	25.1	<a>	24.6	<a>	21.2	<a>	11.7	<a>	5.7	<a>	2.9	<a>	3.5	<a>	0.0	
Minnesota	8.7	9.0	37.0	28.2	28.3	23.7	19.6	17.1	6.5	10.1	0.0	6.1	0.0	2.9	0.0	2.9	0.0	0.0	
Missouri	1.8	8.9	28.1	28.7	32.3	24.2	19.4	15.9	8.5	9.9	6.2	4.9	2.1	2.8	1.4	3.4	0.2	1.2	
Montana<a>																			
Nebraska	0.0	3.0	18.2	24.3	31.8	25.4	27.3	19.4	13.6	11.8	0.0	6.6	9.1	3.1	0.0	6.4	0.0	0.0	
Nevada	2.7	2.0	10.7	20.3	25.0	25.0	27.7	19.8	19.6	12.8	8.9	9.0	3.6	5.0	1.8	6.1	0.0	0.0	
New Hampshire	0.0	1.7	39.4	25.4	27.3	26.5	12.1	16.2	12.1	12.6	6.1	8.2	0.0	4.4	3.0	4.9	0.0	1.3	
New Mexico<d>	0.0	0.2	23.3	17.3	36.7	26.3	13.3	23.4	20.0	15.4	3.3	8.7	3.3	5.6	0.0	3.3	0.0	0.0	
North Carolina	0.7	13.2	18.1	21.9	30.4	24.2	24.6	18.1	17.4	11.6	5.1	5.9	0.7	3.4	2.9	5.0	0.0	0.0	
North Dakota	0.0	5.2	46.1	33.3	46.1	22.6	7.7	12.4	0.0	12.8	0.0	5.2	0.0	4.8	0.0	3.6	0.0	0.0	
Ohio<e>	1.4	2.0	28.1	23.0	31.0	26.0	21.0	19.0	14.2	12.0	2.8	6.0	1.4	3.0	0.0	9.0	0.0	0.1	
Oklahoma	3.6	1.9	25.3	20.1	27.7	27.4	18.1	19.8	9.6	12.7	7.2	7.9	4.8	4.4	2.4	5.6	1.2	0.0	
South Carolina	7.7	5.2	40.9	23.7	26.6	26.5	13.5	19.3	6.9	12.1	2.9	5.3	1.1	3.0	0.4	4.5	0.0	0.3	
Tennessee	27.0	15.0	37.2	32.3	17.5	22.9	10.2	13.4	5.1	7.6	2.9	3.6	0.0	2.2	0.0	2.9	0.0	0.0	
Texas	5.4	4.9	36.5	23.1	30.5	25.8	16.1	19.2	7.6	12.2	2.1	6.4	1.4	3.5	0.5	4.3	0.0	0.6	
Virginia	3.7	<a>	34.6	<a>	23.4	<a>	22.3	<a>	9.7	<a>	3.7	<a>	1.1	<a>	1.5	4.0	0.0	<a>	
Washington	3.3	2.5	27.9	21.2	30.4	23.2	18.1	18.6	10.8	14.4	5.3	8.8	3.3	4.9	1.0	6.4	0.0	0.0	
West Virginia	2.0	0.1	22.5	21.6	35.3	28.6	24.5	19.9	7.8	12.8	5.9	0.6	1.0	3.8	1.0	7.0	0.0	0.0	
Federal Bureau of Prisons<d>	0.0	0.0	6.1	6.3	22.4	14.3	30.6	18.2	20.4	16.4	16.3	10.7	4.1	6.9	0.0	9.2	0.0	18.0	
Mean	3.1	4.1	27.2	23.8	30.6	25.2	19.8	18.1	10.5	12.1	4.9	6.4	2.3	3.9	1.2	4.8	0.5	1.4	

- <a> Not available.
- Males only.
- <c> Community facilities excluded from general population data.
- <d> Estimates for general population.
- <e> Estimates for disruptive maximum security inmates.

**Prior Commitments of Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates
and General Population Prisoners by Agency<a>
(Percent)**

Agency	Three or More		Two		One		Unknown	
	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP
Alabama								
Alaska<c>	14.3		25.0		60.7		0.0	
Arizona								
California								
Colorado	20.6	24.9	28.6	56.4	58.8	4.2	0.0	14.4
Connecticut<d>	9.8		23.2		67.1		0.0	
Delaware	14.2	56.0	27.2	26.7	58.6	17.3	0.0	0.0
District of Columbia<c,d>	43.4		25.2		31.4		0.0	
Florida<e>	16.5	12.3	31.3	19.5	51.6	59.8	0.4	8.4
Georgia								
Hawaii<c,d>	0.0		4.2		95.8		0.0	
Illinois					55.2	58.4	0.0	0.0
Indiana								
Iowa	11.1		25.1		63.2		0.6	
Kansas	9.3	12.2	23.2	17.3	58.1	45.0	9.3	25.5
Kentucky	6.2		25.0		68.8		0.0	
Maryland	52.6		12.8		32.0		2.6	
Massachusetts								
Michigan								
Minnesota	50.0		32.6		17.4		0.0	
Missouri	11.4	9.4	20.2	18.2	68.0	68.9	0.4	3.4
Montana								
Nebraska	22.7	8.2	13.6	8.6	13.6	19.9	50.0	63.4
Nevada								
New Hampshire								
New Mexico	50.0		36.7		13.3		0.0	
North Carolina<d>	39.1	31.3	17.4	18.0	23.9	44.2	19.6	6.4
North Dakota	61.5	26.7	7.7	24.8	30.8	48.6	0.0	0.0
Ohio	23.7		48.0		28.1		0.0	
Oklahoma	7.2	8.6	25.3	20.7	57.8	62.3	9.6	8.3
South Carolina	12.7	18.4	6.6	12.4	17.5	21.5	63.1	47.6
Tennessee					41.6			
Texas	16.4	17.6	30.6	23.8	53.0	58.6	0.0	0.0
Virginia	13.8	11.0	21.2	21.4	64.7	63.2	0.4	4.4
Washington								
West Virginia	23.5	20.2	38.2	28.0	38.2	51.7	0.0	0.0
Federal Bureau of Prisons								
Mean	23.0	19.8	23.9	22.8	48.7	44.5	6.5	13.0

<a> Includes current commitment.

 Not available.

<c> Estimates.

<d> Males only.

<e> Community facilities excluded from general population data.

**Offense History of Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates
and General Population Prisoners by Agency<a>
(Percent)**

Agency	Violent Crime		Non-violent Crime		Unknown	
	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP
Alabama						
Alaska	100.0		0.0		0.0	
Arizona	47.8	36.9	47.8	56.8	4.4	6.3
California						
Colorado	78.8	47.6	21.2	37.8	0.0	14.5
Connecticut<c>	78.0		18.3		3.6	
Delaware	12.4	17.7	87.6	82.3	0.0	0.0
District of Columbia<c>	47.8		52.2		0.0	
Florida<d>	80.4	61.6	19.6	38.9	0.0	0.0
Georgia						
Hawaii<c>	58.3		41.7		0.0	
Illinois	72.8	60.1	27.2	39.9	0.0	0.0
Indiana						
Iowa	71.9		28.1		0.0	
Kansas	69.8	50.2	27.9	48.1	2.3	1.7
Kentucky	75.0	48.4	25.0	49.9	0.0	1.7
Maryland	83.3	60.6	16.7	39.3	0.0	0.0
Massachusetts						
Michigan						
Minnesota	58.7	62.2	41.3	35.5	0.0	2.3
Missouri	76.6	51.0	23.3	48.9	0.0	0.0
Montana						
Nebraska	86.4	42.7	13.6	57.3	0.0	0.0
Nevada	86.6	54.0	13.4	45.9	0.0	0.0
New Hampshire	27.3	45.7	72.7	54.3	0.0	0.0
New Mexico	100.0	61.1	0.0	35.9	0.0	2.9
North Carolina<c>	76.1	45.1	23.9	54.9	0.0	0.0
North Dakota	30.8	42.1	69.2	57.8	0.0	0.0
Ohio<e>	88.6	53.8	11.4	46.2	0.0	0.0
Oklahoma	63.8	46.3	31.3	52.7	4.8	1.0
South Carolina	39.4	35.9	60.6	64.1	0.0	0.0
Tennessee	52.1		47.8		0.0	
Texas	53.7	41.2	46.2	57.6	0.1	1.1
Virginia	75.1	53.0	24.9	42.0	0.0	5.0
Washington	70.1	58.5	29.9	41.5	0.0	0.0
West Virginia	86.3	55.6	13.7	44.3	0.0	0.0
Federal Bureau of Prisons<f>	100.0	21.1	0.0	61.2	0.0	17.7
Mean	68.3	48.0	31.2	49.7	0.5	2.2

<a> Most serious current commitment offense or most serious offense controlling minimum sentence.

 Not available.

<c> Males only.

<d> Community facilities excluded from general population data.

<e> Estimates for disruptive maximum security inmates.

<f> Estimates for general population.

**Maximum Sentence Length of
Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates
and General Population Prisoners by Agency^(a)
(Percent)**

Agency	0-1 Years		2-5 Years		6-10 Years		11-20 Years		20+ Years		Life-- Release Possible		Life-- No Release		Death		Unknown	
	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP
	Alabama																	
Alaska	0.0	15.9	14.3	29.8	35.7	23.5	21.4	19.0	7.1	7.1	21.4	4.6	0.0	0.0	<f>	<f>	0.0	0.0
Arizona	0.0	8.9	15.0	37.8	21.7	28.6	13.3	10.6	13.3	6.1	13.3	4.7			0.0	0.8	23.3	2.5
California																		
Colorado	0.5	2.3	15.3	38.6	23.3	23.3	21.2	10.9	16.9	5.2	21.2	5.5	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	1.0	14.2
Connecticut<c>	0.0		25.6		30.5		13.4		19.5		7.3		0.0		0.0		3.6	
Delaware	0.0	0.0	39.6	84.2	26.6	0.3	16.6	2.2	8.3	3.8	3.6	7.4	1.8	2.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
District of Columbia<c,d>	0.0		10.5		16.8		28.5		41.9		3.6		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Florida<e>	0.2	3.8	18.1	38.5	17.2	16.2	19.5	15.8	23.6	12.4	21.2	11.9	0.0	0.4	0.1	1.0	0.0	0.0
Georgia																		
Hawaii<c>	8.3		20.8		20.8		25.0		12.5		12.5		0.0		<f>	<f>	0.0	
Illinois	0.4	1.2	27.9	39.0	27.6	27.5	17.7	15.1	22.3	15.4	0.0	0.0	2.5	1.2	1.6	0.4	0.1	0.2
Indiana																		
Iowa	0.0		4.1		32.2		8.8		31.0		1.2		22.8		<f>	<f>	0.0	
Kansas	16.3	20.6	27.9	52.8	11.6	9.0	14.0	6.4	11.6	1.6	18.6	7.8	0.0	0.0	<f>	<f>	0.0	1.7
Kentucky	0.0	1.7	12.5	19.8	6.2	22.4	37.5	26.9	6.2	19.9	37.5	8.4	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0
Maryland	0.0	6.7	5.1	30.4	20.5	23.7	26.9	19.6	33.3	13.0					1.3	0.1	3.8	0.0
Massachusetts																		
Michigan		9.8		43.3		21.9		8.9		4.2		5.7		6.2	<f>	<f>		0.0
Minnesota	17.4	17.2	45.6	45.8	15.2	15.5	19.6	9.7	0.0	4.3	2.2	5.4	0.0	0.0	<f>	<f>	0.0	2.1
Missouri	0.2	0.5	24.4	47.8	22.5	22.2	21.7	15.1	13.8	7.2	16.7	6.6	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.0
Montana																		
Nebraska	4.5	36.2	9.1	30.4	18.2	17.5	13.6	7.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	27.3	3.8	9.1	2.4	18.2	2.4
Nevada	0.0	2.0	3.6	35.4	9.8	27.2	21.4	14.8	25.0	5.4	20.5	10.7	15.2	3.6	4.5	0.7	0.0	0.0
New Hampshire	24.2	20.5	39.4	42.8	27.3	20.6	3.0	7.0	3.0	5.0	3.0	2.0	0.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
New Mexico	0.0	3.9	16.7	25.0	36.7	20.8	20.0	19.3	10.0	21.6	0.0	5.1	0.0	0.0	16.7	0.0	0.0	4.4
North Carolina<c>	0.0	8.0	5.8	30.6	17.4	18.0	23.2		0.2		28.3	8.7	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.3	0.0	0.3
North Dakota	0.0	12.1	69.2	62.8	30.8	12.6	0.0	3.1	0.0	7.1	0.0	2.1			<f>	<f>	0.0	0.0
Ohio	11.4	20.4	36.4	44.6	15.6	18.6	11.4	8.0	2.8	1.4	22.4	6.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0
Oklahoma	0.0	5.1	15.7	35.8	18.1	21.5	24.1	13.9	18.1	12.5	15.7	7.2			1.2	0.6	7.2	2.2
South Carolina	13.9	12.6	14.6	14.5	21.5	22.0	14.6	14.3	27.0	18.1	8.4	8.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0
Tennessee	26.5	16.4	2.2	18.2	2.9	21.6	12.5	20.5	35.3	19.2					13.2	0.5	0.0	0.0
Texas	0.0	0.1	15.7	25.2	25.3	25.9	22.2	20.8	24.9	19.0	11.8	7.9			0.0	0.6	0.0	0.6
Virginia	1.1		18.2		20.4		13.8		31.6		12.6	12.0	0.4	0.0	0.4	11.9	1.5	
Washington																		
West Virginia	9.8	44.7	8.8	17.6	8.8	12.2	6.9	6.4	20.6	5.4	21.6	9.2	23.5	4.6	<f>	<f>	0.0	0.0
Federal Bureau of Prisons<d>		1.9													0.0	0.0		98.1
Mean	4.8	10.9	20.1	55.5	20.8	19.7	17.6	12.8	16.4	9.3	12.5	6.4	4.2	1.3	2.2	1.0	2.1	5.1

<a> Maximum sentence length or maximum minimum sentence length.
 Not available.
 <c> Males only.
 <d> Estimates.
 <e> Community facilities excluded from general population data.
 <f> Not applicable.

**Escape History of Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates
and General Population Prisoners by Agency
(Percent)**

Agency	History of Escape or Attempted Escape		No History of Escape or Attempted Escape		Unknown	
	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP
Alabama<a>						
Alaska	14.3	<a>	<a>	<a>	85.7	<a>
Arizona<a>						
California	<a>	18.0	<a>	82.0	<a>	0.0
Colorado	18.5	10.7	81.5	82.4	0.0	6.9
Connecticut	24.4	<a>	70.7	<a>	4.9	<a>
Delaware	15.4	10.1	84.6	89.9	0.0	0.0
District of Columbia<b,c>	10.5	<a>	89.5	<a>	0.0	<a>
Florida<d>	21.3	8.9	78.7	80.3	0.0	10.8
Georgia<a>						
Hawaii	25.0	<a>	75.0	<a>	0.0	<a>
Illinois	2.8	19.1	<a>	<a>	97.2	98.1
Indiana<a>						
Iowa	50.3	<a>	49.7	<a>	0.0	<a>
Kansas	20.9	9.4	79.1	82.9	0.0	7.6
Kentucky	31.2	<a>	68.8	<a>	0.0	<a>
Maryland	44.9	<a>	52.6	<a>	2.6	<a>
Massachusetts<b,c>	15.0	<a>	85.0	<a>	0.0	<a>
Michigan<a>						
Minnesota<a>						
Missouri<c>	3.7	<a>	95.9	<a>	0.4	<a>
Montana	6.3	<a>	93.6	<a>	0.0	<a>
Nebraska	45.4	16.0	54.5	82.6	0.0	1.4
Nevada	28.6	<a>	71.4	<a>	0.0	<a>
New Hampshire<a>						
New Mexico<e>	50.0	10.6	50.0	89.4	0.0	0.0
North Carolina	12.3	6.8	89.1	93.2	0.0	0.0
North Dakota	46.2	8.8	53.8	91.2	0.0	0.0
Ohio	29.5	<a>	70.4	<a>	0.0	<a>
Oklahoma	38.6	12.6	56.6	86.4	4.8	1.0
South Carolina	7.7	6.4	92.3	93.6	0.0	0.0
Tennessee<a>						
Texas	11.0	1.5	89.0	98.5	0.0	0.0
Virginia	10.0	<a>	89.2	<a>	0.7	<a>
Washington<a>						
West Virginia	43.1	13.2	56.9	86.8	0.0	0.0
Federal Bureau of Prisons<a>						
Mean	24.1	10.9	74.1	87.6	7.6	9.0

<a> Not available.

 Males only.

<c> Estimates.

<d> Community facilities excluded from general population data.

<e> Estimates for general population.

**Educational Level of Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates and General Population Prisoners by Agency
(Percent)**

Agency	Grade 0-6		Grade 7-9		Grade 10-12		High School Diploma or GED		Some College or Technical School		College Graduate		Unknown	
	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP
Alabama<a>														
Alaska	3.6	<a>	10.7	<a>	10.7	<a>	42.8	<a>	14.3	<a>	0.0	<a>	17.8	<a>
Arizona	8.9	14.1	26.7	14.1	46.1	45.2	5.0	4.8	5.6	7.5	0.0	0.6	7.8	13.8
California<a>														
Colorado	10.6	8.5	30.7	25.6	15.3	12.8	35.4	30.6	7.9	6.7	0.0	0.4	0.0	15.3
Connecticut<c>	3.6	<a>	40.2	<a>	40.2	<a>	11.0	<a>	3.6	<a>	1.2	<a>	0.0	<a>
Delaware<a>														
District of Columbia<c>	2.9	<a>	22.4	<a>	43.6	<a>	24.5	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>	6.5	<a>
Florida<d>	33.7	23.4	23.3	20.6	8.8	14.8	20.8	23.9	3.0	6.4	0.2	1.1	10.3	9.7
Georgia<a>														
Hawaii<c>	4.2	<a>	29.2	<a>	16.7	<a>	37.5	<a>	8.3	<a>	4.2	<a>	0.0	<a>
Illinois<e>	2.6	4.2	25.1	18.6	46.0	40.8	19.9	40.8	4.9	8.0	0.0	0.9	1.5	0.0
Indiana<a>														
Iowa	3.5	<a>	22.8	<a>	31.6	<a>	35.7	<a>	4.7	<a>	0.6	<a>	1.2	<a>
Kansas	4.6	2.5	23.5	18.9	23.5	20.6	30.2	36.0	0.0	5.6	0.0	0.4	18.6	16.0
Kentucky	0.0	<a>	25.0	<a>	37.5	<a>	31.2	<a>	0.0	<a>	6.2	<a>	0.0	<a>
Maryland	9.0	<a>	61.5	<a>	12.8	<a>	11.5	<a>	5.1	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>
Massachusetts<a>														
Michigan<a>														
Minnesota	2.2	2.2	8.7	10.4	23.9	23.0	45.6	44.7	10.9	10.9	0.0	1.9	8.7	6.9
Missouri	4.8	3.1	36.0	29.1	33.5	27.9	21.3	31.8	2.5	4.8	0.2	6.8	1.8	2.6
Montana<a>														
Nebraska	0.0	0.0	22.7	18.6	22.7	21.4	50.0	38.5	0.0	3.0	4.5	0.9	0.0	17.5
Nevada	6.2	<a>	24.1	<a>	29.5	<a>	35.7	<a>	4.5	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>
New Hampshire	3.0	1.7	45.4	26.8	21.2	21.2	24.2	37.5	6.0	5.3	0.0	2.7	0.0	4.7
New Mexico	3.3	<a>	23.3	<a>	26.7	<a>	26.7	<a>	20.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>
North Carolina<c>	9.4	6.0	48.6	35.2	29.0	31.6	7.2	20.1	5.8	5.3	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.7
North Dakota	7.7	5.0	15.4	12.4	0.0	12.1	76.9	41.2	0.0	21.9	0.0	7.4	0.0	0.0
Ohio	2.8	<a>	38.1	<a>	43.5	<a>	1.4	<a>	1.4	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>
Oklahoma	<a>	1.8	<a>	22.4	<a>	36.0	<a>	33.3	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>	6.5
South Carolina<e>	4.7	2.5	28.8	25.7	40.5	37.5	16.4	20.0	3.3	6.7	1.4	1.4	4.7	3.0
Tennessee	3.7	4.3	27.7	19.2	21.9	21.2	11.0	14.6	2.9	6.3	7.3	3.5	25.5	30.8
Texas	2.1	1.4	7.8	7.8	2.3	4.1	4.3	8.1	4.5	6.6	0.3	0.5	78.7	71.5
Virginia	13.0	<a>	45.4	<a>	29.7	<a>	6.3	18.2	1.5	4.6	0.0	<a>	4.1	8.8
Washington<a>														
West Virginia	3.9	6.4	16.7	20.0	10.8	13.1	43.1	45.9	23.5	13.8	2.0	0.8	0.0	0.0
Federal Bureau of Prisons	<a>	6.3	<a>	17.0	<a>	23.6	<a>	35.5	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>	17.6
Mean	5.9	5.5	28.1	20.1	25.7	23.9	26.0	29.1	5.8	7.7	1.1	2.0	7.2	12.5

<a> Not available.

 Estimates.

<c> Males only.

<d> Community facilities excluded from general population data.

<e> Based on inmate self-report.

**Vocational Skills of Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates
and General Population Prisoners by Agency
(Percent)**

Agency	No Skills		Limited Skills		Substantial Skills		Unknown	
	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP
Alabama<a>								
Alaska	17.8	<a>	39.3	<a>	39.3	<a>	3.6	<a>
Arizona<a>								
California<a>								
Colorado	65.1	55.0	24.9	21.2	10.0	8.5	0.0	15.3
Connecticut<c>	79.3	<a>	12.2	<a>	2.4	<a>	6.1	<a>
Delaware<a>								
District of Columbia (a)	73.2	<a>	15.9	<a>	10.9	<a>	0.0	<a>
Florida<d>	53.6	37.0	23.4	31.3	9.9	18.3	13.0	13.3
Georgia<a>								
Hawaii<c>	0.0	<a>	100.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>
Illinois<a>								
Indiana<a>								
Iowa	64.3	<a>	32.7	<a>	2.9	<a>	0.0	<a>
Kansas	25.6	3.9	55.8	62.8	4.6	15.1	14.0	18.2
Kentucky	31.2	<a>	62.5	<a>	6.2	<a>	0.0	<a>
Maryland	85.9	<a>	11.5	<a>	2.6	<a>	0.0	<a>
Massachusetts<b,c>	95.0	<a>	2.0	<a>	3.0	<a>	0.0	<a>
Michigan<a>								
Minnesota<a>								
Missouri<a>								
Montana<a>								
Nebraska	18.2	6.3	4.5	4.4	13.6	2.2	63.6	87.1
Nevada<a>								
New Hampshire	39.4	34.8	48.5	58.4	12.1	6.7	0.0	0.0
New Mexico	46.7	<a>	26.7	<a>	13.3	<a>	13.3	<a>
North Carolina<a>								
North Dakota	76.9	60.2	23.1	37.1	0.0	26.2	0.0	0.0
Ohio	66.2	<a>	28.1	<a>	5.7	<a>	0.0	<a>
Oklahoma	<a>	24.2	<a>	26.4	<a>	49.4	<a>	0.0
South Carolina<e>	26.6	21.0	8.4	10.2	19.0	35.2	46.0	33.6
Tennessee<a>								
Texas	0.0	0.0	7.3	15.3	1.1	5.5	91.5	79.2
Virginia<a>								
Washington<a>								
West Virginia	48.0	24.7	45.1	57.5	6.9	17.8	0.0	0.0
Federal Bureau of Prisons<a>								
Mean	48.0	26.7	30.1	32.5	8.6	18.5	13.2	24.7

<a> Not available.

 Estimates.

<c> Males only.

<d> Community facilities excluded from general population data.

<e> Based on employment at time of arrest.

**Special Management Categories for Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates and General Population Prisoners by Agency
(Percent)**

Agency	Administrative Segregation		Disciplinary Segregation		Protective Custody		Mentally Ill		Mentally Retarded		Not Applicable		Unknown	
	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP	DMS	GP
Alabama<a>														
Alaska	96.4	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	3.6	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>
Arizona	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.7	0.0	1.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	94.7	0.0	0.0
California	62.5	0.0	58.7	0.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	2.9	0.0	0.6	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>
Colorado	28.6	0.0	7.4	0.0	44.4	0.3	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>
Connecticut	86.6	<a>	13.4	<a>	11.0	<a>	7.3	<a>	1.2	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>
Delaware	0.0	0.0	71.6	0.0	28.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
District of Columbia<b,c>	16.8	<a>	2.1	<a>	16.8	<a>	18.9	<a>	18.9	<a>	37.1	<a>	0.0	<a>
Florida<d>	14.8	1.4	23.7	1.3	17.5	1.3	8.8	3.4	0.1	0.6	0.8	91.7	0.0	0.0
Georgia<a>														
Hawaii	0.0	<a>	100.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>
Illinois	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	5.2	15.0	15.0<c>	5.0	5.0<c>	0.0	<a>	<a>	<a>
Indiana<a>														
Iowa<a>														
Kansas	72.1	1.5	16.3	0.6	0.0	4.9	7.0	1.5	4.6	0.0	0.0	91.4	0.0	0.0
Kentucky	56.2	0.0	43.8	0.0	0.0	6.1	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>
Maryland	19.2	<a>	76.9	<a>	0.0	2.6	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>	3.8	0.0	0.0	0.0
Massachusetts<a>														
Michigan<a>														
Minnesota	0.0	0.4<c>	0.0	1.0	0.0	6.0	0.0	2.5	0.0	0.0	100.0	90.0	0.0	0.0
Missouri<a>														
Montana	0.0	<a>	100.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>
Nebraska	100.0	0.3	0.0	1.6	0.0	2.5	31.8	6.9	4.5	3.0	0.0	85.8	0.0	0.0
Nevada	67.8	<a>	21.4	<a>	10.7	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>
New Hampshire<a>														
New Mexico	100.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0	2.1	0.0	10.4	0.0	8.3	0.0	77.9	0.0	0.0
North Carolina	0.0	<a>	4.3	<a>	0.0	<a>	5.8	<a>	0.0	<a>	89.8	<a>	0.0	<a>
North Dakota	69.2	0.2	15.4	0.2	0.0	0.5	7.7	1.7	7.7	0.7	0.0	96.7	0.0	0.0
Ohio	100.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>
Oklahoma	38.6	<a>	61.4	<a>	0.0	3.8	0.0	0.8	15.7	9.2<c>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>
South Carolina	30.6	0.1	24.4	0.5	0.0	2.5	0.0	0.8<c>	1.4<c>	2.8<c>	43.4	93.3	0.0	0.0
Tennessee	100.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>
Texas	88.7	3.1	2.9	0.7	0.2	5.8	2.9	1.2	0.2	2.5	2.2	81.4	2.9	5.3
Virginia	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>	1.5	2.6	40.9	25.1	<a>	<a>	<a>	<a>
Washington<a>														
West Virginia	14.7	0.0	85.3	0.0	32.3	11.5	1.0	0.2	19.6	12.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Federal Bureau of Prisons	100.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>	0.0	<a>
Mean	50.5	0.5	30.7	0.5	6.3	8.4	4.4	3.4	4.8	4.6	11.1	66.9	0.1	0.4

<a> Not available.

 Males only.

<c> Estimates.

<d> Community facilities excluded from general population data.

Access to Programs Afforded Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates Compared with General Population Prisoners by Agency

Agency	Academic Education	Vocational Education	Counseling/ Casework	Social	Contact Visiting	Non-	Work Assignment	Leisure Activities	Arts/ Crafts	Enter- tainment	General Library	Pre- Release	Recreation
				Education/ Life Skills		Contact Visiting							
Alabama													
Alaska	S	N/A	S	L	L	S	L	S	L	L	S	NR	S
Arizona	L	L	M	L	M	S	L	S	S	L	L	S	L
California	L	M	S	M	M	L	L	S	L	M	S	S	L
Colorado	S	L	M	S	S	S	L	S	M	M	L	S	L
Connecticut	L	M	M	L	S	S	L	S	M	M	L	S	L
Delaware	S	S	S	S	L	L	S	S	L	L	L	S	S
District of Columbia	S	L	S	S	S	N/A	L	L	S	S	L	S	S
Florida	L	M	S	M	L	N/A	M	M	M	M	L	L	L
Georgia	S	L	S	S	L	L	L	S	L	L	S	L	S
Hawaii	M	M	S	S	M	L	L	M	M	M	L	M	L
Illinois	L	L	M	S	S	S	M	L	L	M	L	S	L
Indiana	L	L	S	L	S	M	L	L	M	L	L	M	S
Iowa	L	M	S	M	S	S	M	S	M	S	S	L	S
Kansas	L	M	S	L	L	M	L	S	L	L	S	L	L
Kentucky	L	M	S	N/A	L	L	L	M	L	L	L	L	L
Maryland	L	M	M	M	S	M	M	L	M	M	L	M	L
Massachusetts	S	L	M	S	L	M	M	S	L	L	L	M/A	S
Michigan	L	M	M	S	S	M	L	S	L	L	L	L	L
Minnesota	L	L	S	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	N/A	L
Missouri	L	L	S	L	S	L	L	M	M	L	M	M	L
Montana	L	M	S	N/A	N/A	M	N/A	S	L	M	L	L	L
Nebraska	L	N/A	M	L	M	M	M	L	L	M	L	L	L
Nevada	L	N/A	M	S	L	M	L	S	M	S	S	N/A	S
New Hampshire	L	N/A	S	S	S	M	L	S	S	S	L	L	L
New Mexico	L	M	S	S	S	N/A	L	S	S	S	L	L	L
North Carolina	L	N/A	M	L	N/A	S	M	L	L	M	S	M	L
North Dakota	M	M	S	M	S	S	M	S	L	L	L	L	L
Ohio	M	M	S	L	M	L	M	M	M	M	L	L	L
Oklahoma	L	M	S	L	M	S	M	L	L	M	L	S	S
South Carolina	L	M	S	L	L	M	M	L	L	L	L	M	L
Tennessee	L	L	S	L	L	L	L	S	L	L	L	L	L
Texas	L	M	S	N/A	M	S	M	S	L	L	L	L	L
Virginia	L	M	S	S	L	M	L	L	M	M	S	M	L
Washington	L	M	M	L	M	L	L	L	M	M	S	S	L
West Virginia	L	M	L	M	M	L	L	S	M	L	L	L	L
Federal Bureau of Prisons	L	L	M	L	M	S	M	S	L	S	S	L	L
Mean M (More)	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	0.0	22.2	0.0	5.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
S (Same)	16.7	2.8	63.9	33.3	33.3	30.6	2.8	55.6	11.1	16.7	30.6	28.6	25.0
L (Less)	75.0	30.6	2.8	41.7	33.3	30.6	58.3	30.6	52.8	47.2	66.7	40.0	75.0
M (None)	8.3	52.8	0.0	16.7	27.8	8.3	36.1	8.3	36.1	36.1	2.8	22.8	0.0
N/A	0.0	13.9	0.0	8.3	5.6	8.3	2.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.6	0.0

M (More)

S (Same)

L (Less)

M (None)

N/A (Not Applicable)

NR (No Response)

<a> Not available.

 Males only.

**Access to Services Afforded to Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates
Compared with General Population Prisoners by Agency**

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Food Service</u>	<u>Laundry</u>	<u>Medical/ Dental</u>	<u>Psychological/ Psychiatric</u>	<u>Religious</u>	<u>Legal Library</u>	<u>Telephone</u>	<u>Commissary</u>	<u>Mail</u>	
Alabama<a>										
Alaska	S	S	S	S	S	S	M	S	S	
Arizona	M	S	M	M	S	S	S	S	S	
California	S	S	S	S	L	S	L	L	S	
Colorado	S	S	S	M	L	S	S	S	S	
Connecticut	S	S	S	M	L	L	S	S	S	
Delaware	S	S	S	S	S	L	S	S	S	
District of Columbia	L	S	S	S	S	L	L	S	S	
Florida	S	S	S	S	L	S	L	L	S	
Georgia	S	S	S	S	S	S	L	L	S	
Hawaii	S	S	S	S	S	L	L	M	S	
Illinois	S	S	S	S	L	S	L	S	S	
Indiana	S	S	S	S	L	S	M	S	S	
Iowa	S	S	S	S	L	S	L	L	S	
Kansas	S	S	S	L	L	S	S	L	S	
Kentucky	S	S	S	S	S	L	L	L	S	
Maryland	S	S	S	S	L	S	L	L	S	
Massachusetts	S	S	S	S	S	S	L	L	S	
Michigan	L	S	S	M	L	S	S	L	S	
Minnesota	L	L	S	M	L	L	L	S	S	
Missouri	S	S	S	S	S	S	L	S	S	
Montana	S	S	S	S	L	L	L	L	S	
Nebraska	S	S	S	M	S	L	L	L	S	
Nevada	S	M	S	M	S	L	L	S	S	
New Hampshire	L	S	S	S	L	L	S	L	S	
New Mexico	S	S	S	M	M	S	L	S	S	
North Carolina	S	S	S	M	L	S	N	L	S	
North Dakota	L	L	S	S	L	L	L	L	S	
Ohio	L	L	S	S	L	S	S	L	S	
Oklahoma	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	L	S	
South Carolina	S	S	S	S	L	L	L	L	S	
Tennessee	S	S	S	S	S	L	L	L	S	
Texas	S	S	S	S	L	M	N	S	S	
Virginia	S	L	S	S	L	S	L	L	S	
Washington	S	S	M	M	S	S	S	L	S	
West Virginia	S	S	S	S	L	S	S	S	S	
Federal Bureau of Prisons	L	S	S	S	L	S	L	S	S	
Mean	M (More)	2.8	2.8	5.6	27.8	2.8	2.8	5.6	0.0	0.0
	S (Same)	77.8	86.1	94.4	69.4	38.9	61.1	30.6	41.7	100.0
	L (Less)	19.4	11.1	0.0	2.8	58.3	36.1	58.3	55.6	0.0
	N (None)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.6	2.8	0.0

<a> Not available.

 Males only.

Conditions Affecting Management of Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates by Agency

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Changes in Sentencing Laws</u>	<u>Changes in Alternatives to Confinement</u>	<u>Increased Gang Activity</u>	<u>Increased Prosecution for Drug Offenses</u>	<u>Influences from Outside Groups for Civil Unrest</u>	<u>Inmate Litigation</u>	<u>Changes in Policies & Procedures</u>	<u>None</u>
Alabama<a>								
Alaska						X	X	
Arizona	X							
California						X		
Colorado						X		
Connecticut	X							
Delaware	X			X				
District of Columbia				X		X		
Florida	X	X	X	X		X	X	
Georgia	X	X	X	X		X	X	
Hawaii								
Illinois	X		X	X				
Indiana								X
Iowa	X			X		X		
Kansas							X	
Kentucky			X					
Maryland	X						X	
Massachusetts			X				X	
Michigan	X		X			X		
Minnesota								X
Missouri	X		X	X	X	X	X	
Montana			X		X			
Nebraska							X	
Nevada						X	X	
New Hampshire								X
New Mexico	X	X				X	X	
North Carolina						X	X	
North Dakota								X
Ohio							X	
Oklahoma	X	X						
South Carolina	X					X		
Tennessee						X	X	
Texas			X			X		
Virginia	X					X		
Washington							X	
West Virginia			X		X	X		
Federal Bureau of Prisons	X							
Total	15	4	10	7	3	17	14	4
Percent	41.7	11.1	27.8	19.4	8.3	47.2	38.9	11.1

<a> Not available.

 No conditions reported for females; no response for males.

**Problems Encountered in Supervising
Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates by Agency**

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Inadequate Plant</u>	<u>Inadequate Policies and Procedures</u>	<u>Inadequate Equipment</u>	<u>Malfunc- tioning Equipment</u>	<u>Inadequate Monitoring Devices</u>	<u>No Problems</u>
Alabama						
Alaska<a>						X
Arizona	X	X	X	X	X	
California	X					
Colorado	X		X	X	X	
Connecticut	X					
Delaware				X		
District of Columbia<a>					X	
Florida	X		X		X	
Georgia	X	X	X	X	X	
Hawaii					X	
Illinois	X					
Indiana<a>	X		X		X	
Iowa	X				X	
Kansas	X				X	
Kentucky	X				X	
Maryland	X				X	
Massachusetts<a>	X	X	X	X	X	
Michigan				X	X	
Minnesota						X
Missouri	X		X	X	X	
Montana	X					
Nebraska	X					
Nevada				X	X	
New Hampshire					X	
New Mexico				X		
North Carolina<a>	X		X		X	
North Dakota	X	X			X	
Ohio					X	
Oklahoma						X
South Carolina	X		X	X	X	
Tennessee	X		X		X	
Texas	X		X	X	X	
Virginia	X				X	
Washington						X
West Virginia	X		X		X	
Federal Bureau of Prisons<a>						X
Total	23	4	12	12	23	6
Percent of Total Responses	63.9	11.1	33.3	33.3	63.9	16.7

<a> Males only.

**Perceived Importance of Selected Institutional Behaviors
in Categorizing Inmates as Disruptive**

<u>Institutional Behavior</u>	<u>Ranking<a></u> (Number of Agencies)				
	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
Murder	36	0	0	0	0
Deadly assault	33	2	1	0	0
Assaulting others with instrument capable of bodily harm	25	10	1	0	0
Assaulting staff without use of weapon	18	13	5	0	0
Assaulting inmate without use of weapon	6	13	16	1	0
Physical confrontation with staff resulting in injury to staff member	23	12	1	0	0
Sexual assault	23	11	2	0	0
Participating in sexual harassment or extortion	5	17	14	0	0
Organizing or leading gang activities	17	16	3	0	0
Membership in gang activities	4	14	16	2	0
Organizing, instigating, or causing a riot	29	5	2	0	0
Organizing, instigating, or causing a work stoppage or other major disturbance	23	10	3	0	0
Participating in a riot or disturbance	21	10	5	0	0
Hostage taking	36	0	0	0	0
Manufacturing, possessing, and/or smuggling firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, or poison gas	32	4	0	0	0
Manufacturing, possessing, and/or smuggling dangerous weapons, other than just described	18	13	4	1	0
Participating in drug distribution, manufacture, sales, and/or smuggling	6	13	15	1	1
Having been found guilty of repeated (3 or more in 1 year) minor disciplinary infractions	2	2	6	14	12
Escape/attempted escape	23	9	4	0	0
Major property damage	9	17	10	0	0

<a> Rankings are from 1 (most important) to 5 (least important).

**Legal Action Pertaining to Management
of Disruptive Maximum Security Inmates by Agency**

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Consent Decree</u>	<u>Court Order</u>	<u>Both</u>	<u>Neither</u>
Alabama<a>				
Alaska	X			
Arizona		X		
California		X		
Colorado	X			
Connecticut				X
Delaware				X
District of Columbia		X		
Florida			X	
Georgia		X		
Hawaii	X			
Illinois		X		
Indiana		X		
Iowa		X		
Kansas				X
Kentucky				X
Maryland	X			
Massachusetts				X
Michigan				X
Minnesota	X			
Missouri		X		
Montana				X
Nebraska				X
Nevada	X			
New Hampshire	X			
New Mexico	X			
North Carolina				X
North Dakota				X
Ohio				X
Oklahoma		X		
South Carolina	X			
Tennessee				X
Texas	X			
Virginia	X			
Washington			X	
West Virginia			X	
Federal Bureau of Prisons				X
Total	11	9	3	13
Percent of Total Responses	30.5	25.0	8.3	36.1

<a> Not available.

 Females only.

Violent Incidents by Agency^{a>}

Agency	Inmate Assaults on Staff (Number)					Staff Deaths (Number)					Inmate Assaults on Inmates (Number)					Inmate Deaths (Number)				
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Alabama																				
Alaska						0	0	0	0	0						0	0	0	0	0
Arizona						0	0	0	0	0										
California																				
Colorado	9	11	7	22	15	0	0	0	0	0	17	29	52	55	53	3	2	2	1	2
Connecticut			20	37	60			0	0	0			100	70	126			1	1	0
Delaware				48	54	0	0	0	0	0				123	164	0	0	1	0	0
District of Columbia		68	72	122	106	0	0	0	0	0		125	115	200	203	0	0	0	0	0
Florida	114	431	463	377	446	1	0	0	1	0	719	1,221	1,431	1,429	1,263	7	4	2	4	6
Georgia		50	72	133	148		2			0						13	5	8	4	7
Hawaii																				
Illinois		185	264	388	450	0	0	1	1	1		303	634	1,014	1,315	1	3	1	0	1
Indiana																				
Iowa	44	47	25	31	24	0	0	0	0	0				64	65	0	5	0	0	0
Kansas	2	2	3	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	6	5	6	2	1	3	4	1	3	1
Kentucky		8	13	23	74	0	0	0	0	1		25	26	35	36		2	3	2	2
Maryland		334		284	391	0	0	0	0	1		603		836	2,140	5	4	5	3	3
Massachusetts																				
Michigan	326	344	292	353	497	0	0	0	0	0	428	398	372	432	330	0	3	3	3	1
Minnesota	56	36	64	92	51	0	0	0	0	0	29	34	72	59	70	3	0	0	1	1
Missouri	42	44	80	122	175	0	0	0	1	0	56	94	93	151	190	5	4	1	2	5
Montana	1	4	4	4	3	0	0	0	0	0	7	15	13	7	7	0	0	0	0	0
Nebraska				23	45	0	0	0	0	0				50	56	0	0	0	0	0
Nevada	5	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	11	3	5	6	2	3	1	0	0
New Hampshire	5	0	2	2	8	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	1	3	1	1	1	1	1
New Mexico	<c>	3	4	14	23	<c>	2	0	0	0	<c>		11	14	17	<c>	3	1	0	2
North Carolina	102	98	82	72	102	0	0	0	0	0	68	67	84	75	81	1	3	0	0	1
North Dakota	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						0	0	0	0	0
Ohio	54	57	64	49	58	0	0	0	0	1	40	41	44	46	52	0	0	5	0	0
Oklahoma						0	1	0	0	0						6	3	3	8	6
South Carolina				71	70	0	0	0	0	0				244	319	1	4	2	1	3
Tennessee			39	68	51			0	0	0			149	244	172			5	7	8
Texas				766	1,881	0	0	2	0	0										
Virginia	108	111	160	216	311	0	0	0	0	0	140	122	205	233	327	5	10	4	7	1
Washington																				
West Virginia	0	0	0	12	8	0	0	0	0	1	26	23	26	41	31	0	1	0	0	5
Federal Bureau of Prisons	305	393	281	207	298	1	0	0	2	3	387	362	389	359	342	12	16	11	11	13
Mean	73.3	101.3	87.4	126.3	191.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	138.2	193.3	191.4	216.0	294.8	2.7	3.0	2.1	2.0	2.4

<a> Excludes deaths by natural causes and suicides.

 Not available.

<c> Data excluded due to major riot.

**Appendix B:
Case Studies**

DISRUPTIVE MAXIMUM SECURITY INMATE MANAGEMENT CASE STUDY:

ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION UNIT, ARIZONA STATE PRISON COMPLEX-FLORENCE

Introduction

The Administrative Segregation Unit at the Arizona State Prison Complex-Florence serves as the disruptive inmate management resource for all adult male correctional facilities operated by the Arizona Department of Corrections. The unit houses inmates classified to administrative segregation, prisoners in administrative detention, and inmates on death row. Since its opening in 1980, the Administrative Segregation Unit has experienced a number of serious problems, including poor facility design, inadequate inmate management strategies, frequent administrative changes, and inmate litigation. Determined to surmount such problems, the current unit administration has instituted a proactive management approach that is designed to enhance control of the inmate population. Key elements include remote podular housing, close supervision, limited inmate movement, and objective-based contract system. Most staff perceive the current approach as an asset in managing disruptive prisoners and ensuring more effectual operations at the Department's other facilities. A formal study of the unit is being conducted to assess both its management effectiveness and its systemwide impacts.

Unit History

The Administrative Segregation Unit (Ad. Seg. Unit) at the Florence complex occupies the housing facility known as Cell Block Six. It was constructed to alleviate the overcrowding problem at the Department's previous restrictive housing unit, which could hold only 80 inmates. However, when the first wing of the 200-bed unit opened in February 1980, its initial occupants were 29 prisoners from the Penitentiary of New Mexico, which had just been devastated by major rioting. However, unit staff had not finalized security policies and procedures and were generally unprepared to receive disruptive inmates, particularly prisoners who had recently carried out a major disturbance. The New Mexico inmates were housed in the unit for 60 days and were responsible for considerable destruction to the facility. This damage would continue to hamper unit operations after the New Mexico prisoners were gone.

In the meantime, construction of the remainder of the cell block continued. Upon its completion, the Department transferred in all prisoners facing the death sentence. In late 1981, inmates classified to administrative segregation, along with those on administrative detention status at other institutions, were moved into the unit.

Following the opening of Cell Block Six as the centralized administrative segregation facility for the Arizona Department of Corrections, administrative staff made several concerted attempts to control the behavior of inmates

assigned to a segregation status. The first was the development of what was termed the Intensive Custody Unit (ICU) Phase Program. This was a program designed not only for administrative segregation inmates but also for other inmates classified by the Reception and Treatment Center who had a history of disruptive behavior.

The program was composed of four phases, with rules, regulations, and privileges delineated for each. Specific procedures were provided for visiting privileges, access to educational and vocational training programs, job assignments, escort of inmates, exercise and recreation opportunities, control of inmates on the pod, and access to commissary. Program rules went so far as to specify the amount and type of personal property that an inmate could retain in each phase. Under the ICU Phase Program, a disruptive inmate was defined as "one whose behavior interferes with the duties of officers and other staff; whose behavior interferes with the privacy, privileges, and rights of other inmates."

Due to changes in administrative staff, as well as the complexity of program operations, the ICU Phase Program was eliminated in late 1983. However, it was soon replaced by a comparable disruptive inmate management approach. In the summer of 1984, the Management Adjustment Program (MAP) was developed to "manage the extreme behavior of inmates who are confined to administrative segregation." MAP was created, according to Ad. Seg. Unit staff, in response to emergency sanitation conditions caused by a large number of inmates who engaged in such acts as the throwing of trash, food, and feces; the burning of paper, bedding, and clothing; and an overall failure to comply with building regulations pertaining to the maintenance of cell appearance. In addition, many inmates refused to accept or satisfactorily perform sanitation work assignments.

The Management Adjustment Program consisted of two parts. The first, known as the Progressive Ladder Program, was devised to respond to favorable inmate behavior by gradually increasing privileges. The second part was known as the Regressive Loss of Privileges Program. Under this program, those inmates who did not maintain satisfactory sanitation of the unit were considered to have "broken trust" and thereby lost certain privileges. Similar to the Intensive Custody Unit Phase Program, MAP encompassed many program areas (e.g., visiting, academic and vocational education, and job assignment), with privileges being increased or decreased in order to control disruptive behavior.

However, shortly after its implementation, MAP came under fire as a result of a comprehensive class action suit filed against the Department (Black et al. vs. Ricketts et al., 1985). The program was cited by the plain tiffs as merely "a cover for behavior modification." Because MAP had not been as successful as anticipated, the Department made minimal effort to challenge this contention. The program was eventually terminated as one of the stipulations in the consent decree that resulted from the suit. A voluntary contract system was adopted after MAP was discontinued. The consent decree also altered many other aspects of the unit's operations, including placement and release criteria, food service, use of restraints, and recreation.

During its five and a half years of operation, the Ad. Seg. Unit has also undergone numerous administrative changes. Five different individuals have

occupied the unit's highest administrative post, Deputy Warden, with resultant changes in management policies and procedures that precluded continuity in unit operations.

The current administration has initiated a proactive approach to inmate management that it believes has reduced misconduct in the unit. Security systems have been enhanced, supervision of inmates has become more direct, staffing has been improved, and attempts are being made to identify and transfer prisoners who are mentally ill.

Mission

The Administrative Segregation Unit's most recent mission statement, formulated in February 1986, summarizes the unit's purpose as follows:

To house adult male inmates classified to Administrative Segregation, Condemned Row, or those on Administrative Detention status pending classification. This basically involves housing the Department's most recalcitrant population and providing appropriate programming to prepare them for lesser custody or re-entry into society. In addition, the Administrative Segregation Unit provides other adult institutions with temporary housing during emergencies and/or disturbances.

Architectural Design and Security Environment

The Administrative Segregation Unit is one of seven units comprising the Arizona State Prison Complex-Florence. Located 75 miles southeast of Phoenix, the complex houses approximately 3,200 inmates. The Ad. Seg. Unit is situated in the southeastern section of the complex, where it is completely zoned off from the other units by a 16-foot double-fenced perimeter. The outer fence is topped by concertina wire, the inner fence by razor ribbon. A 12-foot sand trap separates the fences. The perimeter is supervised from three towers, each staffed twenty-four hours a day by one correctional officer. No electronic devices are used to secure the perimeter.

Entry to the unit is through a pedestrian sally port that is supervised by a tower guard and operated from the unit's main control room. All visitors must be cleared by a hand scanner. Failing that, visitors may be subjected to a hand pat-down or a strip search by an officer of the same sex. A video camera system monitors all entrances and exits, doors and hallways, and dayrooms within the unit.

As shown in Figure B-1, the Ad. Seg. Unit is composed of four wings. One wing contains offices for the unit's administrative and support services, as well as eight close observation cells. The other wings are used for inmate housing. Within the unit there are four lockdown positions: the main control room located near the entrance and a control station on each of the three housing wings. However, the location of the wing control stations precludes




Figure B-1. Administrative Segregation Unit Schematic Design

direct surveillance of the housing areas, requiring security staff to rely upon video monitoring devices and periodic walk-throughs.

Every housing wing also includes a counselor's office and two pods. Each pod is of bi-level construction, with 32 single cells and a dayroom. Each pod is also divided by a secure corridor, which is used for inmate movement. Large glazed windows in the corridor enhance staff observation of the pod area. However, these windows have also been historically subject to damage by inmates out in the dayroom or even under escort.

Every cell has a floor area of at least 64 square feet and contains a concrete bed and stainless steel sink and toilet. Most cells also have concrete table-chair sets, but these are gradually being replaced by metal furnishings that are bolted to the floor. Each cell has a rectangular, heavy plastic window with a perforated steel grate, which can be opened from the inside. Cells on two wings have doors with partially open fronts; those on the other wing have closed fronts.

The unit also includes an outdoor recreation area zoned separately from the facility. This area has 16 fenced exercise pens. Each pen is 256 square feet and contains a basketball goal and fixed weight machine. Prior to the construction of these pens in 1984, interior courtyards were used for outdoor recreation. However, the courtyards proved difficult to supervise effectively, resulting in a number of security problems, ranging from damage to exterior cell windows to attempted escape.

In addition, the facility has a multipurpose space for non-contact visiting, attorneys' visits, and religious services; a nurse's station and medical examination room; a dental office; a small law library; a room for court hearings; and a small food service area.

Numerous electrical heat/smoke sensors, which generate both an audible and visual alarm, have been placed throughout the unit. Alarms are located on the display panel in the wing control stations, as well as in the central control room. Manual notification is available through a switch found in any one of the eight key panel boxes on each wing. Fire fighting equipment is located throughout the entire building. Both the alarm system and fire extinguishers are checked daily by correctional officers and weekly by a Fire Safety Specialist from the Facility Fire Safety Office.

Although the Ad. Seg. Unit is relatively new, it exemplifies most of the negative characteristics of indirect supervision facilities, including the inability to effectively monitor inmate behavior in the housing pods, an environment not conducive to proactive management efforts, and difficulties in providing inmates with regular access to programs and recreation due to the remote locations of these areas. Consequently, substantial expenditures of personnel are required for inmate movement and supervision.

Given these design deficiencies and the limited capacity of the unit, Department officials decided in early 1984 to construct a replacement facility approximately one mile away. This 768-bed institution, scheduled to open in the spring of 1987, has been titled the Special Management Unit to reflect the various types of inmates it will house, including those classified to administrative segregation, those sentenced to the death penalty, those

requiring high security protective custody, and those designated serious institutional management problems under the Department's new classification system.

Administration and Management

The Ad. Seg. Unit is managed by a Deputy Warden, who in turn is administratively responsible to the Warden of the Florence prison complex. The Deputy Warden supervises a Correctional Service Captain who manages the unit's security functions.

As shown in Figure B-2, the administrative structure beneath the Captain reflects a traditional shift approach, with each shift supervised by a Correctional Service Lieutenant and Correctional Service Sergeant. Line Correctional Service Officers from each of the three shifts report to the Sergeant.

The majority of program personnel are also under the direct authority of the Deputy Warden. These staff include the Correctional Program Supervisor, Correctional Program Officers, and clerical staff. Medical personnel are accountable to the Deputy Warden, but also report on a line function to the Florence complex Medical Supervisor. Other program staff, such as educators and librarians, report to their respective complex supervisors.

Inmate Profile

The Administrative Segregation Unit is designed to house up to 200 inmates who have a demonstrated need for a high security environment. The great majority of the unit's population consists of inmates who cannot or do not function well in the Department's other institutions. On the average, nearly three-fourths of the population has either been classified to administrative segregation or transferred from other facilities following assignment to administrative detention status. The remainder of the population consists of inmates who have been sentenced to the death penalty.

Typically, nearly one-half of the inmates in the unit are incarcerated due to conviction of a violent crime, and approximately two-fifths are serving sentences of 11 years or longer.

In terms of demographics, the average inmate population is 49% white, 23% Hispanic, 18% black, and 10% other races. Almost one-half of the inmates are age 30 or younger. Approximately 80% have less than a high school education.

The unit houses very few prisoners with special management needs. Inmates classified to protective segregation are sent either to the complex's Central Unit (maximum security cases) or to ASPC-Perryville (lower security cases). The Ad. Seg. Unit is not equipped to handle inmates with chronic medical problems or physical handicaps, so prisoners requiring long-term specialized care are housed in a more appropriate unit within the Florence complex. Similarly, inmates believed to have serious mental health problems




Figure 2. Administrative Structure, Administrative Segregation Unit, ASPC-Florence

are referred to professional staff for evaluation; those found to be overtly psychotic or extremely depressed and potentially suicidal are transferred to the complex's Special Program Unit, the Flamenco Mental Health Center in Phoenix, or an appropriate hospital setting.

Staffing

The unit is currently staffed by 107 full-time permanent personnel, with the ratio of security staff to inmates at approximately 1 to 2. However, the administration has indicated a need for approximately 20 additional line staff. Existing staff can be broken down as follows:

Functional Area/Position	Number of Staff
<u>Administration</u>	
Deputy Warden	1
<u>Security</u>	
Captain	1
Lieutenant	5
Sergeant	6
Correctional Service Officer	86<a>
<u>Program</u>	
Correctional Program Supervisor	1
Correctional Program Officer	3
<u>Services</u>	
Psychiatric Nurse	1
Registered Nurse	1
Physician's Assistant	1
<u>Clerical</u>	
Administrative Secretary	1
Typist	1
Total Staff	107

<a> Correctional Service Officers are assigned as follows: day shift--32, swing shift--32, graveyard shift--16, property--2, supply--2, special assignment--2.

As in other institutions operated by the Arizona Department of Corrections, staff for the Ad. Seg. Unit are selected primarily on the basis of

three criteria: desire to work in the unit, personality characteristics, and prior experience. Gender does not enter into the decision, and both male and female staff are employed in the unit. Nearly all new security staff come directly from the Department's Correctional Officer Training Academy; approximately 2% transfer from other facilities or units. The low percentage of transfers to the Ad. Seg. Unit is attributed to the remote location of the Florence complex. Openings are filled on a seniority basis, with new hires assigned where they are needed.

All staff graduated from the academy have received six weeks of pre-service training. Subjects covered include use of force, crisis management, use of firearms, first aid, communication skills, and inmate rights. New staff also receive two to three weeks of on-the-job training prior to working alone in the unit.

Staff currently are afforded 16 hours of in-service training annually. Most of this training is designed to provide updated information and maintain skill levels. The program includes refresher first aid, forced cell entry, weapons requalification, and report writing.

The administration is working with Training Academy staff to develop a longer, more specialized in-service program that will have both on-site and off-site components. The program is intended to assist staff in coping with the large amount of record keeping required in case of lawsuits, the hostile attitude of the unit's inmate population, and the numerous legal stipulations affecting unit operations. Plans also call for videotaping as much of this training as possible in order to reduce long-term costs.

Within the unit, shift assignments for staff are made by the shift commanders. Post assignments are the responsibility of the Correctional Service Captain. There are no limitations on the length of time that staff can work in the unit, so assignment there is essentially permanent. However, staff who find work in the unit unsatisfactory may request a transfer to another part of the Florence complex. The current Deputy Warden is supportive of such requests and works with staff to facilitate the process.

The Arizona Department of Corrections is one of a very few correctional agencies that offer special incentives to work in restrictive housing areas. Staff in the Ad. Seg. Unit receive an extra \$3 per day as hazardous duty pay. The current administration also believes that the unit's "team-oriented" philosophy provides another incentive. An esprit de corps exists among staff, who understand that they are working with the most difficult-to-manage component of the inmate population. Staff working overtime are given compensatory time off, but overtime is not used on a frequent or regular basis.

Although no formal studies have been conducted, the administration no longer views stress as a major concern among staff. Changes in operational policies and procedures have lessened anxieties, and the only time tension becomes evident is when the unit is short of personnel and staff must pick up the slack.

Staff turnover is approximately 3% per year, a rate below that of other units at the Florence complex. The primary reason for leaving the unit is promotion.

Assignment, Review, and Release

According to a directive issued in May 1985, the Arizona Department of Corrections "may reclassify an inmate from maximum security to administrative segregation when the inmate requires constant security provision and control and is normally considered to be a very high security risk or whose presence in the general inmate population poses a threat to the secure and orderly operation of the institution."

The decision to classify an inmate to administrative segregation is made by the Administrative Segregation Committee. Members, appointed by the Director of Corrections, include a chairman, who is knowledgeable in all aspects of classification; a representative from the security staff; and a representative from the program staff.

An inmate is normally classified to administrative segregation if he has executed, attempted, or in any way assisted with one or more of the following actions: murder; deadly assault; hostage taking; sexual assault; escape; arson; and manufacture, possession, or smuggling of firearms, explosives, and/or incendiary or poison gas devices.

In addition, an inmate may be classified to administrative segregation if he has been involved in such acts as extortion, drug distribution, assault with an instrument that could cause bodily harm, and rioting.

An inmate who has been found guilty of serious misconduct is referred by institutional staff to the Administrative Segregation Committee for a hearing. The inmate must be notified of the referral and has the right to be present and make a statement at the hearing. The hearing must be held within 10 working days of the date on which the inmate receives notification unless a continuation is granted. (An inmate is usually transferred to the Ad. Seg. Unit while awaiting his hearing and may be held there up to 30 working days.)

If the committee decides to reclassify an inmate to administrative segregation, the inmate is given a housing assignment in the Ad. Seg. Unit. He is also oriented to unit policies and procedures so that he understands what is expected of him.

Upon completion of his first 30 days, and then again after his first 90 days, each inmate is reviewed to determine whether the reasons for placement in administrative segregation still exist. Thereafter, reclassification hearings occur every six months. In reviewing an inmate's status, the Administrative Segregation Committee assesses several factors:

- Reason for initial placement in administrative segregation,
- Criminal conviction history,
- Disciplinary history, and
- Compliance with uniform requirements for conduct and sanitation.

If the inmate has not been found guilty of a major disciplinary violation and has been cooperative in performing work and programming assignments, he is normally released from administrative segregation and returned to the institution from which he was initially transferred. Any decision by the committee to deny release must be based in part upon specific facts that indicate the inmate poses a continuing threat to the safety or security of the institution to which he would be assigned.

An inmate has one opportunity to appeal the outcome of any reclassification hearing. He must complete a departmental appeal form and submit it within 15 working days to the Administrator of Offender Administration. Upon reviewing the appeal, the Administrator, or his designee, may uphold, overturn, or modify the decision; he/she may also order a rehearing. The Administrator must act on the appeal within 15 working days after receiving it.

Inmate Management

Due to the nature of the high-risk, disruptive population in the Ad. Seg. Unit, security is the top priority. Most inmates are confined in their cells at least 20 hours a day and are closely observed by staff. Each wing has a Correctional Service Officer who serves as a "pod man." This individual periodically monitors the two pods on the wing and checks individual cells. During the day these security checks occur approximately once an hour; at night, six random checks are made. Two additional officers act as "rovers," patrolling the corridor and providing inmate escort as needed.

Before an inmate is released from his cell, he is strip searched and then handcuffed to a restraining belt. If the inmate is being moved outside the unit, leg irons are also applied. At least two officers supervise each inmate whenever he is not in his cell.

Physical force is employed only as a last resort and only to the extent necessary to control and/or move inmates. Staff using physical force must complete a special form and submit it to the Deputy Warden. Staff report that an average of five use-of-force incidents occur each month. Restraints may be applied only to deter escape while transporting inmates, to preclude injury to self or others, to prevent property damage, and to meet medical or psychiatric requirements. Use of restraints requires approval of the Deputy Warden or his/her designate.

All unit staff have been trained in forced cell movement. Following each action, the inmate is examined by medical personnel. All forced movements are videotaped, and a report on each action is sent to the Deputy Warden.

Inmate management is also effected through a voluntary contract system, which was developed after the Management Adjustment Program was discontinued. Upon placement in the Ad. Seg. Unit, each prisoner has an opportunity to sign a form, agreeing to abide by a set of "uniform requirements" for conduct and pod sanitation. (See Figure B-3.) As the inmate continues to meet these requirements, he is afforded more freedom of movement and increased privileges.

Figure B-3

Uniform Requirements Contract Form

To: Administrative Segregation Unit Inmate

Subject: Uniform Requirements

A classification committee after reviewing your case has determined that you be placed in the Administrative Segregation Unit. The amount of time you can expect to remain in this unit is dependent upon your actions while here.

Your adherence to the below listed uniform requirements will increase your chances for a timely release from the Administrative Segregation Unit:

1. You must be free of a major disciplinary violation for the six (6) months immediately preceding the reclassification hearing.
2. You must satisfactorily perform all work assignments.
3. You must maintain a clean cell and refrain from throwing any item(s) which may cause harm or an unsanitary condition.

You can expect your assigned Unit Counselor to get together with you within the next few days to review this form.

To: Whom It May Concern

Subject: Acknowledgement of Receipt of Uniform Requirements

On this date, _____, I received a copy of this Uniform Requirement form and a verbal explanation of what was expected of me as to the above listed uniform requirements.

Signature

Date

DC No.

In the final stage of this contract system, the inmate is placed in a special housing pod, where he not only has greater freedom of movement but also is given a work assignment. An inmate must meet all contract requirements to be considered for release from the unit.

Inmates who choose not to establish contracts are assigned to special pods. They are housed in closed-front cells and are not allowed to work, but do receive the same programs and services as other prisoners in the unit. These inmates are given the chance to enter into a contract at least once every 30 days.

Programs and Services

Inmates in the Administrative Segregation Unit are afforded programs and services commensurate with their security requirements and constitutional rights. On the whole, program opportunities are more limited than in the general population; availability of services is usually about the same.

Academic and Vocational Education

The unit offers A.B.E. and G.E.D. programs, which are supervised by a full-time instructor. Several college-level courses are available through televised programming. In addition, Spanish-speaking inmates are provided with opportunities to improve their English language skills. Due to security requirements, no vocational classes are offered.

Work Programs

Twenty-three paid work assignments are open to unit inmates who are fulfilling their contract requirements. These assignments entail painting, cleaning, general maintenance, and assisting the academic instructor. In addition, one to two temporary, non-paid assignments are usually available to inmates working on a trial basis. Ad. Seg. inmates are not allowed to participate in industries.

Counseling/Mental Health

Unit inmates have access to a certified psychologist and psychology associate. In addition, a psychiatric nurse is on duty eight hours a day, seven days a week. Specialized services include group counseling and an anger suppression course. A counselor is stationed on each wing to help individual prisoners experiencing problems. Inmates with severe emotional illnesses are normally transferred out of the unit.

Medical/Health Care

The Ad. Seg. Unit includes a nurse's station, medical records office, and medical exam room staffed five days a week by a registered nurse and a physician's assistant. The assistant makes daily rounds to each pod, and a licensed physician visits the unit weekly.

Inmates with serious medical problems are taken to the complex's hospital unit. This 16-bed facility has 24-hour nursing coverage and is capable of providing most laboratory, x-ray, pharmacy, and diagnostic services. When necessary, inmates may be taken by ambulance to nearby Maricopa County Hospital.

Dental care is provided in the unit twice a week by a licensed dentist.

Law Library

The unit maintains a master list of the complex's legal holdings. Inmates may request a book or copy of a particular case by submitting a request to the Special Services Sergeant. Turn-around time is approximately 24 hours. A small legal library containing basic references is also available within the unit for inmate use. Inmates may sign up to work in the library for a two-hour period, or longer if no one is waiting to use the room. Two inmates may work in the library simultaneously if they are known to be compatible. Also, consistent with security requirements, inmates may work in the law library with co-defendants or co-plaintiffs in preparing their cases.

Personal Hygiene and Sanitation

Inmates are provided with all the articles necessary for maintaining personal hygiene. Prisoners are permitted three 15-minute showers a week, normally after exercise. Haircuts may be requested by kite (written request).

In addition, inmates are provided with cleaning supplies and are expected to thoroughly clean their cells at least once a week. Pod cleaning is conducted daily by inmates approved for work assignments. All areas of the unit are subject to weekly inspections by an administrative staff member.

Religious Activities

Upon arrival, all inmates complete a "Religious Preference and Privilege Request Form." This form enables prisoners to apprise the chaplaincy of special dietary and grooming practices associated with their religious faith.

Services for all major faith groups, including Native American pipe and sweat lodge ceremonies, are held regularly. However, participation is limited to ten inmates at a time, and security staff are present to monitor prisoner conduct. Inmates may also request permission to see a chaplain at any time by submitting a kite to the Special Services Sergeant.

Recreation and Leisure-time Activities

The Ad. Seg. Unit maintains an outdoor recreation area consisting of 16 fenced exercise pens, each with an area of 256 square feet. Within each pen are a basketball goal and weightlifting equipment. Recreation is restricted to one prisoner per pen and is normally scheduled by wing. The recreation area is available for use Monday through Saturday. Inmates are permitted to exercise for two hours, three times per week.

Inmate Communications

Visiting in the unit is restricted primarily to non-contact in order to prevent the introduction of contraband. Visiting is conducted in an area that ensures privacy via telephone conversation but also permits visual monitoring by security officers. Inmates who have been in administrative segregation status for six months may request contact visitation. These requests are evaluated by the Deputy Warden, based on considerations such as health, safety, security, and the orderly operation of the facility. Requests for contact visitation may not be denied for disciplinary reasons unless previous visits have involved rule violations.

Inmates may keep visiting lists of up to ten people, excluding persons under age 18, who must be accompanied by a parent or legal guardian. Prisoners must submit visitation slips to the Visitation Officer for approval prior to receiving any visitors. Visiting is scheduled in two-hour blocks on Saturdays, Sundays, Mondays, and holidays. However, persons residing in Arizona are permitted only one visit per week. Visitors are required to register prior to each visit and must clear a hand scanner before entering the unit. Failure to comply with unit rules and policies generally results in a temporary suspension of visiting privileges.

Attorney visits are limited to Tuesdays through Fridays unless special authorization is received. Attorneys must schedule their visits at least two days, but no more than seven days, in advance to ensure availability of space.

Department policy affords inmates telephone access in accordance with their security classifications and institutions' physical capabilities. In the Ad. Seg. Unit, this translates into one five-minute collect call every two weeks. Each wing has one phone available for inmate use, and inmates must submit requests to place calls, specifying both date and time. A counselor ensures that the phone is brought to inmates' cells at the scheduled time.

Correspondence between prisoners is prohibited, but otherwise there are no restrictions on the amount of mail that inmates may send or receive. Correspondence is not read or censored unless there is clear evidence to justify such actions. However, all incoming mail is routinely opened to inspect for contraband. If contraband items are found, they are confiscated and noted in a special log. Both the sender and addressee are also notified in writing within 24 hours of receipt. Legal mail is opened by staff in inmates' presence and inmates must sign for it.

Food Service

Meals are prepared in another unit within the complex and transported to the Ad. Seg. Unit in temperature-controlled bulk containers. A small food service area is used for portioning individual servings and loading trays onto hot/cold carts. The carts are then brought to the various pods, where inmates are fed in their cells. Special religious and medical diets are also provided for inmates who require and are authorized to receive them. All food services operations are supervised by staff.

Commissary

Inmates may purchase up to \$35 of goods from the commissary each week. Prisoners receive store lists on Sunday and submit their orders on Monday; goods are distributed on Thursday. During the holiday season from December 1 through January 15, additional items are stocked in the commissary, and the spending allowance is increased to \$100.

Laundry

All inmates receive state-issue clothing and bedding. Both clothing and linen exchange occur once a week. All laundry is done outside the unit in other complex facilities.

Legal Issues/Litigation

The Ad. Seg. Unit is currently subject to a Stipulated Partial Settlement Agreement (Black et al. vs. Ricketts et al., 1985) that affects numerous aspects of inmate management. The agreement contains stipulations pertaining to such areas as classification, inmate communications, food service, discipline, internal management, and programs and services. It prohibits the use of behavior modification techniques to help manage prisoners, and also limits the items that may be considered privileges or conduct incentives. An independent monitor has been appointed to observe and report on compliance with the consent decree.

In addition, the Department reports that it is subject to litigation pertaining to such issues as use of force, disciplinary procedures, internal classification procedures, visitation, access to legal materials, mail policies, medical and mental health care, and food service.

Cost

Construction costs for the Ad. Seg. Unit, which was completed in 1981, were slightly more than \$6 million. Total annual operating expenditures, however, are nearly impossible to determine because the unit shares some programs, services, and staff with the rest of the Florence complex. For example, most health care, as noted earlier, is provided through the complex's hospital unit. FY 86 operating costs that could be broken out for the Ad. Seg. Unit are presented below in Table B-1.

Table B-1

Discrete Operating Costs (FY 86)
 Administrative Segregation Unit, ASPC-Florence

Personnel	\$2,433,900
Food Service	225,700
Operations	159,600
Maintenance	84,500
Total	\$2,803,700

Effectiveness

Staff report considerable improvement in inmate management following implementation of the proactive approach in the fall of 1984. Most noticeable have been increased security and sanitation within the Ad. Seg. Unit.

One measure of the unit's effectiveness can be found in its return rate. During the last half of 1985 and the first half of 1986, 125 inmates were released from the facility. Only an estimated 10% of these prisoners have subsequently been reclassified to administrative segregation.

In addition, staff working in the unit appear to be generally satisfied with the effectiveness of its operation, as well as the degree of personal safety the present management approach affords. Staff have observed a decrease in inmate assaults on staff and other prisoners, a reduction in inmate grievances and complaints, greater inmate access to programs and services, and a higher number of inmates returning to general population. Staff satisfaction is reflected in the unit's turnover rate, which is among the lowest systemwide.

The Arizona Department of Corrections has authorized a formal study of current management practices in the Ad. Seg. Unit. The study will assess more fully the unit's effectiveness in managing disruptive inmates and its impact on operations at the Department's other institutions.

Summary

The Administrative Segregation Unit at the Arizona State Prison Complex-Florence houses the Department's most difficult-to-control inmates. The unit has been operational since 1980, but has experienced a troubled history. Following inmate litigation in 1984, the unit underwent substantial changes in policies and procedures. A new administration has initiated a more direct approach to inmate management--intended to avert situations conducive to violence or tension--and has taken steps to strengthen staff training. A voluntary object-based contract system has also been implemented to provide inmates with incentives for good behavior and to help staff assess inmates' readiness for release. The facility design, however, continues to present problems. Although the podular design enhances management by housing prisoners in relatively small groups, it is limited in its ability to promote effective

inmate supervision and access to programs and services. A replacement unit is currently under construction.

Both administration and staff perceive improvements in the current operation, including a reduction in violent incidents and greater inmate access to programs and services. A formal evaluation of the unit is being funded by the National Institute of Justice.

**DISRUPTIVE MAXIMUM SECURITY INMATE MANAGEMENT CASE STUDY:
WASHINGTON CORRECTIONS CENTER, INTENSIVE MANAGEMENT UNIT**

Introduction

The Intensive Management Unit (IMU) is a physically separate, well-designed maximum security unit located within the security perimeter of the Washington Corrections Center (WCC) in Shelton. The facility was opened in December 1984 to house disruptive and high risk inmates within the Washington Department of Corrections' (WDOC) adult male prisoner population. The IMU was designed to separate problematic inmates from the general population. It houses inmates who, through their behavior, have demonstrated an inability to conform to institutional regulations or to adjust to general population. The program, through its structure and intensity, manages and controls several disparate types of special management inmates and provides an opportunity for change. Privileges attained in the IMU are earned in stages as inmates demonstrate improvement in their behavior patterns. Assignment to the IMU may be long-term, based on inmates' inappropriate or chronic behavior, or propensity to present a serious risk to the safety of other inmates, staff, community, or themselves.

Institutional History

The original design for the Washington Corrections Center failed to provide the capability for segregating inmates who were disruptive, in need of protective custody, mentally unstable, or in detention awaiting a disciplinary hearing. To meet the WCC's segregation needs, one housing unit within the Receiving Unit was designated for this purpose. However, disruptive inmates proved difficult to manage within the environment of the Receiving Unit (R-Unit). Unrest in the segregation cells of the R-Unit would spread to other housing areas and segregation inmates would antagonize receiving unit inmates. The administration of WCC could not transfer particularly troublesome segregation inmates to the department's other facilities because these facilities also had inadequate segregation facilities. Increased commitments to the WDOC in the early 1980's and the resulting crowding within the Receiving Unit forced the issue.

The Department of Corrections had constructed an intensive management unit on the grounds of the Washington State Penitentiary at Walla Walla in 1983. The perceived effectiveness of that unit and its positive impacts on the administration's ability to manage both its special needs and general populations prompted the replication of this concept at the WCC facility. The experience with the IMU at WSP contributed to a more efficient and effective design for the WCC-IMU.

Construction of the Intensive Management Unit at WCC began in July 1983. When the legislature authorized the project, only about half of the necessary funds were appropriated. The north end housing unit, containing 62 single

cells, and the support space in the center of the facility were constructed first. Inmates occupied this portion of the IMU in December 1984 while the remaining cells were under construction.

The IMU serves primarily the segregation needs of WCC, but it also accepts limited transfers from other WDOC facilities.

Mission

The Intensive Management Unit is specifically designed to restore violent inmates and special needs inmates to stable participation in general population. The IMU achieves a major Department of Corrections' goal by separating violent and unstable inmates from the general and reception populations at the Washington Corrections Center. This separation ensures a safer and more stable environment within WCC and enhances programming opportunities for stable offenders.

Architectural Design and Confinement Environment

The 124-bed Intensive Management Unit was constructed within the security perimeter of the Washington Corrections Center. (This was an intentional design change from the WSP-IMU.) The prison site has 98 acres within the perimeter and 250 acres outside the perimeter. It is located about seven miles from the small town of Shelton. In addition to the Receiving Unit, which has 479 beds, there is a 1,200-bed training center for medium custody inmates. The Washington Corrections Center currently houses about 1,320 inmates.

The perimeter of the WCC is a double fence topped with concertina wire. Observation towers keep the WCC perimeter under constant surveillance. A vehicular perimeter patrol is also used. There are no electronic intrusion devices. The IMU building shell serves as its primary perimeter. Three towers monitor outside entry doors to the IMU. These towers also monitor maintenance exits. Entry and exit through the outside door to the unit are controlled by the main tower (Tower Number 1), which is adjacent to the administrative complex for the WCC facility. Entrance into and out of the IMU sally port is regulated by the control booth located in the north end of the IMU. The north control booth also supervises access to support areas within the unit. The south control booth regulated access to the south end housing area.

To gain access to the IMU's main corridor (support core), official visitors and staff must pass through a sally port from the administrative area to the inmate program and service area, through a locked door into the passageway, through a locked door out of the passageway and a locked door into the IMU, and through a sally port--a total of seven secure barriers.

Inmate visitors go directly from the passageway into the visiting area and take their places in secure visiting booths. Other visitors to the unit, along with staff, exit the passageway to the outside of the IMU and enter under the supervision of the main tower.

The WCC-IMU physical plant occupies 47,409 gross square feet, or approximately 382 gross square feet per inmate. As can be seen in Figures B-4 and B-5, it is composed of two inmate housing areas, one at each end of the unit. The center of the unit consists of support space. There are also three individual holding cells within this central core.


Each housing area consists of three physically separate pods, two with 20 single cells on two tiers and one with 11 single cells on two tiers. Each cell is approximately 81 square feet and includes a stainless steel combination toilet and sink unit (embedded in concrete), a steel bed, and a steel shelf. Each cell has two security windows, one within the door and the other facing outdoors. A light unit serves a dual purpose--it provides lighting for the cell interior and two-way communication between the inmate and the control booth officer. IMU inmates are responsible for cleaning their tiers; inmates from the training center are brought in to clean common areas. The IMU includes 12 small recreation areas, six (three indoor/three outdoor) for each complement of 62 inmates. On the north end, only one inmate at a time is allowed to use the adjacent yards for indoor/outdoor recreation. One portion of each housing unit has three individual offices and a common area for staff. The control booth officer has complete visibility into this program/service area. In the center of each housing unit is a secure control booth which supervises access to the housing area, opens and closes sliding cell doors, unlocks doors between pods, permits access to the shower areas, and regulated access to the program/service space. Television cameras monitor the control booths on the north and south ends of the unit.

Within the central support core of the unit are two yards for outdoor recreation. These yards are bounded by the construction of the unit. They are covered with mesh to prevent the introduction of contraband from outside the unit. The visiting room is composed of 12 individual secure visiting booths. A dental operatory is also provided in the central support core. It opens on the main corridor connecting the north and south ends of the unit. Other space is used for storage, property room, staff toilet facilities, staff smoking room, and staff offices.

The design of the Intensive Management Unit yields one very important advantage--it is a self-contained facility. All routine services required by inmates are located within the facility. With the exception of dental care, all normal services are located within the housing units. Inmate movement is highly restricted and controlled. In addition, the separation of the housing areas into three pods allows much flexibility in managing several disparate types of inmates. Within the IMU, the staff must manage five distinct inmate statuses: disciplinary detention, administrative segregation, pre-hearing detention, isolation, and intensive management. The design of the facility facilitates the provision of safety, security, and control within a humane environment.


Figure B-4

WASHINGTON CORRECTIONS CENTER IMU



FIRST LEVEL FLOOR PLAN
1/16" = 1'-0"





3/4" = 1'-0"

WASHINGTON CORRECTIONS CENTER
IMU SECOND LEVEL FLOOR PLAN

Figure B-5

Administration and Management

As shown in Figure B-6, the WCC-IMU is administered by a Captain of Maximum Security Operations. He reports to the Associate Superintendent of Maximum Security/Operations. Both of these individuals also administer other units within the WCC complex. In addition, a Lieutenant directly supervises the Intensive Management Unit on a full-time basis. Each of the three shifts is headed by a Sergeant, who supervises control booth officers, floor officers, and the property room officer.

Although not specifically designated as such, the management approach of the IMU is similar to unit management. Each unit (housing area) is a small, self-contained inmate living and staff area, operating semi-autonomously within the confines of the larger unit. The essential components of this approach which are employed by the IMU are:

- A manageable number of inmates housed within one area, which can be further subdivided into smaller units;
- The assignment of an inmate to a particular unit based upon security and/or programmatic needs specific to the management capabilities of that unit; and
- The administrative authority for all intra-unit aspects of inmate living and programming.

The components of unit management that are not used by the IMU are:

- A multidisciplinary team of staff who have offices located adjacent to the inmate living area and who are permanently assigned to work with inmates within that unit; and
- An administrator (unit manager) with executive authority and supervisory responsibility for unit staff.

With the exception of the IMU counselor, staff who deliver inmate programs and services within the IMU also deliver these same services to the greater WCC inmate population.

To promote efficient operations, the IMU maintains extensive records on each inmate. These records include data sent from all departments/agencies and information related to classification, discipline, detainers, sentence calculations, transfers, medical and health care, and program needs.

In addition, eight different types of logs are kept:

- Unit;
- Control room (booth);
- Visit;
- Daily report of segregated inmate;
- Search;
- Tylenol, aspirin, and antacids;




Figure B-6. Administrative Organization, Intensive Management Unit

- Washington Administrative Code grievance procedure legal books; and
- Nutrient loaf.

Management of the IMU is enhanced by a monitoring system comprised of the following activities:

- The IMU is visited daily by a Lieutenant or staff member of a higher rank. The visits are recorded in the Unit Logs.
- The Unit Logs are reviewed and initialed monthly by the Associate Superintendent of Maximum Security/Operations or his designee. The areas of noncompliance with policies and procedures are reported in writing to the Superintendent.
- The Administrative Segregation Hearing Officer reviews chronological logs of segregated inmates to ensure compliance with conditions of confinement/program reviews and classification. Areas of noncompliance are reported in writing to the Superintendent.
- An Intensive Management Status report is prepared quarterly and submitted to the Director of the Division of Prisons. This report includes each inmate's:
 - . Name and number;
 - . Length of stay (days);
 - . Reason for placement; and
 - . Next review date;

Inmate Profile

Although WCC-IMU is capable of housing 124 inmates, the optimal population for effective management, control, and separation is believed to be around 100. Most inmates at the IMU were formerly among the general population at the Washington Correction Center. The facility also receives a limited number of transfers from other Washington Department of Corrections' facilities.

Within the total Washington Department of Corrections, the disruptive maximum security inmate population is predominantly white (66%) and aged 20 to 29 (58%).¹ Seventy percent were committed to the Department for violent crimes.

¹ Demographic data describing the inmate population confined within the WCC-IMU were not available. However, the Washington Department of Corrections did provide limited summary information about its total disruptive maximum security population in response to the survey conducted for this study. These data have been cited here because it is believed that the disruptive maximum security population confined at WCC-IMU does not differ appreciably from the disruptive maximum security population confined elsewhere within the state. These data, however, are limited and no conclusions can be drawn from them.

The WCC-IMU houses two categories of special management inmate--protective custody and mentally ill. Its capability to house such disparate inmate populations within reasonably close confines is due to its physical design and tightly controlled and supervised inmate movement policies. Data concerning the proportion of the IMU population that was protective custody, mentally ill, or in need of special medical care were not available at the time of the site visit.

Staffing

At present, total IMU staff number 41.9, or approximately one staff member for every three inmates. The ratio of uniformed security staff to inmates is 1 to 3.2. This comparatively low ratio is possible because of the staff-efficient design of the facility. This complement is broken down as shown in Table B-2.

Table B-2
IMU Staff

<u>Position</u>	<u>FTE</u>
Captain	0.5
Lieutenant	1.0
Sergeant	5.0
Correctional Officer	32.4
Correctional Counselor II (Frozen)	1.0
Correctional Counselor III	1.0
Clerk Typist II	1.0

Written institutional policy governs assignment of custody staff to the IMU. The WCC Superintendent or his/her designee is responsible for the selection, administrative review, on-the-job performance, and rotation of staff assigned to the IMU.

Selection criteria include personality characteristics such as maturity, tolerance, highly skilled, and interest in working with offenders in this setting. Other factors include the historic use of sick leave, prior evaluation results, and supervisory file notations.

Assignment of staff to the IMU is based on a competitive bid process. However, applicants must have the recommendation of the WCC Captain and Associate Superintendent. Only custody staff on permanent status--those who have completed the probationary period--are assigned to a duty post within the IMU.

Staff assignments do not exceed 12 months unless exceptions are authorized in writing by the Superintendent and are noted in the individual's personnel file under which conditions the assignment may be extended for a second 12 month period. There are provisions within the written policy for extending the term of assignment to the IMU beyond 24 months. Such an extension must receive written approval from both the Superintendent and the Director of the Division of Prisons. In practice, staff members--with the exception of the Captain--are

not permitted to work within the IMU for more than 24 months. The Superintendent annually reviews the Captain's appointment.

There are no special training requirements for custody officers selected to work in the IMU. All officers complete one week orientation, two weeks academy training (standard course), and one week on-the-job training. Inservice training comprises 20 hours per year.

The WCC administration believes that staff view the IMU to be a good assignment. Because all inmate movement is by escort, the IMU is perceived as a busy place where time passes quickly. A survey of sick leave and leave without pay utilization, comparing IMU staff with other WCC staff, is under way. WCC administrators expect the results to show that IMU staff use less sick leave and leave without pay than other WCC staff. The survey results should be available by late summer 1986. Also, the perception of the administration is that staff turnover is lower for the IMU than for the facility as a whole.

There are no special staff incentives to work within the IMU. In addition, overtime is used as little as possible. The portion of the annual operating budget targeted for overtime is typically less than 1% and much of this is used for training.

Assignment, Review, and Release

Inmates are assigned to the IMU for the following reasons:

- Protection of other inmates from the threat of harm;
- Prevention of escape or attempted escape by an inmate;
- Protection of an inmate from self-injury;
- Protection of an inmate from verified threat or harm/actual harm by other inmates;
- Protection of staff from threats of harm by an inmate;
- Maintenance of order and security where other methods of control have failed.

In making IMU assignments, five classification statuses are used: pre-hearing detention; disciplinary segregation; isolation; administrative segregation, which includes mentally unstable and protective custody offenders; and intensive management. Specific policies and procedures governing assignment, review, and release for each classification status are explained below.

Disciplinary Segregation: Assignment to disciplinary segregation is by the Administrative Segregation Hearing Officer for a period not to exceed 30 consecutive days. Once the term of the sanction has been served, the inmate is released back into the general population of WCC.

Isolation: An inmate may be assigned to isolation (imposed sanction) by the Administrative Segregation Hearing Officer for a period not to exceed 10 consecutive days. However, should the inmate commit another serious infraction, the period of isolation may be increased by an additional 10 consecutive days. This additional isolation sanction may not be imposed without the Director's prior approval unless the inmate is released from isolation for a minimum of 72 hours before another isolation sanction is imposed.

Administrative Segregation: Inmates may be assigned to administrative segregation by the Administrative Segregation Hearing Officer when their presence in the general population would constitute a serious threat to the safety of staff, visitors, other inmates; a serious threat to their own safety; the probability of their escape and/or a serious threat to the orderly operation of the institution.

Offenders who suffer from mental deficiencies which produce assaultive or bizarre behavior that cannot be properly supervised in the general population are also assigned to administrative segregation by the Administrative Segregation Hearing Officer. The Unit monitors the inmate's behavior in concert with WCC mental health staff and recommends placement in a more appropriate setting as the inmate's behavior improves or deteriorates.

Inmates are admitted to the IMU for protective custody only when there is documented reason to believe that protective custody is warranted and no reasonable assignment alternatives are available.

Once a decision to place an inmate on administrative segregation status has been made, the Administrative Segregation Hearing Officer must conduct a classification meeting within 10 days. If the Superintendent's decision is to retain in administrative segregation status, an intermediate informal review is conducted within 20 days of the first classification meeting. If the Superintendent decides again to retain the inmate in administrative segregation, a second classification meeting is held 20 working days after the intermediate informal review decision.

At the second classification meeting, the Superintendent's decision must be one of the following: release the inmate to general population; refer to the Director's Review Committee for intensive management status; or refer to the Director's Review Committee if recommendation is to transfer to another institution or out of state.

The authority to release an inmate from administrative segregation rests with the Superintendent of WCC and/or an official Transfer Order from the Director, Division of Prisons.

After the decision has been made to release an inmate from administrative segregation, the inmate's Correctional Unit Supervisor is notified. The Correctional Unit Supervisor is responsible for facilitating the inmate's return to general population of WCC.

Intensive Management: Inmates in this status have an established history of serious misconduct or have committed a singular act of a particularly threatening nature; i.e., assaulting staff, inciting a riot, taking hostages,

assaultive behavior, and/or escape. Assignment to intensive management status is by the Director's Review Committee. Typically, these inmates are assigned to this status for a minimum of six months. They may be retained in this status indefinitely if classification reviews determine they would continue to present a substantial risk if released to general population. Inmates who require long-term protective custody may also be placed on intensive management status through assignment of the DRC.

All inmates assigned to intensive management status are reviewed by the Administrative Segregation Hearing Officer at least every 30 days. The Hearing Officer meets informally with individual inmates to discuss adjustment and compliance with adjustment criteria. However, simply meeting adjustment criteria does not necessarily result in discharge from administrative segregation/intensive management status.

Authority to release inmates from intensive management status rests with the Director, Division of Prisons, or designee(s).

Pre-Hearing Detention: Inmates may be assigned to the IMU prior to and during hearings on serious infractions when there is reason to believe they are a substantial security risk or present a danger to themselves, to others, or to the order and security of the institution. Following the disciplinary hearing, inmates in pre-hearing detention will be reclassified, as appropriate, to disciplinary segregation, isolation, or administrative segregation. In unusual circumstances an inmate could be reclassified to intensive management status by the DRC. The applicable classification hearings and reviews depend upon the reclassification status.

Classification Reviews

The procedure for conducting classification reviews provides for:

- 48 hours' advance written notice to the inmate;
- Appointment of a staff advisor to the inmate, if requested and approved;
- Collection of witness statements;
- Written reasons for assignment to Intensive Management Unit; and
- Superintendent's review of the classification action and a recommendation to the Director's Review Committee if IMU placement is supported.

The classification review addresses the custody status of the inmate. Behavior expectations for return to the general population are provided to the inmate. At subsequent six-month classification reviews, the inmate is advised of whether he has met the program expectations for recommended return to a less structured living environment.

Inmate Management

Three primary factors account for the effective management of disruptive maximum security inmates within the WCC-IMU. The first is the design of the physical plant, the second is the policies and procedures developed to operate the unit, and the third is a structured behavior management program.

As described previously, the design of the physical plant facilitates the provision of a safe, secure, and humane confinement environment. For example, it is well lighted, consolidates all routine inmate services and programs within the unit, and provides the capability to segregate up to six different inmate classification statuses.

A well-designed facility, however, does not guarantee a well-run facility. The key elements are comprehensive policies and procedures that capitalize on the design features and well-trained, experienced staff to implement them.

Examples of policies and procedures that promote effective management of IMU inmates include thorough counts, judicious use of force, routine security inspections, inmate movement, strip/body cavity searches, and emergency preparedness.

Counts--Six formal counts are held each day. Informal counts are at the discretion of the shift supervisor. All counts require two staff to account for all inmates present; they must observe a living, breathing body and human flesh. A picture count is initiated whenever a count cannot be rectified. (A picture of all IMU inmates is maintained in the appropriate control booth.)

Use of Force--By WCC policy, physical force is used only as a last resort and not more than reasonably necessary to accomplish the objective. Physical force is restricted to:

- Preventing escape;
- Defending oneself;
- Preventing inmate self-injury;
- Protecting the public;
- Protecting staff;
- Protecting other inmates;
- Protecting property; and
- Ensuring justifiable orders necessary to maintain institutional safety, security

WCC policy prohibits the use of force as a form of punishment or discipline. When physical force is used, it is videotaped if possible and the applicable documentation is completed.

Security Inspection--The procedures involved in conducting security inspections are not described, as they are considered confidential by the WCC administration. It is sufficient to note they are conducted at the beginning of each shift. Pertinent forms used are included in Attachment 1.

Inmate Movement--The process of moving inmates to and from various locations within the IMU is designed to provide the maximum level of security for

staff and inmates. Inmates housed in the North End Unit are not released from their cells until they are properly restrained. Inmates housed in South End, D, E, and F Tiers are not permitted to leave the housing unit until they are properly restrained.

Proper restraint calls for inmates to remain handcuffed during all interviews, hearings, and counseling sessions. Inmates remain restrained during visiting periods only when disruptive behavior has been displayed during previous visits.

Normal routine movement begins at about 6:30 a.m., when yard periods start, and concludes at about 9 p.m., after showers. Special non-routine movements include medical transport, Intensive Management Level reassignments, and placement on Intensive Watch (to prevent inmate self-injury). During all inmate movement requiring staff escort and restraint, two escort staff maintain physical control of the inmate by taking hold of the handcuffs to ensure the inmates' safety, security, and control.

All special movements are videotaped. When possible, the Sergeant completes a preliminary interview on tape that includes the inmate's identity, the date and time, the staff involved, and the reason for the special movement.

Strip/Body Cavity Searches--WCC policy provides that inmates may be strip/body cavity searched upon admission to the IMU and at any time staff have good reason to believe inmates are concealing contraband. Body cavity searches are performed by medical staff and require prior approval of the Superintendent/Acting Superintendent/designee.

During orientation to the Washington corrections system, each newly admitted inmate is advised and acknowledges in writing that a digital probe search may be conducted on special categories of offenders entering an Intensive Management Unit within the Division of Prisons. These categories include:

- Intensive Management status inmates;
- Administrative Segregation status inmates;
- Others assigned to Intensive Management Unit when there exists possible/reasonable cause an inmate might be concealing contraband;
- Inmates under sentence of death at Washington State Penitentiary.

In addition, body cavity searches are conducted prior to placement in the Intensive Management Unit, upon return to the Unit when a good opportunity for contraband concealment has occurred, and upon possible/reasonable suspicion of contraband concealment.

Body cavity searches are conducted in private, with only the inmate and the persons responsible for the search present. The search is videotaped, beginning with the supervisor's statement, which is made out of sight and hearing of the inmate. If the inmate does not resist during the search procedure, the videotape is erased or edited in its entirety after 90 days. If

the inmate resisted the search in any form, the tape is maintained for at least two years.

Emergency Preparedness Drill and Training--On a regular basis, select IMU staff participate in an emergency preparedness drill or training session. The supervisor evaluates the Unit's response to the drill and the staff training session. The form used to document and evaluate the drill/training session is shown as Figure B-7.

Finally, the third factor, a structured behavior management program, is concerned with returning as many inmates as possible to general population. In pursuit of this objective, the administration has developed a Management Level system that increases or decreases an inmate's privileges based primarily upon his behavior within the Unit.

The IMU employs a phase system of inmate management with inmates assigned to administrative segregation and to intensive management status. The management levels serve two functions. First, they provide specific guidance to correctional staff by defining conditions of confinement and specifying management practices for inmates in each level. Second, the program structure clearly gives every inmate an opportunity to advance through the IMU to return to the general population. Each management level is designed to allow and encourage the inmate to progress by exhibiting stable behavior.

The four management levels differ in terms of status assigned, location of housing unit assignment (by tier), movement restrictions, available programs/services, and length of stay. Key elements of each Management Level are described below.

General

All IMU inmates, with the exception of those assigned to isolation, are permitted one hour of recreation per day.

Inmates at Levels I, II, and III, must be handcuffed behind their backs through a cuff portal prior to removal from their cells. They remain handcuffed during all staff contacts and movement. Handcuffs are removed after the inmate is secured in the cell, visiting booth, shower, or exercise area. Inmates at Level IV are handcuffed only when being transported off their assigned tier.

Management Level I

All inmates assigned to isolation by sanction of the Administrative Segregation Hearing Officer remain Level I for the term of their confinement. They are permitted scheduled showers, stamps and correspondence materials (maximum \$10 value), access to legal materials, and legal and personal correspondence. They are not permitted recreation, visiting, or access to general library services. Level I inmates are fed in their cells.

WASHINGTON CORRECTIONS CENTER
SAFETY PROGRAM

Emergency Preparedness Drill & Training

Unit or Section _____ Date _____
 Time of Drill/Training _____ Time Secured _____

UNIT MEMBERS PARTICIPATING

Type drill or Simulation Actual response and/or physical use of equipment.
 Verbal response or discussion of procedures only.

Fire or Emergency Situation Class "A" Common Combustibles Degree of Severity: Minor Fire
 Class "B" Flammable Liquids Major Fire
 Class "C" Electrical Location _____
 Other Emergency Simulation: _____

Equipment Used or Training on: Extinguishers Fire Hose Air Paks Communications
 Exhaust Fans Key Control
 Other: _____

Was movement of, or evacuation of residents held in conjunction with the Drill? Yes No Time it took to Evacuate: _____

Briefly Describe the Training/Drill: _____

_____ (Attach additional sheet if needed)

Debriefing & Suggested Training or Corrective Action Needed: _____

_____ (Attach additional sheet if needed)

Report completed by: _____

** THIS SECTION TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR WHEN EVALUATING UNITS RESPONSE **

Staff Knowledge of	Equipment Used	Satisfactory	Improvement Needed
Extinguishers	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Hose Handling/Use	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Air Paks	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ventilation System	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Key Control	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Communications	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Evacuation Procedures		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Post Orders		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other: _____		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
_____		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
_____		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Comments: _____

Evaluator _____

Figure B-7
B-34

Management Level II

All inmates assigned to pre-hearing detention/disciplinary segregation maintain Level II status until their infractions have been totally adjudicated. Inmates assigned to administrative segregation are maintained in Level II until after the first classification meeting following IMU placement. They are then eligible for level review. Inmates assigned to Intensive Management Status by the Director's Review Committee begin at Level II. They are reviewed monthly for promotion to Level III. The criteria used to promote/demote inmates from Level II are: behavior; classification; security/safety; population management; medical/mental health needs; and institution need. In addition to the limited services provided at Level I, inmates at Level II may schedule two 90 minute visits per week; have access to general library services; and request maximum store orders of \$15.00. Level II inmates are fed in their cells.

Management Level III

Inmates assigned administrative segregation or intensive management status reach Level III through promotion. The criteria for promotion/demotion are: behavior; classification; security/safety; institution need; population management; medical/mental health needs; and release plan. In addition to the services and programming available at Level II, inmates at Level III may schedule two 150 minute visits a week, receive 3rd and 4th class mail, request maximum store orders of \$20.00, and are eligible for a radio in their cells (earplugs/phones mandatory), personal property, work assignments, and academic correspondence courses. Level III inmates are fed in their cells.

Management Level IV

Inmates assigned administrative segregation or intensive management status reach Level IV through promotion and maintain this level until they are released from the IMU or demoted. The criteria for demotion are the same as for Level III with the exception of the release plan. In addition to the services and programming afforded inmates at Level III, inmates who reach Level IV may schedule two 210 minute visits per week, request maximum store orders of \$30.00, participate in recreation with up to four other Level IV inmates, a choice of inside or outside yards, enjoy extended yard times, and are eligible for television in their cells. Level IV inmates may eat together in the dayroom according to a rotating schedule established by staff.

Table B-3 summarizes the privileges available to IMU inmates by management level.

A Level Review Committee, consisting of the Administrative Segregation Hearing Officer, the IMU Counselor, and the IMU Lieutenant, meets weekly to make level promotion/demotion recommendations to the IMU Captain. Final promotion/demotion decisions are made by the IMU Captain. The IMU Captain has the authority to promote/demote on demand. Such an action is reviewed by the Associate Superintendent and Superintendent of the complex.

Table B-3
Privileges Available by Management Level

	Management Levels			
	Level I	Level II	Level III	Level IV
Shower	X	X	X	X
Store Order Stamps/Correspondence Material \$10	X	X	X	X
Access to Legal Materials	X	X	X	X
Recreation		X	X	X
Visits (90 Minutes)		X	X	X
Visits (150 Minutes)			X	X
Visits (210 Minutes)				X
Library Access		X	X	X
Eligible for Radio			X	X
Eligible for Personal Property			X	X
Eligible for Work Assignment			X	X
Eligible for Academic Courses			X	X
Receives 3rd and 4th Class Mail			X	X
Store Orders \$15		X	X	X
Store Orders \$20			X	X
Store Orders \$30				X
Multi-Man Recreation 5 Maximum				X
Choice of Yards <u>Inside</u> Outside				X
Multi-Man Meals				X
Extended Yard Times				X
Restricted Movement Out of Restraints				X
Eligible for Television in Cell				X

Programs and Services

To facilitate management of disruptive maximum security inmates, all routine programs/services are delivered on the unit. The level of programming and services available to IMU inmates corresponds to the management level to which they have been classified. These programs and services are described more fully on the pages that follow.

Education

IMU inmates assigned to Management Levels III and IV may take correspondence courses that have been approved by the Institutional Education Department and counselor, with final approval by the IMU Captain.

There are no vocational programs available. The IMU physical plant does not contain space for vocational training, and such programming is not consistent with the level of control the existing unit management is able to exert over the movement and activities of the IMU inmates.

Recreational Library Services

A library staff member visits the IMU weekly. Inmates may request specific titles and/or subjects for the next delivery. Books previously checked out are picked up before delivery is made on subsequent orders.

Inmates may check out no more than two classified library books at any one time. Inmates are not permitted to pass these books among themselves.

In addition, recreational reading books and magazines are available in all dayroom locations within the IMU. Inmates may exchange books within the dayrooms during their yard periods.

Legal Library Material

WAC rules and selected legal materials are stored in the IMU library for distribution to inmates. Requests for legal materials which are not available in the IMU are forwarded to the WCC librarian who fills the request. Inmates may use legal materials for a maximum of one week. Legal books, WAC rules, etc. may be checked out for a period of five working days.

The following free printed legal forms are available in the Unit via Interview Slip (kite): Civil Rights Complaint, Habeas Corpus, Marshall Services Form, Summons Form of Paupers to Habeas Corpus, and Tort Claims.

Religion

The facility Chaplain is available to IMU inmates. Should inmates wish to talk to the Chaplain, they must submit an Interview Slip to the IMU escort officer. No in-unit services are held.

Inmate Communications

Each yard and dayroom has a coinless telephone for inmate use. (The Control Room has a cut-off switch for making the telephones inoperative.) Inmates may make scheduled telephone calls during their individual recreation periods. The number and duration of telephone calls depends upon the inmate's management level.

All IMU inmates, including those on isolation status, are granted telephone time for legal and related matters. IMU policy permits inmates to place these calls Monday through Friday, 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. Legal calls can be placed only to law firms and legal assistance groups. Inmates are limited to three legal telephone calls per week. However, inmates who show cause may place additional calls during a week. Legal calls are typically not to exceed one-half hour.

All IMU inmates are eligible to receive visits, except when assigned to isolation status. Visiting is conducted on Fridays, 4:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., and Saturdays, 12 noon to 3:45 p.m. Special visits (outside visiting hours) must be scheduled at least three days in advance with the IMU Captain. Visiting space is limited and is scheduled on a first come, first served basis. The duration of visits is governed by the inmate's management level.

All visits are non-contact. Only two adults are permitted to visit IMU inmates at one time due to the small size of the visiting booths.

Inmates are escorted to and from visits in restraints. Normally, the restraints are removed during visits. If an inmate refuses to be recuffed at the conclusion of the visit, he loses the privilege of having restraints removed during visits.

Transportation of visitors from outside the WCC secure perimeter to the IMU is provided by the unit's visiting officer. If a visitor arrives late, the visit is canceled for that day unless it can be rescheduled. Visitors are searched and processed at the Main Institution desk. Visitors may be searched again at the IMU public lobby search room if warranted.

Attorneys must schedule visits at least 24 hours in advance with the IMU Captain. Attorney visits are conducted in designated attorney visiting booths between 12 noon and 3 p.m. Monday through Friday and are not permitted to interfere with meals and institutional counts.

Mail

Inmates at all levels may receive and send personal and legal correspondence. Only inmates at Levels III and IV may receive books, magazines, and newspapers.

Recreation

IMU inmates, except those assigned to isolation status, are permitted one hour of recreation each day. Dayrooms and/or enclosed indoor and outdoor recreation areas are available for inmate use. Limited recreation equipment is available. Jogging and calisthenics are permitted only in the yards. The range of recreational opportunities is proscribed by the inmate's management level.

Medical

To reduce the need to remove inmates for treatment, a broad range of health care services are provided on the unit:

- Medication delivery. Medication is delivered three times daily.
- Medical sick call. A nurse performing a screening sick call when the first medication is delivered.
- Physician and psychiatrist. A physician is available for consultation for two hours, two times per week, to see inmates referred by the physician's assistant. A psychiatrist is available for consultation one hour per week.
- Dentist. A dentist holds sick call and provides dental treatment six hours per day, two days per week (one scheduled session for each end of the unit).
- Psychologist. A psychologist is available 20 hours per week for diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders.
- Physical examinations. Complete physical exams, to include laboratory tests, are performed on inmates assigned to the IMU if no physical has been completed within the previous year. Otherwise, a screening exam is completed.
- Medical and dental emergencies. Emergencies are handled under the same procedures existing for the WCC.

Services for which an inmate is removed from the IMU include, but are not limited to, x-ray, EKG, minor surgery, oral surgery, orthopedic consultations, eye examinations and medical emergencies requiring diagnosis, observation and surgery at the WCC Infirmary or community hospitals or health care facilities.

Mental Health/Counseling

Inmates who are classified administrative segregation or intensive management status are assigned to an IMU counselor within three days of admission to the IMU. Inmates on prehearing confinement or disciplinary segregation retain counselors from their permanent living units.

The counselor interviews inmates within 48 hours after their placement in the IMU to develop a classification schedule and to define goals and objectives for the inmate's IMU confinement. Subsequent meetings between the inmate and his counselor, other than scheduled reviews, are at the inmate's request.

The IMU has a special suicide prevention program for identifying and reporting suicidal and self-destructive behavior. The Suicide Prevention Program involves a series of eighteen steps, including identification, assessment, determination, admission, intervention, and follow-through. Once a suicide watch is initiated, all steps are conducted.

Meal Service

Meals are brought from the main institution kitchen and delivered to the IMU loading dock. Kitchen employees and officers supervise all tray preparation and transportation. Trays and eating utensils are counted before meals are served. All inmates are fed in their cells with the exception of those at Management Level IV. Level IV inmates eat in multi-man groups according to a rotation schedule. Inmates are given 20 minutes to finish each meal before trays are picked up. If an inmate does not return his tray, an infraction is written up; he is restricted to his cell until he returns the tray; and nutrient loaf is issued for all subsequent meals until the tray is returned. The IMU Captain or Duty Officer may direct forced removal of the tray. Trays are counted at pickup and if any are missing, the inmate may not leave his cell until it is searched.

At the direction of the WCC Superintendent (or his designee), nutrient loaf may be substituted for regular meals for those inmates who throw food, fecal material, or urine. The substitution of nutrient loaf for regular meals (three per day) may not exceed 72 loaves for each incident.

During meal service, only emergency inmate traffic into or out of the unit is permitted.

Store

All inmates assigned to the IMU, with the exception of those on isolation status, are allowed store, but the type and number of items allowed are more restricted than for the general population. The maximum amount of the order,

per week, is determined by the inmate's management level. Inmates placed in disciplinary segregation for abusing store privileges are not allowed store.

Work Programs

Inmates on Levels II, III, and IV may apply for porter (cleaning) positions by submitting an Interview Slip to the IMU Lieutenant.

Legal Issues/Litigation

The IMU is not currently subject to any court orders or consent decrees.

Costs

As would be expected with a maximum security institution, capital and staff costs are comparatively high. Construction cost for the physical plant, including fixtures and equipment, was \$8,625,000, or just under \$70,000 per bed. Annual staffing costs are \$1.2 million. Annual costs of inmate programs and services were not available as they are not accounted for separately from those for the entire Washington Corrections Center facility. Maintenance/replacement expenditures have been negligible since the IMU is new and has been under maintenance service agreements since its opening in December 1984.

Effectiveness

The IMU concept of managing disruptive maximum security inmates is very popular with WCC staff, as is the design of the WCC-IMU.

In October 1985, an IMU Cost-Benefit Analysis Report was published, which:

- Analyzed the impact that an IMU has had on the inmates and staff at WCC and WSP (Washington State Penitentiary);
- Applied those findings to the potential impact on the Washington State Reformatory, Monroe Command institutions;
- Identified the need for additional IMU bed space throughout the Washington Department of Corrections;
- Identified the impact that not building a Monroe Command IMU would have on the current renovation project at WSR (Washington State Reformatory).

The most salient findings of this report for WCC-IMU were:

Positive Findings

- There was a 67% decrease in the number of staff injuries that required treatment at an outside hospital.
- There was a 100% decrease in the number of staff injuries due to assaults in the IMU compared to segregation.
- There was a 39% decrease in the number of inmate injuries that occurred in the IMU compared to segregation. There was a 100% decrease in assaults and a 71% decrease in accident-related injuries.
- There was a 27% decrease institution-wide in the number of hospital trips for inmate injuries.
- There was a 17% decrease in infractions by inmates in the general population.
- There was also a 43% decrease in infractions by inmates in IMU compared to segregation. Particularly impressive were the decreases in the most serious infractions at the WCC:
 - . Assault - 38%
 - . Fighting - 47%
 - . Setting a fire - 47%
 - . Destroying property - 52%
 - . Possession of a weapon - 38%
 - . Controlled substances/paraphernalia - 21%
 - . Making intoxicants/drugs - 92%
- There was a 40% decrease in the amount of good time lost by inmates after the IMU opened.
- No weapons have been found in the IMU.
- In comparing staff turnover rate six months before the IMU opened and six months after, the data indicated no significant change in the rate of custody staff turnover.

Negative Findings

- Injuries to staff due to use of force increased from 0 to 8.
- Injuries to staff caused by assaults in the general population increased 43%.
- There was a 41% increase in the number of injuries to inmates in the total population. The increase occurred in the general population, as there was a decrease in inmate injuries in the IMU compared to segregation.
- There was a 93% increase in the instances of controlled substances being found in the general population.

- There was a 67% increase in the instances of weapons being found in the general population.
- Inmate grievances against the physical plant increased 7.25 times per inmate compared to the segregation unit. Most of these grievances were related to the "shakedown" of a new facility.

Case Summary

The Washington Corrections Center-Intensive Management Unit was opened in December 1984 following the Washington Department of Corrections' success with a similar unit at Walla Walla. The facility's ability to effectively manage disruptive maximum security inmates is greatly enhanced by its physical design, which minimizes the need for inmate movement and provides maximum capability for separating disparate special management populations; e.g., disciplinary segregation, protective custody, and mentally ill. Written policies and procedures complement the design of the facility and are implemented by trained, experienced staff. A unique policy of the WCC-IMU requires staff rotation after 24 months of duty. A structured behavior management system ensures that all inmates are presented with the opportunity to earn their way back into general population. The IMU has experienced few serious incidents--for example only one suicide has occurred since it opened and during its first six months of operation no weapons were found during shakedowns. Not surprisingly, the staff and the Department are very supportive of the intensive management unit concept. While the initial cost was comparatively high, \$8.6 million for 124 beds, the IMU has provided WCC with the capability to segregate its problematic and disruptive inmates in a safe, secure, and humane environment.

AREA INSPECTION CHECK LIST (SAFETY & SECURITY)

TO: Shift Lieutenant

DATE:

FROM:

AREA:

SPECIFIC ITEM	ACTION CODE	SPECIFIC ITEM	ACTION CODE
1. Exterior Walls (In & Out)		23. Locker Room	
2. Interior Walls		24. Day Rooms	
3. Windows		25. Utility Rooms	
4. Security Screens		26. Office Spaces	
5. Doors and Locks		27. Storage Space	
6. Fences		28. Crawl Space	
7. Mechanical Rooms		29. Basements	
8. Cells		30. Foyer Areas	
9. Bars		31. Waiting Areas	
10. Locks		32. Public Restrooms	
11. Pipe Chases		33. Salley Ports	
12. Manholes, Thatches		34. Control Booths	
13. Ventilator Ducts		35. Inmate Common Areas	
14. Generators		36. Visiting Rooms	
15. Fire Hydrants		37. Other (List):	
16. Storm Drains			
17. Light Poles			
18. Shadow/Security Lights			
19. Sewage Drain Plugs			
20. Locked Cabinets			
21. Restrooms			
22. Shower Areas			

CODES: W - Work Order Initiated
 I - Infraction/Investigation & Work Order Initiated
 H - Hazard Report & Work Order Initiated
 X - Checked
 NA - Not Applicable

 Signature

Distribution: Chain of Command to Associate Superintendent; Area Supervisor

I. M. U.
SAFETY/SECURITY INSPECTION CHECK SHEET

Attachment #2

TO: Captain

For week of _____ to _____

FROM: 1st - 2nd - 3rd Shift Sergeant

NORTH END

DISCREPANCIES

Housing Unit - inside - Inspection	Time Sun.		Time Mon.		Time Tues.		Time Wed.		Time Thurs.		Time Fri.		Time Sat.		Remarks
	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	
Y=Yes, N=No															
F - 1															
C - 1															
C - 2															
B - 1															
B - 2															
A - 1															
A - 2															
R - 1															
A - 4															
R - 2															
V - 2															
V - 1															
H - 4															
H - 5															
4:00 Visiting Booths 1-12															
R - 4															
Fire Hose Door															
R - 5															
H - 3															
Chains															
H - 1															
Dental Office															
C Mop Closet Roof Access															
Pipe Chases Tues., Thurs.															

I. M. U.
SAFETY/SECURITY INSPECTION CHECK SHEET

Attachment #2

TO: _____ For week of _____ to _____

FROM: 1st - 2nd - 3rd Shift Sergeant

SOUTH END

DISCREPANCIES

Housing Unit - inside - Inspection	Time Sun.		Time Mon.		Time Tues.		Time Wed.		Time Thurs.		Time Fri.		Time Sat.		Remarks
	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	
Y=Yes, N=No															
Activity Room															
D - 1															
D - 2															
E - 1															
F - 1															
F - 4															
F - 5															
R - 6															
R - 7															
R - 8															
D Mop Closet Roof Access															

I. M. U.
SAFETY/SECURITY INSPECTION CHECK SHEET

Attachment #2

TO: Captain _____

For week of _____ to _____

FROM: 1st - 2nd - 3rd Shift Sergeant
 (Circle Shift)

DISCREPANCIES

Housing Unit -outside- Inspection	Time Sunday		Time Monday		Time Tuesday		Time Wednesday		Time Thursday		Time Friday		Time Saturday	
	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N
Y=Yes, N=No														
Main Entrance														
W - 1														
Loading Dock Gate														
South Stair- well Door														
R - 6 South														
M - 1														
R - 3 North														
C - 5														
Vehicle Gate														
Security Fence														
Outside Lights														
Manhole Covers														
S - 4														
S - 5														
S - 6														
S - 7														
S - 8														
W - 2														
Visitor Toilet														
Roof, C & D Tier Mop Closet Access Mon., Wed., Fri.														

DISRUPTIVE MAXIMUM SECURITY INMATE MANAGEMENT

CASE STUDY: MINNESOTA CORRECTIONAL FACILITY - OAK PARK HEIGHTS

Introduction

The Minnesota Correctional Facility-Oak Park Heights is a maximum security institution operated by the state department of corrections. The facility was opened in 1982 to house the more disruptive and high risk inmates within the department's adult male prisoner population. It was thought that removing these inmates from other correctional facilities would improve the system's overall stability. While the Oak Park Heights facility is a high security operation, it also seeks to provide a humane, responsive environment that is conducive to constructive programming and behavioral change. Both departmental and institutional personnel believe that the facility is meeting these objectives. Effective management of this potentially dangerous population is attributed to the unique design of the facility, the support of departmental leadership, and, most important, the performance of competent and professional correctional staff.

Institutional History

The Minnesota Correctional Facility-Oak Park Heights (MCF-OPH) was developed in response to problems confronting the Minnesota correctional system during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Public pressure for reform was building due to some highly publicized escapes from the maximum security prison at Stillwater. This facility was also experiencing an unusually high number of punitive and administrative lockups. In addition, a select committee authorized by the state legislature recommended in 1974 that the corrections department move away from operation of large facilities like Stillwater (capacity-- 1,075) in favor of smaller, specialized institutions.

In early 1975, the legislature funded a study to assess the problems at the Stillwater facility. A Task Force on Correctional Institutions was subsequently appointed to examine security and program operations, as well as the physical plant itself. In its February 1976 report, the task force concluded that "since construction of the Minnesota State Prison at Stillwater during the early part of this century, beliefs and practices related to prison architecture, security, programming and management have changed radically." After discussing several alternatives to the existing facility, the task force recommended construction of a new maximum security institution as "the most cost-effective, secure, programmatically promising approach that the State can implement."

Adopting this recommendation, the legislature appropriated funds for preliminary plans and working drawings for the new facility. A collection of 16 task forces, focusing on areas such as administration, housing, security, case management and industry, then set about developing an "ideal" maximum security institution. An operational program for the facility was prepared

based on the facility's mission to give highest priority to public safety, while also providing a secure and humane environment for inmates and staff. A local architectural firm, supported by a nationally known correctional facility design agency, was hired to plan an institution that would accommodate this mission.

The result of these planning and design efforts was a 400- bed maximum security prison, incorporating the most advanced technology in security, housing environment, and energy conservation. MCF-OPH became operational on March 23, 1982, with units opening on a phased basis. Within two years, the institution received American Correctional Association accreditation. The facility currently houses all inmates in the Minnesota correctional system who have been classified as maximum custody or categorized as risks to the public.

Mission

According to an official mission statement issued in February 1984,

The primary mission of [MCF-OPH] is to operate Minnesota's maximum security correctional facility, placing the highest priority on public safety, while providing a secure, safe, clean, responsive, just and humane environment for inmates and staff. Inherent in our mission is the responsibility to maintain an environment conducive to and encouraging the rehabilitation of those inclined to change through emphasis on control, accountability, sensitivity and responsiveness to the real and imagined concerns of inmates and staff. Essential to that environment is a wide range of educational, vocational, treatment and work opportunities tailored to the needs of the inmate population, which provide full-time, constructive assignments and structured leisure-time activities. Those inmates who opt not to participate in constructive program are provided with the necessary surveillance, supervision and control to ensure that they do not interfere with, obstruct or impede those inmates who desire full participation in program.

Our mission is to accept from the other adult male facilities, all inmates classified as maximum custody, or categorized as risks to the public consistent with the Department of Corrections Inmate Custody Status Classification System, which includes those convicted of serious person offenses, high escape risks and dangerous and/or serious management cases. Our program is designed to control, evaluate and facilitate the transfer of inmates to less secure facilities in the system after they have demonstrated a satisfactory adjustment over an established time period at Oak Park Heights. In those cases where the inmate is unable to make the desired adjustment, we maintain the necessary custody, control and program consistent with his identified needs until he meets our adjustment expectations or is released by proper authority.

Architectural Design and Confinement Environment

The Minnesota Correctional Facility-Oak Park Heights is an earth-sheltered structure located approximately 20 miles east of the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area. The facility is situated on a 160-acre site that includes a 60-acre secured area within its double-fenced perimeter. The two fences are separated by a pit that serves as a vehicle trap. Due to the cold climate in Minnesota, few electronic security devices are used. An alarm network was installed on the roof of the facility and on one of the fences. The perimeter is also patrolled by vehicle.

The MCF-OPH physical plant occupies 330,000 square feet. As can be seen in Figures B-8 and B-9, it is composed of a series of eight complexes arranged in a U-shape around a large courtyard. The facility is earth-sheltered on three sides so that it blends into the surrounding landscape and is nearly invisible to public view from County Highway 21 and a nearby residential community. All housing units face inward onto the courtyard, providing more light and a greater sense of openness than found in many correctional facilities.

Six of the eight complexes are designated for housing general population inmates. Each of these complexes is a self-contained, three-level unit (see Figure B-10). The first two levels form a living area. Inmate housing consists of 52 single cells arranged linearly in a split-level design. Each cell is 70 square feet and includes a stainless steel sink and toilet and concrete bed, desk, and shelves. Each cell also has two security windows, one within the door and one in the outside wall facing the courtyard. The housing area opens onto a day room containing facilities for food service, study activities, meetings, and indoor recreation. (Each complex also has its own fenced outdoor recreation area within the central courtyard.) The third level of the unit is reserved for industrial, educational, and treatment programs. Both the living area and the work area include a secure control station, which contains a television monitoring system, affording a full view of the complex.

The complexes are connected by a two-level corridor system. Inmates and staff can move through one of the corridors, but use of the other is restricted to staff.

The remaining two complexes are used for special management inmates. One of these serves as the Control Unit. Like the general population units, the Control Unit contains 52 single cells. The Control Unit cells, however, are slightly larger, and 13 have been modified to house inmates whose behavior demonstrates a need for greater control. Furnishings within Control Unit cells resemble those found in general population cells, but doors and windows have been reinforced. The unit includes a day room and provides for restricted exercise activity in a secure area adjacent to the cells as well as in an outside segregated recreation area. The third level of the complex contains space for non-contact visiting, rooms for attorney visits, offices for the Due Process Unit, and rooms for disciplinary hearings.

The other special housing unit is a medical center with 42 beds, 10 for use in medical and health care and 32 for mental health treatment. Its cells are approximately twice the size of those in the general population units.

Figure B-8. Site Plan, MCF-OPH






Figure B-9. Facility Plan, Level 2, MCF-OPH




B-52


Figure B-10. Typical Complex Section Elevations, MCF-OPH



Section



Side Elevation



Front Elevation

The administration building is the only section of the institution rising above grade level. It follows the three-level structure of the complexes, with its top level serving as the facility's main entry area. All visitors to MCF-OPH must have their belongings inspected there and pass through a metal detector. In addition to administrative offices, the building contains visitor's facilities, the central kitchen, a group dining room, and the security/control center.

The facility also includes a gymnasium, located between the administration building and the medical center, and several multipurpose areas for activities such as religious services and staff training.

A computerized building status system monitors security throughout the institution. Routine events, like opening and closing doors, are programmed into the computer, and any deviations from standard procedures, unless cleared with security officers, trigger an alarm. The system also monitors fire safety and controls heating and ventilating operations.

The design of the Oak Park Heights facility yields several notable advantages. First is the cost savings derived from the energy-efficient, earth-shelter design. More important are the enhanced security and control features. The system of complexes allows for the separation of inmates into small, manageable, and more compatible groups. This permits an environment conducive to good staff-inmate communication. Moreover, the design minimizes blind spots. Finally, the self-contained structure of each complex enables it to be easily isolated, when needed to ensure security and safety of the unit or the institution.

Administration and Management


As shown in Figure B-11, MCF-OPH is organized into three divisions: Administration, Operations, and Industry. The Administration and Operations Divisions are each directed by an associate warden. The Industry Division is managed by a superintendent. All division heads report directly to the Warden.

The Operations Division is responsible for administering the facility's housing complexes. Oak Park Heights employs a unit management approach in its housing complexes. Unit management is a concept designed to improve inmate control and delivery of correctional services. A unit is a relatively small, self-contained inmate living and staff area, operating semi-autonomously within the confines of the larger facility. The essential components are:

- A manageable number of inmates housed within one area, which can be further divided into smaller subunits;
- A multidisciplinary team of staff who have offices located adjacent to the living area and are permanently assigned to work with inmates in that unit;
- An administrator (unit manager) with executive authority and supervisory responsibility for unit staff;

Figure B-11. Organizational Structure

Minnesota Correctional Facility – Oak Park Heights



- The administrative authority for all intra-unit aspects of inmate living and programming; and
- The assignment of an inmate to a particular unit based on security and/or programmatic needs specific to the management capabilities of that unit.

Advantages of the unit management approach include:

- Making use of the multidisciplinary backgrounds of unit staff and their varied areas of expertise, which enhances communication and cooperation with other institutional departments;
- Enhancing staff involvement in the correctional process and management decision-making;
- Improving administration through decisions made by unit staff who are closely associated with inmates; and
- Increasing program flexibility through development of special environments to meet the needs of inmates in each unit.

At Oak Park Heights, half of the complexes house inmates who want to work in a particular industry. For example, one complex provides training and work in micrographics. In addition, one complex serves as a chemical dependency and sex offender unit, and another is an education unit, offering a full-time day program. The medical center provides a mental health treatment program. Each complex is administered by a unit manager and staffed by a caseworker, correctional officers, and program personnel. The unit manager reports to the Associate Warden of Operations, who is responsible to the Warden.

To help manage its operations efficiently and effectively, MCF-OPH maintains an extensive recordkeeping system. The heart of this system is the Information Center, which keeps a detailed base file and a confidential file on every inmate. Based on data sent from all departments and/or agencies concerning inmates, these files include information related to classification, discipline, case summary, sentence calculation, detainers, transfers, education, and health care. The Information Center also is responsible for ensuring that these data are entered into a statewide computerized data processing system.

In addition, the facility's records unit is charged with maintaining the Captain's Log and all watch reports. These documents are periodically transferred to microfiche to facilitate maintenance and storage.

Inmate Profile

Although MCF-OPH is capable of housing up to 400 inmates, the population has generally been kept at 360-370, a range considered conducive to acceptable programming. Most inmates at Oak Park Heights have either been initially assigned there due to conviction of felony offenses and/or classification to maximum custody status or been transferred from another institution where they

have proved to be serious management problems.² The facility also receives some high-risk prisoners from other state correctional systems and the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Only two inmates have been received directly from the courts, and, due to specific problems, both were assigned to the Mental Health Unit.

The inmates received at MCF-OPH tend to be among the most serious offenders convicted by Minnesota courts. Sentencing guidelines and increased use of community corrections filter out most low-risk offenders, leaving a more dangerous population for incarceration. Consequently, a large proportion of the Oak Park Heights population (93%) has committed crimes against persons. In terms of specific commitment offense, approximately one-third of the current prisoners have been convicted of homicide, one-third have been sentenced for sex offenses, and nearly one-fifth have been convicted of robbery. Approximately 10% also have detainers pending against them. Inmates typically spend two to four years at Oak Park Heights before being transferred to a lower security facility.

Demographically, the average age at admission to MCF-OPH is 30. Approximately 40% of the inmates are single, slightly more than 20% are married, and 16% are divorced. The largest proportion of inmates are white (57%); the next largest, black (31%); followed by American Indian (8%). Almost half of the inmates have not completed high school, with 16% of these having less than an eighth grade education. Few have marketable vocational skills.

While Oak Park Heights accepts no protective custody cases due to its high risk population, the facility does house several other categories of special management inmates. Approximately 6% of the population, for instance, has a health problem such as diabetes or epilepsy that requires special medical care. In addition, the Mental Health Unit provides in-patient psychiatric services to all adult males under the jurisdiction of the Minnesota Department of Corrections. Average daily census at this unit during 1984 was 17 inmates; average length of stay was 36 days.

Staffing

Staff at MCF-OPH are considered the key ingredient to continuing fulfillment of the institution's mission. The institution's original staff were handpicked from other facilities operated by the Minnesota DOC. Since then, careful screening of prospective personnel and judicious approval of transfer requests have been used to select new staff. At present, total institutional staff number 305\ or approximately one staff member per inmate. (The ratio of uniformed security staff to inmates is 1 to 1.7.) This complement can be broken down as shown in Table B-4.

² Criteria for assignment and transfer to MCF-OPH are discussed in more detail on pp. 17-18.

Table B-4
Breakdown of Current Staffing at MCF-OPH

<u>Department/Position Title</u>	<u>Number of Staff</u>
<u>Administration</u>	
Warden	1
Associate Warden/Operations	1
Associate Warden/Administration	1
Assistant to the Warden	1
Internal Affairs Officer	1
Industry Superintendent	1
<u>Managers</u>	
Resident Program Managers	2
Captain	1
Corrections Supervisor (Caseworker Supervisor)	1
Accounting Officer Principal	1
Physical Plant Director	1
Due Process Unit Supervisor	1
Information Center Supervisor	1
Training Director	1
Personnel Director	1
Medical Director (on contract)	1
Food Service Director (on contract)	1
Factory Supervisor	1
Institutional Psychological Services Director	1
Education Specialist	1
<u>Uniformed Security Staff</u>	
Corrections Counselor 1	30 ^a
Corrections Counselor 1	17 ^b
Corrections Counselor 2	110
Corrections Counselor 3 (Sergeant)	31
Corrections Counselor Supervisor	13
Corrections Counselor 4 (Lieutenant)	11
<u>Non-Uniformed Supervisors</u>	
Building Maintenance Supervisor	1
Accounting Supervisor	1
Industry Supervisor	3
Assistant Group Supervisor	1
Industry Business Manager	1
Nurse Supervisor	1
Psychologist 2 Supervisor	1

^a Includes some staff over complement.
^b Intermittent officer--perimeter patrol only.

Professional Staff--Non-Supervisory^c

Buyer	1
Chaplain	1
Behavior Therapist	10
Sales Executive	1
Caseworker	8
Industry Development Administrator	1
OSHA Officer	1
Psychologist 3	1
Psychologist 2	1
Registered Nurse	

Technical Staff 8

Clerical Staff 24

Physical Plant Staff 14

Industry Foreman 6

Medical Staff on Contract^d

Radiologist	1
Pharmacist	3
Physical Therapist	1
Psychiatrist	2
Eye Specialist	1
Dentist	2
Dietician	1
Ophthalmologist	1
Doctor	1

Food Service Staff on Contract^d 6

Education Staff on Contract 22

^c Does not include teachers.
^d Director included under Managers.

Selection of correctional officers for work at Oak Park Heights is based on departmental policies and procedures. In general, most officers have had no previous correctional experience. However, these staff have all passed a physical examination and selection interview. Nearly 45% also have a four-year college degree.

Prior to working at MCF-OPH, new correctional officers must complete an intensive six-week pre-service training course tailored to the institution's needs and expectations. This training provides an orientation to the facility's mission and management philosophy and covers such subjects as security procedures, use of force, custodial restraints, use of firearms, and staff-inmate relations. The course also makes extensive use of on-the-job training.

All other newly hired staff must attend a 40-hour orientation program. The program covers information related to management philosophy, physical plant, and programs and services.

The Oak Park Heights administration places a high priority on in-service training. In accordance with American Correctional Association standards, all employees are required to attend in-service training on an ongoing basis. Employees who have contact with inmates receive a minimum of 40 hours annually; clerical and support personnel receive at least 16 hours. These requirements can be met by attending seminars or training classes; writing reports on approved reading materials, videotapes, and films; and cross-training with other posts within the institution.

A minimum of three correctional officers are assigned to each living unit on each shift, with officers rotating between the control room and the floor every two hours. A correctional supervisor is also assigned to each unit, and one lieutenant oversees every two units. In addition, two watch commanders (lieutenants) are present on an overlap basis to ensure continuous coverage on each shift. Correctional supervisors are also assigned to the visiting room, commissary, master control, squad, and recreation.

Most staff are assigned to a unit or work area for a minimum of six months. If desired, they may then request a transfer, which is typically granted on a seniority basis. However, to alleviate burnout and broaden their perspective, staff in the Control Unit are rotated to other areas for two to five months every twelve months.

Staff report experiencing stress related to continual contact with inmates. These reports are supported by a recent study conducted by the St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. A survey of 204 employees found moderate levels of occupational stress, with correctional officers reporting the highest level and managerial personnel the lowest. However, stress management is covered in pre-service training and opportunities for transfer exist so that the effects of this tension are thought to be minimized. In addition, annual retreats give staff an opportunity to voice their concerns and discuss solutions to problems, thus reducing frustration and stress.

No special incentives are offered to staff working at MCF- OPH. Nevertheless, turnover rates have been low, ranging from 1-5% per quarter.

Assignment, Review, and Release

Upon court commitment to the Minnesota DOC, all adult male inmates are sent to one of the department's receiving institutions, where they are classified within 21 days of arrival. Determination of initial custody status is based upon four criteria:

- Type of risk category the inmate represents;
- Term of imprisonment;
- Existence of detainers; and
- Incarceration of the inmate in an adult state or federal correctional institution in the past five years.

Maximum custody is assigned to any inmate categorized as a risk to other inmates and staff or a risk of escape from a maximum or close security facility. Any inmate classified to maximum custody status is transferred to MCF-OPH, providing he has a minimum of 16 months to serve to his release date. In instances in which an inmate initially classified to this status is not transferred to Oak Park Heights, the warden of the sending institution must forward a written rationale to the Deputy Commissioner of Institutional Services for review and approval.

Any inmate classified as a risk to the public due to conviction of a felony offense such as murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, kidnapping, and rape is also transferred to MCF-OPH unless he has less than 37 months to serve to his release date.

Finally, an inmate within the correctional system may be transferred to Oak Park Heights as the result of new information that may alter his initial classification status or pending release date. An inmate who emerges as a serious management problem or has been assigned a segregation sentence of 60 days or more may also be transferred to MCF-OPH. Such transfers are subject to agreement by the respective wardens.³

Once an inmate is received at Oak Park Heights, he is assigned to a room in the medical center for one week while undergoing orientation. (Inmates transferred directly to the Mental Health or Control Unit receive orientation there.) Afterward, the inmate is assigned to a living unit based on programming needs determined during orientation. Each unit houses inmates with similar assignments. Half of the six general population units are designated for industry programming; of the other three units, one is devoted to service programming, one to educational programming, and one to general programming.

³ MCF-OPH also accepts inmates from the Federal Bureau of Prisons and other state correctional systems (under the Interstate Compact). For example, the facility housed 25 FBOP prisoners and 30 Wisconsin DOC prisoners during 1985.

Any inmate who chooses not to participate in programming is required to remain in his cell during the assignment period so as not to interfere with others engaged in constructive activity. An initial living assignment may subsequently be changed by inmate, staff, or administrative request.

Every inmate's involvement in institutional programming is monitored by a Case Management Program Team, composed of his assigned Case Manager and representatives from custody, psychology, education, and work programs. This team reviews an inmate's progress at least once a year. It is also responsible for modifying program plans and making transfer recommendations, both within MCF-OPH and to other facilities. An inmate is entitled to a personal appearance before his Case Management Program Team whenever his case is being reviewed. He may also initiate a review at any time by submitting a written or verbal request to his Case Manager.

Typically, an inmate retains his initial custody status until 70% of his term of imprisonment has been served. At that time, he may be reclassified to a less restrictive custody status. There are, however, four exceptions to this rule:

- An inmate who has been categorized as a risk due to his behavior in the five years preceding his sentence date must spend additional time in his initial custody status based upon the time since his categorized behavior occurred;
- An inmate having an assigned custody status of maximum must serve the greater of a minimum of six months or 50% of the term of imprisonment remaining to be served from the date of the assignment of the custody status to release date;
- An inmate who at the time of initial classification meets all criteria for minimum custody except that he is not within 12 months of his release date must be continued in medium custody until he is within 12 months of release date; and
- An inmate who spends time in disciplinary segregation or fails to fulfill his programming commitments must have one day added to his time in custody status for each day in disciplinary segregation, or unauthorized idle.

An inmate may also be reclassified at any time to a more restrictive custody level as a consequence of disciplinary offense(s), disciplinary segregation, or new information.

Classification decisions are generally initiated by the Classification Review Committee, whose recommendations are sent to the Chief Executive Officer for approval. If an inmate disagrees with the decision, he may file a written appeal. The appeal is reviewed by the Classification Review Board, which must make a recommendation to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) within seven days after receiving the appeal. The CEO must reach a final decision within 14 days of receipt of the appeal.

As an inmate's custody status decreases, his chances of transfer to a less secure institution increase. Oak Park Heights also offers a transfer agreement

grid system (Table B-5), whereby any inmate who fulfills his agreement grid time may request a transfer or be transferred to one of the department's close custody institutions. In either case, both institutions must agree to the transfer. The inmate must also meet current transfer criteria. For example, according to departmental policy, an inmate sent to MCF-OPH due to maximum custody classification, risk category, or new information must serve at least one year there, but not more than 30% of his total term of imprisonment. An inmate whose custody status has not been reduced may be transferred to a close security institution if he has met his grid time and maintained a good work record and positive disciplinary history. An inmate remaining in the MCF- OPH general population, for whatever reason, until he is within four months of release is transferred back to the close custody facility in which he was last confined. This transfer is designed to facilitate release planning and decompression in a less secure setting prior to re-entry into the community.

Table B-5
Transfer Agreement Time Grid

Category	Basic Time to Serve at OPH	Aggravating Factors			
		Attempted Escape or Escape in Last 5 Years	Offense Resulting in Loss of Good Time in Last Year	6 or More Felony Convictions	Disruptive Influence, Sending Institution Discretion
Criteria IV and V ^a	- 12 Months	Add 3-6 Months	Add 2-6 Months	Add 6 Months	Add 3 Months
0-6 Years Yet to Serve	12-18 Months	Add 3-6 Months	Add 2-6 Months	Add 6 Months	Add 3 Months
6-12 Years Yet to Serve	18-30 Months	Add 3-6 Months	Add 2-6 Months	Add 6 Months	Add 3 Months
12 Years- Life Yet to Serve	30-60 Months	Add 3-6 Months	Add 2-6 Months	Add 6 Months	Add 3 Months

^a Inmates in medium custody status or minimum custody status within 12 months of their release date.

Inmate Management

Two general principles govern inmate management at Oak Park Heights. The first stresses a proactive approach to controlling the prisoner population. The second dictates that inmates be dealt with the way staff would want to be treated if they were incarcerated--with dignity and respect.

In implementing a proactive management strategy, personnel are viewed as more important than the design of the physical plant. Staff have been trained to exert a high level of professional control and restraint in even the most provocative situations. Force is used only when necessary to restrain an individual or group, and responses to disruptive behavior are tailored to individual perpetrators rather than the entire population. Whenever possible, staff also try to obviate potential for dangerous situations and reduce tension. Attempts by inmates to form cultural cliques or power groups are broken up by transferring members to other complexes. Inmates who have reason to dislike one another are also assigned to different complexes. Even verbal abuse is targeted for intervention in order to reduce the potential for physical violence.

In addition, MCF-OPH has devised an incompatibility system to ensure that inmates with serious interpersonal problems do not encounter one another without direct and heavy staff supervision. Staff track conflicts and confrontations between inmates, and Case Managers weekly report any instances of concern to an incompatibility committee. The severity of the incompatibility is then rated from A (minor alert to staff) to D (inmates not deemed suitable for residence in the same institution).

The administration also views incarceration itself as punishment and does not advocate increasing that punishment by worsening the conditions of confinement. Thus, every effort is made to create an environment conducive to change.

One aspect of this environment, as noted earlier, is constructive programming. This programming also serves to enhance inmate management by providing prisoners with positive activity while situating them in a specified place at a designated time. Ten formal counts, including three "stand-up" (in-cell) counts, and four informal counts are taken every day.

Since inmates are assigned to programming provided in the same complexes where they live, movement is kept to a minimum. Inmates are escorted from living areas to programming areas and are closely supervised by staff at all locations. Closed-circuit monitoring is also used in many areas.

Another effective means of inmate management is the use of periodic, preventative lockups of selected units. These lockups generally last from three to four days while staff search cells and program areas for contraband and dangerous weapons. The lockups also provide a "time out" period, when staff can interview each inmate individually.

One hundred staff have received training in riot control tactics, ensuring an adequate response to any serious disturbance. In the event of a major incident, a specially trained squad, armed with mace, can be called in immediately.

MCF-OPH maintains a Control Unit for separating especially disruptive inmates from the rest of the population. The Control Unit houses inmates in Administrative Segregation, Segregation Status, Restrictive Segregation Status, and Modified Room Status. Segregation Status and Restrictive Segregation status are punitive and may be imposed only in accordance with the U.S. District Court consent decree governing discipline (Harvey et al. vs. Schoen

et al., 1973). Pursuant to this decree, Oak Park Heights has instituted a number of detention procedure safeguards, including specific criteria for placement on detention status, notice of violation within 24 hours, opportunity for due process hearing within 4 days of notice, and representation by an attorney. Modified Room Status is not punitive, but a measure taken when an inmate's behavior indicates a need for greater control. Administrative Segregation is also non-punitive and is used as a temporary solution to situations involving risk to the security or safety of staff or inmates.

Like other housing complexes at MCF-OPH, the Control Unit is administered via unit management. The Unit is under the general supervision of the Residential Program Manager. However, it is directly managed by a Lieutenant, who is responsible for hiring, training, and supervising staff on the Unit.

All inmates convicted of a disciplinary offense or held on "pre-due process" (pre-hearing) detention, may participate in a phase program. This program offers the inmate an opportunity to earn additional privileges by exhibiting good behavior for specified periods of time.

If an inmate decides to participate in the program, he is immediately placed on Phase I, receiving the basic amenities afforded to all Control Unit inmates. After 30 consecutive days of good behavior, the inmate is placed on Phase II. He remains on Phase II until his 60th day, at which time he is placed on Phase III. After 120 consecutive days of good behavior, the inmate is placed on Phase IV. As can be seen on the grid presented in Table B-6, privileges steadily increase as the inmate progresses through these four phases.

Phase V starts when the inmate has approximately two weeks left to serve, or it may be of longer length if determined necessary. Phase V is tailored to the specific needs of the inmate as determined by unit staff, in conjunction with the inmate. It may include the inmate going out to orientation during his last days in the Control Unit if he has not been through the program. Phase V also includes an appearance before the Job Placement Committee and, possibly, employment in industries. If it is determined necessary by administrative staff, an inmate may work outside of the unit during the day and return at night. Details of all arrangements are contained in a Phase V contract developed by the Case Manager.

If an inmate abuses any privilege, the abuse is documented in an incident report, and the privilege may be suspended through an informal discipline system. If an inmate has a disciplinary report written on him or has a disciplinary report pending, he automatically drops back to Phase I until a disposition has been reached. If acquitted, his phase status at the time of the report, including the accumulated time he had lost toward his next phase, is restored.

Security procedures for disciplinary violators reflect both their risk potential and their punitive status. All inmates are handcuffed for routine movement, and wrist chains are used for movement out of the Control Unit. Movement of inmates is routinely escorted with a minimum of one officer per inmate. Pat searches are conducted when inmates leave their cells for any reason and when they return from areas outside the unit.

Table B-6
Phase Program Privileges Grid

Phase	Length of Time	Telephone Calls	Visits	Exercise (Inside)	Exercise (Outside)	Access to Gym or Gym Equipment	Radio	Typewriter	Educational Courses and Material	In-House Employment	Newspaper	Ice Cream
I	30 days	1 10-minute call 4 days/week; legal calls included	1 hour per week	1 hour/day 5 days/week	1 hour/day 2 days/week	None	No	No	No	Eligible	No	No
II	31-60 days	1 15-minute call 4 days/week; legal calls included in total time	<u>2 hours/week</u> 1 hour twice/ week	1½ hours/day 5 days/week	1 hour/day 2 days/week	None	No	No	To be re- viewed on an individual basis	Eligible	No	No
III	61-120 days	1 15-minute call 5 days/week calls included in total time	<u>2 hours/week</u> 2-hour block with approval of officer in charge	1½ hours/day 5 days/week	1 hour/day 2 days/week	None	Yes	Yes	To be re- viewed on an individual basis	Eligible	No	Yes
IV	121+ days	1 20-minute call 5 days/week; legal calls included in total time	3 hours/week; any visit longer than 1 hour will be approved by officer in charge	2 hours/day 5 days/week	1 hour/day 2 days/week	1 hour/week or inside exercise for that day— not both	Yes	Yes	To be re- viewed on an individual basis	Eligible	Yes	Yes

Programs and Services

Inmate programs and services are considered crucial to maintaining an environment that is responsive, just, and humane. They are also an important part of the security operation in that an active, goal-oriented program schedule enables inmates to learn self-control and responsibility. Consequently, the facility provides a wide range of educational, vocational, treatment, and work opportunities that afford full-time, constructive assignments and structured leisure-time activities. These programs and services are discussed in more detail on the pages that follow.

Education/Vocational Training

The education program at MCF-OPH is delivered by contract through the Continuing Education and Extension Departments at the University of Minnesota. This arrangement provides administrative coordination of a six-school consortium, offering diverse classes on-site at the facility. By working closely together, this consortium operates two major programs for inmates: a full-time day program for the Education Unit and a voluntary evening program for inmates in other units. Day program components include a skills center where qualified instructors provide individualized basic skills training from the remedial to the college level. GED preparation is also available through the skills center. In addition, a full-time college program of 14-15 credits a quarter is offered by faculty from the consortium schools. Various short courses are also provided in practical areas such as job seeking and life coping skills. Each inmate on the Education Unit selects classes from current offerings and creates his own schedule. The unit operates under a pay incentive plan, and each inmate's work is regularly assessed.

The evening program affords similar but less comprehensive educational opportunities. Inmates showing continued interest in evening classes are encouraged to transfer to the Education Unit for full-time programming.

Vocational training is provided through the education program. Current offerings include drafting and computer programming. Some individualized training is available through a certified correspondence program.

Work Programs

Work programs at Oak Park Heights are operated under the auspices of the Service Unit. Inmates assigned to this complex perform many of the food service, laundry, commissary, and maintenance functions within the institution. All work programs employ a pay incentive plan. Inmates are furnished with detailed job specifications and required to sign a working agreement. Work performance is evaluated regularly; an unsatisfactory assessment can result in automatic dismissal from employment.

Industries

The Oak Park Heights industry program is operated with the latest equipment in order to provide up-to-date employment experiences for inmates. The program is centered in three complexes, which operate micrographics, garment manufacturing, and vinyl products shops. In addition to providing work

experience, the industry program gives inmates an opportunity to earn money based on their level of production and quality of workmanship. Under a career ladder concept, inmates can work their way up from trainee through apprentice to leadman/journeyman.

The program's goal is to become self-sufficient, thereby providing each inmate with a marketable skill at no cost to the taxpayer. To this end, a five-year business plan has recently been prepared. The plan includes marketing strategies, sales forecasts, and production goals.

Medical/Health Care

The Oak Park Heights health care program offers a full range of services through licensed professional staff. These services include basic dental care, drug detoxification, programs for individuals requiring close medical supervision, medical examinations and evaluations, routine eye care, sick call, and convalescent care. The program maintains its own pharmacy and operates a 10-bed infirmary.

Health care staff are provided on contract and include one physician, two dentists, one physical therapist, one dietician, three pharmacists, one ophthalmologist, and fourteen registered nurses. At least one registered nurse is on duty at all times. A physician is on site at least twice a week and on call around the clock.

The health care program also includes 24-hour access to St. Paul Ramsey Medical Center for emergency and major surgical procedures.

Personal Hygiene and Sanitation

According to policy, "all inmates at Oak Park Heights are permitted freedom in personal grooming within general guidelines established in the interest of managing a maximum security institution." Inmates are expected to maintain a neat, well-groomed appearance and to shower at least once a week.

A sanitary environment is considered important to fulfillment of the institution's mission. Inmates are required to keep their cells clean and orderly, and must sign an agreement to that effect. All cells are inspected at least once every four days; annual inspections of the institution are conducted by state health officials.

Inmates failing to meet facility standards for personal hygiene and sanitation are issued a warning. Repeated violation results in disciplinary action.

Mental Health Care

Psychological and psychiatric services at MCF-OPH are an integral part of the institution's health care program. Psychological and psychiatric staff seek to assess and treat inmates so as to improve their behavioral, mental, and emotional adjustment. Achievement of this goal is facilitated through interviews and testing, referrals from staff, and response to inmate requests.

A wide variety of psychological and psychiatric services are provided at Oak Park Heights. Upon admission, each inmate is given a psychological or psychiatric evaluation if one is not furnished by the sending facility. Inmates facing unanticipated problems may be referred by institution staff or may submit a request for services on their own. A psychologist is available around the clock to deal with any emergency cases. In addition, staff administer psychotropic medications when appropriate, monitor inmates on observation status, and assess inmates in lockup areas.

MCF-OPH also operates a 32-bed Mental Health Unit. This unit was created by Minnesota Statutes to provide in-patient psychiatric services to seriously ill inmates not only at Oak Park Heights but from any of the department's correctional institutions. Inmates enter the unit on a voluntary basis or upon commitment by a probate court. Mental Health Unit staff offer individual psychotherapy, chemotherapy, and group therapies. Biofeedback and Alcoholics Anonymous are also part of the programming within the Mental Health Unit. The Mental Health Unit staff have developed a sophisticated point system, whereby inmates are given points for personal hygiene, room care, and attendance at treatment activities for motivational purposes. They may use these points to rent radios and televisions or buy candy and cigarettes. Disruptive behavior may result in an inmate being fined a specific number of points.

Social Services

Social services for inmates at MCF-OPH are provided through Case Management Program Teams. Each inmate is assigned to a program team upon admission. This team is responsible for planning, monitoring, and evaluating the inmate's involvement in all aspects of institutional programming. Due to its multidisciplinary membership, the Case Management Program Team is able to coordinate services and activities and, when necessary, resolve misunderstandings and disputes. Each team is chaired by a Case Manager. The Case Manager provides the inmate with a number of social services, including counseling and referral. The Case Manager assists in implementing transfer to another facility and, in the event of direct release to the community, works with the inmate's parole agent to develop an appropriate release plan. In addition, the Case Manager serves as a liaison between the inmate and his family and community as the need arises.

Library

The general library at Oak Park Heights is in an early stage of development due to the facility's relatively recent opening. The library's current collection includes 1,500 books and subscriptions to 30 periodicals and 1 newspaper. In addition, the library maintains an interlibrary loan agreement with the St. Paul Public Library. A system for computerizing library services has been designed but not implemented.

Religious Services

MCF-OPH provides numerous opportunities for inmates to participate in religious services. Formal services in the chapel are open to all men whose names have been entered on a monitored list of inmates indicating a desire to participate. (Inmates known to be incompatible with others attending the services of a specific faith group are afforded the chance to worship at a

different time and/or place.) Those who are not on this list must submit a request to their Case Manager in order to attend. Inmates in the Control Unit are visited weekly by a member of the chaplaincy services.

Regularly scheduled services include Roman Catholic mass; Protestant worship; Native American Pipe, Drum and Sweat Lodge Ceremonies; Islamic, Jumah prayer service; and Zen Buddhist meditation. In addition, services are scheduled in accordance with special events, religious observances, and holy days. All services are monitored by security or recreation staff assigned to the Chapel Control Bubble. Most inmates may also meet individually in the chapel area with registered persons representing faith groups in the community. The facility also maintains a Chapel Book and Tape Cassette Library.

Current staffing includes one full-time chaplain and one to two part-time graduate theological students.

Recreation and Leisure-time Activities

Recreation and leisure-time activities are considered "a crucial area of focus in a person's rehabilitation," aiding in "the development of sportsmanship and leadership qualities." A wide range of activities is available to inmates, geared to participants' ages and provided on a unit basis. Unless placed in a restrictive area, all inmates have at least two hours of daily access to recreation areas and equipment during times assigned to their units. Inmates working irregular hours are scheduled for alternate gym or yard time. Those housed in restrictive areas participate in recreation according to procedures developed for each area.

Current offerings include sports activities such as softball, basketball and handball, as well as more sedentary activities like chess and table tennis. The Recreation Department also schedules special events such as handball tournaments and summer softball leagues.

All activities are carefully supervised, and during outside recreation, two additional correctional officers are stationed on the facility's roof. No more than two units are ever scheduled simultaneously for recreation in the gym or yard.

Inmate Communications

General population inmates at MCF-OPH are allowed 16 visiting hours per calendar month. Inmates may keep visiting lists of up to 12 persons, excluding attorneys, ministers, etc., and receive up to 4 visitors at any one time. Visiting is considered a privilege that must be maintained through responsible behavior by both inmates and their visitors. Visitors must register at the Information Desk at least 30 minutes prior to the end of visiting time and be screened by the Information Desk Officer. Most visiting is conducted on a contact basis in the facility's visiting room. Visits are carefully monitored and visitors may be pat searched. Violation of prescribed regulations may result in a loss of visiting privileges or contact visiting, depending on the type of violation committed. The decision to place inmates on non-contact visiting is made administratively and, thus, is separate from the due process system. Administrative separation ensures the security needed to prevent the introduction of contraband into the facility.

Control Unit inmates are allowed one hour of non-contact visiting weekly. This time may be gradually increased in accordance with inmates' behavior.

There is no restriction on the number of persons with whom inmates may correspond nor any limit on the amount of mail they may receive or send. For purposes of security, a correspondence log is kept for every inmate, and all incoming and outgoing mail, except for privileged communication, is opened and visually inspected for contraband. Correspondence may be read with the written approval of the Warden or his designee if there is justifiable concern for the safety of the institution, public officials, or general public.

To facilitate communication with their families, friends and attorneys, inmates are given reasonable and equitable access to telephones. Telephones designated for inmate use are located in each of the living complexes. However, use is limited to some extent by the facility's mission. For instance, inmates may not place non-emergency calls when engaged in program activities or when confined to their cells for security purposes. When phone use is allowed, general population inmates may sign up to reserve time for one 15-minute collect local call daily. They also are allowed to make two collect long-distance calls, not to exceed 40 minutes, daily; on weekends and holidays, extended phone time is allowed. All long-distance calls are recorded in the complex log book. Requests for legal calls must be submitted 24 hours in advance. These communications are limited to one call of 15 minutes duration a day. Phone use is considered a privilege, and abuse can lead to revocation of phone privileges or disciplinary proceedings, depending on the circumstances involved.

Legal Requirements

In line with constitutional requirements concerning access to legal materials, Oak Park Heights maintains a law library that includes up-to-date constitutional, statutory, and case law materials; applicable court rules; and practice treatises. The library also provides typewriters, paper, pens, and copying facilities. The law library operates on a regular schedule for each unit at times allowing maximum accessibility to inmates. To utilize the library, inmates must submit a written request to their Case Managers, specifying the materials needed and the reason(s) for the request. The requests are then ordered according to specificity and urgency and sent to the law librarian. Because the librarian is not an attorney, he/she does not provide legal advice but performs only information and referral functions.

Inmates also have a constitutional right to consult with their attorneys. To assist in assuring the maintenance of all inmate rights, Legal Assistance for Minnesota Prisoners (LAMP), Legal Advocate Project (LAP), and Public Defender attorneys are given regular access to inmates to assist them in preparing and filing legal papers upon the inmate's request. Every effort is made to accommodate attorneys within the limits of the facility's physical plant and staff. In addition to visiting their clients, attorneys may be contacted on a confidential basis by use of institution-provided inmate telephones and through uncensored mail.

As discussed earlier, subject to restrictions necessary to ensure a safe, orderly and secure institution, inmates also have the following rights:

- Access to courts, without reprisals or penalties because of their decision to seek relief;
- Access to recreational opportunities and equipment;
- Option to refuse to participate in any rehabilitation or treatment program, except adult basic education programs, work assignment, and those programs ordered by the sentencing court or required by statute;
- Freedom in personal grooming;
- Freedom to practice their religion;
- Visiting;
- Communication or correspondence with persons or organizations;
- Reasonable access to the communications media;
- Access to programs, work assignments, and administrative decisions without regard to inmates' race, religion, national origin, sex, handicap, or political views;
- Protection from personal abuse, corporal punishment, personal injury, disease, property damage, and harassment;
- Written grievance procedure that includes at least one level of appeal; and
- Protection from unlawful searches and seizures where a new crime is suspected.

Food Service

Inmates at Oak Park Heights eat in the day rooms on their respective living units. Meals are prepared in Food Services and transported in bulk containers via "hot carts" to sally ports outside the individual units. Unit staff then inspect the carts and monitor food service. Two inmates are responsible for serving the food and cleaning up after each meal. Prisoners on restrictive status are served in their cells. At the request of an inmate or medical staff member, Food Services also prepares special diets (e.g., no salt, no pork).

Commissary-Canteen

In accordance with departmental policy, MCF-OPH operates a canteen to provide inmates with a variety of personal items and amenities. Canteen runs are made to each unit on a regular weekly basis. Inmates may order items for delivery by submitting regulation Canteen Slips. Orders are restricted to \$50 per run (\$20 in the Control Unit) and must not exceed an inmate's current financial account. A minimum of one canteen officer and one correctional

officer supervise canteen deliveries. Strict inventory control procedures are used to monitor supply and demand and to ensure responsible operations.

Laundry

All inmates are issued linen and limited clothing from MCF-OPH, which may be supplemented through canteen purchases. The facility also provides for the daily maintenance and cleaning of clothing issue and the weekly exchange of linen during the canteen run. A centralized laundry, operated by inmates from the Service Unit, performs bulk cleaning of institution laundry. In addition, each general population unit has two washers and dryers for inmates' personal and issue clothing. Inmates have regular access to these machines but must supply their own soap.

Program Schedule

MCF-OPH strives to maintain a safe, secure environment and provide full-time, constructive assignments and structured leisure-time activities. This mission is reflected in the program schedule for general population inmates presented in Table B-7. This schedule includes ten formal counts and approximately seven hours of program or work activity.

Table B-7

Program Schedule

Daily Schedule for General Population Inmates

6:30	Wake up
<u>6:45-6:55</u>	<u>Live Count</u> - Must show movement
7:00-7:20	Breakfast
7:25	Sick call
8:30	Report to work
7:35-11:25	Work or program
<u>11:25-11:40</u>	Return to the unit - <u>Stand-Up Count</u>
<u>11:40-12:15</u>	Lunch
12:15	Return to work
12:20-3:35	Work or program
<u>3:35-3:40</u>	Return to the unit - <u>Verification Count</u>
<u>3:40-4:35</u>	Free time - outside activity
<u>4:35-4:45</u>	<u>Stand-Up Count</u>
4:50-6:30	Dinner and free time
<u>6:30-8:30</u>	Evening program - yard exercise (6:30-dusk) - <u>Verification Count</u>
8:30-9:55	Free time
<u>10:00</u>	Lock check and <u>Stand-Up Count</u> - inmates are locked in
10:55-11:55	Shift change - Count
1:00	Count
3:00	Count
5:00	Count

Saturday Schedule

6:45-6:55 Live Count - Must show movement
7:20-8:00 Breakfast
9:00-11:50 Gym - outside activities - free time
12:00-12:10 Stand-Up Count
12:10-12:50 Lunch
12:45-2:55 Gym - outside activity - free time
3:00 Verification Count
3:30-5:00 Gym - outside activity - free time
5:15-5:30 Stand-Up Count
5:30-6:30 Supper - free time (6:30-dusk)
6:30-8:30 Gym - free time - Verification Count
8:30-10:00 Showers - other activities
10:00 Lock check and Stand-Up Count - inmates are locked in

Sunday Schedule

6:45-6:55 Live Count - Must show movement - inmate can return to bed after count
7:30-8:00 Breakfast (cold cereal and/or rolls, coffee)
10:35-11:50 Gym - outside activity - free time
9:30-11:30 Brunch - prepared to order items
12:00-12:10 Stand-Up Count
1:30-3:00 Gym - outside activity - free time
3:00 Verification Count
3:20-5:20 Activity period, gym - free time - yard exercise time
5:15-5:30 Stand-Up Count
5:30-6:30 Supper
6:30-8:30 Gym - free time - Verification Count - summer yard schedule (6:30-dusk)
8:30-10:00 Free time
10:00 Lock check and Stand-Up Count - inmates are locked in

Legal Issues/Litigation

MCF-OPH is currently subject to two major consent decrees that were applied specifically to other Minnesota DOC facilities but have been adopted department-wide.

The first, Harvey et al. vs. Schoen et al. (1973), pertains to due process, specifically disciplinary proceedings. Following this decree, the department prepared a uniform discipline plan that currently governs procedures at all institutions. At Oak Park Heights, that plan is executed by the Due Process Discipline Unit, which is responsible for the facility's internal quasi-judicial system. This unit handles the investigating, charging, and processing of all alleged rule violations committed by inmates. This process includes serving notice, negotiating, scheduling discipline hearings, and monitoring segregation penalties. It may also entail loss of statutory good time.

The second consent decree, Hines vs. Anderson (1977), concerns medical care. Under this order, "to the fullest extent possible in the prison environment, the provisions of Minn. Stat. 144.651 (1974), commonly known as the 'Patients' Bill of Rights," shall apply to inmates who receive medical care and treatment...." These provisions have been incorporated into Health Services policies and procedures, which are discussed on page 28 of this case study.

In addition to these consent decrees, MCF-OPH has been subject to litigation with respect to mail policies and procedures, privacy, inmate safety, use of restraints, and library access.

Cost

As would be expected with a maximum security institution, the costs associated with operating Oak Park Heights are comparatively high. Construction cost for the physical plant, which was completed in 1982, was \$31.8 million. Current annual operating costs total slightly more than \$12 million. These expenditures can be broken down as follows:

Inmate Programs	\$7,029,000
Inmate Services	4,626,000
Equipment	65,000
Maintenance/Replacement	325,000

Assuming an inmate population of 365, the cost of confining an offender at MCF-OPH is \$33,890 per year, or \$92.85 per day. While these figures may seem quite high to some persons, the current administration at Oak Park Heights believes they are reasonable given the extent of security, programming, and services provided inmates. Moreover, the facility's per diem expenditures are considerably less than those at other state institutions providing intensive care--for example, mental hospitals, where daily operating costs may reach \$120 per patient.

Effectiveness

The present administration at Oak Park Heights considers the facility successful in meeting its mission and managing its high-risk population. According to staff, MCF-OPH has maintained a humane environment, while reducing both the frequency and severity of violence. Moreover, the institution has experienced "record" intervals between the incidents that have occurred.

One measure of the effectiveness of the Oak Park Heights operation is the average daily population in the Control Unit, which has been approximately ten percent of the institution's total prisoner population. Recently, this proportion has begun to drop. During the first eight months of 1985, the average Control Unit population was 21.78 inmates as compared to 38 inmates in 1984, while the total population during this period rose from 347 to 362. Staff attribute the relatively low Control Unit population to two factors. First, the overall program at MCF-OPH lends itself to less violence and fewer behaviors that lead to placement in the unit. Second, inmates are able to work their way out of the Control Unit if they are placed there.

In addition, the facility has experienced few major incidents. In its four years of operation, Oak Park Heights has had no escapes or serious escape attempts, no staff fatalities, and just two inmate deaths--both suicides. During 1983-1984, the facility reported a quarterly average of 2 assaults on staff, 3.5 assaults on inmates, and 14 incidents involving threats to others. However, no serious disturbance has occurred since 1982, when a small group of inmates initiated a fist fight with staff.

Another indicator of the effectiveness of the institution's management approach, according to staff, is the high level of participation in inmate programming. Although participation is voluntary, nearly 95% of the inmate population is involved in full-time education, industry, or treatment programs.

While the facility has been operational for just four years, it has had a relatively low return rate. Only 15 inmates transferred to lower security institutions have been sent back to Oak Park Heights due to management problems.

Staff at MCF-OPH seem satisfied with current operations. As noted previously, the turnover rate among staff varies between 1- 5% per quarter. Moreover, a 1985 survey of a sample of employees, conducted by the MCF-OPH Stress and Wellness Committee, found that while 47% of the respondents stated that stress bothers them from time to time, only 4% indicated that it was always a problem. Interestingly, work schedule was mentioned as a stressor almost as often as inmates.

Finally, other high security institutions in Minnesota indicate that their operations have been enhanced by the opportunity to transfer difficult-to-manage inmates to Oak Park Heights. MCF-Stillwater, for example, has been able to break up gangs and reduce lockups via transfer procedures.

Case Summary

The Minnesota Correctional Facility-Oak Park Heights was opened in 1982 to house the state's most potentially dangerous prisoners. The facility's approach to managing this population is to provide a secure, clean, and humane environment while encouraging the rehabilitation of inmates inclined to change. Traditional security measures have been enhanced by the facility's unique design, which consists of seven self-contained living/programming complexes, and by proactive strategies to defuse possibly volatile situations. Just as vital to a successful operation, according to the present administration, are competent, professional staff and departmental support and confidence. The institution itself has experienced few serious incidents and the overall stability of the department's correctional system has improved. Not surprisingly, the costs associated with the high security and full-time programming at Oak Park Heights are high, as is the staff-inmate ratio needed to effect the facility's management approach.

DISRUPTIVE MAXIMUM SECURITY INMATE MANAGEMENT CASE STUDY:

UNITED STATES PENITENTIARY - MARION, ILLINOIS

Introduction

The United States Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois, is the highest security institution within the Federal Bureau of Prisons. It is designed to house adult male offenders who have serious histories of management problems at other federal correctional institutions, as well as dangerous and difficult-to-control inmates who have been transferred from state prisons and the District of Columbia. Due to its high-risk population and a series of disruptive incidents, which culminated in 1983 with the murders of two officers and an inmate and numerous assaults on staff, a special management approach has been instituted at Marion. This high security approach emphasizes inmate control while satisfying the basic elements of humane care and programming. Since this approach was implemented, serious injuries to staff and inmates have declined dramatically. This trend is expected to continue, and it is believed that, from an overall systemic perspective toward managing this segment of the prisoner population, the United States Penitentiary at Marion will provide many important benefits.

Institutional History

Although conceived as a replacement for United States Penitentiary (USP)-Alcatraz, Marion did not initially undertake that function. When Alcatraz was closed in 1963, its population was dispersed among several federal penitentiaries, including USP-Marion.

During most of the 1970s, USP-Marion housed the most difficult-to-manage inmates in federal custody, but the population was also interspersed with a number of high security inmates who did not have recent histories of escape, institutional violence, or disruption. At this time, Marion provided a wide range of programs, including industry employment, vocational training, academic classes, and group and individual counseling.

In 1979, however, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) adopted a new security designation system that rated facilities from level 1, or lowest security level, to level 6, or highest security level. As part of this scheme, Marion was designated as the only level 6 institution in the system.

The decision to establish a level 6 facility was prompted by signs that the federal prison system was receiving an increasingly violent, disruptive population and that highly predatory prison gangs were becoming an important factor in federal facilities. It was felt that more needed to be done to control these dangerous elements. Thus, Marion, by design, was to become the main repository for inmates who worked their way up the federal prison system ladder through disciplinary transfers or who were sent there from various state systems as a result of serious disciplinary problems. From a total system standpoint, the decision to concentrate more serious types of offenders at

USP-Marion was seen as allowing other institutions to operate in a more open manner.

However, one of the consequences of this shift to a level 6 facility was increased violence at Marion. A task force, appointed in June 1979, identified 57 major incidents that had occurred at Marion during the 22-month period ending July 1979, including a successful escape, several inmate murders, and the near fatal stabbing of an associate warden.

The task force concluded that it was both feasible and desirable to convert Marion into a closed, tightly controlled, unitized institution that would permit the continued concentration of the most violent, assaultive, and disruptive inmates at one facility yet would better protect staff and inmates from violence. The task force report was discussed at an FBOP executive staff meeting, but no action was taken because the warden and staff at Marion believed they could return the institution to normal operations.

Events during 1980 demonstrated, however, that new operating procedures were needed at USP-Marion. The final consideration was a series of three inmate work strikes that began in January 1980 and culminated in January of the following year. At that point, the executive staff authorized the transfer of all industrial operations from the facility and endorsed a proposed plan of action placing greater restrictions on inmate movement.

What emerged was a system of restricted movement by cellhouse rather than by total institution. Under this system, while one housing unit was scheduled to go to the dining room for lunch, another would be scheduled for outdoor recreation, still another for indoor recreation, and so forth. All corridor movement was restricted to one unit at a time. All industrial and general maintenance work assignments for the penitentiary inmates were eliminated, and only a few orderly and barbering positions remained. Other programs were either eliminated or highly restricted. Evening lockdown was moved to 8 p.m. rather than the customary 10 p.m.

Unitized movement at Marion operated from September 1980 until February 1983, when a four-phase plan was designed to gradually return the population to work and open the institution up in other areas. However, only two phases of the plan were implemented before Marion again experienced serious problems. In July 1983, an officer was seriously injured by two inmates with homemade knives. Other incidents followed, and on October 22, two officers were fatally assaulted and two others seriously injured in incidents in the Control Unit. Then, on October 27, an inmate was murdered and later that evening four staff were assaulted by inmates on their way to the dining room.

On October 28, 1983, an indefinite state of emergency was declared. A few days later, a special task force of prison administrators met to examine the existing situation and consider Marion's future. The document they prepared set the direction for the high security operation that gradually replaced the emergency lockdown and became the basis for operation at USP- Marion.

Mission

As stated in its 1985 master plan:

It is the mission of the United States Penitentiary, Marion, Illinois, to provide for the safety of inmates, staff and the public through appropriately designed correctional programs and procedures for those inmates identified as the most difficult to manage. The philosophy, procedures and operations under which Marion functions are guided by the formal written policies which govern all institutions in the Federal Prison System.

Marion serves the Federal Prison System as a specialized resource facility which has been designated as a closely controlled, high security institution. It houses inmates who, at least temporarily, cannot function in general population in more open settings due to assaultive or escape-prone behavior or other factors which present a serious threat to institutional security and good order.

. . . Its main purpose is to control this extremely difficult population in a secure environment which is safe for both staff and inmates, in the process eliminating their disruptive influence at other penitentiaries.

Marion's success in controlling these dangerous and disruptive offenders at one location allows other facilities to continue to function as open, working institutions with safe, humane and less stringent environments.

Architectural Design and Confinement Environment



Located on the edge of the Crab Orchard National Wildlife Refuge, approximately 300 miles south of Chicago, USP-Marion is a compact facility made of poured concrete. As shown in Figure B-11, the main complex is surrounded by two 15-foot-high chain link fences with electronic sensors. Spread between and atop the fences are several types of barbed wire, including razor ribbon. Eight concrete gun towers, each staffed round-the-clock by one officer, stand just outside the fences. Every tower is fitted with two sets of green windows designed to conceal the position of the officer inside, and each officer is armed with an M-14 rifle, a shotgun, and a "line gun" capable of tangling helicopter rotors.

To the east, beyond the gun towers, is a federal prison camp for 185 low security inmates. These prisoners are used for work details, but are kept out of physical and direct visual contact with penitentiary inmates.

Figure B-11

Site Diagram, USP-Marion

Architect	Heimlich, Obata & Kassabaum
Civil Engineer	Hornor & Shirin
Structural Engineer	Eugene Dubin
Mech. Elec. Engineer	The Engineers Collaborative, Inc.
Architectural Consultant	George W. Aderhold
Contractor	Blount Brothers Construction Company
Capacity	600 Beds
Area of Building	334,100 SF
Completion Date	1962
Cost	\$8,300,000



Within the main complex, five gates separate inmates' cells from the penitentiary's entrance. The gates are operated electronically from a control room located near the center of the main complex. The control room also contains closed-circuit television equipment for monitoring movement within the institution.

USP-Marion contains nine housing units, which are located along the facility's east and north corridors. Eight of the units have four tiers, two upstairs and two downstairs, and all contain only single cells. Three of the units on the east corridor--D, E, and F--are designated for general population inmates. These cellhouses are of inside construction, with approximately 18 cells on each of the four ranges. Each cell is provided with a bed, waxed cardboard locker, and 13" black-and-white, government-issued television.

Across the corridor from the general population housing are B- and C-Units. B-Unit is utilized as a transitional or pre-transfer unit for inmates awaiting reassignment to other correctional facilities, and it closely resembles a traditional open correctional environment. This unit contains 68 single cells but generally houses no more than 50 inmates. C-Unit functions as an intermediate step between the general population units and the Pre-transfer Unit. It, too, is capable of housing up to 68 prisoners, although current policy restricts the unit to a maximum of 32.

Four specialized housing units are located along the north corridor. Although USP-Marion is a super-maximum security facility, it also maintains a Control Unit, known as H-Unit, for inmates who are unable to function in general population without being a threat to others or the orderly operation of the institution. The Control Unit is of bi-level, inside cell construction and has a capacity of 58. Within the unit, one range has been designated as the disciplinary segregation area. The cells in the back half of that range have small external vestibules and fronts that may be temporarily converted for use as closed-front cells by the insertion of plexiglass panels in the doors. The unit is equipped with two separate screened-in recreation areas on each range as well as two screened-in outside recreation yards adjacent to the unit.

I-Unit is a bi-level cellhouse of interior cell construction, with a total bed capacity on its four ranges of 70. Two of the ranges serve as a traditional administrative detention area. The other two operate as a disciplinary segregation area for Marion's general population. Seven cells at the back of one of the segregation ranges have small vestibules and second solid security doors that ordinarily remain open, but provide the capacity in unusual circumstances for closed-front cells.

G-Unit is of outside cell construction, with two tiers containing approximately 70 cells. It serves as an overflow from administrative detention in I-Unit and also houses inmates who fall into the categories of verified or unverified protection cases.

The Marion Secure Unit, or K-Unit, is a high security area located in the basement of the hospital. It has seven cells that are considerably larger than normal single cells at Marion. Each has a self-contained shower and television and provides for additional personal property and inmate movement. K-Unit houses notorious inmates whose safety can only be guaranteed through isolation

from other inmates. Placement in this unit requires special authorization by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons.

Also located on the north corridor is a hospital that provides routine medical care. It also handles some emergency cases until arrangements can be made for transfer to the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri.

The penitentiary's control center is situated at the intersection of the north, east, south, and west corridors. This location enhances observation of inmate movement and facilitates responses to disruptive incidents. (Staff also supervise inmates directly, in a protective, open fashion.)

In addition, the main facility includes two chapels, dining hall, gymnasium, recreation field, and industrial area. Inmate access to these areas, however, is limited and supervision is extremely close.

Administrative offices are situated in a separate building beyond the institution's secure perimeter. It is connected to the rest of the penitentiary via a long hallway that is entered only after passing through two electronically operated gates.

To ensure adequate security, the penitentiary's power plant, warehouse, and firehouse are located outside the double fence, adjacent to the work camp.

Administration and Management

Administratively, USP-Marion is divided into four functional departments. As shown in Figure B-12, the penitentiary's organizational structure is dominated by two departments-- Programs and Operations, each headed by an associate warden. The Programs Department oversees such areas as the housing units, institutional recordkeeping, facility safety program, and staff training. The Operations Department directs personnel management, facility maintenance, financial management, research, and most inmate programs and services. The two remaining departments are responsible for legal services and management of the minimum security work camp.

The housing units at Marion are administered under the unit management concept. Unit management is an approach designed to improve inmate control and delivery of correctional services. A unit is a relatively small, self-contained inmate living and staff area, operating semi-autonomously within the confines of the larger facility. The essential components are:

- A manageable number of inmates housed within one area, which can be further divided into smaller subunits;
- A multidisciplinary team of staff who have offices located adjacent to the living areas and are assigned to work with inmates in that unit;
- An administrator (unit manager) with supervisory responsibility for the unit staff;

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


Figure B-12. Organizational Structure, USP-Marion

- The administrative authority for all intra-unit aspects of inmate living and programming; and
- The assignment of an inmate to a particular unit based on security and/or programmatic needs specific to the management capabilities of that unit.

Advantages of the unit management approach include:

- Making use of multidisciplinary backgrounds of unit staff members and their varied areas of expertise, which enhances communication and cooperation with other institutional departments;
- Enhancing staff involvement in the correctional process and management decision-making;
- Improving administration through decisions made by unit staff who are closely associated with inmates; and
- Increasing operational flexibility through development of special environments to meet the needs of inmates in each unit.

The five units in the east corridor operate under the direction of two unit managers who supervise case managers, counselors, and clerical help and also direct unit activities in conjunction with the chief correctional supervisor. Unit Team 1 manages two cellhouses for general population inmates. Unit Team 2 is responsible for three cellhouses: one for general population inmates, the Intermediate Unit, and the Pre-transfer Unit.

On the north corridor, the Control Unit has a unit manager, while the two units housing inmates in detention and segregation status are under the supervision of a correctional supervisor assigned there on a rotating basis. A team from the east corridor also services the Secure Unit.

All unit managers report directly to the Associate Warden of Programs.

Inmate Profile

USP-Marion is designed to house approximately 500 adult, male offenders; however, given the serious nature of the population, the institution generally operates at a level of 335-350. The great majority are long-term prisoners who have serious histories of management problems while confined and are received in disciplinary transfer from other institutions. Generally, around one-third of the population has been transferred from institutions in other states or the District of Columbia, while the remainder are federal offenders.

A small number of inmates are received directly from court, often upon the sentencing court's recommendation and with legitimate concerns. These may be individuals whose offenses are particularly notorious or violent or who are involved in organized activities with high potential for violence. They may also have prior extremely disruptive institutional experience or have demonstrated disorderly pre-trial or trial behavior.

Among the typical population housed at Marion, the mean number of prior arrests per inmate is just over ten. The median age at first offense is approximately 16 years.

On the average, almost one-quarter of the inmates at USP-Marion have committed murder during their current confinement. Nearly one-half have charges of escape or escape attempt against them. Many are serving multiple sentences for such offenses as bank robbery, murder, kidnapping, and drug law violations. Approximately one-third are serving life sentences. Many also have one or more detainers that provide for additional long sentences in other jurisdictions. The median sentence length in 1984, including concurrent terms, was 40.5 years.

The penitentiary receives very few prisoners who have serious medical or mental health care problems. Most inmates with such special needs are gradually weeded out by the federal and state prison systems. Within the FBOP, for example, these inmates are usually sent to the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri.

In regard to demographic characteristics, a description of the typical inmate population at Marion would yield the following picture:

- Approximately 33% of the inmates are white, slightly over 40% are black;
- The median age is around 34 years; and
- Just over 20% are married, nearly 50% have never married.

Staffing

Experience has shown that employment at USP-Marion is among the most difficult and demanding work assignments in the entire federal prison system. Daily contact with hard-core prisoners, ever present threat of danger, need for constant vigilance, and recurrent periods of crisis generate a pressure on staff which exceeds that experienced at most facilities. The operation at Marion places a premium on staff who at all times can maintain a high professional standard in attitude and behavior.

In view of these demands, considerable attention is devoted to recruiting or accepting in transfer those who are among the best qualified individuals available. Line staff positions are currently limited to males due to the dangerous nature of the inmate population and the physical requirements of the job. Great effort is also expended in the selection and placement of supervisors and administrative staff who combine the experience and desired personal qualities necessary to provide an example of strong but humane leadership to line staff. Line staff are composed of correctional officers within the Federal Bureau of Prisons who have chosen assignment to Marion. All

have satisfactorily completed FBOP requirements pertaining to physical examination, security investigation, and training.

USP-Marion currently employs 326 full-time permanent staff, although it is allocated 335 full-time employees. Present staffing can be broken down as shown on the next page:

<u>Department</u>	<u>Number of Staff</u>
Warden's Office and Staff	9
Unit Management	22
Research	2
Correctional Services	215
Education	4
Recreation	3
Religion	2
Personnel	5
Fiscal and Business	12
Commissary	3
Food Service	11
Construction and Mechanical Services	26
Mental Health	2
Health Services	8
Record Office/Administrative Systems	5
Total	329 ^a

^a Includes 3 temporary positions and staff assigned to the federal work camp.

As can be seen from this list, the high security operation at Marion is very staff-intensive, requiring just over one staff member per inmate. From a security standpoint, the operation utilizes approximately one correctional officer for every two inmates.

Special emphasis is given to providing these staff with training that will physically and mentally prepare them and keep them fit for the arduous nature of their work. There exists a strong commitment to ongoing training to guard against cynicism, to promote a mutually supportive network, and to develop the interpersonal skills necessary to deal with an oftentimes highly confrontive and antagonistic inmate population.

Like all federal correctional officers, line staff at Marion must complete 160 hours of formal training within their first year of employment. Subjects covered include firearms, self-defense, and interpersonal communications. New line staff also receive four hours of pre-service training pertaining to control of disruptive prisoners; annual in-service training devotes eight hours to this subject.

New first-level supervisory personnel must complete an introductory correctional/supervision course, encompassing safety and management strategies, within one year of appointment. An advanced supervision course must be taken

within two years of appointment. All supervisory staff receive specialized training in unit management and disturbance control, on both a pre-service and in-service basis.

To provide the financial and interpersonal incentives conducive to establishing a high level of staff motivation, USP- Marion participates in the FBOP Incentives Awards Program. This program is designed to "recognize and equitably reward employees who perform in an exemplary manner or make significant contributions to the efficiency and effectiveness" of institutional operations. Incentives are various, including both non-cash awards (e.g., letters of commendation and special pins or insignias) and cash awards (e.g., grade pay increases). However, there are no special incentives to work at Marion rather than at another federal correctional facility or penitentiary.

In order to reduce stress and ensure their safety, unit staff are rotated frequently. In most units, personnel are rotated every six months. However, in the Control Unit, where the atmosphere is highly adversarial, rotation occurs on a quarterly basis.

Assignment, Review, and Release

The Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) has adopted a security level system of classifying physical facilities. Institutions are assigned a security level from 1 through 6, with a level 1 institution having the lowest degree of security and level 6, the highest.

The FBOP employs a similar system with inmates. Upon entry into the federal prison system, inmates are assigned a security level designation from 1 to 6. Level 1 inmates require the least amount of security or physically secure confinement and level 6, the greatest. This classification system is based on factors primarily related to inmates' histories before incarceration. As a general rule, inmates are assigned to institutions based upon their initial security levels.

Inmates are also given one of four custody level classifications:

Maximum--Inmate requires maximum control and supervision. This classification is for individuals who, by their behavior, have identified themselves as assaultive, predacious, riotous, serious escape risks, or seriously disruptive to the orderly running of an institution.

In--Inmate is assigned to regular quarters and is eligible for all regular work assignments and activities under normal level of supervision but not for work details or programs outside the institution's secure perimeter.

Out--Inmate may be assigned to less secure housing and is eligible for work details outside the institution's perimeter.

Community--Inmate is eligible for the least secure housing, including any outside the institution's perimeter; may work on outside details with minimal supervision; and is eligible for community-based program activities.

The custody classification is used to determine the kind of supervision and control necessary for an inmate. For example, an inmate with a maximum custody classification must be housed in a level 5 or 6 institution, regardless of his security level classification. The custody level classification relies primarily on institutional adjustment and does not necessarily correspond with security level. Consequently, while all inmates at USP-Marion have a maximum custody level, only half have a security level of 6.

Since USP-Marion is the only level 6 institution within the federal prison system, there are few initial designations to Marion and these are specially screened. Similarly, transfers into USP-Marion are carefully scrutinized. The Director of the North Central Region of the FBOP must personally approve all assignments.

Because operations at USP-Marion are based on the unit management concept, placement and review policies vary by unit.

To be assigned to the Intermediate Unit, for instance, a general population inmate must have at least 12 months of clear conduct. In addition, his unit team must recommend placement in a less secure environment. This recommendation is forwarded to a screening committee composed of the Associate Warden for Programs, the case coordinator, the manager of Intermediate Unit, and the inmate's current unit manager.

Each inmate in the Intermediate Unit participates in a formal program discussion with the unit team every 90 days to review his progress. The review is documented and placed in the inmate's central file. Close scrutiny is given to the inmate's readiness for transfer from Marion. In addition to the required clear conduct, unit staff evaluate the inmate's willingness to participate in or cooperate with institutional programs and procedures. Close attention is also given to determining whether the management concerns and other behavior and case factors that led to placement at Marion have been sufficiently mitigated to indicate the inmate can function successfully at a less secure facility. Ordinarily, an inmate must spend at least six months in the Intermediate Unit before the unit team initiates a recommendation for placement in the Pre-transfer Unit.

Inmates receiving serious incidents reports and found guilty are removed from the Intermediate Unit and reassigned to general population.

Policies and procedures governing placement in the Pre-transfer Unit closely resemble those for admission to the Intermediate Unit, except that an inmate generally must have 18 months of clear conduct at Marion. Once an inmate has been approved and moved into the Pre-transfer Unit, he typically remains there a minimum of six months before being considered for transfer to another institution. A record of clear conduct is a key indicator of readiness for transfer. Each inmate participates in a formal program review every 90 days with his unit team.

An inmate in the Pre-transfer Unit is expected to maintain a high level of personal responsibility as an indication of his readiness for transfer. Any prisoner guilty of a serious incident report ordinarily is returned to general population.

Placement in the Control Unit is based upon inmate conduct that threatens others or disrupts the orderly operation of the institution. The nature of the incident resulting in placement is the primary factor in determining the time to be served in the unit. This decision is made by the Executive Panel, consisting of the Director of the FBOP North Central Regional Office and the Assistant Director of the Correctional Programs Division (or their designees), and is communicated to the inmate upon admission.

An inmate's expected confinement in the Control Unit may be increased or decreased, depending on his behavior within the unit. Cases are closely monitored by the unit team, which includes the unit manager (chairman), lieutenant, case manager, correctional counselor, education representative, and psychologist. The team reviews each case every 30 days and considers the inmate's unit status, adjustment, and readiness for release from the unit. A Control Unit Review Form is completed for each review, outlining the inmate's progress and months remaining to be served in the unit. This form is signed by each member of the unit team, with the Warden serving as the reviewing authority, and a copy is given to the inmate. It is mandatory that a prisoner appear for his 30-day review in order to receive monthly credit. An inmate found guilty of an infraction does not receive credit even if he should appear.

Control Unit cases are also monitored by the Executive Panel, which reviews each case every 60 to 90 days to determine the inmate's readiness for release from the unit based on the following factors:

- Personal grooming and cleanliness,
- Quarters sanitation,
- Relationship with other inmates and staff,
- Self-improvement activities, and
- Adherence to Bureau and Institution policy.

Prior to each executive review, the unit team prepares an Executive Review Sheet and a list of recommended releases, which is subject to approval of the Warden. The case manager prepares an up-to-date progress report and a change in custody level form for each inmate recommended for release. All material is made available to the Executive Panel. The Executive Panel then makes the final decision on those recommended for release from the unit. Before an inmate is released, the panel will designate a suitable institution for each releasee, taking into account security and supervision needs, programmatic requirements, and proximity to residence.

The Federal Bureau of Prisons has an administrative process by which inmates can call critical attention to circumstances of their confinement such as placement, disciplinary actions, medical care, etc. Although a tremendous number of administrative remedy complaints are filed by Marion inmates, each is investigated by staff, and a written response is prepared for the Warden's review and signature either granting or denying the request. Inmates who are dissatisfied with the initial response have the option of requesting further investigation by the Regional Office in Kansas City, Missouri, and, if deemed needed, filing a complaint with the General Counsel of the FBOP in Washington, D.C.

Inmate Management

Since USP-Marion assumed the mission of handling many of the nation's most dangerous and unmanageable prisoners, attempts to provide an open and traditional operation have been met with highly disruptive and violent behavior by inmates, often with tragic consequences. As a result, a non-traditional approach has been implemented to control the prisoner population and ensure the safety and well-being of both staff and inmates. Marion currently uses a high security operation that emphasizes inmate control while meeting constitutional requirements for humane care and programming. It also relies heavily upon prisoners' understanding of and compliance with institutional guidelines, along with their desire to gain more privileges and freedoms. As part of their orientation, all inmates are apprised of unit procedures, expected behavior, and available programs.

As shown in Table B-8, this approach translates into different policies and procedures for the various types of units at Marion.

Table B-8
Policies/Procedures for Selected Units at USP-Marion

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Degree of Security</u>	<u>Minimum Length of Stay</u>	<u>Requirements for Transfer to Less Secure Unit</u>
General Population	Inmates Generally Restricted to Their Cells	12 months	Clean Record, Unit Team Recommendation
Intermediate	Inmates Generally Restricted to Range and Their Cells	6 months	Clean Record, Unit Team Recommendation
Pre-transfer	Inmates Allowed Movement Throughout Most of Facility	6 months	Clean Record, Demonstrated Responsibility

The general population units are highly secure, relatively self-contained housing environments. Each of the three units includes two satellite law libraries, all prisoners are fed in their cells, and inmates are greatly restricted in the amount of recreation time they spend outside their cells.

In each of these three cellhouses, sufficient staffing is provided to facilitate all necessary operations and functions in the unit and to provide direct visual supervision for all in-unit recreation periods on the ranges.

Ordinarily, inmates from the general population units are moved handcuffed behind their backs, with one officer holding the cuffs and a second officer providing escort. When prisoners are moved to a recreation area outside the housing unit, they are usually moved in small groups with escort officers holding the handcuffs, while two other officers accompany the squad. Each of these group movements is directed by an experienced officer in charge. When inmates are moved to the hospital, they are handcuffed in front with the use of

a waist chain, thus providing easier access for medical staff to administer necessary examinations or treatment. When individual circumstances warrant, some modification, such as leg irons and "black boxes," may be used. Inmates are also strip searched before and after all visits and every trip to the hospital.

If general population inmates maintain a clean record, however, they can become eligible for transfer to the Intermediate Unit, where they are afforded greater privileges. Prisoners in the Intermediate Unit are fed in small groups on the range, are provided additional out-of-cell recreation time, and can watch television in groups on the range. Other security procedures are similar to those in the general population units. Inmates receiving serious incident reports and found guilty are returned to general population, but continued good conduct can lead to placement in the Pre-transfer Unit.

The Pre-transfer Unit serves as a transitional unit for inmates prior to reassignment to other institutions. It affords more privileges than any other unit and, as much as possible, resembles a traditional open penitentiary unit. Inmates are not required to wear restraint equipment when escorted outside the unit. They eat all meals in the main dining hall and receive increased recreation off the unit. In addition, work assignments are available for all inmates. Ordinarily, inmates are not locked in their cells except between 10 in the evening and the start of the morning breakfast hour. Prisoners engaging in serious misconduct are sent back to general population; those maintaining clear records are eventually transferred out of Marion.

Inmates who have shown themselves unable to function in general population may be placed in one of Marion's special housing units. By virtue of their prisoner populations, these specialized housing units employ tighter security measures than those described above.

Administrative detention functions are provided by G-Unit and two ranges on I-Unit. Inmates in administrative detention are generally confined to their cells. They receive meals and limited programs and services there. Five hours of recreation is provided in adjacent, screened exercise areas. When outside their cells, prisoners are handcuffed from behind and escorted by three officers, one of whom holds the handcuffs. All prisoners are thoroughly searched prior to and following any movement. Institutional policy provides for weekly and monthly reviews of inmates by the institutional discipline committee. Inmates are usually discharged after 90 days but, when warranted, the warden may authorize an extension.

Inmates placed in disciplinary segregation are housed in two ranges on I-Unit. Privileges here are more curtailed than in administrative detention. Inmates are fed in their cells, and movement is restricted to five hours of weekly recreation in adjacent fenced exercise areas. Other, limited services are provided in prisoners' cells. Movement is closely supervised. Inmates are handcuffed behind their backs, with one officer holding the cuffs and two providing escort. Inmates are strip searched on leaving and returning to their cells.

H-Unit serves as the Control Unit at Marion. Upon placement in the Control Unit, inmates are advised of their expected duration of confinement.

This period may be decreased or increased, depending on inmates' behavior within the unit.

Inmates in the Control Unit are fed in their cells, work assignments are limited to jobs on individual ranges, and legal work is conducted in satellite law libraries. Prisoners are provided seven hours of supervised exercise per week, six hours in the screened recreation areas on each range and one hour outdoors in a recreation cage. Group exercise is not authorized.

When out of their cells, Control Unit inmates are always moved with leg irons. Handcuffs are ordinarily applied behind the back, except during social and legal visits or medical examination and treatment. In situations where they are applied in front, waist chains are also used. A three-man escort, at a minimum, is always used in moving inmates, with one officer holding the handcuffs and two equipped with batons. Prisoners are strip searched before and after social and legal visits, trips to the hospital, and recreation.

Within the Control Unit, one range has been designated as a disciplinary segregation area. Half of the cells in this area may be converted for use as closed-front cells by inserting plexiglass panels in the doors. In addition to the standard security searches conducted in the Control Unit, inmates in disciplinary segregation are strip searched before and after showers. Personal property in the disciplinary segregation area is tightly controlled by institutional regulations.

The Secure Unit is a small, high security area located in the basement of the hospital. Each cell in this unit has a self-contained shower and a small black-and-white television. The unit also includes self-contained recreation areas--both indoors and outdoors for use on an individual basis.

Because the Secure Unit houses inmates whose well-being, often due to verified threats combined with personal notoriety, can be guaranteed only by virtual isolation from the prisoner population, movement outside the unit occurs infrequently and under special procedures. Only specially assigned staff are allowed entrance into this unit, and admittance of any non-staff member requires special clearance.

The unit management structure at USP-Marion also enables the institution to provide a secure environment for separation cases. Since all programs and activities are provided on an individual or unit basis, prisoners assigned to different units do not come into contact with one another. Similarly, inmates in special housing units do not commingle with other prisoners.

Policies and procedures governing emergency situations vary according to the nature of the situation. In general, no weapons are used in responding to incidents since all firearms are kept in the gun towers. Instead, a Special Operations Response Team (SORT) is employed to control prisoners engaging in disruptive behavior or refusing to leave their cells. A SORT team is composed of five officers, each outfitted with a visored helmet, flak vest, jumpsuit, gloves, and special boots. Every officer on the team has a pre-specified responsibility during an action. Twenty-two staff have been trained to function as SORT team members, thus providing the capability to respond to more than one situation at a time, as well as assure round-the-clock coverage. SORT actions are videotaped by institution personnel for purposes of documentation, and,

following all incidents, inmates undergo examination by medical staff. Staff credit SORT responses for a notable decrease in forced cell moves during 1984.

Programs and Services

In view of some unique aspects of the high security operation in place at USP-Marion, it has been determined that several FBOP Program Statements are not realistic at Marion. The areas of non-compliance do not involve essential programs and services, and, to the extent possible, the institution's programs operate according to the provisions of these statements.

Education/Vocational Training

Educational programming is presented primarily via a closed circuit video channel. All prisoners, except some in special housing units, have small black-and-white televisions in their cells. Programs offered are ABE (In both English and Spanish) and GED, as well as courses in conversational Spanish and German. In addition, video programming includes aerobics, stress relief, and special interest programming such as travelogue, history, science, and classic films. A college correspondence program is offered through the University of Illinois, and inmates may enroll in one course at a time.

No vocational training is currently offered to prisoners at Marion. The area formerly used for vocational training has been converted into a recreational facility.

Work Programs

Some 30-40 prisoners participate in work programs, having been approved by their unit managers and the Associate Warden for Custody. For example, four paid positions as range orderlies are available in the Control Unit. Inmates in the Pre-transfer Unit can work as unit orderlies or barbers, or they may receive assignments in other areas of the institution, such as the gymnasium.

Industries

Following a series of work stoppages in 1980-1981, all prison industries at Marion were terminated. In 1984, a small UNICOR electronic cable factory was opened, providing both full-time and part-time employment for a large segment of the population in the Pre-transfer Unit as well as some inmates from the Intermediate Unit.

Law Library

Marion has a number of state and federal inmates actively pursuing legal matters. To satisfy these interests while maintaining a high security level, Marion operates a main law library and 22 satellite law libraries located in the various living units. Each general population unit has two satellite law libraries, while the special housing units have from one to four. Each satellite library provides a set of basic legal reference materials as required by national policy. These are supplemented by material in the main law library, which is available to inmates on 24-hour checkout. Multiple sets of

many volumes have been acquired in the main law library in order to eliminate delays in providing frequently used volumes to inmates. In addition, over 30 states have prisoners contractually boarded at Marion, and almost all have extensive access plans that provide these inmates with books or services or both. The main law library contains approximately 8000 volumes; an additional 3700 volumes are located in the satellite libraries.

Medical/Health Care

The penitentiary operates a well-equipped medical department that employs various full-time staff, including two physicians, a dentist, hospital administrator, assistant administrator, and physician assistants. For routine medical needs, the physician assistants make sick call rounds to each cellhouse on an established schedule to visit inmates who have signed up for an appointment. When it is necessary to refer inmates to a physician, the inmates are either seen in their units or taken to the institution hospital. Part-time, in-house contract services are provided by an optometrist and a psychiatrist, while inmates are taken to other specialists in the community on an as-needed basis.

Medical emergencies may be handled in-house or transported to a local hospital as the situation demands. Military helicopter service from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, is available for emergency use. More extensive medical treatment ordinarily requires transfer to the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri. Inmates diagnosed as chronically psychotic are not housed at Marion, and acute psychotic cases are evaluated for possible transfer to an FBOP mental health facility.

Religious Services

USP-Marion employs three full-time staff chaplains who minister to the needs of the inmate population. Contract chaplains provide services for inmates of faith groups other than those to which the staff chaplains belong. Staff chaplains visit each unit once each week in order to give each inmate an opportunity for personal attention and to receive requests for religious materials, information, etc. Inmates can have private interviews with the chaplains at their cells or in an office area if circumstances warrant. Inmates of all units are afforded the opportunity to have private interviews with the contract chaplains. These interviews take place in the attorney's visiting room booths, which have no voice monitoring devices and ensure privacy. All inmates can also arrange for religious and pastoral visitors to come to the visiting room during regular visiting hours.

In addition, weekly devotional or educational programs for each religious group are provided on the closed-circuit institutional TV system. Staff or contract chaplains conduct weekly services for Pre-transfer Unit inmates in the west corridor chapel. Monthly religious services are also held for inmates in the general population units. These inmates may attend the service of the faith group of their choice. One unit attends each weekend of the month.

Recreation and Leisure-time Activities

Inmates in general population receive 11 hours of recreation weekly. One hour per day is provided each man on the unit range in groups of six. Four

hours per week are spent in one of four off-unit recreation areas. Two recreation yards are utilized for groups of up to 14, where inmates can use boxing bags, exercise, jog, or play sports such as basketball, tennis, and football. Exercise is also provided in the gymnasium and in the converted vocational training area, which include facilities for handball, racquetball, ping pong, and billiards as well as a carpeted jogging track.

Inmates in the Pre-transfer Unit have greater access to off-unit recreation facilities and spend some 18 hours a week in these areas. Those housed in the Intermediate Unit have group TV viewing on the range and more out-of-cell recreation time than general population inmates.

In the Control Unit, seven hours of individual recreation is provided per week, while the disciplinary segregation and administrative detention units receive five hours of recreation weekly. These units have their own outside fenced concrete recreation areas.

Inmates in all units except disciplinary segregation and administrative detention also have individual televisions for their personal use. In addition, various hobbycrafts--such as acrylic and pastel painting, beadwork, pencil sketching, and macrame--are offered. Soft-cover books are distributed weekly in all units.

Inmate Communications

To prevent the introduction of contraband, all visiting at USP-Marion is conducted on a non-contact basis. The previously open visiting room has been converted into a series of small rooms with telephone hookups and partitioned dividers to separate the inmate from his visitor(s). Five social visits of three hours duration each are permitted monthly, while legal visiting is not limited by number. Visits are permitted from Thursday to Sunday and on federal holidays.

Marion policy regarding inmate correspondence conforms with FBOP policy, which provides for review of all incoming and outgoing mail with the exception of "special mail" (correspondence with attorneys, public officials, etc.). Outgoing "special mail" remains sealed, while incoming "special mail" is opened in the presence of the inmate to check for contraband.

Two 10-minute social calls per month are permitted for prisoners in the general population units. Control Unit and administrative detention inmates may receive one phone call per month. Inmates in disciplinary segregation status are limited to one call every three months. All social calls are monitored by staff and recorded.

Food Service

Food service at Marion is a complete microwave program with the exception of the Pre-transfer Unit, where inmates are allowed to eat in the institution dining room, where food is served cafeteria style. Inmates in the Intermediate Unit eat in small groups at tables on the unit range. Inmates in other units are served in their cells. Meals are prepared in the main kitchen under supervision of staff using inmates from the minimum security prison camp as helpers. Prepared food is placed in microwaveable inserts, which are then

wrapped and placed on serving trays. Completed trays are stored in refrigerated carts that are transported to the living units at meal time. Food items requiring reheating are placed in the microwave oven and heated to the proper temperature before being replaced on the trays and served to inmates.

Commissary

Unlike many institutions where inmates are allowed to purchase snack items, cigarettes, etc. directly from the institution commissary, inmates at Marion must order items in advance and then have their orders delivered to their cells. (The one exception is the Pre-transfer Unit, where inmates go directly to commissary for their purchases.) Commissary is delivered weekly to all eligible living units. Inmates are allowed to spend up to \$25 a week and have a wide variety of products from which to choose. Items cannot be sold in glass containers, and food products must be of the type that will keep well without refrigeration.

Legal Issues and Litigation

Due to its high security operation, USP-Marion has experienced numerous legal actions regarding conditions of confinement. Some of these actions have been filed by prisoners' rights groups, but many have been initiated by inmates at Marion. One of the more recent, as well as more significant, cases is Bruscino et al. vs. Carlson et al. (S.D. Ill. 1985). The plaintiffs in this case alleged that Marion staff "have engaged in a systematic pattern and practice of assault, abuse, denial of access to courts, racial and religious discrimination, property deprivation, and harassment of prisoners." The court found no credible evidence to support the plaintiffs' claims and concluded that operations at Marion were warranted by virtue of its dangerous prisoner population. Moreover, the court stated that "conditions at USP- Marion, singularly or totally, are constitutional."

Despite the volume of legal action it has incurred, USP-Marion has taken an extra step to facilitate handling of inmate litigation. In a practice relatively unique among federal prisons, the U.S. Magistrate for the district federal court in the area holds open court at the penitentiary during one week of each month. Marion inmates are thus provided a regular opportunity to be heard when filing civil litigation.

Cost

As would be expected, the high security, staff-intensive operation at USP-Marion requires considerable financial expenditures. In FY 85, operating costs, including salaries, exceeded \$11 million. These costs are broken down and presented in Table B-9 on the next page.

On a per diem basis, Marion spends slightly over \$76 per inmate, with \$2.16 going to food service, \$1.70 to medical services, \$0.60 to inmate services, and the remainder to staff salaries.

Table B-9
FY 85 Operating Costs

Operating Plan

Food Service	\$401,700
Non-BOP Medical	27,600
Medical Services	81,200
Inmate Services	112,000
Corrections Services	29,300
Narcotic Surveillance	8,700
Employee Uniform	5,900
Education	30,400
Recreation	49,100
Religious Services	15,500
Psychology	1,000
Unit Management	2,500
Inmate Release Costs	21,200
Warden's Office	3,400
Personnel	2,000
Financial Management	101,200
Administrative Systems	22,200
Administrative Travel	10,400
Safety/Sanitation	35,000
Training	16,800
Mechanical Services	202,800
Powerhouse	36,500
Garage	32,000
Staff Housing	7,000
Utilities	450,000
Research	1,200
Total Operating Plan	1,706,600

Salaries

Full-time, Regular	7,601,216
Other Full-time, Regular/Part-time	64,862
Personal Benefits	1,172,153
Overtime	175,727
Night and Sunday Differential	274,808
Holiday	154,725
Incentive Awards/Suggestions	14,100
Terminal Leave	57,311
Total Salaries	9,514,902
Total Cost	\$11,221,502

Effectiveness

Although no comprehensive evaluation of the operations at USP-Marion has been conducted, several measures suggest that its high security program is having a positive impact. For example, institutional records substantiate a reduction of violence. During the period from October 27, 1983, through June 30, 1985, Marion experienced two murders compared with seven murders during the twenty months preceding this period. The amount of homemade weapons or other serious contraband found by staff has similarly declined; 23 homemade knives were discovered in 1984 versus 73 in 1983. Assaults with weapons on staff or inmates have also decreased.

In addition, the high security operation has affected gang activities. The population at Marion includes members and leaders of some of the most sophisticated gangs in the prison system, including the Aryan Brotherhood and the Mexican Mafia. These gangs have historically controlled drug trafficking and extortion within the institution and were responsible for much of the violence and disruptive incidents prior to the new security approach. Current security measures have hampered the operation of these gangs.

Data regarding inmate grievances also serve as a source of information about the operation's impact. Since 1974, when the FBOP established its Administrative Remedy Procedures, Marion inmates have typically filed an average of 100 grievances per month. However, during the ten-month period following the October 1983 lockdown, the monthly average jumped to 154.2 grievances. Since then, the figure has dropped to 104.6. Although part of this recent decline may be attributed to greater inmate acceptance of the high security program, staff believe that installation of televisions in all general population cells has played a more important role in reducing complaints. Currently, inmate grievances focus on disciplinary matters, institution operations, and institution programs, with 19.4% of all filings granted.

Participation in educational programs, according to institutional records, has increased since the new security program was implemented. During 1983, 21 inmates enrolled in GED classes and 21 took correspondence courses for college credit. For the first 11 months of 1985, total enrollments were 82 and 93, respectively. This increase is probably related to cutbacks in other program opportunities and to less out-of-cell time.

Another measure of the program's effectiveness can be found in the number of inmates returned to Marion after transfer to another facility. Of the 373 prisoners at Marion when the high security operation was implemented, 236 have been transferred to other institutions or released; only nine inmates have been returned. This finding suggests that inmates are moderating their behavior to avoid subsequent confinement at Marion.

Also noteworthy is a recent study which contradicts charges that Marion's high security operation seriously affects inmates' mental health. The study sought to obtain an indirect measure of inmate mental health by examining self-reported stress-sensitive medical complaints. Its findings suggest that psychological problems among inmates have not increased as a result of the new approach. Most of the stress-sensitive items had only a few complaints recorded, and those items reported most often--bowel and back/neck

complaints--seem more a reflection of prisoners' sedentary existence than a result of psychological forces.

Finally, staff reaction to the overall operation at the penitentiary is generally favorable. Initially, staff were extremely concerned about the less restrictive environment in the Pre-release Unit. However, experience has shown that inmate conduct improves--and the adversarial atmosphere lessens--as prisoners progress through the system, and most staff now support the gradual release concept.

Case Summary

USP-Marion has instituted a high security operation that appears to be successful in managing disruptive maximum security inmates. At the system-wide level, the strategy of concentrating difficult-to-control prisoners at one institution has enabled other facilities to operate more openly and safely. In addition, the tight security measures at Marion seem to have a deterrent effect; few inmates reassigned to other institutions have been returned via disciplinary transfer. At the institutional level, Marion's security operations, combined with its gradual release program, have decreased disruptive behavior by inmates. Yet, it should also be noted that Marion's effectiveness exacts a toll on the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The extensive security approach entails considerable financial expenditures. Moreover, the need for a special, staff-intensive operation tends to require many of the agency's best personnel.

Appendix C:
Sample Questionnaires for Use in
Performance Evaluation

APPENDIX C

SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRES FOR USE IN PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

This appendix presents two sample questionnaires--one for agency staff, the other for inmates--that can be used as a basis for evaluating the management of disruptive inmates confined in a restrictive housing unit. The questionnaires are intended to supplement analysis of agency records by soliciting opinions on the extent of disruptive behavior in the unit, individuals' sense of personal safety, and effectiveness of specific management strategies. The questionnaires in this appendix are designed to compare conditions before and after initiation of new management practices. However, they can easily be modified to assess only existing conditions or those resulting from implementation of new policies and procedures.

It must be emphasized that these questionnaires suggest examples of the kinds of information an agency may wish to obtain, as well as some formats for the questions themselves. Individual agencies may find it necessary to alter the terminology, content, and structure of these sample questionnaires in order to meet their own needs.

SAMPLE DISRUPTIVE INMATE MANAGEMENT SURVEY

(STAFF)

I. Personal Background

1. AGE AT LAST BIRTHDAY

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Under 21 | <input type="checkbox"/> 41-45 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 21-25 | <input type="checkbox"/> 46-50 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 26-30 | <input type="checkbox"/> 51-55 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 31-35 | <input type="checkbox"/> Over 55 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 36-40 | |

2. RACE

- American Indian
- Asian American
- Black
- Latino (Chicano, Cuban, Puerto Rican, etc.)
- White
- Other: _____

3. WHAT IS THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION THAT YOU HAVE COMPLETED?

- Less than 12 years
- 12 years or high school equivalency program
- Some college
- Bachelor's degree
- Master's degree
- Ph. D.

II. Correctional Experience

1. HOW MANY YEARS HAVE YOU BEEN WORKING IN CORRECTIONS?

- Less than 1 year
- 1-2 years
- 3-5 years
- 6-10 years
- 11-15 years
- More than 15 years

2. HOW LONG HAVE YOU WORKED IN THIS RESTRICTIVE HOUSING UNIT?

- Less than 1 year
- 1-2 years
- 3-5 years
- 6-10 years
- More than 10 years

3. HAVE YOU WORKED IN OTHER CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS?

- Yes
- No

4. WHAT IS YOUR CURRENT JOB CLASSIFICATION?

- Administrator
- Administrative staff
- Security supervisor
- Security staff
- Program supervisor
- Program staff
- Support services staff

5. WHAT WAS THE JOB CLASSIFICATION YOU WERE IN LONGEST DURING THE YEAR
PRIOR TO _____.
(DATE)

- Administrator
- Administrative staff
- Security supervisor
- Security staff
- Program supervisor
- Program staff
- Support services staff

III. Current Conditions Relating to Disruptive Inmate Management

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ASK FOR YOUR OPINION ABOUT CONDITIONS THAT HAVE EXISTED IN THIS RESTRICTIVE HOUSING UNIT SINCE _____ (DATE NEW MANAGEMENT PRACTICES INITIATED).

1. FOR EACH CONDITION LISTED BELOW, CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST SHOWS YOUR VIEW OF THE CONDITION IN THIS UNIT SINCE _____ (DATE)

	NOT A PROBLEM	MINOR PROBLEM	MODERATE PROBLEM	SERIOUS PROBLEM	DON'T KNOW
Overcrowding	1	2	3	4	9
Poorly trained security staff	1	2	3	4	9
Inmate assaults on other inmates	1	2	3	4	9
Racial conflict among inmates	1	2	3	4	9
Inmate assaults on staff	1	2	3	4	9
Poor security	1	2	3	4	9
Property damage	1	2	3	4	9
Inmate use of drugs/alcohol	1	2	3	4	9
Extortion	1	2	3	4	9
Gang activities	1	2	3	4	9
Introduction of contraband	1	2	3	4	9
Poorly trained administrators	1	2	3	4	9
Verbal abuse of staff by inmates	1	2	3	4	9
Not enough staff	1	2	3	4	9
Malfunction of equipment	1	2	3	4	9

2. ARE THERE ANY OTHER CONDITIONS RELATED TO DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITIES IN THIS UNIT THAT ARE NOT LISTED IN QUESTION 1?

___ No
 ___ Yes WHAT ARE THOSE CONDITIONS? _____

3. TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK THE STAFF HAVE CONTROL OVER THE INMATES HERE DURING THE DAY?

___ Staff have no control over inmates.
 ___ Staff have some control over inmates.
 ___ Staff have a lot of control over inmates.
 ___ Staff have complete control over inmates.

4. TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK THE STAFF HAVE CONTROL OVER THE INMATES HERE DURING THE NIGHT?

___ Staff have no control over inmates.
 ___ Staff have some control over inmates.
 ___ Staff have a lot of control over inmates.
 ___ Staff have complete control over inmates.

5. CAN YOU SUGGEST ANY WAYS TO IMPROVE STAFF CONTROL OVER INMATES?

6. ON THE LINE SCALES BELOW, CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST INDICATES HOW SAFE THIS UNIT CURRENTLY IS FOR EACH OF THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES.

The average staff member

	<u>1</u>	2	3	4	<u>5</u>
	Very				Not At
	Safe				All Safe

The average inmate

	<u>1</u>	2	3	4	<u>5</u>
	Very				Not At
	Safe				All Safe

7. FROM THE LIST BELOW, RANK THE THREE MOST IMPORTANT REASONS FOR DISRUPTIVE BEHAVIOR HERE SINCE _____ . PUT A "1" BY THE MOST (DATE) IMPORTANT REASON, A "2" BY THE NEXT MOST IMPORTANT REASON, AND A "3" BY THE THIRD MOST IMPORTANT REASON.

- Gambling among inmates
- Drug activity among inmates
- Strong-arm tactics among inmates
- Racial conflict among inmates
- Sexual assault among inmates
- Gang activity among inmates
- Idleness/boredom among inmates
- Inmates with mental problems
- Inadequate training of staff
- Insufficient number of staff
- Other: _____

8. WHAT PERCENTAGE OF INMATES IN THIS UNIT DO YOU THINK ARE:

CIRCLE ONE

Extremely dangerous	0-5	15	30	50	70	90-100
Somewhat dangerous	0-5	15	30	50	70	90-100
Not dangerous	0-5	15	30	50	70	90-100
Mentally ill	0-5	15	30	50	70	90-100
Mentally retarded	0-5	15	30	50	70	90-100

9. DO YOU THINK THERE ARE ENOUGH STAFF ASSIGNED TO THIS UNIT TO PROVIDE FOR STAFF AND INMATE SAFETY DURING THE DAY?

- Yes
- No

10. DO YOU THINK THERE ARE ENOUGH STAFF ASSIGNED TO THIS UNIT TO PROVIDE FOR STAFF AND INMATE SAFETY DURING THE NIGHT?

- Yes
- No

11. CAN YOU SUGGEST ANY WAYS TO IMPROVE UNIT STAFFING PATTERNS OR ASSIGNMENTS? _____

12. ARE THERE ANY PARTICULAR TIMES OF THE DAY OR NIGHT THAT YOU DO NOT FEEL SAFE HERE?

No
 Yes WHEN? _____

WHY DON'T YOU FEEL SAFE? _____

WHAT ARE SOME WAYS TO IMPROVE SAFETY AT THESE TIMES?

13. ARE THERE ANY PARTICULAR PLACES IN THIS UNIT THAT YOU AVOID GOING ALONE?

No
 Yes WHERE? _____

WHY? _____

WHAT ARE SOME WAYS TO IMPROVE SAFETY IN THESE PLACES?

14. HOW OFTEN HAVE STAFF USED PHYSICAL FORCE ON INMATES IN THIS UNIT SINCE _____?
(DATE)

Never
 Rarely
 Occasionally
 Frequently

15. CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST INDICATES HOW OFTEN EACH OF THE FOLLOWING ITEMS HAS BEEN A PROBLEM IN THIS UNIT SINCE _____
(DATE)

	NEVER	RARELY	OCCASIONALLY	ALWAYS
Insects	1	2	3	4
Rodents	1	2	3	4
Dirt	1	2	3	4
Litter	1	2	3	4

16. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE CURRENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES PERTAINING TO
RELEASE FROM THIS UNIT?

- They usually allow inmates to be released too soon.
- They usually enable inmates to be released when ready to return
to general population.
- They usually keep inmates in the unit too long.

17. CAN YOU SUGGEST WAYS TO IMPROVE UNIT RELEASE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES?

18. LISTED BELOW ARE SOME INMATE PROGRAMS AND SERVICES. CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST INDICATES HOW ADEQUATE YOU THINK EACH CURRENTLY IS FOR INMATES IN THIS UNIT.

	MORE THAN ADEQUATE	ADEQUATE	LESS THAN ADEQUATE	DON'T KNOW
Academic education	1	2	3	9
Vocational education	1	2	3	9
Work assignments	1	2	3	9
Industries	1	2	3	9
Counseling/casework	1	2	3	9
Indoor recreation	1	2	3	9
Outdoor recreation	1	2	3	9
Visiting	1	2	3	9
Attorney visiting	1	2	3	9
Food service	1	2	3	9
Laundry	1	2	3	9
Sanitation/hygiene	1	2	3	9
Medical/dental care	1	2	3	9
Psychological/psychiatric services	1	2	3	9
Religious services	1	2	3	9
General library	1	2	3	9
Legal library	1	2	3	9
Telephone use	1	2	3	9
Mail	1	2	3	9
Commissary/canteen	1	2	3	9
Grievance mechanism	1	2	3	9

IV. Perceived Changes in Disruptive Inmate Management at This Unit

THE QUESTIONS BELOW ASK YOU TO COMPARE CONDITIONS AT THIS UNIT BEFORE AND AFTER _____ (DATE NEW MANAGEMENT PRACTICES INITIATED).

DO NOT COMPLETE THIS SECTION IF YOU WERE NOT EMPLOYED AT THIS UNIT PRIOR TO _____ (DATE).

1. IN YOUR OPINION, TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THIS UNIT CHANGED IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS SINCE _____. CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ON EACH LINE SCALE. IF YOU BELIEVE NO CHANGE HAS OCCURRED, CIRCLE "3."

Staff control over inmates 1 2 3 4 5
Less _____ More

Staff training 1 2 3 4 5
Less _____ More

Administrative support of staff 1 2 3 4 5
Less _____ More

Inmate racial tension 1 2 3 4 5
Less _____ More

Gang-related violence 1 2 3 4 5
Less _____ More

Internal management of inmates 1 2 3 4 5
Less _____ More

Inmate misconduct 1 2 3 4 5
Less _____ More

Effectiveness of release policies 1 2 3 4 5
Less _____ More

2. IN WHICH OF THE AREAS BELOW HAVE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES BEEN ALTERED SO AS TO REDUCE DISRUPTIVE BEHAVIOR HERE? CHECK ALL THAT APPLY.

- | | |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mail/telephone communication | <input type="checkbox"/> Inspections |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Staff training | <input type="checkbox"/> Recreation |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Inmate classification | <input type="checkbox"/> Medical/health care |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Security and custody | <input type="checkbox"/> Mental health care |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Visiting | <input type="checkbox"/> Work assignments |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Inmate orientation | <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency procedures |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Inmate grievances | <input type="checkbox"/> Educational programs |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Disciplinary procedures | <input type="checkbox"/> Assignment criteria |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Food service | <input type="checkbox"/> Release criteria |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Staff education/experience | |

V. Previous Conditions Relating To Disruptive Inmate Management

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE CONCERNED WITH CONDITIONS THAT EXISTED AT THIS RESTRICTIVE HOUSING UNIT PRIOR TO _____ (DATE NEW MANAGEMENT PRACTICES INITIATED).

DO NOT COMPLETE THIS SECTION IF YOU WERE NOT EMPLOYED AT THIS UNIT PRIOR TO _____ (DATE).

1. FOR EACH CONDITION LISTED BELOW, CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST SHOWS YOUR VIEW OF THE CONDITION IN THIS UNIT BEFORE _____ (DATE).

	NOT A PROBLEM	MINOR PROBLEM	MODERATE PROBLEM	SERIOUS PROBLEM	DON'T KNOW
Overcrowding	1	2	3	4	9
Poorly trained security staff	1	2	3	4	9
Inmate assaults on other inmates	1	2	3	4	9
Racial conflict among inmates	1	2	3	4	9
Inmate assaults on staff	1	2	3	4	9
Poor security	1	2	3	4	9
Property damage	1	2	3	4	9
Inmate use of drugs/alcohol	1	2	3	4	9
Extortion	1	2	3	4	9
Gang activities	1	2	3	4	9
Introduction of contraband	1	2	3	4	9
Poorly trained administrators	1	2	3	4	9
Verbal abuse of staff by inmates	1	2	3	4	9
Not enough staff	1	2	3	4	9
Malfunction of equipment	1	2	3	4	9

2. WERE THERE ANY OTHER CONDITIONS RELATED TO DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITIES IN THIS UNIT THAT ARE NOT LISTED IN QUESTION 1?

No
 Yes WHAT WERE THOSE PROBLEMS? _____

3. TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK THE STAFF HAD CONTROL OVER THE INMATES HERE DURING THE DAY BEFORE _____?
(DATE)

Staff had no control over inmates.
 Staff had some control over inmates.
 Staff had a lot of control over inmates.
 Staff had complete control over inmates.

4. TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK THE STAFF HAD CONTROL OVER THE INMATES HERE DURING THE NIGHT?

Staff had no control over inmates.
 Staff had some control over inmates.
 Staff had a lot of control over inmates.
 Staff had complete control over inmates.

5. ON THE LINE SCALES BELOW, CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST INDICATES HOW SAFE THIS UNIT WAS FOR EACH OF THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES.

The average staff member

	<u>1</u>	2	3	4	<u>5</u>
Very					Not At
Safe					All Safe

The average inmate

	<u>1</u>	2	3	4	<u>5</u>
Very					Not At
Safe					All Safe

6. FROM THE LIST BELOW, RANK THE THREE MOST IMPORTANT REASONS FOR DISRUPTIVE BEHAVIOR HERE BEFORE _____ . PUT A "1" BY THE MOST
 (DATE)
 IMPORTANT REASON, A "2" BY THE NEXT MOST IMPORTANT REASON, AND A "3" BY THE THIRD MOST IMPORTANT REASON.

- ___ Gambling among inmates
- ___ Drug activity among inmates
- ___ Strong-arm tactics among inmates
- ___ Racial conflict among inmates
- ___ Sexual assault among inmates
- ___ Gang activity among inmates
- ___ Idleness/boredom among inmates
- ___ Inmates with mental problems
- ___ Inadequate training of staff
- ___ Insufficient number of staff
- ___ Other reasons: _____

7. BEFORE _____ , WHAT PERCENTAGE OF INMATES IN THIS UNIT DO YOU
 (DATE)
 THINK WERE:

	CIRCLE ONE					
Extremely dangerous	0-5	15	30	50	70	90-100
Somewhat dangerous	0-5	15	30	50	70	90-100
Not dangerous	0-5	15	30	50	70	90-100
Mentally ill	0-5	15	30	50	70	90-100
Mentally retarded	0-5	15	30	50	70	90-100

8. DO YOU THINK THERE WERE ENOUGH STAFF ASSIGNED TO THIS UNIT THEN TO PROVIDE FOR STAFF AND INMATE SAFETY DURING THE DAY?

___ Yes
 ___ No

9. DO YOU THINK THERE WERE ENOUGH STAFF ASSIGNED TO THIS UNIT THEN TO PROVIDE FOR STAFF AND INMATE SAFETY DURING THE NIGHT?

___ Yes
 ___ No

10. WERE THERE ANY PARTICULAR TIMES OF THE DAY OR NIGHT THAT YOU DID NOT FEEL SAFE HERE?

No
 Yes WHEN? _____
WHY DIDN'T YOU FEEL SAFE? _____

11. WERE THERE ANY PARTICULAR PLACES IN THIS UNIT THAT YOU AVOIDED GOING ALONE?

No
 Yes WHERE? _____
WHY? _____

12. HOW OFTEN DID STAFF USE PHYSICAL FORCE ON INMATES IN THIS UNIT BEFORE _____?
(DATE)

Never
 Rarely
 Occasionally
 Frequently

13. CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST INDICATES HOW OFTEN EACH OF THE FOLLOWING ITEMS HAS BEEN A PROBLEM IN THIS UNIT SINCE _____.
(DATE)

	NEVER	RARELY	OCCASIONALLY	ALWAYS
Insects	1	2	3	4
Rodents	1	2	3	4
Dirt	1	2	3	4
Litter	1	2	3	4

14. LISTED BELOW ARE SOME INMATE PROGRAMS AND SERVICES. CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST INDICATES HOW ADEQUATE YOU THINK EACH WAS FOR INMATES IN THIS UNIT BEFORE _____.

(DATE)

	MORE THAN ADEQUATE	ADEQUATE	LESS THAN ADEQUATE	DON'T KNOW
Academic education	1	2	3	9
Vocational education	1	2	3	9
Work assignments	1	2	3	9
Industries	1	2	3	9
Counseling/casework	1	2	3	9
Indoor recreation	1	2	3	9
Outdoor recreation	1	2	3	9
Visiting	1	2	3	9
Attorney visiting	1	2	3	9
Food service	1	2	3	9
Laundry	1	2	3	9
Sanitation/hygiene	1	2	3	9
Medical/dental care	1	2	3	9
Psychological/psychiatric services	1	2	3	9
Religious services	1	2	3	9
General library	1	2	3	9
Legal library	1	2	3	9
Telephone use	1	2	3	9
Mail	1	2	3	9
Commissary/canteen	1	2	3	9
Grievance mechanism	1	2	3	9

15. HOW EFFECTIVE WERE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES PERTAINING TO RELEASE FROM THIS UNIT BEFORE _____?
(DATE)

- They usually allowed inmates to be released too soon.
- They usually enabled inmates to be released when ready to return to general population.
- They usually kept inmates in the unit too long.

THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.

SAMPLE DISRUPTIVE INMATE MANAGEMENT SURVEY
(INMATE)

I. Current Conditions Relating To Disruptive Inmate Management

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ASK FOR YOUR OPINION ABOUT CONDITIONS THAT HAVE EXISTED IN THIS RESTRICTIVE HOUSING UNIT SINCE _____ (DATE NEW MANAGEMENT PRACTICES INITIATED).

1. FOR EACH CONDITION LISTED BELOW, CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST SHOWS YOUR VIEW OF THE CONDITION IN THIS UNIT SINCE _____ (DATE).

	NOT A PROBLEM	MINOR PROBLEM	MODERATE PROBLEM	SERIOUS PROBLEM	DON'T KNOW
Overcrowding	1	2	3	4	9
Poorly trained security staff	1	2	3	4	9
Inmate assaults on other inmates	1	2	3	4	9
Racial conflict among inmates	1	2	3	4	9
Inmate assaults on staff	1	2	3	4	9
Poor security	1	2	3	4	9
Property damage	1	2	3	4	9
Inmate use of drugs/alcohol	1	2	3	4	9
Extortion	1	2	3	4	9
Gang activities	1	2	3	4	9
Introduction of contraband	1	2	3	4	9
Poorly trained administrators	1	2	3	4	9
Verbal abuse of staff by inmates	1	2	3	4	9
Not enough staff	1	2	3	4	9
Malfunction of equipment	1	2	3	4	9

2. ARE THERE ANY OTHER CONDITIONS RELATED TO DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITIES IN THIS UNIT THAT ARE NOT LISTED IN QUESTION 1?

No
 Yes

WHAT ARE THOSE CONDITIONS? _____

3. TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK THE STAFF HAVE CONTROL OVER THE INMATES HERE DURING THE DAY?

Staff have no control over inmates.
 Staff have some control over inmates.
 Staff have a lot of control over inmates.
 Staff have complete control over inmates.

4. TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK THE STAFF HAVE CONTROL OVER THE INMATES HERE DURING THE NIGHT?

Staff have no control over inmates.
 Staff have some control over inmates.
 Staff have a lot of control over inmates.
 Staff have complete control over inmates.

5. ON THE LINE SCALES BELOW, CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST INDICATES HOW SAFE THIS UNIT CURRENTLY IS FOR EACH OF THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES.

The average inmate

	<u>1</u>	2	3	4	5
Very					Not At
Safe					All Safe

The average staff member

	<u>1</u>	2	3	4	5
Very					Not At
Safe					All Safe

6. BELOW ARE SOME THINGS THAT HAPPEN TO INMATES. CIRCLE THE RESPONSE THAT BEST INDICATES HOW OFTEN THESE THINGS HAVE HAPPENED TO YOU IN THIS UNIT SINCE _____ (DATE)

Written up for a minor rule violation	Never	Rarely	Occasionally	Frequently
Written up for a major rule violation	Never	Rarely	Occasionally	Frequently
Been a victim of assault	Never	Rarely	Occasionally	Frequently
Been verbally abused by staff	Never	Rarely	Occasionally	Frequently
Been physically abused by staff	Never	Rarely	Occasionally	Frequently
Been sexually assaulted	Never	Rarely	Occasionally	Frequently
Used drugs/alcohol	Never	Rarely	Occasionally	Frequently

7. HOW OFTEN HAVE YOU BEEN CHARGED WITH ASSAULTING ANOTHER INMATE IN THIS UNIT SINCE _____ ? (DATE)

- ___ Never
- ___ Once
- ___ Twice
- ___ Three or more times

8. IN YOUR OPINION, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS WERE RELATED TO YOUR BEING CHARGED WITH THESE ASSAULTS? CHECK ALL THAT APPLY.

- ___ Because of my race
- ___ Because I belong to a certain inmate group
- ___ Because I am an inmate leader
- ___ Because someone snitched on me
- ___ Because the staff wanted to harass me
- ___ Because I was guilty
- ___ Other reasons: _____

9. HOW OFTEN HAVE YOU BEEN CHARGED WITH ASSAULTING A UNIT STAFF MEMBER SINCE _____ ? (DATE)

- ___ Never
- ___ Once
- ___ Twice
- ___ Three or more times

10. IN YOUR OPINION, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS WERE RELATED TO YOUR BEING CHARGED WITH THESE ASSAULTS? CHECK ALL THAT APPLY.

- Because of my race
- Because I belong to a certain inmate group
- Because I am an inmate leader
- Because someone snitched on me
- Because the staff wanted to harass me
- Because I was guilty
- Other reasons: _____

11. FROM THE LIST BELOW, RANK THE THREE MOST IMPORTANT REASONS FOR DISRUPTIVE BEHAVIOR HERE SINCE _____ . PUT A "1" BY THE (DATE) MOST IMPORTANT REASON, A "2" BY THE NEXT MOST IMPORTANT REASON, AND A "3" BY THE THIRD MOST IMPORTANT REASON.

- Gambling among inmates
- Drug activity among inmates
- Strong-arm tactics among inmates
- Racial conflict among inmates
- Sexual assault among inmates
- Gang activity among inmates
- Idleness/boredom among inmates
- Inmates with mental problems
- Inadequate training of staff
- Insufficient number of staff
- Other reasons: _____

12. WHAT PERCENTAGE OF INMATES IN THIS UNIT DO YOU THINK ARE:

	CIRCLE ONE					
Extremely dangerous	0-5	15	30	50	70	90-100
Somewhat dangerous	0-5	15	30	50	70	90-100
Not dangerous	0-5	15	30	50	70	90-100
Mentally ill	0-5	15	30	50	70	90-100
Mentally retarded	0-5	15	30	50	70	90-100

13. DO YOU THINK THERE ARE ENOUGH STAFF ASSIGNED TO THIS UNIT TO PROVIDE FOR STAFF AND INMATE SAFETY DURING THE DAY?

- Yes
- No

14. DO YOU THINK THERE ARE ENOUGH STAFF ASSIGNED TO THIS UNIT TO PROVIDE FOR STAFF AND INMATE SAFETY DURING THE NIGHT?

- Yes
- No

15. ARE THERE ANY PARTICULAR TIMES OF THE DAY OR NIGHT THAT YOU DO NOT FEEL SAFE HERE?

- No
- Yes WHEN? _____
- WHERE? _____
- WHY DON'T YOU FEEL SAFE? _____
- _____
- _____

16. HOW OFTEN HAVE STAFF USED PHYSICAL FORCE ON INMATES IN THIS UNIT SINCE _____? (DATE)

- Never
- Rarely
- Occasionally
- Frequently

17. CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST INDICATES HOW OFTEN EACH OF THE FOLLOWING ITEMS HAS BEEN A PROBLEM IN THIS UNIT SINCE _____ (DATE)

	NEVER	RARELY	OCCASIONALLY	ALWAYS
Insects	1	2	3	4
Rodents	1	2	3	4
Dirt	1	2	3	4
Litter	1	2	3	4

18. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE CURRENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES PERTAINING TO RELEASE FROM THIS UNIT?

- They usually allow inmates to be released too soon.
- They usually enable inmates to be released when ready to return to general population.
- They usually keep inmates in the unit too long.

19. LISTED BELOW ARE SOME INMATE PROGRAMS AND SERVICES. CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST INDICATES HOW ADEQUATE YOU THINK EACH CURRENTLY IS FOR INMATES IN THIS UNIT.

	MORE THAN ADEQUATE	ADEQUATE	LESS THAN ADEQUATE	DON'T KNOW
Academic education	1	2	3	9
Vocational education	1	2	3	9
Work assignments	1	2	3	9
Industries	1	2	3	9
Counseling/casework	1	2	3	9
Indoor recreation	1	2	3	9
Outdoor recreation	1	2	3	9
Visiting	1	2	3	9
Attorney visiting	1	2	3	9
Food service	1	2	3	9
Laundry	1	2	3	9
Sanitation/hygiene	1	2	3	9
Medical/dental care	1	2	3	9
Psychological/psychiatric services	1	2	3	9
Religious services	1	2	3	9
General library	1	2	3	9
Legal library	1	2	3	9
Telephone use	1	2	3	9
Mail	1	2	3	9
Commissary/canteen	1	2	3	9
Grievance mechanism	1	2	3	9

II. Perceived Changes in Disruptive Management at This Unit

THE QUESTIONS BELOW ASK YOU TO COMPARE CONDITIONS AT THIS UNIT BEFORE AND AFTER _____ (DATE NEW MANAGEMENT PRACTICES INITIATED).

DO NOT COMPLETE THIS SECTION IF YOU WERE NOT CONFINED IN THIS RESTRICTIVE HOUSING UNIT PRIOR TO _____ (DATE)

1. IN YOUR OPINION, TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THIS UNIT CHANGED IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS SINCE _____? CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ON EACH LINE SCALE. IF YOU BELIEVE NO CHANGE HAS OCCURRED, CIRCLE "3."

Staff control over inmates	<u>1</u>	2	3	4	<u>5</u>
	Less				More
Staff training	<u>1</u>	2	3	4	<u>5</u>
	Less				More
Administrative support of staff	<u>1</u>	2	3	4	<u>5</u>
	Less				More
Inmate racial tension	<u>1</u>	2	3	4	<u>5</u>
	Less				More
Gang-related violence	<u>1</u>	2	3	4	<u>5</u>
	Less				More
Internal management of inmates	<u>1</u>	2	3	4	<u>5</u>
	Less				More
Inmate misconduct	<u>1</u>	2	3	4	<u>5</u>
	Less				More
Effectiveness of release policies	<u>1</u>	2	3	4	<u>5</u>
	Less				More

2. IN WHICH OF THE AREAS BELOW HAVE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES BEEN CHANGED SO AS TO REDUCE DISRUPTIVE BEHAVIOR HERE? CHECK ALL THAT APPLY.

- | | |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mail/telephone communication | <input type="checkbox"/> Inspections |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Staff training | <input type="checkbox"/> Inmate orientation |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Inmate classification | <input type="checkbox"/> Educational programs |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Security and custody | <input type="checkbox"/> Work assignments |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Visiting | <input type="checkbox"/> Medical/health care |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Food service | <input type="checkbox"/> Mental health care |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Inmate grievances | <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency procedures |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Disciplinary procedures | <input type="checkbox"/> Assignment criteria |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Recreation | <input type="checkbox"/> Release criteria |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Staff education/experience | |

III. Previous Conditions Relating To Disruptive Inmate Management

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ASK FOR YOUR OPINION ABOUT CONDITIONS THAT EXISTED IN THIS RESTRICTIVE HOUSING UNIT BEFORE _____ (DATE NEW MANAGEMENT PRACTICES INITIATED).

DO NOT COMPLETE THIS SECTION IF YOU WERE NOT CONFINED IN THIS UNIT BEFORE _____ (DATE)

1. FOR EACH CONDITION LISTED BELOW, CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST SHOWS YOUR VIEW OF THE CONDITION IN THIS UNIT BEFORE _____ (DATE)

	NOT A PROBLEM	MINOR PROBLEM	MODERATE PROBLEM	SERIOUS PROBLEM	DON'T KNOW
Overcrowding	1	2	3	4	9
Poorly trained security staff	1	2	3	4	9
Inmate assaults on other inmates	1	2	3	4	9
Racial conflict among inmates	1	2	3	4	9
Inmate assaults on staff	1	2	3	4	9
Poor security	1	2	3	4	9
Property damage	1	2	3	4	9
Inmate use of drugs/alcohol	1	2	3	4	9
Extortion	1	2	3	4	9
Gang activities	1	2	3	4	9
Introduction of contraband	1	2	3	4	9
Poorly trained administrators	1	2	3	4	9
Verbal abuse of staff by inmates	1	2	3	4	9
Not enough staff	1	2	3	4	9
Malfunction of equipment	1	2	3	4	9

2. WERE THERE ANY OTHER CONDITIONS RELATED TO DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITIES IN THIS UNIT THAT ARE NOT LISTED IN QUESTION 1?

No
 Yes WHAT WERE THOSE CONDITIONS? _____

3. BEFORE _____, TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK THE STAFF HAD
 (DATE)
CONTROL OVER THE INMATES HERE DURING THE DAY?

- Staff had no control over inmates.
- Staff had some control over inmates.
- Staff had a lot of control over inmates.
- Staff had complete control over inmates.

4. TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK THE STAFF HAD CONTROL OVER THE INMATES
HERE DURING THE NIGHT?

- Staff had no control over inmates.
- Staff had some control over inmates.
- Staff had a lot of control over inmates.
- Staff had complete control over inmates.

5. ON THE LINE SCALES BELOW, CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST INDICATES HOW
SAFE THIS UNIT WAS FOR EACH OF THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES.

The average inmate

	<u>1</u>	2	3	4	<u>5</u>
Very					Not At
Safe					All Safe

The average staff member

	<u>1</u>	2	3	4	<u>5</u>
Very					Not At
Safe					All Safe

6. BELOW ARE SOME THINGS THAT HAPPEN TO INMATES. CIRCLE THE RESPONSE THAT BEST INDICATES HOW OFTEN THESE THINGS HAPPENED TO YOU IN THIS UNIT BEFORE _____.
(DATE)

Written up for a minor rule violation	Never	Rarely	Occasionally	Frequently
Written up for a major rule violation	Never	Rarely	Occasionally	Frequently
Were a victim of assault	Never	Rarely	Occasionally	Frequently
Were verbally abused by staff	Never	Rarely	Occasionally	Frequently
Were physically abused by staff	Never	Rarely	Occasionally	Frequently
Were sexually assaulted	Never	Rarely	Occasionally	Frequently
Used drugs/alcohol	Never	Rarely	Occasionally	Frequently

7. HOW OFTEN HAD YOU BEEN CHARGED WITH ASSAULTING ANOTHER INMATE IN THIS UNIT BEFORE _____?

- ___ Never
- ___ Once
- ___ Twice
- ___ Three or more times

8. IN YOUR OPINION, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS WERE RELATED TO YOUR BEING CHARGED WITH THESE ASSAULTS? CHECK ALL THAT APPLY.

- ___ Because of my race
- ___ Because I belonged to a certain inmate group
- ___ Because I was an inmate leader
- ___ Because someone snitched on me
- ___ Because the staff wanted to harass me
- ___ Because I was guilty
- ___ Other reasons: _____

9. HOW OFTEN HAD YOU BEEN CHARGED WITH ASSAULTING A UNIT STAFF MEMBER BEFORE _____?
(DATE)

- ___ Never
- ___ Once
- ___ Twice
- ___ Three or more times

10. IN YOUR OPINION, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS WERE RELATED TO YOUR BEING CHARGED WITH THESE ASSAULTS? CHECK ALL THAT APPLY.

- Because of my race
- Because I belonged to a certain inmate group
- Because I was an inmate leader
- Because someone snitched on me
- Because the staff wanted to harass me
- Because I was guilty
- Other reasons: _____

11. FROM THE LIST BELOW, RANK THE THREE MOST IMPORTANT REASONS FOR DISRUPTIVE BEHAVIOR HERE BEFORE _____ . PUT A "1" BY THE (DATE) MOST IMPORTANT REASON, A "2" BY THE NEXT MOST IMPORTANT REASON, AND A "3" BY THE THIRD MOST IMPORTANT REASON.

- Gambling among inmates
- Drug activity among inmates
- Strong-arm tactics among inmates
- Racial conflict among inmates
- Sexual assault among inmates
- Gang activity among inmates
- Idleness/boredom among inmates
- Inmates with mental problems
- Inadequate training of staff
- Insufficient number of staff
- Other reasons: _____

12. WHAT PERCENTAGE OF INMATES IN THIS UNIT DO YOU THINK WERE:

	CIRCLE ONE					
Extremely dangerous	0-5	15	30	50	70	90-100
Somewhat dangerous	0-5	15	30	50	70	90-100
Not dangerous	0-5	15	30	50	70	90-100
Mentally ill	0-5	15	30	50	70	90-100
Mentally retarded	0-5	15	30	50	70	90-100

13. BEFORE _____, DO YOU THINK THERE WERE ENOUGH STAFF ASSIGNED (DATE) TO THIS UNIT TO PROVIDE FOR STAFF AND INMATE SAFETY DURING THE DAY?

- Yes
- No

14. DO YOU THINK THERE WERE ENOUGH STAFF ASSIGNED TO THIS UNIT THEN TO PROVIDE FOR STAFF AND INMATE SAFETY DURING THE NIGHT?

- Yes
 No

15. WERE THERE ANY PARTICULAR TIMES OF THE DAY OR NIGHT THAT YOU DID NOT FEEL SAFE HERE?

- No
 Yes

WHEN? _____

WHERE? _____

WHY DIDN'T YOU FEEL SAFE? _____

16. HOW OFTEN DID STAFF USE PHYSICAL FORCE ON INMATES IN THIS UNIT BEFORE _____?

(DATE)

- Never
 Rarely
 Occasionally
 Frequently

17. CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST INDICATES HOW OFTEN EACH OF THE FOLLOWING ITEMS HAS BEEN A PROBLEM IN THIS UNIT SINCE _____?

(DATE)

	NEVER	RARELY	OCCASIONALLY	ALWAYS
Insects	1	2	3	4
Rodents	1	2	3	4
Dirt	1	2	3	4
Litter	1	2	3	4

18. HOW EFFECTIVE WERE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES PERTAINING TO RELEASE FROM THIS UNIT BEFORE _____?

(DATE)

- They usually allowed inmates to be released too soon.
 They usually enabled inmates to be released when ready to return to general population.
 They usually kept inmates in the unit too long.

19. LISTED BELOW ARE SOME INMATE PROGRAMS AND SERVICES. CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST INDICATES HOW ADEQUATE YOU THINK EACH WAS FOR INMATES IN THIS UNIT BEFORE _____.
(DATE)

	MORE THAN ADEQUATE	ADEQUATE	LESS THAN ADEQUATE	DON'T KNOW
Academic education	1	2	3	9
Vocational education	1	2	3	9
Work assignments	1	2	3	9
Industries	1	2	3	9
Counseling/casework	1	2	3	9
Indoor recreation	1	2	3	9
Outdoor recreation	1	2	3	9
Visiting	1	2	3	9
Attorney visiting	1	2	3	9
Food service	1	2	3	9
Laundry	1	2	3	9
Sanitation/hygiene	1	2	3	9
Medical/dental care	1	2	3	9
Psychological/psychiatric services	1	2	3	9
Religious services	1	2	3	9
General library	1	2	3	9
Legal library	1	2	3	9
Telephone use	1	2	3	9
Mail	1	2	3	9
Commissary/canteen	1	2	3	9
Grievance mechanism	1	2	3	9

IV. Personal Background

1. AGE AT LAST BIRTHDAY:

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Under 18 | <input type="checkbox"/> 41-45 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 18-21 | <input type="checkbox"/> 46-50 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 22-25 | <input type="checkbox"/> 51-55 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 26-30 | <input type="checkbox"/> 56-60 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 31-35 | <input type="checkbox"/> Over 60 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 36-40 | |

2. RACE:

- American Indian
 Asian American
 Black
 Latino (Chicano, Cuban, Puerto Rican, etc.)
 White
 Other: _____

3. HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION COMPLETED:

- Less than 8th grade
 Some high school
 High school or high school equivalency program
 Some college
 College degree
 Post-graduate education

4. MARITAL STATUS:

- Never married
 Married
 Divorced
 Separated
 Widowed

5. PRIMARY OFFENSE YOU ARE NOW DOING TIME FOR:

(If parole or probation violation, check original offense. If more than one offense, put a "1" by the most serious, and check additional offenses.)

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Arson | <input type="checkbox"/> Murder |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Assault | <input type="checkbox"/> Manslaughter |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Bribery | <input type="checkbox"/> Rape |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Burglary | <input type="checkbox"/> Other sex offenses |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Drugs (sales or possession) | <input type="checkbox"/> Robbery |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Embezzlement | <input type="checkbox"/> Auto theft |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Forgery | <input type="checkbox"/> Grand theft |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Fraud | <input type="checkbox"/> Other theft: _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kidnapping | <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ |

6. CURRENT CUSTODY STATUS:

- Administrative detention
- Administrative segregation
- Protective custody
- Death row
- Other: _____

7. WHEN YOU WERE ARRESTED FOR YOUR CURRENT OFFENSE, WERE YOU EMPLOYED?

- Yes
- No

8. WHEN YOU WERE ARRESTED FOR YOUR CURRENT OFFENSE, WERE YOU UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL OR DRUGS?

- Yes
- No

9. HOW MANY PRIOR ADULT PRISON COMMITMENTS HAVE YOU HAD? (Do not count city or county jail or youth institutions.)

- 0
- 1
- 2
- 3
- More than 3

10. HOW MANY YEARS HAVE YOU SERVED SO FAR FOR YOUR CURRENT OFFENSE? (If you were on parole, count the time you served before parole plus the time served since your return.)

- Less than 1 year
- 1-2 years
- 3-5 years
- 6-7 years
- 8-10 years
- 11-16 years
- More than 16 years

11. HOW MANY YEARS DO YOU HAVE LEFT TO SERVE ON YOUR CURRENT OFFENSE?

- Less than 1 year
- 1-2 years
- 3-5 years
- 6-10 years
- 11-16 years
- More than 16 years

12. HOW LONG HAVE YOU CURRENTLY BEEN CONFINED IN THIS UNIT?

- Less than 1 month
- 1-3 months
- 4-6 months
- 7-12 months
- More than 12 months

13. ARE YOU CURRENTLY INVOLVED IN ANY PROGRAM ACTIVITIES?

- Yes
- No

14. HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY DONE TIME IN THIS RESTRICTIVE HOUSING UNIT?

- Yes
- No

THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.

Disruptive Maximum Security Inmate
Management Guide

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