

# HOW HOULD PRPOOSED CHAKEES IN FEDERAL DIVESSITY JURISDCTTION AFFECT STATE COURTS? 

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## EXECUTIVE SUMARKY

Federal jurisdiction, based upon controversies between citizens of different states or between states and foreign nations, arises from Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Proposals to curtail or abolish federal diversity jurisdiction have been made ever since it was conferred on federal courts by the Judiciary Act of 1789.

Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Former Chief Justice Warren Burger argued strongly for the elimination of diversity jurisdiction. The Judicial Conference of the United States, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Conference of Chief Justices, and the American Law Institute have all passed resolutions supporting the curtailment or elimination of diversity jurisdiction. On the other hand, the American Bar Assoctation and most trial lawyers' associations favor retaining diversity jurisdiction in federal courts.

The debate over diversity jurisdiction has its roots in concern over bias against out-of-state litigants in state courts. This concern permeates other arguments over the transfer of federal diversity jurisdiction, including concerns over the comparative quality of justice in state and federal courts, concerns over restricting choice of forum, and concerns over federal court workloads. The debate has taken on a new character recently because the number of alternatives between total abolition of diversity cases in federal courts and complete retention has increased. Several options are available now that previously were not considered. Research on these alternatives is essential to provide Congress with a basis for deciding whether legislation is required, and which alternatives will best achieve Congressional objectives. Research will also help state court justices and state
legislators formulate their positions on diversity transfer based upon an understanding of how each alternative would affect courts in their states,and also will permit attorneys to estimate the effects of the transfer on their practices. Readers interested in the effects of proposed changes on specific states may refer to Appendix E.

The number of federal diversity filings has increased dramatically in the past 10 years, but diversity cases as a proportion of total civil filings in U.S. District Courts have been fairly constant (ranging between $24 \%$ and $28 \%$ of all civil filings). Contract and tort cases have regularly comprised more than $90 \%$ of all federal diversity filings. In the past 25 years, diversity contract suits have increased more rapidly than diversity tort suits and now comprise nearly half of all diversity filings.

Under a grant from the State Justice Institute, the National Center for State Courts conducted this research to determine the impact on state courts of the possible transfer of federal diversity jurisdiction. At the time this research began, the three most prominent proposals were: abolishing diversity jurisdiction, barring in-state plaintiffs from initiating diversity actions, and raising the federal amount-in-controversy requirement from $\$ 10,000$ to $\$ 50,000$. On November 19, 1988, during the final three months of this project, the change in amount-in-controversy was adopted as part of the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act. Consequently, the last alternative is now a reality and data from this research will provide a baseline against which to measure its effect on state court caseloads. The major research question addressed is: How will caseloads removed from federal courts be distributed among the states if diversity jurisdiction is curtailed or eliminated?

Specific findings from the National Center's research are as summarized

## NMMEER DVEESSTY FILINGS ESTTMTED TO BE TRANSEERRED TO STATE COURTS UWDER THREE PROPOSALS TO CHAGE FEDERAL DIVESSTY JURISOICTION


under each of the three proposals. Table I which which also appears in the text as Table 26 , summarizes the number of new filings that would have been added to state courts under each of the three proposals if diversity jurisdiction had been changed in FY 1987. All figures in this table and ail proportions calculated below are based upon the diversity cases filed in U.S. District Court in FY 1987. To the extent that federal court cases are more complex than cases filed in state courts, the affect of the transfer on states will be underestimated. Similarly, to the extent that one federal court action, e.g. an airline accident involving people from different states could result in more than one state court filing, the impact on states of any change in diversity jurisdiction will also be underestimated. The State Justice Institute has awarded continuation funding to examine the effects of changes proposed in diversity jurisdiction in four trial courts of general jurisdiction. That research also will examine the degree to which the state courts most likely to receive the newly-transferred cases are already overburdened. Adding an identical number of cases to state courts with large backlogs of pending cases and comparatively long time intervals between filing and disposition is more serious than rechanneling cases to state trial courts with small backlogs and short case processing times. The last caveat about these numbers are that the impact on states will be affected by the desire of plaintiffs to pursue their claims in state courts, rather than settle or use other options.

## 1. Effects of Total Abolition

If federal diversity jurisdiction has been completely abolished in $F Y$ 1987, as many as 66,408 new filings would have been added to state courts.

Pennsylvania would have received the most diversity filings and North Dakota would have received the least.

The more populous states obviously would receive the most diversity cases if diversity jurisdiction were eliminated. California, New York, Texas, Pennsylvania, Florida, Illinois, Ohio, and Michigan have $48 \%$ of the national population and would receive $48 \%$ of the diversity filings as well. It is therefore desirable to examine the states where the relationship between population and filings is not proportionate. Based upon filings per 100,000 population, the District of Columbia would have received the most diversity cases per population (169). Other states receiving disproportionately high filings per 100,000 population include Mississippi, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Montana, Pennsylvania, and Illinois.

Many of these same states would be affected disproportionately if impact were measured by filings per judge. In South Carolina, abolition of diversity jurisdiction would have meant that the currently sitting general jurisdiction judges would have received 35 new cases. Other states disproportionately affected by total abolition as measured by filings per judge are: Oklahoma, Hawaii, Mississippi, Massachusetts, and the District of Columbia.

Under total abolition, a roughly equal proportion of tort and contract filings would be transferred. A lack of data from state courts makes it impossible to calculate percentage increases for both tort and contract filings in all 52 jurisdictions. From the 22 states which separate their civil filings into tort and contract categories, however, even the total abolition of diversity jurisdiction would increase state case filings by only three or four percent in most states. (The increase in tort filings makes the percentage increase in Hawail significantly greater.) Contract filings
would increase by approximately $12 \%$ in New York, Massachusetts, and Hawaii, but by less than c!e and a half percent in Wisconsin, Arizona, and Arkansas. The increase in tort filings would be greatest in Hawaii (21\%) and are estimated to increase about $11 \%$ in Mississippi, Louisiana, and Montana.

Of the diversity cases disposed in U.S. District Courts in FY 1987, 36\% were terminated without court action. The rate of termination without court action varied significantly among states. For example, only $5 \%$ of the diversity cases were terminated without court action in Colorado and Puerto Rico districts, whereas two-thirds of the diversity cases were terminated without court action in Alaska, Connecticut, Oregon, and Vermont districts. On the other hand, about $8 \%$ of all FY 1987 diversity cases were disposed by trial ( $6 \%$ by jury trials). A third of all diversity trials were conducted in four states--Texas, Pennsylvania, Georgia and Louisiana. If that pattern continued when and if diversity jurisdiction were abolished, these states would be affected significantly more than the raw number of filings would indicate. The proportion of cases terminated by trial varied from a low of two percent in Alaska and Illinois to a high of $25 \%$ in Vermont. Other states with high trial rates for diversity cases terminated in U.S. District Court are Wyoming, Texas, and Rhode Island.
2. Effects of Barring In-State Plaintiffs from Initiating Diversity Actions in Federal Court

Under the proposal that federal courts would be closed to in-state plaintiffs, Texas would have received the most $(3,269)$ new diversity filings in 1987, and North Dakota would have received the least. The District of Columbia, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Louisiana and Hawail would receive disproportionately high filings per 100,000 population under this proposal as
they would under the proposal to abolish diversity jurisdiction. Similarly, except for the District of Columbia, the states that would receive a disproportionate number of filings per judge under the proposal to eliminate diversity jurisdiction also would receive disproportionately large filings per judge if the ability of in-state plaintiffs to file in federal court were eliminated. (These states are South Carolina, Oklahoma, Hawaii, Mississippi and Massachusetts.)
3. Effects of the New Law Raising the Federal Diversity Jurisdiction

## Limit to $\$ 50,000$

Raising the federal jurisdiction limit to $\$ 50,000$ in 1987 would have transferred an estimated 25,810 federal diversity filings to state courts. Because about a third of the filings in U.S. District Court do not list dollar amount-in-controversy, estimates were based on the data that were available and upon national averages in states which had insufficient data to make estimates. If the estimates are correct, about a third of all diversity cases filed in federal courts in FY 1987 involved amounts-in-controversy of $\$ 50,000$ or less. This ratio varied greatly among states. In Puerto Rico and Mississippi only $15 \%$ of all filings were for amounts less than $\$ 50,000$, but in Nevada and Illinois over $60 \%$ of all diversity filings had amounts-in-controversy of less than $\$ 50,000$. The Illinois figure may be unusually high because of the large proportion of real property filings in the Northern District of Illinois.

South Carolina, Pennsylvania, Nevada, Hawaii, and Illinois would have received a disproportionate share of diversity filings per judge. Nevada, Pennslyvania, Florida, and Hawail would have received a disproportionate share of diversity filings per 100,000 population under the proposal to increase jurisdictional limits.

Unlike the other two proposals which would transfer more tort filings than contract filings, raising the federal jurisdiction limit to $\$ 50,000$ is expected to transfer more contract filings than tort filings to state courts. Idaho, Alabama and Kentucky are expected to receive the largest percentage increase in tort cases under this new law.

Considering the three measures together (filings per population, filings per judge, and percentage of increase in state tort filings), Hawaif, Pennsylvania and perhaps Oklahoma will be the states disproportionately affected by any change in diversity jurisdiction. Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and the District of Columbia would receive a disproportionate number of filings under proposals to abolish diversity jurisdiction or to bar in-state plaintiffs from filing in federal court. Under the new law raising the amount-in-controversy limit to $\$ 50,000$, Nevada, Texas, and perhaps Illinois might expect to receive a disproportionately high number of diversity filings. Only when FY 1990 data are reported will it be possible to determine if the decrease in number of federal cases under $\$ 50,000$ is as great as predicted, or whether plaintiffs will be able to increase the amount demanded to sufficiently meet the new federal juridictional limit. In either event, the estimates presented in this report provide a baseline against which to measure changes in state court filing patterns.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Any research endeavor requires the concatenation of intellectual and physical resources. In this effort, I would like to express my appreciation to the State Justice Institute for their financial support of the Diversity Transfer Project and to David Tevelin, Director of the State Justice Institute and Project Officer for this Project, for his assistance in providing the resources and support necessary to complete this work. David Cook, Chief of the Statistical Analysis and Reports Division for the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, not only provided the data tapes upon which the analysis was based, but did special runs of other data, including the proportion of trials completed in U.S. District Courts in 1987, upon which the analysis depended. Beyond the technical assistance, Mr. Cook was always ready to provide telephone consultations to discuss peculiarities in the data. This Project literally could not have been done without his help.

Although he did not join the Project staff until December of 1988 , Craig Boersema quickly reviewed the work that had been done and participated in the discussions of which general jurisdiction judges to count when determining filings per judge and which state tort and contract figures to use. He produced the charts and tables used in this report. Darren Burns, a second-year law student at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary, was with the Project from the start and a constant source of inspiration. His natural curiosity led him to produce many alternative tables, graphs, and hypotheses, and his ebullient personality never let us get discouraged when brilliant ideas did not work out empirically.

Three consultants to the Project, Maurice Rosenberg, Harold R. Medina Professor of Procedural Jurisprudence of Columbia University, Marc Galanter, Evjue-Bascom Professor of Law of the University of Wisconsin, and Joel Grossman, Professor of Political Science and Law at the University of Wisconsin reviewed the first draft of this manuscript. Their thoughtful and reasoned suggestions greatly improved the quality of this report. NCSC President Edward McConnell reviewed the second draft of this manuscript and made many helpful recommendations including the reorganization of the executive summary and the summary of effects of diversity transfer on individual states. Dr. Geoff Gallas, Director of Research for the National Center for State Courts (NCSC), was responsible for making many refinements in the proposal that guided the current research. He was particularly insistent that the 1987 data be placed in a context of other years to ensure that the year chosen for analysis was not peculiar in any way. NCSC staff Dr. Roger Hanson, Dr. David Rottman, and Harry Swegle read an earlier draft of this manuscript and made many useful suggestions. Larry Polansky, Executive Officer of the District of Columbia Courts, and J. Denis Moran, Director of State Courts in Wisconsin, provided several insights on the effects of the potential transfer on their jurisdictions as well as a review of the manuscript as a whole. H. Stuart Cunningham, Clerk of Court for the Northern District of Illinois, explained the larger number of real property cases in Illinois and clarified other discrepancies. Carol Flango assisted the Project effort by checking and cross-checking figures produced from different data sets and by compiling Appendices D and E. Don Hayward of the College of William and Mary downloaded the tape containing data supplied by U.S. Administrative Office of Court to 12 floppy disks so data could be analyzed on National Center's personal computers. Jane Raynes typed and retyped the manuscript several times as new ideas were tried. My appreciation to all of you is gratefully acknowledged.
V. E. Flango

## Chapter I

## Introduction

Federal jurisdiction based upon "controversies between citizens of different States" and "between a State; or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects" arises from Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Proposals to curtail or abolish federal jurisdiction in cases between citizens of different states have been made ever since diversity jurisdiction was conferred on federal courts by the Judiciary Act of $1789 .{ }^{1}$

Organizations and individuals have taken a variety of positions on the transfer of diversity jurisdiction. Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Former Chief Justice Warren E. Burger have argued strongly for the elimination of diversity jurisdiction. ${ }^{2}$ The Judicial Conference of the United States, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Conference of Chief Justices, and the American Law Institute have passed resolutions supporting the curtailment or elimination of federal diversity jurisdiction. ${ }^{3}$

Associate Justice Antonin Scalia contends that elimination of diversity jurisdiction would remove the most challenging cases from the federal courts, and therefore prefers the alternative of substantially raising jurisdictional limits. ${ }^{4}$ The American Bar Association and most trial lawyers' associations favor retaining diversity jurisdiction in federal courts. Researchers at MATHTECH concluded that, "It is not too great a simplification to say that public and private sectors are now joined in issue over diversity jurisdiction." ${ }^{5}$

Despite the length of time various proposals to abolish or curtail diversity jurisdiction have been debated, the amount of empirical evidence upon which the U.S. Congress, state court judges, and legislators have to make decisions remains limited. Congress needs information to help decide
whether legislation is required and which alternative proposals for the abolition or curtailment of diversity jurisdiction will achieve their objectives; state court justices and state legislators need information in order to formulate their positions on the potential transfer based upon knowledge of how their states would be affected, and attorneys need information to help them estimate the effects of the transfer on their practices. Judge Bernard Meyer of the New York Court of Appeals considers the lack of empirical research on the impact of federal legislation on state courts (and vice versa) surprising "... in view of the intensive debate in recent years over the removal of diversity cases from federal courts."6 A. The Debate Over Diversity: Bias Against Out-Of-State Residents

Historically, bias against out-of-state litigants has been cited as the basic reason for retaining diversity jurisdiction in federal courts ever since 1809 when Chief Justice John Marshall said that the Constitution 'entertains apprehensions' that local courts are biased in favor of local citizens. Despite assurances from distinguished people, such as Professor Maurice Rosenberg of Columbia University School of Law who contends that many "hard working judges and thoughtful academics believe those fears of hometown favoritism are not really a problem today,"7 Marshall's "apprehension" of the "hometown effect" is echoed today. Attorney Robert Dames, for example, states that Rosenberg's assurance of no hometown favoritism may be true for metropolitan areas, but "this is not the reality for most attorneys in most parts of the country."8 Surveys designed to determine whether fear of prejudice was a major factor in lawyer's choice of forum have come to conflicting conclusions. Sixty percent of Virginia lawyers cited potential prejudice as a reason for their choice of federal court, and 40 percent of 74 attorneys representing out-of-state clients in federal cases found fear of local bias a consideration in choice of forum. ${ }^{9}$ On the other hand, only
twelve percent of the 82 Wisconsin lawyers cited "local bias against non-resident client" as a factor in their choice of forum. ${ }^{10}$ In the best designed of these surveys, Kristin Bumiller found that fear of bias against out-of-state clients influenced the decision to use federal courts in Milwaukee and in Columbia, South Carolina. Equally striking, was the relative unimportance of perceived local bias in Los Angeles and Philadelphia.:' The proponents of diversity divestiture argue that bias against out-of-state parties is unlikely in modern times and whatever biases exist against out-of-state parties result from prejudices, such as those against large corporations, that have nothing to do with a litigant's citizenship. ${ }^{12}$ She was also able to isolate anti-corporate sentiment from local favoritism as separate influences on choice of forum. Bumiller interprets her data not as less of an attempt by out-of-state plaintiffs to avoid local bias but as a preference for the tandards of federal court justice. ${ }^{13}$ Nevertheless, this basic concern over bias against out-of-state residents permeates the other arguments against the transfer of federal diversity of citizenship jurisdiction: concerns over the comparative quality of state and federal courts, concerns over federalism, and concerns over federal workload.

1. Concerns Over Comparative Quality of State and Federal Courts

Some commentators believe that the quality of justice in federal courts is better because federal courts have more qualified judges, less congestion, and better rules of procedure. In her survey of attorneys from four federal districts, Kristen Bumiller found preference for perceived higher quality of federal judges an important factor in choice of forum in all districts, but especially in the two more rural districts. ${ }^{14}$ The counter-argument is that state courts have improved, and many are now on par with and less congested than the federal courts. In particular, proponents
of the transfer of diversity jurisdiction stress that procedural rules in most states now follow the federal rules of procedure.
2. Concerns Over Federalism and Restricting Choice of Forum

A corollary argument reilating to quality of justice is the benefit to the legal system in having cross-fertilization between federal and state courts. Those who favor retaining diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts contend that concurrent jurisdiction produces an interaction and encourages state and federal systems to borrow from each other, to their mutual benefit. Others have argued that regardless of whether diversity exists, many lawyers will continue to practice in both systems and thereby provide the desired interaction. Indeed, an extreme form of the argument would be that the availability of a federal alternative creates a disincentive for state courts to improve their performance.

Opponents of change in diversity jurisdiction argue that litigants ought to have a choice of forum. Eichner contends that lawyers should be able to choose the court system that can make the decisions more quickly. ${ }^{15}$ Using an experimental design to test the reactions of 977 attorneys to several factors that might influence choice of forum, Perlstein found that court congestion was the only variable to influence significantly the choice of forum. ${ }^{16}$ Bumiller also found avoidance of delay a critical variable in choice of forum. Attorneys in her Philadelphia and Los Angeles samples ranked "faster disposition" and "court calendar more current" as the two most critical factors in choosing federal courts. These two factors were less important to attorneys in the more rural Milwaukee. Wisconsin and Columbia, South Carolina samples. ${ }^{17}$ Proponents of the transfer observe that forum shopping also allows defendants to choose the slowest system, rather than the one that would resolve the dispute most expeditiously. involve the application of state law, not federal law, and therefore diversity cases should be decided by state courts. Butler and Eure observe that matters at issue in diversity cases:
...are generally questions of private right and duty--tort and contract matters that arise from the everyday relationships among citizens. The federal government, either from lack of power or lack of interest, does not regulate these interests. ${ }^{13}$
3. Concerns Over Federal Workload

One major impetus for transferring diversity cases to state courts is concern over increasing federal court caseloads. Proponents of the transfer argue that diversity cases constitute too large a proportion of the federal caseloads, especially since they required a large proportion of trials and consume a disproportionately high percentage of judge time. ${ }^{19}$ The rationale is that the workload could be spread over a larger number of state court judges. Indeed, Justice Frankfurter succinctly summed up the argument by saying that "An Act for the elimination of diversity jurisdiction could fairly be called an Act for the relief of federal courts."20

## B. Objectives of This Research

Because the Federal Judicial Center has conducted research on the effects of the abolition or curtailment of diversity jurisdiction on federal courts, ${ }^{21}$ research on the impact on state courts is especially important. A 1978 .study by Victor Flango and Nora Blair of the National Center for State Courts found that all states would not be affected equally by a transfer of federal diversity jurisdiction--some states would receive a disproportionate share. ${ }^{22}$ The major research question to be addressed in this project is: How will the caseloads removed from federal courts be distributed among state courts if diversity
jurisdiction is curtailed or eliminated? Related to this is the question of how the dramatic increase in diversity cases filed--an increase of some $60 \%$ since $1980^{23}$--affects the potential distribution of diversity cases among states.

A remarkable number of challenges to diversity jurisdiction have been made since the first concerted challenge arose in Congress in the 1870's, but the number of proposed alternatives between total abolition and complete retention in federal courts has increased. Robert Feidler, Director of Legislation and Public Affairs for the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, said "Creative approaches are being made. There are probably a dozen viable options out there now, where 10 years ago, there weren't."24 Because it would be extremely difficult to evaluate the impact of all possible diversity jurisdiction proposals, this research will focus on the three most prominent at the time this research was initiated: (1) abolishing diversity jurisdiction completely; (2) barring private plaintiffs from invoking federal diversity jurisdiction in states with which they have substantial ties; and (3) raising the jurisdictional limit.

1. Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction

Total elimination of diversity jurisdiction is the most radical proposal. It was recommended as a way to achieve greater judicial efficiency by the Pound Commission in 1914. ${ }^{25}$ In 1932, Senator George Norris of Nebraska introduced a bill to abolish diversity jurisdiction completely. ${ }^{26}$ Although other bills were introduced in 1979 and 1983, and, as recently as 1986, the Judicial Conterence of the United States included abolition of diversity jurisdiction in a series of recommendations made in response to Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation
(March, 1986). ${ }^{27}$ The Reagan administration supported the complete abolition of diversity jurisdiction. ${ }^{28}$
2. Barring In-State Plaintiff-Initiated Diversity Actions

The rules for determining state citizenship are complex. An individual is a citizen of his state of domicile, and before 1958 corporations were considered citizens only of their state or country of incorporation. In July of 1958, Congress added section 1332(c) to the federal diversity statute which treated corporations as a citizen both of any state of incorporation and the site of its principal place of business. Under the law in effect at the time the research was conducted, a plaintiff could invoke diversity jurisdiction if the suit was between citizens of different states and the amount-in-controversy exceeded $\$ 10,000$. Under the same circumstances, an out-of-state defendant, but not an in-state defendant, could remove the case from state to federal courts. Diversity jurisdiction is not avallable if any defendant and any plaintiff are citizens of the same state. Thus, a plaintiff can prevent a case from going to federal district court by including a defendant from his state as party to the suit.

The American Law Institute, after an eight year study, proposed to limit diversity jurisdiction to litigants who lack substantial ties to the forum state. ${ }^{29}$ The reporters' commentary argued that an in-state plaintiff "can hardly be heard to ask the federal government to spare him from litigation in the courts of his own state." ${ }^{30}$ Operationally, this proposal would restrict venue by precluding plaintiffs from invoking diversity jurisdiction in their home state or where they have had their principal place of business or employment for more than two years. The U.S. Judicial Conference endorsed this proposal in 1976.
3. Raising the Jurisdictional Limit

The least extensive proposal would raise the jurisdictional
limits for amount-in-controversy in federal courts. In March, 1986, U.S. Representative Robert $W$. Kastenmeier introduced two bills that would limit diversity jurisdiction. In 1988, the first of them, H.R. 4314 which raised the jurisdictional amount under Section 1332 to $\$ 50,000$, was passed. Section 1332 presently "excludes interest and costs from consideration in determining the amount-in-controversy," but attorneys' fees are not excluded. ${ }^{31}$ Title II, Section 201 of Public Law 100-702 will take effect "on or after the 180th date of enactment," which means that all diversity cases where the amount-in-controversy is less than $\$ 50,000$ will go to state courts after May 18, 1989. (The other bill, H.R. 4315, would have raised the jurisdictional amount to $\$ 25,000$ and would have provided venue rules for certain cases arising out of mass torts).

Predicting the impact of a change in jurisdictional amount is hazardous, because the amount demanded is often arbitrary and the dollar amount demanded could simply be increased. ${ }^{32}$ Federal rules pertaining to amount-in-controversy are quite liberal, with the amount determined "...from the complaint itself, unless it appears or is in some way shown that the amount stated in the complaint is not claimed 'in good faith'."33 The flexibility of the dollar amount demanded depends upon the legal theory upon which the claim is based. For example, "pain and suffering" in tort cases and punitive damages are subject to uncertainty and are, eherefore, more malleable than complaints in which damages are determined more mechanically, as in many contract cases. Presently, 28 U.S.C. §1332 authorizes cost sanctions if the plaintiff falls to recover the minimum amount. The suit can be dismissed if there is evidence that
an attorney increased the amount of a plaintiff's state court claim simply to get the suit into federal court. ${ }^{34}$

The purpose of this research is to supply empirical evidence on the actual impact on states of the abolition or curtailment of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. The amount of additional case burden added to each state will be estimated not only by the raw number of filings added but also by the proportion and complexity of cases added.

Where data availability permits, the impact on states of the transfer of diversity jurisdiction will be measured ity:

- the number of cases estimated to be transferred to each state in relation to:
--size of population
--number of general jurisdiction judges
--number of torts and contracts currently filed in state courts;
- the complexity of cases transferred to each state --proportion of torts to contracts --proportion of jury trials.

The next chapter discusses methodological issues that may affect conclusions drawn in this research. Chapter III will discuss the consequences for states of eliminating federal diversity jurisdiction completely; Chapter IV will examine the consequences for states of closing federal courts to in-state plaintiffs, i.e. barring private plaintiffs from invoking diversity jurisdiction in states with which they have substantial ties. Chapter $V$ will discuss the effects on states of the recently-passed law raising the federal jurisdictional limit to $\$ 50,000$. Chapter VI will present contrasts among the three plans and draw conclusions about the overall effects on states.

## C. Limitations and Future Directions

Diversity jurisdiction is expected to have a differential effect on the filings of different state courts. It may have a negligible effect
on some state courts and a devastating effect on others. The starting point for this research was that one case eliminated from federal courts would result in one case being added to the state courts. This assumption is an oversimplification to be refined in the later stages of this research, but permits the impact of the transfer to be estimated directly. Most observers believe that the mix of cases, type and number of parties to the suit, methods of disposition, and case processing times differ between federal and state courts. The mix of cases, for example, more product liability and fewer auto tort cases in federal courts, undoubtedly affects the likelihood of a trial and the time necessary to process cases. To the extent that cases to be transferred are similar to cases already being handled by state courts, estimates based upon federal diversity filings will be accurate. To the extent that cases to be transferred are different, the estimates made in this research will be less accurate, and will probably underestimate the impact on states. Similarly, to the extent that one federal court action, such as an airline accident involving passengers from different states, could result in multiple original actions in state courts, the impact of any change in diversity jurisdiction in states will be underestimated. The effect of a possible transfer may depend upon the degree to which state courts receiving the cases are already congested. Using data from the Civil Litigation Research Project, Bumiller measured the comparative disposition rates of federal diversity cases and state "diversity-like" cases with amounts in controversy over $\$ 10,000$. She found no significant differences in rates of disposition between federal and state courts in Columbia, South Carolina, but faster overall termination rates for federal courts in Los Angeles and Philadelphia, and faster termination rates for state courts in Milwaukee. ${ }^{35}$ Adding cases to state courts
with a large backlog of pending cases and comparatively long time intervals between filings and disposition will have more serious consequences than rechanneling cases to trial courts with small backlogs and short processing times.

In effect, then, the second phase of this research will determine the extent to which the state-level findings of this study apply to the court-level as well. Using specific courts of general jurisdiction, rather than all courts in a state, will permit research to determine the relationship between tort and contract filings in state courts and federal courts. Future research may be necessary to more explicitly estimate the amount of both judicial and non-judicial personnel time necessary to dispose of diversity cases. The question of the states' capacity to handle the extra work is considered indirectly in measures of filings per judge, but the specific ability of each state to respond to the additional case burden is beyond the scope of this research.

The reader will note that all of the research envisioned so far provides information to decisionmakers on how the various plans for the transfer of federal diversity jurisdiction might affect the state courts. The arguments for and against the transfer of federal diversity jurisdiction, not as easily subjected to empirical analysis, have been left for later analysis. The arguments relating to the relative quality of federal and state courts, for example, have both subjective and objective components. Apart from the objective measures of "quality," however, are the subjective perceptions that may induce an attorney to file in state or federal court. These too can be measured by a survey of lawyers' attitudes toward federal and state courts, but this task is beyond the scope of this research. Similarly, the general concern over bias is not explicitly addressed in this research. Although this concern
too may have a perceptual component that can be measured by a survey of attorneys' attitudes, bias may also be estimated by a closer examination of case outcomes. Once the impact of the transfer of diversity jurisdiction on state courts is known, the debate over the impact of new case filings on state courts should be settled and refocused on the more subjective quality of justice issues.
A. Increase in Diversity Filings

In 1941 there were 7,286 diversity cases filed in federal courts, 20,524 cases in 1956, and 31,675 cases in 1976 . Figure 1 shows the dramatic increase to 68,224 filings in federal diversity filings between 1976 and 1988. This increase helps explain why the issue of diversity jurisdiction comes up whenever federal workload is discussed. Despite the increase in total diversity filings, however, the proportion of diversity cases filed in U.S. District Court has remained relatively constant during the past 13 years (see Figure 2).

In his analysis of changing federal court caseloads between 1960 and 1986, Marc Galanter noted the dramatic increase of both tort and contract cases filed under diversity jurisdiction. ${ }^{36}$ Figure 3 shows the increase in U.S. District Court tort and contract filings. All contract filings grew at an annual rate of some five percent (compared to the tort growth rate of three percent), but diversity contract filings had an even more impressive annual growth rate of $8.5 \%$--more than two and a half times the $3.2 \%$ growth rate of diversity tort filings. Figure 4 shows the relative proportion of tort and contract diversity filings. In 1960, only $29 \%$ of the contracts filings were based on diversity jurisdiction; by 1986, diversity cases made up $67 \%$ of all contract filings. ${ }^{37}$

Table 1 lists the total number of diversity case: filed per state in FY 1976, 1977, 1986, 1987, and 1988. Because there is a relationship between the size of population and caseloads generally, ${ }^{36}$ it is not unreasonable to expect a relationship between population and number of diversity cases expected to be filed. The correlation between the two is high and positive (.83). States are listed in population

Figure 1
Diversity Filings in U.S. District Court


Source: Administrative Office of U.S.
Courts

## Figure 2 <br> Diversity Filings Compared To Total Civil Filings



Source: Administrative Office of U.S.
Courts

## Tort and Contract Cases



SOURCE: Marc Galanter, "The Life and Times of the Big Six; or, The Federal Courts Since the Good 01d Days," 1988 Wisconsin Law Review 921.

## Percent Torts and Contracts Cases



[^0]| STATES | 1976 | 1277 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| (In Population Order) |  |  |  |  |  |
| California | 1535 | 1612 | 3896 | 4224 | 3844 |
| New York | 2864 | 2693 | 4701 | 5521 | 4931 |
| Texas | 1917 | 1854 | 4492 | 5564 | 4500 |
| Florida | 1130 | 966 | 1671 | 1807 | 1942 |
| Pennsylvania | 2349 | 2661 | 5414 | 5668 | 7904 |
| Illinois | 1688 | 1593 | 4271 | 5574 | 5302 |
| Ohio | 946 | 890 | 1469 | 1526 | 2274 |
| Michigan | 1081 | 1077 | 2183 | 2156 | 2080 |
| New Jersey | 823 | 823 | 1826 | 2043 | 2078 |
| North Carolina | 399 | 330 | 612 | 645 | 652 |
| Georgia | 1226 | 1220 | 2048 | 1975 | 1891 |
| Virginia | 804 | 869 | 1265 | 1489 | 1662 |
| Massachusetts | 604 | 611 | 1384 | 12.46 | 1156 |
| Indiana | 728 | 834 | 1414 | 1194 | 1076 |
| Missouri | 745 | 826 | 1649 | 1458 | 1384 |
| Tennessee | 735 | 747 | 1327 | 1265 | 1662 |
| Wisconsin | 259 | 204 | 480 | 432 | 440 |
| Washington | 276 | 202 | 445 | 574 | 449 |
| Maryland | 449 | 411 | 1049 | 1040 | 1005 |
| Louisiana | 1103 | 1174 | 2621 | 2785 | 2646 |
| Minnesota | 386 | 385 | 673 | 494 | 539 |
| Alabama | 988 | 967 | 1394 | 1422 | 1477 |
| Kentucky | 369 | 394 | 947 | 812 | 811 |
| South Carolina | 908 | 958 | 1092 | 1078 | 1203 |
| Arizona | 233 | 251 | 435 | 418 | 594 |
| Colorado | 467 | 335 | 731 | 520 | 596 |
| Puerto Rico | 337 | 382 | 237 | 303 | 484 |
| Oklahoma | 788 | 856 | 2162 | 2035 | 1782 |
| Connecticut | 273 | 277 | 920 | 1295 | 859 |
| Iowa | 234 | 236 | 385 | 378 | 1237 |
| Oregon | 384 | 307 | 526 | 555 | 538 |
| Mississippi | 747 | 794 | 2299 | 1786 | 1451 |
| Kansas | 484 | 545 | 634 | 609 | 552 |
| Arkansas | 473 | 469 | 850 | 884 | 797 |
| West Virginia | 304 | 332 | 591 | 608 | 644 |
| Utah | 160 | 128 | 371 | 397 | 361 |
| Nebraska | 229 | 233 | 353 | 344 | 326 |
| New Mexico | 281 | 235 | 418 | 463 | 438 |
| Maine | 97 | 90 | 174 | 185 | 160 |
| Hawaii | 133 | 155 | 400 | 607 | 726 |
| New Hampshire | 195 | 188 | 286 | 240 | 241 |
| Idaho | 101 | 107 | 230 | 187 | 211 |
| Rhode Island | 133 | 172 | 269 | 313 | 355 |
| Nevada | 154 | 135 | 550 | 549 | 458 |
| Montana | 135 | 131 | 393 | 397 | 379 |
| South Dakota | 98 | 99 | 178 | 182 | 142 |
| North Dakota | 62 | 76 | 144 | 120 | 95 |
| Delaware | 104 | 91 | 167 | 201 | 190 |
| District of Columbia | 477 | 427 | 1131 | 1060 | 1256 |
| Vermont | 120 | 121 | 137 | 134 | 123 |
| Alaska | 69 | 88 | 157 | 143 | 162 |
| Hyoming | 91 | 117 | 170 | 216 | 156 |
| TOTALS | 31675 | 31678 | 63671 | 67121 | 68221 |

order throughout this report to enable the reader to see the connection between population and diversity filings. ${ }^{39}$ If the number of federal diversity cases were proportionate to size of population, diversity filing figures should be arranged from largest to smallest. In other words, California should have the largest number of diversity filings and Wyoming should have the smallest. To the extent that diversity filings do not follow this descending pattern, a disproportionately larger or smaller share of diversity cases are now going to federal courts and would potentially go to state courts if diversity jurisdiction were transferred. For example, on the basis of population size, California should have more diversity case filings than Texas. The fact that California has fewer diversity filings than Texas causes speculation of why California has fewer filings than expected, but also means that estimates of filings based on population will overstate the number of diversity cases filed in California.
B. Is the 1987 Diversity Data Set Unusual?

Three tests were used to ensure that the findings from this research using data from FY 1987 were not an artifact of the particular year chosen for analysis: intercorrelation of diversity filings between years, examination of change in state share of diversity filings over time, and change of ratio of tort and contract cases per state.

Diversity filings are highly correlated among years. The correlation between the FY 1987 diversity filings and those in FY 1977 is .95. The correlation between filings in FY 1986 and FY 1987 is . 99 (the correlation between FY 1988 and FY 1987 filings is .96). These correlations indicate that FY 1987 diversity data are similar to filing patterns in recent years. Accordingly, findings based on FY 1987 data should be generalizable to other recent years as well.

A second way to determine if 1987 data are peculiar is to determine each state's share of the total number of diversity cases. Table 2 shows the percentage of total filings that would fall to each state if diversity jurisdiction were eliminated completely. The proportions do not change too much from year to year. (A logarithmic transformation which would tend to spread out the smaller values could be used here if the measurement of percent of change over time were the purpose of these calculations.) The largest change over the ten year period between FY 1977 and FY 1987 is in Illinois, which had $5 \%$ of the total diversity filings in FY 1977 and $8.3 \%$ of the filings in FY 1987. There was a 2.4\% change in the Texas share of the diversity filings, a $1.4 \%$ change in the South Carolina share, a $1.2 \%$ change in the Pennsylvania share, and a 1.1\% change in the Connecticut share over that same ten year time span. The variation in share of total diversity cases filed in the other states was less than one percent. This is another indicator that conclusions based on FY 1987 data will apply to other years as well. The large increase in proportion of diversity filings in Pennsylvania between FY 1987 and $F Y$ 1988 however, suggests that state-specific generalizations based on FY 1987 data be made with extreme caution.

A third way to examine the data in context is to look at the differences in numbers of tort and contract cases in recent years $F Y$ 1986, 1987, and 1988. Table 3 shows that the numbers are fairly consistent in recent years. Contract cases are very consistent during the three year period (all correlations are over .99); tort cases somewhat less so (the correlation between fiscal years 1986 and 1987 is .96, and between fiscal years 1987 and 1988 is .87). Note, however, that in FY 1987, Texas had almost a thousand more tort cases than in either FY 1986 or FY 1988. On the other hand, the large increase in tort cases in

## proporiion Of diversity filings by state for selected years

| STATES | 1976 | 1977 | 1986 | 1987 | 1288 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California | 4.85 | 5.09 | 6.12 | 6.29 | 5.63 |
| New York | 9.04 | 8.50 | 7.38 | 8.22 | 7.23 |
| Texas | 6.05 | 5.85 | 7.05 | 8.29 | 6.60 |
| Florida | 3.57 | 3.05 | 2.62 | 2.69 | 2.85 |
| Pennsylvania | 7.42 | 8.40 | 8.50 | 8.44 | 11.59 |
| Illinois | 5.33 | 5.03 | 6.71 | 8.30 | 7.77 |
| Ohio | 2.99 | 2.81 | 2.31 | 2.27 | 3.33 |
| Michigan | 3.41 | 3.40 | 3.43 | 3.21 | 3.05 |
| New Jersey | 2.60 | 2.60 | 2.87 | 3.04 | 3.05 |
| North Carolina | 1.26 | 1.04 | . 96 | . 96 | . 96 |
| Georgia | 3.87 | 3.85 | 3.22 | 2.94 | 2.77 |
| Virginia | 2.54 | 2.74 | 1.99 | 2.22 | 2.44 |
| Massachusetts | 1.91 | 1.93 | 2.17 | 1.86 | 1.69 |
| Indiana | 2.30 | 2.63 | 2.22 | 1.78 | 1.58 |
| Missouri | 2.35 | 2.61 | 2.59 | 2.17 | 2.03 |
| Tenriessee | 2.32 | 2.36 | 2.08 | 1.88 | 2.44 |
| Wisconsin | . 82 | . 64 | . 75 | . 64 | . 64 |
| Washington | . 87 | . 64 | . 70 | . 86 | . 66 |
| Maryland | 1.42 | 1.30 | 1.65 | 1.55 | 1.47 |
| Louisiana | 3.48 | 3.71 | 4.12 | 4.15 | 3.88 |
| Minnesota | 1.22 | 1.22 | 1.06 | . 74 | . 79 |
| Alabama | 3.12 | 3.05 | 2.19 | 2.12 | 2.16 |
| Kentucky | 1.16 | 1.24 | 1.49 | 1.21 | 1.19 |
| South Carolina | 2.87 | 3.02 | 1.72 | 1.61 | 1.76 |
| Arizona | . 74 | . 79 | . 68 | . 62 | . 87 |
| Colorado | 1.47 | 1.06 | 1.15 | . 77 | . 87 |
| Puerto Rico | 1.06 | 1.21 | . 45 | . 45 | . 71 |
| Oklahoma | 2.49 | 2.70 | 3.40 | 3.03 | 2.61 |
| Connecticut | . 86 | . 87 | 1.44 | 1.93 | 1.26 |
| Iowa | . 74 | . 74 | . 60 | . 56 | 1.81 |
| Oregon | 1.21 | . 97 | . 83 | . 83 | . 79 |
| Mississippi | 2.36 | 2.51 | 3.61 | 2.66 | 2.13 |
| Kansas | 1.53 | 1.72 | 1.00 | . 91 | . 81 |
| Arkansas | 1.49 | 1.48 | 1.33 | 1.32 | 1.17 |
| West Virginia | . 96 | 1.05 | . 93 | . 91 | . 94 |
| Utah | . 51 | . 40 | . 58 | . 59 | . 53 |
| Nebraska | . 72 | . 74 | . 55 | . 51 | . 48 |
| New Mexico | . 89 | . 74 | . 66 | . 69 | . 64 |
| Maine | . 31 | . 28 | . 27 | . 28 | . 23 |
| Hawai | . 42 | . 49 | . 63 | . 90 | 1.06 |
| New Hampshire | . 62 | . 59 | . 45 | . 36 | . 35 |
| Idaho | . 32 | . 34 | . 36 | . 28 | . 31 |
| Rhode Island | . 42 | . 54 | . 42 | . 47 | . 52 |
| Nevada | . 49 | . 43 | . 86 | . 82 | . 67 |
| Montana | . 43 | . 41 | . 62 | . 59 | . 56 |
| South Dakota | . 31 | . 31 | . 28 | . 27 | . 21 |
| North Dakota | . 20 | . 24 | . 23 | . 18 | . 14 |
| Delaware | . 33 | . 29 | . 26 | . 30 | 28 |
| District of Columbia | 1.51 | 1.35 | 1.78 | 1.58 | 1.84 |
| Vermont | . 38 | . 38 | . 22 | . 20 | . 18 |
| Alaska | . 22 | . 28 | . 25 | . 21 | . 24 |
| Hyoming | . 29 | . 37 | . 27 | . 32 | . 23 |


| States | $\begin{array}{r} 1986 \\ \text { Torts } \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1987 \\ \text { Torts } \\ \hline \end{array}$ | 1988 <br> Torts | $\begin{gathered} 1986 \\ \text { Contracts } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1987 \\ \text { Contracts } \end{gathered}$ | 1988 <br> Contracts |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California | 1081 | 1224 | 1015 | 2768 | 2928 | 2770 |
| New York | 1647 | 2482 | 1908 | 2992 | 2969 | 2944 |
| Texas | 2570 | 3428 | 2258 | 1837 | 2049 | 2163 |
| Florida | 688 | 687 | 654 | 943 | 1087 | 1244 |
| Pennsylvania | 2959 | 2938 | 4954 | 2373 | 2649 | 2861 |
| Illinais | 931 | 1069 | 349 | 1947 | 2008 | 1909 |
| Ohio | 781 | 802 | 1580 | 669 | 698 | 677 |
| Michigan | 936 | 982 | 935 | 1218 | 1145 | 1108 |
| New Jersey | 796 | 855 | 897 | 1011 | 1161 | 1162 |
| North Carolina | 207 | 213 | 261 | 388 | 423 | 379 |
| Georgia | 974 | 980 | 945 | 1050 | 959 | 924 |
| Virginia | 540 | 768 | 776 | 695 | 692 | 839 |
| Massachusetts | 866 | 724 | 630 | 498 | 499 | 507 |
| Indiana | 513 | 404 | 375 | 453 | 422 | 390 |
| Missouri | 871 | 707 | 624 | 750 | 734 | 729 |
| Tennessee | 691 | 623 | 1064 | 616 | 620 | 564 |
| Wisconsin | 170 | 152 | 145 | 300 | 272 | 280 |
| Washington | 188 | 272 | 136 | 242 | 295 | 300 |
| Maryland | 567 | 523 | 560 | 473 | 510 | 424 |
| Louisiana | 1453 | 1630 | 1523 | 1093 | 1090 | 1036 |
| Minnesota | 315 | 186 | 208 | 346 | 301 | 314 |
| Alabama | 385 | 438 | 546 | 930 | 919 | 867 |
| Kentucky | 448 | 386 | 361 | 463 | 407 | 425 |
| South Carolina | 598 | 564 | 596 | 478 | 486 | 572 |
| Arizona | 147 | 141 | 270 | 283 | 273 | 305 |
| Colorado | 327 | 165 | 244 | 384 | 333 | 330 |
| Puerto Rico | 136 | 174 | 356 | 146 | 121 | 121 |
| Oklahoma | 793 | 665 | 744 | 1224 | 1245 | 955 |
| Connecticut | 578 | 698 | 349 | 331 | 571 | 476 |
| Iowa | 172 | 180 | 7038 | 194 | 178 | 189 |
| Oregon | 208 | 201 | 205 | 308 | 336 | 320 |
| Mississippi | 1503 | 1043 | 842 | 755 | 718 | 572 |
| Kansas | 266 | 248 | 233 | 354 | 328 | 307 |
| Arkansas | 428 | 467 | 376 | 379 | 397 | 375 |
| West Virginia | 305 | 290 | 346 | 273 | 286 | 280 |
| Utah | 120 | 115 | 108 | 234 | 260 | 238 |
| Nebraska | 190 | 187 | 205 | 155 | 150 | 113 |
| New Mexico | 199 | 214 | 179 | 204 | 234 | 245 |
| Maine | 106 | 128 | 98 | 62 | 53 | 62 |
| Hawai | 217 | 383 | 565 | 177 | 215 | 155 |
| New Hampshire | 187 | 143 | 134 | 97 | 90 | 96 |
| Idaho | 77 | 81 | 100 | 137 | 96 | 99 |
| Rhode Island | 131 | 142 | 178 | 132 | 160 | 170 |
| Nevada | 111 | 141 | 112 | 428 | 400 | 333 |
| Montana | 183 | 196 | 186 | 190 | 183 | 172 |
| South Dakota | 89 | 99 | 71 | 82 | 75 | 68 |
| North Dakota | 65 | 34 | 39 | 77 | 85 | 53 |
| De1aware | 98 | 110 | 114 | 65 | 89 | 73 |
| District of Columbia | 060 | 619 | 736 | 447 | 415 | 487 |
| Vermont | 82 | 84 | 64 | 50 | 49 | 57 |
| Alaska | 68 | 37 | 61 | 88 | 100 | 98 |
| Wyoming | 78 | 96 | 76 | 81 | 105 | 70 |
| TOTALS | 28699 | 30118 | 31930 | 31870 | 32868 | 32207 |

Iowa and Ohio in FY 1988, caused by the large increases in asbestos cases filed in the Southern District of Iowa and the Northern District of Ohio, make it difficult to argue that choosing the FY 1988 would have resulted in more consistency among years. Table 4 confirms the conclusions drawn from Table 3. The variations in tort filings from year to year means that the ratio of tort diversity filings to the total number of torts and contract diversity filings is more volatile than total diversity filings per state used alone.

The overall conclusion based upon data from Tables 1 through 4 is that analysis based on FY 1987 data is not peculiar to that particular year, but applies to other recent years as well.

## C. Adjustments to the Federal Data Set

Aggregate data as used above will permit a general picture of diversity trends to be painted, but specific analysis of the impact on states individual case data were required. David Cook, Chief of the Statistical Analysis and Reports Division, Administrative Office of United State Courts, provided a data tape of all diversity of citizenship cases filed in U.S. District Court during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1987. The data were examined for inconsistencies among the key variables essential to the proposed analysis: total filings, residency of plaintiff, and amount-in-controversy.

## 1. Total Filings

The total number of diversity filings data are valid. Some discrepancies may exist, but no more than are to be expected in a data set of this size. The totals in Table 1 differ slightly from those reported on Figure 1 because 3 filings from the territories of Guam, the Northern Marianas Islands, and the Virgin Islands and 27 civil rights and social security cases that slipped through the edit program used by the

## Rafio of Tort oiversity filings to total TORT AND CONTRACT OIVERSITY Filings

| STATES | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | Percent Change 86-87 | Percent Change 87-88 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California | 28.1 | 29.5 |  |  |  |
| New York | 35.5 | 45.5 | 26.8 | 1.4 | -2.6 |
| Texas | 58.3 | 62.6 | 59.1 | 10.0 | -6.2 |
| Florida | 42.2 | 38.7 | 54.1 | 4.3 | -11.5 |
| Pennsylvania | 55.5 | 52.6 | 34.4 63.4 | -3.5 | -4.3 |
| Illinois | 32.4 | 34.7 | 33.4 33.2 | -2.9 | 10.8 |
| Ohio | 53.9 | 53.5 | 70.0 | 2.4 | -1.5 |
| Michigan | 43.5 | 46.2 | 45.8 | 5.4 | 16.5 |
| New Jersey | 44.1 | 42.4 | 43.8 | 2.7 -1.6 | -. 4 |
| North Carolina | 34.8 | 33.5 | 40.8 | -1.6 | 1.2 |
| Georgia | 48.1 | 50.5 | 50.6 | -1.3 | 7.3 |
| Virginia | 43.7 | 52.6 | 48.1 | 2.4 | -4.0 |
| Massachusetts | 63.5 | 59.2 | 55.4 | -4.9 | -4.6 |
| Indiana | 53.1 | 48.9 | 49.0 | -4.2 | -3.8 |
| Missouri | 53.7 | 49.1 | 46.1 | -4.7 | -1 |
| Tennessee | 52.9 | 50.1 | 65.4 | -4.7 | -2.9 |
| Wisconsin | 36.2 | 35.9 | 34.3 | -2.8 | 15.2 |
| Washington | 43.7 | 48.0 | 31.2 | 4.3 | -1.6 |
| Maryland | 54.5 | 50.6 | 56.9 | -3.9 | -16.8 |
| Mouisiana | 57.1 | 59.9 | 59.5 | 2.9 | 6.3 |
| Minnesota | 47.7 | 38.2 | 39.9 | -9.5 | 7.4 |
|  | 29.3 | 32.3 | 38.6 | 3.0 | 6.4 |
| South Carolina | 49.2 | 48.7 | 45.9 | -. 5 | -2.8 |
| Arizona | 35.6 | 53.7 | 51.0 | -1.9 | -2.7 |
| Colorado | 44.2 | 34.1 | 47.0 | -. 1 | 13.0 |
| Puerto Rico | 48.0 | 33.1 | 42.5 | -12.9 | 9.4 |
| Oklahoma | 38.2 | 59.0 34.8 | 74.6 | 10.8 | 15.7 |
| Connecticut | 39.3 63.6 | 34.8 55.0 | 43.8 | -4.5 | 9.0 |
| Iowa | 47.0 | 55.0 50.3 | 42.3 | $-8.6$ | -12.7 |
| Oregon | 40.3 | 50.3 37.4 | 84.6 | 3.3 | 34.3 |
| Mississippi | 66.6 | 59.4 | 39.1 | -2.9 | 1.6 |
| Kansas | 66.6 42.9 | 59.2 43.1 | 59.6 | -7.3 | . 3 |
| Arkansas | 53.0 | 43.1 | 43.2 | . 2 | . 1 |
| West Virginia | 52.8 | 54.1 50.4 | 50.1 | 1.0 | -4.0 |
| Utah | 33.9 | 50.4 30.7 | 55.3 | -2.4 | 4.9 |
| Nebraska | 55.1 | 30.7 55.5 | 31.2 | -3.2 | . 6 |
| New Mexico | 49.4 | 55.5 47.8 | 64.5 | . 4. | 9.0 |
| Maine | 63.1 | 70.7 | 42.2 | -1.6 | -5.6 |
| Hawaif | 55.1 | 64.1 | 61.3 | 7.6 | -9.5 |
| New Hampshire | 65.9 | 64.1 | 78.5 | 9.0 | 14.4 |
| Idaho | 36.0 | 45.8 | 58.3 | -4.5 | -3.1 |
| Rhode Island | 49.8 | 47.8 47.0 | 50.3 | 9.8 | 4.5 |
| Nevada | 20.6 | 26.1 | 51.2 | -2.8 | 4.1 |
| Montana | 49.1 | 51.7 | 25.2 | 5.5 | -. 9 |
| South Dakota | 52.1 | 57.0 | 52.0 | 2.7 | . 2 |
| North Dakota | 45.8 | 28.6 | 42.1 | 4.9 | -5.8 |
| Delaware | 60.1 | 55.3 | 42.4 | -17.2 | 13.8 |
| District of Columbia | 59.6 | 59.9 | 61.0 | -4.9 | 5.7 |
| Vermont | 62.1 | 63.2 | 52.2 | . 2 | . 3 |
| Alaska | 43.6 | 27.0 | 32.9 | 1.0 | -10.3 |
| yoming | 49.1 | 47.8 | 38.4 52.1 | -16.6 | 11.4 |

Administrative Office of U.S. Courts were removed from this data set. The total number of diversity filings analyzed in the remaining chapters further differs from filings reported in the Annual Report from the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts because late filings are not included in the data set. Cases filed in March or April of 1986, but not sent to the Administrative Office until after July 1, 1987 must be added to the filings for the next fiscal year (July 1, 1986--June 30,1987 ) to make the inventory balance. This research has no such responsibility to balance filings and dispositions among years, and so only the 66,408 cases actually filed in FY 1987 are used in the analysis. Only these would have been filed in state courts in FY 1987 if diversity jurisdiction were modified or abolished. One possibility that arises from this strategy is that districts which file late will file late every year so that a significant number of filings will be missed. Table Al in the Methodological Appendix shows that late filings are distributed evenly among states, with the possible exception of Mississippi which submitted about $10 \%$ of its 1986 diversity cases to the U.S. Administrative Office in FY 1987. In conclusion, the slight modification of the federal data set should not affect the analysis.

## 2. Residency of Plaintiff

The quality of the residency variable, essential for determining how many plaintiffs were in-state residents, is more tenuous. Figure 5 is the Civil Cover Sheet used by the Clerks of the U.S. District Court to initiate the civil docket sheet. Item III, which applies to diversity cases only, lists citizenship of the principal parties. In cases where there are multiple plaintiffs or defendants only the first listed are coded. Residence of plaintiff is coded as follows: (1) citizen of this state; (2) citizen of another state; (3) citizen or

 shen（SEE instructions on the reverse of the form．）

## I（a）PLANTIFFS

（b）COUnty of resioence of first listed plaintiff
（EXCEPT IN US．PLAINTIFF CASES）
（c）ATTORNEYS（FIGM NAME．ADDRESS．AND TELEPHONE NUMEEA）

## DEFENDANTS

COUNTY OF RESIDENCE OF FIAST LISTED DEFENDANT
（ $N$ US．PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY）
note：in land condemnation cases．use the location of the TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED

ATTORNEYS（IF KNOWN）

## II．BASIS OF JURISDICTION

IMACE AN x IN OME BOX OMCY

コ 1 U．S．Government Plaintiff<br>こ 2 U．S．Government Defondemt<br>－ 3 Federat Oueation<br>（U．S．Govemment Not a Party）<br>－ 4 Otversity<br>（Indicate Citizenshio of Partes in Itom III）

## III．CITIENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES ，Mece wr in ome ob （For Diversmy Cases Only） <br> fOA MANTIFP WO OVE BOX FOM DEPEMOA

|  | PTP OEF |  | PTF DEF |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Chizen of Thim State | こ1 こ1 | －Ineorporanded or Principal Pisce of Buminees in This State | こ4こ |
| Citizan of Avother State | こ2 | incorperatad and Pincipel Plece of Butineas in Anotier Stente | $=5$ |
| Citisen or Subpect of a Foraign Country | 二3 3 | Foracion Mation | こ6－6 |


DO MOT CITE sumonctional starutes unesp onenarty）

subject of a foreign county; (4) incorporated or principal place of business in this state; (5) incorporated and principal place of business in another state; and (6) foreign nation. This six-fold classification scheme for plaintiffs and defendants is relatively new, having been instituted in December of 1984. The previous scheme used only four residency categories: (1) citizen of state in which case was filed; (2) incorporated in state in which case was filed; (3) foreign corporation-principal place of business in another state; (4) other non-citizen of a state in which case was filed. The possibility exists that the older coding scheme is still being used in some districts, and therefore data on residency of the plaintiff should be used cautiously. For purposes of this research, however, the key variable of in-state plaintiff ("citizen of this state") will determine how many cases would be likely to be transferred to state courts if restrictions were placed on venue. That category, coded as "1", has remained the same under both coding schemes. In their estimates of potential reduction of federal court caseloads, the U.S. Administrative Office of Courts uses only residence code 1 , because corporations may have residence in states where they are incorporated and in states with which they have substantial ties. Accordingly, the federal practice of counting only in-state citizens, rather than in-state corporations, when making estimates of federal caseload will be followed in estimating impact on state courts.

## 3. Amount-In-Controversy

Dollar amount-in-controversy is essential to determining the effect of change in jurisdictional limit on case filings. For this reason, the available data must be used, even though one-third of the diversity cases do not provide data on amount-in-controversy. Even when data are provided, it is not always possible to establish how the amount was determined. If attorneys omit the amount in controversy on the cover sheet
(Figure 5) or simply specify the amount "in excess of $\$ 10,000$," or "damages in whatever amount the court deems appropriate," the staff in the clerk of court's office may leave the "demand $\$$ " column in Item VII blank or enter $\$ 10,000$. Other common errors include aggregating plaintiffs' claims or including interest in circumstances where it cannot be counted in order to reach the $\$ 10,000$ limit. Moreover, some people do not follow precisely the instruction to report the amount in thousands and may be reporting actual amounts.

In order to determine whether or not the missing data for amount-in-controversy would affect the conclusions drawn, an effort was made to determine whether the missing data on dollar amount was distributed randomly among districts or whether there were patterns to the missing data. To answer that question, the federal amount demanded data were sorted by district and a percentage of cases with amount demanded was calculated. Table 5 shows a pattern to missing dollar demanded data by federal district. The average (mean) district reported data on dollar amount demanded for $64 \%$ of the cases filed. The presence of amount demanded data varied within states. For example, amount-in-controversy is reported for $71 \%$ of the cases in the Northern District of California, but not at all in the Central District, which has the most diversity filings.

The more populous, and presumably busiest, districts might be expected to be less likely to report amount-in-controversy data, but this does not appear to be the case. In some states with multiple districts the percentage of data present is nearly the same across districts. In Washington, for example, the more populous district reports dollar demanded data for $22 \%$ of its filings, whereas the less populous district reported dollar demanded data for $28 \%$ of its filings. The comparable figures for Virginia, another state with two federal judicial districts,

MISSSNG Data for amown-iN-CONTROVERSY BY DISTRCT

| STATES/DISTRICTS | tOTAL diversity FILINGS | $\begin{aligned} & \text { CASES } \\ & \text { REPORTING } \\ & \$ \text { AMOUNT } \end{aligned}$ | percentage of \$ AMOUNT OATA PRESENT |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California - Northern | 1224 | 872 | 71 |
| Eastern | 259 | 70 | 27 |
| Central | 2370 | 4 | 0 |
| Southern .. | 329 | 92 | 28 |
| Total ..... | 4182 | 1038 | 25 |
| New York - Northern .... | 529 | 440 | 83 |
| Eastern | 1321 | 884 | 67 |
| Southern | 3216 | 1912 | 59 |
| Western ..... | 416 | 244 | 59 |
| Total ....... | 5482 | 3480 | 63 |
| Texas - Northern ....... | 1749 | 652 | 37 |
| Eastern | 1947 | 1754 | 90 |
| Southern | 1322 | 966 | 73 |
| Western | 519 | 163 | 31 |
| Total .......... | 5537 | 3535 | 64 |
| Florida - Northern ..... | 113 | 16 |  |
| Middle | 867 | 256 | 29 |
| Southern | 807 | 416 | 51 |
| Total .. | 1787 | 688 | 39 |
| Pennsylvania - Eastern . | 4039 | 2186 | 54 |
| Middle | 552 | 492 | 89 |
| Western | 1051 | 841 | 80 |
| Total. | 5642 | 3519 | 62 |
| Illinois - Northern .... | 4922 | 4503 | 91 |
| Centrai | 200 | 157 | 79 |
| Southern | 410 | 352 | 86 |
| Total ....... | 5532 | 5012 | 91 |
| Ohio - Northern ........ | 884 | 710 | 80 |
| Southern | 619 | 445 | 72 |
| Total . | 1503 | 1157 | 77 |
| Michigan - Eastern ..... | 1826 | 621 | 34 |
| Western | 291 | 230 | 79 |
| Total . | 2117 | 851 | 40 |
| New Jersey ............. | 2025 | 379 | 19 |
| North Carolina - Eastern | 204 | 171 | 84 |
| Middle | 137 | 100 | 73 |
| Western | 303 | 216 | 71 |
| Total | 644 | 487 | 76 |
| Georgia - Northern ..... | 1287 | 874 | 68 |
| Middle ....... | 270 | 208 | 77 |
| Southern | 404 | 274 | 68 |
| Total . | 1961 | 1356 | 69 |
| Massachusetts .......... | 1233 | 966 | 78 |
| Virginia - Eastern ..... | 1124 | 863 | 77 |
| Western ..... Total..... | 356 1480 | 271 1134 | 76 |

Table 5 (continued)


Table 5 (continued)

are $77 \%$ and $76 \%$ respectively. On the other hand, federal districts within other states report very different proportions with respect to presence of amount-in-controversy data. In Michigan, the Eastern District (with $86 \%$ of the total filings) reports dollar amounts on $34 \%$ of its filings whereas the Western District (with $14 \%$ of the filings) reports dollar amounts on $79 \%$ of them. This pattern holds true for the two-district states with similar caseloads as well: Indiana $886 \%$ and 22\%) and Iowa (61\% and 27\%). In California, New York, Texas and Pennsylvania, states containing four federal judicial districts, the percentage of amount-in-controversy present varied widely. In multiple-district states having a low percentage of reported, amount-in-controversy data, districts with especially low rates of reporting do affect the state averages.

In sum, it appears that districts with high caseloads are not necessarily less likely to report amount-in-controversy data. One reason for the low reporting of amount-in-controversy in Colorado may be that the attorneys are not required to report dollar amounts demanded in state courts and so do not report dollar amounts in federal courts either. ${ }^{40}$ Whether legal culture, vigilance of court clerks or some other reason explains the pattern of missing data by district, there is no reason to believe that the amount-in-controversy data that are available is unrepresentative of the dollar-demanded data.

Now that the percentage of diversity filings without amount-incontroversy data is established, the question becomes how much missing data can be tolerated before a state must be excluded from analysis of the effects of raising the jurisdictional limit? Assuming, for example, half of the data on amount-in-controversy were missing, would the data available be distributed proportionally between torts and contracts? If
dollar amounts were available for all contract cases and unavailable for tort cases, for example, tort data may be excluded even though the overall percentage of dollar amount data available exceeded $50 \%$.

Table 6 compares the percentage of tort filings (of combined torts and contracts) with the percentage of tort cases which have data on amount-in-controversy data. If the two percentages are similar, the dollar amount data from that state is more likely to be useful in comparative analysis. For example $45 \%$ of the federal diversity filings in New York in FY 1987 were tort cases and $44 \%$ of federal filings with data on amount-in-controversy were torts, which suggests that New York's amount-in-controversy data is representative of total filings. Hawaij, Wyoming, Colorado, New Jersey, and Washington did have significantly more missing amount-in-controversy data on torts than on contracts, but the reason for this is probably the low percentage of filings that specified amount-in-controversy. All five states had dollar amount data on less than half of their filings. On the other hand, amount-in-controversy data were more likely to be present for torts in California and West Virginia. In the remaining states, the percentage of tort cases with data on amount-in-controversy data reported is close to the percentage of total cases which are torts. In other words, amount-in-controversy information is no more likely to be missing from torts than it is from contracts, which leads us to conclude that missing dollar amount demanded is not related to casetype.

Given the various proposals for raising the dollar amount demanded, the data available on amount-in-controversy were sorted into three categories: cases in which the amount demanded was $\$ 50,000$ or less; cases in which the amount sought was greater than $\$ 50,000$ but less than $\$ 100,000$, and cases in which more than $\$ 100,000$ was demanded. These

## TABLE 6

district comparisons of missing amount-in-controversy data for tort cases


|  | - | Total Diversity filinas | Tort Diversity Filings | Percentage of filings Which Are Torts | Total \$ Demand Present | Tort \$ Demand Present | Percentage of Present Iort \$ Demand | Percentage Difference |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Georgia - Northern |  |  |  | 872 | 408 |  |  |
|  | Middle |  |  |  | 208 | 112 |  |  |
|  | Southern |  |  |  | 274 | 182 |  |  |
|  | Total .. | 1961 | 977 | 50 | 1354 | 702 | 52 | +2 |
|  | Virginia - Eastern |  |  |  | 863 | 479 |  |  |
|  | Western |  |  |  | 271 | 154 |  |  |
|  | Total . | 1480 | 765 | 52 | 1134 | 633 | 56 | +4 |
|  | Massachusetts .... | 1233 | 719 | 58 | 964 | 601 | 62 | +4 |
|  | Indiana - Northern |  |  |  | 571 | 169 |  |  |
|  | Southern |  |  |  | 114 | 35 |  |  |
|  | Total ... | 1179 | 400 | 34 | 685 | 204 | 30 | -4 |
|  | Missouri - Eastern |  |  |  | 870 | 448 |  |  |
|  | Western |  |  |  | 365 | 182 |  |  |
|  | Total . | 1449 | 702 | 48 | 1235 | 630 | 51 | +3 |
|  | Tennessee - Eastern |  |  |  | 570 | 327 |  |  |
|  | Middle |  |  |  | 269 | 118 |  |  |
|  | Western |  |  |  | 171 | 94 |  |  |
|  | Total .. | 1252 | 616 | 49 | 1010 | 539 | 53 | +4 |
|  | Wisconsin - Eastern |  |  |  | 217 | 73 |  |  |
|  | Western |  |  |  | 140 | 65 |  |  |
| $\stackrel{\omega}{\sim}$ | Total .. | 430 | 152 | 35 | 357 | 138 | 39 | +4 |
|  | Washington - Eastern |  |  |  | 42 | 11 |  |  |
|  | Western |  |  |  | 94 | 31 |  |  |
|  | Total .. | 568 | 269 | 47 | 136 | 42 | 31 | -16 |
|  | Maryland | 1037 | 521 | 50 | 848 | 442 | 52 | +2 |
|  | Louisiana- Eastern |  |  |  | 1370 | 847 |  |  |
|  | Middle. |  |  |  | 291 | 163 |  |  |
|  | Western |  |  |  | 814 | 477 |  |  |
|  | Total .. | 2759 | 1616 | 59 | 2475 | 1487 | 60 | +1 |
|  | Minnesota | 491 | 184 | 37 | 266 | 106 | 40 | +3 |
|  | Alabama - Northern |  |  |  | 669 | 167 |  |  |
|  | Middle.. |  |  |  | 189 | 66 |  |  |
|  | Southern |  |  |  | 274 | 127 |  |  |
|  | Total ... | 1416 | 434 | 31 | 1132 | 360 | 32 | +1 |
|  | Kentucky - Eastern |  |  |  | 279 | 114 |  |  |
|  | Western |  |  |  | 279 | 176 |  |  |
|  | Total .. | 803 | 383 | 48 | 558 | 290 | 52 | $+4$ |

## Table 6 (continued)


$\left.\begin{array}{lrllllll}\text { Table } 6 \text { (contiriued) }\end{array}\right]$
categories were the basis of a second test for representativeness of the data.

Table 7 ranks states in order of dollar amount data present and then shows the percentage of cases in each of the three dollar categories described above. Rather than drawing conclusions based only upon data on amount-in-controversy available for each state, the number of cases filed in each of the three dollar-amount categories were estimated using the data from states that: (1) reported dollar amounts for at least half of their filings and (2) where the amount-in-controversy data present was distributed proportionately between torts and contracts. Using these two criteria together made it possible to make estimates based upon state-specific data for 39 jurisdictions.

Thirty five percent of the cases for which data were available had an amount-in-controversy of $\$ 50,000$ or less and $53 \%$ had a dollar amount demanded of over $\$ 100,000$. Data from Kansas will be used to illustrate how these relative proportions in dollar amount demanded were used to create estimates of the amount of cases under $\$ 50,000$ in each state. In Kansas, 55\% of the reported amount-in-controversy cases were for $\$ 50,000$ or less. Therefore, an estimate of $55 \%$ of the 606 diversity cases filed in Kansas, or 330 cases, were likely to be for $\$ 50,000$ or less.

Two exceptions to the criteria require explanation. Data from West Virginia was estimated even though it had more dollar demanded data available for torts than for contracts, because of the high percentage of filings (82\%) where dollar demanded data was available. Because the District of Columbia reports dollar amount demanded data for $48 \%$ of its diversity filings rather than $50 \%$, it could be excluded, but because the amount-in-controversy data was balanced between tort and contract filings, it too was included in the analysis.

ESTIMMTES OF FILINGS 以ITH AMOUT-IH-CONTROVERSY
$\$ 50,000$ OR LESS IN FY 1987

|  |  |  |  | Percentage of Cases With Amount-in-Controyersy |  |  | Estimated Number of Cases |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | States | Percentage of <br> \$ Amount Data Present | Number of Dtversity Filings. | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 50,000 \\ & \text { or Less } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 50,000 \text { to } \\ & \$ 100,000 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Over } \\ & \$ 100,000 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 50,000 \\ & \text { or Less } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \$ 50,000 \text { to } \\ & \$ 100,000 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Over } \\ & \$ 100,000 \end{aligned}$ |
|  | Illinois | 91 | 5532 | 60 | 21 | 19 | 3343 | 1140 | 1049 |
|  | Louisiana | 90 | 2759 | 20 | 11 | 69 | 547 | 311 | 1901 |
|  | Puerto Rico | 90 | 299 | 15 | 13 | 72 | 45 | 39 | 215 |
|  | Kansas | 88 | 606 | 54 | 8 | 37 | 330 | 51 | 225 |
|  | Vermont | 86 | 132 | 53 | 7 | 40 | 69 | 9 | 53 |
|  | Missourt | 85 | 1449 | 32 | 14 | 54 | 462 | 206 | 781 |
|  | Maine | 84 | 185 | 14 | 10 | 75 | 26 | 19 | 140 |
|  | Wiscons in | 83 | 430 | 34 | 15 | 51 | 148 | 64 | 218 |
|  | 0k lahoma | 83 | 2024 | 27 | 11 | 61 | 554 | 228 | 1242 |
|  | Mississippi | 83 | 1630 | 15 | 7 | 77 | 249 | 122 | 1259 |
|  | North Dakota | 83 | 119 | 48 | 7 | 44 | 58 | 8 | 53 |
|  | Maryland | 82 | 1037 | 22 | 10 | 69 | 224 | 100 | 713 |
|  | West Virginia | 82 | 604 | 24 | 11 | 65 | 142 | 68 | 393 |
|  | Tennessee | 81 | 1252 | 26 | 14 | 60 | 327 | 170 | 755 |
|  | Alabama | 80 | 1416 | 36 | 14 | 50 | 517 | 198 | 702 |
|  | Nevada | 80 | 537 | 65 | 13 | 23 | 347 | 68 | 122 |
|  | South Dakota | 79 | 180 | 23 | 13 | 64 | 42 | 23 | 115 |
|  | Massachusetts | 78 | 1233 | 19 | 13 | 68 | 239 | 157 | 837 |
|  | Ohio | 77 | 1503 | 21 | 9 | 71 | 314 | 129 | 1060 |
|  | Virginia | 77 | 1480 | 22 | 10 | 68 | 324 | 150 | 1006 |
|  | North Carolina | 76 | 644 | 51 | 14 | 35 | 329 | 91 | 223 |
|  | Arkansas | 76 | 882 | 35 | 10 | 55 | 312 | 87 | 483 |
|  | Georgia | 69 | 1961 | 28 | 12 | 60 | 547 | 237 | 1177 |
|  | Kentucky | 69 | 803 | 34 | 9 | 57 | 275 | 72 | 456 |
| $\omega$ | Idaho | 68 | 185 | 26 | 7 | 67 | 47 | 13 | 124 |
| 6 | Alaska | 68 | 139 | 43 | 12 | 45 | 60 | 16 | 63 |
|  | Utah | 65 | 392 | 39 | 13 | 48 | 153 | 52 | 187 |
|  | Texas | 63 | 5537 | 56 | 6 | 39 | 3078 | 315 | 2144 |
|  | New York | 63 | 5482 | 32 | 9 | 59 | 1759 | 493 | 3234 |
|  | Pennsylvania | 62 | 5642 | 58 | 31 | 11 | 3279 | 1753 | 612 |
|  | Rhode Island | 62 | 310 | 6 | 5 | 89 | 18 | 16 | 276 |
|  | New Mexico | 61 | 459 | 35 | 13 | 52 | 160 | 62 | 238 |
|  | Connecticut | 60 | 1289 | 34 | 13 | 54 | 434 | 163 | 692 |
|  | Indiana | 58 | 1179 | 55 | 14 | 31 | 643 | 167 | 370 |
|  | Minnesota | 54 | 491 | 46 | 11 | 44 | 223 | 54 | 214 |
|  | Arizona | 50 | 417 | 41 | 13 | 46 | 173 | 54 | 191 |
|  | Oregon | 50 | 496 | 37 | 20 | 43 | 184 | 100 | 212 |
|  | New Hampshire | 50 | 238 | 16 | 11 | 73 | 38 | 26 | 175 |
|  | District of Columbia | 48 | 1053 | 20 | 14 | 66 | 208 | 151 | 694 |
| Estimates based unon national averages |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Lowa | 47 | 377 | 38 |  |  | 145 |  |  |
|  | Nebraska | 43 | 343 | 35 |  |  | 120 |  |  |
|  | Delaware | 43 | 200 | 35 |  |  | 70 |  |  |
|  | Wyoming | 43 | 216 | 35 |  |  | 76 |  |  |
|  | Michigan | 40 | 2117 | 40 |  |  | 849 |  |  |
|  | Florida | 39 | 1787 | 42 |  |  | 747 |  |  |
|  | Montana | 39 | 396 | 35 |  |  | 139 |  |  |
|  | Hawait | 34 | 606 | 35 |  |  | 212 |  |  |
|  | South Carolina | 27 | 1073 | 35 |  |  | 376 |  |  |
|  | California | 25 | 4182 | 42 |  |  | 1769 |  |  |
|  | Washington | 24 | 568 | 35 |  |  | 197 |  |  |
|  | New Jersey | 19 | 2025 | 35 |  |  | 709 |  |  |
|  | Colorado | 2 | 512 | 35 |  |  | 179 |  |  |

Data for 7 of the remaining 13 states were estimated by using the $35 \%$ average (from the 39 states where at least half of the dollar-demanded data were available) multiplied by the total number of cases. For states with multiple districts, the $35 \%$ average was used for districts where more than half of the dollar amount data were missing, but modified by actual percentages from districts where more than half of the dollar demanded data were available.
D. Creation of a State Data Set

The next methodological step was to construct a state-level data set to examine the effect of the potential transfer of diversity cases on each state. To the data provided by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts were added data on the tort, contract, and real property filings of state courts. These data were not available for all states, but were gathered for those 28 states where they could be obtained. These data will be useful in determining how much the potential transfer of diversity will contribute to the current civil caseloads of states. In addition to the caseload data, the population of each state was also appended to the state-level data set.

Table 8 shows that only the Circuit Courts of Michigan and Oregon, and the Superior Courts of North Carolina and Puerto Rico, match the $\$ 10,000$ jurisdictional limit that the U.S. District Courts had at the time this study was conducted. Moreover, only a few state courts of general jurisdiction match exactly the subject matter of U.S. District Courts. Accordingly, the number of state judges affected by a transfer of diversity jurisdiction must be estimated. The decision rules as to which courts are comparable to U.S. District Courts, will affect the number of state judges eligible to receive diversity cases, and hence the
estimates of the workload brought about by the transfer of federal diversity jurisdiction to state courts.

Initially, a serious attempt was made to count only general jurisdiction judges and to separate these into two categories--those likely to receive diversity cases and those unlikely to receive diversity cases. After much effort, this attempt was abandoned because it is simply impossible to make such a distinction. In some states, e.g. Arkansas, law courts are clearly distinguished from equity courts, and so it is possible to identify equity judges who are unlikely to receive diversity cases. In most states, however, general jurisdiction judges hear all civil cases, including domestic relations and probate, and so judges who would bear the burden of deciding the additional diversity cases cannot be separated from other general jurisdiction judges. In still other states, general jurisdiction judges divide their time between civil and criminal dockets and it is not possible to determine the proportion of time spent on each. Besides, the very concept of a general jurisdiction judge is one who can decide all types of cases. Therefore, an infusion of new cases could result in judges increasing the proportion of their time spent on the newly-transferred diversity cases. General jurisdiction judges who now hear criminal or domestic relations cases could be assigned to hear some of the diversity torts or contracts.

The number of general jurisdiction judges by court level is listed in the National Center for State Courts publication, State Court Organization 1987. ${ }^{41}$ The decision rules used to determine number of judges who would be eligible to hear diversity cases are as follows:

1. In states with a two-tiered court system, judges serving on courts of limited or special jurisdiction, were not included in state totals. Judges who hear cases involving specific subject matter, e.g.

## TABLE 8

## MINTWM AHOWT-TIN-CONTROERSY REOUREEHENS FOR STATE COURTS OF GeEERAL JURISOCTTOON

Minimum Dollar
Amount
California 25000
Michigan 10000
North Carolina 10000
Oregon 10000
Puerta Rico 10000
Florida 5000
Hawai i 5000
Rhode Island 5000
Kentucky 2500
Maryland 2500
Alabama 1000
Nevada 1000
Wyoming 1000
Arizona 500
New Hampshire 500
Ohio 500
West Virginia 300
Texas 200
Vermont 200
Arkansas 100
Montana 50
Tennessee 50
Alaska 0
Coloardo 0
Connecticut 0
Oelaware 0
District of Columbia 0
Georgia 0
Idaho
0
Illinois 0
Indiana 0
Iowa 0
Kansas 0
Louisiana 0
Maine 0
Massachusetts 0
Minnesota 0
Mississippi 0
Missouri 0
Nebraska 0
New Jersey 0
New Mexico 0
New York 0
North Dakota 0
Oklahoma 0
Pennsylvania 0
South Carolina 0
South Dakota 0
Utah 0
Virginia 0
Washington 0
Wisconsin 0

Source: Court Statistics Project, State Court Organization 1987
(Williamsburg, VA: National Center for State Courts, 1988).
small claims or traffic cases, or civil cases with amounts-in-controversy under $\$ 10,000$, would be unlikely to be part of the pool of judges who would receive the tort, contract or real property cases transferred from federal courts.
2. In states with a two-tiered court system, all general jurisdiction judges are included in the pool of judges eligible to receive diversity cases. Magistrates, commissioners and referees were not counted as general jurisdiction judges. In cases where status of "quasi-judges" was in doubt, dollar amount of jurisdiction was used to distinguish judges from quasi-judicial officers. For example, 102 "commissioners and referees" with authority to perform chamber business, take depositions and conduct other business connected with the administration of justice were not counted as general jurisdiction judges in California.
3. In states with a single unified trial court, an effort was made to separate judges from associate judges, commissioners, referees and others who are the functional equivalents of limited jurisdiction judges in states with a two-tiered court system. This effort was made only in states where it was possible to separate caseloads by type of judge also. The District of Columbia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and South Dakota are the seven jurisdictions which have no courts of limited or special jurisdiction. In Idaho, the 62 lawyer and 8 non-lawyer magistrates who handle cases where the amount-in-controversy is under $\$ 10,000$ were not counted as general jurisdiction judges. In Illinois, associate circuit judges were not counted in the total for general jurisdiction judges. In Iowa, district associates hear only civil cases of up to $\$ 5,000$ and magistrates hear misdemeanors and small claims (SS 602.6202). In Massachusetts, the three
justices in Land Court, and the 53 in Juvenile, Housing and Family Courts were not counted in the general jurisdiction total. Magistrates were not counted as general jurisdiction judges in South Dakota because Statute 16-12a-24 limits magistrates to cases involving amounts-in-controversy of less than $\$ 2,000$.

In six other states that have a two-tiered court system, the general jurisdiction courts have exclusive civil jurisdiction. For diversity cases, these courts are the functional equivalent of a unified court system because the lower courts do not have jurisdiction over civil cases. For purposes of this analysis, Connecticut, Kansas, Missouri, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Vermont and Wisconsin are treated as single-tiered court systems. If caseloads can be separated by type and two classes of judges are identified, the judges will be counted with the other general jurisdiction court judges. Otherwise, the data from unitary civil systems, will be presented separately. For example, tort and contracts over $\$ 5,000$ are "regular actions" in Kansas. Section 20-3026 of Kansas Statutes Annotated limits magistrates to cases where the amount-incontroversy is less than $\$ 5,000$. Because it is possible to identify Kansas judges likely to receive diversity cases, as well as to separate state tort and contract filings, Kansas data can be compared with data from states with two-tiered court systems.

The total number of general jurisdiction judges per state used to calculate the impact of diversity filings per judge is provided in Figure 6. Using the three criteria listed above, it was possible to distinguish general jurisdiction judges eligible to hear diversity cases from other judges in all but six jurisdictions: Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Minnesota, New Jersey, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Because it was not possible to distinguish "general-jurisdiction-like"
judges from "limited-jurisdiction-like" judges in these six states, the effects of any change in diversity jurisdiction will be underestimated. Accordingly, these states will be separated from the others in all tables where per judges figures are calculated.

## E. Creation of a Disposition Data Set

The first chapter listed proportion of jury trials as one measure of the complexity of diversity cases. This is important to some smaller courts because even a few complex jury cases may disrupt normal court operations.

Ideally, it would be best to use the data set of FY 1987 filings to determine proportion of jury trials. The problem with that solution is that no more than two-thirds of the cases filed in 1987 have been disposed. Because jury trials take the longest to process, most of these have not been disposed yet. Rather than eliminate this variable from analysis, however, staff decided to create a separate data set of all cases disposed in FY 1987. The reader is warned that this disposition data set is not strictly comparable to the data set containing diversity cases filed in FY 1987. Nevertheless, use of these two data sets together presents a more comprehensive picture of the impact of the transfer of diversity cases on states. Total diversity cases terminated in FY 1987 is presented in Figure 7.

## Figure 6

## Number of General Jurisdiction Judges Per State--1987



## Figure 7

## 1987 Diversity Terminations by State



Source: Administrative Office
of U.S. Courts

## CHAPTER III

## Effects of Total Abolition

For purpose of this study, total abolition of diversity means the elimination of all diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332, except that available under the Interpleader Act. ${ }^{42}$ Because the number of filings are so small, preserving the Interpleader Act would not materially reduce the impact of abolishing diversity jurisdiction. Under reporting rules to the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, cases that include both diversity and federal question claims are characterized as federal question cases. Therefore, cases classified as diversity do not appear to have the potential for returning to federal courts under some other jurisdictional provision. ${ }^{43}$ Total elimination of diversity jurisdiction is the most extreme proposal and as such provides the baseline against which all other proposals for the curtailment of diversity jurisdiction can be evaluated.
A. Estimated Number of Cases to Be Transferred

1. Total Filings

Table 9 shows the total number of filings, as well as the number of tort, contract, and real property filings, that might have gone to each state in Fiscal Year 1987 if diversity jurisdiction had been abolished. If diversity jurisdiction had been totally eliminated, as many as 66,408 new filings would have been transferred to state courts. (The reader is reminded of the assumption that cases filed in federal courts would have been filed in state courts rather than not filed at all, and that one federal diversity case would result in only one state case.) The bar chart in Figure 8 shows the number of diversity cases that would be transferred to each state if diversity jurisdiction were abolished completely.

## FEDERAL DVIVRSITY CASES BY STATE

States
California
New York
Texas
Florida
Pennsylvania
Illincis
Ohio
Michigan
New Jersey
North Carolina
Georgia
Virginia
Massachusetts
Indiana
Missouri
Tennessee
Wisconsin
Washington
Maryland
Louisiana
Minnesota
Alabama
Kentucky
South Carolina
Arizona
Colorado
Puerto Rico
Oklahoma
Connecticut
Iowa
Oregon
Mississippi
Kansas
Arkansas
West Virginia
Utah
Nebraska
New Mexico
Maine
Hawaii
New Hampshire
Nevada
Idaho
Rhode Island
Montana
South Dakota
North Dakota
Delaware
Mistrict of Columbia
Vermont
Alaska
Wyoming

| State |
| :---: |
| Populations |
| Lin_theusands) |
| 27663 |
| 17825 |
| 16789 |
| 12023 |
| 11936 |
| 11582 |
| 10784 |
| 9200 |
| 7672 |
| 6413 |
| 6222 |
| 5904 |
| 5855 |
| 5531 |
| 5103 |
| 4855 |
| 4807 |
| 4538 |
| 4535 |
| 4461 |
| 4246 |
| 4083 |
| 3727 |
| 3425 |
| 3386 |
| 3296 |
| 3292 |
| 3272 |
| 3211 |
| 2834 |
| 2724 |
| 2625 |
| 2476 |
| 2388 |
| 1897 |
| 1680 |
| 1594 |
| 1500 |
| 1187 |
| 1083 |
| 1057 |
| 1007 |
| 998 |
| 9886 |
| 809 |
| 709 |
| 644 |
| 622 |
| 548 |
| 525 |
|  |
|  |
|  |


| Total Number |
| :---: |
| of Federal |
| Diversity Filings |
| 4182 |
| 5482 |
| 5537 |
| 1787 |
| 5642 |
| 5532 |
| 1503 |
| 2117 |
| 2025 |
| 644 |
| 1961 |
| 1480 |
| 1233 |
| 1179 |
| 1449 |
| 1252 |
| 430 |
| 568 |
| 1037 |
| 2759 |
| 491 |
| 1416 |
| 803 |
| 1073 |
| 417 |
| 512 |
| 299 |
| 2024 |
| 1289 |
| 377 |
| 496 |
| 1630 |
| 606 |


| Federal Tort Filings | Federal Contract $\qquad$ | Federal Property Filings |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1218 | 2902 | 62 |
| 2470 | 2948 | 64 |
| 3416 | 2044 | 77 |
| 683 | 1075 | 29 |
| 2931 | 2636 | 75 |
| 1056 | 1989 | 2487 |
| 791 | 688 | 24 |
| 958 | 1133 | 26 |
| 850 | 1151 | 24 |
| 213 | 422 | 9 |
| 977 | 955 | 29 |
| 765 | 686 | 29 |
| 719 | 495 | 19 |
| 400 | 419 | 360 |
| 702 | 731 | 16 |
| 616 | 614 | 22 |
| 152 | 270 | 8 |
| 269 | 293 | 6 |
| 521 | 509 | 7 |
| 1616 | 1080 | 63 |
| 184 | 300 | 7 |
| 434 | 918 | 64 |
| 383 | 401 | 19 |
| 560 | 485 | 28 |
| 141 | 272 | 4 |
| 161 | 332 | 19 |
| 173 | 118 | 8 |
| 660 | 1242 | 122 |
| 695 | 569 | 25 |
| 180 | 177 | 20 |
| 177 | 304 | 15 |
| 960 | 649 | 21 |
| 246 | 328 | 32 |
| 465 | 397 | 20 |
| 288 | 285 | 31 |
| 114 | 256 | 22 |
| 186 | 150 | 7 |
| 212 | 232 | 15 |
| 128 | 53 | 4 |
| 383 | 214 | 9 |
| 142 | 89 | 7 |
| 134 | 395 | 8 |
| 80 | 95 | 10 |
| 142 | 158 | 10 |
| 196 | 182 | 18 |
| 99 | 73 | 8 |
| 34 | 84 | 1 |
| 109 | 89 | 2 |
| 614 | 414 | 25 |
| 84 | 47 | 1 |
| 36 | 100 | 3 |
| 96 | 105 | 15 |
| 29,819 | 32,553 | 4,036 |
| 573 | 626 | 78 |
| 336 | 396 | 19 |

# Figure 8 <br> Total Diversity Filings by State 



Filings

The more populous states would obviously receive the most diversity cases if diversity jurisdiction were eliminated. The eight states of California, New York, Texas, Pennsylvania, Florida, Illinois, Ohio and Michigan have $48 \%$ of the population of the United States and would receive $48 \%$ of the diversity cases. Nevertheless, the exceptions to this relationship are notable as well.

Before examining the relationship in more detail, the analysis may be clarified if real property cases are removed from analysis. Clearly, the number of diversity property cases is not related to state population and may obscure any relationship that may exist between case volume and population. ${ }^{44}$ Figure 9 shows the relationship between state population (bars) and diversity filings (lines).

When the line showing diversity cases is below the bars showing state population, the state will receive fewer diversity cases than expected based on its population and vice versa. (Figure 10 depicts the same relationship using a logarithmic scale to "smooth out" the differences between the larger and smaller states. Logarithmic charts are often used to show relative change when comparing series that vary greatly in magnitude, e.g. filings in thousands and population in millions.)

Table 10 shows total diversity filings per 100,000 population and combined diversity tort and contract filings per 100,000 . Table 11 lists the total number of federal tort and contract diversity filings by state and compares these numbers with the population-based estimates. (Comparable estimates derived from regression analysis are presented in Appendix A.) To illustrate the procedure, California had $11.2 \%$ of the national population, and so could be expected to have $11.2 \%$

## Figure 9

 Population and Diversity FilingsDiversity Cases in Thousands


# Figure 10 Population and Diversity Filings <br> (Logarithmic Scale) 

Diversity Filings


DIVERSITY FILINGS PER POPULATION

| States | State Population (In Thousands) | Total Diversity $\qquad$ | ```Diversity Filings Per 100,000 Pobulation``` | Tort and Contract Diversity Filings | Tort and Contract <br> Filings Per 100,000 Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California | 27663 | 4182 | 15 | 4120 | 15 |
| Hew York | 17825 | 5482 | 31 | 5418 | 30 |
| Texas | 16789 | 5537 | 33 | 5460 | 33 |
| Florida | 12023 | 1787 | 15 | 1758 | 15 |
| Pennsylvania | 11936 | 5642 | 47 | 5567 | 47 |
| Illinois | 11582 | 5532 | 48 | 3045 | 26 |
| Ohio | 10784 | 1503 | 14 | 1479 | 14 |
| Michigan | 9200 | 2117 | 23 | 2091 | 23 |
| New Jersey | 7672 | 2025 | 26 | 2001 | 26 |
| North Carolina | 6413 | 644 | 10 | 635 | 10 |
| Georgia | 6222 | 1961 | 32 | 1932 | 31 |
| Virginia | 5904 | 1480 | 25 | 1451 | 25 |
| Massachusetts | 5855 | 1233 | 21 | 1214 | 21 |
| Indiana | 5531 | 1179 | 21 | 819 | 15 |
| Missouri | 5103 | 1449 | 28 | 1433 | 28 |
| Tennessee | 4855 | 1252 | 26 | 1230 | 25 |
| Wisconsin | 4807 | 430 | 9 | 422 | 9 |
| Washington | 4538 | 568 | 13 | 562 | 12 |
| Maryland | 4535 | 1037 | 23 | 1030 | 23 |
| Louisiana | 4461 | 2759 | 62 | 2696 | 60 |
| Minnesota | 4246 | 491 | 12 | 484 | 11 |
| Alabama | 4083 | 1416 | 35 | 1352 | 33 |
| Kentucky | 3727 | 803 | 22 | 784 | 21 |
| South Carolina | 3425 | 1073 | 31 | 1045 | 31 |
| Arizona | 3386 | 417 | 12 | 413 | 12 |
| Colorado | 3296 | 512 | 16 | 493 | 15 |
| Puerto Rico | 3292 | 299 | 9 | 291 | 9 |
| Oklahoma | 3272 | 2024 | 62 | 1902 | 58 |
| Connecticut | 3211 | 1289 | 40 | 1264 | 39 |
| Iowa | 2834 | 377 | 13 | 357 | 13 |
| Oregon | 2724 | 496 | 18 | 481 | 18 |
| Mississippi | 2625 | 1630 | 62 | 1609 | 61 |
| Kansas | 2476 | 605 | 24 | 574 | 23 |
| Arkansas | 2388 | 882 | 37 | 862 | 36 |
| West Virginia | 1897 | 604 | 32 | 573 | 30 |
| Utah | 1680 | 392 | 23 | 370 | 22 |
| Nebraska | 1594 | 343 | 22 | 336 | 21 |
| New Mexico | 1500 | 459 | 31 | 444 | 30 |
| Maine | 1187 | 185 | 16 | 181 | 15 |
| Hawail | 1083 | 606 | 56 | 597 | 55 |
| New Hampshire | 1057 | 238 | 23 | 231 | 22 |
| Nevada | 1007 | 537 | 53 | 529 | 53 |
| Idaho | 998 | 185 | 19 | 175 | 18 |
| Rhade Island | 986 | 310 | 31 | 300 | 30 |
| Montana | 809 | 396 | 49 | 378 | 47 |
| South Dakota | 709 | 180 | 25 | 172 | 24 |
| North Dakota | 672 | 119 | 18 | 118 | 18 |
| Delaware | 644 | 200 | 31 | 198 | 31 |
| District of Columbia | 522 | 1053 | 169 | 1028 | 165 |
| Vermont | 548 | 132 | 29 | 131 | 24 |
| Alaska | 525 | 139 | 26 | 136 | 26 |
| Wyoming | 490 | 216 | 44 | 201 | 41 |


| STATES | State <br> Population <br> (in thousands) | Total Filings (torts and contracts) | Estimates Based Upon Population | Qifference | Percentage Difference |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California | 27663 | 4120 | 6995 | -2874 | -41 |
| New York | 17825 | 54.18 | 4507 | 911 | 20 |
| Texas | 16789 | 5460 | 4245 | 1215 | 29 |
| Florida | 12023 | 1758 | 3040 | -1282 | -42 |
| Pennsylvania | 11936 | 5567 | 3018 | 2549 | 84 |
| Illinois | 11582 | 3045 | 2928 | 117 | -46 |
| Ohio | 10784 | 1479 | 2727 | -1248 | -46 |
| Michigan | 9200 | 2091 | 2326 | -235 | -10 |
| New Jersey | 7672 | 2001 | 1940 | 61 | 3 |
| North Carolina | 6413 | 635 | 1621 | -986 | -61 |
| Georgia | 6222 | 1932 | 1573 | 359 | 23 |
| Virginia | 5904 | 1451 | 1493 | -42 | -3 |
| Massachusetts | 5855 | 1214 | 1480 | -266 | -18 |
| Indiana | 5531 | 819 | 1398 | -579 | -41 |
| Missouri | 5103 | 1433 | 1290 | 143 | 11 |
| Tennessee | 4855 | 1230 | 1228 | 2 | 0 |
| Wisconsin | 4807 | 422 | 1215 | -793 | -65 |
| Washington | 4538 | 562 | 1147 | -585 | -51 |
| Maryland | 4535 | 1030 | 1147 | -117 | -10 |
| Louisiana | 4461 | 2696 | 1128 | 1568 | 139 |
| Minnesota | 4246 | 484 | 1074 | -590 | -55 |
| Alabama | 4083 | 1352 | 1032 | 320 | 31 |
| Kentucky | 3727 | 784 | 942 | -158 | -17 |
| South Carolina | 3425 | 1045 | 866 | 179 | 21 |
| Arizona | 3386 | 413 | 856 | -443 | -52 |
| Colorado | 3296 | 493 | 833 | -340 | -41 |
| Puerto Rico | 3292 | 291 | 832 | -541 | -65 |
| OkTahoma | 3272 | 1902 | 827 | 1075 | 130 |
| Connecticut | 3211 | 1264 | 812 | 452 | 56 |
| Iowa | 2834 | 357 | 717 | -360 | -50 |
| Oregon | 2724 | 481 | 689 | -208 | -30 |
| Mississippi | 2625 | 1609 | 664 | 945 | 142 |
| Kansas | 2476 | 574 | 626 | -52 | -8 |
| Arkansas | 2388 | 862 | 604 | 258 | 43 |
| West Virginia | 1897 | 573 | 480 | 93 | 19 |
| Utah | 1680 | 370 | 425 | -55 | -13 |
| Nebraska | 1594 | 336 | 403 | -67 | -17 |
| New Mexico | 1500 | 444 | 379 | 65 | 17 |
| Maine | 1187 | 181 | 300 | -119 | -40 |
| Hawai | 1083 | 597 | 274 | 323 | 118 |
| New Hampshire | 1057 | 231 | 267 | -36 | -14 |
| Nevada | 1007 | 529 | -255 | 274 | 108 |
| Idaho | 998 | 175 | 252 | -77 | -31 |
| Rhode Island | 986 | 300 | 249 | 51 | 20 |
| Montana | 809 | 378 | 205 | 173 | 85 |
| South Dakota | 709 | 172 | 179 | -7 | -4 |
| North Dakota | 672 | 118 | 170 | -52 | -31 |
| Delaware | 644 | 198 | 163 | 35 | 22 |
| District of Columbia | 622 | 1028 | 157 | 871 | 554 |
| Vermont | 548 | 131 | 139 | -8 | -5 |
| Alaska | 525 | 136 | 133 | 3 | 2 |
| Wyoming | 490 | 201 | 124 | 77 | 62 |

(or 6994) of the total number of tort and contract diversity filings. Actual diversity filings in 1987 were 4120 , so the estimate based on proportion of population was lower by 2878 cases. Other estimates based on proportion of population were more accurate. For example, the difference between the predicted cases in Alaska (133) and the actual cases (136) was only three cases. The District of Columbia would receive nearly 3-1/2 times more than the number of diversty cases one would expect given its population. Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Hawali receive twice as many diversity cases as expected. On the other hand, several states, such as Puerto Rico, Wisconsin, North Carolina, Iowa, Arizona, and Washington, would receive fewer than half the number of diversity cases that one would expect given the size of their populations. So, while there is a strong relationship between the number of federal diversity torts and contracts filings and state populations, a comparison of the estimates to actual filings shows that estimates can be misleading for individual states.

## 3. Filings Per Judge

The previous analysis demonstrated which states would receive a disproportionate share of diversity filings if diversity jurisdiction were abolished, but did not take into consideration the capacity of states to respond to the influx of diversity cases. The number of judges available to decide civil cases will play a key role in how well a given state can handle the transfer of cases. On the face of it, there should be little difference between measuring the impact of the abolition of federal diversity jurisdiction using population or number of judges, since larger states will typically also have more judges. (The correlation between population and number of general jurisdiction judges
for 1987 was .87.) Again, some states have substantially fewer or more general jurisdiction judges than would be expected on the basis of population alone.

Table 12 shows that South Carolina, Oklahoma, Hawaii, Mississippi, the District of Columbia, and Massachusetts would be most affected by the abolition of federal diversity jurisdiction as measured by the number of additional cases that would go to each general jurisdiction judge. Puerto Rico, Minnesota and Wisconsin may be affected the least, but keep in mind that the consequences of diversity transfer are underestimated for states listed at the bottom of the per judge tables, and these include Minnesota and Wisconsin.
B. Complexity of Cases Transferred

1. Caseload Composition

Figure 11 shows the caseload composition of federal diversity cases and hence the composition of cases transferred if diversity jurisdiction were totally abolished. In 1987, contracts made up $49 \%$ of the federal diversity filings, torts $45 \%$, and real property cases the remaining $6 \%$ of filings. The property cases are an insignificant proportion of diversity cases in most states--the median number of cases is only 19. In that context, Indiana's 360 property filings stands out, but the noticeable discrepancy is Illinois. (See Table 9.) Foreclosures in the Northern District of Illinois accounted for $62 \%$ of the federal real property diversity filings in the United States. ${ }^{45}$ H. Stuart Cunningham, Clerk of the Northern District of Illinois, describes the phenomenon as the result of a particular "ecological niche." Illinois altered its law to require a sheriff's presence at each foreclosure and his fee is $\$ 600$. Attorneys for one large foreign corporation with offices in Chicago decided that their

TABEE 12
DIVERSITY FILINGS PER JUGEE BY POPULATION - 1987

| States | Number of General Jurisdiction $\qquad$ | Total Diversity $\qquad$ | Total Diversity Cases Per _Judge |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California | 724 |  |  |
| New York | 387 | 5482 | ${ }^{6}$ |
| Florida | 375 | 5537 | 15 |
| Pennsylvania | 362 330 | 1787 | 5 |
| Illinois | 363 | 5642 | 17 |
| Ohio | 363 339 | 5532 | 15 |
| Michigan North Carolina | 196 | 1503 | 11 |
| North Carolina Georgia | 72 135 | 644 | 9 |
| Virginia | 135 | 1961 | 15 |
| Massachusetts | 61** | 1480 | 12 |
| Indiana | 206 | 1233 | 20 |
| Missouri | 133 | 1179 | 11 |
| Tennessee | 128 | 1252 | 10 |
| Maryland | 133 | 568 | 4 |
| Louisiana | 109 | 1037 | 10 |
| Alabama | 124 | 2759 | 14 |
| Kentucky | 124 91 | 1416 | 11 |
| South Carolina | 31 | 803 | 9 |
| Arizona | 101 | 1073 | 35 |
| Colorado | 121 | 417 | 4 |
| Puerto Rico | - 92 | 512 | 4 |
| OkTahoma | 71 | . 299 | 3 |
| Iowa | 100 | - 2024 | 29 |
| Oregon | 85 | 496 | 4 6 |
| Mississippi Kansas | 79 | 1630 | 21 |
| Arkansas | 146 | 606 | 4 |
| West Virginia | 60 | 882 | 13 |
| Utah | 29 | 604 392 | 10 |
| Nebraska | 48 | 392. | 14 |
| New Mexico | 59 | 343 459 | 7 |
| Maine. | 16 | 185 | 8 |
| Hawaii | 24 | 185 | 12 |
| New Hampshire | 25 | 606 | 25 |
| Nevada | 35 | 238 | 10 |
| Idaho | 33 | 537 185 | 15 |
| Rhode Island | 19 | 185 310 | ${ }_{16}^{6}$ |
| Montana South Dakota | 41 | 396 | 16 10 |
| South Dakota | 35 | 396 180 | 10 5 |
| North Dakota | 26 | 119 | 5 5 |
| Alaska | 17 | 200 | 12 |
| Wyoming | 17 | 139 216 | 13 |
| States with Non-Comparable Judge Figures |  |  |  |
| New Jersey | 321 | 2025 |  |
| Wisconsin Minnesota | 197 | 2025 430 | 2 |
| Minnesota | 224 | 491 | 2 |
| District of Columbia | 139 | 1289 | 9 |
| Vermont | 51 25 | 1053 | 21 |
| *Superior Court Depar | ges only |  |  |

## Figure 11 <br> Types of Federal Diversity Cases



Source: Administrative Office of U.S.
Courts ("Other" cases not included--
63 in FY1987 and 80 in FY1988.)
foreclosure cases would be decided more quickly in federal court and the corporation would be spared the inconvenience of going to several county seats to file cases. A second Chicago law firm imitated the practice of filing in federal court and together these firms account for the bulk of the real property filings in the Northern District of Illinois and to a lesser degree, in the Northern District of Indiana.

Federal contract diversity filings are much more closely related to population (correlation of .89 ) than are federal tort diversity filings (correlation of .72 ). Federal contract cases are more proportionate to state population-- the larger the state the more contract cases. State population explains less of the variation in federal tort cases, which is another way of saying that factors, in addition to state's population, determine where tort cases are filed. (Note the contrast with the close relationship between population and state tort filings, discussed below in Section B.2.)

Considering federal contract cases only, Table 13 shows attorneys in the District of Columbia file four times more diversity cases in federal court than one would expect given the District's population. Figure 12 depicts graphically the percentage difference between the actual contract diversity cases filed in each state in $F Y$ 1987 compared to the number of cases that would have been filed if contract cases were filed in direct proportion to each state's population. Oklahoma and Nevada are the two other states that would receive many more federal contract filings than one would expect based upon their populations, if federal diversity were abolished completely. On the other hand, Puerto Rico, Wisconsin, Maine, Iowa, Ohio, North Carolina, and Washington would receive fewer than half the number of diversity contract cases one would expect given their population.

| STATES | State Population (in thousands) | Contract Filings |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California | 27663 | 2902 |
| New York | 17825 | 2948 |
| Texas | 16789 | 2044 |
| Florida | 12023 | 1075 |
| Pennsylvania | 11936 | 2636 |
| Illinois | 11582 | 1989 |
| Ohio | 10784 | 688 |
| Michigan | 9200 | 1133 |
| New Jersey | 7672 | 1151 |
| North Carolina | 6413 | 422 |
| Georgia | 6222 | 955 |
| Virginia | 5904 | 686 |
| Massachusetts | 5855 | 495 |
| Indiana | 5531 | 419 |
| Missouri | 5103 | 731 |
| Tennessee | 4855 | 614 |
| Wisconsin | 4807 | 270 |
| Hashington | 4538 | 293 |
| Maryland | 4535 | 509 |
| Louisiana | 4461 | 1080 |
| Minnesota | 4246 | 300 |
| Alabama | 4083 | 918 |
| Kentucky | 3727 | 401 |
| South Carolina | 3425 | 485 |
| Arizona | 3386 | 272 |
| Colorado | 3296 | 332 |
| Puerto Rico | 3292 | 118 |
| Oklahoma | 3272 | 1242 |
| Connecticut | 3211 | 569 |
| Iowa | 2834 | 177 |
| Oregon | 2724 | 304 |
| Mississippi | 2625 | 649 |
| Kansas | 2476 | 328 |
| Arkansas | 2388 | 397 |
| West Virginia | 1897 | 285 |
| Utah | 1680 | 256 |
| Nebraska | 1594 | 150 |
| New Mexico | 1500 | 232 |
| Maine | 1187 | 53 |
| Hawai | 1083 | 214 |
| New Hampshire | 1057 | 89 |
| Nevada | 1007 | 395 |
| Idaho | 998 | 95 |
| Rhode Island | 986 | 158 |
| Montana | 809 | 182 |
| South Dakota | 709 | 73 |
| North Dakota | 672 | 84 |
| Delaware | 644 | 89 |
| District of Columbia | 622 | 414 |
| Vermont | 548 | 47 |
| Alaska | 525 | 100 |
| Hyoming | 490 | 105 |

TOTAL

Figure 12

## Percentage Difference Between Actual and Estimated Contract Diversity Cases



It has already been noted that federal tort filings are less related to population than contract filings, and therefore population-based estimates are likely to be less accurate for torts. Table 14 and Figure 13 show how true this generalization is for each state. The District of Columbia has seven times more diversity cases filed in federal court than one would expect given its population. Louisiana, Mississippi, and Hawaii have more than twice the number of federal diversity filings as expected. Wisconsin, North Carolina, Arizona, and California on the other hand, have two times fewer cases than expected.
2. State Filings

The question of how the transfer of federal torts and contracts would affect states that already have many tort and contract filings cannot be resolved completely because so many jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia, South Carolina, Mississippi, and Oklanoma where the impact of the transfer is expected to be large, do not separate civil filing statistics into tort and contract categories. ${ }^{46}$ Table 15 shows that state contract filings can be distinguished from other civil cases, that figures are avallable in only 22 states, and that tort cases can be distinguished in 28 states. Fortunately, there is a high enough correlation (.95) between state population and state torts in states with two tiered court systems to encourage the construction of estimates. Tort filings from three states (Connecticut, Minnesota and Wisconsin) with single-tiered or unitary trial court systems were not used to establish the relationship between population and state torts presented in figure 14. Tort filings accordingly were not estimated for states with single-tiered trial courts (District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa and South Dakota) or for their functional equivalent, i.e., states

TABEE 14
ESTIMATES OF TORT DIVERSTY CASES

| STAIES | State Population | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Federal } \\ & \text { Tort } \\ & \text { Filings. } \end{aligned}$ | Estimates Based on Population | Oifference | Percentage Difference |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California | 27663 | 1218 | 3344 | -2126 | -64 |
| New York | 17825 | 2470 | 2155 | 315 | 15 |
| Texas | 16789 | 3416 | 2029 | 1387 | 68 |
| Florida | 12023 | 683 | 1453 | -770 | -53 |
| Pennsylvania | 11936 | 2931 | 1443 | 1488 | 103 |
| Illinais | 11582 | 1056 | 1400 | -344 | -25 |
| Ohio | 10784 | 791 | 1304 | -513 | -39 |
| Michigan | 9200 | 958 | 1112 | -154 | -14 |
| New Jersey | 7672 | 850 | 927 | -77 | - |
| North Carolina | 6413 | 213 | 775 | -562 | -73 |
| Georgia | 6222 | 977 | 752 | 225 | 30 |
| Virginia | 5904 | 765 | 714 | 51 | 7 |
| Massachuseits | 5855 | 719 | 708 | 11 | 2 |
| Indiana | 5531 | 400 | 669 | -269 | -40 |
| Missouri | 5103 | 702 | 617 | 85 | 14 |
| Tennessee | 4855 | 616 | 587 | 29 | 5 |
| Wisconsin | 4807 | 152 | 581 | -429 | -74 |
| Washington | 4538 | 269 | 549 | -280 | -51 |
| Maryiand | 4535 | 521 | 548 | -27 | -5 |
| Louisiana | 4461 | 1616 | 539 | 1077 | 200 |
| Minnesota | 4246 | 184 | 513 | -329 | -64 |
| Alabama | 4083 | 434 | 494 | -60 | -12 |
| Kentucky | 3727 | 383 | 451 | -68 | -15 |
| South Carolina | 3425 | 560 | 414 | 146 | 35 |
| Arizona | 3386 | 141 | 409 | -268 | -66 |
| Colorado | 3296 | 161 | 398 | -237 | -60 |
| Puerto Rico | 3292 | 173 | 398 | -225 | -57 |
| Oklahoma | 3272 | 660 | 396 | 264 | 67 |
| Connecticut | 3211 | 695 | 388 | 307 | 79 |
| Iowa | 2834 | 180 | 343 | -163 | -47 |
| Oregon | 2724 | 177 | 329 | -152 | -45 |
| Mississippi | 2625 | 960 | 317 | 643 | 203 |
| Kansas | 2476 | 246 | 299 | -53 | -18 |
| Arkansas | 2388 | 465 | 289 | 176 | 61 |
| West Virginia | 1897 | 288 | 229 | 59 | 26 |
| Utah | 1680 | 114 | 203 | -89 | -44 |
| Nebraska | 1594 | 186 | 193 | -7 | -3 |
| New Mexico | 1500 | 212 | 181 | 31 | 17 |
| Maine | 1187 | 128 | 143 | -15 | 11 |
| Hawaii | 1083 | 383 | 131 | 252 | 193 |
| New Hampshire | 1057 | 142 | 128 | 14 | 11 |
| Nevada | 1007 | 134 | 122 | 12 | 10 |
| Idaho | 998 | 90 | 121 | -41 | -34 |
| Rhode Island | 986 | 142 | 119 | 23 | 19 |
| Montana | 809 | 196 | 98 | 98 | 100 |
| South Dakota | 709 | 99 | 86 | 13 | 16 |
| North Dakota | 672 | 34 | 81 | -48 | -58 |
| Delaware | 644 | 109 | 78 | 31 | 40 |
| District of Columbia | 622 | 614 | 75 | 539 | 717 |
| Vermont | 548 | 84 | 66 | 18 | 27 |
| Alaska | 525 | 36 | 63 | -27 | -43 |
| Wyoming | 490 | 96 | 59 | 37 | 62 |
| TOTAL |  | 29819 |  |  |  |

Figure 13
Percentage Difference Between Actual and Estimated Tort Diversity Cases


TABLE 15: POTENTIAL INCREASE IN TORTS AND CONTRACTS PER STATE

| States | State Torts | State Contracts | State Torts and Contracts | Federal $\qquad$ | Federal Contracts | Federal Torts and Contracts | Percent Increase in Torts and Contracts |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California | 137455 |  |  | 1218 | 2902 |  |  |
| New York | 92538 | 23650 | 116188 | 2470 | 2948 | 4120 5418 | 5 |
| Texas | 40764 | 56835 | 97599 | 3416 | 2044 | 5460 | 6 |
| Flarida | 35453 | 57076 | 92529 | 683 | 1075 | 1758 | 2 |
| Ohio | 29375 |  |  | 791 | 688 | 1479 | 2 |
| Michigan | 29756 |  |  | 958 | 1133 | 2091 |  |
| Morth Carolina | 8981 | 4824 | 13805 | 213 | 422 | 635 | 5 |
| Massachusetts | 14251 | 3994 | 18245 | 719 | 495 | 1214 | 7 |
| Missouri | 10483 | 7571 | 18054 | 702 | 731 | 1433 | 8 |
| Tennessee | 13597 | 8257 | 21854 | 616 | 614 | 1230 | 6 |
| Wisconsin | 9545 | 42323 | 51868 | 152 | 270 | 422 | 1 |
| Washington | 8007 12938 | 14352 7323 | 22359 | 269 | 293 | 562 | 3 |
| Maryland | 12938 10739 | 7323 8760 | 20261 19499 | 521 184 | 509 300 | 1030 | 5 |
| Arizona | 12260 | 25680 | 19499 37940 | 184 141 | 300 272 | 484 413 | 2 |
| Colorado | 3666 | 18979 | 22645 | 161 | 332 | 493 | 2 |
| Puerto Rico | 4811 | 4944 | 9755 | 173 | 118 | 291 | 3 |
| Connecticut | 15385 | 21176 | 36561 | 695 | 569 | 1264 | 3 |
| Kansas | 3588 | 9305 | 12893 | 246 | 328 | 574 | 4 |
| Arkansas | 5606 | 26900 | 32506 | 465 | 397 | 862 | 3 |
| Utah | 1351 |  |  | 114 | 256 | 370 |  |
| Naw Mexico | 4037 | 11734 | 15771 | 212 | 232 | 444 | 3 |
| Maine | 1786 | 1082 | 2868 | 128 | 53 | 181 | 6 |
| Hawaii | 1785 | 1690 | 3475 | 383 | 214 | 597 | 17 |
| Idaho | 1376 |  |  | 80 | 95 | 175 |  |
| Montana North Dakota | 1792 551 | 4234 3594 | 6026 4145 | 196 34 | 182 84 | 378 118 136 | 3 |
| Alaska | 1664 | 3594 | 4145 | 34 36 | 84 100 | 118 136 | 3 |

Source: State court data are from Court Statistics Project, State Court Caselead Statistics: Annual Report, 1987 (Williamsburg, VA: National Center for State Courts, 1989).
where a single court has jurisdiction over all civil cases (New Jersey, OKlahoma, and Vermont). Figure 15 shows how close the estimates of tort filings based on population would have been in those 25 states where tort data are available, and thus indicate how accurate the estimates are overall. Using population tended to overestimate the number of torts filed in California and New York, and to underestimate the tort filings elsewhere. Actual state tort filings in 25 states and estimated tort filings from 17 states with two-tiered court systems are presented in Figure 16.

Focusing attention on torts and contracts improves the comparison between federal and state cases, but even here one can not assume that a federal tort or contract transferred is squivalent to a state tort or contract. First of all, the mix of cases is different. For example, an Iowa study found more product liability torts and fewer auto torts in federal court, ${ }^{47}$ which means that the cases transferred are likely to be more complex than the cases originally filed in state courts. Secondly, the amount-in-controversy is likely to be greater. Table 8 showed that the dollar limit in all state courts of general jurisdiction but California is equal to or lower than the $\$ 10,000$ federal limit used in 1987. To the extent that lesser amounts-in-controversy translate into less case processing time, state torts and contracts may be "easier" than federal torts and contracts. Therefore, cases transferred from federal courts may consume more resources and take longer to decide than cases already being heard in state courts.

Accepting for the moment a rough equivalence between state and federal cases, Table 15 shows that Hawaii would experience the largest percentage increase in tort and contract filings if federal diversity jurisdiction were abolished. The bar charts, Figures 17 and 18

## Figure 14

Relationship $\mathrm{R}^{--}$ween State Tort Filings and Population

## Figure 15

## Percent Difference Between Actual And Estimated State Tort Filings



- Percents indicate that actual fort
fllings were - $*$ morelless than
expected based upon population estimates


## Figure 16 <br> Number of State Tort Filings



- Data ars from all slates
which report torts as a
separate category of civil cases.
Estimated Tort Filings

- Data are from all states
which report torts as a
separate category of civil cases.
depict the percentage increases in state tort and contract filings separately. Of the jurisdictions where data are available, Hawaii, New York and Massachusetts, would experience the largest percentage increase in contract filings. Hawaij would also experience a large percentage increase in tort filings. Increases in estimated tort filings are also predicted for Mississippi and Louisiana. It is unfortunate that more state data on torts and contracts are not available so that percentage increase in all states could be measured more accurately.


## 3. Jury Trials

Table 16 shows the number of federal diversity cases terminated per state in FY 1987, and the number terminated without court action, by trial, and by jury trial. The remaining filings are terminated by pre-trial actions (e.g. dismissals) that require some court effort. The $36 \%$ of diversity cases that were disposed without any court action would not add much to the workload of states. About $8 \%$ of all 1987 terminations were disposed by trial ( $6 \%$ by jury trials). Although there is no guarantee that state courts would have disposed of these cases in the same manner that federal courts did, these proportions can be used to estimate the number of jury trials each state would receive if diversity jurisdiction were abolished.

The percentage of terminations through no court action and through trial varies widely. For example, only $5 \%$ of the diversity cases were terminated without court action in Colorado and Puerto Rico, whereas over two-thirds of the diversity cases were terminated without court action in Alaska, Connecticut, Oregon, and Vermont.

Obviously, if cases filed in federal courts that would potentially be transferred to state courts required no court action, the impact of the transfer is negligible. On the other hand, some state

## Figure 17 Increase in State Contract Cases Under Total Abolition*



## Figure 18 <br> Increase in State Tort Filings <br> Under Total Abolition



- Data are from all states
which report torts as a
separate category of civil cases.
Estimated Increase in Torts

- Data are estimated from population
because these states do no report torts
as a separate category of civil cases.

TABLE 16
Manner of Disposition, Federal Diversity Cases

| States | Total <br> Terminations | Termination Through No Action. | Percentage of Terminations By lo Action | Termination Through $\qquad$ Trial | Percentage of Terminations By Trial | Termination Through Jury Trial | Percentage of Terminations By Jury Trial |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California | 3497 | 1409 | 40 | 229 | 7 | 127 | 4 |
| New York | 4364 | 1956 | 45 | 251 | 6 | 159 | 4 |
| Texas | 4657 | 989 | 21 | 831 | 18 | 739 | 16 |
| Florida | 1705 | 654 | 38 | 116 | 7 | 72 | 4 |
| Pennsylvania | 5261 | 1002 | 19 | 434 | 8 | 313 | 6 |
| Illinois | 5177 | 2206 | 43 | 96 | 2 | 55 | 1 |
| Ohio | 1433 | 521 | 36 | 117 | 8 | 25 | 6 |
| Michigan | 2526 | 740 | 29 | 151 | 6 | 118 | 5 |
| New Jersey | 1769 | 588 | 33 | 105 | 6 | 28 | 2 |
| North Carolina | 599 | 234 | 39 | 57 | 10 | 42 | 7 |
| Georgia | 2212 | 1291 | 58 | 258 | 7 | 130 | 6 |
| Virginia | 1251 | 595 | 48 | 184 | 15 | 104 | 8 |
| Massachusetts | 1571 | 549 | 35 | 88 | 6 | 69 | 4 |
| Indiana | 1269 | 397 | 31 | 51 | 4 | 39 | 3 |
| Missouri | 1308 | 700 | 54 | 147 | 11 | 103 | 8 |
| Tennessee | 1153 | 489 | 42 | 117 | 10 | 75 | 7 |
| Wisconsin | 479 | 189 | 39 | 37 | 8 | 27 | 6 |
| Washington | 525 | 267 | 51 | 26 | 5 | 14 | 3 |
| Maryland | 1053 | 326 | 31 | 88 | 8 | 66 | 6 |
| Louisiana | 2618 | 631 | 24 | 236 | 9 | 116 | 4 |
| Minnesota | 748 | 368 | 49 | 27 | 4 | 20 | 3 |
| Alabama | 1500 | 318 | 21 | 184 | 12 | 119 | 8 |
| Kentucky | 815 | 241 | 30 | 76 | 9 | 66 | 8 |
| South Carolina | 1091 | 224 | 21 | 114 | 10 | 90 | 8 |
| Arizona | 470 | 254 | 54 | 14 | 3 | 7 | 1 |
| Colorado | 692 | 33 | 5 | 40 | 6 | 28 | 4 |
| Puerto Rico | 320 | 15 | 5 | 31 | 10 | 20 | 6 |
| OkI ahoma | 2161 | 565 | 26 | 153 | 7 | 111 | 5 |
| Connecticut | 779 | 534 | 69 | 63 | 8 | 35 | 4 |
| Iowa | 393 | 114 | 29 | 27 | 7 | 16 | 4 |
| Oregon | 536 | 388 | 72 | 37 | 7 | 23 | 4 |
| Mississippi | 1640 | 848 | 52 | 160 | 10 | 105 | 6 |
| Kansas | 761 | 490 | 64 | 48 | 6 | 32 | 4 |
| Arkansas | 848 | 343 | 40 | 101 | 12 | 74 | 9 |
| West Virginia | 688 | 157 | 23 | 30 | 4 | 21 | 3 |
| Utah | 378 | 177 | 47 | 26 | 7 | 17 | 5 |
| Nebraska | 316 | 195 | 62 | 31 | 10 | 18 | 6 |
| New Mexico | 415 | 158 | 38 | 32 | 8 | 19 | 5 |
| Maine | 386 | 72 | 19 | 31 | 8 | 28 | 7 |
| Hawali | 342 | 218 | 64 | 9 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| New Hampshire | 284 | 53 | 19 | 35 | 12 | 26 | 9 |
| Nevada | 575 | 279 | 49 | 26 | 5 | 13 | 2 |
| Idaho | 246 | 17 | 7 | 18 | 7 | 13 | 5 |
| Rhode Island | 263 | 86 | 33 | 46 | 17 | 37 | 14 |
| Montana | 331 | 122 | 37 | 13 | 4 | 7 | 2 |
| South Dakota | 167 | 82 | 49 | 25 | 15 | 16 | 10 |
| North Dakota | 139 | 51 | 37 | 19 | 14 | 10 | 7 |
| Delaware | 176 | 63 | 36 | 22 | 13 | 19 | 11 |
| District of Columbia | 907 | 569 | 63 | 55 | 6 | 44 | 5 |
| Vermont | 141 | 94 | 67 | 35 | 25 | 26 | 18 |
| Alaska | 135 | 101 | 75 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Wyoming | 168 | 67 | 40 | 32 | 19 | 19 | 11 |
| totals | 63249 | 23029 | 36\%* | 5078 | $8 \%^{*}$ | 3562 | 6\%* |

*Percentages are based upon national totals, not an average of percentages in the columns.
court administrators and chief justices have expressed the opinion that the bottom line effect of the transfer of diversity jurisdiction will be the number of trials that the newly-transferred cases would require. By this standard, the consequences of abolishing diversity jurisdiction would affect four states the most--Texas (831 trials), Pennsylvania (434), Georgia (258) and Louisiana (236). The proportion of cases terminated by trial varied by state from a low of two percent in Alaska and Illinois to a high of $25 \%$ in Vermont. In Vermont, terminations either through no court action or by trial (and mostly jury trials at that) account for $91 \%$ of the total dispositions. Other states with high trial rates include Wyoming, Texas, and Rhode Island. (The proportion of jury trials to all trials varied from 0 in Hawaii to $90 \%$ in Maine, with the average state terminating $65 \%$ of its trials by using juries.)

## Chapter IV

## Barring In-State Plaintiffs from Initiating Diversity Actions

The proposal to bar plaintiffs from invoking diversity jurisdiction in their home states would substantially curtail diversity filings. The pie chart, figure 19, shows the proportion of diversity cases filed by each category of plaintiff. The Administrative Office of U.S. Courts data identify the state of citizenship of the principal plaintiff only. In making estimates of the reduction in federal caseload that would occur with diversity transfer, the Administrative Office uses only data from in-state individual plaintiffs, because corporations may be considered residents of the several states where they do business. That practice is followed here. (Data on in-state corporate plaintiffs are presented in Appendix $B$ to satisfy the curiosity of those who may wonder about the effects of including in-state corporation plaintiffs in the analysis.)

## A. Estimated Number of Cases to Be Transferred

1. Total Filings

Table 17 shows the total number of diversity cases filed by in-state individual plaintiffs in FY 1987. If venue for in-state individual plaintiffs were restricted, almost half (32,400 of the 66,608 ) of the diversity cases would have been transferred from federal jurisdiction to state jurisdiction. Note that many more tort cases than contract cases would be transferred. Figure 20 depicts the number of filings each state would have received in 1987 if the proposal to restrict venue were adopted.

The strong positive correlation (.83) between in-state citizen diversity filings and state population parallels the relationship already established between total diversity filings and population. Simply put,

Figure 19

## Origin of Diversity Plaintiffs



[^1]TABBE 17
IN-STATE CITIZEN DVERSTIY FILINGS BY STATE

| States | Total In-State Citizen Filings | Iort | Contract | Real Property |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California | 2485 | 973 | 1479 | 33 |
| New York | 2308 | 1671 | 611 | 26 |
| Texas | 3269 | 2550 | 675 | 44 |
| Florida | 931 | 489 | 434 | 8 |
| Pennsylvania | 2905 | 1912 | 966 | 27 |
| Illinios | 1378 | 726 | 608 | 44 |
| Ohio | 876 | 585 | 283 | 8 |
| Michigan | 1344 | 823 | 510 | 11 |
| New Jersey | 644 | 389 | 249 | 6 |
| North Carolina | 265 | 144 | 119 | 2 |
| Georgia | 1076 | 706 | 354 | 16 |
| Virginia | 709 | 469 | 224 | 16 |
| Massachusetts | 705 | 528 | 168 | 9 |
| Indiana | 432 | 251 | 156 | 25 |
| Missouri | 785 | 510 | 267 | 8 |
| Tennessee | 670 | 393 | 260 | 17 |
| Wisconsin | 172 | 94 | 75 | 3 |
| Washington | 325 | 207 | 117 | 1 |
| Maryland | 499 | 342 | 152 | 5 |
| Louisiana | 1431 | 1067 | 339 | 25 |
| Minnesota | 223 | 117 | 103 | 3 |
| Alabama | 618 | 300 | 303 | 15 |
| Kentucky | 378 | 216 | 154 | 8 |
| South Carolina | 664 | 435 | 218 | 11 |
| Arizona | 165 | 83 | 79 | 3 |
| Coloardo | 206 | 81 | 120 | 5 |
| Puerto Rico | 136 | 86 | 49 | 1 |
| Oklahoma | 963 | 422 | 492 | 49 |
| Connecticut | 713 | 586 | 117 | 10 |
| Iowa | 214 | 123 | 76 | 15 |
| Oregon | 176 | 90 | 84 | 2 |
| Mississippi | 1138 | 710 | 417 | 11 |
| Kansas | 257 | 143 | 99 | 15 |
| Arkansas | 504 | 317 | 177 | 10 |
| West Virginia | 298 | 175 | 107 | 16 |
| Utah | 139 | 53 | 79 | 7 |
| Nebraska | 184 | 129 | 50 | 5 |
| New Mexico | 212 | 116 | 92 | 4 |
| Maine | 119 | 86 | 32 | 1 |
| Hawaii | 381 | 326 | 53 | 2 |
| New Hampshire | 110 | 78 | 29 | 3 |
| Nevada | 148 | 42 | 100 | 6 |
| Idaho | 61 | 38 | 21 | 2 |
| Rhode Island | 170 | 91 | 75 | 4 |
| Montana | 268 | 157 | 102 | 9 |
| South Dakota | 73 | 42 | 30 | 1 |
| North Dakota | 55 | 22 | 33 | 0 |
| Delaware | 67 | 36 | 30 | 1 |
| District of Columbia | 355 | 240 | 106 | 9 |
| Vermont | 50 | 35 | 14 | 1 |
| Alaska | 65 | 20 | 41 | 4 |
| Wyoming | 81 | 45 | 28 | 8 |
| TOTALS | 32,400 | 20,269 | 11,556 | 575 |
| MEAN | 623 | 390 | 222 | 11 |
| MEDIAN | 340 | 212 | 117 | 8 |

# Figure 20 Individual In-State Diversity Plaintiffs 



Filings
Total Cases $=\mathbf{3 2 , 4 0 0}$
larger states can expect more diversity cases if venue is restricted just as they could expect to receive a larger number of diversity cases if diversity jurisdiction were completely abolished.
2. Filings Per Population

In-state citizens' diversity filings per population is shown in Table 18. With respect to the total number of in-state plaintiff filings, the District of Columbia again has the highest ratio. Other states that would receive an unusually high ratio of diversity filings per population are Mississippi, Hawail, Montana and Oklahoma. States receiving disproportionately fewer filings per population are Wisconsin, North Carolina, and Puerto Rico. Interestingly enough, states with low in-state diversity filings per population have both unusually low tort and contract filings. The pattern with respect to unusually high in-state plaintiff filings is mixed. The District of Columbia, Mississippi, and Montana have disproportionately high filings per population for both tort and contract cases, whereas Oklahoma's high proportion of in-state filings is primarily a result of high contract filings and Hawaii's high rate is attributable to the large proportion of tort filings.
3. Filings Per Judge

Table 19 shows the number of in-state citizen filings per judge. When number of judges are considered, South Carolina will receive the most in-state filings (21) per judge. Other states receiving an unusually high proportion of filings per judge are Hawaii, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Virginia. Neither the District of Columbia nor Montana, jurisdictions which also were expected to receive a high proportion of filings per population, came out unusually high on this measure. Wisconsin, Puerto Rico, and Minnesota would receive an unusually low

IN-STAEE CITIZEN DIVERSTTY FILINGS PER POPULATION

| States | State <br> Population <br> (in thousands) | Total <br> Citizen <br> Filings | Total Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population | Tort filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population | Contract filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California | 27663 | 2485 | 9 | 4 | 5 |
| New York | 17825 | 2308 | 13 | 9 | 3 |
| Texas | 16789 | 3269 | 19 | 15 | 4 |
| Florida | 12023 | 931 | 8 | 4 | 4 |
| Pennsylvania | 11936 | 2905 | 24 | 16 | 8 |
| Illinois | 11582 | 1378 | 12 | 6 | 5 |
| Ohio | 10784 | 876 | 8 | 5 | 3 |
| Michigan | 9200 | 1344 | 15 | 9 | 6 |
| New Jersey | 7672 | 644 | 8 | 5 | 3 |
| North Carolina | 6413 | 265 | 4 | 2 | 2 |
| Georgia | 6222 | 1076 | 17 | 11 | 6 |
| Virginia | 5904 | 709 | 12 | 8 | 4 |
| Massachusetts | 5855 | 705 | 12 | 9 | 3 |
| Indiana | 5531 | 432 | 8 | 5 | 3 |
| Missouri | 5103 | 785 | 15 | 10 | 5 |
| Tennessee | 4855 | 670 | 14 | 8 | 5 |
| Wisconsin | 4807 | 172 | 4 | 2 | 2 |
| Washington | 4538 | 325 | 7 | 5 | 3 |
| Maryland | 4535 | 499 | 11 | 8 | 3 |
| Louisiana | 4461 | 1431 | 32 | 24 | 8 |
| Minnesota | 4246 | 223 | 5 | 3 | 2 |
| Alabama | 4083 | 618 | 15 | 7 | 7 |
| Kentucky | 3727 | 378 | 10 | 6 | 4 |
| South Carolina | 3425 | 664 | 19 | 13 | 6 |
| Arizona | 3386 | 165 | 5 | 2 | 2 |
| Colorado | 3296 | 206 | 6 | 2 | 4 |
| Puerto Rico | 3292 | 136 | 4 | 3 | 1 |
| Ok7ahoma | 3272 | 963 | 29 | 13 | 15 |
| Connecticut | 3211 | 713 | 22 | 18 | 4 |
| Iowa | 2834 | 214 | 8 | 4 | 3 |
| Oregon | 2724 | 176 | 6 | 3 | 3 |
| Mississippi | 2625 | 1138 | 43 | 27 | 16 |
| Kansas | 2476 | 257 | 10 | 6 | 4 |
| Arkansas | 2388 | 504 | 21 | 13 | 7 |
| West Virginia | 1897 | 298 | 16 | 9 | 6 |
| Utah | 1680 | 139 | 8 | 3 | 5 |
| Nebraska | 1594 | 184 | 12 | 8 | 3 |
| New Mexico | 1500 | 212 | 14 | 8 | 6 |
| Maine | 1187 | 119 | 10 | 7 | 3 |
| Hawai | 1083 | 381 | 35 | 30 | 5 |
| New Hampshire | 1057 | 110 | 10 | 7 | 3 |
| Nevada | 1007 | 148 | 15 | 4 | 10 |
| Idaho | 998 | 61 | 6 | 4 | 2 |
| Rhode Island | 986 | 170 | 17 | 9 | 8 |
| Montana | 809 | 268 | 33 | 19 | 13 |
| South Dakota | 709 | 73 | 10 | 6 | 4 |
| North Dakota | 672 | 55 | 8 | - 3 | 5 |
| Delaware | 644 | 67 | 10 | 6 | 5 |
| District of Columbia | 622 | 355 | 57 | 39 | 17 |
| Vermont | 548 | 50 | 9 | 6 | 3 |
| - Alaska | 525 | 65 | 12 | 4 | 8 |
| Wyoming | 490 | 81 | 17 | 9 | 6 |
| Total |  | 32,400 |  |  |  |
| Mean |  | 623 | 15 | 9 | 5 |
| Median |  | 340 | 12 | 7 | 4 |

IN-STATE CITIZEN DIVERSTTY FILINGS PER JUGGE

| States | In-State Citizen filings | Number of <br> Judges | In-State <br> Citizen Filings <br> Per Judge |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California | 2485 | 724 | 3 |
| New York | 2308 | 387 | 6 |
| Texas | 3269 | 375 | 9 |
| Florida | 931 | 362 | 3 |
| Pennsylvania | 2905 | 330 | 9 |
| Illinois | 1378 | 363 | 4 |
| Ohio | 876 | 339 | 3 |
| Michigan | 1344 | 196 | 7 |
| North Carolina | 265 | 72 | 4 |
| Georgia | 1076 | 135 | 8 |
| Virginia | 709 | 122 | 6 |
| Massachusetts | 705 | 61 | 12 |
| Indiana | 432 | 206 | 2 |
| Missouri | 785 | 133 | 6 |
| Tennessee | 670 | 128 | 5 |
| Washington | 325 | 133 | 2 |
| Maryland | 499 | 109 | 5 |
| Louisiana | 1431 | 192 | 7 |
| Alabama | 618 | 124 | 5 |
| Kentucky | 378 | 91 | 4 |
| South Carolina | 664 | 31 | 21 |
| Arizona | 165 | 101 | 2 |
| Colorado | 206 | 121 | 2 |
| Puerto Rico | 136 | 92 | 1 |
| OkTahoma | 963 | 71 | 14 |
| Iowa | 214 | 100 | 2 |
| Oregon | 176 | 85 | 2 |
| Mississippi | 1138 | 79 | 14 |
| Kansas | 257 | 146 | 2 |
| Arkansas | 504 | 70 | 7 |
| West Virginia | 298 | 60 | 5 |
| Utah | 139 | 29 | 5 |
| Nebraska | 184 | 48 | 4 |
| New Mexico | 212 | 59 | 4 |
| Maine | 119 | 16 | 7 |
| Hawai i | 381 | 24 | 16 |
| New Hampshire | 110 | 25 | 4 |
| Nevada | 148 | 35 | 4 |
| Idaho | 61 | 33 | 2 |
| Rhode 1sland | 170 | 19 |  |
| Montana | 268 | 41 | 7 |
| South Dakota | 73 | 35 | 2 |
| North Dakota | 55 | 26 | 2 |
| Delaware | 67 | 17 | 4 |
| Alaska | 65 | 29 | 2 |
| Wyoming | 81 | 17 | 5 |
| States with Non-Comparable Judge Figures |  |  |  |
| New Jersey | 644 | 321 | 2 |
| Wisconsin | 172 | 197 | 1 |
| Minnesota | 223 | 224 | 1 |
| Connecticut | 713 | 139 | 5 |
| District of Columbia | 355 | 51 | 7 |
| Vermont | 50 | 25 | 2 |
| Total | 32,400 | 6,948 |  |
| Mean | 623 | 134 | 5 |
| Median | 340 | 92 | 4 |

ratio of in-state filings per judge. Again, note that Wisconsin and Minnesota are both states where the inability to distinguish judges eligible to decide diversity cases tends to understate the impact of diversity filings.

## B. Complexity of Cases Transferred

1. Caseload Composition

Table 20 shows how the caseload composition varies between total diversity filings and in-state citizen filings. In all states but Delaware, closing federal courts to in-state plaintiffs would mean that the percentage of torts transferred to states would be higher than would be the case if diversity jurisdiction were abolished completely. In all states but Illinois, barring in-state plaintiffs from filing in federal court, rather than abolishing diversity jurisdiction altogether, would increase the proportion of contract cases transferred.

## 2. Increase in State filings

The question of how the transfer of federal torts and contracts would affect the states cannot be resolved completely because so many jurisdictions do not separate civil filings into tort and contract categories. This information is available for nearly one-half of the states and estimates of tort filings are made for an additional 17 states.

Table 21 lists tort filings figures for 28 states and contract filings for 22 and calculates the percentage increase in state tort and contract caseloads under this option. Assuming again some equivalence among state and federal cases, Table 21 shows that Hawaii would receive the largest burden of cases under the venue restriction option (an 18\% increase). Other states receiving a large proportion of cases (i.e. increasing their caseload by $5 \%$ or more) include Arkansas, Montana, and Texas.

## TORTS AID CONTRACTS AS A PEECENT OF TOTAL DVVERSITY AND IN-STATE CITIZEN PLANTITF CASES

| States | Contracts as Percentage of otal Diversity Filings | Contracts as Percentage of In-State Citizen $\qquad$ Plaintiff | Percentage Difference | Torts as Percentage of Total Diversity $\qquad$ | Torts as Percentage of In-State Citizen $\qquad$ Plaintiff | Percenta <br> Differen |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California | 69 | 60 | -9 | 29 | 39 | 10 |
| New York | 54 | 26 | -28 | 45 | 72 | 27 |
| Texas | 37 | 21 | -16 | 62 | 78 | 16 |
| Florida | 60 | 47 | -13 | 38 | 53 | 15 |
| Pennsylvania | 47 | 33 | -14 | 52 | 66 | 14 |
| Illinois | 36 | 44 | 8 | 19 | 53 | 35 |
| Ohio | 46 | 32 | -14 | 53 | 67 | 14 |
| Michigan | 54 | 38 | -16 | 45 | 61 | 16 |
| New Jersey | 57 | 39 | -19 | 42 | 60 | 18 |
| North Carolina | 66 | 45 | -21 | 33 | 54 | 21 |
| Georgia | 49 | 33 | -16 | 50 | 66 | 16 |
| Virginia | 46 | 32 | -14 | 52 | 66 | 14 |
| Massachusetts | 40 | 24 | -16 | 58 | 75 | 17 |
| Indiana | 36 | 36 | 0 | 34 | 58 | 24 |
| Missouri | 50 | 34 | -16 | 48 | 65 | 17 |
| Tennessee | 49 | 39 | -10 | 49 | 59 | 10 |
| Wisconsin | 63 | 44 | -19 | 35 | 55 | 20 |
| Washington | 52 | 36 | -16 | 47 | 64 | 17 |
| Maryland | 49 | 30 | -19 | 50 | 69 | 19 |
| Louisiana | 39 | 24 | -14 | 59 | 75 | 16 |
| Minnesota | 61 | 46 | -15 | 37 | 52 | 15 |
| Alabama | 65 | 49 | -16 | 31 | 49 | 18 |
| Kentucky | 50 | 41 | -9 | 48 | 57 | 9 |
| South Carolina | 45 | 33 | -12 | 52 | 66 | 14 |
| Arizona | 65 | 48 | -17 | 34 | 50 | 16 |
| Colorado | 65 | 58 | -7 | 31 | 39 | 8 |
| Puerto Rico | 39 | 36 | -3 | 58 | 63 | 5 |
| Ok7ahoma | 61 | 51 | -10 | 33 | 44 | 11 |
| Connecticut | 44 | 16 | -28 | 54 | 82 | 28 |
| Iowa | 47 | 36 | -11 | 48 | 57 | 9 |
| Oregon | 61 | 48 | -13 | 36 | 51 | 15 |
| Mississippi | 40 | 37 | -3 | 59 | 62 | 3 |
| Kansas | 54 | 39 | -16 | 41 | 56 | 15 |
| Arkansas | 45 | 35 | -10 | 53 | 63 | 10 |
| West Virginia | 47 | 36 | -11 | 48 | 59 | 11 |
| Utah | 65 | 57 | -8 | 29 | 38 | 9 |
| Nebraska | 44 | 27 | -17 | 54 | 70 | 16 |
| New Mexico | 51 | 43 | -8 | 46 | 55 | 9 |
| Maine | 29 | 27 | -2 | 69 | 72 | 3 |
| Hawaii | 35 | 14 | -21 | 63 | 86 | 23 |
| New Hampshire | 37 | 26 | -11 | 60 | 71 | 11 |
| Nevada | 74 | 68 | -6 | 25 | 28 | 3 |
| Idaho | 51 | 34 | -17 | 43 | 62 | 19 |
| Rhode Island | 51 | 44 | -8 | 46 | 53 | 7 |
| Montana | 46 | 38 | -8 | 49 | 59 | 10 |
| South Dakota | 41 | 41 | 0 | 55 | 58 | 3 |
| North Dakota | 71 | 60 | -11 | 29 | 40 | 11 |
| Delaware | 45 | 45 | 0 | 55 | 54 | -1 |
| District of Columbia | ia 39 | 30 | -9 | 58 | 68 | 10 |
| Vermont | 36 | 28 | -8 | 64 | 70 | 6 |
| Alaska | 72 | 63 | -9 | 26 | 31 | 5 |
| Wyoming | 49 | 35 | -14 | 44 | 56 | 12 |
| Mean <br> Median | $\begin{aligned} & 50 \\ & 49 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 39 \\ & 36 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -11 \\ & -13 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 46 \\ & 48 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 59 \\ & 59 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 13 \\ & 11 \end{aligned}$ |

TABLE 21: IICREASE IH TORTS ANO CONTRACTS PER STATE

|  | States | State Torts | State Contracts | State Torts and Contracts | Federal Torts | Federal Contracts | Federal Torts and Contracts | Percent Increase in Torts and Contracts |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | California | 137455 |  |  | 973 | 1479 | 2452 |  |
|  | New York | 92538 | 23650 | 116188 | 1671 | 611 | 2282 | 2 |
|  | Texas | 40764 | 56835 | 97599 | 2550 | 675 | 3225 | 3 |
|  | Florida | 35453 | 57076 | 92529 | 489 | 434 | 923 | 1 |
|  | Ohio | 29375 |  |  | 585 | 283 | 868 |  |
|  | Michigan | 29756 |  |  | 823 | 510 | 1333 |  |
|  | North Carolina | 8981 | 4824 | 13805 | 144 | 119 | 263 | 2 |
|  | Massachusetts | 14251 | 3994 | 18245 | 528 | 168 | 696 | 4 |
|  | Missouri | 10483 | 7571 | 18054 | 510 | 267 | 777 | 4 |
|  | Tennessee | 13597 | 8257 | 21854 | 393 | 260 | 653 | 3 |
|  | Wisconsin | 9545 | 42323 | 51868 | 94 | 75 | 169 | 0 |
|  | Washington | 8007 | 14352 | 22359 | 207 | 117 | 324 | 1 |
|  | Maryland | 12938 | 7323 | 20261 | 342 | 152 | 494 | 2 |
|  | Minnesota | 10739 | 8760 | 19499 | 117 | 103 | 220 | 1 |
|  | Astizona | 12260 | 25680 | 37940 | 83 | 79 | 162 | 0 |
|  | Colorado | 3666 | 18979 | 22645 | 81 | 120 | 201 | 1 |
|  | Fuerto Rico | 4811 | 4944 | 9755 | 86 | 49 | 135 | 1 |
| $\cdots$ | Connecticut | 15385 | 21176 | 36561 | 586 | 117 | 703 | 2 |
|  | Kansas | 3588 | 9305 | 12893 | 143 | 99 | 242 | 2 |
|  | Arkansas | 5606 | 26900 | 32506 | 317 | 177 | 494 | 2 |
|  | Utah | 1351 |  |  | 53 | 79 | 132 |  |
|  | New Mexico | 4037 | 11734 | 15771 | 116 | 92 | 208 | 1 |
|  | Maine | 1786 | 1082 | 2868 | 86 | 32 | 118 | 4 |
|  | Hawaii | 1785 | 1690 | 3475 | 326 | 53 | 379 59 | 11 |
|  | Idaho | 1376 |  |  | 38 | 21 | 59 |  |
|  | Montana | 1792 | 4234 | 6026 | 157 | 102 | 259 | 4 |
|  | North Dakota | 551 | 3594 | 4145 | 22 | 33 | 55 | 1 |
|  | Alaska | 1664 |  |  | 20 | 41 | 61 |  |

Source: State court data are from Court Statistics Project, State Court Caselead Statistics: Annual Report, 1987 (Williamsburg, VA: National Center for State Courts, 1989).

Figure 21 depicts the percent increase in tort caseloads not only for the states in Table 2l, but also for those states where tort filings can be estimated based on population. Estimates were made for the 17 states with two-tiered court systems in addition to four states listed in Table 2l, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania would also receive a disproportionately large increase in torts if federal courts were closed to in-state citizen plaintiffs.


## Effects of Raising the Jurisdictional Limit

There has been an amount-in-controversy requirement for cases based upon diversity of citizenship jurisdiction ever since the Judiciary Act of 1789 established the amount at $\$ 500$. The dollar demanded remained at $\$ 500$ for nearly a century until it was raised to $\$ 2,000$ in 1887 , then to $\$ 3,000$ by 1911 , and to $\$ 10,000$ in 1958 . During the course of this research the federal jurisdictional limit was again raised to $\$ 50,000$. Therefore, all diversity cases where the amount-in-controversy is less than $\$ 50,000$ will go to state courts after May 18, 1989. Accordingly, this research will provide baseline data against which the changes in diversity filings can be evaluated in the years to come.

The total number of diversity cases filed in federal court is highly correlated with the consumer price index, which suggests a tie to inflation. ${ }^{48}$ The American Bar Association calculated that it would take approximately $\$ 35,000$ in current dollars to equal the $\$ 10,000$ jurisdictional limit established in $1958 .{ }^{44}$ This inflation means that, in relative terms, cases are being filed in U.S. District Court now that could not have been filed in 1958. It also means that, in effect, the new legislation raised the jurisdictional limit only $\$ 15,000$ once inflation is taken into account.

The second reason is that so much data on dollar amount demanded is missing that the number of cases where the amount-in-controversy is $\$ 50,000$ or less must be estimated for all states. The estimation procedures used were discussed in Chapter II.

## Figure 22 <br> Percentage of Diversity Cases With Amount Demanded of $\$ 50,000$ or Less

State


Note: estimates based on avallable
amount demanded data

## A. Estimated Number of Cases to Be Transferred

1. Total Filings

The percentage of total diversity cases in which the amount demanded was $\$ 50,000$ or less is given in Figure 22. About a third (35\%) of all cases filed in federal court in FY 1987 involved amounts-incontroversy of $\$ 50,000$ or less. Puerto Rico, Mississippi and Maine were the three states with the lowest percentage of cases (15\%) with dollar demands under $\$ 50,000$. On the other hand, over $60 \%$ of the diversity cases filed in Nevada and Illinois were for dollar amounts under $\$ 50,000$. The large number (1772) of real property diversity cases where the dollar demand is $\$ 50,000$ or less helps to explain why Illinois' filings under $\$ 50,000$ were so high. Figure 23 graphically displays the estimates of the number of cases filed in which the amount in controversy was $\$ 50,000$ or less.
2. Filings Per Population

Table 22 shows diversity filings per population for cases where the dollar demanded was $\$ 30,000$ or less. By this criterion, Nevada, The District of Columbia, Illinois, and Pennsylvania would have the largest number of filings per pópuiātioñ añá Puerto Rico, kinode island, Maine, Ohio, and Wisconsin would have the smallest.
3. Filings Per Judge

Estimated number of filings where dollar demand was $\$ 50,000$ or less per judge is listed in Table 23. Using the per judge criteria, South Carolina, Pennsylvania, Nevada and Hawail would receive proportionately more of these cases than other states would.

## Figure 23 <br> Estimated Number of Diversity Cases With Amount Demanded of $\$ 50,000$ or Less



Note: estimates based on avaliable
amount demanded data

TABLE 22
ESTIMaTED NuBEER OF DVVESSTTY CASES
HITH DOLLAR DEMAND OF \$50,OOO OR LESS

| States | State Populations (in thousands) | Total Number of Federal Diversity Filings | Percentage of Diversity Cases With \$ Demanded of $\$ 50,000$ or Less | Estimated Diversity Cases With \$ Demanded of $\$ 50,000$ or Less | $\begin{gathered} \text { Estimated Filir } \\ \text { Per } 100,000 \\ \text { Population } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California | 26981 | 4182 | 42 | 1769* | 7 |
| New York | 17772 | 5032 | 32 | 1754 | 10 |
| Texas | 16789 | 5537 | 56 | 3078 | 18 |
| Florida | 12023 | 1787 | 42 | 747* | 6 |
| Pennsylvania | 11936 | 5642 | 58 | 3279 | 27 |
| Illinois | 11582 | 5532 | 60 | 3343 | 29 |
| Ohio | 10784 | 1503 | 21 | 314 | 3 |
| Michigan | 9200 | 2117 | 40 | 849* | 9 |
| New Jersey | 7672 | 2025 | 35 | 709* | 9 |
| North Carolina | 6413 | 644 | 51 | 329 | 5 |
| Georgia | 6222 | 1961 | 28 | 547 | 9 |
| Virginia | 5904 | 1480 | 22 | 324 | 5 |
| Massachusetts | 5855 | 1233 | 19 | 239 | 4 |
| Indiana | 5531 | 1179 | 55 | 643 | 12 |
| Missouri | 5103 | 1449 | 32 | 462 | 9 |
| Tennessee | 4855 | 1252 | 26 | 327 | 7 |
| Wisconsin | 4807 | 430 | 34 | 148 | 3 |
| Washington | 4538 | 568 | 35 | 197* | 4 |
| Maryland | 4535 | 1037 | 22 | 224 | 5 |
| Louisiana | 4461 | 2759 | 20 | 547 | 12 |
| Minnesota | 4246 | 491 | 45 | 223 | 5 |
| Alabama | 4083 | 1416 | 36 | 517 | 13 |
| Kentucky | 3727 | 803 | 34 | 275 | 7 |
| South Carolina | 3425 | 1073 | 35 | 376* | 11 |
| Arizona | 3386 | 417 | 41 | 173 | 5 |
| Colorado | 3296 | 512 | 35 | 179* | 5 |
| Puerto Rico | 3292 | 299 | 15 | 45 | 1 |
| Okl ahoma | 3272 | 2024 | 27 | 554 | 17 |
| Connecticut | 3211 | 1289 | 34 | 434 | 14 |
| Iowa | 2834 | 377 | 38 | 145* | 5 |
| Oregon | 2724 | 496 | 37 | 184 | 7 |
| Mississippi | 2625 | 1630 | 15 | 249 | 9 |
| Kansas | 2476 | 606 | 54 | 330 | 13 |
| Arkansas | 2388 | 882 | 35 | 312 | 13 |
| West Virginia | 1897 | 604 | 24 | 142 | 7 |
| Utah | 1680 | 392 | 39 | 153 | 9 |
| Nebraska | 1594 | 343 | 35 | 120* | 8 |
| New Mexico | 1500 | 459 | 35 | 160 | 11 |
| Maine | 1187 | 185 | 15 | 26 | 2 |
| Hawai | 1083 | 606 | 35 | 212* | 20 |
| New Hampshire | 1057 | 238 | 16 | 38 | 4 |
| Nevada | 1007 | 537 | 65 | 347 | 34 |
| Idaho | 998 | 185 | 26 | 47 | 5 |
| Rhode Island | 986 | 310 | 58 | 18 | 2 |
| Montana | 809 | 396 | 35 | 139* | 17 |
| South Dakota | 709 | 180 | 23 | 42 | 6 |
| North Dakota | 672 | 119 | 48 | 58 | 9 |
| Del aware | 644 | 200 | 35 | 70* | 11 |
| District of Columbia | 622 | 1053 | 20 | 208 | 33 |
| Vermowe | 548 | 132 | 53 | 69 | 13 |
| Alaska | 525 | 139 | 43 | 60 | 11 |
| Wyoming | 490 | 216 | 35 | 76* | 16 |
| totals | 246,691 | 66,408 |  | 25,810 |  |
| MEAN |  | 1,277 |  |  |  |
| median |  | 625 |  |  |  |

## ESTHMTED NMBEER OF OIVESSTTY CASES PER STATE JUOGE \$50,000 OR LESS

| States | Number of General Jurisdiction $\qquad$ | Estimated Number of Cases with Amount Demanded of $\$ 50.000$ or less | Estimated Number of Cases Per Judge |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California | 724 | 1769* | 2 |
| New York | 387 | 1754* | 5 |
| Texas | 375 | 3078 | 8 |
| Florida | 362 | 747* | 2 |
| Pennsylvania | 330 | 3279 | 10 |
| Illinois | 363 | 3343 | 9 |
| Ohio | 339 | 314 | 1 |
| Michigan | 196 | 849* | 4 |
| North Carolina | 72 | 329 | 5 |
| Georgia | 135 | 547 | 4 |
| Virginia | 122 | 324 | 3 |
| Massachusetts | 61** | 239 | 4 |
| Indiana | 206 | 643 | 3 |
| Missouri | 133 | 462 | 3 |
| Tennessee | 128 | 327 | 3 |
| Washington | 133 | 197* | 1 |
| Maryland | 109 | 224 | 2 |
| Louisiana | 192 | 547 | 3 |
| Alabama | 124 | 517 | 4 |
| Kentucky | 91 | 275 | 3 |
| South Carolina | 31 | 376* | 12 |
| Arizona | 101 | 173 | 2 |
| Colorado | 121 | 179* | 1 |
| Puerto Rico | 92 | 45 | 1 |
| Oklahoma | 71 | 554 | 8 |
| Iowa | 100 | 145* | 1 |
| Oregon | 85 | 184 | 2 |
| Mississippi | 79 | 249 | 3 |
| Kansas | 146 | 330 | 2 |
| Arkansas | 70 | 312 | 4 |
| West Virginia | 60 | 142 | 2 |
| Utah | 29 | 153 | 5 |
| Nebraska | 48 | 120* | 3 |
| New Mexico | 59 | 160 | 3 |
| Maine | 16 | 26 | 2 |
| Hawaii | 24 | 212* | 9 |
| New Hampshire | 25 | 38 | 2 |
| Nevada | 35 | 347 | 10 |
| Idaho | 33 | 47 | 1 |
| Rhode Island | 19 | 18 | 1 |
| Montana | 41 | 139* | 3 |
| South Dakota | 35 | 42 | 1 |
| North Dakota | 26 | 58 | 2 |
| Delaware | 17 | 70* | 4 |
| Alaska | 29 | 60 | 2 |
| Wyoming | 17 | 76* | 4 |
| States with Non-Comparable Judge Figures |  |  |  |
| New Jersey | 321 | 709* | 2 |
| Wisconsin | 197 | 148 | 1 |
| Minnesota | 224 | 223 | 1 |
| Connecticut | 139 | 434 | 3 |
| District of Columbia | 51 | 208 | 4 |
| Vermont | 25 | 69 | 3 |

1. Caseload Composition

Table 24 shows the breakdown of diversity filings where the amount-in-controversy is less than $\$ 50,000$ into torts and contracts. Of the 20,199 filings from 39 states estimated to be transferred, 10,589 would be contracts and 6966 would be torts. In terms of average state percentages, a much larger proportion of contracts (63\%) than torts (31\%) would be transferred. This proportion, however, is affected strongly by the unusually large number of real property cases in Illinois and Indiana. Accordingly, estimates of the number of tort cases with dollar amount demanded of $\$ 50,000$ or less were based upon the ratio between tort and contract filings in 37 states. Removing the Illinois and Indiana figures, changed the ratio of estimated tort to contract filings ( $40 \%$ and 58\% respectively).

## 2. Increase In State Filings

Between the 39 states where estimates in dollar amount were possible, the 28 states where state data on torts are available, and the 22 states where state data on contracts were available, there were only 14 states where it was possible to calculate percentage increase in state filings. Without using further estimates, of these, the largest percentage increase was Hawail with four percent. Using the estimates prepared in Table 24, however, enables us to predict the impact in many more states. Table 25 and Figure 24 shows the result of that analysis. States that may expect a five percent increase in filings are Texas and Hawaii. Pennsylvania and Utah could expect to receive a four percent increase in tort filings.

The manner of disposition for federal diversity cases terminated in FY 1987 in which the amount in controversy was $\$ 50,000$ or less is presented in Appendix $C$. The table was not included in the main body of the report to emphasize that the data must be viewed with caution. The number of terminations where the amount in controversy is unknown is likely to be high, probably about a third of all terminations, if the dollar demanded data missing for filings is any indication, and unevenly distributed. On the premise that data not available at filing will not be avallable at termination, states in which less than half of the dollar amounts was reported at filing are marked with an asterisk. Most states so marked do appear to have fewer total terminations than expected. The reader will recall, for example, that only two percent of the filings in the U.S. District Court in Colorado specified amount in controversy. In Appendix $C$, the number of the terminations for diversity filings of $\$ 50,000$ or less in Colorado is only 23. Although there was some hesitation about including this table in the text at all because of the missing dollar information, for some states this will be the most useful information in the report. From the data presented in Appendix $C$ states will be able to estimate the additional number of trials caused by the increase in the federal furisdictional limit to $\$ 50,000$.

Despite the problems of underreporting of dollar amount demanded in the states marked with an asterisk, the aggregate national figures are revealing. For example, the 42 percent of cases in which the dollar amount demanded was $\$ 50,000$ or less were terminated through no court action, or six percentage points higher than the proportion of total diversity cases terminated without court action. Similarly the proportion of cases under $\$ 50,000$ terminated by trial (6.5\%) is less than
$\$ 50,000$ OR LESS CASES BY CASETYPE

States
New York
Texas
PennsyTvania Illinois Ohio North Carolina Georgia Virginia
Massachusetts
Indiana Missouri Tennessee Wisconsin Maryland Louisiana Minnesota Alabama Kentucky Estimated Number
Cases $1 / 2$ ith Demand
of $\$ 50.000$ or Less

1754
3078 3078
3279
3343
314
329
547
324
239
239
643
462
327
$+148$
224
547
223
517
Arizona
175
Puerto Rico
Oklahoma
Connecticut
Oregon
Mississippi
Kansas
Arkansas
West Virginia
New Mexico
Maine
New Hampshire
Nevada 347
Idaho 47

Rhode Island
South Dakota
North Dakota
District of Columbia
Vermont
Alaska
Estimates based upon national averages.

| Iowa | 145 | 58 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Nebraska | 120 | 48 |
| Delaware | 70 | 28 |
| Wyoming | 76 | 30 |
| Michigan | 849 | 340 |
| Florida | 747 | 299 |
| Montana | 139 | 56 |
| Hawaii | 212 | 85 |
| South Carolina | 376 | 150 |
| California | 1,769 | 708 |
| Washington | 197 | 79 |
| New Jersey | 709 | 248 |
| Colorado | 179 | 77 |

Real Propert $\begin{array}{ll}\text { Tort Cases } & \text { Contract Cases } \\ \$ 50.000 \text { or Less } & \$ 50.000 \text { or Less }\end{array}$

Cases $\$ 50,00$ or Less.
1456
811
1672
1036
207
247
372
227
165
71
300
255
99
186
334
119
357
160
106
31
426
317
147
152
171
191
100
95
107
17
30
288
35
12
23
41
135
23
39

TABLE 25
ESTIMATED IMCREASE IN SATE TORT FILINGS
ASSUHING A FEDERAL JURISOICTION LIMIT OF \$50,000

|  | Estimated Number of Tort Cases Under $\$ 50.000$ | Number of State <br> Iort Filings | Estimated <br> Percentage Increase <br> In Tort Filings |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California | 708* | 137,455 | 1 |
| New York | 281 | 92,538 | ** |
| Texas | 2216 | 40,764 | 5 |
| Florida | 299* | 35,453 | 1 |
| Pennsylvania | 1541 | 38,311* | 4 |
| Illinois | 535 | - | - |
| Ohio | 98 | 29,375 | ** |
| Michigan | 340* | 29,756 | 1 |
| New Jersey | 284* | - | - |
| North Carolina | 79 | 8981 | 1 |
| Georgia | 170 | 19971* | 1 |
| Virginia | 94 | 18950* | 1 |
| Massachusetts | 67 | 14251 | 1 |
| Indiana | 103 | 17753* | 1 |
| Missouri | 157 | 10483 | 2 |
| Tennessee | 72 | 13597 | 1 |
| Wisconsin | 46 | -- | - |
| Washington | 79* | 8007 | ** |
| Maryland | 36 | 12,938 | ** |
| Louisiana | 197 | 14318* | 1 |
| Minnesota | 100 | - | - |
| Al abama | 124 | 13105* | 1 |
| Kentucky | 110 | 11962* | 1 |
| South Carolina | 150* | 10993* | 1 |
| Arizona | 67 | 12260 | 1 |
| Colorado | 77* | 3666 | 2 |
| Puerto Rico | 9 | 4811 | ** |
| Oklahoma | 89 | - | - |
| Connecticut | 113 | -- | - |
| Iowa | 58* | - | - |
| Oregon | 35 | 8743* | ** |
| Mississippi | 92 | 8425* | 1 |
| Kansas | 142 | 3588 | ** |
| Arkansas | 112 | 5606 | 2 |
| West Virginia | 38 | 6089* | 1 |
| Utah | 50 | 1351 | 4 |
| Nebraska | 48* | 5116* | 1 |
| New Mexico | 53 | 4037 | 1 |
| Maine | 9 | 1786 | 1 |
| Hawai | 85* | 1785 | 5 |
| New Hampshire | 8 | 3393* | ** |
| Nevada | 56 | 3232* | 2 |
| Idaho | 11 | 1376 | 1 |
| Rhode Island | 6 | 3165* | ** |
| Montana | 56* | 1792 | 3 |
| South Dakota | 16 | - | - |
| North Dakota | 17 | 551 | 3 |
| Delaware | 28* | 2067* | 1 |
| District of Columbia | 65 | -- | - |
| Vermont | 45 |  | - |
| Alaska | 17 | 1664 | 1 |
| Wyoming | 30* | 1573* | 2 |

Figure 24
Increase in State Tort Filings When Dollar Amount Is Raised to $\$ 50,000$


- Data are from all states
which report forts as a
separate category of civil cases.
Estimated Increase in Torts


[^2]the proportion of total diversity cases terminated by trial (8\%). The comparable figures for jury trials are similar ( $4.6 \%$ and $6 \%$ respectively). It is not surprising to find that cases in which the amount in controversy is $\$ 50,000$ or less are more likely to be settled without court action and less likely to require trials (non-jury or jury) than cases where the dollar amount demanded is over $\$ 50,000$.

A comparison of the pattern of terminations in Appendix $C$ with those in Table 16 show that again Colorado and Puerto Rico have the lowest percentage of terminations without court action and Alaska, Connecticut and Oregon have the highest percentage of terminations without court action. In other words, the three states which have a high percentage of terminations without court action overall also have a high percentage of terminations without court action for cases with amounts if controversy is under $\$ 50,000$. However, California, District of Columbia, and Wyoming have a large percentage of cases involving amounts over $\$ 50,000$ terminated without court action, but not a large number of diversity cases overall terminating without court action.

In absolute terms, Texas and Pennsylvania would receive the most trials. The proportion of cases under $\$ 50,000$ terminated by trial varied from a low of zero for Arizona, Colorado and Idaho (one percent in Illinois and Indiana) to 21 percent in Rhode Island, Texas, and Vermont. Again, these proportions are similar to the ones reported for termination by trial in all diversity cases.

The estimates presented in this chapter are a baseline against which to measure actual changes in both federal and state filings. In 1958, when the amount-in-controversy jurisdictional limit was raised from $\$ 3,000$ to $\$ 10,000$, the number of cases declined by approximately 8,367 cases (from 25,709 to 17,342 filings or $33 \%$ ) the next year, and it took

14 years for the filings to increase to their 1958 level. Unfortunately, the transition from the $\$ 10,000$ to the $\$ 50,000$ jurisdictional limit will occur on May 18, 1989--near the end of FY 1989. Therefore, the FY 1989 data will not clearly reflect any changes in filing patterns. Indeed, filings under $\$ 50,000$ may actually increase as attorneys struggle to file cases before the May deadline. Only when FY 1990 data are reported will it be possible to determine if the decline in number of federal cases under $\$ 50,000$, and consequently the increase in the number of cases reverting to state courts, is as great as predicted.

## Contrasts and Conclusions

This chapter will attempt to bring together the research findings of the earlier chapters. The research question was how state courts would be affected if federal diversity jurisdiction were eliminated or curtailed. This question can be best answered by examining the effects on state court caseloads of each of the three major proposals to abolish or curtail federal diversity jurisdiction, including the increase in federal jurisdiction to $\$ 50,000$ which has already become law. Appendix $E$ provides a state-by-state summary of how the proposed changes in diversity jurisdiction would affect individual states. The remaining portion of this chapter discusses the effect on the states as a whole.

## A. Contrasts in Case Distribution

1. Total Filings

Assuming that one filing in federal district court would have resulted in one filing in state court if diversity jurisdiction were transferred, completely abolishing diversity jurisdiction in FY 1987 would have added 66,408 filings to state courts. Closing federal courts to individual in-state plaintiffs would have added 32,400 ( $49 \%$ of the total) filings to state courts in FY 1987. Raising the jurisdictional limit would have transferred an estimated 25,000 ( $43 \%$ of the total) diversity filings from federal court to state courts. Table 26 shows the number of cases that would have bsen filed in state courts if diversity jurisdiction had been abolished or curtailed in FY 1987. Pennsylvania would have received the most diversity filings under the assumption of total abolition, Texas would have received the most under the assumption that the diversity option would be closed to in-state plaintiffs, and Illinois is expected to receive the greatest number of filings under the

## FMMEER DVERSSITY FILINGS ESTIMTED TO BE TRAMSEERED TO STATE COURTS UNDER THREE PROPOSALS TO CHAGEE FEDERAL DIVERSTY JURISOICTION

| States | Total Diversity filines | Total <br> In-State Citizen <br> Diversity Filings | Estimated Filings With Dollar Demand of $\$ 50.000$ or Less |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California | 4182 | 2485 | 1769* |
| New York | 5482 | 2308 | 1754 |
| Texas | 5537 | 3269 | 3078 |
| Florida | 1787 | 931 | 747* |
| Pennsylvania | 5642 | 2905 | 3279 |
| Illinois | 5532 | 1378 | 3343 |
| Ohio | 1503 | 876 | 314 |
| Michigan | 2117 | 1344 | 849* |
| New Jersey | 2025 | 644 | 709* |
| North Carolina | 644 | 265 | 329 |
| Georgia | 1961 | 1076 | 547 |
| Virginia | 1480 | 709 | 324 |
| Massachusetts | 1233 | 705 | 239 |
| Indiana | 1179 | 432 | 643 |
| Missouri | 1449 | 785 | 462 |
| Tennessee | 1252 | 670 | 327 |
| Wisconsin | 430 | 172 | 148 |
| Washington | 568 | 325 | 197* |
| Maryland | 1037 | 499 | 224 |
| Louisiana | 2759 | 1431 | 547 |
| Minnesota | 491 | 223 | 223 |
| Alabama | 1416 | 618 | 517 |
| Kentucky | 803 | 378 | 275 |
| South Carolina | 1073 | 664 | 376* |
| Arizona | 417 | 165 | 173 |
| Colorado | 512 | 206 | 179* |
| Puerto Rico | 299 | 136 | 45 |
| Oklahoma | 2024 | 963 | 554 |
| Connecticut | 1289 | 713 | 434 |
| Iowa | 377 | 214 | 145* |
| Oregon | 496 | 176 | 184 |
| Mississippi | 1630 | 1138 | 249 |
| Kansas | 606 | 257 | 330 |
| Arkansas | 882 | 504 | 312 |
| West Virginia | 604 | 298 | 142 |
| Utah | 392 | 139 | 153 |
| Nebraska | 343 | 134 | 120* |
| New Mexico | 459 | 212 | 160 |
| Maine | 185 | 119 | 26 |
| Hawai | 606 | 381 | 212* |
| New Hampshire | 238 | 110 | 38 |
| Nevada | 537 | 148 | 347 |
| Idaho | 185 | 61 | 47 |
| Rhode Island | 310 | 170 | 18 |
| Montana | 396 | 268 | 139* |
| South Dakota | 180 | 73 | 42 |
| North Dakota | 119 | 55 | 58 |
| Delaware | 200 | 67 | 70* |
| District of Columbia | 1053 | 355 | 208 |
| Vermont | 132 | 50 | 69 |
| Alaska | 139 | 65 | 60 |
| Hyoming | 216 | 81 | 76* |

new law raising the federal jurisdiction limits to $\$ 50,000$. Half of the states would receive more than 625 filings (median), and half less than 625 under the assumption of total abolition. Under the assumption that federal courts would be closed to in-state individual plaintiffs the median number of filings would be 340 . Under the new law that raises the federal jurisdiction limits to $\$ 50,000$, the median number of filings would be 232. If diversity jurisdiction had been eliminated in FY 1987, North Dakota would have received 119 new filings. If in-state plaintiffs were barred from filing diversity actions, Vermont would have received 50 additional cases. Finally, if the legislation raising federal amount in controversy amounts to $\$ 50,000$ had been in effect in FY 1987, Rhode Island would have received 18 new filings. Figure 25 graphically compares filings under all three proposals.

Which counties would receive the most diversity filings if federal diversity jurisdiction were abolished? This is a difficult question to answer because "County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff" is not given for out-of-state plaintiffs. (If the U.S. Government is plaintiff, the county where the first listed defendant resides is named.) Appendix $D$ to this report lists the counties which had approximately 100 or more diversity filings in FY 1987. Not surprisingly, the counties with the most filings were also the largest: Los Angeles ( 1,360 ), New York $(1,351)$, Philadelplia $(1,200)$ and Cook (1,109). The large proportion (33\%) of the filings with out-of-state plaintiffs make conclusions drawn on the basis of county data tenuous.

This research also investigated the question of how the doubling of diversity filings between FY 1977 and FY 1987 affected the distribution of filings among states. A close examination of Table 2 reveals that the dramatic increase has been proportionate among states.

Figure 25
Filings Affected By The Three Proposals Individual $\operatorname{In}$-State Diversity Plaintiffs


Estimated Number of Diversity Cases With Amount Demanded of $\$ 50,000$ or Less

$\stackrel{\circ}{8}$

Generally, states which would have received the largest proportion of the 31,678 filings in FY 1977 would have received the largest proportion of the 67,125 filings in FY 1987. The only exceptions to this conclusion are Illinois and Texas, but in both of these states the state share of total diversity filings dropped in FY 1988. The conclusion remains that the increase has been proportionate among states.

## 2. Filings Per 100,000 Population

The diversity cases per 100,000 population that would have gone to states in FY 1987 under the three proposals for transfer are presented in Table 27. Under the assumption of total abolition, the median filings per 100,000 would be 25 ; under the assumption that in-state plaintiffs are barred from invoking federal diversity jurisdiction; the diversity filings per 100,000 would be 15 , and under the assumption that the dollar amount demanded was raised to $\$ 50,000$, the median filings per 100,000 would be 9.

Based upon diversity filings per 100,000 population, the District of Columbia would have received the most diversity filings under two of the three proposals and second highest filings, after Nevada, under the new law raising federal diversity jurisdiction to $\$ 50,000$. This is not surprising given the number of out-of-state individuals, including aliens, who work in Washington, D.C. and who are therefore eligible to file in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. The complete abolition of diversity jurisdiction or the closing of federal courts to in-state plaintiffs would have similar impacts on several states. In addition to the District of Columbia, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Loutsiana and Hawali would receive disproportionately large filings per population. Raising the jurisdiction limit to $\$ 50,000$ appears to

TABEE 27
Diversity filing per population UNOER THREE PROPOSALS

| States | State <br> Population (in Thousands) | Total Diversity <br> Filings Per 100.000 Population | In-State Citizen Plaintiff Filings Per 100.000 Population | Estimated Filings with Dollar Demands of $\$ 50,000$ or Less Per 100,000 Populatio |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California | 27663 | 15 | 9 | 7* |
| New York | 17825 | 31 | 13 | 10 |
| Texas | 16789 | 33 | 19 | 18 |
| Florida | 12023 | 15 | 8 | 6* |
| Pennsylvania | 11936 | 47 | 24 | 27 |
| Illinois | 11582 | 48 | 12 | 29 |
| Ohio | 10784 | 14 | 8 | 3 |
| Michigan | 9200 | 23 | 15 | 9* |
| New Jersey | 7672 | 26 | 8 | 9* |
| North Carolina | 6413 | 10 | 4 | 5 |
| Georgia | 6222 | 32 | 17 | 9 |
| Virginia | 5904 | 25 | 12 | 5 |
| Massachusetts | 5855 | 21 | 12 | 4 |
| Indiana | 5531 | 21 | 8 | 12 |
| Missouri | 5103 | 28 | 15 | 9 |
| Tenneasee | 4855 | 26 | 14 | 7 |
| Wisconsin | 4807 | 9 | 4 | 3 |
| Washington | 4538 | 13 | 7 | 4* |
| Maryland | 4535 | 23 | 11 | 5 |
| Louisiana | 4461 | 62 | 32 | 12 |
| Minnesota | 4246 | 12 | 5 | 5 |
| Alabama | 4083 | 35 | 15 | 13 |
| Kentucky | 3727 | 22 | 10 | 7 |
| South Carolina | 3425 | 31 | 19 | 11* |
| Arizona | 3386 | 12 | 5 | 5 |
| Colorado | 3296 | 16 | 6 | 5* |
| Puerto Rico | 3292 | 9 | 4 | 1 |
| Oklahoma | 3272 | 62 | 29 | 17 |
| Connecticut | 3211 | 40 | 22 | 14 |
| Iowa | 2834 | 13 | 8 | 5* |
| Oregon | 2724 | 18 | 6 | 7 |
| Mississippi | 2625 | 62 | 43 | 9 |
| Kansas | 2476 | 24 | 10 | 13 |
| Arkansas | 2388 | 37 | 21 | 13 |
| West Virginia | 1897 | 32 | 16 | 7 |
| Utah | 1680 | 23 | 8 | 9 |
| Nebraska | 1594 | 22 | 12 | 8* |
| New Mexico | 1500 | 31 | 14 | 11 |
| Maine | 1187 | 16 | 10 | 2 |
| Hawai | 1083 | 56 | 35 | 20* |
| New Hampshire | 1057 | 23 | 10 | 4 |
| Nevada | 1007 | 53 | 15 | 34 |
| Idaho | 998 | 19 | 6 | 5 |
| Rhode Island | 986 | 31 | 17 | 2 |
| Montana | 809 | 49 | 33 | 17* |
| South Dakota | 709 | 25 | 10 | 6* |
| North Dakota | 672 | 18 | 8 | 9 9* |
| Delaware | 644 | 31 | 10 | 11* |
| District of Columbia | 622 | 169 | 57 | 33 |
| Vermont | 548 | 24 | 9 | 13 |
| Alaska | 525 | 26 | 12 | 11 |
| Wyoming | 490 | 44 | 17 | 16* |
| MEAN |  | 31 | 19 | 10 |
| MEDIAN |  | 25 | 15 | 9 |

[^3]disproportionately affect a different set of states: Nevada, Pennsylvania; Florida and Hawaii, as well as the District of Columbia.

## 3. Filings Per Judge

The ability of states to respond to increases in diversity filings will depend upon many factors, including the number of filings currently being filed in state courts and the number of general jurisdiction judges. In this report, the number of judges is used as a surrogate measure for all court resources needed to process the additional caseload. Obviously, research needs to be conducted to assess the abilities of specific states and trial courts of general jurisdiction to respond to the increased case filings.

Table 28 shows the filings per judge that would have been transferred to state courts if diversity jurisdiction had been abolished or modified in FY 1987. Filings per judge in South Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Hawail would be high under all three alternatives. Abolishing diversity jurisdiction or barring in-state plaintiffs from filing in federal court would have affected Massachusetts and Mississippi as well. The District of Columbia would receive disproportionately large filings if diversity jurisdiction had been abolished totally, but not if the ability of in-state citizens plaintiffs to file in federal courts was eliminated. Again, raising the dollar amount to $\$ 50,000$ appears to result in disproportionate filings for a different set of states (e.g. Illinois, Nevada and Texas) than are affected by other two proposals.

## B. Case Complexity

## 1. Caseload Composition

Table 29 shows the composition of the caseloads that would have been transferred to state courts under each of the three proposals. If diversity jurisdiction were abolished, a roughly equal proportion of

TABEE 28

## diversity filings per voge lover thre proposals

| States | Number of General Jurisdiction $\qquad$ Judges | Total Diversity <br> Filings Per $\qquad$ Judge | In-State Citizen Plaintiff Filings Per Judae | Estimated Filings with Dollar Demands of $\$ 50,000$ or Less Per Judge. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California | 724 | 6 | 3 | 2 |
| New York | 387 | 14 | 6 | 4 |
| Texas | 375 | 15 | 9 | 8 |
| Florida | 362 | 5 | 3 | 2 |
| Pennsylvania | 330 | 17 | 9 | 10 |
| Illinois | 363 | 15 | 4 | 9 |
| Ohio | 339 | 4 | 3 | 1 |
| Michigan | 196 | 11 | 7 | 4 |
| North Carolina | 72 | 9 | 4 | 5 |
| Georgia | 135 | 15 | 8 | 4 |
| Virginia | 122 | 12 | 6 | 3 |
| Massachusetts | 61 | 20 | 12 | 4 |
| Indiana | 206. | 6 | 2 | 3 |
| Missouri | 133 | 11 | 6 | 3 |
| Tennessee | 128 | 10 | 5 | 3 |
| Washington | 133 | 4 | 2 | 1 |
| Maryland | 109 | 10 | 5 | 2 |
| Louisiana | 192 | 14 | 7 | 3 |
| Alabama | 124 | 11 | 5 | 4 |
| Kentucky | 91 | 9 | 4 | 3 |
| South Carolina | 31 | 35 | 21 | 12 |
| Arizona | 101 | 4 | 2 | 2 |
| Colorado | 121 | 4 | 2 | 1 |
| Puerto Rico | 92 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| 0k1 ahoma | 71 | 29 | 14 | 8 |
| Iowa | 100 | 4 | 2 | 1 |
| Oregon | 85 | 6 | 2 | 2 |
| Mississippi | 79 | 21 | 14 | 3 |
| Kansas | 146 | 4 | 2 | 2 |
| Arkansas | 70 | 13 | 7 | 4 |
| West Virginia | 60 | 10 | 5 | 2 |
| Utah | 29 | 14 | 5 | 5 |
| Nebraska | 48 | 7 | 4 | 3 |
| New Mexico | 59 | 8 | 4 | 3 |
| Maine | 16 | 12 | 7 | 2 |
| Hawai i | 24 | 25 | 16 | 9 |
| New Hampshire | 25 | 10 | 4 | 2 |
| Nevada | 35 | 15 | 4 | 10 |
| Idaho | 33 | 6 | 2 | 1 |
| Rhode Island | 19 | 16 | 9 | 1 |
| Montana | 41 | 10 | 7 | 3 |
| South Dakota | 35 | 5 | 2 | 1 |
| North Dakota | 26 | 5 | 2 | 2 |
| Delaware | 17 | 12 | 4 | 4 |
| Alaska | 29 | 5 | 2 | 2 |
| Wyoming | 17 | 13 | 5 | 4 |
| States with Non-Somparable Judge Figures |  |  |  |  |
| New Jersey | 321 | 6 | 2 |  |
| Wisconsin | 197 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Minnesota | 224 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Connecticut | 139 | 9 | 5 | 3 |
| District of Columbia | 51 | 21 | 7 | 4 |
| Vermont | 25 | 5 | 2 | 3 |
| MEAN |  | 11 | 7 | 3 |
| median |  | 10 | 6 | 3 |


| States | Total Abolition |  | In-State Citizen Plaintiffs |  | Estimated Filings $\$ 50,000$ or less |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Percentage Torts | Percentage Contracts. | Percentage Torts | Percentage Contracts | Percentage Torts | Percentage Contracts |
| California | 29 | 69 | 39 | 60 |  |  |
| New York | 45 | 54 | 72 | 26 | 16 | 83 |
| Texas | 62 | 37 | 78 | 21 | 72 | 27 |
| Florida | 38 | 60 | 53 | 47 |  |  |
| Pennsylvania | 52 | 47 | 66 | 33 | 47 | 51 |
| Illinois | 19 | 36 | 53 | 44 | 16 | 32 |
| Ohio. | 53 | 46 | 67 | 32 | 32 | 66 |
| Michigan | 45 | 54 | 61 | 38 |  |  |
| New Jersey | 42 | 57 | 60 | 39 |  |  |
| North Carolina | 33 | 66 | 54 | 45 | 24 | 75 |
| Georgia | 50 | 49 | 66 | 33 | 31 | 68 |
| Virginia | 52 | 46 | 66 | 32 | 29 | 70 |
| Massachusetts | 58 | 40 | 75 | 24 | 28 | 68 |
| Indiana | 34 | 36 | 58 | 36 | 16 | 11 |
| Missouri | 48 | 50 | 65 | 34 | 34 | 65 |
| Tennessee | 49 | 49 | 59 | 39 | 23 | 78 |
| Wisconsin | 35 | 63 | 55 | 44 | 31 | 66 |
| Washington | 47 | 52 | 64 | 36 |  |  |
| Maryland | 50 | 49 | 69 | 30 | 16 | 83 |
| Louisiana | 59 | 39 | 75 | 24 | 16 | 61 |
| Minnesota | 37 | 61 | 52 | 46 | 45 | 52 |
| Alabama | 31 | 65 | 49 | 49 | 24 | 68 |
| Kentucky | 48 | 50 | 57 | 41 | 41 | 58 |
| South Carolina | 52 | 45 | 66 | 33 |  |  |
| Arizona | 34 | 65 | 50 | 48 | 38 | 62 |
| Colorado | 31 | 65 | 39 | 58 |  |  |
| Puerto Rico | 58 | 39 | 63 | 36 | 20 | 68 |
| Ok1ahoma | 33 | 61 | 44 | 51 | 16 | 78 |
| Connecticut | 54 | 44 | 82 | 16 | 26 | 73 |
| Iowa | 48 | 47. | 57 | 36 |  |  |
| Oregon | 36 | 61 | 51 | 48 | 18 | 80 |
| Mississippi | 59 | 40 | 62 | 37 | 37 | 61 |
| Kansas | 41 | 54 | 56 | 39 | 43 | 52 |
| Arkansas | 53 | 45 | 63 | 35 | 36 | 61 |
| West Virginia | 48 | 47 | 59 | 36 | 27 | 70 |
| Utah | 29 | 65 | 38 | 57 | 33 | 62 |
| Nebraska | 54 | 44 | 70 | 27 |  |  |
| New Mexico | 46 | 51 | 55 | 43 | 33 | 67 |
| Maine | 69 | 29 | 72 | 27 | 36 | 64 |
| Hawai i | 63 | 35 | 86 | 14 |  |  |
| New Hampshire | 60 | 37 | 71 | 26 | 21 | 79 |
| Nevada | 25 | 74 | 28 | 68 | 16 | 83 |
| Idaho | 43 | 51 | 62 | 34 | 22 | 75 |
| Rhode Island | 46 | 51 | 54 | 44 | 36 | 64 |
| Moncana | 49 | 46 | 59 | 38 |  |  |
| South Dakota | 55 | 41 | 58 | 41 | 39 | 55 |
| North Dakota | 29 | 71 | 40 | 60 | 29 | 71 |
| Delaware | 55 | 45 | 54 | 45 |  |  |
| District of Columbia | 58 | 39 | 68 | 30 | 31 | 65 |
| Vermont | 64 | 36 | 70 | 28 | 65 | 33 |
| Alaska | 26 | 72 | 31 | 63 | 29 | 63 |
| Wyoming | 44 | 49 | 56 | 35 |  |  |
| MEAN | 46 | 50 | 59 | 38 | 31 | 63 |
| median | 48 | 49 | 59 | 37 | 29 | 66 |

torts and contracts would have been transferred. If in-state citizen plaintiffs were barred from filing diversity cases, more torts than contracts would be transferred to state courts. The raising of the federal jurisdiction limit to $\$ 50,000$ means that more contracts than torts will be transferred to state courts. The average percentages listed in Table 29 underestimate the ratio of torts to contracts because of the unusually large number of real property filings in Illinois and Indiana. Removing those two states from the averages does not alter the conclusion that more contracts than torts will be transferred when the jurisdictional limit is raised to $\$ 50,000$, but increases the proportion of torts from $31 \%$ to $40 \%$.
2. Increase in State Torts

When added to the total state tort filings, the percentage
increase caused by transfer of all or some portion of tort diversity caseloads is small. Of the 45 states where tort data can be estimated, Hawali would experience the largest percentage increase under two of the three proposals. Table 30 shows the percentage increase in torts for all the states where data are available or can be estimated. Under the first two alternatives, Montana, Louisiana, and Mississippi, in addition to Hawail, would receive the largest percentage increases in tort filings. Under the new law raising the federal jurisdictional limit to $\$ 50,000$, Alabama, Kentucky and Idaho would receive the largest increase in tort filings.
C. Which States Will Be Affected Disproportionately?

This report has attempted to measure the effects on state trial courts of abolishing diversity jurisdiction, barring in-state plaintiffs from filing diversity actions, or raising the federal jurisdictional limit to $\$ 50,000$. All three proposals will affect some states

## TABBE 30

PERCENT INCREASE IN STATE TORTS UNDER THREE PROPOSALS

| States | State <br> Iorts | Percent Increase in State Torts Under Total Abolition. | Percent Increase in Torts If State Plaintiffs Are Barred From Filing | Percent Increase of Estimated Torts with Dollar Demanded $\qquad$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California | 137,155 | 9 | 1 | 1 |
| New York | 92,538 | 3 | 2 | * |
| Texas | 40,764 | 8 | 6 | 5 |
| Florida | 35,453 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Ohio | 29,375 | 3 | 2 | * |
| Michigan | 29,756 | 3 | 3 | 1 |
| North Carolina | 8,981 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| Massachusetts | 14,251 | 5 | 4 | 2 |
| Missouri | 10,483 | 7 | 5 | 2 |
| Tennessee | 13,597 | 5 | 3 | 1 |
| Washington | 8,007 | 3 | 3 | * |
| Maryland | 12,938 | 4 | 3 | * |
| Arizona | 12,260 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Colorado | 3,666 | 4 | 2 | 2 |
| Puerto Rico | 4,811 | 4 | 2 | * |
| Kansas | 3,588 | 7 | 4 | * |
| Arkansas | 5,606 | 8 | 6 | 2 |
| Utah | 1,351 | 8 | 4 | 4 |
| Maine | 1,786 | 7 | 5 |  |
| Hawai i | 1,785 | 21 | 18 | 5 |
| Idaho | 1,376 | 5 | 3 | 10 |
| Montana | 1,792 | 11 | 9 | 3 |
| North Dakota | 551 | 6 | 4 | 3 |
| Alaska | 1,664 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| New Mexico | 4,037 | 5 | 3 | 1 |
| Estimated |  |  |  |  |
| Pennsylvania | 38,311 |  |  |  |
| Georgia | 19,971 | 5 | 4 | 1 |
| Virginia | 18,950 | 4 | 3 |  |
| Indiana | 17,753 | 2 | 1 | , |
| Louisiana | 14,318 | 11 | 8 | 1 |
| Alabama | 13,105 | 3 | 2 | 10 |
| Kentucky | 11,962 | 3 | 2 | 10 |
| South Carolina | 10,993 | 5 | 4 | 1 |
| Oregon | 8,743 | 2 | 1 | * |
| Mississippi | 8,425 | 11 | 8 | 1 |
| West Virginia | 6,089 | 5 | 3 | 1 |
| Nebraska | 5,116 | 4 | 3 | 1 |
| New Hampshire | 3,393 | 4 | 2 | * |
| Nevada | 3,232 | 4 | 1 | 2 |
| Rhode Island | 3,165 | 5 | 3 | 1 |
| Delaware | 2,067 1,573 | 5 6 | 2 3 | 1 |

*Percentage is less than $1 \%$.
**Percentage increases were not estimated for the following states where all torts, regardiess of civil jurisdiction, would go to a single-tiered court: Connecticut, District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Any percentages calculated, therefore, would greatly underestimate the impact of any change in diversity jurisdiction.
disproportionately depending upon which criteria are used to measure impact.

Measuring diversity filings as proportion of state population, total filings, and general jurisdiction judges, Flango and Blair determined that the abolition of diversity jurisdiction or restriction of venue for in-state plaintiffs would have a disproportionately high impact on nine states: Georgia, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Wyoming. (However, Rhode Island, Wyoming, and perhaps South Carolina, had enough judges to handle the extra filings without the addition of new judges, leaving only six or seven states which would require additional judgeships.)

This report uses three measures: filings per population, filings per judge and percentage increase in tort filings to estimate the impact of diversity transfer on states. Darkened states on the map (Figures 26, 27, and 28) would be disproportionately affected under each of the three alternatives. The solid black states would receive a disproportionate number of filings regardless of which of the three measures are used. The cross-hatched states would be disproportionately affected using two of the three measures. Regardless of the alternative or the measures used, Hawaii, Pennsylvania and perhaps Oklahoma will clearly be affected disproportionately by any change in diversity jurisdiction. Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and the District of Columbia will receive a disproportionately high number of transfers under the proposals to abolish diversity jurisdiction or to bar in-state plaintiffs from filing diversity actions in federal court, but not under the new law raising federal amount-in-controversy limits to $\$ 50,000$. Nevada, Texas and perhaps Illinois will recelve a disproportionately high number of filings under the new law increasing the federal jurisdictional limit to $\$ 50,000$.

Interestingly enough, the states that would be disproportionately affected by a transfer of diversity jurisdiction in 1987, differ from the states that would have been affected had diversity jurisdiction been transferred in 1976. The exceptions are Mississippi and Oklahoma, which were expected to receive a disproportionately high number of filings per 100,000 population in 1976 as well as 1987. Because the distribution of filings among states does change over time, there is more reason to monitor the number of diversity filings in federal courts. When the data On federal diversity cases filed in FY 1990 are available, and the consequences of the increase in the jurisdiction limit are known, a new baseline will be established from which the impact of further alterations in diversity jurisdiction can be measured. Until that time, research will be conducted in the degree to which tort and contract diversity cases filed in federal court are equivalent to tort and contract dases filed in state court so that the impact of any further changes in diversity furisdiction in states can be more accurately measured.




1 CH. $230, \S 11,1$ Stat 73 and is presently provided by 28 U.S.C. §1332(a)(I)(1970). James W. Moore and Donald T. Weckstein, "Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future," 43 Texas Law Review 1-10 (Noveinber 1964). See P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro and H. Wechsler, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System (2nd ed.) 1051-1060, 1973, for a history of statutory development. For a description of diversity jurisdiction, see Wright, Miller and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction, Sections 3601-3642 (1975).
2. Marcia Coyle, "Time to Kill Diversity Jurisdiction?" 10 The National Law Journal (February 29, 1988) quotes Chief Justice Rehnquist's statements in the 1987 report. Warren E. Burger, "Chief Justice Burger's 1977 Report to the American Bar Association," 63 A.B.A. Journal, 504 (1977). When Bork was Solicitor General, he expressed his opposition to diversity jurisdiction in Department of Justice Committee on Revision of the Federal Judicial System, The Needs of Federal Courts 13-25 (1977).

3 Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 8 (March 1977); Testimony of Hon. Robert J. Sheran, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota, on behalf of the Conference of Chief Justices, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Fifth Congress Federal Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978) p. 85. A 1977 survey of federal district and appellate judges show a majority favor the abolition of diversity jurisdiction, Shapiro, "Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal" 91 Harvard Law Review 317, 332-339 (1977).

4 Scalia's, "Remarks Before Fellows of the American Bar Foundation and National Council of Bar Presidents," New Orleans, February 15, 1987 quoted in the National Center's Washington Memorandum (March 13, 1987).

Katherine E. Douglas, Jeanna F. Celeste, and John M. Dawson, "A Justice Impact Statement on the Abolition of Diversity Jurisdiction." Report submitted to Department of Justice, April 1980, p. 6.

6 Bernard S. Meyer, "Justice, Bureaucracy, Structure and Simplification" 42 Maryland Law Review 672 (1983).

7 Quoted in Marcia Coyle, op cit., 40.
s Robert D. Dames, Jr. "Diversity is for Litigants, Not Courts or Judges" The National Law Journal p. 12 (April 4, 1988).
$9 \quad$ Note, "The Cholce Between State and Federal Court in Diversity Cases in Virginia" 51 Virainia Law Review 178, 179 (1965) and Jerry Goldman and Kanneth Marks "Diversity Jurisdiction and Local Bias: A Preliminary Empirical Inquiry" 9 Journal of Legal Studies (1980) p. 93.

[^4]${ }^{11}$ Kristin Bumiller, "Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases: Analysis of a Survey and Implications for Reform" 15 Law and Society Review (1980-81) 760.

12 Henry J. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 147-148 and H. Ted Rubin "An Idea Whose Time Has Gone" 70 ABA Journal 6,17 (1984); but see testimony of John R. Gibson, President of the Missouri Bar Association, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, op. cit., p. 192 in which he expressed the fear that elected judges would favor local residents.

Bumiller, op. cit., 773.
14 Bumiller, op. cit., 768.
is Eichner, "Diversity Jurisdiction: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Gone" 71 A.B.A. Journal, 4,5 (1985).

16 Jolanta Perlstein, "Lawyer's Strategies and Diversity Jurisdiction" 3 Law and Policy Quarterly p. 321.

17 Bumiller, op. cit., p. 762.
is Butler and Eure, "Diversity in the Court System: Let's Abolish It." 11 Virginia Bar Association Journal 4,7 (1985).
${ }^{19}$ Friendly, loc. cit. and J. Woodford Howard Jr. and Jerry Goldman, "The Variety of Litigation Demand in Three United States Courts of Appeals" 47 George Washington University Law Review (1978) 223.

20 National Mut. Ins. Co. V. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
${ }^{21}$ See, e.g. Anthony Partridge, The Budgetary Impact of Possible Changes in Diversity Jurisdiction (Washington, D.C.: Federal Judicial Center, 1988).

22 Victor E. Flango and Nora F. Blair, "The Relative Impact of Diversity Cases on State Trial Courts," 2 State Court Journal (Summer 1978), 20-26.

23 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of United States Courts 1985 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985) pp. 273, 308, 310.

24 Quoted in Marcia Coyle, "Time to Kill Diversity Jurisdiction?" 10 National Law Journal (February 29, 1988).

25 See Preliminary Report on Efficiency in the Administration of Justice, 28 (1914). Charles W. Joiner, "Corporations as Citizens of Every State Where They Do Business: A Needed Change in Diversity Jurisdiction" 70 Judicature 291 (1987), is an excellent source of background information on the proposal.

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26 See S. 939, H.R. 11508, 72nd Cong. 1st Sess. (1932).
27 See H.R. 130, 96th Cong. 1st Session (1979); H.R. 2202, 9th Cong.
lst Session (1979); H.R. 3689-3693, 98th Cong. Ist Sess. (1983).
28 "Legislative Developments: Congress Debates Proposals to Limit Diversity Jurisdiction" 9 Litigation News 5 (1984). During the presidential campaign, Michael Dukakis opposed legislation to abolish diversity jurisdiction. See "The Candidates Respond," ABA Journal 56 (October, 1988).
29 American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts, 1969. A recent proposal by U.S. District Judge Charles \(W\). Joiner would restrict diversity jurisdiction of some multi-state corporations, loc. cit.
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Ibid. p. 124.
Partridge, op. cit., p. 13.
32 David P. Currie, "The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, Pt. II, 36 University of Chicago Law Review 268, 295 (1969) from his sample of 386 cases, Partridge, op cit, p. 17 found 41 (10.6\%) in which the amount-in-controversy clearly was $\$ 50,000$ or less, 116 (30.1\%) where the ad dannum could plausibly have been redrawn to claim more than $\$ 50,000$ and 229 (59.3\%) where jurisdiction would be unaffected.

33 Horton V. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 367 U.S. 348 (1961).
34 Arnold V. Troccoli, 344 F.2d 842 (2nd Cir., 1965).
35 Bumiller, op. cit., pp. 763-757.
Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six: or, The Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days (Madison, Wisconsin: Institute for Legal Studies, Disputes Processing Research Program, August, 1988) pp. 14, 19; this report will also be published in 1988 Wisconsin Law Review, pg. 921.

37 Ibid, p. 19.
${ }^{38}$ Court Statistics and Information Management Project, State Court Caseload Statistics: Annual Report, 1984 (Williamsburg, Va.: National Center for State Courts, June 1986) p. 182 states that "...the single best predictor of civil filings in state courts is total state population." Correlations between population and tort and contract filings are reported throughout this report where appropriate.

39 The source for 1987 state population figures is U.S. Bureau of Census, Current Population Reports, series P-25. For a discussion of variations in state tort filing rates, see Robert T. Roper "The Propensity to Litigate in State Trial Courts, 1981-1984, 1984-1985." Justice System Journal 262-281 (1986) and Courts Statistics and Information Management Project, State Court Caseload Statistics: Annual Report, 1985, (Williamsburg, VA: National Center for State Courts, 1987).

We are indebted to James Jezek of the Colorado Judicial Department for suggesting this possibility.

41 Court Statistics Project, State Court Organization, 1987
(Williamsburg, Va.: National Center for State Courts, 1988).
42 As recently as March 1986, the U.S. Judicial Conference reaffirmed its long-standing request that Congress eliminate diversity jurisdiction. See Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States (Washingion, D.C.: Superintendent of Documents, 1986) p. 72.

43 Partridge, op. cit., p. 8.
44 The correlation between state population and federal diversity cases minus real property filings increases only slightly to .84.

45 This proportion is not an artifact of the year chosen. In 1986, the Northern District of Illinois accounted for $45 \%$ of all real property filings and in $1988,61 \%$ of all real property filings in the United States.

46 Court Statistics Project, State Court Caseload Statistics: Annual Report, 1987 (Williamsburg, Va.: National Center for State Courts, 1989).

47 Robert Tobin, Daniel J. Valuzzi, and Samuel D. Conti, Iowa Tort Liabllity Study (North Andover, Mass: Northeastern Regional Office of the National Center for State Courts, 1986), p. 16.
${ }^{48}$ We are indebted to H. Stuart Cunningham, Clerk of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for this observation.

49 Hearing on Omnibus Court Reform, Statement of Robert MacCrate quoted in Legislative History, House Report No. 100-889, Judicial Improvements Act, P.L. 100-702, p. 6006.

## Methodological Appendix

## A. Modification of Federal Data Set

Chapter II discusses how this research is based upon diversity cases actually filed in FY 1987 and excludes cases filed in FY 1986, but reported to the U.S. Administrative Office in FY 1987. For those who may be interested in whether exclusion of late reports affects the analysis conducted, Table Al presents the differences in data sets by state. B. Estimates Based on Regression Analysis

Regression analysis is the standard technique used to estimate the effect of the explaining variable (in this case population) on the variable to be explained (diversity filings). Estimates of diversity filings per state based on regression analysis are fairly accurate, as shown in Table A2. Because regression requires that data be normally distributed, because population is so closely related to case filings, and because regression estimates are influenced by extreme data points, in this particular instance inferring the proportion of diversity cases from proportion of state population actually produced slightly better estimates of diversity filings than did regression analysis. The methodologically-oriented reader may wish to compare the estimates produced in Table Al with those produced in Table 10.

Tables A3 and A4 illustrate the relationship between population and contract and tort filings respectively.

## TABEE AI <br> COMPPRESON OF TOTAL DUUERSTYY FILINGS REPPORED bY U.S. ADHNISTRRATIVE OFFICE WITH FILINGS USED IN THIS RESEARCH

| States | State Populations (in thousands) | Total Number of Diversity Filings Reported by $\qquad$ | Total Number of Federal Diversity Filings | Difference |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California | 27663 | 4224 | 4182 | 42 |
| New York | 17825 | 5521 | 5482 | 39 |
| Texas | 16789 | 5564 | 5537 | 27 |
| Florida | 12023 | 1307 | 1787 | 20 |
| Pennsylvania | 11936 | 5668 | 5642 | 26 |
| Illinois | 11582 | 5574 | 5532 | 42 |
| Ohio | 10784 | 1526 | 1503 | 23 |
| Michigan | 9200 | 2156 | 2117 | 39 |
| New Jersey | 7672 | 2043 | 2025 | 18 |
| North Carolina | 6413 | 645 | 644 | 1 |
| Georgia | 6222 | 1975 | 1961 | 14 |
| Virginia | 5904 | 1489 | 1480 |  |
| Massachusetts | 5855 | 1246 | 1233 | 13 |
| Indiana | 5531 | 1194 | 1179 | 15 |
| Missouri | 5103 | 1458 | 14.49 | 9 |
| Tennessee | 4855 | 1265 | 1252 | 13 |
| Wisconsin | 4807 | 432 | 430 | 2 |
| Washington | 4538 | 574 | 568 | 6 |
| Maryland | 4535 | 1040 | 1037 | 3 |
| Louisiana | 4461 | 2785 | 2759 | 26 |
| Minnesota | 4246 | 494 | 491 | 3 |
| Alabama | 4083 | 1422 | 1416 | 6 |
| Kentucky | 3727 | 812 | 803 | 9 |
| South Carolina | 3425 | 1078 | 1073 | 5 |
| Arizona | 3386 | 418 | 417 | 1 |
| Colorado | 3296 | 520 | 512 | 8 |
| Puerto Rico | 3292 | 303 | 299 | 4 |
| Oklahoma | 3272 | 2035 | 2024 | 11 |
| Connecticut | 3211 | 1295 | 1289 | 6 |
| Iowa | 2834 | 378 | 377 | 1 |
| Oregon | 2724 | 537 | 496 | 41 |
| Mississippi | 2625 | 1786 | 1630 | 156 |
| Kansas | 2476 | 609 | 606 | 3 |
| Arkansas | 2388 | 884 | 882 | 2 |
| West Virginia | 1897 | 608 | 604 | 4 |
| Utah | 1680 | 397 | 392 | 5 |
| Nebraska New Mexico | 1594 | 344 | 343 | 1 |
| New Mexico | 1500 | 463 | 459 | 4 |
| Maine | 1187 | 185 | 185 | 0 |
| Hawai i | 1083 | 607 | 606 | 1 |
| New Hampshire | 1057 | 240 | 238 | 2 |
| Nevada | 1007 | 549 | 537 | 12 |
| Idaho | 998 | 187 | 185 | 2 |
| Rhode Island | 986 | 313 | 310 | 3 |
| Montana | 809 | 397 | 396 | 1 |
| South Dakota | 709 | 182 | 180 | 2 |
| North Dakota | 672 | 120 | 119 | 1 |
| Delaware | 644 | 201 | 200 | 1 |
| District of Columbia | 622 | 1060 | 1053 | 7 |
| Vermont | 548 | 134 | 132 | 2 |
| Alaska | 525 | 143 | 139 | 4 |
| Wyoming | 490 | 216 | 216 | 0 |
| TOTALS | 246,691 | 67,125 | 66,408 |  |

regression estiahes of total tort/Conract duersity filings

| STATES | (in thousands) | contracts) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California | 27663 | 4120 |
| New York | 17825 | 5418 |
| Texas | 16789 | 5460 |
| Florida | 12023 | 1758 |
| Pennsylvania | 11936 | 5567 |
| [llinois | 11582 | 3045 |
| Ohio | 10784 | 1479 |
| Michigan | 9200 | 2091 |
| New Jersey | 7672 | 2001 |
| North Carolina | 6413 | 635 |
| Georgia | 6222 | 1932 |
| Virginia | 5904 | 1451 |
| Massachusetts | 5855 | 1214 |
| Indiana | 5531 | 819 |
| Missouri | 5103 | 1433 |
| Tennessee | 4855 | 1230 |
| Wisconsin | 4807 | 422 |
| Washington | 4538 | 562 |
| Maryland | 4535 | 1030 |
| Louisiana | 4461 | 2696 |
| Minnesota | 4246 | 484 |
| Alabama | 4083 | 1352 |
| Kentucky | 3727 | 784 |
| South Carolina | 3425 | 1045 |
| Arizona | 3386 | 413 |
| Colorado | 3296 | 493 |
| Puerto Rico | 3292 | 291 |
| Oklahoma | 3272 | 1902 |
| Connecticut | 3211 | 1264 |
| Iowa | 2834 | 357 |
| Oregon | 2724 | 481 |
| Mississippi | 2625 | 1609 |
| Kansas | 2476 | 574 |
| Arkansas | 2388 | 862 |
| West Virginia | 1897 | 573 |
| Utah | 1680 | 370 |
| Nebraska | 1594 | 336 |
| New Mexico | 1500 | 444 |
| Maine | 1187 | 181 |
| Hawai | 1083 | 597 |
| New Hampshire | 1057 | 231 |
| Nevada | 1007 | 529 |
| Idaho | 998 | 175 |
| Rhode Island | 986 | 300 |
| Montana | 809 | 378 |
| South Dakota | 709 | 172 |
| North Dakota | 672 | 118 |
| Delaware | 644 | 198 |
| District of Columbia | 622 | 1028 |
| Vermont | 548 | 131 |
| Alaska | 525 | 136 |
| Wyoming | 490 | 201 |

\(\left.$$
\begin{array}{ccccc}\begin{array}{c}\text { State } \\
\text { Population } \\
\text { (in thousands) }\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}\text { Total Filings } \\
\text { (torts and } \\
\text { contracts) }\end{array}
$$ \& \begin{array}{c}Estimates <br>
Based Upon <br>

Population\end{array} \& Difference\end{array}\right]\)| Percentage |
| :---: |
| Difference |

table as
REGRESSION ESTTMATES OF CONTRACT DIVERSITY CASES FROM POPULATION

| STATES | State <br> Population <br> (in thousands) | Contract Filings |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California | 27663 | 2902 |
| New York | 17825 | 2948 |
| Texas | 16789 | 2044 |
| Florida | 12023 | 1075 |
| Pennsylvania | 11936 | 2636 |
| Illinois | 11582 | 1989 |
| Ohio | 10784 | 688 |
| Michigan | 9200 | 1133 |
| New Jersey | 7672 | 1151 |
| North Carolina | 6413 | 422 |
| Georgia | 6222 | 955 |
| Virginia | 5904 | 686 |
| Massachusetts | 5855 | 495 |
| Indiana | 5531 | 419 |
| Missouri | 5103 | 731 |
| Tennessee | 4855 | 614 |
| Wisconsin | 4807 | 270 |
| Washington | 4538 | 293 |
| Maryland | 4535 | 509 |
| Louisiana | 4461 | 1080 |
| Minnesota | 4246 | 300 |
| Alabama | 4083 | 918 |
| Kentucky | 3727 | 401 |
| South Carolina | 3425 | 485 |
| Arizona | 3386 | 272 |
| Colorado | 3296 | 332 |
| Puerto Rico | 3292 | 118 |
| Oklahoma | 3272 | 1242 |
| Connecticut | 3211 | 569 |
| Iowa | 2834 | 177 |
| Oregon | 2724 | 304 |
| Mississippi | 2625 | 649 |
| Kansas | 2476 | 328 |
| Arkansas | 2388 | 397 |
| West Virginia | 1897 | 285 |
| Utah | 1680 | 256 |
| Nebraska | 1594 | 150 |
| New Mexico | 1500 | 232 |
| Maine | 1187 | 53 |
| Hawai i | 1083 | 214 |
| New Hampshire | 1057 | 89 |
| Nevada | 1007 | 395 |
| Idaho | 998 | 95 |
| Rhode Island | 986 | 158 |
| Montana | 809 | 182 |
| South Dakota | 709 | 73 |
| North Dakota | 672 | 84 |
| Delaware District Oolumbia | 644 | 89 |
| District of Columbia | 622 | 414 |
| Varmont | 548 | 47 |
| Alaska | 525 | 100 |
| yoming | 490 | 105 |


| Estimates Based Upon Population | Difference | Percentage Difference |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 3422 | -520 | -15 |
| 2222 | 726 | - 33 |
| 2095 | -51 | -2 |
| 1514 | -439 | -29 |
| 1503 | 1133 | 75 |
| 1460 | 529 | 36 |
| 1363 | -675 | -50 |
| 1170 | -37 | -3 |
| 983 | 168 | 17 |
| 830 | -408 | -49 |
| 806 | 149 | -18 |
| 768 | -82 | -11 |
| 762 | -267 | -35 |
| 722 | -303 | -42 |
| 670 | 61 | 9 |
| 640 | -26 | -4 |
| 634 | -364 | -57 |
| 601 | -308 | -51 |
| 601 | -92 | -15 |
| 591 | 489 | 83 |
| 565 | -265 | -47 |
| 545 | 373 | 68 |
| 502 | -101 | -20 |
| 465 | 20 | 4 |
| 460 | -188 | -41 |
| 449 | -117 | -26 |
| 449 | -331 | -74 |
| 446 | 796 | 178 |
| 439 | 130 | 30 |
| 393 | -216 | -55 |
| 380 | -76 | -20 |
| 368 | 281 | 77 |
| 349 | -21 | -6 |
| 339 | 58 | 17 |
| 279 | 6 | 2 |
| 252 | 4 | 2 |
| 242 | -92 | -38 |
| 230 | 2 | 1 |
| 192 | -139 | -72 |
| 179 | 35 | 19 |
| 176 | -87 | -49 |
| 170 | 225 | 132 |
| 169 | -74 | -44 |
| 168 | -10 | -6 |
| 146 | 36 | 25 |
| 134 | -61 | -45 |
| 129 | -45 | -35 |
| 126 | -37 | -29 |
| 123 | 291 | 236 |
| 114 | -67 | -59 |
| 107 | -11 -2 | -10 -2 |

regression estimates of tort diversity cases from population

| STATES | State Population (in thousands) | $\begin{gathered} \text { Tort } \\ \text { Filings } \end{gathered}$ | Estimates Based Upon Population | Difference | Percentage Difference |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California | 27663 | 1218 | 2762 | -1544 | -56 |
| New York | 17825 | 2470 | 1822 | 648 | 36 |
| Texas | 16789 | 3416 | 1723 | 1693 | 78 |
| Flarida | 12023 | 683 | 1268 | -585 | -46 |
| Pennsylvania | 11936 | 2931 | 1260 | 1671 | 133 |
| Illinois | 11582 | 1056 | 1226 | -170 | -14 |
| Ohio | 10784 | 791 | 1150 | -359 | -31 |
| Michigan | 9200 | 958 | 999 | -41 | -4 |
| New Jersey | 7672 | 850 | 853 | -3 | 0 |
| North Carolina | 6413 | 213 | 733 | -520 | -71 |
| Georgia | 6222 | 977 | 715 | 262 | 37 |
| Virginia | 5904 | 765 | 684 | 81 | 12 |
| Massachusetts | 5855 | 719 | 680 | 39 | 6 |
| Indiana | 5531 | 400 | 649 | -249 | -38 |
| Missouri | 5103 | 702 | 608 | 94 | 16 |
| Tennessee | 4855 | 616 | 584 | 32 | 5 |
| Wisconsin | 4807 | 152 | 579 | -427 | -74 |
| Washington | 4538 | 269 | 554 | -285 | -51 |
| Maryland | 4535 | 521 | 553 | -32 | -6 |
| Louisiana | 4461 | 1616 | 546 | 1070 | 196 |
| Minnesota | 4246 | 184 | 526 | -342 | -65 |
| Alabama | 4083 | 434 | 510 | -76 | -15 |
| Kentucky | 3727 | 383 | 476 | -93 | -20 |
| South Carolina | 3425 | 560 | 448 | 112 | 25 |
| Arizona | 3386 | 141 | 444 | -303 | -68 |
| Colorado | 3296 | 161 | 435 | -274 | -63 |
| Puerto Rico | 3292 | 173 | 435 | -262 | -60 |
| Oklahoma | 3272 | 660 | 433 | 227 | 52 |
| Connecticut | 3211 | 695 | 427 | 268 | 63 |
| Iowa | 2834 | 180 | 391 | -211 | -54 |
| Oregon | 2724 | 177 | 381 | -204 | -53 |
| Mississippi | 2625 | 960 | 371 | 589 | 159 |
| Kansas | 2476 | 246 | 357 | -111 | -31 |
| Arkansas | 2388 | 465 | 348 | 117 | 33 |
| West Virginia | 1897 | 288 | 302 | -14 | -5 |
| Utah | 1680 | 114 | 281 | -167 | -59 |
| Nebraska | 1594 | 186 | 273 | -87 | -32 |
| New Mexico | 1500 | 212 | 264 | -52 | -20 |
| Maine | 1187 | 128 | 234 | -106 | -45 |
| Hawai | 1083 | 383 | 224 | 159 | 71 |
| New Hampshire | 1057 | 142 | 221 | -79 | -36 |
| Nevada | 1007 | 134 | 217 | -83 | -38 |
| Idaho | 998 | 80 | 216 | -136 | -63 |
| Rhode Island | 986 | 142 | 215 | -73 | -34 |
| Montana | 809 | 196 | 198 | -2 | -1 |
| South Dakota | 709 | 99 | 188 | -89 | -47 |
| North Dakota | 672 | 34 | 185 | -151 | -82 |
| Delaware | 644 | 109 | 182 | -73 | -40 |
| District of Columbia | 622 | 614 | 180 | 434 | 241 |
| Vermont | 548 | 84 | 173 | -89 | -51 |
| Alaska | 525 | 36 | 171 | -135 | -79 |
| Wyoming | 490 | 96 | 167 | -71 | -43 |

# Figure A-1 <br> Percentage Difference between Actual and Estimated Contract Diversity Cases 

State


Figure A-2
Percentage Difference between Actual and Estimated Tort Diversity Cases


## In-State Corporate Plaintiffs

This section is appended for those interested in the corisequences of a diversity transfer for in-state corporations. The analysis is valid only to the extent that corporations would not be able to become out-of-state corporations for the purposes of filings. The reader is also reminded that plaintiff's residence codes were charged in December of 1984 and that some districts may still be using older codes. Thus, the data on in-state corporations may be less reliable than data on in-state individual plaintiffs.

## 1. Total Corporate Filings

Table Bl shows the number of diversity cases filed in each state by in-state corporations in FY 1987. These 8,672 filings were $13 \%$ of all diversity filings and $21 \%$ of the total cases filed by in-state plaintiffs.
2. Corporate Filings Per Population

In-state corporate filings per 100,000 population are presented in Table B2. This table shows that the District of Columbia, Nevada, Oklahoma and New York would receive disproportionately more in-state corporation filings per population than other states would.
3. Corporate Filings Per Judge

Table B2 also presents the in-state corporate filings per judge for each state. On this measure, South Carolina, New York, Oklahoma, Wyoming and Nevada would receive an unusually high proportion of corporate diversity filings per judge--3 per judge. Of course, even one complex corporate case could disrupt normal operations in most general jurisdiction courts.

CASELOAD COMPOSTITON OF DVEESSTYY FILINGS BY IN-STATE CORPOPATIONS

| States | Tort | Contract | Real Property | $\begin{gathered} \text { Total } \\ \text { In-State } \\ \text { Cerporations } \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California | 62 | 302 | 6 | 370 |
| New York | 217 | 1091 | 15 | 1323 |
| Texas | 101 | 447 | 10 | 558 |
| Florida | 44 | 240 | 2 | 286 |
| Pennsylvania | 157 | 447 | 11 | 615 |
| Illinois | 61 | 425 | 30 | 516 |
| Ohio | 39 | 144 | 2 | 185 |
| Michigan | 33 | 225 | 3 | 261 |
| New Jersey | 76 | 404 | 3 | 483 |
| North Carolina | 11 | 125 | 1 | 137 |
| Georgia | 71 | 167 | 8 | 246 |
| Virginia | 113 | 116 | 1 | 230 |
| Massachusetts | 25 | 124 | 1 | 150 |
| Indiana | 43 | 74 | 8 | 125 |
| Missouri | 28 | 111 | 0 | 139 |
| Tennessee | 52 | 122 | 2 | 176 |
| Wisconsin | 10 | 76 | 0 | 86 |
| Washington | 7 | 49 | 1 | 57 |
| Maryland | 73 | 85 | 0 | 158 |
| Louisiana | 34 | 233 | 8 | 275 |
| Minnesota | 15 | 95 | 0 | 110 |
| Al abama | 20 | 147 | 3 | 170 |
| Kentucky | 35 | 55 | 1 | 91 |
| South Carolina | 49 | 80 | 3 | 132 |
| Arizona | 8 | 54 | 1 | 63 |
| Colorado | 12 | 60 | 1 | 73 |
| Puerto Rico | 28 | 25 | 2 | 55 |
| Oklahoma | 65 | 155 | 10 | 230 |
| Connecticut | 29 | 49 | 6 | 84 |
| Iowa | 23 | 24 | 1 | 48 |
| Oregon | 26 | 87 | 2 | 115 |
| Mississippi | 48 | 54 | 3 | 105 |
| Kansas | 5 | 78 | 2 | 85 |
| Arkansas | 19 | 56 | 4 | 79 |
| West Virginia | 31 | 41 | 5 | 77 |
| Utah | 59 | 13 | 3 | 75 |
| Nebraska | 22 | 37 | 0 | 59 |
| New Mexico | 13 | 29 | 2 | 44 |
| Maine | 19 | 6 |  | 26 |
| Hawai | 47 | 3 |  | 53 |
| New Hampshire | 25 | 28 | 0 | 54 |
| Nevada | 22 | 83 | 0 | 105 |
| Idaho | 3 | 23 | 0 | 26 |
| Rhode Island | 7 | 33 | 1 | 41 |
| Montana | 7 | 18 | 2 | 27 |
| South Dakota | 14 | 16 | 0 | 30 |
| North Dakota | 1 | 8 |  | 10 |
| Delaware | 8 | 13 | 1 | 22 |
| District of Columbia | 44 | 79 | 3 | 126 |
| Vermont | 5 | 9 | 0 | 14 |
| Alaska | 4 | 8 | 2 | 14 |
| Wyoming | 19 | 33 | 1 | 53 |
| TOTALS | 1989 | 6506 | 177 | 8672 |
| MEAN | 38 | 125 | 3 | 167 |
| MEDIAN | 27 | 75 | 2 | 98 |

TABEE B2
IN-STATE COPPORation PLANTIFF FILINGS
PER POPLLATION AND PER JUGEE

| States | State <br> Population <br> (in thousands) | Total In-State Corporation Filings | Corporate Filings Per 100,000 Population | Number of Judges | Corporate Filings Per Judge |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California | 27663 | 270 | 1 | 724 | 1 |
| New York | 17825 | 1323 | 7 | 387 | 3 |
| Texas | 16789 | 558 | 3 | 375 | 1 |
| florida | 12023 | 286 | 2 | 362 | 1 |
| Pennsylvania | 11936 | 615 | 5 | 330 | 2 |
| Illinois | 11582 | 516 | 4 | 363 | 1 |
| Ohio | 10784 | 185 | 2 | 339 | 1 |
| Michigan | 9200 | 261 | 3 | 196 | 1 |
| North Carolina | 6413 | 137 | 2 | 72 | 2 |
| Georgia | 6222 | 246 | 4 | 135 | 2 |
| Virginia | 5904 | 230 | 4 | 122 | 2 |
| Massachusetts | 5855 | 150 | 3 | 61 | 2 |
| Indiana | 5531 | 125 | 2 | 206 | 1 |
| Missouri | 5103 | 139 | 3 | 133 | , |
| Tennessee | 4855 | 176 | 4 | 128 | 1 |
| Washington | 4538 | 57 | 1 | 133 | * |
| Maryland | 4535 | 158 | 3 | 109 | 1 |
| Louisiana | 4461 | 275 | 6 | 192 | 1 |
| Alabama | 4083 | 170 | 4 | 124 | 1 |
| Kentucky | 3727 | 91 | 2 | 91 | 1 |
| South Carolina | 3425 | 132 | 4 | 31 | 4 |
| Arizona | 3386 | 63 | 2 | 101 | 1 |
| Colorado | 3296 | 73 | 2 | 121 | 1 |
| Puerto Rico | 3292 | 55 | 2 | 92 | 1 |
| Ok7ahoma | 3272 | 230 | 7 | 71 | 3 |
| Iowa | 2834 | 48 | 2 | 100 | * |
| Oregon | 2724 | 115 | 4 | 85 | 1 |
| Mississippi | 2625 | 105 | 4 | 79 | 1 |
| Kansas | 2476 | 85 | 3 | 146 | 1 |
| Arkansas | 2388 | 79 | 3 | 70 | 1 |
| West Virginia | 1897 | 77 | 4 | 60 | 1 |
| Utah | 1680 | 75 | 4 | 29 | 3 |
| Nebraska | 1594 | 59 | 4 | 48 |  |
| New Mexico | 1500 | 44 | 3 | 59 | 1 |
| Maine | 1187 | 26 | 2 | 16 | 2 |
| Hawai i | 1083 | 53 | 5 | 24 | 2 |
| New Hampshire | 1057 | 54 | 5 | 25 | 2 |
| Nevada | 1007 | 105 | 10 | 35 | 3 |
| Idaho | 998 | 26 | 3 | 33 | 1 |
| Rhode Island | 986 | 41 | 4 | 19 | 2 |
| Montana | 809 | 27 | 3 | 41 | 1 |
| South Dakota | 709 | 30 | 4 | 35 | 1 |
| North Dakota | 672 | 10 | 1 | 26 | * |
| Delaware | 644 | 22 | 3 | 17 | 1 |
| Alaska | 525 | 14 | 3 | 29 | * |
| Wyoming | 490 | 53 | 11 | 17 | 3 |
| States with Non-Comparable Judge Figures |  |  |  |  |  |
| New Jersey | 7672 | 483 | 6 | 321 | 2 |
| Wisconsin | 4807 | 86 | 2 | 197 | * |
| Minnesota | 4246 | 110 | 3 | 224 | * |
| Connecticut | 3211 | 84 | 3 | 139 | 1 |
| District of Columbia | 622 | 126 | 20 | 51 | 2 |
| Vermont | 548 | 14 | 3 | 25 | 1 |
| TOTALS |  | 8672 |  | 6948 |  |
| MEAN |  | 167 | 4 | 134 | , |
| median |  | 98 | 3 | 92 | 1 |
| * Less than one. |  |  |  |  |  |

4. Increase In-State Filings

Table B3 separates corporate in-state plaintiff filings into tort and contract filings. This table shows that corporate plaintiffs file proportionately more contract cases and fewer tort cases than do in-state citizens. Only in Hawail, Alaska, Utah and Maine do in-state corporate plaintiffs file a smaller proportion of contract diversity cases and a larger proportion of tort diversity cases than citizen plaintiffs do.

TABLE 83
PROPORTION OF CONTRACT AND TORT CASES FILED BY IN-STATE CORPORATE PLAINTIFFS

| States | Torts as \% of In-State Citizen flaintiff Eliings | Torts as \% of In-State Corporation $\qquad$ Plaintiff Eilinas | Percentage <br> Difference | ```Contracts as * of In-State Citizan Eilings``` | Contracts as $x$ of In-state Corporations Plaintiff filings. | Percentag Differenc |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California | 39 | 17 | 22 | 60 | 82 | -22 |
| New York | 72 | 16 | 56 | 26 | 82 | -22 |
| Texas | 78 | 18 | 60 | 21 | 80 | -59 |
| Florida | 53 | 15 | 38 | 47 | 84 | -37 |
| Pennsylvania | 65 | 26 | 40 | 33 | 73 | -40 |
| Illinots | 53 | 12 | 41 | 44 | 82 | -38 |
| Ohto | 67 | 21 | 46 | 32 | 78 | -46 |
| Michigan | 61 | 13 | 48 | 38 | 86 | -48 |
| New Jersey | 60 | 16 | 44 | 39 | 84 | -45 |
| North Carolina | 54 | 8 | 46 | 45 | 91 | -46 |
| Georgia | 66 | 29 | 37 | 33 | 68 | -35 |
| Virginia | 66 | 49 | 17 | 32 | 50 | -18 |
| Massachusetts | 75 | 17 | 58 | 24 | 83 | -59 |
| Indiana | 58 | 34 | 24 | 36 | 59 | -23 |
| Missouri | 65 | 20 | 45 | 34 | 80 | -46 |
| Tennessee | 59 | 30 | 29 | 39 | 69 | -30 |
| Wisconsin | 55 | 12 | 43 | 44 | 88 | -44 |
| Washington | 64 | 12 | 52 | 36 | 86 | -50 |
| Maryland | 69 | 46 | 23 | 30 | 54 | -24 |
| Louisiana | 75 | 12 | 63 | 24 | 85 | -61 |
| Minnesota | 52 | 14 | 38 | 46 | 86 | -40 |
| Alabama | 49 | 12 | 37 | 49 | 86 | -37 |
| Kentucky | 57 | 38 | 19 | 41 | 60 | -19 |
| South Carolina | 66 | 37 | 29 | 33 | 61 | -28 |
| Arizona | 50 | 13 | 37 | 48 | 86 | -38 |
| Colorado | 39 | 16 | 23 | 58 | 82 | -24 |
| Puerto Rico | 63 | 51 | 12 | 36 | 45 | -9 |
| 0k lahoma | 44 | 28 | 16 | 51 | 67 | $-16$ |
| Connecticut | 82 | 35 | 47 | 16 | 58 | -42 |
| Lowa | 57 | 48 | 9 | 36 | 50 | -14 |
| Oregon | 51 | 23 | 28 | 48 | 76 | -28 |
| Mississippi | 62 | 46 | 16 | 37 | 51 | -14 |
| Kansas | 56 | 6 | 50 | 39 | 92 | -53 |
| Arkansas | 63 | 24 | 39 | 35 | 71 | -36 |
| West Virginia | 59 | 40 | 19 | 36 | 53 | -17 |
| Utah | 38 | 17 | 21 | 57 | 79 | -22 |
| Nebraska | 70 | 37 | 33 | 27 | 63 | -36 |
| New Mexico | 55 | 30 | 25 | 43 | 66 | -23 |
| Haine | 72 | 73 | -1 | 27 | 23 | 4 |
| Hawait | 86 | 89 | -3 | 14 | 6 | 8 |
| New Hampshire | 71 | 46 | 25 | 26 | 52 | -26 |
| Nevada | 28 | 21 | 7 | 68 | 79 | -11 |
| Idaho | 62 | 12 | 50 | 34 | 88 | -54 |
| Rhode Island | 54 | 17 | 37 | 44 | 80 | -36 |
| Hontana | 59 | 26 | 33 | 38 | 67 | -29 |
| South Dakota | 58 | 47 | 11 | 41 | 53 | -12 |
| North Dakota | 40 | 10 | 30 | 60 | 80 | -20 |
| Delaware | 54 | 36 | 18 | 45 | 59 | -14 |
| District of Columbia | 68 | 35 | 33 | 30 | 63 | -33 |
| Vermont | 70 | 36 | 34 | 28 | 64 | -36 |
| Alaska | 31 | 29 | 2 | 63 | 57 | 6 |
| Wyoming | 56 | 36 | 20 | 35 | 62 | -27 |
| Mean | 59 | 29 | 31 | 39 | 68 | -31 |
| MEDIAN | 59 | 26 | 33 | 37 | 70 | -32 |

## MANER OF OISPOSITION FOR FEEERAL DIVERSTTY CASES WITH AOOUHT-IH-CONTOVEESS OF \$50,000 OR LESS

|  | States | Total Terminations | Termination Through No Court Action | Percentage of Terminations By Ho Action. | Termination Through $\qquad$ Triai | Percentage of Terminations By Trial | Termination Through Jury Trial | Percentage of Terminations By Jury Trial |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | California* | 336 | 227 | 68\% | 16 |  |  |  |
|  | New York | 1035 | 592 | 57\% | 41 | 5x | 11 | $3 \%$ $18 \%$ |
|  | Texas | 1345 359 | 313 | 23\% | 289 | 218 | 265 | 18\% |
|  | Pennsylvania | 1844 | 146 531 | 418 | $\begin{array}{r}24 \\ 124 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | 7\% | 15 | 4\% |
|  | Illinois | 2893 | 1308 | 29x | 124 36 | 7\% | 96 25 | 5\% |
|  | Ohio | 243 | 99 | 41\% | 17 | 7\% | 14 | 6\% |
|  | Michigan* | 410 | 145 | 35\% | 18 | 4x | 14 | 6\% |
|  | New Jersey* | 269 | 97 | 36\% | 12 | 4\% | 15 4 | 1\% |
|  | North Carolina | 221 | 101 | 46\% | 18 | 8\% | 11 | 5\% |
|  | Georgia | 671 | 363 | 54\% | 31 | 5* | 27 | 4\% |
|  | Massachusetts | 233 281 | 131 115 | 56\% | 34 | 15\% | 14 | 6\% |
|  | Indiana | 427 | 115 96 | 42\% | 14 5 | 5\% | 10 | 4\% |
|  | Missouri | 344 | 227 | 66\% | 29 | 18 | 3 19 | 1\% |
|  | Tennessee | 254 | 120 | 47\% | 26 | 108 | 12 | 5\% |
|  | Wisconsin | 146 | 61 | 42x | 9 | 6\% | 4 | 3\% |
|  | Washington* | 48 | 26 | 548 | 1 | 2\% | 0 | 0\% |
|  | Maryland | 248 | 73 | 29\% | 23 | 9\% | 16 | 6\% |
|  | Louistana | 509 | 139 | 27\% | 36 | 78 | 9 | 28 |
|  | Minnesota | 271 | 152 | 568 | 11 | 48 | 11 | 4\% |
|  | Alabama | 444 | 120 | 278 | 23 | 5\% | 13 | 38 |
|  | Kentucky | 194 | 63 | 328 | 14 | 78 | 9 | 5\% |
| $\stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\omega}$ | South Carolina* | 132 | 18 | $14 \%$ | 13 | 10\% | 9 | 7\% |
| $\omega$ | Arizona | 85 | 52 | 61\% | 0 | 02 | 0 | $0 \%$ |
|  | Colorado* | 23 | 0 | 0\% | 0 | 0x | 0 | $0 \%$ |
|  | Puerto Rico | 68 | 5 | 7\% | 8 | 12x | 3 | 48 |
|  | Oklahoma | 493 | 165 | 33x | 19 | 4x | 12 | 28 |
|  | Connecticut | 128 | 90 | 70\% | 4 | 3x | 2 | $2 \%$ |
|  | Iowa* | 77 | 23 | $30 \%$ | 2 | 38 | 1 | 1\% |
|  | Oregon | 86 | 68 | 79\% | 7 | $8 \%$ | 3 | $3 \%$ |
|  | Mississippi | 319 | 198 | 62\% | 22 | 78 | 14 | 4\% |
|  | Kansas | 270 | 168 | 62\% | 17 | 6\% | 11 | 4\% |
|  | Arkansas | 230 | 100 | 438 | 17 | 7\% | 11 | 5\% |
|  | West Virginia | 130 | 33 | 25\% | 9 | $7 \%$ | 7 | 5\% |
|  | Utah | 76 | 43 | 578 | 5 | 7\% | 3 | 4\% |
|  | Hebraska* | 58 | 36 | 62\% | 5 | $9 \%$ | 2 | 3\% |
|  | New Mexico | 79 | 42 | 53x | 3 | 48 | 2 | 3\% |
|  | Matne | 139 | 12 | 9\% | 13 | 98 | 13 | 9\% |
|  | Hawait** | 57 | 40 | 70\% | 1 | 2\% | 0 | 0\% |
|  | New Hampshire | 64 | 9 | 14x | 13 | 20x | 7 | 11\% |
|  | Nevada | 341 | 185 | 54\% | 12 | 4x | 6 | 2\% |
|  | Idaho | 49 | 8 | 16x | 0 | 0x | 0 | 0\% |
|  | Rhode Island | 13 | 3 | 238 | 4 | 318 | 2 | 15\% |
|  | Montana* | 40 | 22 | 55\% | 1 | 38 | 0 | 9\% |
|  | South Dakota | 33 | 18 | 55\% | 4 | 12x | 0 | $0 \%$ |
|  | North Dakota | 55 | 29 | 53x | 2 | 4x | 0 | 0\% |
|  | Delaware* | 36 | 15 | 42x | 4 | 112 | 4 | 11\% |
|  | District of Columbia | 137 | 90 | $66 \%$ | 7 | 5\% | 4 | 38 |
|  | Vermont | 53 | 39 | 28\% | 11 | 21\% | 9 | 17\% |
|  | Alaska | 38 | 31 | 82\% | 2 | 5\% | 0 | 0\% |
|  | Wyoming* | 18 | 12 | 67x | -3 | 178 | -2 | 11\% |
|  | totals | 16,352 | 6,799 | 42x | 1,061 | 6.5\% | 754 | 4.6\% |

*States which reported less than half of the amount in controversy data at filing.

## COUNTIES LIKELY TO RECEIVE IOO OR MORE DIVERSITY CASES

| STATE/OLSTRICI | TOTAL OIVERSITY $\qquad$ | FILINGS BY OUT-OF-STATE PLAINIIFES | PERCENTAGE OF FILINGS IN-STAIE | COUNTIES WITH ABOUT 100 CASES OR MORE | NUMBER DF CASES |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| California - Northern .. | . 1224 | 272 | 78\% | San Francicso Alameda Santa Clara | 231 127 150 |
| Eastern Central | 259 | 50 | 81\% | Los Angeles Orange | $\begin{array}{r} 1360 \\ 288 \end{array}$ |
|  | 2370 | 827 | 65\% |  |  |
| Southern <br> Total | $\begin{array}{r} 329 \\ \cdot \quad 4182 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 60 \\ 1209 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 82 \% \\ & 71 \% \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| New York - Northern .... | 529 | 24 | 95\% | Albany Onondaga | $\begin{aligned} & 123 \\ & 123 \end{aligned}$ |
| Eastern | 1321 | 415 | 69\% | Nassau | 331 |
|  |  |  |  | Queens Suffolk | 217 216 |
| Southern | 3216 | 1245 | 61\% | Bronx <br> Kings <br> New York <br> West Chester | 106222 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | 1351 |
| Western | 416 | 56 | 87\% | Erie Monroe | $\begin{array}{r} 97 \\ 186 \end{array}$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total ....... | 5482 | 1740 | 68\% |  |  |
| Texas - Northern | 1749 | 1043 | 41\% | Tarrant <br> Dallas <br> Orange <br> Jefferson <br> Harris | 124 |
|  |  |  |  |  | 404 |
| Eastern | 1947 | 152 | 92\% |  | 205 |
|  |  |  |  |  | 925 |
| Southern Western Total . | $\begin{array}{r} 1322 \\ 519 \\ 5537 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 388 \\ 133 \\ 1716 \end{array}$ |  |  | 670 |
|  |  |  | $75 \%$ |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Florida $\qquad$$\qquad$ Middle $\qquad$ Southern $\qquad$ | $\begin{aligned} & 113 \\ & 867 \\ & 808 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 15 \\ 99 \\ 2 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 87\% } \\ & \text { 89\% } \\ & 99 \% \end{aligned}$ | Hillsborough Broward Dade | $\begin{aligned} & 160 \\ & 196 \\ & 474 \end{aligned}$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total ...... | 1787 | 116 | 94\% |  |  |
| Pennsylvania - Eastern. | 4039 | 1561 | 61\% | Bucks Chester Delaware Montgomery Philadelphia | 200 |
|  |  |  |  |  | 105 |
|  |  |  |  |  | 241 |
|  |  |  |  |  | 389 |
|  |  |  |  |  | 1200 |
| Middle .. |  | 103 | 81\% |  |  |
| Western <br> Total | $\begin{aligned} & 1051 \\ & 5642 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 407 \\ 2071 \end{array}$ | 61\% $63 \%$ | Allegheny | 388 |
| Illinois - Northern $\ldots .$. 4922 <br> Central $\ldots .$. 200  <br> Southern $\ldots .$. 410  |  | $\begin{array}{r} 3319 \\ 44 \\ 77 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 33 \% \\ & 88 \% \\ & 81 \% \end{aligned}$ | Cook <br> Madison <br> St. Clair | 1109 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 122 |  |  |  |
|  |  | 97 |  |  |  |
| Total ....... | 5532 |  | 3440 |  | 38\% |  |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & 884 \\ & 619 \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & 132 \\ & 127 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 85 \% \\ & 80 \% \end{aligned}$ | Cuyahoga Franklin Hamilton | 34891176 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 1503 | 259 | 83\% |  |  |  |
| Michigan - Eastern ..... | 1826 | 404 | 78\% | Macomb Oakland Wayne | 110368716 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Western ..... | 291 | 51 | 83\% |  |  |  |
| Total ....... | 2117 | 455 | 79\% |  |  |  |
| New Jersey . ............ | 2025 | 630 | 69\% | Essex | 170 |  |



|  | Appendix 0 (continued) |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| STATEIDISTRICI | TOTAL OIVERSITY FILINGS | FILINGS BY OUT-OF-STATE PLAINTIFFS | PERCENTAGE OF EILINGS IN-STATE | COUNTIES WITH ABOUT 100 CASES OR MORE | NUMBER OF CASES |
| Colorado ............... | 512 | 245 | 52\% | Denver | 83 |
| Puerto Rico ............. | 299 | 167 | 44\% |  |  |
| Ok1ahoma - Northern .... <br> Eastern ..... <br> Western ..... <br> Total | $\begin{array}{r} 475 \\ \cdot \quad 187 \\ \cdot \quad 1362 \\ \cdot \quad 2024 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 164 \\ 2 \\ 629 \\ 795 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 34 \% \\ & 99 \% \\ & 54 \% \\ & 61 \% \end{aligned}$ | Oklahoma | 389 |
| Connecticut ............ | . 1289 | 441 | 66\% | Fairfield Hartford New Haven New London | $\begin{array}{r} 148 \\ 278 \\ 265 \\ 96 \end{array}$ |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & 154 \\ & 223 \\ & 377 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 8 \\ 23 \\ 31 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 95 \% \\ & 90 \% \\ & 92 \% \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| Oregon.. | . 496 | 200 | 60\% | Multnomah | 158 |
| Mississippi - Northern . Southern. | $\begin{array}{r} 458 \\ \cdot \quad 1172 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 159 \\ 296 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 65 \% \\ & 75 \% \end{aligned}$ | Harrison Jackson | $\begin{aligned} & 145 \\ & 265 \end{aligned}$ |
| Total | 1630 | 455 | 72\% |  |  |
| Kansas . | 606 | 272 | 55\% |  |  |
| Arkansas - EasternHestern <br> Total $\ldots$. ..... | $\begin{aligned} & 471 \\ & 411 \\ & 882 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 86 \\ 151 \\ 237 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 82 \% \\ & 63 \% \\ & 73 \% \end{aligned}$ | Pulaski | 124 |
| West Virginia - Northern Southern Total | $\begin{aligned} & 150 \\ & 454 \\ & 604 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 2 \\ 131 \\ 133 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 99 \% \\ & 71 \% \\ & 78 \% \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| Utah. | 392 | 0 | 100\% |  |  |
| Nebraska ... | 343 | 129 | 63\% |  |  |
| New Mexico .......... | 459 | 213 | 54\% | Bernalillo | 106 |
| Maine ............... | 185 | 29 | 85\% |  |  |
| Hawai i ................ | 606 | 168 | 72\% |  |  |
| New Hampshire .......... | 238 | 107 | 55\% |  |  |
| Idaho ................... | 185 | 99 | 46\% |  |  |
| Rhode Island ........ | 310 | 30 | 90\% |  |  |
| Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . | 537 | 215 | 60\% | Clark | 282 |
| Montana .............. | 396 | 78 | 80\% |  |  |
| South Dakota ....... | 180 | 78 | 57\% |  |  |
| North Dakota .... | 119 | 67 | 44\% |  |  |
| Delaware ............... | 200 | 110 | 45\% | Kent | 105 |
| District of Columbia ... | 1053 | 666 | 37\% | D.C. | 376 |
| Vermont ................. | 132 | 65 | 51\% |  |  |
| Alaska ................. | 139 | 60 | 57\% |  |  |
| Wyoumiñ . ............... | 216 | 85 | 61\% |  |  |
| Totals 6 | 66,408 |  |  |  |  |

## APPEDDIX E

## CAPSULE SUMAARY OF THE EFFECT OF PROOOSED CHAICES IN FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISOICTTON BY STATE

This is a summary of the results of the analysis of the effects of the proposed changes in federal diversity jurisdiction presented by state for the convenience of readers interested in the impact of legislation or proposed legislation on particular states. Under each of the three proposals, total abolition of diversity jurisdiction, the proposal to bar in-state plaintiffs from initiating federal diversity actions, and the new law increasing the jurisdictional limit to $\$ 50,000$, are five measures:

1. Number of filings are diversity cases filed in U.S. District Court in FY 1987. To the extent that federal court cases are more complex than state court cases, these figures will underestimate the effects on states of any transfer in federal diversity jurisdiction.
2. Number of trials are cases disposed by trial in U.S. District Court in FY 1987. The number of trials involving in-state citizen plaintiffs is not available. In FY 1987, the average federal bench trial required 8.4 judge hours and the average jury trial required 19.3 judge hours.
3. Percentage change in torts is the number of diversity tort filings estimated to be transferred to the state divided by the number of state tort cases filed in 1987. Figures marked with an asterisk (*) represent estimates of the number of state tort flings. The NA (not available)
symbol indicates that estimates could not be calculated for states where all torts go to a single-tiered court of civil jurisdiction.
4. Filings per general jurisdiction judge is the number of diversity cases expected to have been transferred in 1987 under each of the three proposals divided by the number of state general jurisdiction court judges or full judges in states that distinguish judges from associate judges or magistrates. The total number of judges were used in states that neither separate civil courts into limited and general jurisdiction categories nor separate judges into two categories: judges eligible to hear all cases regardless of amount-in-controversy (equivalent to general jurisdiction judges) and judges restricted to hearing cases below a specified dollar amount (equivalent to limited jurisdiction judges). Measures based on number of total judges, marked by a double asterisk (**), may underestimate the effect on states of any transfer of federal diversity jurisdiction.
5. Filings per 100,000 population is the number of federal diversity cases that would have been transferred in 1987 under each of the three proposals divided by population. Because this measure often results in a small fraction, the per capita figure is multiplied by 100,000 to facilitate comparison.

A number symbol (\#) is used in conjunction with the last three measures to indicate disproportionately large figures, i.e. those states that would be affected more than others by a change in diversity jurisdiction.

## ALABAMA

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> InTorts | 4. Filings <br> Per General | Jurisdiction Judge |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | | Per 100,000 |
| :---: |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General | Jurisdiction Judge |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | | Filings |
| :---: |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number of Filings | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings Per 100,000 Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 517 | 23 | 10\% \# | 4 | 13 |

## ALASKA

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 139 | $2 \%$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number of Filings | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change $\qquad$ | 4. Filings Per General Jurisdiction Judge | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 5. Filings } \\ & \text { Per 100,000 } \\ & \text { Population } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 65 | -- | 1\% | 2 | 12 |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number |
| :---: |
| of |
| Filings |

3. Percent

Change In Torts
$1 \%$
4. Filings

Per General Jurisdiction Judge
5. Filings

Per 100,000
Population
11

## ARIZONA

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 14 |  |  |  |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Action

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 165 | $-\infty$ | $1 \%$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings | Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 0 | $1 \%$ | 2 | 5 |  |

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> InTorts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 882 | $\frac{8 \%}{101}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 504 | -- |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $2 \%$ | 4 | 13 | Population |
|  |  |  |  |  |

## CALIFONIIA

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 4182 | 229 | $9 \% \#$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> InTorts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 2485 | -- | $1 \%$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

III. Law which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> InTorts | 4. Filings <br> Per General | Jurisdiction Judge |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | | Cer Filings |
| :---: |
| Population |

## COLORAD

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 512 | 40 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number of $\qquad$ | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change In Torts | 4. Filings Per General Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings Per 100,000 Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 206 | -- | $2 \%$ | 2 | 6 |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number |
| :---: |
| of |
| Filings |

¡79*
2. Number
of
Trials
0
3. Percent

Change In Torts
$2 \%$
4. Filings

Per General Jurisdiction Judge

1
5. Filings

Per 100,000
Population

5*

## COMECTICUT

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | NA <br> 1289 | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | | 9** Filings |
| :---: |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Action

| 1. Number of Filings | 2. Number of Trials | 3. Percent Change In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 713 | -- | NA | 5** | 22\# |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Pa |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

## DELAMRRE

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 200 | 22 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 67 | -- |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General | Jurisdiction Judge <br> 4 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

## DISTRICT OF COLMMBIA

I. Proposal to Abolish Federai Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number of Filings | 2. Number of Trials | 3. Percent Change In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings Per 100,000 Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1053 | 55 | NA | 21** \# | 169\# |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number of $\qquad$ | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change $\qquad$ | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings Per 100,000 Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 355 | -- | NA | 7** \# | 57\# |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> 208 | 7 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

## FLORIDA

I. Proposal to Abciish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 1787 | Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $2 \%$ | 5 | 15 |  |  |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General | Surisdiction Judge | Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | -- | $1 \%$ |  | 8 |  |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> InTorts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 24 | $1 \%$ |  | $6^{*}$ |

## GEORGIA

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number of $\qquad$ | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change $\qquad$ | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1961 | 258 | 5\% | 15 | 32 |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Action

| 1. Number <br> of | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 1076 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number of Filings | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change $\qquad$ | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 547 | 31 | 1\% | 4 | 9 |

## HAWMII

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $21 \% \#$ | $25 \#$ | $56 \#$ |  |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number of $\qquad$ | 2. Number of Trials | 3. Percent Change $\qquad$ | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 381 | -- | 18\% \# | 16\# | 35\# |
| Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to \$50,000. |  |  |  |  |
| 1. Number of $\qquad$ | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings Per 100,000 Population |
| 212* | 1 | 5\% \# | 9\# | 20\# |

## IDAHO

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number of Filings | 2. Number of Trials | 3. Percent Change In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings Per 100,000 Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 185 | 18 | 5\% | 6 | 19 |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number of $\qquad$ | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings Per 100,000 Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 61 | -- | 3\% | 2 | 6 |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 47 | 0 | $10 \% \#$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

ILLINOIS
I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number of Filings | 2. Number of Trials | 3. Percent Change In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Par General <br> Junisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 5532 | 96 | NA | 15 | 48\# |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> InTorts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 1378 | - | $N A$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number of $\qquad$ | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change $\qquad$ | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings Per 100,000 Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 3343 | 36 | NA | 9\# | 29\# |

## INDIAMA

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of | 2. Number <br> of <br> Filings | Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | | 50 Filings |
| :---: |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Action

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings | Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | -- | $1 \%$ |  | 8 |  |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Triais | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 543 | $1 \%$ | 3 | 12 |

## IONA

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number of $\qquad$ | 2. Number of Trials | 3. Percent Change In Torts | 4. Filings Per General Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 377 | 27 | NA | 4 | 13 |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Fer General <br> 214 | -- | $N A$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | NA | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | | 1 |
| :---: |

## KANSAS

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 48 |  |  |  |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 257 | $-\quad$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Flings <br> Per General <br> 330 | 17 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | | $\frac{\text { Less Than }}{1 \%}$ |
| :---: |

## KEHTCCY

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 76 | $3 \%$ |  | 22 |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 378 | -- |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number of Filings | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 275 | 14 | 10\% \# | 3 | 7 |

## LOUISIANA

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Numberof <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 236 | $11 \% \#$ |  | 62 |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Action

| 1. Number of Filings | 2. Number of Trials | 3. Percent Change In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1431 | -- | 8\% \# | 7 | 32\# |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number of $\qquad$ | 2. Number of Trials | 3. Percent Change $\qquad$ | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 547 | 36 | 1\% | 3 | 12 |

## MAINE

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 31 | $7 \%$ | 12 | 16 |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

1. Number
of
Filings

119
2. Number of
Trials
--
3. Percent
Change
In Torts

5\% \#
4. Filings Per General Jurisdiction Judge

7
III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number |
| :--- |
| of |
| Filings |

$\begin{array}{r}\text { 3. Percent } \\ \text { Change } \\ \text { In Torts } \\ \hline\end{array}$
$1 \%$
4. Filings

Per General
Jurisdiction Judge
5. Filings Per 100,000 Population

```
    2
```


## MARYLAND

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 88 | $4 \%$ | 10 | 23 |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 499 | -- |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> 224 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

## MSSSACHSETTS

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 1233 | 88 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number of $\qquad$ | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings Per 100,000 Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 705 | -- | 4\% | 12\# | 12 |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

1. Number of Filings 239
2. Number of
Trials
14
3. Percent
Change
In Torts
$2 \%$
4. Filings
Per General Jurisdiction Judge
5. Filings
Per 100,000
Population
4

## MCHIGAN

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number of $\qquad$ | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change $\qquad$ | 4. Filings <br> Per General Jurisdiction Judge | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 5. Filings } \\ & \text { Per } 100,000 \\ & \text { Population } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2117 | 151 | $3 \%$ | 11 | 23 |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Action

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 1344 | -- |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

III. Law which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 18 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

## MINNESOTA

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | -- |  |  |  |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Triais | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 11 | NA | 5 |  |

## MISSISSIPPI

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 1630 | $11 \% \#$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | | Jurisdiction Judge Filings |
| :---: |
| Per 100,000 |
| Population |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Inịtiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number of Filings | 2. Number of Trials | 3. Percent Change In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings Per 100,000 Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1138 | -- | 8\% \# | 14\# | 43\# |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 249 | 22 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

## MISSOURI

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 1449 | 147 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> InTorts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 785 | -- |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 29 | $2 \%$ |  | 9 |

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General | Jurisdiction Judge |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | | 5. Filings |
| :---: |
| Per 100,000 |
| Population |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Action

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 268 | -- |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

1. Number
of
Filings

139*
2. Number
of Trials

1
4. Filings

Per General
Jurisdiction Judge

3
5. Filings Per 100,000 Population 17*\#

## NEBRASKA

1. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 343 | Jurisdiction Judge |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | | 5. Filings |
| :---: |
| Per 100,000 |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.


184
2. Number
of
Trials
--
3. Percent

Change
In Torts
$3 \%$
4. Filings

Per General
Jurisdiction Judge

4
III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. <br> Number <br> of <br> Trials |
| :---: | :---: |

5
3. Percent

Change
In Torts
$1 \%$
4. Filings

Per General Jurisdiction Judge
5. Filings Per 100,000 Population 12
5. Filings Per 100,000 Population

3
8*

## NEVMOA

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 537 | 26 | $4 \%$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | | 15 |
| :---: | | Jurisdiction Judge Filings |
| :---: |
| Per 100,000 |
| Population |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Triais | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $-\infty$ |  |  |  |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> InTorts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $2 \%$ |  | $10 \#$ | $34 \#$ |

## NEW HAMPSHIRE

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General | Jurisdiction Judge |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | | 5er Filings |
| :---: |
| 238 |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 110 | $-\quad$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 38 | 13 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | | $\frac{\text { Less Than }}{1 \%}$ |
| :---: |

## NEW JERSEY

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General | Surisdiction Judge | Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | NA |  | 26 |  |  |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | -- | $N A$ |  | Per 100,000 <br> Population |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number of $\qquad$ | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General Jurisdiction Judge | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 5. Filings } \\ & \text { Per } 100,000 \\ & \text { Population } \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 709* | 12 | NA | 2** | 9 |

## NEW MEXXCO

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number of Filings | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change $\qquad$ | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings Per 100,000 Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 459 | 32 | 5\% | 8 | 31 |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversicy Actions.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | -- | $3 \%$ |  |  |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.


160
2. Number of Trials

3
3. Percent Change In Torts
$1 \%$
4. Filings
5. Filings

Per General Per 100,000 Jurisdiction Judge Population

11

## NEE YOKK

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number of $\qquad$ | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change In Torts | 4. Filings Per General Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings Per 100,000 Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 5482 | 251 | 3\% | 14 | 31 |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 2308 | -- | $2 \%$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number of $\qquad$ | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change $\qquad$ | 4. Filings Per General Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings Per 100,000 Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Less Than |  |  |
| 1754 | 41 | 1\% | 4 | 10 |

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number of Filings | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General Jurisdiction Judge | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 5. Filings } \\ & \text { Per } 100,000 \\ & \text { Population } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 644 | 57 | $2 \%$ | 9 | 10 |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General | Jurisdiction Judge | Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | - | $2 \%$ |  | 4 |  |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General | Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 18 | 5 | 5 |  |  |

## NORTH OKKOTA

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number of $\qquad$ | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change $\qquad$ | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 119 | 19 | 6\% | 5 | 18 |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Action

| 1. Number of $\qquad$ | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change $\qquad$ | 4. Filings Per General Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 55 | -- | 4\% | 2 | 8 |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2 | $3 \%$ | 2 | 9 |

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 1503 | 117 $3 \%$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Action's.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $-\infty$ | $2 \%$ |  | Per 100,000 <br> Population |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number of $\qquad$ | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change $\qquad$ | 4. Filings Per General Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Less Than |  |  |
| 314 | 17 | 1\% | 1 | 3 |

## OKLAHOMA

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 2024 | Jurisdiction Judge |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 153 | NA | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |  |  |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> InTorts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $-\infty$ |  | $14 \#$ | $29 \#$ |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> InTorts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | NA |  | $17 \#$ |

## CRECON

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> InTorts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $2 \%$ |  | $\frac{18}{\text { Population }}$ |  |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> InTorts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 176 | -- |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Nuriber of $\qquad$ | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change In Torts | 4. Filings Per General Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings Per 100,000 Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Less Than |  |  |
| 184 | 7 | \% 1 \% | 2 | 7 |

## PENSYYLUANIA

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per Gneral <br> 5642 | 434 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Action

| 1. Number of $\qquad$ | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2905 | -- | 5\% \# | 9\# | 24\# |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 3279 | 124 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

## PUETTO RICO

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> InTorts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | 41 |  |  |  |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $-\infty$ | 1 |  |  |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

1. Number
of
Filings

45
2. Number
of
Trials

8
3. Percent

Change In Torts $\frac{\text { Less Than }}{1 \%}$
4. Filings

Per General Jurisdiction Judge
5. Filings

Per 100,000 Population

## RHOOE ISLANO

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General | Jurisdiction Judge |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 46 | $5 \%$ | Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |  |
| 16 |  |  |  |  |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number of $\qquad$ | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 170 | -- | 3\% | 9\# | 17 |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 18 | 4 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | | $\frac{\text { Less Than }}{1 \%}$ |
| :---: |

## SOUTH CAROLINA

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number of Filings | 2. Number of Trials | 3. Percent Change In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1073 | 114 | 5\% | 35\# | 31 |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number of Filings | 2. Number of Trials | 3. Percent Change In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 664 | -- | 4\% | 21\# | 19\# |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number of Filings | 2. Number of Trials | 3. Percent Change In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General Jurisdiction Judge | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 5. Filings } \\ & \text { Per } 100,000 \\ & \text { Population } \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 376* | 13 | 1\% | 12\# | 11* |

## SOUTH DKKOTA

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General | Jurisdiction Judge |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | | Filings |
| :---: |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions

| 1. Number of $\qquad$ | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 73 | -- | NA | 2 | 10 |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> InTorts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 42 | Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | NA | 1 | 6 |  |

## TEMESSEE

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $5 \%$ |  | 26 |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number of $\qquad$ | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General Jurisaiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 670 | -- | 3\% | 5 | 14 |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> InTorts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 26 | $1 \%$ |  |  |

## TEXAS

I. Froposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General | Jurisdiction Judge |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 831 | $8 \% \#$ | Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |  |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 3269 | -- |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> InTorts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 289 | $5 \%$ | 8 | 18 |

## UTAH

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number of $\qquad$ | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change $\qquad$ | 4. Filings <br> Per General Jurisdiction Judge | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 5. Filings } \\ & \text { Per } 100,000 \\ & \text { Population } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 392 | 26 | 8\% \# | 14 | 23 |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> InTorts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 139 | $-\infty$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number of Filings | 2. Number of Trials | 3. Percent Change $\qquad$ | 4. Filings Per General Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings Per 100,000 Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 153 | 5 | 4\% \# | 5 | 9 |

## VERYONT

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number of $\qquad$ | 2. Number of Trials | 3. Percent Change $\qquad$ | 4. Filings <br> Per General Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings Per 100,000 Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 132 | 35 | NA | 25** | 24 |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions

| 1. Number of $\qquad$ | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change $\qquad$ | 4. Filings <br> Per General Jurisdiction Judge | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 5. Filings } \\ & \text { Per } 100,000 \\ & \text { Population } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 50 | -- | NA | 5** | 9 |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> InTorts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 69 | 11 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

## VIRGIMIA

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> InTorts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 184 | $4 \%$ | 12 | 25 |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 1. Number } \\ & \text { of } \\ & \text { Filings } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change $\qquad$ | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings Per 100,000 Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 709 | -- | 3\% | 6 | 12 |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

1. Number
of
Filings

324
2. Number of Trials 34
3. Percent Change In Torts
$1 \%$
4. Filings

Per General Jurisdiction Judge
5. Filings

Per 100,000 Population

## WASHINGTON

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> InTorts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $3 \%$ |  | 13 |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.
i. Number
of
Filings
325
2. Number
of
Trials
3. Percent
Change
In Torts
3\%
4. Filings
Per General
5. Filings Per 100,000 Population
7
III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number of Filings | 2. Number of Trials | 3. Percent Change In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings Per 100,000 Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 197* | 1 | $\frac{\text { Less Than }}{1 \%}$ | 1 | 4* |

## hess virgivin

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number of $\qquad$ | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 604 | 30 | 5\% | 10 | 32 |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Actions.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> 298 | -- |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> InTorts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings | Per 100,000 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

## WISCONSON

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number of $\qquad$ | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change $\qquad$ | 4. Filings Per General Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 <br> Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 430 | 37 | NA | 2** | 9 |

II. Proposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Action

| 1. Number of $\qquad$ | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change $\qquad$ | 4. Filings Per General Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings Per 100,000 Population |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 172 | -- | NA | 1** | 4 |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> InTorts | 4. Filings <br> Per General |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Jurisdiction Judge |  |  |

5. Filings Per 100,000 population 3

## HOWHIG

I. Proposal to Abolish Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.

| 1. Number of Filings | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change In Torts | 4. Filings Per General Jurisdiction Judge | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 5. Filings } \\ & \text { Per } 100,000 \\ & \text { Population } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 216 | 32 | 6\% | 13 | 44\# |
| roposal to Bar In-State Plaintiffs From Initiating Federal Diversity Action |  |  |  |  |
| 1. Number of Filings | 2. Number of $\qquad$ | 3. Percent Change In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings Per 100,000 Population |
| 81 | -- | 3\% | 5 | 17 |

III. Law Which Raises Federal Jurisdiction Limit to $\$ 50,000$.

| 1. Number <br> of <br> Filings | 2. Number <br> of <br> Trials | 3. Percent <br> Change <br> In Torts | 4. Filings <br> Per General <br> Jurisdiction Judge | 5. Filings <br> Per 100,000 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |


[^0]:    SOURCE: Marc Galanter, "The Life and Times of the Big Six; or, The Federal Courts Since the Good 01d Days," 1988 Wisconsin Law Review 921.

[^1]:    Total Diversity Cases=66,408.

[^2]:    - Data are estimated from population
    because these states do no report torts
    as a separate category of civil cases.

[^3]:    *Estimates based on national averages rather than state averages.

[^4]:    10 Marvin Summers, "Analyses of Factors that Influence Choice of, Forum in Diversity Cases" 47 Iowa Law Review 933 (1962).

