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

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HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT

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DEVELOPING A POLICING STYLE FOR NEIGHBORHOOD ORIENTED POLICING:

EXECUTIVE SESSION #1
THE HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report is a direct result of a tremendous amount of collaboration among numerous people within and outside the Houston Police Department. Their collective goal was to develop a policing style, for the Houston Police Department, which was reflective of the philosophy of neighborhood oriented policing.

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Finally, this report could not have been provided without the contributions from all of the members of the Executive Session. Without their dedication and willingness to participate in this endeavor, the mission of developing a new policing style for the Houston Police Department would not have been accomplished.

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DEVELOPING A POLICING STYLE FOR NEIGHBORHOOD ORIENTED POLICING

ABSTRACT

In preparing for the opening and occupation of the Westside Command Station in the Spring of 1987, Chief Lee P. Brown initiated the first in a series of six Executive Session meetings on October 1, 1986. The purpose of these meetings was to allow the participants an opportunity to freely discuss ideas, facts, experiences, and values that would help describe the style of policing to be adopted by the Westside Command Station personnel, and, eventually, all personnel within the department.

A total of 29 personnel were asked to participate in these sessions. Under the sponsorship of the Police Foundation, the membership was able to invite guest speakers to their sessions to discuss a variety of programs and experiences that were beneficial to the task placed before them.

This report contains the descriptions, thoughts, and ideas developed by the membership as a result of participating in the six Executive Session meetings. The membership was able to describe what they felt should be the department's philosophy with respect to providing services throughout the city of Houston. This philosophy, entitled, Neighborhood Oriented Policing (NOP) was defined by the membership and set forth as the ideal from which a policing style for the department could be developed.

Toward that end, the membership described the roles of the officers, supervisors, managers, and administrators which they thought were commensurate with the concept of NOP. A considerable amount of time was spent examining research trends and implications within the profession during the last 10 to 15 years with particular attention being paid to the relevance to programs administered within the Houston Police Department during the last three to four years. A proposed process model was developed as a vehicle for transforming the concept of NOP into a sustainable, reality-based policing style. The report concludes by describing the framework within the department that has been established to support the philosophy of NOP and the ensuing policing style.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Members of the Houston Police Department began the conceptual development work on the Command Station during 1979. Initially, efforts were taken to examine a number of options regarding the status of the existing substations. The first option was to consider improving the physical attributes of the existing substations. Second, the prospect of building more substations was discussed. Finally, it was decided to pursue the prospect of building several large police facilities known as Command Stations. The reason for constructing a series of command stations was to provide facilities which would house all of the necessary personnel and equipment needed to provide efficient and comprehensive neighborhood police services on a decentralized basis throughout the city of Houston. Unlike the traditional substations which can not house support functions under the same roof, each command station building is to contain jail facilities, municipal court facilities, and the necessary police facilities (records, identification, computer support, operation and investigative functions among others).

Given the physical capacity of the building, a preliminary report outlining the feasibility of decentralizing police functions was forwarded to the Command staff in March, 1980. This report was rapidly followed-up with a more comprehensive study designed to examine a number of service delivery issues and related support service concerns in order to determine the most efficient means of utilizing the facility to provide effective service to the neighborhood residents.

In response to this study, a number of task force committees were formed under the guidance of the Planning and Research Division. These committees were instructed to study the various organizational components which would be

affected by altering operational strategies as a result of decentralization to the command station facility. The work of these committees was completed during July, 1981.

In mid 1982, efforts were taken to examine the feasibility of actually implementing, on an experimental basis, the work of the Field Deployment Task Force. The task force members were recommending, as a model program, the implementation of the Directed Area Responsibility Team (D.A.R.T.) Program. The D.A.R.T. Program represented a variation of the team policing concept used predominantly throughout the country during the 1970's. The D.A.R.T. Program, however, was not a duplication of any one of those programs. It included elements of some successful team policing programs, but was primarily constructed in accordance with the perceptions of what would meet the needs of Houstonians and the capabilities of the department's resources.

From 1983 through 1984 the D.A.R.T. Program was implemented within a single district and evaluated (and is still in effect today). The evaluation report entitled, An Evaluation of the Houston Police Department's D.A.R.T. Program, did reveal a number of significant findings that had a direct bearing on the department's ability to alter its method of delivering services to the neighborhoods.

In October, 1985, the Westside Command Station Steering Committee was formed within the department. Their primary responsibility was to review and update the preliminary task force reports of July, 1981, as well as examine the assessment report on the D.A.R.T. Program. The steering committee subdivided the work and assigned the responsibility to five subcommittees: Geographic Considerations, Staffing Considerations, Operational Considerations, Criminal Investigations, and Operational Support Service Considerations. Their

findings were completed in February/March, 1986 and submitted to Chief Brown in a document known as the Planning Recommendations for the Westside Command Station.

By August, 1986, steps were being taken to establish the Westside Transition Team. Their primary responsibility was to review the Steering Committee's work, make necessary operational and administrative adjustments as deemed appropriate, and begin to coordinate the implementation of the actual transition stages in order to occupy the Command Station. A portion of this responsibility centered upon the need to develop a plan which would articulate the policing style utilized by the beat officers. In order to describe the policing style it became necessary to begin examining how services would be delivered under the concept of Neighborhood Oriented Policing (NOP). A series of Executive Session meetings were scheduled, in an effort to accomplish this particular task.

On October 1, 1986, Police Chief Lee P. Brown convened the first of six Executive Session meetings. A total of 28 classified personnel representing all ranks were selected to participate with the Chief of Police in these meetings. Additionally, a number of civilian, resource personnel were asked to attend the sessions (please see Appendix A). The purpose of conducting the Executive Sessions was to allow the participants an opportunity to freely discuss ideas, facts, experiences, and values that would help describe the style of policing to be adopted by the Westside Command Station personnel and, eventually, all personnel within the police department.

This report contains the collective thoughts, concerns, and feelings from the panel members that were obtained during the course of the six Executive Session meetings. The information represents the membership's ability to

describe a proposed policing style which would perpetuate the concept of NOP. The material contained within this report, consequently, represents a philosophical framework from which operational plans for the Westside command station, and eventually the entire city, can be developed and implemented.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT

The Houston Police Department is committed to providing services throughout the city in manner that is responsive to neighborhood concerns. This commitment is clearly evident in the Department's mission statement which reads as follows:

> **The mission of the Houston Police Department is to enhance the quality of life in the City of Houston by working cooperatively with the public and within the framework of the United States Constitution to enforce the laws, preserve the peace, reduce fear, and provide for a safe environment**

It is the responsibility of all members of the department to conduct their business in a manner that is consistent with this mission. To assist in this effort, the department has established a set of values.

Collectively, these values represent a set of beliefs that govern the development of policies and procedures as well as affect the attitudes displayed by the members of the department. The values also incorporate a number of expectations held by the citizens of Houston. Foremost among these expectations is the desire and willingness to have the citizenry and members of the department work together to improve the quality of neighborhood life.

The commitment to developing and maintaining this relationship is quite evident in three of the ten department value statements:

- **The Houston Police Department will involve the community in all policing activities which directly impact the quality of community life;**
- **The Houston Police Department believes that it must structure service delivery in a way that will reinforce the strengths of the city's neighborhoods; and**
- **The Houston Police Department believes that the public should have input into the development of policies which directly impact the quality of neighborhood life.**

If these values are to be meaningful, efforts must be made to administer an operational philosophy which is conducive to supporting an environment which will facilitate the development of a cooperative relationship between the public and the police. It is the opinion of the Executive Session membership that the concept of NOP should represent that operational philosophy for the department.

NOP constitutes a major philosophical departure from traditional means of providing police services. This departure is best exemplified by a different way of thinking about how police services are delivered. Indeed, the essence of NOP is in thinking about new and innovative ways of providing services to the public through increased communication with community members, ascertaining citizens' concerns, and getting citizens more involved in addressing and resolving problems that are of mutual concern to both the police and the public.

This requires police personnel and members of the community to learn how to work together. An interactive working relationship must be developed that stems from a commitment from an individual(s), from neighborhood groups, and/or the community as a whole if deemed necessary. It becomes the collective responsibility of both the police and the citizens to identify the issues in need of resolution. This can not be accomplished without assistance from the neighborhood residents.

Participation from the neighborhood residents is paramount to the successful implementation of the NOP philosophy for two reasons. First, community input is valuable to the department in that it offers a different perspective from that of police personnel as to what the local neighborhood concerns and problems are. It will not suffice to believe that only the police

are in a position to determine neighborhood needs. History has demonstrated repeatedly that the police do not know everything nor can they be everywhere at once.

Second, the police and the community work much better together when they know and understand one another. The essence of meaningful understanding, consequently, is learning how to effectively communicate. As so aptly noted by one of the panel members,:

> **"The better we communicate, the more we communicate; the better we understand what problems are in the neighborhoods, the better we understand the community we are responsible to, and, the better the community understands us".**

For too long a period of time, the ability to develop this mutual understanding has been inhibited by the officers' desire to hide behind a shroud of professionalism that is characterized by anonymity. Officers must discard the desire to remain aloof from the public. The syndrome of noninvolvement must be overcome. The concept of professionalism must be redefined in a manner that stimulates a commitment to communicate and interact on behalf of the officers and the neighborhood residents. The desire and willingness to work together with the public should become an inherent feeling within all officers.

Consequently, the concept of NOP should become the police department's culture. The department should become a part of the community and not separate or a part from the community. All department personnel should be an active and integral part of the neighborhood they serve. This should be demonstrated in their attitudes and behavior, especially by the beat officers working in the neighborhoods. The officers' attitudes should also reflect this philosophy. No where could this be more important than by beginning to have the residents

learn who the officers are that provide services within their respective neighborhoods.

To perpetuate this feeling of working with one another, officers must realize that every contact they have is a community relations contact. Whether the situation dictates the situation to be a detrimental or positive experience for the citizen, the behavior of the officer is what is often remembered. The officers must understand this and understand the implications of their corresponding behavior. According to one panel member, experience has demonstrated that:

> "it is not how good you are, it's how good those people out there think you are that is important. Officers may think they are the best at what they do, however, if the people, the citizens, the community, the civic groups do not think they are the best or do not think they are doing the job they should be doing, the officers have not accomplished anything positive".

This change in orientation between the police and the public is a gradual one that must be reciprocal. While the department is willing to provide as much support as possible to assist the neighborhood beat officers in working with citizen groups, the department expects that the citizens will also be willing to make a similar commitment.

At present, the department's resources are strained because of fiscal cutbacks and a freeze on hiring additional personnel. Plus, the department will not compromise its responsibility in continuing to respond to and handle emergency calls for service, a fundamental activity of the patrol function that can not be delegated. The department, however, welcomes the opportunity to develop new policing strategies in working more closely with the public at the neighborhood level.

DEFINING NEIGHBORHOOD ORIENTED POLICING

Neighborhood Oriented Policing (NOP) is a concept which seeks to define and describe a philosophy which guides and directs the delivery of police services throughout the City of Houston. As a philosophy, NOP seeks to incorporate the department's values into a responsive policing style which is dependant upon quality of the day to day interactions between the police and the public.

The key to defining NOP appears to reside in the ability to recognize the need to establish rapport between the beat officers and the citizens that work and live within each of the officers' respective beats. It is the nature of this rapport between the officers and the citizens that defines the quality of their relationship. It is through these relationships, either established in handling calls for service or in meeting with citizens when not on call, that the officers can begin to identify and begin to think about the most salient service delivery needs in each of their respective beats.

The concept of NOP, consequently, can best be initially defined as follows:

> **Neighborhood oriented policing is an interactive process between police officers assigned to specific beats and the citizens that either work or reside in these beats to mutually develop ways to identify problems and concerns and then to assess viable solutions by providing available resources from both the police department and the community to address the problems and/or concerns.**

The NOP concept will help clarify responsibilities for both parties as they attempt to identify and resolve problems in the neighborhood beats. NOP, therefore, must involve continuous planning participation, program involvement, evaluation, and adjustments by both the officers patrolling the beats and the citizens living in their respective neighborhoods.

The role of the beat officer will be enhanced as a result of increased interaction with the citizens. Beat officers, for example, will be actively involved in the decision making process regarding the identification, prioritizations, and selection of resolutions for identified problems or concerns. Additionally, because of the officers' interaction with the citizens, they will be in an excellent position to determine what resources, if any could be obtained from them in combating neighborhood concerns. Since the beat officers should be most familiar with the citizens who work and reside within their beats, the officers, if given the appropriate direction and support, are in an ideal position to implement programs and other initiatives to improve the quality of life within the neighborhoods.

As noted by several of the panel members' comments, the purpose of NOP is multifaceted. Among the more prominent features are the need:

- **To establish trust and harmony between the neighborhood residents and the beat officer(s);**
- **To exchange information which will strengthen rapport and enhance neighborhood safety;**
- **To address the problem of crime and reduce the level of fear associated with the criminal activity;**
- **To help identify and resolve neighborhood problems;**
- **To clarify responsibilities on behalf of the citizens and the officers; and**
- **To help define service needs.**

Each of these features is noted or implied in the initial definition. It should also be realized these features represent a sampling of the standards by which success should be measured. This is not to suggest the definition is complete, for it lacks an operational perspective.

Toward this end, a number of traditional operational assumptions may be challenged as we begin to examine the process of more completely describing and implementing the NOP concept. For example, NOP implies a concern for reexamining how the traditional, total service delivery concept is defined. Furthermore, the focus of NOP appears to suggest an altering of the orientation or perspective of the patrol officers. The officers should be encouraged to expand their responsibilities in concert with the needs of the neighborhood. Among other things, this suggests the development of different performance indicators in order to stimulate and reinforce among all patrol officers a sense of neighborhood ownership so eminently displayed by the department's storefront officers. These assumptions are seldom found within the traditional police service concept.

The traditional event/call oriented, random, preventive patrol concept emphasizes mobility, impersonal relationships, and the lack of a need to establish a more meaningful interaction with the citizenry. Traditional patrol work has accentuated random, preventive patrol and assumes that high mobile police visibility has a marked deterrent effect on the commission of crime. Officers are not expected to look beyond an incident in an attempt to define and resolve a particular type of problem. Once dispatched to handle calls, the patrol officers are encouraged to return to service as quickly as possible to resume random, preventive patrol. Rapid responses, handling numerous calls, and making arrests are the primary means of measuring productivity.

As the panel membership sought to identify the various conceptual elements associated with the NOP philosophy (Please see Appendix B), suggestions were made to consider reexamining how these elements would effect the department's operational commitments. Panel members were concerned about the need to

rethink how NOP would affect the department. Specific concerns focused upon attempting to determine the affects NOP would have on role expectations of department personnel and implementing various strategy considerations.

ROLE EXPECTATIONS AND THE CONCEPT OF NOP

NOP is not a new concept to the profession of policing. Theoretically, the desire to work with the public has been a long standing goal of numerous departments throughout the country. In some instances, departments have developed and administered programs which emphasize the need to work closely with the public. Some of these programs were successful (i.e., Flint, Michigan Foot Patrol Program) while others were not. Experience has demonstrated that part of the success factor is based upon the ability of department's officers to accept change, especially as it affected traditional role expectations.

It would behoove administrators, consequently, to realize that the process of change is a complex one. One must understand that by altering a department's philosophy, numerous variables will be simultaneously affected. Among them is the need to recognize how the process of change will affect: which strategies will be considered and actually implemented, what skills will be used by the personnel to implement the strategies, how the strategies and skills will define a management style for the department, and how the shared values expressed by the officers will define the department's beliefs and desires to work with the community. Collectively, these variables have a direct effect on the acceptability of the change process by department personnel.

A large portion of the officers' reluctance to accept change is based upon the fear of the unknown. Officers do not like to change their ways once they are comfortable in performing their established duties. What needs to be realized under the concept of NOP is that proposed changes are designed to perpetuate the officers' positive worth to the community. Therefore, in the

context of the Houston Police Department, the dynamic process of change should be interpreted and experienced as a gradual shift in emphasis from one positive operational role to another.

In adopting NOP as an operational philosophy, a shift in emphasis in the role of the patrol officer will occur. This shift in emphasis will, in general, deemphasize the role of the officer as being primarily "an enforcer" in the neighborhood beats. The more desired perception is for the officer to be viewed as someone that can provide help and assistance, someone that cares about people and shares their concern for safety, someone that expresses compassion through empathizing and sympathizing with victims of crime, and someone that can organize community groups, inspire and motivate community groups, and facilitate and coordinate the collective efforts and endeavors of others.

This desired perception of the role of the patrol officer may be difficult to realize. The evolution of bureaucratic and militaristic organizational structures in policing since the turn of the century has served to support and perpetuate traditional definitions of the police officer's role as solely being that of a "crime fighter." This notion, arising out of the 1930s, was instrumental in creating and reinforcing "time-hardened assumptions" regarding the effectiveness of random, preventive patrol in deterring crime and in the development of patrol management systems predicated on the basis of achieving rapid police response to all calls for service. Because of the emphasis to have patrol officers handle their calls as quickly as possible and return to service to continue performing preventive patrol to suppress crime, little attention was directed toward the service needs of the citizens, including the needs of the citizens that had become victims of crime. The "effectiveness" of

this "call oriented system" was measured by "crunching numbers" (i.e., counting the number of calls handled and the number of arrests made). Hence, a quantitative preoccupation with numbers dominated concern over the quality and types of the services delivered.

The organizational culture of municipal policing has, in general, continued to condition police officers to think of themselves primarily as "crime fighters." Traditionally, police departments have attempted to identify and recruit individuals into policing that have displayed bravado. Organizational incentives have also been designed to favor self conceptions of machismo; conceptions that are reinforced through pop art (e.g., detective novels, "police stories," "Dirty Harry" movies, etc.). Many, if not most, of the approximately 500,000 law enforcement officers in policing in America today have strong opinions about what constitutes "real police work." Because NOP is almost completely antithetical to traditional ways of thinking about police work, attempts to change these opinions may be met with resistance by some officers.

Resistance can also be expected throughout all of the managerial levels within the organization. By operationalizing the concept of NOP, traditional and autocratic management styles will be challenged. A different, more responsive, attitude and managerial style will be required to stimulate, accommodate, and perpetuate desired behavioral changes which will occur as a result of redefining the officers' role. This new form of management must encourage a willingness within all managers to transform new concepts into attainable goals and objectives. Those goals and objectives must, in turn, be articulated within the organization and must be transformed into actions which are consistent with the service demands expressed by the citizenry.

To ensure these actions are consistent with expressed service needs, NOP solicits organizational input from the "bottom up" as opposed to the traditional direction of "top down" so evidently displayed in most bureaucratic organizations. As so poignantly noted among the department's values:

> **The Houston Police Department will seek the input of employees into matters which impact employee job satisfaction and effectiveness.**

Effective management must include the active participation of the officers in policy development, procedure and strategy design, program formulation, and implementation. Since upper management personnel are removed from the officers' working environment, they can not be expected to dictate service responses without first obtaining feedback from the officers as to what the neighborhood expectations and commitments are.

Even then, there are no convenient solutions, no eloquent equations, or no magical formulas that upper management can employ to provide NOP services. The types of calls, types of citizens, and the types of issues and problems that officers encounter will vary from one neighborhood to the next and, to a great extent, vary by time of day (e.g.,across shifts). Consequently, this will require managerial resiliency and flexibility. By providing this flexibility managers must also realize a certain amount of "risk taking" will need to be allowed. It must be remembered that one can learn equally as much if not more from failures as from successes.

What upper management can do to facilitate the acceptance and implementation of the NOP concept is provide their subordinates with a process that encourages the officers to become involved in developing new and innovative ways to improve the quality of policing in the neighborhood beats.

Top management can provide the patrol officers and their supervisors with an opportunity to design a "custom patrol plan" that is tailored to the needs of the neighborhood beats and is sensitive to citizen concerns across all shifts.

First line supervisors and middle managers must realize their responsibility should be one of encouraging the officers to become involved in this process. A major portion of their role should be designed to support the officers attempts to identify citizen concerns, assist in mobilizing appropriate resources (or removing the impediments) to address those concerns, and assess the effects of the assistance provided.

Upper management can also provide the right types of incentives to encourage officers to expand their roles and assume additional responsibilities. As these roles change, it will require a concomitant change in the officers' behavior. Research in the social science field has indicated that if behavior is to change, one's attitude must change first. Understandably, management can not dictate attitudes; but management can provide the necessary support to facilitate the acceptance of an alternative style of policing such as NOP. If the officers accept such a policing style, it will be primarily due to their belief that such as approach is an effective means of delivering services to the community.

Finally, upper management can attempt to provide, despite the presence of tight fiscal constraints, the types of resources required to effectively implement, assess, and sustain the NOP process. Supervisors and subordinates cannot be held responsible for performing a function or fulfilling an expectation when they are too ill-equipped to reasonably succeed.

Although NOP seeks to expand the role of the patrol officers to allow them more latitude in developing new ways to police their beats, it does not relax

their compliance with the department's standards of professional conduct. And while the image of the patrol officer as being dedicated full time "to fighting crime and evil" is expected to change, it does not mean the department will reduce its commitment in attempts to prevent crime and interdict criminal perpetrators. It is anticipated that developing closer ties with the citizens in Houston will enhance the department's ability to prevent crime as well as identify and arrest persons engaged in the commission of crime.

RESEARCH TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS

Following the advent of the 1970s, municipal policing began to experience accelerated change. This change was initially influenced by protest demonstrations against the government's military actions in Vietnam and the incivility that occurred across the country in the mid- to late 1960s. It was later perpetuated by a plethora of research findings regarding police operations that emanated out of the 1970s. The impetus for this research was directly linked to police actions in handling anti-war demonstrations, their attempts to control incivility, and a search for more effective methods to combat crime. Although the findings from this research generated more questions than answers, it seriously challenged the veracity of time-hardened assumptions underlying management of the patrol, dispatch, and investigative functions.

Beginning with a review of pertinent research that addressed the patrol function, the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment provided the most dramatic attack on conventional wisdom regarding the deterrent effects of random patrol in preventing crime. In its efforts to develop a participatory management system, the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department had established task forces at each of its four patrol divisions (a task force had also been established in the department's Special Operations Division). These task forces consisted of patrol officers and first line supervisors. The task forces were charged with responsibility to generate new and innovative ideas to improve policing. The establishment of these task forces was based on the chief's belief that the ability to make competent planning decisions existed at all levels within the department. Because police officers were often most

directly affected by change, management thought that they should have an active voice in planning and implementing change. Recommendations from these task forces were sent up through the chain of command to be reviewed for consideration.

The impetus for the preventive patrol experiment came from within the department in 1971. The South Patrol Task Force had identified five problem areas to impact through patrol efforts (e.g., residential burglaries, juvenile delinquents, etc.). But in considering strategies to impact these problems task force members could not agree on the value of preventive patrol as a strategy to address some of the problems identified. The South Patrol Task Force therefore generated a position paper that questioned the effectiveness of random, preventive patrol. Intrigued by the thought, the department sought funds and technical assistance from the Police Foundation to design a methodology to evaluate the effectiveness of this traditional patrol procedure.

The 15 beats that comprised the South Patrol Division were randomly divided into three groups, proactive, reactive, and control, to test the deterrent effects police visibility had in preventing crime. Officers assigned to "reactive beats" were not permitted to enter their beats unless officially dispatched to handle a call (or in hot pursuit of another vehicle). Conversely, officers assigned to "proactive beats" were expected to perform "aggressive patrol work," i.e., increased car checks, pedestrian ("ped") checks, etc. Additionally, there was supposed to be approximately two to three times the level of police visibility in the proactive beats. Officers from the reactive areas were encouraged to enter the proactive areas and engage in routine patrol. Finally, officers assigned to the "control beats" were expected to conduct business as usual; to drive systematically unsystematically

throughout their beats until interrupted by a dispatched call for service. Once the call was handled, the officers were to return to performing random, preventive patrol.

Data were collected for about a year to assess the effectiveness of preventive patrol. Analysis of this data revealed that there were no statistically significant differences in crime rates among the three different types of patrol procedures evaluated. The study therefore concluded that random patrol was not an effective deterrent in preventing crime.

While researchers and police practitioners were at a loss to suggest an alternative to random patrol, the data also revealed that approximately 60 percent of the patrol officers' time was not committed to handling calls for service. Effort was initiated to identify ways to make this uncommitted time more productive.

Perhaps the major managerial lesson learned from the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment was the extent to which departments could "experiment" in trying alternative policing strategies. If traditional, preventive patrol is not effective in deterring crime, flexibility to try other options can be explored. Patrol officers can be directed to perform activities other than random patrolling without causing local increases in the crime rate or generating dissatisfaction among citizens.

As if the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department didn't arouse enough attention among police administrators by questioning the sanctity of preventive patrol, another effort initiated by this agency (in response to a request from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice) sought to assess the value of rapid police response. Since the advent of the radio patrol car, rapid police response had long been an accepted procedure in

municipal policing. And the need to reduce response time had served as justification to bolster officer strength and to provide for large expenditures on equipment. While it was not unreasonable to assume that rapid police response would produce more arrests, more witnesses, fewer serious injuries, and more satisfied citizens, little empirical data existed that supported such assumptions.

The Response Time Analysis Study was designed to provide a comprehensive assessment of issues and assumptions regarding the value of police response to a variety of crime and noncrime, emergency and nonemergency, incidents. Specifically, two objectives were established for study: analysis of the relationships between citizen reporting delays, dispatch, and police travel times to the outcomes of on-scene criminal apprehensions, witness availability, citizen satisfaction, and the frequency of citizen injuries in connection with crime and noncrime incidents; and identification of problems (involuntary delays) and patterns (voluntary delays) in reporting crime or requesting police assistance.

To facilitate measurement of response time, the concept was operationalized on a continuum that consisted of three intervals. The first was the time taken by citizens to report incidents or request police assistance. The second was the time taken to locate, nominate, and dispatch units to handle the calls. The last was the time taken for the police to respond to the dispatched locations. The data collection process was divided into three components analogous to the three response time intervals. Civilian observers accompanied police officers to record travel times. Research analysts extracted time information from recordings of taped conversations between complainants and intake operators/dispatchers to measure dispatch

times. And interviewers collected reporting times from victims and other citizens who had reported incidents to the police.

As with the preventive patrol experiment, data collection lasted approximately one year. Analysis of data produced some startling conclusions. These included the following:

- A large proportion of Part I, i.e., "serious crime" (according to definitions provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reporting criteria), are not susceptible to the impact of rapid police response, because almost two thirds (62.3%) of the Part I crime sample analyzed indicated that these crimes were detected after they occurred ("discovery crimes");

- Prompt reporting can increase the chance of making on-scene arrests for all types of Part I crimes in which a citizen saw, heard, or became involved at any point during the commission of an offense ("involvement crimes"). For the proportion of these crimes (37.7%), however, the time taken to report the incident largely predetermines the effect police response time will have on desired outcomes;

- Explanations for reporting delays are primarily associated with citizen apathy and voluntary actions taken (e.g., telephoning other persons for advice, waiting or observing the situation, investigating the incident scene themselves, contacting their employer, a supervisor, or a security guard, etc.) in arriving at a decision to notify the police. Problems encountered with either public or police communications systems (e.g., being "cut off," being inadvertently transferred to another number, not being able to access a public pay phone, etc.) accounted for reporting delays in less than one out of five (16.5%) involvement crimes;

- Although rapid police response based on the need to assist an injured victim has been overshadowed by an emphasis toward making an on-scene arrest, there were more cases in which persons sustained injuries of sufficient seriousness as to require hospitalization (5.4%) than in the number of "response-related arrests" resulting from rapid reporting, dispatching, and officer response (3.7%); and

- Neither dispatch nor travel times were found to be associated with citizen satisfaction with police response time. Rather, citizen satisfaction with response time

was dependent on whether citizens perceived response time to be faster or slower than they expected.

A major but unpopular implication from this study indicated that an infusion of additional patrol officers to reduce police response time would have negligible impact on crime outcomes, because of the time taken by citizens to report involvement crimes and the relatively small number of involvement vis-a-vis discovery crimes. This implication also tended to negate justification for technological innovations such as automated vehicle locations systems designed to reduce police response time. Moreover, it also refuted claims to lower police response time that were made by American Telephone and Telegraph in marketing their 911 telecommunications system. The study found that the time required to phone the police was of minuscule significance compared to the time citizens took in reaching a decision to call. The time required to dial the police department's "crime alert" number took approximately nine seconds, although a substantial proportion of callers simply dialed "O" for operator. The average time taken to report Part I crimes was almost four hours, while the median time, that point above which and below which 50 percent of the cases lie, was about five and a half minutes.

A second implication from this study suggested the need for departments to develop formal call screening procedures to accurately discriminate between emergency and nonemergency calls. And given findings regarding citizen satisfaction with police response time it was further suggested that "call stacking" procedures be developed so that calls could be prioritized with varying queue delays thereby insuring that the most urgent calls received the most expeditious dispatching. As a result of these implications, further research was later funded to develop and evaluate differential police response

(DPR) strategies.

Finally, noting the relatively low response-related, on-scene arrest rate (3.7%) and the inclination toward "over response" by officers to "hot calls," it was suggested that interception strategies be developed to apprehend suspects in flight following the commission of robberies. Over response by officers endangers their lives and invites serious and disabling injuries. It also places innocent citizens in peril and is costly to repair or replace damaged equipment that results from over response. Of course, unit(s) will be dispatched to the scene of a crime to possibly render first aid, complete a report, locate witnesses, and collect physical evidence. But, according to this recommendation, officers not dispatched that travel away from the scene to a predetermined "perimeter point" (for those crimes reported in close proximity to the time of occurrence) stand a better chance of intercepting suspects than do officers that drive directly to the location of where the crime occurred.

Because of the "sensitivity of the findings," the Response Time Analysis study was replicated in four other cities by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF): Hartford, Connecticut; Jacksonville, Florida; Peoria, Illinois; and San Diego, California. All of the findings reported by the original study were substantiated in the subsequent replications.

The Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department's Directed Patrol study stemmed from the Police Foundations's Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment. As previously mentioned, once the preventive patrol experiment had been completed police administrators and researchers were at a loss to suggest alternative strategies to replace conventional, preventive patrol. Again, findings from the preventive patrol experiment indicated that preventive patrol was not effective in deterring crime. And, as already mentioned, the study

disclosed that approximately 60 percent of the patrol officers' time was uncommitted. The Directed Patrol study was therefore designed to structure, i.e., direct, this uncommitted time. The project was implemented in the East Patrol Division.

At the outset of the project, several support mechanisms were established. A crime analysis position was created for a certified officer to gather crime data for each of the beats. This data was used by field sergeants to intensify patrol efforts to high crime locations within the beats rather than having the officers perform random patrol all over their beats. Civilian clerks were hired to staff the desk at the division headquarters to handle "walk-in" and "mail-in" reports. In addition, a "tele-serve" function was established so that the civilian clerks could take some offense reports over the phone rather than having officers dispatched to complete "insurance reports."

A list of activities for patrol officers to perform while formerly conducting routine patrol was generated by the project staff. This list included tasks designed to bring the officers into closer communication with the public. Most of the tasks were oriented toward crime prevention activities to impact residential burglaries and commercial robberies. For example, officers would stop by and visit with citizens and help them serialize articles of personal property sought by residential burglars for quick sale. The officers also placed "height strips" and surveillance cameras in convenience stores. Officers engaged in these activities were considered to be on "directed patrol" and unavailable for dispatch except for emergencies.

The managerial implications derived from this study demonstrated that uncommitted patrol time could be structured for activities perhaps more meaningful than simply performing preventive patrol. It also demonstrated the

function of crime analysis in providing the types of data needed to support some forms of directed patrol activities. Given the emphasis the program placed on crime prevention, it also helped establish rapport between the police and the public. And finally, having obtained preliminary results from the Response Time Analysis study, the study demonstrated that alternative response strategies could be developed and implemented, thereby diverting calls that had previously required mobile responses by a police officers.

The San Diego Police Department also conducted several significant research efforts during the 1970s. These included an evaluation of one versus two officer patrol cars, an experiment to assess the relationship between the completion of "field interrogations" of suspicious persons and criminal deterrence, and, most germane to this paper, a Community Oriented Policing (COP) project.

At the time the COP study was initiated in 1973, the San Diego Police Department had a poor relationship with their community. It also had a chief who was held in low esteem by the public. Officer attrition had reached approximately 25 percent, and the department was in desperate need of communications equipment. Because of concern regarding corruption, commanders kept police officers on the move; moving them to new beats and shifts every three weeks.

Patrol officers were expected to complete a specific number of field interrogations and write a certain number of traffic citations each day. Clever officers found where the "easy pickings" were and got these requirements out of the way in the first 45 minutes of their tours of duty. There was little meaningful accountability since the officers and sergeants moved too quickly from one beat and shift to another to learn anything about their

districts; much less assume any responsible for the crime that occurred in their districts.

For the most part, the COP program was planned and implemented from the bottom up. The head of the police union, an organization with considerable clout within the department, was assigned to the Patrol Planning Unit. Officers in the Patrol Planning Unit designed the program that emphasized the officers in becoming very knowledgable about their beats. This knowledge was to be obtained through officer "beat profiling" activities. Beat profiling required that the officers learn about the topographical, demographic, and call histories of their beats. Also stressed was the development of "tailored patrol" strategies to impact the types of crime and address citizen concerns that had been communicated to the officers.

The Patrol Planning Unit randomly selected 24 officers to participate in the study. They were given 60 hours of training and assigned to permanent beats on fixed shifts in the North Patrol Division. The officers were required to contact citizens to identify citizen concerns and find out what the citizens expected regarding police service delivery. The officers were also encouraged to subscribe to neighborhood newsletters and attend attend community meetings. In short, the officers were made responsible and held accountable for the problems identified in their beats.

Based on initial results, the program was an unqualified success. The officers liked it, as did the citizens. Officers participating in the experiment concluded that random patrol was not as important as they had once thought it was. They also indicated that getting to know the citizens in their beats and developing stronger ties with the community was more important than they had previously thought it was. Many officers developed creative solutions

to complex problems, and they might have been even more creative had there been cooperation among the officers in adjacent beats. In spite of this shortcoming, all of the objectives of the program were accomplished.

For political reasons, the San Diego Police Department jumped on the success of the program and attempted to expand it too quickly throughout the entire department. They failed to change the old accountability requirements of measuring the officers' performance based on ticket quotas and other forms of "bean counting." They failed to include the middle managers, i.e., shift lieutenants, into the planning and implementation process. They failed to adequately train the sergeants, and they cut time from the officers' training program. There was little staff support to perpetuate the success that had been initially achieved, and the program was a complete washout within three months.

Many lessons were learned from this study. One of the more important lessons included the benefits derived from having the officers develop closer ties with citizens in their beats. Through getting to know the citizens, the officers obtained valuable information about persons responsible for perpetrating crimes in their beats. They also obtained realistic expectations regarding citizen needs as recipients of police services. For the adept patrol officer, a different perspective of the citizen emerges. Citizens constitute a potential resource than can be mobilized to assist officers in problem identification and problem resolution.

Another lesson learned from this project involved a rethinking about shift (and beat) rotation. Although perhaps elementary, it is of absolute necessity to have officers assigned to permanent shifts and beats if they are expected to engage in activities other than simply reacting to calls for service. Having

officers periodically rotate among the shifts impedes their ability to identify problems. It also discourages creative solutions to impact the problems, because the officers end up rotating away from the problems. Thus, a sense of responsibility to identify and resolve problems is lost. Likewise, management can not hold the officers accountable to deal with problems if the officers are frequently rotated from one shift to another.

Finally, the COP program demonstrated the critical role shift lieutenants and sergeants play in program planning and implementation. Exclusion of supervisory involvement in training and program expansion ultimately lead to the demise of COP in San Diego. It is unfortunate that the San Diego Police Department never received the credit they deserved for conceptualizing the COP program. Presently, almost 11 or 12 years later, there are approximately 220 municipal police departments out of around 11,600 that are engaged in "community oriented policing."

A program less community oriented and more enforcement oriented came out of the New Haven, Connecticut, Police Department in the mid 1970s. Called the Directed-Deterrent Patrol study, the major objective was to assess the effectiveness of utilizing crime analysis information for "directed runs" to suppress (i.e., deter) crime. Each patrol officer received a "D-Run" book that was compiled by crime analysts. These books were issued every 28 days and consisted entirely of statistical aggregations of data. The D-Run books contained very explicit instructions regarding the D-Runs. Every so often, a dispatcher would send out a car, usually the beat unit, to do a D-Run (e.g., "Adam 11, execute D-Run 32 immediately."). The D-Runs generally lasted between 15 and 45 minutes. They were timed so communications personnel knew exactly where the officers were supposed to be at any given time.

Based on final analysis of the results, the Directed-Deterrent Patrol study was moderately successful. Somewhat surprisingly (based on the fact that the D-Run books contained relatively stale data), burglaries, pursesnatchings, and thefts from autos, all "targeted crimes," were substantially reduced. But the program was eventually scraped, because the patrol officers hated it so much. Given the rigidity of executing D-Runs, the officers were left with the impression (albeit accurate) that police managers thought of them as being hopelessly stupid and incapable of thinking on their own. Loss of discretion in executing D-Runs tended to reinforce the officers' perceptions of management toward them.

Several operational implications were gleaned from this effort. Perhaps most important, patrol officers do not like to be treated like robots. They shouldn't be told what to do by crime analysts, either civilian or sworn. The function of crime analysis is to collect, analyze, and generate data; not to tell patrol officers (or street supervisors) how the information is to be used. Letting patrol officers suggest tactical actions to address crime patterns builds confidence and enriches job satisfaction. And the officers are much more enthusiastic about making their plan work than they are in implementing someone else's ideas.

Crime analysis information must be current in relationship to day to day criminal incidents. Field supervisors and police officers do not want to receive "history reports" from crime analysts that indicate what happened weeks or even months ago. They want to know of any significant events that occurred on the previous shift(s) and what might "go down" on their shift. In general, crime patterns only last about two to three weeks. Hence, officers in New Haven might have been patrolling the wrong area, because the data contained in

the D-Run books were already 28 days old when issued.

A different approach in dealing with directed patrol came from the Wilmington, Delaware, Police Department. Entitled the Wilmington Split-Force Patrol Experiment, the Wilmington Police Department developed a patrol program that consisted of three components. First, the patrol force was divided into two groups; "basic" and "structured." The basic group consisted of 65 percent of the patrol force, while the structured group represented the remaining 35 percent of the patrol officers. The "basic officers" responded to routine calls for service and took "mundane reports," but did not do any patrolling. The "structured officers" performed both random and directed patrol and only answered "in-progress crime" and other noncrime emergency calls for service.

Second, the dispatchers "stacked" nonemergency and low priority calls, took some types of crime reports over the phone, and asked victims and other complainants to come to police headquarters to have reports completed.

Finally, the beats were rearranged and the shifts altered to fit the needs of the basic group, based on an analysis of call for service workload data. The city's beat structure, therefore, changed by time of day (shift). Because of the beat variability, no roll calls were held for the basic officers. They simply reported to duty at different times and worked "staggered shifts."

Results from this study were mixed but somewhat favorable in relationship to the objectives tested. Placing calls in queue (call stacking delays) did not effect (reduce) citizen satisfaction, i.e., the public accepted response delays and telephone reporting procedures. And 65 percent of the patrol officers were able to handle 96 percent of the overall workload. Perhaps because the basic patrol officers were conducting more perfunctory preliminary investigations, the detectives were less successful in clearing crimes. They

became "ticked off" at the basic officers.

The officers involved in this study detested it. The "dynamic shift and beat plans" were termed confusing. Participants suggested that the officers assigned to the basic group were probably unhappy in having to do so much work, while the officers in the structured group were probably bored stiff. The structured group thought that their work was too mechanical, and the basic officers expressed dissatisfaction in having to move around so frequently. They indicated that they did not have any "turf" of their own with commensurate responsibility to police "their areas." The project implicitly telegraphed to all the officers that they were simply too "dumb" to do more than one thing at a time.

While most of the research done in policing during the 1970s dealt with patrol issues, another study that also achieved national notoriety addressed criminal investigations. Conducted by the Rand Corporation, this study sought to identify the work actually performed by detectives, although in contrast to the other studies already discussed, the "methodology" used by the Rand researchers lacked scientific rigor. Researchers at Rand collected survey information from a number of police departments and selected a few sites for intensive observation. Based on analysis of data collected, the findings revealed that the work performed by detectives stood in sharp contrast to perceptions of detectives as portrayed through popular media. Rand cited an almost complete lack of administrative control in managing criminal investigations. They indicated that departments could substantially cut their detective forces without suffering a significant decline in clearances. They indicated that more than half of all cases obtained by detectives received little more than superficial investigative attention. And they found that 90

percent of clearances resulted, not from the sagacity of "super sleuths," but from information obtained by patrol officers.

Although publication of these findings infuriated detectives, it did serve to provoke serious inspection of the criminal investigations process. This process was analyzed by first looking at what patrol officers did as part of their on-scene, preliminary investigations. Next, the initial handling and internal routing of cases received in investigative divisions was analyzed. Finally, the manner in which cases were submitted for criminal prosecution and then tracked through the courts to determine ultimate dispositions was assessed.

A response to remedy the "investigative inefficiencies" outlined in the Rand reports resulted in the development of a national program to help law enforcement agencies more effectively manage criminal investigations. Sponsored by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ), work began in the summer of 1976 to design an 18-month "field test" to implement the program; Managing Criminal Investigations (MCI). By December of 1976, five agencies had been selected to "test" the MCI model, although implementation didn't actually begin until the spring of 1977. The agencies selected included: Birmingham, Alabama; Montgomery County, Maryland; Rochester, New York; Santa Monica, California; and St. Paul, Minnesota.

During the fall of 1976, work also began to design a training program on managing criminal investigations. This program was to be delivered to ten "regional workshops" across the country. Also funded through NILECJ, these sessions were eventually expanded to include an additional ten "department specific" sites for agencies requiring technical assistance in implementing procedures to more effectively manage their criminal investigations.

Altogether, the 20 training presentations began during the latter part of 1976 and continued through the last quarter of 1978.

During the spring of 1978, LEAA held a series of "briefings" to consider the possibility of expanding MCI to other cities. Discussions at these meetings addressed the scope and objectives of MCI, preliminary results of program accomplishments from the five pilot agencies already funded through NILECJ, and the development of evaluation criteria to be used in monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of a new MCI initiative.

By late winter of 1978, program guidelines had been completed for this new initiative and were included in an "incentive grant" program that was distributed nationally by LEAA in early 1979. During the spring of 1979, LEAA asked representatives from a technical assistance contractor, University Research Corporation, a firm that had been instrumental in the original development of the MCI prototype, to develop a training program for prospective recipients of grant awards. Once developed and approved by LEAA, the program was presented at a "preaward training conference" in August of 1979. Following the training, agencies interested in participating in the new MCI program had approximately 80 days to complete and submit proposals to LEAA for funding consideration. The following year 15 cities from across the country wee awarded grants to participate in this program. These grants included a 24-month timetable for program implementation.

Given the demise of LEAA in 1982, however, the full impact of LEAA's (including NILECJ's) MCI program was never thoroughly evaluated, although an evaluation report was published by the Urban Institute in 1979 regarding the five MCI test sites originally funded through NILECJ. Perhaps with the possible exception of some police departments in California and Florida, states

that had adopted the programmatic components of another LEAA national initiative that evolved during the mid 1970s, the Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program (ICAP), the overall impetus generated by LEAA during the mid- and late 1970s to improve management of criminal investigations gradually succumbed to spotty and infrequent MCI implementations among law enforcement agencies.

Results published during the late 1970s about the "success" of MCI program implementations that appeared in the Urban Institute's evaluation report and a variety of other "prescriptive packages," "program implementation guides," and MCI "test site manuals" were, in general, inconclusive. Overall, while some departments did experience positive results in certain programmatic areas, no single agency achieved "complete success" in implementing all of the programmatic components of MCI.

Analysis of findings from "test site literature" that specifically pertained to the case screening function revealed mixed results. All five of the MCI field test sites (funded through NILECJ) did reduce their investigative case loads through establishing more formalized case screening procedures. But only two of these agencies, Birmingham and Santa Monica, were able to reassign detectives to other in their departments after having achieved reductions in their overall investigative work loads (mention of these findings is not to suggest that a reduction in investigative personnel is or should be a goal of MCI). Additionally, data available for analysis indicated that the MCI test sites did not realize increases for arrests, case clearances, and convictions.

In retrospect, it appears that too much credence may have been given to the use of solvability factors as the primary, if not only, criterion in

screening cases for possible assignment. But in the context of the times during the mid- to late 1970s solvability factors were novel and in national vogue. The initial MCI prototype, if limited in comparison to today's standards, did, however, provide a conceptual clarity and a structural framework for organizing some of the investigative functions that had gone undocumented theretofore. By analytically dividing the overall investigative process into a series of discrete, albeit logically interdependent functions, the MCI model (at least) suggested a more formal method to establish objectives and thus monitor investigative performance through accounting for the outcome and disposition of cases. In so doing, it suggested the importance of establishing positive liaisons between the police and the prosecutors to review changes in the filing of charges and in tracking cases through the courts.

Perhaps of tantamount importance to the model itself, efforts to implement MCI revealed the weight tradition carries in thwarting organizational change. An important component of MCI included expanding the responsibilities of patrol officers in the investigative process. This change from tradition required patrol officers to perform more comprehensive initial investigations, i.e., to conduct neighborhood canvasses, detect and collect physical evidence, interview witnesses, interrogate suspects, etc. It also included latitude to seek "early case closures" through following leads obtained during the initial investigation that resulted in the apprehension of suspects or, in having exhausted all leads or in failing to obtain any meaningful evidence, to inform victims that further investigation was unlikely, rather than telling them that they would be contacted by a detective. In general, however, detectives were reluctant to relinquish this work, not to mention the thought of having patrol officers become involved in tactical activities, e.g., physical and electronic

surveillances, stakeouts, decoy operations, etc.

Aside from management initiatives to identify "performance anchors" and develop methods to better account for detectives' time and activities, expanding the role of patrol officers to become more involved in some forms of criminal investigations tended to threaten detectives. Many detectives perceived that a loss of work traditionally performed only by them would mean fewer detectives needed to pursue criminal investigations. Although this rationale is not illogical -- as mentioned elsewhere, several police department did reduce their investigative strength -- detectives that are apprehensive about the ramifications of change can not realistically be expected to enthusiastically embrace MCI and the changes that go along with this program.

While a reluctance to accommodate the organizational changes required to implement MCI has been mentioned as the primary reason for MCI's failure to deliver more than it promised, closer inspection of the MCI model reveals some inherent deficiencies with the (initial) model itself. In its generic form, MCI displayed a propensity to address broad generalities in suggesting ways to improve investigative efficiency rather than in providing substantive detail in suggesting exactly how particular functions were to be performed. In-depth thought had not addressed differences in investigative routines among the various types of investigations performed, e.g., burglary, theft, homicide, robbery, rape, motor vehicle theft, arson, aggravated assault, etc. And little, if any, consideration was given to the rationale and criteria used in case assignment, an oversight observed but not articulated by experienced investigators.

Collectively pooling all the implications from the research conducted

during the 1970s lead to the following conclusions:

- The use of random, preventive patrol should be dismissed, and the use of preprogrammed, goal-oriented patrol strategies (e.g., directed patrol, etc.) should be increased. Quite simply, preventive patrol doesn't prevent crime, and random patrol produces random results.

- The addition of more officers to reduce police response time to all calls for service can not be justified as a means to increased on-scene criminal apprehensions. Only about ten to 15 percent of dispatched calls for service constitute bona fide emergencies. Citizens reporting delays tend to negate the potential impact rapid police response would have to many types of calls in which a desired outcome could be achieved.

- Effective management of the patrol function is dependent upon intelligent management of the dispatch function. Logical and interdependent linkages exist between management of the dispatch function, management of the patrol function, and management of criminal investigations. All too often, the patrol function is "managed" by the dispatchers. The development of differential police response (i.e., call diversion) strategies and call prioritization and queueing procedures is critical in managing incoming calls for service and thus the patrol officers' time. Given the important but limited role patrol officers have in criminal investigations through conducting preliminary investigations, sufficient time needs to be available for the officers to perform quality and comprehensive initial investigations.

- The development of crime and operational analysis procedures is vital in managing the patrol and investigative functions. Implementation of directed patrol activities is dependent upon the timely and accurate crime analysis information.

- As a viable resource, the use of patrol officers in activities other than performing routine patrol and "running calls" has been underutilized. Meaningful incentives needed to attract and retain good officers in patrol must be developed by police managers. Police officers need enhanced status and enriched job responsibilities. They need to become more involved in providing direction and insight into managing the patrol function.

- A strong emphasis is needed to involve the community in policing. Traditional methods used by the police to

"combat crime" and render various types of services have not always been effective. Initiatives must be taken by the police to identify citizen expectations regarding service delivery and to work with citizens in addressing and resolving problems of mutual concern. Management must recognize that, as with the patrol officers, citizens also represent an untapped resource that can provide valuable assistance in helping the police perform their work.

- To facilitate the development of stronger ties with the community, policies that require the frequent rotation of officers across shifts must be seriously examined. Frequent shift rotations impede the officers' ability to become acquainted with citizens that live and work in their beats.

- Attention also needs to be devoted to assessing or reassessing the purpose and function of beat structures. Rather than being traditionally defined as "patrol areas" (initially developed to equalize work load), emphasis needs to be given to reconfiguring beats around neighborhoods. Ideally, these neighborhoods would be relatively homogeneous after having considered demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. More homogeneous "neighborhood beats" would make it easier for the officers to become familiar with the values of citizens that reside in these beats. Rather than having to deal with an extensive amount of cultural diversity among various different groups of people, the officers would be better prepared to identify problems and solicit solutions from residents to impact these problems.

- Officer assigned to the patrol function must become more actively involved in criminal investigations. The quality of the initial investigation is critical in determining weather a case may be solved or receive subsequent investigative attention. Appropriate training and equipment must be provided to facilitate competent and comprehensive initial/preliminary investigations. And patrol officers should be permitted to perform some follow up investigations and obtain early case closures if sufficient time is available.

- Case management systems must be developed and implemented to fit the needs of the various investigative functions. These systems must include sound case screening mechanisms, logical criteria in the assignment of cases, methods to efficiently manage ongoing investigations, and procedures to monitor and track the filing of charges and prosecutorial dispositions of cases. Systematic procedures also need to be developed to account for cases as either being open or closed, and uniform terminology

needs to be developed to accurately account for case clearances. Finally, appropriate procedures need to be developed that professionally informs victims (for some types of cases) that, given the absence of leads, continued investigation can no longer be justified.

In having now reviewed some of the pertinent literature informing police operations and in having assessed the implications from this research that was conducted during the 1970s, it is not surprising that the findings from these studies made many police administrators nervous. Occasionally, these findings appeared in local newspapers, having been released through the wire services. Many chiefs were caught off guard when confronted by mayors and city managers who demanded explanations and wanted to discuss the political and policy implications of the findings. Of interest is the fact that the findings, in general, did not tell police administrators what it was they were doing that did work; only what didn't.

Of no small consequence, it became exceedingly difficult for chiefs of police to defend the traditional rationale that had been used for budgetary increases for additional officers and more equipment. And the economic milieu of the 1970s with recession, inflation, fuel shortages, and "prop 13s" provided credence to elected officials who, in light of the research findings, sought justification to chop police budgets.

Many chiefs of police did not survive the momentum for change that began to build during the past decade. But for most of those that did they brought a different philosophy of municipal policing into the 1980s. Influenced by the events of the 1960s and the research of the 1970s, this philosophy contained an expression of values regarding human life, personal dignity, and individual rights. It also contained a change in emphasis that diminished the perception of police officers from being primarily "enforcement oriented" to becoming more

receptive and open in working with the public to prevent crime and identify and suggest solutions for crime and noncrime citizen concerns.

Not surprisingly, many of the innovative programs and a good deal of the research that has been funded during the 1980s has reflected the philosophy of this new breed of police chiefs. Whereas the decade of the 1970s was replete with the names of departments that had been extensively involved in research initiatives, Kansas City, Missouri, San Diego, California, Rochester, New York, a new set of names would emerge out of the 1980s. These would include Madison, Wisconsin, Flint, Michigan, Newport News, Virginia, and Minneapolis, Minnesota, to name just a few.

The 1980s started with a major study sponsored by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ). To test the utility of a comprehensive police response system for managing incoming calls for service, NIJ designed the Differential Police Response (DPR) Field Test Program in October of 1980. In having initially searched for a number of agencies to participate in the project, three cities were finally selected as sites to test the program under controlled, experimental conditions. These cities included: Garden Grove, California; Greensboro, North Carolina; and Toledo, Ohio.

The DPR experiment had evolved from an earlier Differential Police Response Strategies project, also supported by NIJ, that had as its mission the development of a model to manage incoming calls for service. The Birmingham, Alabama, Police Department was selected as the site for model development. Knowledgable about preliminary findings from the Kansas City Response Time Analysis Study, a group of police practitioners and researchers began work to devise the model. Through a series of meetings, such a model was eventually developed and its implications discussed.

The model involved a two-dimensional schematic that included a set of priority codes for the following categories: major personal injury; major property damage; potential personal injury; potential property damage; minor personal injury; minor property damage; other minor crime; and other minor noncrime calls. Under each of these headings were other categories that sought to classify reporting delays, e.g., "in-progress, proximate, and cold."

The response alternatives developed for this model included "sworn mobile," "nonsworn mobile," and "nonmobile." Adjacent to each of these headings were subcategories that identified the appropriate type of mobile response. These included "immediate," "expedite," "routine," and" "appointment." Alternative response strategies developed for the nonmobile responses included: "telephone," "walk-in," "mail-in," "referral," and "no response."

Theoretically, the rationale underlying the model appeared to make sound managerial sense. But the model was never formally evaluated until the DPR experiment was implemented.

There were two primary objectives of the DPR test: 1) to increase the efficiency of the management of calls for service; and 2) to maintain or improve citizen satisfaction with police service. To evaluate the first objective, a set of subordinate objectives were identified. These included the following:

- To reduce the number of nonemergency calls for service handled by immediate mobile response;
- To increase the number of nonemergency calls for service handled by a telephone reporting unit by delayed mobile responses or by other alternative response strategies;
- To decrease the amount of time patrol units spent answering calls for service and increase the amount of

time available for crime prevention or other activities; and

- To increase the availability of patrol units to respond rapidly to emergency calls.

The second objective addressed the need to determine how many and what types of calls could be handled by alternative response strategies without adversely affecting citizen satisfaction. It was assumed that if calls were carefully screened, if citizens were informed of potential delays, and if alternative strategies were appropriate and timely, citizen satisfaction would not decrease. Hence, the second objective contained the following subordinate objectives:

- To explain to citizens during their initial contact with the intake operators the method and reason for the type of police response suggested to service their calls; and
- To provide satisfactory responses to citizens for resolving their calls for service.

To prepare the departments to implement the program and the experimental conditions, uniform procedures had to be developed to classify and prioritize calls, establish alternative response strategies, and effectively screen and process incoming calls. An extensive amount of training was required at each site to ready personnel for the test implementation. Alternative response strategies included the implementation of a telephone report unit (called either a Telephone Report Unit [TRU] or an Expeditor Unit) to take reports over the phone, a procedures to delay mobile police responses from 30 to 60 minutes, a procedures to refer calls to other agencies, e.g., the Humane Society, public works, animal control, etc., and a method to handled "scheduled walk-in reporting," and "main-in reporting."

After all most two years of time needed to plan for implementation and then collect data following implementation, a few of the key conclusions from

this project are presented below:

- Police departments can achieve a sizeable reduction in the number of nonemergency calls for service handled by immediate mobile dispatch without sacrificing citizen satisfaction. The DPR experiment demonstrated that up to 47 percent of all calls could have received alternative response treatments.

- Citizens showed a high willingness to accept response alternatives to the immediate dispatch of a patrol unit for nonemergency calls.

- Citizen surveys revealed that 75 percent of persons calling the police were willing to accept delays of up to an hour in police response time to nonemergency calls for service.

- Citizen satisfaction with the initial conversations with intake operators was very high. Satisfaction with call takers among citizens in the experimental groups receiving mobile responses exceeded 95 percent at all three sites; for those receiving delayed mobile responses, satisfaction with call takers ranged from 92 percent in Garden Grove to 97 percent in Toledo. Citizens receiving telephone reporting response alternatives expresses satisfaction levels in excess of 95 percent (ranging from 95.8% in Toledo to 97.3% in Garden Grove).

- Citizen satisfaction with mobile responses averaged 95.4 percent among the three sites tested. Citizen satisfaction with delayed mobile responses averaged 94.4 percent for participating cities. And an average of 94.2 percent of the citizens surveyed expressed satisfaction with telephone reporting procedures.

- Alternative response strategies are less costly than traditional mobile responses, and productivity levels are much higher for personnel using response alternatives. In Toledo, for example, the number of calls that could be handled by a four-person telephone reporting unit would require ten officers to be mobilized for immediate responses.

- According to the test sites participating in this experiment, the advantages of civilianizing call intake operators and police dispatchers far outweigh the disadvantages. Civilians can be hired and trained at lower costs, have higher retention rates, and are better educated.

- The use of civilian evidence technicians to handle initial calls for certain property crimes can be an attractive alternative for police departments. Evidence technicians in Greensboro were able to process 18 percent of all nonmobile responses.

- Travel time to emergency calls was not significantly reduced as a result of DPR experimental conditions (not a surprising finding given previous mention of results from the Kansas City Response Time Analysis study), however, the new call classification systems did enable patrol officers to respond quickly when needed for bona fide emergency situations.

- The use of mail-in reporting procedures was not found to be an effective response alternative. "Call-back" procedures, where the call taker telephones the offending party back and warns them of impending action, can be an efficient response for certain types of calls, e.g., barking dogs, loud noise, etc.

Given the historicity of research in policing, it is rare, and usually controversial, when empirical findings are presented from experimental research about a certain aspect of police operations. But, unlike the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment, the findings from the DPR experiment generally confirmed what had already been learned (or assumed) from previous efforts to implement methods to more effectively manage the dispatch function. Thus, this study provided credence to departments that had already implemented intake and call screening procedures, the development of priority response codes, and the establishment of alternative response mechanisms that allowed for some types of calls to be diverted away from having to mobilize field units to respond to calls.

As with the DPR experiment, two other studies funded by NIJ that primarily focused on improving internal police operations received national attention during the mid 1980s: The Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department's Repeat Offender Project (ROP); and the Police Executive Research Forum's (PERF) study of burglary and robbery investigations.

Formulated in May of 1982, the impetus for the development of the ROP program was based on the assumption that a vast majority of criminal acts are perpetrated by a relatively small number of repeat, career criminals. The mission of the ROP program was, therefore, to identify, arrest, and successfully prosecute recidivists. Suspects "targeted" for ROP surveillance were believed to be committing five or more Part I offenses weekly.

The ROP program offered a unique opportunity to assess the problems and effectiveness of a proactive police unit specifically formed to carry out a selective apprehension strategy. To measure the unit's effectiveness, the design of a controlled experiment sought to determine whether repeat offenders identified by ROP officers were more likely to be arrested by ROP than they were in the absence of ROP activities. A comparative component examined prior arrest histories and current case dispositions of a sample of persons arrested by 40 ROP and 169 non-ROP officers, as well as arrest productivity rates for both groups of officers.

Analysis of data produced the following findings:

- ROP substantially increased the likelihood of arrest of the persons it targeted;
- Targeted persons arrested by ROP officers had longer and more serious prior arrest histories than a sample of those arrested by non-ROP officers;
- Rop arrestees were more likely to be prosecuted and convicted on felony charges, and more likely to be incarcerated than non-ROP comparison arrestees; and
- ROP officers made only half as many total arrests as non-ROP comparison officers, but made slightly more "serious" arrests.

The study by PERF to examine criminal investigations of robbery and burglary cases was conducted in three police agencies: the DeKalb County

Department of Public Safety (Georgia); the St. Petersburg, Florida, Police Department; and the Wichita, Kansas, Police Department. Burglary and robbery cases were selected for this project for several reasons; they are relatively common, they are "serious crimes" (according to F.B.I. Uniform Crime Reporting criteria), and they consume a large amount of police resources.

This study was primarily designed to determine the importance of preliminary and follow up investigations in solving robbery and burglary crimes. To address this issue, several questions were asked. These included the following:

- How much time does a "typical" investigation take to conduct?
- What actions are performed during an investigation?
- What information is obtained during investigations?
- What are the sources of information gained during investigations, and how often do such sources provide information?
- What is the relative importance of the role patrol officers and detectives play in conducting investigations?
- What actions taken or information gained by investigators contribute to the arrest of suspects?

In seeking to answer these questions, the study took about two years to complete and involved analysis of investigative data from more than 320 robbery cases and 3,360 burglary cases in the three participating jurisdictions. The findings from this effort revealed that detectives and patrol officers contribute equally to the solution of both types of crimes examined. But the investigation of such cases rarely consumes more than four hours, spread over as many days, and three-quarters of the investigations are suspended within two days for lack of leads. In the remainder of cases, the follow up work

performed by detectives is a major factor in determining whether suspects will be identified and arrested. However, both detectives and patrol officers rely too heavily on victims, who seldom provide information that leads to an arrest. And detectives and patrol officers make too little use of other sources of information most likely to lead to arrest, i.e., witnesses, informants, peers, and police records. The single conclusion derived from this research is that **sound management is required to ensure that investigations are effective and that resources are not wasted.**

Up to this point, most of the research presented has focused on assessing or improving management of internal police operations. As indicated earlier, however, a change in orientation has taken place in policing that tends to focus more on external resources, i.e., the citizens, in working with and assisting the police. Many of the traditional approaches tried to combat or reduce crime have achieved only marginal success. Perhaps through establishing rapport and a better working relationship with citizens the police, over time, will find innovative solutions to remedy persistent problems.

In April of 1979, Herman Goldstein, a Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin, published an article that presented a different way of thinking about the police mission. Rather than run from call to call without having time to identify any underlying problems associated with these calls, much less address them, Dr. Goldstein suggested an alternative approach; "problem-oriented policing." This approach necessitates moving away from a reactive, "incident/event-orientation" and moving toward ways to identify, define, and impact problems that continue to drain police resources. Dr. Goldstein indicates that problem resolution constitutes the "real, substantive business" of policing.

Although this type of thinking is not incompatible with progressive police thought, attempting to operationalize it through traditional police management structures poses a significant challenge. But two police departments have accepted this challenge; the Madison, Wisconsin, Police Department and the Newport News, Virginia, Police Department.

While work completed in the Madison Police Department has yet to be published, work that documents the problem-oriented approach in Newport News is in the process of being published.

Also in 1979, work began in Flint, Michigan, to develop a "foot-beat" program. Seed money to develop the program was provided through a private source. The program involved the selection of a number of patrol officers to develop a close working relationship with citizens that lived in the officers' beats. The term "foot-beat officer" is actually a misnomer, because the offices in Flint who are involved in this program are not supposed to spend any time walking beats, unless there is a specific purpose of this activity. Their role is primarily to act as community mobilizers, facilitators, and coordinators in identifying and addressing crime and noncrime problems that are brought to their attention. In general, they tend to work out of an office, donated by citizen groups, located in their beats. While some vehicles are available, many of these offices rely on unconventional sources of transportation such as motor scooters and bicycles.

Of particular interest to other law enforcement administrators, the foot-beat program has been funded by a separate four-mill property tax increase. When this funding support was first presented to voters in a special election held in August of 1982, the measure passed by about 53 percent. In 1985, another election was held to determine is the tax payers wanted the

program continued. This time the measure passed by 68 percent. Recent polls conducted during the fall of 1986 indicate that citizen satisfaction with the program continues to grow. The latest survey reveals a general citizen satisfaction level of 75 percent. This poll also revealed a satisfaction level among Black citizens to be 80 percent.

The Minneapolis, Minnesota, Police Department took part in a Domestic Violence Experiment. Conducted from early 1981 through mid 1982, this was the first scientifically controlled test of the effects of arrest for any crime.

The purpose of the experiment was to address an intense debate about how police should respond to cases of domestic violence (misdemeanors). This debate involved three different viewpoints: 1) The traditional police approach of doing as little as possible, on the premise that offenders will not be punished by the courts even if they are arrested, and that the problems are basically not solvable; 2) The clinical psychologists' recommendations that police activity mediate or arbitrate disputes underlying the violence, restoring peace but not making any arrests; and 3) The approach recommended by many women's group of treating the violence as a criminal offense subject to arrest.

If the purpose of police response to domestic violence calls is to reduced the likelihood of that violence recurring, the question is which of these approaches is more effective than the others? In response to this question, experimental findings revealed that arrest was the most effective of the three standard methods police use to reduce domestic violence. The other methods, attempting to counsel both parties or sending assailants away from their homes for several hours, were found to be considerably less effective in deterring future violence in the cases examined.

The Houston Police Department collaborated with the Newark, New Jersey, Police Department on a project designed to reduce the fear of crime among citizens. Funded through NIJ, this program sought to accomplish one or more of the following objectives:

- Reduce the level of perceived neighborhood crime and disorder;
- Reduce the fear of and concern about crime;
- Improve satisfaction with police service; and
- Increase satisfaction with the neighborhood as a place to live.

Houston and Newark were selected as examples of two different types of cities -- similar, however, in that their police departments were able to design and manage complex experimental programs. Task forces were assembled in each city to determine which programs would best address local needs.

In both cities, the programs tested included the following:

- A local police community newsletter containing crime prevention advice, information about successful efforts to thwart crimes, neighborhood news, and, in some cases, local recorded crime data.
- A police-community multi-service center, where residents could go to report crimes, hold meetings, and obtain information.
- Contacts made by police officers with neighborhood residents to determine and address what the public considered to be local problems.

In Houston only, the programs included the following:

- Telephone contacts with victims of crime in an attempt to provide assistance and demonstrate concern; and
- An effort by police officers to create a neighborhood organization.

In Newark only, the programs included the following:

- A program to reduce the "signs of crime" -- social

disorder and physical deterioration; and

- A coordinated effort to provide information, increase the quantity and quality of police-citizen contacts, and reduce the social and physical signs of crime.

Results indicated that of all the programs tried, the most successful involved neighborhood police centers, door-to-door contacts, and community organizing by police. Inspection of the findings disclosed that these efforts had two characteristics in common: 1) They provided time for police to have frequent discussions with citizens who were encouraged to express their concerns about their neighborhoods; and 2) They relied upon the initiative and innovativeness of individual officers to develop and implement programs responsive to the concerns of the public.

As can be seen from a brief review of the work that has been completed or is currently ongoing, the research of the 1980s continues to build from what was found during the previous decade. And future research will certainly follow what is presently being learned about policing today. While additional research will continue to explore programs that involve the police with the public, more work is needed in criminal investigations, department organizational structures, and police management systems.

STRATEGY CONSIDERATIONS

During the course of each Executive Session meeting, a number of individual presentations were made. The presentations were designed to expose the panel members to a variety of different programs which had been implemented within the department and/or throughout the nation. The reason for exposing the panel members to this information was to provide them with an opportunity to consider using any one of them (or combination) as a vehicle to operationalize the concept of NOP. It was anticipated that any one of the programs could become a part of the policing style utilized by all officers within the department.

It is of interest in passing to note that programs developed within the Houston Police Department incorporated relevant findings from a lot of the research conducted during the 1970s in policing. But, for the most part, the department's efforts went further than the "enforcement-oriented" projects of the 1970s by including built-in linkages with representatives from the community. For example, the department's Directed Area Responsibility Team program not only included crime analysis and directed patrol components, it also included a series of activities to increase communications with the citizens.

This portion of the report, therefore, serves to identify those programs and associated strategies that were presented to and discussed by the panel membership during the six sessions. Each of the programs will be briefly described below.

The Oasis Technique

The OASIS technique is a comprehensive approach that includes a systematic analysis of the problems contributing to the formation of the neighborhood slum and neighborhood decay; coalition building and collaboration between local government service agencies, the private sector, the local residents; and development of an experienced plan for action and implementation. The technique identifies the strengths and weaknesses of a target neighborhood in order to focus services and attention on that area to reverse the trend of neighborhood deterioration. Once some improvement in the area and the housing occurs, and committed and helpful residents have been identified, an "oasis" can be created in the neighborhood resulting in an initial step towards safe and decent housing. These improved areas are then supposed to produce a ripple effect resulting in a revitalization of the neighborhood over time. Once the private sector sees the promise of the area, investment funds may be forthcoming.

A major feature of the Oasis technique is to make more effective and efficient use of existing resources so that visible results are produced in a relatively short time period.

The uniqueness of the Oasis technique is that it implements urban renewal in such a way that the character, social, and economic pattern of the area is preserved. This is in contrast to urban renewal which concentrates on removal of residents and replacement of structures.

The Oasis technique consists of seven steps. On a collective basis, these steps represent strategy considerations for the executive session membership. They are as follows:

1) Orienting and Organizing the Facilitators and Implementors: As a key component, this group generally consists of top representatives from the public and private sector, including the city administrator's office, public housing, police, public works, elected officials, business persons, and community leaders. These facilitators will eventually be charged with the responsibility of implementing the neighborhood plan;

2) Collecting the Data: the methodology of collecting data includes collecting and analyzing historical records and available data (census, crime, housing, employment, etc.), direct observation of the conditions in the target area, interviewing residents, and other steps to compile a physical, economic, and social profile of the target area. Some of the key data elements include the following:

   - history of physical maintenance, code violations, and antisocial behavior at the residences;
   - identification of private owners and landlords;
   - identification of "good" residents and "bad" residents in target areas; and
   - identification of social structures in target areas.

3) Evaluating the Data: the evaluation step helps the participants understand the interrelationships in the data as they attempt to identify target areas offering the most opportunity for success;

4) Presenting the Data: this enables the decision-makers to make more efficient choices regarding revitalization expenditures and strategies. It also provides an effective means of demonstrating to interested parties that certain policy choices are appropriate;

5) Preparation of the Plan: the plan identifies the commitment of resources. Among the determining factors is the identification of the oases, which residents will receive housing improvements, and the level of involvement from government agencies, including the police;

6) Conducting Implementation Training: as a result of the plan being adopted, new or different services will be required to be performed. The training serves to prepare personnel to deliver those services; and

7) Implementing the Oasis Neighborhood Plan: as a result of the services being delivered, actual physical and/or social changes in the target area will materialize.

The Oasis technique relies heavily on the involvement of the police for its success. Should a decision be made to adopt the Oasis technique certain recommendations are made as to the role the police serve with respect to the project. These recommendations include the following:

1) Police should focus on crimes involving order maintenance that directly impacts the quality of life of individuals who live in low income neighborhoods (drugs, prostitution, gambling, drinking in public, disorderly conduct, junked cars, etc.);

2) Police departments supporting an oasis effort must be willing to allocate a dedicated squad of patrol officers. This squad should be headed by a sergeant whose sole responsibility is supervision of the oasis unit. While the size of the unit can vary, the squad should not exceed eight patrol officers and one sergeant. A liaison officer between the Oasis squad and the office of the Chief of Police is also needed;

3) The Oasis squad should have flexible working schedules in order that the criminal element will not be able to predict when the Oasis squad will be on the street;

4) It is beneficial to assign detectives to the Oasis squad on an as needed basis in order to assist with follow-up investigations; and

5) The officers selected as Oasis squad members should be open-minded, and squad personnel should be ethnically mixed.

There are no specific recommendations describing particular policing techniques. Officers are expected to be involved in a wide range of activities, inclusive of: walk and talk activities, developing confidential informants, undercover and surveillance activities, raids, serving warrants, and participation in community meetings.

The Directed Area Responsibility Team (DART) Program

The DART Program was designed to provide the department with a process of altering its methods of delivering police services to the community. Substantively, the program sought to expand the role of the officer through the process of decentralizing basic police responsibilities. By enlarging the officers' role and providing increased managerial flexibility, the department attempted to commit itself to the effective management of patrol operations.

The program consisted of five major strategy classifications. Included within each classification were numerous strategies which were administered during the experimentation period. A brief description of each of the strategies is provided below.

I. Deployment Strategies

1) Beat Integrity - the assignment of officers to specific beats where they remain during their tour of duty, providing the requested services;

2) One-officer Units - the increased deployment of one-officer units beyond the normal ratio of one and two officer units. In conjunction with beat integrity, the strategies were designed to increase visibility and reduce response time to emergency calls;

3) Tactical Assignments - consisted of a series of events whereby the officers attempted to identify neighborhood problems and then provide a response in the form of using formal methods such as Tactical Action Plans or informal methods such as saturation patrols, covert surveillance, sting operations, and so forth;

4) Designated Report Units - establishing a single unit, per shift, to be responsible for writing offense reports within the district, which occur during duty hours;

II. Team Interaction Strategies

5) Information Sharing - methods used to stimulate information exchange between officers, inclusive of using a blackboard or clip boards for leaving messages, increased number of meetings, interacting with investigative sergeants, sharing of workcard information etc.;

6) Investigative Sergeants - the decentralizing of the investigative function involving the crimes of robbery, burglary, larcenies, and vehicle thefts. Investigative sergeants were reassigned to the Field Operations Command from the Investigative Operations Command, which allowed them to become generalists in addition to working more closely with the patrol officers;

III. Job Diversification Strategies

7) Patrol Officer Follow-up Investigations - expansion of the officers' role allowing them to spend time with the investigative sergeants working on criminal investigations;

8) Supportive Response Team - the establishment of a covert, plainclothes tactical squad of officers whose responsibility was to combat neighborhood vice and narcotic operations

9) Structured Patrol - the assignment of officers during their uncommitted patrol time to resolve neighborhood problems through the use of a variety of tactical and deployment responses. The strategy was dependant upon the access to crime analysis information and the diligence of the officers in discovering neighborhood problems;

10) Participatory Management - establishing opportunities for personnel within each rank to provide input into decisions that either directly or indirectly affected their work;

11) Assistant Squad Leader - designating an officer to assume some of his supervisors responsibilities during his scheduled absence;

IV. Knowledge Gaining/Sharing Strategies

12) Beat Profiling - establishment of a process whereby officers collect information about their beat which would assist them in providing appropriate types of services;

13) Crime Analysis - establishment of a process of collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information designed to decrease crime and noncrime activity;

V. Community Interaction Strategies

14) Community Contacts - when possible, officers were encouraged to interact with the citizens in their beat in order to exchange information. The purpose of the exchanges was to facilitate a better understanding of each others expectations, and, with respect to the officer, be able to respond to any particular needs expressed by the citizen;

15) Neighborhood Meetings - requiring beat officers to attend neighborhood meetings conducted by civic clubs in order to expose the officers to the residents within their beat and allow them the opportunity to respond to any questions offered regarding the activities occurring in and around their neighborhood;

16) Police Community Relations Officer - officers were reassigned from the Community Services Division in order to facilitate interaction between the citizen and the beat officer. This consisted of coordinating the flow of information which would educate the citizen about safety and crime prevention techniques, responding to special requests from civic groups, schools, or individuals;

17) Crime Prevention/Security Surveys - allowing officers to participate in crime prevention presentations and administering security surveys to private residences and businesses within their respective beats. Officers identified potential problems as well as solutions to those problems for all interested parties.

As the needs of Houstonians changed over time, the department responded by designing and administering a program capable of coping with the demands of an everchanging environment. DART served as a mechanism which provided the

department with an opportunity to become flexible in addressing the challenges of the future.

The Positive Interaction Program (PIP)

The purpose of the PIP is to facilitate an exchange of information between beat officers and neighborhood residents using as a forum community exchange meetings. The program contains a variety of program goals, among them are:

1) Building more meaningful communication linkages between the public and members of the department;

2) Creating a more knowledgeable understanding of the law by the citizen;

3) Providing an opportunity for both the officers and the citizens to develop a better understanding of each others expectations and responsibilities;

4) Exposing the citizens to the profession of policing;

5) Providing a forum to exchange ideas and suggestions relative to the concerns and services that are pertinent to the beat in question; and

6) Demonstrating to the citizens the members of the department do care about the quality of life within their neighborhoods.

Monthly meetings are held bringing together members of the police department with representatives of various civic groups located within the division's jurisdiction. The citizen participants are responsible for transmitting information obtained from the meeting (e.g., newsletters) back to their respective civic groups. They also act as a conduit to express the concerns of their civic groups to the police officers in attendance. Other ancillary duties include notification of membership to attend meetings and providing refreshments for the meeting.

The responsibility of department personnel is to schedule the meetings, share information with the attendees, (i.e., crime analysis reports) and to discuss the ramifications of actions administered within the area. Probably one of the most important functions the department assumes is ensuring the participation of the beat officers. This allows the citizens an opportunity to discuss local concerns with the individuals responsible for policing their neighborhoods. It also provides a forum for the police officers to demonstrate their awareness of neighborhood concerns as well as availing themselves to any new information which they were previously unaware of.

The program seeks to strengthen community ties by uniting the citizens and the officers. As mutual admiration and respect grow for one another, cooperative efforts begin to form in response to the unique concerns and problems in their neighborhoods. This in turn enhances a sense of trust and caring of the officers on behalf of the citizens. If the citizens realize the officers care about the quality of life in their neighborhoods, then they will be more apt to participate in its preservation.

The Fear Reduction Program

Research conducted by the National Institute of Justice revealed that fear of crime is a major problem in our society. Yet, other research evidence indicates that the level of fear appears to be far out of proportion to the objective risks of crime. The incongruity of the research findings is based upon the fact that fear may be derived from a concern about the "signs of crime" (e.g., vandalism, loitering, public drinking or gambling). Other factors, including impersonal relationships between the police and the citizens and the lack of information about crime and crime prevention techniques, may

create a sense of powerlessness, leading to higher levels of fear.

Law abiding citizens and merchants eventually opt to relinquish their neighborhoods to those who would prey upon them. Eventually, it has been suggested, this withdrawal process produces an exodus by those who can afford to move to other, apparently safer, areas. If such migration occurs, the fear-inflicted areas then provide abandoned homes and shops that could become breeding grounds for vandalism, drug use, and other forms of disorder.

No research exists which provides systematic evidence that such a cycle exists, or, if it does, what can be done to interrupt the cycle. The Fear Reduction Program, consequently, represents an attempt to empirically determine how the police can effectively address the problems of fear, disorder, the quality of police service, neighborhood satisfaction, and, ultimately, crime itself.

The program consisted of administering a total of five strategies. Each of the strategies is briefly described below:

1) Police-Community Newsletter: represented an attempt by the department to disseminate information to community groups and individuals in the form of a newsletter. Two versions of the newsletter were published. The first version contained information about the department, crime prevention tips, stories about police and citizen's working together to prevent crimes; and "good news" stories about crimes that had been prevented or solved in the neighborhood. Additionally, a regular column by the Chief of Police was included.

   The second version contained similar information as the first, except a map of the neighborhood and a list of crimes that had occurred since the previous newsletter were included. The crime information included the type of crime committed, the date of occurrence, the street and block number in which it happened, and whether it occurred during the daylight, evening, or nighttime hours;

2) Community Organizing Response Team: spearheaded by a group of patrol officers, attempts were made to create a community organization where none had previously existed. The purpose was to create a sense of community in the area, and to identify a group of residents who would work regularly with the police to define and solve neighborhood problems.

Door to door surveys of a neighborhood were conducted by officers in an attempt to identify problems warranting police attention, and whether they, or any area resident they knew, might be willing to host small meetings of neighbors and police in their homes.

Meetings were held, problems and concerns discussed, and arrangements were made to have representatives meet with the district captain each month to discuss problems and devise potential solutions involving both the police and the citizens;

3) Citizen Contact Patrol: the purpose of this strategy was to enable beat officers to become more familiar with residents and employees working in their area. During their tour of duty, the officers were encouraged to make proactive contacts at residences and businesses.

During these contacts the officer would explain the purpose of the contact, and inquire as to the identification of any neighborhood problems the police should know about. The officer left a business card upon the conclusion of their interview in case the citizen wished to recontact the officer regarding additional information concerning their neighborhood;

4) Police Community Station: this strategy was designed to reduce the physical and psychological distance between the officer and the neighborhood residents. A small office was establish in the neighborhood, staffed by police personnel and civilians.

The officers were not responsible for handling calls for service in the area (although they could respond if they wished). When possible they did patrol the neighborhood in and around the community station. Their primary responsibility, however, was to design and implement storefront programs. Furthermore, they were to avail themselves to citizens who visited the storefront seeking assistance and/or information; and

5) Recontacting Victims: the purpose of this strategy was to assist crime victims and demonstrate the police cared about their plight. A team of officers were assigned the responsibility of reviewing case reports in search of

relevant information about the victim and the crime. Upon contacting the victim, the officers would ask the victim if they had any problems which the police might be able to help, and whether they had any further information about their case they could give the police.

If problems were identified, the officer would refer the person to the proper agency for assistance. If the victim needed information for insurance purposes, the officer would attempt to supply it. The officers also mailed a crime prevention package to the victims if they so desired.

It was the contention of the task force members that these strategies could possibly reduce the fear of crime in the respective neighborhoods as well as produce other desired favorable effects. This feeling was based upon the belief that legitimate commitments were going to be made to interact with the citizenry using a variety of different strategies. Since the officers helped develop these strategies, had seen their success in other departments, and were going to be personally involved in the application of them, their desire and willingness to see the strategies succeed strongly influenced their initial opinion.

WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?

The Houston Police Department has developed and implemented, during the course of the last five years, a number of significant community oriented programs as was identified in the previous section of this report. In implementing each of these programs, the department sought to determine what they could learn about the nature of relationship between the officers and the citizens. In each instance, this relationship was affected by the purpose and frequency of the interaction experienced by both parties.

Given that the City of Houston can best be characterized as a large urban area containing a multitude of unique challenges, it becomes the responsibility of the police department to determine what its role is in addressing those challenges. The concept of NOP appears to represent a logical method of tackling those challenges. In the development of this concept, however, it requires a commitment on behalf of department personnel to design a policing style which incorporates the lessons learned from previous program experimentation efforts.

This portion of the report identifies the lessons learned from the department's experimental programs. Since the purpose of this paper is to describe salient characteristics of a policing style for the department, there will be no attempt to suggest which programs should be incorporated within the NOP concept. Furthermore, there will be no attempt at this time to describe relationship between a particular program(s) and the department's prospective policing style.

The Oasis Technique

From the department's standpoint, the success of the Oasis technique is dependant upon two primary factors: 1) the actual commitment by agencies other than the police department and 2) the involvement of the patrol officer in the Oasis technique process. Of the two factors, the second is more conducive to control by department officials.

The process by which the Oasis technique becomes operational, consists of seven steps: (please see page 55 for a more detailed description)

1) Orienting and organizing the facilitators and implementors;
2) Collecting the data;
3) Evaluating the data;
4) Presenting the data;
5) Preparation of the plan;
6) Conducting implementation training; and
7) Implementing the Oasis neighborhood plan.

The Oasis technique, therefore, suggests a means of examining **how** one should go about performing his job.

As indicated by various panel members: ". . . we need to quit trying to create more programs; we have enough programs . . . what we've got to do is make all of the police officers that we have, community based police officers." The implication is that the Oasis technique represents a method which will cause this change to occur. Again, in referencing panel member comments: "You get the officers at the grass roots level, involved in the plan, they interact with the facilitators, plan what's going on, and participate and are responsible for implementation. They know what's going to happen (and) why its going to happen".

Although the Oasis technique ascribes to the use of a squad of officers, it appears that once the residents gain control of their own neighborhood, the

squad can be disbanded and responsibility turned over to the beat officers. This may or may not be consistent with previous discussions regarding the role of the beat officers under the concept of NOP.

The Directed Area Responsibility Team (DART) Program

The DART Program can best be described as a process which simultaneously incorporated the decentralizing of basic police services with a concomitant expansion of the roles of the officers, sergeants, and lieutenants. In association with the role expansion was a commensurate increase in supervisory and managerial flexibility. The focal point of the program centered upon the implementation of 17 different strategies, grouped under 5 different operational categories.

The findings gleaned from the Evaluation Report are provided below:

1) Deployment Strategies:

- Beat Integrity - need more cooperation from the Dispatch Division with respect to assigning calls to the beat units; officers are in need of constant encouragement to remain in their beats; and officers must be given the flexibility to police their beat in accordance with the needs of the residents they serve;

- One-officer Units - strategy is heavily dependant upon a "system of deployment" which includes the ability to control radio traffic, accessing information through the mobile digital computers, maintaining visual assurances (from other units) during patrols, and sharing crime data and activities verbally during roll calls and shift changes; response times were reduced; "wolfpacking occurred"; and vehicle availability was a must;

- Tactical Assignments - strategy is dependant upon timely and reliable crime analysis information; identifying tactical assignments became difficult; standardized administrative procedures guiding the implementation of the strategy were non existent; more comprehensive preparatory training is needed; officers

need to be given credit on the workcard for the performing tactical assignments; and

- Designated Report Units - total failure due to the complex coordination of administrative responsibilities; recommend it not be used unless following suggestions were incorporated: training for dispatchers in screening and recording the report calls, an increase in the report unit's responsibility to compensate for those times when the unit is not needed for reports, and deployment of strategy should be consistent for those beats/districts finding a large number of report calls. Reference was made to resurrect the Calls for Service Management Program as a more effective method of handling these types of calls.

Officer visibility can be increased utilizing existing resources. Response times decreased as a direct result of these specific deployment practices. Officers did not like beat integrity and are concerned about their safety. Tactical assignments need stronger crime analysis support and resistance was experienced for the designated report unit.

2) Team Interaction Strategies:

- Information Sharing - rapport between the officers and the investigative sergeants was effective; communication among the officers between shifts was sporadic and

- Investigative Sergeants - a clearer understanding of the investigative sergeant's role within the overall operational context was needed; this includes establishing coordination linkages with the centralized divisions; data collection procedures must be established immediately to measure the quantity and quality of the work conducted; inadequate support equipment and furniture also attributed to an initial decline in enthusiasm for the strategy.

Officers are reluctant to share information unless there is a conduit, such as a localized crime analysis unit. Investigative sergeants and patrol officers can work together as long as the job task expectations are satisfactorily attained by both parties. This will lead to writing more

comprehensive initial investigation reports and thereby expedite case closure.

3) Job Diversification Strategies:

- Patrol Officer Follow-up Investigations - officers were not properly informed as to the purpose of the strategy; a systematic method of assigning cases should be considered to avoid charges of favoritism being alleged; on-the-job training should be improved; officer participation should not just be limited to "leg work" or menial tasks;

- Supportive Response Team - strategy led to a prompt resolution of neighborhood vice and narcotic problems; stricter controls need to be established to govern the amount and type of activities the team should be involved with; conflict occurred with structured patrol operations thus causing coordination problems to occur for the beat officers' supervisor;

- Structured Patrol - initially, confusion over the meaning of the concept occurred, but was eventually clarified; the success of the strategy is dependant upon the collection and analysis of information; this proved to be an obstacle as the crime analysis strategy was not as effective as initially envisioned; a means of scheduling structured patrol activities needs to be developed;

- Participatory Management - a clear and concise operational definition of the concept was needed; more opportunities for meetings needed to become available; a more clear understanding of one's role in the concept is needed; and

- Assistant Squad Leader - a worthwhile concept if a clear definition of the scope of the leader's authority can be developed; selection criteria needs to be uniform; a method of evaluating performance should be devised; this strategy would be more effective if used in conjunction with a squad concept for the officers.

Officers are fully capable of resolving problems within their beat if given the chance, and knowing they would be held fully accountable for their actions. The expansion of the officers' role led to increased productivity

and improved supervisory relationships. The sergeants became more responsible for managing the affairs of their officers in light of the expansion of their officers' job responsibilities. Uncommitted patrol time was reduced.

4) Knowledge Gaining/Sharing Strategies:

- Beat Profiling - the theory of beat profiling was supported by the officers' supervisors; the scope of information collected should be limited to its operational significance; because the information collected was not deemed to be practical for operational purposes, the strategy was seen as an inefficient use of the officers' time and
- Crime Analysis - strategy was strongly supported by the rank and file, however, because of the lack of equipment and office space, the strategy was a minimal success.

Information support is an essential element if one is to effectively manage patrol operations. Furthermore, the utility of the crime analysis information is only as good as it is perceived by the officers; therefore, the information must be timely, reliable, and informative. Additionally, crime analysis personnel must be easily accessible by the patrol officers requiring their services. If this occurs, the officers become quite appreciative of the information and find it beneficial to the performance of their job.

5) Community Interaction Strategies:

- Community Contacts - supervisory support of the strategy was apparent; extreme difficulty in defining what type of activity represented a community contact; community personnel should be more informed about the strategy at community meetings or through newsletters;
- Neighborhood Meetings - strategy was responsible for establishing a closer relationship between the patrol officers and the citizens attending the meetings; coordination problems for the meetings existed but were eventually resolved; hidden agendas need to be removed; the use of a community feedback form was a plus;

- Police Community Relations Officer - a very useful strategy as a definitive need existed; prior to the expiration of the experimental time period, the strategy was adopted by all of the FOC patrol divisions; and

- Crime Prevention/Security Surveys - beneficial strategy within the community; need to develop a more effective method of delivering the service; more officers may need to be trained as to how to perform the strategy; standard operating procedures need to be developed; procedures should include a recognition of who should perform the strategy, this infers training commitments.

Community support for department operations helps facilitate strategy success. Officers and citizens can learn to respect each others' perspective if given the chance to meet and discuss issues which are conducive to a successful resolution. Interaction between the officers and the citizens enhances the level of satisfaction toward the department, given the nature of the encounter is nonadversarial

The DART experience should be viewed as a process in transition. It is apparent personnel resources can be more effectively redeployed if the equipment is available. There is considerable value in securing information from the public and from one another within the department. The officers can perform more responsibilities if given the opportunity, under appropriate supervision, and with the necessary operational support. Experience has demonstrated that portions of the program, can be expanded as this has already occurred throughout the other divisions within the Field Operations Command.

What is urged, however, is not an overreliance on just replicating the strategies. Efforts should be directed toward analyzing how the patrol officer became more involved in providing a wider range of services heretofore unperformed. This seems to be more closely associated with the requirements demanded by the NOP concept.

The Positive Interaction Program (PIP)

The PIP sought to improve the relationship between the neighborhood residents and members of the Southeast Division. This was obtained by establishing a forum for civic group leaders to meet once a month with the division patrol captain and a number of patrol officers and/or supervisors. The meetings provided a forum for the participants to exchange information and ideas governing activities observed and/or performed in their respective neighborhoods. The civic group leaders would then transmit the information obtained from the meeting back to the members of their particular civic group.

The cohesive relationship that formed between the officers and the citizens led to many success ranging from interacting with other governmental agencies to combat localized neighborhood concerns to performing special activities such as food drives and sharing information from various newsletters.

The PIP sought to establish cooperative responsibilities on behalf of department personnel as well as the citizens. This led to the citizens becoming more informed about the law enforcement profession and the demands placed upon the officers. The officers also became more responsive to the needs of the citizens as they saw them as supportive friends and not just an entity requesting a particular type of service.

Suggestions for expansion also provide insight into the success of the program. Membership drives are encouraged to involve more citizens thereby expanding the network of communication flow from the officers. The use of neighborhood volunteers to work in the department is strongly encouraged as a means to develop a more meaningful understanding by the citizens of the department's commitment to the effective delivery of services. "Ride alongs" were also encouraged as an educational tool for the concerned citizen.

Finally, a citywide committee of representatives from all the PIPs would be useful in exchanging information and ideas throughout the entire city as opposed to a certain portion of the city.

The Fear Reduction Program

A total of five different strategies were implemented during the course of the program. The strategies consisted of distributing newsletters, creating a community organizing response team (CORT), deploying a citizen contact patrol activity, establishing a community station (storefront), and recontacting victims of a crime. The results of implementing these strategies has been extracted from, Reducing Fear of Crime in Houston and Newark: A Summary Report, authored by the members of the Police Foundation.

The significant findings for each of the strategies are as follows:

1) Police-Community Newsletter: people appreciated receiving the newsletter, but there were no significant effects on any of the program's desired outcomes;

2) Community Organizing Response Team: the strategy was associated with a significant reduction in the level of perceived social disorder in the area and with a significant improvement in the evaluation of police service. There were also significant reductions in the levels of perceived personal and property crime in the area. One unanticipated effect was a perceived police aggressiveness among program area residents;

3) Citizen Contact Patrol: the strategy was associated with significant reductions in levels of perceived social disorder in the area, increased satisfaction with the neighborhood, and reduced property victimization.

   One aspect of the evaluation revealed significant reductions in the fear of personal victimization as well as reductions in levels of perceived personal and property crime and police aggressiveness in the area. A significant improvement in evaluations of police service was also indicated;

4) Police Community Station: the strategy was associated with significant reductions in fear of personal victimization and in the level of perceived personal crime in the area.

   One aspect of the evaluation indicated significant reductions in levels of perceived social disorder and perceived property crime in the area. The analysis also found that area residents took significantly fewer defensive actions to protect themselves from crime; and

5) Recontacting Victims: the only significant effect was that victims who were recontacted perceived more personal crime in the area than did victims who were not recontacted. In particular, Hispanic and Asian victims who were recontacted demonstrated significantly higher levels of fear of crime and of perceived area crime. Such persons were significantly more likely to report taking defensive steps to protect themselves from crime.

Although the program did not achieve all of the desired outcomes it had originally hoped, there were several implications for the practitioner to consider. Based on the fact the strategies involving citizens had the most desirable impacts, and were easier and less costly to operate, the following suggestions can be offered:

- Every available opportunity should be taken to increase the quantity and improve the quality of contacts between police officers and the citizens they serve. This would involve a dedication of "out-of-service" time, which officers usually use for nondirected patrol, to making contacts with citizens;

- During the course of police-citizen contacts, officers should attempt to determine what problems are of greatest concern to the residents of particular neighborhoods, what they believe are the causes of those problems, and what they think can be done about them;

- Stringent efforts should be made to reach out to all types of people, not just those who are easiest to reach or who initiate contacts with the police;

- Programs should be developed to address the problems identified by the citizens, not those assumed to exist by the police themselves;

- Every effort should be made to involve citizens in addressing the problems they have identified;

- A continuous process should be established to determine when some problems have been alleviated and others have arisen;

- Officers selected for assignments such as these should be clearly informed as to what the purpose of the program is - and that their efforts, at least at the beginning, may appear unorthodox and frustrating;

- Personnel involved in these programs will need respect, trust, and considerable latitude to determine the nature of the problems they should address and how best to do so;

- Those officers who are most creative, enthusiastic,and self-motivated will perform best. (The surest way to "bury" a program is to use it as a way to "bury" an unproductive officer.);

- Because these community-oriented programs are unlike usual police operations, special efforts should be taken to provide recognition and rewards to officers who perform them well;

- Supervisors should be selected who provide enough oversight to demonstrate concern, but not so much that individual officer initiative is stifled;

- A great deal of tolerance will be necessary, particularly at the early stages, to allow officers and their supervisor room to experiment and, occasionally, to fail;

- Training is crucial, and can best be provided by those who have proven their ability to conduct such programs;

- Any department considering the programs discussed in this report should examine those programs directly. No report . . . can effectively substitute for firsthand experience, including the excitement of their successes and the disappointment of their failures; and

- Finally, successful implementation of such strategies requires more than just a mechanical execution of steps such as these. In the end, a sincere commitment to problem-solving with the community must infuse the organization and its members.

These suggestions should aid the practitioner in his efforts to enlist the assistance of the public in preventing and reducing criminal activity within his community.

Collectively, the programs, strategies, and activities described in this report were, for the most part, appendages to the management function within the Field Operations Command. But management within the Field Operations Command recognized the need to incorporate these initiatives into the mainstream of the management structure. It was therefore suggested that an administrative process be developed to tie new programs and initiatives into the existing management system. Unlike the implementation of the D.A.R.T. Program that initially had to limp along pretty much on its own, the development of a more formal process to capture lessons learned from previous efforts was required to facilitate and direct implementation of other initiatives.

In short, the Command recognized that a set of concepts was simply not sufficient to initiate and administer program activities. The concepts needed to be related to the Command's goals and objectives and presented in the context of an administrative framework that addressed the process issues. These issues include questions regarding what is proposed to be done, what resources are needed and are available to achieve program objectives, how will the programmatic activities be accomplished, and what are the role expectations regarding responsibilities to insure that the appropriate ranks are held accountable. It is with these questions in mind that the ensuing section of this report was developed.

A PROCESS MODEL FOR DEVELOPING NOP

Overview

As noted previously in this report, the definition of Neighborhood Oriented Policing (NOP) is as follows:

> **NOP is an interactive process between police officers assigned to specific beats and the citizens that either work or reside in these beats to mutually develop ways to identify problems and concerns and then to assess viable solutions by providing available resources from both the police department and the community to address the problems and/or concerns.**

A crucial component of the NOP definition is establishing an interactive relationship between the beat officers and the neighborhood residents. This type of relationship is important in that it perpetuates a sense of responsibility, a sense of caring and willingness, and a sense of commitment on behalf of both parties in order to make the neighborhoods a safer place to live, work, and play. This desire to establish stronger bonds of trust and honesty must also occur among and between department personnel if the concept of NOP is expected to be successful.

In most instances, the amount of exposure between department personnel and the public results when officers respond to calls for service. These meetings, more often than not, are not conducive to open, interactive forms of conversation. They are usually quite specific with a focus on attempting to respond to or resolve a particular concern voiced by the citizen. There are times, however, when officers and citizens can meet under more relaxing conditions. In most instances, this would involve directing officer activities during their uncommitted patrol time.

During the officers' uncommitted patrol time, supervisors, managers, and administrators alike must be willing to provide the officers with an opportunity to pursue the enhancement of their beats and the development of their relationship with the citizens. The officers, however, must realize that the activities emanating from these opportunities will have to be performed in accordance with department parameters. Conversely, management must realize that officers are capable of devising methods of working with the citizens and that supervisory responsibility should focus on the desire to stimulate the willingness and dedication of the officer to become actively involved in identifying and responding to neighborhood concerns.

The officers and their supervisors will need to work together in determining what action needs to be taken, when it should be performed, and how it should be performed. There may be times when this causes disagreements to occur between the officers and the supervisors. When this occurs, the supervisors must be willing to sit down with their officers and discuss viable alternatives to their initial sets of recommendations. There may be instances when the officer's decision is appropriate and there may be times when the supervisor has to make the final decision. What is important, however, is the realization that the officers and their supervisors must begin to feel they are working with another and not against one another.

The attitude that police officers must be guided and directed at every turn must be discarded. Police officers are more than just programmatical robots; they are creative, dedicated, and conscientious individuals who are capable of delivering police services in a manner that is consistent with neighborhood expectations.

This is not to suggest that no semblance of control is needed to guide the officers' actions. What is needed is a better sense of when to exercise that control so as not to inhibit their ability to develop a feeling of ownership and pride in their work. This can best be accomplished by opening up lines of communication between the officers, supervisors, managers, and administrators.

The content of these exchanges should not necessarily be devoted to barking out instructions, requesting justifications for actions taken, or handing out occasional "pats on the back." Although these actions are necessary at times, more of an emphasis needs to be placed on the need to challenge the individual's sense of accomplishment. Officers, supervisors, and managers alike need to be asked questions which prompt them to think about the types of activities they have performed, why those activities were administered, what problems, if any, were experienced on behalf of the individuals involved, how the activities coincided with any previously designed plans, what adjustments will need to be made, and so forth. The point is, department personnel must be challenged to plan, organize, and assess their daily contributions in relationship to the needs and expectations of the residents living within their beats and the responsibilities of the police department.

The NOP Process

Given this initial orientation, it is imperative the beat officers realize the NOP process focuses on creating an environment from which they would be able to develop meaningful information exchanges with the neighborhood residents. The purpose of these exchanges is to provide the officers with additional insight beyond their own experiences as to what types of services

need to be delivered within the neighborhoods. Consideration, therefore, should be given toward identifying how the officers would acquire data which would help them formulate a set of reliable neighborhood expectations.

The collection of information by the officers could incorporate the use of internal and external sources. Internal sources would include obtaining information from complainants, self-initiated activities, crime analysis reports, operational analysis reports, experiences from their sergeants, lieutenant, and/or captain, and so forth. External sources of information could be obtained through proactive citizen contacts, interviews with business proprietors, citizen surveys, civic group meetings, church gatherings, and so on. Collectively, this information would broaden the officer's understanding of the concerns of the neighborhood. Comparisons with present service delivery methods could then be made by the officer. It would become the officers' responsibility to compare neighborhood concerns with present types of services delivered within the officers' respective beats.

As the officers begin to think about the service needs they have been able to identify, some attention needs to be given to verifying the accuracy of the information they have been exposed to. Officers may discover that certain neighborhood sources have identified concerns that have been totally unnoticed by department personnel and vice versa. In either case, efforts should be made to cross check the reliability of the information. For example, if the officer was told about a burglary problem in a neighborhood, and the problem had previously been unknown to him, he could check with the crime analysis personnel to determine if they have detected such a problem. This form of verification will allow officers to eventually prioritize the neighborhood needs.

Generally, the officers' experience will be a primary factor in justifying how the neighborhood needs are prioritized. Other considerations may be dependant upon whether the need is of a criminal or noncriminal nature. It may also be dependant upon the officers' perceived sense of resource availability given the size of the problem. Another justification criterion could be the acknowledgment of impact considerations by the officers. The impact concerns would more clearly describe what would happen if the neighborhood need(s) was not addressed by the department.

At this juncture, the officers would begin to assess the need to commit resources on a short or long term basis. A commitment to either time frame would clarify what the officers could realistically hope to accomplish within their respective beats.

The officers should also be expected to identify appropriate evaluation criteria which would coincide with the various courses of action they are considering. By identifying performance criteria, the officers are more apt to be cognizant of the commitments they need to make if they expect to deliver quality service. They are also more likely to want their efforts to succeed since they had a substantial amount of involvement in the identification stages.

This process of interacting with the public to acquire relevant information, verifying its accuracy, prioritizing the information, assessing resource availability, and identifying performance criteria, should become a mental mind set within each of the patrol officers. This should not be construed to mean that the officers be required to document this series of activities. A more appropriate purpose is to ensure that the officers be able

to clearly envision what they feel should be done to service neighborhood needs.

It is expected that the officers will want to begin servicing those needs as soon as possible. The service would obviously require an articulation of tasks, activities, strategies, and/or programs in need of implementation in order to resolve the neighborhood concerns. The officers, however, would also have to realize that whatever action is taken, it must be performed in conjunction with the delivery of normal, daily responsibilities such as responding to calls for service, making arrests, and writing reports. It would become the responsibility of the supervisors, managers, and administrators to determine how all of these responsibilities could be blended together to form a deliberate commitment to providing comprehensive service to the officers' respective neighborhoods.

Consequently, it becomes the responsibility of the sergeant to discuss the service needs identified by the officers. Depending upon the nature of the discussion, the sergeants may opt to discuss with the officers the rationale they used to formulate their position. Hopefully, as a result of the sergeants' self-initiative to become aware of the neighborhood needs and problems, there will be some consensus with the officers' viewpoint. If discrepancies or differences of opinion do not exist, the sergeant could authorize the officers to pursue their recommended course of action.

There may be instances, however, where the recommendations warrant the commitment of substantial resources. Additionally, the recommendations for one beat may be similar to those in another. In either instance, the sergeants may decide to reassess the officers' recommendations and make minor adjustments, devise an alternative course of action, or decide to consult with their

lieutenant to determine the proper course of action to follow.

An important aspect of the sergeants' role, consequently, is the recognition that they will be receiving a number of recommendations from the officers working the different beats under their direct supervision. It will be the sergeant's responsibility to coordinate and supervise the implementation of the accepted recommendations. This task will not be an easy one to accomplish as the sergeants must still recognize the need to continue supervising the delivery of basic services within the neighborhoods (e.g. calls for service, arrests, and reports).

The sergeants must realize that as the officers assume more responsibility, the job of coordinating the implementation of the activities becomes more difficult. In order for the sergeants to efficiently account for their officers' actions, managerial methods will need to be developed and deployed. Only then can the sergeant be in a position to effectively monitor the progress of the officers' actions.

Once the officers' actions have been administered and assessed, it becomes the responsibility of the sergeant to provide feedback to the officers. The officers may feel their actions were successful from the standpoint of removing the problem; however, the sergeant's observations may provide added insight with respect to citizen feedback (e.g., via civic groups), how efficiently department resources were utilized and coordinated, or, share the concerns from other officers who assisted in the delivery of the service.

Irrespective of whether the sergeants decide to authorize immediate implementation in response to a given set of requests, it will still be their responsibility to apprise their lieutenants of what is occurring within their districts. This means, especially in the case of recommendations requiring

long term attention, that the sergeants be able to sit down and discuss with their lieutenants what the overall course of activity is for their area of responsibility. It becomes the responsibility of the lieutenant to begin coordinating the recommendations received from all of his sergeants. In most cases, this will mean reviewing the activity conducted or recommended from more than one district.

As managers and coordinators, the lieutenants are ultimately responsible for conveying to the division captain what is happening on their shifts across the districts, within the beats. By meeting with their sergeants on a regular basis, the lieutenants can ascertain the compatibility of their sergeants' recommendations with any thoughts they or the captain may have. This is very important given the possibility of there being other specific requests to use resources that have limited availability.

In similar fashion to that of the sergeants, the lieutenants must also recognize the need to coordinate a multitude of potentially different and similar requests. The scope of the lieutenants' responsibility, however, is even broader than those of the sergeants since they must oversee the administration of shift activities. Whereas the sergeants are responsible for examining the recommendations from all of the beats, the lieutenants have the added burden of examining the recommendations for all of the respective districts. Such an examination may also include the need to reverify the quality of information collected, the accuracy of the analysis, the availability of resources, and the compatibility of the recommendations given the identified concern or problem within the different neighborhoods in question. In some cases, this will cause the lieutenants to reprioritize the recommendations.

The reprioritization could be justified on the basis of many factors. Among them could be the nature, frequency, and severity of the problem identified, the availability of resources, or its relationship to concerns of the department's administration or those of city council. In other words, the lieutenants may have to assume a very delicate role in coordinating the needs of numerous independent entities, all of whom may have legitimate concerns.

Once the lieutenants have formulated their recommendations, they should arrange a meeting with the division captain. The captain's ultimate responsibility is to approve or disapprove the plans brought forth by each of the shift lieutenants. As was the case before him, the captains are entrusted with the responsibility of assessing the merits of the recommendations from all of the shifts. The same type of constraints put forth before the shift lieutenants are of equal concern, if not more, to the captains.

Upon approving any of the recommendations, it is imperative the captain be apprised of any progress that is made. In order for the captains to assess the relative merits of any effort, they must be aware of the evaluation criteria. Once the progress is reported back to the captains, they will be in a position to match the officers' performance with the performance criteria associated with the activities, strategies, or programs administered. As the captains review the progress of the endeavor, they will be able to determine the relative success of the officer(s) and proceed to report those finding up through the chain of command to the chief of police.

In summary, this portion of the report sought to identify several steps which could be useful in describing how the concept of NOP could be operationalized. In retrospect, each of the aforementioned stages has a varying degree of applicability as one progresses up the chain of command. The

various roles, procedures, and responses mentioned are part of an evolutionary change process associated with operationalizing the concept of NOP. One can not expect the officers, supervisors, managers, and administrators to adjust rapidly. Progress must be gradual but deliberate, it must be coordinated, and above all, it must be stimulated by a strong commitment to satisfy both the demands of the neighborhood residents and the desires of department personnel.

To reiterate, conceptually, the process described throughout this portion of the report includes the following elements:

1) Formulation of expectations - the officers must be given the opportunity to develop a realistic set of expectations for their respective beats;

2) Data collection and verification - officers must be allowed to interact with neighborhood residents in order to determine what their concerns are. They should also have access to department statistics which identify work demands within their beats;

3) Analysis and discussion - a mutual responsibility of the officers and sergeants; the purpose of interacting is to identify and verify severity, frequency, and location of crime and noncrime activities within neighborhoods and business areas in need of attention by the police;

4) Service commitments - primarily the responsibility of the sergeant to determine if the service should be delivered by the officers. The decision must take into consideration the department's ability to allow the officers to perform certain tasks, activities, strategies, or programs. Concomitantly, as assessment of resource availability and appropriate accountability measures should also be made;

   Although initial recommendations come from the officers, the sergeants and lieutenants must begin determining how they can combine and/or coordinate the commitment of existing resources; as one progresses up the chain of command, the magnitude of the coordination increases and thus becomes more difficult to administer;

   All officers must realize that if appropriate resources are not available from within the department, the decision to implement their recommendations may be denied. The

officers, however, should be encouraged to rethink another means of resolving the identified problems or delivering the needed services;

5) Implementation - the decision to implement can emanate from any level depending upon the nature of the request. This step basically represents the process of performing, supervising, and managing the actions taken by the officers in response to the citizens' concerns.

   Simple requests may be handled directly by the officer or after a quick consultation with the sergeant. More complex demands may require input and confirmation from the lieutenant and/or captain;

   Confirmation to implement may be based upon the captain's ability to secure a commitment on behalf of local neighborhood groups to supply certain types of resources or other types of assistance;

   The commitment to implement can also be affected by unexpected service demands which can legitimately interrupt officer activity and thereby redirect the officers' attention to another concern. This would result in the officers reinstituting their actions at a later time;

6) Feedback and Adjustment - generally a responsibility of all participants. The success of the endeavor is dependent upon the identification of evaluation criteria from which reliable data can be collected and assessed in relationship to the preestablished command objectives.

Process Requirements

The implementation of any new process should require the recognition and acceptance of adjustments to the present method of operation. As noted previously, the transition associated with adopting the NOP philosophy affects each and every rank within the department. Among the more prominent changes in need of consideration are the following:

1) The development and incorporation of a patrol management plan which assists in operationalizing the NOP concept;

2) The development of information gathering strategies which are designed to unite the officers with the neighborhood residents in an attempt to identify local concerns and/or

problems; these strategies must contain criteria which identify for the officer, how different types of information can be collected from different sources; and

3) A recognition of the fact that interaction on behalf of the officers and the citizens, other officers, and/or their supervisors requires time. Not only is cooperation from the dispatch personnel important, but supervisors should consider devising methods of allowing their officers to conduct meetings during their duty hours. Examples of how this could occur include:

- Considering the use of split roll call sessions, whereby time is devoted to having the sergeant meet with his respective beat groups;

- Establishing district group meetings consisting of representatives from each beat group and a sergeant to act as a resource person and document the minutes of the meetings. The meetings could be held on a bimonthly basis with a rotating membership so all beat officers would be involved in the interaction process;

- Providing time for the officers to collect data from their internal and external sources without interruption to handle calls for service. This could be accomplished by reassigning a beat officer to perform this function over the span of a couple of days and then rotating it to the next beat officer; and

- Allowing the officers time to meet and discuss their method of analysis of the data they collected. This would allow them to develop more meaningful and effective recommendations governing their respective plans.

The incorporation of these changes and others serve only to place the beat officer in a more advantageous position to acquire data, analyze it, and react to it in a responsive and efficient manner. The benefits to be gained from this transition are innumerable. The efforts expended by the department to facilitate and support this change will surely have a direct bearing on how successful the concept of NOP can be operationalized.

THE FRAMEWORK FOR NOP

NOP is a concept which seeks to define and describe a philosophy which guides and directs the delivery of police services throughout the city of Houston. As a philosophy, NOP attempts to incorporate the department's values into a responsive policing style which is dependant upon quality day to day interactions between the police and the public. Quality daily interactions are based upon the success of being able to establish a desire and willingness within the officers to work together with the public. This feeling should become inherent within all officers up to the point that it becomes a representation of the department's culture. By adopting this philosophy as the department's culture and transforming it into operational reality, a firm foundation will have been set from which the quality of life within all neighborhoods throughout the city of Houston can be improved.

This basic description of NOP served as the impetus for the Executive Session membership to identify a variety of aspects which would assist the officers, supervisors, and managers in describing how they could best operationalize the philosophy of NOP. As the Executive Session membership began to grapple with the task of incorporating the NOP philosophy within the day to day attitudes and behaviors displayed by the officers, two critical aspects of the definition garnered their attention. The first aspect focused upon the phrase:

> **"an interactive process between the police officers assigned to specific beats and the citizens that either work or reside in these beats. . ."**

This phrase suggests that department personnel need to rethink what the nature of their relationship with the public should be. Traditionally, there was little, if any, reciprocity between the officers and the public in sharing

responsibilities for the delivery of police services. Under the concept of NOP, police personnel and members of the community must learn how to work together.

The nature of this relationship, therefore, requires both parties to actively communicate with one another. By virtue of communicating with one another, both the police and the community assume the responsibility of identifying issues in need of resolution. As these issues are identified, it will invariably cause the officers to think about new and innovative methods of providing services. This is not to suggest that traditional service delivery methods are no longer valid.

What is apt to occur is the identification of issues which require different types of commitments or methods of delivering services. Herein lies the second key aspect of the NOP definition:

> ". . . assess viable solutions by providing available resources from both the police department and the community to address the problems and/or concerns."

This implies that the role of the citizen becomes a more active one whereby they seek to assist the officers in resolving identified neighborhood concerns.

No longer should the public assume the police can single-handedly identify all of their neighborhood problems. Furthermore, the public must assume the posture of not only informing the police of their concerns, but they must also be in a position to assume some responsibility for helping the police address these concerns. The extent of this involvement on behalf of the public will vary depending upon the types of concerns needing attention and the ability of the police to respond, given the magnitude of their overall responsibilities.

This shift in orientation toward the public, by the police, will change the role of the beat officer. Although there will still be a need to recognize the value of enforcement activities, the desired perception is for the officer to be viewed as someone that can provide different forms of help and assistance. It requires the officers to demonstrate an attitude of caring about the safety and well being of the citizens, someone who is not afraid to express compassion through empathizing and sympathizing with victims of crime. It also requires officers to be able to organize community groups, inspire and motivate community groups into action, and facilitate and coordinate the collective efforts and endeavors of others.

As so poignantly discussed by the Executive Session membership, this shift in emphasis cannot occur without a commensurate shift in the attitude and behavior by the supervisors and managers. Some resistance is expected as the philosophy of NOP challenges the overreliance on using autocratic management styles. A different more responsive attitude and managerial style will be required to stimulate, accommodate, and perpetuate the desired behavioral changes which will occur as a result of redefining the officers' role.

This new form of management must encourage a willingness within all managers to transform new concepts into attainable goals and objectives. These goals and objectives must, in turn, be articulated within the organization and must be transformed into actions which are consistent with the service demands expressed by the citizenry. Thus, it becomes the responsibility of the administration to create an environment which will facilitate and support the development and implementation of a policing style under the NOP concept.

In discussing how such an environment can be created within the department, the membership began to examine a number of programs that had been or still are

being administered throughout the country. Based upon an analysis of these programs, it became apparent that the success of creating such an environment was primarily attributed to the ability to effectively manage police operations. Based upon a review of the research trends and implications, it became clear to the membership that in order to effectively manage police operations several department commitments had to be made.

Chief among these commitments was the need to recognize the relationship between managing the calls for service workload and the ability to manage patrol and investigative operations. The membership was quick to concede, however, that significant strides could not be made in strengthening these functional relationships unless changes were made within accompanying support operations.

One of those changes involved a massive reconfiguration of all police beat boundaries. As a forerunner to the development of the NOP concept, the new beat boundaries were aligned in accordance with neighborhood affinities. Concomitantly, efforts were also taken to conduct a work demands analysis study which identified prospective manpower allocation levels based partly upon the work load handled by the line officers. From this data a patrol schedule plan was developed which served as a guideline in identifying scheduling assignments for the beat officers. Collectively, this information provided the administration with a glimpse of resource needs in relationship to the documented work demands within the department.

As these changes were being made, other experiments were being administered to determine what type of program would best serve as the foundation from which the line operations at the command station could be based. The most notable programs and strategies discussed within this report were the D.A.R.T. Program,

Fear Reduction Program, the Oasis Technique, and the Positive Interaction Program. Each of these programs sought to alter the traditional roles of the officers, supervisors, and managers. More importantly though, was the fact that these programs introduced into the arena of police operations a responsibility on behalf of the public to mutually participate in the performance of certain duties with the police officers.

Since the inception of the D.A.R.T. Program, the role of the public in police operations had not been envisioned as a significant one. As a result of implementing the Community Contact strategies, however, the officers began to develop an appreciation for the citizens' concerns as did the citizens become more knowledgeable of what the officers could and could not do. Coupled with the experiences from other programs (e.g., PIP and Fear Reduction) and strategies implemented throughout the department; officers, supervisors, and managers began to realize that interacting with the community could lead to obtaining information which could be of value to police operations.

In responding to this realization, further developments transpired within the department which focused upon analyzing and responding to community input. An extensive crime analysis system, for example, has been developed. This system contains centralized and decentralized components. Through this system, personnel can assess the relevancy of information as it relates to resolving neighborhood problems, interdicting criminal perpetrators, and preventing crime. The Police/Citizen Cooperative Agreement project has also been completed and is presently being reviewed by department personnel. The purpose of this endeavor is to formalize, to some extent, a commitment on behalf of the department and neighborhood civic groups as to the responsibilities each will share in addressing local neighborhood concerns.

In relation to this project, attempts are also being made to further develop and expand the use of the Houstonians on Watch Program. When coupled with the Positive Interaction Program, the citizens will become actively involved in working with the police in improving the quality of life in their neighborhoods.

Equally as important is the commitment to establish a teleserve program which, as a call management tool, will assist in providing the beat officers with more time to work in the neighborhoods. The Victimization Program along with a number of the D.A.R.T. Program strategies are being institutionalized within the Field Operations Command. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, is the development of a new performance evaluation system which will allow one the opportunity to assess performance activities associated with NOP.

It is quite apparent that a number of changes have been and still are in the process of being made within the department. In discussing these changes and related issues during the Executive Sessions, a number of questions arose. Probably the most perplexing, yet vitally critical question, centered upon how the acquisition, analysis, and reaction to information obtained from the public would effect the ability to efficiently manage patrol operations. It became clear to the membership that a process needed to be developed which would define how the cooperative relationship between the public and officers would be developed. Through the implementation of this process, it was perceived that significant steps could be taken to improve the quality of life within the neighborhoods. It was at this juncture the membership felt their responsibility ended. It had clearly become their feeling that operational personnel should assume the responsibility for developing this process.

CONCLUSION

In retrospect, the Executive Session meetings accomplished several tasks. Among them, the membership:

1) Clearly articulated what the philosophy of the department was as it related to the concept of NOP;

2) Defined the concept of NOP. The definition was firmly associated with the department's mission and values. It also clearly established the need to develop, implement, and maintain the process of having the beat officers interact with the community;

3) Described role expectations associated with the concept. This included identifying certain traditional policing assumptions that would be challenged by the NOP concept;

4) Reviewed findings from programs administered throughout the country as well as within the department in order to determine what would represent an appropriate operational foundation from which to base the NOP concept; and

5) Discussed the ramifications of operationalizing the concept of NOP. It became quite apparent that any adjustment in operations, to support the concept of NOP, would require input from the personnel affected by the new process.

Collectively, the material contained within this report represents the membership's attempt to describe the characteristics of the policing style to be adopted by all department personnel, especially the beat officers working in the neighborhoods. In the minds of the membership, it is the acceptance of this policing style by the beat officer that is crucial to the success of the philosophy. If the officers are allowed to develop a sense of accomplishment in servicing their respective neighborhoods, then the desire, willingness, and motivation to support NOP will become commonplace.

It becomes the responsibility of personnel outside the scope of the Executive Session membership to determine how this sense of ownership and pride can be developed as a part of the officers' policing style. There are other,

equally demanding issues contained within this report that are also in need of attention by operation personnel. For example, what type of management structure is needed to sustain NOP, can supervisors and managers support NOP given their present types of responsibilities, how will NOP effect department policies and procedures, what types of implications does NOP have for the department, and so forth. Failure to recognize and address these issues and others could result in the inability to sustain the NOP philosophy.

In closing, the occupation of the Westside Command Station represents a turning point in time in the history of the Houston Police Department where all of the discussions, experiments, and expectations are transformed into an operational format that epitomizes the philosophy of neighborhood oriented policing. This transformation process contains a multitude of different commitments which have already been made or are in the process of being made within the department. All of these accomplishments represent years of dedication and commitment, not to mention the thousands of man-hours spent in preparing for the occupation of the Command Station.

It now becomes the responsibility of field operations personnel to continue the transformation process by examining the material contained within this report, to discuss its operational implications, and to use it as a guide in developing a plan which seeks to convert the concept of NOP into a viable and realistic policing style for the Westside Command Station, and eventually, the City of Houston as a whole.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Panel Participants and Resource Persons

CHAIRMAN:

Lee Brown	

PANEL COORDINATOR:

Tim Oettmeier	Field Operations Command

PARTICIPANTS:

George Alderete	Southwest Patrol Division/ Beechnut Substation
John Bales	Field Operations Command
Artie Contreras	Northeast Patrol Division
Ed Davis	South Central Patrol Division/ D.A.R.T.
Ruben Davis, Jr.	West Patrol Division/ Command Station Operations
Jerry DeFoor	Office of Planning and Research
Dorothy Edwards	Internal Affairs Division
Rudy Garza	Southeast Patrol Division/ Magnolia Park Substation
Chris Gillespie	Inspections Division
Ralph Gonzales	West Patrol Division/ Command Station Operations (Crime Analysis)
Jerry Jones	South Central Patrol Division
Robin Kirk	North Shepherd Patrol Division/ Northline Park Community Center
Tom Koby	Burglary and Theft Division
Steve Lyons	West Patrol Division/ Command Station Operations
Gary Matthews	South Central Patrol Division/ D.A.R.T.

PARTICIPANTS (Continued):

Paul Michna	Major Investigations Bureau
Tommy Mitchell	Support Services Command
Sam Nuchia	West Patrol Bureau
Martin Reiner	Police Advisory Committee
John Roberson, Jr.	Southwest Patrol Division/ Police Storefront
John Snelson	West Patrol Division/ Command Station Operations
Dennis Storemski	Investigative Operations Command
Gene Thaler	Southeast Patrol Division
Victor Trevino, Jr.	Northeast Patrol Division/ Lee Road (Wesley House Community Center)
David Walker	Southeast Patrol Division/ Park Place Substation
Betsy Watson	Auto Theft Division
Frank Yorek	Professional Standards Command

RESOURCE PERSONS:

Bill Bieck	Houston Police Department
Bob Bowers	Houston Police Department
Herman Goldstein	University of Wisconsin
George Kelling	Harvard University
Jack Seitzinger	Houston Police Department
Mary Ann Wycoff	Police Foundation

APPENDIX B

EXECUTIVE SESSION - POLICING STYLE

NEIGHBORHOOD ORIENTED POLICING DEFINITION ELEMENTS

Definition Elements:

1) Focus upon the expectations and/or perceptions of what is desired in terms of service delivery from the police and the public;

2) Effectiveness is based upon the need to have the officers involved as well as the citizens;

3) Efforts should be made to determine what the public wants in terms of service delivery;

4) Alter the role of the officer;

5) Develop a sense of trust between the officers and the citizens;

6) Improve the officers' attitude by instilling a willingness to provide the service;

7) Responsibilities must be well defined and communicated to the officers;

8) Allow for operational flexibility to match resources to community needs;

9) Develop a means of learning how to stimulate community involvement;

10) Key is the initial contact of the citizen by the officer; we must make a conscious effort to approach people;

11) Officers must be willing to accept responsibility;

12) Control rumors regarding the perception of what is occuring within the neighborhood;

13) Be accessible to the public with a willingness to share information;

14) We should shoulder the responsibility for getting the community involved;

15) Beat officers should be responsible for providing community service functions;

16) Must have good communications and be responsive to the communications;

17) Style is dependant upon intentions;

18) A sense of responsibility is needed;

Definition Elements cont'd:

19) Motivation is based upon being given responsibility;

20) Motivation comes from working with people who care about them;

21) Must be aware of the change, monitor responses through feedback and evaluations;

22) Coordinate the delivery of services with a perspective for the whole;

23) Refrain from using special squads when no longer needed;

24) Learn how to use the information (crime analysis) we receive;

25) Be sensitive to the different needs of ethnic groups;

26) Learn to utilize the information we obtain from the public

27) Officers must mature faster to overcome problems associated with youth and aggressiveness;;

28) Recognize fiscal limitations;

29) Recognize the issue of job satisfaction for the officers;

30) Assist in helping the citizens determine their role with respect to addressing problems or requesting service.