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Perspectives on Policing



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Implementing Community Policing

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ACQUISITIONS

A simple lesson, well understood by truck drivers, helps to frame the problem for this paper: greater momentum means less maneuverability. The professional truck driver does not drive his 50-ton trailer-truck the same way that he drives his sports car. He avoids braking sharply. He treats corners with far greater respect. And he generally does not expect the same instant response from the trailer, with its load, that he enjoys in his car. The driver's failure to understand the implications and responsibilities of driving such a massive vehicle inevitably produces tragedy: if the driver tries to turn too sharply, the cab loses traction as the trailer's momentum overturns or jackknifes the vehicle.

Police organizations also have considerable momentum. Having a strong personal commitment to the values with which they have "grown up," police officers will find any hint of proposed change in the police culture extremely threatening. Moreover, those values are reflected in many apparently technical aspects of their jobs—systems for dispatching patrols, patrol officers constantly striving to be available for the next call, incident-logging criteria, etc. The chief executive who simply announces that community policing is now the order of the day, without a carefully designed plan for bringing about that change, stands in danger both of "losing traction" and of throwing his entire force into confusion.

The concept of community policing envisages a police department striving for an absence of crime and disorder and concerned with, and sensitive to, the quality of life in the community. It perceives the community as an agent and partner in promoting security rather than as a passive audience. This is in contrast to the traditional concept of policing that measures its successes chiefly through response

This is one in a series of reports originally developed with some of the leading figures in American policing during their periodic meetings at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. The reports are published so that Americans interested in the improvement and the future of policing can share in the information and perspectives that were part of extensive debates at the School's Executive Session on Policing.

The police chiefs, mayors, scholars, and others invited to the meetings have focused on the use and promise of such strategies as community-based and problem-oriented policing. The testing and adoption of these strategies by some police agencies signal important changes in the way American policing now does business. What these changes mean for the welfare of citizens and the fulfillment of the police mission in the next decades has been at the heart of the Kennedy School meetings and this series of papers.

We hope that through these publications police officials and other policymakers who affect the course of policing will debate and challenge their beliefs just as those of us in the Executive Session have done.

The Executive Session on Policing has been developed and administered by the Kennedy School's Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management and funded by the National Institute of Justice and private sources that include the Charles Stewart Mott and Guggenheim Foundations.

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times, the number of calls handled, and detection rates for serious crime. A fuller comparison between traditional and community policing models is given in the appendix in a question-and-answer format.

The task here is to focus attention upon some of the difficulties inherent in a change of policing style, rather than to defend or advocate community policing. So we will address some general problems of institutional change, albeit within the context of a discussion of policing styles.

Those who accept the desirability of introducing community policing confront a host of difficult issues: What structural changes are necessary, if any? How do we get the people on the beat to behave differently? Can the people we have now be forced into the new mold, or do we need to recruit a new kind of person? What should we tell the public, and when? How fast can we bring about this change? Do we have enough external support?

These are the problems of implementation. The aim of this paper is to assist in their resolution. You will find here, however, no particular prescription—no organizational chart, no list of objectives, no sample press releases. Such a prescription could not satisfy any but the most particular of circumstances. The intent here is to explore some general concepts in organizational behavior, to uncover particular obstacles to desired change that might be found within police departments, and then to find the most effective means for overcoming the obstacles.

Dangers of underestimating the task: changing a culture

Even the superficial review of community policing in the appendix indicates the magnitude of the task facing a chief executive. Implementing community policing is not a simple policy change that can be effected by issuing a directive through the normal channels. It is not a mere restructuring of the force to provide the same service more efficiently. Nor is it a cosmetic decoration designed to impress the public and promote greater cooperation.

For the police it is an entirely different way of life. It is a new way for police officers to see themselves and to understand their role in society. The task facing the police chief is nothing less than to change the fundamental culture of the organization. This is especially difficult because of the unusual strength of police cultures and their great resistance to change.

The unusual strength of the police culture is largely attributable to two factors. First, the stressful and apparently dangerous nature of the police role produces collegiate bonds of considerable strength, as officers feel themselves

besieged in an essentially hostile world. Second, the long hours and the rotating shifts kill most prospects for a normal (wider) social life; thus, the majority of an officer's social life is confined to his or her own professional circle.

“ . . . a huge ship can . . . be turned by a small rudder. It just takes time . . . ”

Altering an organizational philosophy is bound to take considerable time. Another analogy may be helpful: the greater the momentum of a ship, the longer it takes to turn. One comforting observation is that a huge ship can nevertheless be turned by a small rudder. It just takes time, and it requires the rudder to be set steadfastly for the turn throughout the whole turning period.

It is worth pointing out, also, that there will be constant turbulence around a rudder when it is turning the ship—and no turbulence at all when it is not. This analogy teaches us something if the office of the chief executive is seen as the rudder responsible for turning the whole organization. The lessons are simple. First, the bigger the organization the longer it will take to change. Second, throughout the period of change the office of the chief executive is going to be surrounded by turbulence, like it or not. It will require personal leadership of considerable strength and perseverance.

Rendering susceptible to change

A chief executive may be fortunate enough to inherit an organization that is already susceptible to change. For instance, he may arrive shortly after some major corruption scandal or during a period when external confidence in the police department is at rock bottom. In such a case the chief executive is fortunate, in that leadership is required and expected of him. His organization is poised to respond quickly to his leadership on the grounds that the new chief, or his new policies, may represent the best or only hopes of rescue.

A chief executive who inherits a smoothly running bureaucracy, complacent in the status quo, has a tougher job. The values and aspirations of the traditional policing style will be embodied in the bureaucratic mechanisms—all of which superficially appear to be functioning well. The need for change is less apparent.

The task of the chief executive, in such a situation, is to expose the defects that exist within the present system. That will involve challenging the fundamental assumptions of the organization, its aspirations and objectives, the effectiveness

of the department's current technologies, and even its view of itself. The difficulty for the chief is that raising such questions, and questioning well-entrenched police practices, may look and feel destructive rather than constructive. Managers within the department will feel uneasy and insecure, as they see principles and assertions for which they have stood for many years being subject to unaccustomed scrutiny.

The process of generating a questioning, curious, and ultimately innovative spirit within the department seems to necessarily involve this awkward stage. It looks like an attempt by the chief to deliberately upset his organization. The ensuing uncertainty will have a detrimental effect upon morale within the department, and the chief has to pay particular attention to that problem. Police officers do not like uncertainty within their own organization; they already face enough of that on the streets.

The remedy lies in the personal commitment of the chief and his senior managers. Morale improves once it is clear that the change in direction and style is taking root rather than a fleeting fancy, that the chief's policies have some longevity, and that what initially appeared to be destructive cynicism about police accomplishments is, in fact, a healthy, progressive, and forgiving openmindedness.

“Morale improves once it is clear that the change in direction and style is taking root rather than a fleeting fancy . . .”

The chief executive is also going to require outside help in changing the organization. For instance, the chief may be able to make a public commitment to a new kind of policing long before he can convince his organization to adopt it. He may be able to create a public consensus that many of the serious policing problems of the day are direct results of the fact that the new kind of policing was not practiced in the past. He may be able to educate the public, or the mayor, about the shortcomings of existing practices even before his staff is prepared to face up to them.

He may identify pressure groups that he can use to his advantage by eliciting from them public enunciation of particular concerns. He may be able to foster and empower the work of commissions, committees, or inquiries that help to make his organization vulnerable to change. He can then approach his own organization backed by a public mandate—and police of all ranks will, in due course, face questions from the public itself that make life very uncomfortable for them if they cling to old values.

The chief may even accentuate his staff's vulnerability to external pressures by removing the protection provided by a public information officer and insisting that the news media be handled by subordinate officers. In so doing the chief would have to accept that some mistakes will inevitably be made by officers inexperienced in media affairs. High-level tolerance of those early errors will be critical to middle management's acceptance of the new openness. They will need to feel that they are working within a supportive, challenging, coaching environment—not that they are being needlessly exposed to personal risk.

Two kinds of imbalance

Two different types of imbalance within the organization may help render it susceptible to change: “directed imbalance” and “experimental imbalance.”

Directed imbalance: Return for a moment to physical analogies, and consider the process of turning a corner on a bicycle. Without thinking, the rider prepares for the turn by leaning over to the appropriate side. Small children learning to ride a bicycle quickly discover the perils of not leaning enough, or too much, for the desired turn. The characteristics of the imbalance, in this instance, are that it is necessary and that it only makes sense in the context of the anticipated change in direction. It is, nevertheless, imbalance—because the machine will fall over if the turn is not subsequently made. Inevitable disaster follows, conversely, from making the turn without the preparatory leaning.

Directed imbalances within a police organization will be those imbalances that are created in anticipation of the proposed change in orientation. They will be the changes that make sense only under the assumption that the whole project will be implemented, and that it will radically alter organizational priorities.

Examples of such directed imbalance would be the movement of the most talented and promising personnel into the newly defined jobs; making it clear that the route to promotion lies within such jobs; disbanding those squads that embody and add weight to the traditional values; recategorizing the crime statistics according to their effect on the community; redesigning the staff evaluation system to take account of contributions to the nature and quality of community life; providing inservice training in problem-solving skills for veteran officers and managers; altering the nature of the training given to new recruits to include problem-solving skills; establishing new communication channels with other public services; and contracting for annual community surveys for a period of years.

Experimental imbalance: This differs from directed imbalance in its incorporation of trial and error—lots of trials and a tolerance of error. The benefits of running many different experiments in different parts of the organization are more numerous than they might, at first sight, appear. There is the obvious result of obtaining experimental data, to be used in planning for the future. There is also the effect of creating a greater willingness to challenge old assumptions and hence a greater susceptibility to change, at a time when the organization needs to change most rapidly.

“The resourcefulness of police officers . . . can at last be put to the service of the department.”

There is also the effect of involving lots of officers in a closer and more personal way. It does not matter so much what it is that they are involved in—it is more important that they feel involved, and that they feel they are subject to the attention of headquarters. They will then be much more disposed to try to understand what the values of headquarters really are.

Also, officers will see lots of apparently crazy ideas being tried and may, in time, realize that they have some ideas of their own that are slightly less crazy. Perhaps for the first time they will be willing to put their ideas forward, knowing that they will not be summarily dismissed. The resourcefulness of police officers, so long apparent in their unofficial behavior, can at last be put to the service of the department. Creativity blossoms in an experimental environment that is tolerant of unusual ideas.

Managing through values

Existing police structures tend to be mechanistic and highly centralized. Headquarters is the brain that does the thinking for the whole organization. Headquarters, having thought, disseminates rules and regulations in order to control practice throughout the organization. Headquarters must issue a phenomenal volume of policy, as it seeks to cover every new and possible situation. A new problem, new legislation, or new idea eventually produces a new wave of instructions sent out to divisions from headquarters.

The 1984 publication in Britain of the “Attorney General’s New Guidelines on Prosecution and Cautioning Practice” provides a useful example. The purpose of the guidelines was to introduce the idea that prosecutions should be

undertaken when, and only when, prosecution best serves the public interest. As such, the guidelines represent a broadening of police discretion. In the past, police were authorized to caution only juveniles and senior citizens. Under the new guidelines offenders of any age may be cautioned in appropriate circumstances. Unfortunately, the order was issued in some county forces through some 30 pages of detailed, case-by-case, instructions distributed from headquarters. The mass of instructions virtually obscured the fact that broader discretion was being granted.

Police officers have long been accustomed to doing their jobs “by the book.” Detailed instruction manuals, sometimes running into hundreds, even thousands, of pages have been designed to prescribe action in every eventuality. Police officers feel that they are not required to exercise judgment so much as to know what they are supposed to do in a particular situation. There is little incentive and little time to think, or to have ideas. There is little creativity and very little problem solving. Most of the day is taken up just trying not to make mistakes. And it is the voluminous instruction manuals which define what is, and what is not, a mistake. Consequently heavy reliance is placed upon the prescriptions of the manuals during disciplinary investigations and hearings.

How does the traditional management process feel from the receiving (operational) end? Something like this: “It all comes from headquarters; it is all imposed; it is all what somebody else has thought up—probably somebody who has time to sit and think these things up.” New ideas are never conceived, evaluated, and implemented in the same place, so they are seldom “owned” or pursued enthusiastically by those in contact with the community.

Why is this state of affairs a hindrance to the ideals of community policing? Because it allows for no sensitivity either on a district level (i.e., to the special needs of the community) or on an individual level (i.e., to the particular considerations of one case). It operates on the assumption that wealthy suburban districts need to be policed in much the same way as public housing apartments. While patrol officers may be asked to behave sensitively to the needs of the community and to the individuals with whom they deal, there is little organizational support for such behavior.

“There is . . . little time to think, or to have ideas. . . . Most of the day is taken up just trying not to make mistakes.”

Of course, there remains a need for some standing orders, some prepared contingency plans, and some set procedures. But such instructions can come to be regarded as a resource,

rather than as constraining directives. In the past, instruction manuals have been used as much to allocate blame retrospectively after some error has come to light, as to facilitate the difficult work of patrol officers. Many departments, in implementing community policing (which normally involves a less militaristic and more participatory management style), have deemphasized their instruction manuals.

The instruction manual of the West Midlands Police Force, in England, had grown to 4 volumes, each one over 3 inches thick, totaling more than 2,000 pages of instructions. In June 1987, under the direction of Chief Constable Geoffrey Dear, they scrapped it. They replaced it with a single-page "Policy Statement" which gave 11 brief "commandments." These commandments spoke more about initiative and "reasonableness of action" than about rules or regulations. All officers were issued pocket-size laminated copies of this policy statement so that, at any time, they could remind themselves of the basic tenets of their department.

The old manual had contained some useful information that could not be found elsewhere. This was extracted, condensed, and preserved in a new, smaller, "advice manual." It was only one-third the size of the old manual and, significantly, was distributed with an explicit promise that it would never be used in the course of disciplinary investigations or hearings. The ground-level officers were able to accept it as a valuable resource, whereas they had regarded the old manual as a constant threat, omniscient but unfeeling.

The Chief Constable had set up a small team to be responsible for introducing the new policy statement and advice manual. One year after the first distribution of these two documents to the force, the feelings of that team were that the ground-level officers accepted the change and appreciated it, but that some of the mid-level managers found the implied management style harder to accept and were reluctant to discard their old manuals.¹

Another trend in the management of policing is for procedures "set in stone" to be played down in favor of accumulated experience. There are growing repositories of professional experience, either in the form of available discussion forums for officers trying new techniques, or in the form of case studies where innovations and their results are described.² One difficulty here is that police officers have to be persuaded that it is helpful, rather than harmful, to record their failures as well as their successes—and for that they will need a lot of reassurance.

Senior managers have begun to emphasize the ideals, ethics, and motivations that underlie the new image of policing, as opposed to the correctness or incorrectness of procedures. Disciplinary inquiries, therefore, come to rest less firmly on the cold facts of an officer's conduct and more upon his intentions, his motivations, and the reasonableness and acceptability of his judgment in the particular situation.

The relationship between headquarters and district commands may also need to change. The role of headquarters will be to preach the values and state the principles and broad objectives, and then allow the districts a great deal of discretion in deciding on particular programs suited to their geographical area. Similarly, management within any one division or district should be, as far as possible, through values and principles rather than rules and regulations; individual officers can then be encouraged to use their own judgment in specific cases.

“ [A] police force . . . of 3,000 . . . has nine layers of ranks. . . . [The] Roman Catholic Church . . . does a fairly good job of disseminating values with only five layers. ”

The nature of the rank structure itself can be a principal obstacle to the effective communication of new values throughout the organization, primarily because it consists of many thin layers. A typical British police force (say of 3,000 officers) has nine layers of ranks. The larger Metropolitan forces have even more. In the larger American forces, the number of ranks can vary from 9 to 13 depending on the size of the department. This is in contrast to the worldwide Roman Catholic Church (with over 600 million members), which does a fairly good job of disseminating values with only five layers. We know from physics that many thin layers is the best formula for effective insulation; for instance, we are told that the best protection from cold weather is to wear lots of thin layers of clothing, rather than a few thick ones.

Certainly such a deep rank structure provides a very effective natural barrier, insulating the chief officer from his patrol force. It makes it possible for the police chief to believe that all his officers are busily implementing the ideas which, last month, he asked his deputy to ask his assistants to implement—while, in fact, the sergeant is telling his officers that the latest missive from those cookies at headquarters "who have forgotten what this job is all about" shouldn't actually affect them at all.

During a period of organizational reorientation the communication between the chief and the rank and file needs to be more effective than that—and so will need to be more direct. The insulating effects of the rank structure will need to be overcome, if there is to be any hope of the rank and file understanding what their chief officers are trying to get them to think about. It means that the chief must talk to the

officers, and must do so at length. Some chiefs have found it valuable to publish their own value statements and give all patrol officers personal copies. Alternatively, the chief may choose to call meetings and address the officers himself.

This is not proposed as a permanent state of affairs, as clearly the rank structure has its own value and is not to be lightly discarded. During the period of accelerated change, however, the communication between the top and the bottom of the organization has to be unusually effective. Hence, it is necessary to ensure that the message is not filtered, doctored, or suppressed (either by accident or as an act of deliberate sabotage) by intermediate ranks during such times.

The likelihood of a change in policy and style surviving, in the long term, probably depends as much on its acceptance by middle management as on anything else. The middle managers, therefore, have to be coached and reeducated; they have to be given the opportunity and incentive for critical self-examination and the chance to participate in the reappraisal of the organization. Some chiefs have invested heavily in management retraining, seminars, and retreats, taking great care to show their personal commitment to those enterprises.

Territorial responsibility

One of the most obvious structural changes that has normally accompanied a move toward community policing is the assignment of officers to beats. It is important to understand how such a move fits into the general scheme of things. At first sight it appears that patrol officers who drive cars on shift work have territorial responsibility; for 8 hours a day they each cover an area. In fact, there are two senses in which that particular area is not the officer's professional territory. First, officers know that they may be dispatched to another area at any time, should the need arise. Second, they are not responsible for anything that occurs in their area when they are off duty. The boundaries of their professional territories are more clearly defined by the time periods when

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they are on duty than by a geographical area. The fact that a professional territory spans a period of time rather than an area clearly has the effect of forcing the officer's concern to be largely focused on incidents rather than on the long-term problems of which the incidents may be symptoms. The patrol officers are bound to remain reactive rather than proactive. Long-term problems remain outside their responsibility.

“... beat officers know ... the opportunity and obligation to have an impact ...”

In contrast, when patrol officers are given an area and told “this is yours, and nobody else’s,” their professional territory immediately becomes geographical. The 24-hour demand on police resources requires that some calls in their area will be dealt with by other personnel. But the beat officers know that they have principal responsibility for a street or streets. They have the opportunity and obligation to have an impact on difficult problems. The more committed beat officers demand to know what happened on their beat while they were off duty; they tend to make unsolicited followup visits, and struggle to find causes of incidents that would otherwise be regarded as haphazard.

It is fairly easy to see how the chief officer, district commanders, and individual beat officers can have a clear territorial responsibility. What about the remainder in middle management? There is a danger that community contact and concern will be the preserve of the highest and lowest ranks of the service, with the middle ranks living a cozy internal life of administration.

Middle-ranking officers can continue to be a barrier to the dissemination of the new values unless they too are made to live by them. This is perhaps best accomplished by making each rank correspond to some level of aggregation of beats or of community concerns. Thus middle managers should interact as fully with the community as the most senior and most junior officers. They thereby become a meaningful resource for the patrol officers rather than just one more level of supervision. They then can provide contextual frameworks, at successively higher levels, to assist subordinates in the understanding and resolution of particular community problems.

Resistance and sabotage

The most robust resistance to any change in values within an organization will come from those parts that stand to benefit most by the perpetuation of the old set of values.

In introducing the ideals of community policing, the chief should anticipate substantial resistance from particular areas, the first of which is the detective branch.

The idea that crime investigation is the single most important function of the police makes the criminal investigation division the single most important unit within the organization; it gives a detective higher status than a patrol officer. Should we expect the detective branch to applaud an absence of crime? It seems that their values are sometimes shaped to prefer an abundance of crime, provided it is all solved. It seems that special attention may have to be given to dismantling the detectives' view of what is, and what is not, important. Certainly the detective branch typically views the introduction of community policing as a matter for the patrol officers—"our job is still to solve crime."

Detectives' perception of their job will remain "my job is to solve crime" until they are removed from the group that reinforces that perception. Their goals will remain the same until their professional territory is redefined. Their professional territories, if the detectives are to adopt and understand the ideals of community policing, should be defined segments of the community.

The detectives may, or may not, share their segments with uniformed officers; they may, or may not, retain the title of detective. Such considerations will depend, to an extent, on the particular constraints imposed by union power. But they have to be incorporated into the community policing system. They have to be encouraged to work closely within neighborhood policing units. Thus the valuable intelligence that detectives gain through crime investigation can be fed back into the patrol operation. Also, the detectives are made to feel that crime prevention is their principal obligation, and not the preserve either of the patrol force or of a dedicated, but peripheral, unit.

“... chief officers may have the authority... but they are frequently frustrated by administrators...”

The essential change, whatever the prevailing circumstances, is that the detectives' professional territory has to be extended some considerable distance beyond the instances of reported crime. The detectives may end up looking more like "district investigators" than members of an elite, and separate, unit.

A second area of resistance will probably be the bureaucratic administration. It will include many key personnel who have been able to do their jobs comfortably and mechanically for

many years. Such jobs will include the purchase of equipment and supplies, the recruiting and training of staff, and, perhaps most importantly, the preparation and administration of annual budgets. The chief officers may have the authority to allocate police resources as they think best, but they are frequently frustrated by administrators who find some bureaucratic reason for not releasing funds for particular purposes, or by the creation of other bureaucratic obstacles.

A fundamental reappraisal of organizational priorities is likely to "upset the apple cart" in these areas in a manner that bureaucrats will find difficult to tolerate. Such staff members need to be converted. The practical implication is that such personnel must be included in the audience when the new organizational values are being loudly proclaimed. If they are left out at the beginning, they may well become a significant stumbling block at some later stage.

Conclusion

One final cautionary note: the principal task facing police leaders in changing the orientation of their organizations has been identified as the task of communicating new values. In order to stand a chance of communicating values effectively, you need to believe in them yourself, and to be part of a community that believes in them, too.

Notes

1. The Metropolitan Police Department (London) is in the process of making a similar change, moving away from a comprehensive instruction manual and toward clear, brief statements of the principles for action.
2. Much of this work stemmed from initiatives funded by the National Institute of Justice, the Police Executive Research Forum, the Police Foundation, and concerned philanthropic foundations.

The Executive Session on Policing, like other Executive Sessions at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, is designed to encourage a new form of dialog between high-level practitioners and scholars, with a view to redefining and proposing solutions for substantive policy issues. Practitioners rather than academicians are given majority representation in the group. The meetings of the Session are conducted as loosely structured seminars or policy debates.

Since it began in 1985, the Executive Session on Policing has met seven times. During the 3-day meetings, the 31 members have energetically discussed the facts and values that have guided, and those that should guide, policing.

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Appendix

Traditional vs. community policing: Questions and answers

	<u>Traditional</u>	<u>Community policing</u>
<i>Question: Who are the police?</i>	A government agency principally responsible for law enforcement.	Police are the public and the public are the police: the police officers are those who are paid to give full-time attention to the duties of every citizen.
<i>Question: What is the relationship of the police force to other public service departments?</i>	Priorities often conflict.	The police are one department among many responsible for improving the quality of life.
<i>Question: What is the role of the police?</i>	Focusing on solving crimes.	A broader problem-solving approach.
<i>Question: How is police efficiency measured?</i>	By detection and arrest rates.	By the absence of crime and disorder.
<i>Question: What are the highest priorities?</i>	Crimes that are high value (e.g., bank robberies) and those involving violence.	Whatever problems disturb the community most.
<i>Question: What, specifically, do police deal with?</i>	Incidents.	Citizens' problems and concerns.
<i>Question: What determines the effectiveness of police?</i>	Response times.	Public cooperation.

Appendix (continued)

Traditional vs. community policing: Questions and answers

	<u>Traditional</u>	<u>Community policing</u>
<i>Question: What view do police take of service calls?</i>	Deal with them only if there is no real police work to do.	Vital function and great opportunity.
<i>Question: What is police professionalism?</i>	Swift effective response to serious crime.	Keeping close to the community.
<i>Question: What kind of intelligence is most important?</i>	Crime intelligence (study of particular crimes or series of crimes).	Criminal intelligence (information about the activities of individuals or groups).
<i>Question: What is the essential nature of police accountability?</i>	Highly centralized; governed by rules, regulations, and policy directives; accountable to the law.	Emphasis on local accountability to community needs.
<i>Question: What is the role of headquarters?</i>	To provide the necessary rules and policy directives.	To preach organizational values.
<i>Question: What is the role of the press liaison department?</i>	To keep the "heat" off operational officers so they can get on with the job.	To coordinate an essential channel of communication with the community.
<i>Question: How do the police regard prosecutions?</i>	As an important goal.	As one tool among many.

The Executive Session on Policing
convenes the following distinguished panel of leaders in the field of policing:

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