STUDENT ESSAY

THE ROLE OF U.S. MILITARY IN THE "DRUG WAR"

BY

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

THE ROLE OF U.S. MILITARY IN THE "DRUG WAR"

An Individual Essay

by

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ABSTRACT

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The current drug abuse problem in the United States has grown to unprecedented proportions and affects all sectors of our society. This wide-spread abuse threatens our national stability as an economic leader, our national security, and our democratic way of life. Solutions to the problem focus on both the supply and demand sides as they are interrelated issues which require a national effort. Congress is requiring an expanded role for the military in this war on drugs, but the role is not clear and creates controversy in the Defense organization. The military is being used effectively, and can do more, but this paper will argue it should not become a civil police force. The solution to controlling the drug abuse problem should receive more effort on the demand side to reduce illicit drug use which will eventually eliminate the supply of drugs.

The Role of U.S. Military in the "Drug War"

The use of illicit drugs in the United States has risen to an alarmingly high proportion of our society. Drug usage is no longer limited to, or submerged in, the crime ridden inner cities or just a trendy experience of students on college campuses. Abusive drug usage has expanded to every sector, class and race of our society. It can be found in rural America, in our high schools and elementary schools and in the work place. No one in America can escape the effects of this social ill. As one author from the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) states:

> If you live today in the United States, or Canada or Western Europe, or almost anywhere else, "Drugs are your problem". If you work in an industry, like the railroads, that provides a service to the public, and that is entrusted with the safety of large numbers of people, then you have even more cause for concern, and an even greater need to be involved and informed.1

Unfortunately, the above concern was not heeded by some as the nation was shocked recently by a massive train wreck in Northern Maryland. Several people were killed and more injured because of suspected irresponsible drug use by the train operators. This is only the most recent example of the results of the drug abuse problem. Almost daily one can read or view cases of drug use, drug abuse and drug related crimes in the papers and on television.

Informed Americans are getting involved and are calling for action - action at all levels, with all of our resources. They feel it is time to take a firm stand on this issue and stop illegal drug traffic and rampant drug abuse which is eroding our nation's effectiveness. Even President Reagan, early in his presidency, made the 'drug war' a high priority issue. Even more recently, he declared that the drug issue has become a direct threat to our national security. What appears to have finally happened is total American awareness of a major problem. This is supported by a recent poll which indicated that the nation's most important problem is illegal drug use...not unemployment, not the federal budget, not even the threat of nuclear war.2

The U.S. Congress has reacted firmly to this public outcry for action. They have enacted laws with stiffer penalties for drug trafficking and authorized additional funding to support drug interdiction and eradication efforts. There has been a call for a coordinated effort of federal, state and local drug enforcement agencies. H.R. 5484 prepared by the 99th Congress included a mandate to the executive branch to use military forces for interdiction and eradication missions. This congressional mandate has caused controversy in the defense community about the use of military forces as civilian police. This essay will focus on aspects of that controversy; specifically, the drug threat, our national strategy, congressional intent, and the issues for or against the use of military forces to achieve national objectives in the drug war.

To adequately address this issue it is first essential to better understand the drug problem in the U.S. To put the problem in perspective one must start by looking at the characteristics of drug trafficking and drug abuse. Both present two separate, but interrelated sets of problems. The first problem is the supply side of drug trafficking; where do drugs come from, who controls them and how do they get here? The second problem, is the demand side; who uses drugs, and why, and what are the patterns? Obviously, as is usually the case of demand and supply, one side drives the other. Where there is no demand, there is no basis for supply; conversely, where drugs are easier to obtain, and less expensive, supply increases. On which side to focus is the problem for drug enforcement agencies which determines the mission for those forces and the resources to be employed. If the supply is the focus, then clearly interdiction and eradication is required. The demand side however, involves a different set of solutions; more society responsibility, education and welfare programs and cooperation in the private and public sector to collectively stop abuse. Unfortunately, the decision is not simply which focus to choose. Enforcement efforts must be directed at both the suppliers and the users.

The demand for drugs in our country is a monumental problem. Americans are considered by most of the world to be the number one users of illicit drugs. As a result, we have become a lucrative target for drug traffickers by those countries dealing in illegal drugs.

> Even as recently as five years ago, our foreign counterparts castigated the United States for causing the drug problem because of our insatiable appetite for more and more drugs of all kinds. From heroin, marijuana and cocaine, to legal drugs, such as tranquilizers diverted into the illegal drug trade, to the so-called designer drugs, the United States has always seemed to lead the way in the demand for drugs.3

It has been estimated that 1 in 10 Americans have used an illegal drug; with 20 million using marijuana at least once a month and 1 out of 18 high school students using it daily. Cocaine users number four and one half million citizens with regular habits and 15 million which have tried it. Heroin usage remains constant with only half a million addicts. With these staggering figures how does a nation begin to deal with the problem?4

The results from this high usage rate are also alarming. We are experiencing needless loss of life, crippled and broken individuals, loss of productive time, and squandered economies.

How the drug problem in our society is perceived is key to a solution. Many Americans are not aware of the problem, pay little attention to the issues or just plain ignore the facts. In a recent high school survey, only 3 percent of the parents believed their children used marijuana, while 28 percent of the students actually admitted to using marijuana in the past 30 days. This is a difference between perception and reality.5

The implications for cocaine abuse is equally staggering. In research conducted by Dr. Mark Gold, over a cocaine hotline, he

demonstrated the magnitude of the demand side of the problem. His research was based on an estimated 1200 calls a day, day in and day out for a three year period, 1983-1986. The results, using only the adult figures from the report, reveal:

- Cocaine users were predominately male (66 percent), but now are equally split between male and female. Average for the first survey was 30 years old, in follow-ups the average age had declined by several years.
- 76 percent were employed, but of those employed, most (about 2/3) earned less than $25,000. In earlier surveys, most earned over $25,000.
- Estimates of weekly use by adult callers ranged from 1 to 32 grams. An average amount spent on cocaine was $637 a week.
- Over 80 percent of the adults reported that they were unable to refuse cocaine when it was available. 75 percent said they lost control of their cocaine use. 66 percent defined themselves as addicted.
- Over 90 percent of the adults reported adverse physical, psychological, and social/financial consequences.
- Over 70 percent of the adults said cocaine was more important than family or friends; about 25 percent were divorced as a result.
- 56 percent of the callers had used up at least half of their savings, half were in debt, and 42 percent had lost all their monetary assets.
- 38 percent of the callers thought about suicide; 9 percent actually tried.

Adolescent responses and on-the-job incidents were equally as alarming. For example, 42 percent of the youth became dealers to support their habit. Forty-three percent were in debt. Thirty-eight percent had stolen money or property as a direct result of cocaine use. On-the-job figures provided by Dr. Gold indicated that 75 percent reported using drugs, and 92 percent performed their jobs under the influence of drugs.6

With this kind of demand in the U.S. it is not difficult to understand why we are such a lucrative target for drug producers. This high rate of demand is attributable to a wealthy nation with a high rate of per capita income, and individual freedoms which are well protected. The combination of wealth and personal freedom of choice have led the way to irresponsibility and a highly permissive society. These two characteristics present major challenges to drug enforcement agencies in determining how to deal with the problem of demand for illicit drugs.

The other part of the drug problem is the supply side and the ease with which this growing demand is fostered. Drugs are becoming easier to obtain and cheaper; therefore, more can afford them. In addition, purity levels have increased substantially. The result is a major challenge to enforcement agencies.

Over the land, by sea or in the air, dangerous cargoes of heroin, cocaine and marijuana are brought to America daily to feed our insatiable appetite for more and better drugs. Literally thousands of aircraft and seacraft penetrate our air space and coastal areas annually, undetected. The 2000 miles of border between the U.S. and Mexico provides accessible land routes for ease of movement into the U.S. At the same time, production in this country of marijuana, synthetic drugs and designer drugs, continues to escalate at an alarming rate.7

According to a USAWC Strategic Studies Institute Report, a large majority of the illicit drugs come from countries in Central and South America, to include the Caribbean Basin,

Mexico, Columbia, Bolivia, Peru, Panama, Belize and Jamaica. Many of these countries have economies that are highly dependent upon drug production as a major part of their individual incomes. Columbia presently has replaced Mexico as our largest supplier of illicit drugs due to eradication efforts in Mexico. But as is usually the case when production is retarded in one area, production simply moves to another area within the country or into another country. Consequently, production in Mexico continues to increase dispite eradication efforts.8

Interestingly, the United States is the third largest producer of marijuana. For the first time in U.S. history this illicit crop is the most valuable crop in the United States. In 1986 the marijuana harvest in the United States produced a record crop of 18.6 billion, putting it slightly ahead of corn. Federal, state, and local enforcement agencies have moved to eradicate this high rise in production, but efforts have only resulted in new techniques of production being developed. The latest trend is indoor production, i.e., the use of green-houses and grow-lights. Farmers who have been unsuccessful with traditional crops have turned to marijuana to offset their losses. Records from 1985 indicate that this illicit drug is being produced in 44 states and that some quantities are actually now being exported to other countries. Marijuana has become a major crop in the U.S.9

Heroin demand, with only an estimated 500,000 users, has stabilized in the U.S. Mexico once the primary source for this drug, provided the U.S. with 90 percent of its needs in 1977, but

eradication efforts have effectively reduced Mexico's production. Countries in Southwest Asia have attempted to fill the void (Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, included). Lack of governmental control in these third world countries makes production highly successful. U.S. consumption of herion from these countries has grown from 2 percent in 1977, to 47 percent in 1985. Countries in Southeast Asia, primarily, Burma, produce 14 percent of the United State's consumption.10

Mexico, which sends us all of their heroin production, still claims a third of the market in the U.S. Improved cultivation techniques, favorable weather and a weakened economy has pushed more out-of-work peasants into this illicit drug business. Because of thier geographical location to the U.S. southern border, Mexico continues to pose a major threat in the heroin business.

The purity of Mexican produced heroin adds another dimension to the problem. A new type of heroin called "Black Tar" with a greater purity of 60 to 70 percent has caused an inordinate amount, 104 percent increase, of hospital emergency cases of heroin addicts in the U.S.

Cocaine, produced from cocoa leaves grown in the Latin American countries, continues to be a major concern of drug enforcement agencies. Cocaine is responsible for the second highest number of hospital emergency room cases. Death rates from cocaine have doubled in the U.S. since 1983. Columbia has the highest number of cocaine refineries in Latin America which

are controlled by a dozen private organizations. After the assassination of the Columbian Minister of Justice in 1986 by suspected drug dealers for his anti-drug stance, Colombians began to realize the seriousness of their involvement in the drug business. Today, the government of Columbia is cooperating with the U.S. and has initiated a stronger eradication campaign to eliminate cocoa plants and processing facilities. Unfortunately, the growers and producers have moved to neighboring countries.

Peru, another country which produces cocaine, has also attempted to eradicate the drug, but has paid a high price for their effort. In the process of attempting to eliminate cocaine production, 26 of its government officials have been killed.

Bolivia, also a cocaine producer, has been hesitant to initiate eradication efforts. It is estimated that 400,000 of its people depend on the drug business as a sole source of their livelihood. Bolivia being the poorest country in South America, finds it difficult to take firm action to eliminate a major portion of their economy.

Drugs produced both in the United States and throughout many countries in the world, particularly underdeveloped countries, provide a major challenge to our nation. While many Americans will argue that stopping the demand for illicit drugs is a major goal of the U.S., clearly the amount of revenues produced from the drug business makes the supply side equally attractive. The amount of dangerous drugs funnelling through our borders must be stopped. To do this effectively, the U.S must support

eradication programs in other countries, enhance interdiction efforts on our borders and expand our campaign for eradication in the U.S.

Much has been accomplished in the drug enforcement program to date, but with only limited success. The major problem has been disjointed efforts involving numerous federal and state agencies with no clear direction coupled with constant disputes over who is responsible for what. Congress, responding to public pressure, has demanded federal agencies coordinate their drug traffic prevention efforts. President Reagan recognizing, that previous efforts were insufficient, directed in NSDD 221 a reorganization of the drug enforcement agencies to better deal with the drug problem. The President called for a comprehensive strategy to include business, civic and social organizations at all levels of government to eliminate illicit drug abuse in the United States.11

The current national strategy for the drug war is to apply pressure simultaneously on both the demand and supply side which will reduce and ultimately eliminate the drug problem. The policy includes a six point program of enforcement, international cooperation, research, treatment, prevention, and education. The federal agency responsible for orchestrating all this is the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).12

DEA operates with a staff of 5000 and a total budget of just over 360 million dollars. About half of the staff (2,400) are special agents with 200 of them located in 43 key drug source

countries. Given the monumental task of controlling drug traffic and drug abuse, this is a relatively small organization. Comparatively, it is smaller than the combined police forces of New York City.13

DEA is responsible for coordinating the efforts of all federal, state and local agencies. On the federal side this includes: the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Customs, U.S. Coast Guard, Internal Revenue Service, Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section, Office of Drug Abuse Policy, National Institute on Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration, National Narcotics Border Interdiction System, and now the Military. But this long list is a major part of the problem; there are too many agencies involved who have different aspects of the drug elimination issue. This large number of federal agencies is why U.S. efforts at drug control appear to be piecemeal and certainly not effective. The need for one central action agency is precisely why Congress to looked to the military for a bigger role in the drug war effort.

On 11 September 1986, the House of Representatives passed H. R. 5484. This bill titled "Defense Narcotics Act of 1986" specifically charged the President to:

> (1) apply the full measure of the executive power of the President against the introduction of controlled substances into the United States; and
> (2) to that end, should take such steps as may be necessary and appropriate (including the deployment of radar, aircraft, and military personnel) to expand the role of the Armed Forces in the war on illegal drugs.14

Tied to this bill was an authorization of additional equipment to include: $40 million for Blackhawk helicopters, $83 million for radar aircraft, and $90 million for seven additional aerostats(balloon-borne search radars). All of this equipment was to be purchased by Department of Defense (DOD) out of existing funds (no new funds were authorized)!

The mission for the Armed Forces was to seal off the borders and stop the drug flow:

> -Within 30 days after enactment, President to deploy Armed Forces sufficient to halt the unlawful penetration of borders by aircraft and vessels carrying narcotics. 'Such equipment and personnel shall be used to locate, pursue, and seize such vessels and aircraft and to arrest their crews. Military personnel may not make arrests of crew members of such aircraft or vessels after the crew members have departed the aircraft or vessels, unless the military personnel are in hot pursuit.
>
> -President ordered to 'substantially halt the unlawful penetration' of U.S. borders by drug smugglers within 45 days after enactment, 60 days later he is to report to Congress the effect on military readiness of the drug interdiction program and the equipment, personnel, needed to restore readiness. 15

The intent of the House of Representatives was clear; use the military to solve the problem. But, in reality, it was not possible to seal off the borders and stop all aircraft and vessels carrying drugs in 45 days! The military was being given an unreal task. Certainly the military can, and has assisted in the drug interdiction effort, but to assume full responsibility and divert major portions of our Armed Forces from national

security missions to a drug enforcement agency seemed outrageous. In an interview with Secretary of Defense, Casper W. Weinberger, when asked a question about this new role, he remarked:

> I think basically on the face of it, it's pretty absurd, to be perfectly frank about it. They have ordered the President to halt all penetration of the borders of United States in 45 days. It's not a discretionary thing. He's ordered to do it in much the same way that King Canute attempted to order the tides back. This is a nice expression of something that we all hope could happen; but to put it in mandatory language ordering the President to do it is, I think not very useful. 16

He went on to explain that the mission required him, in effect, to conduct a complete naval and air blockade to stop anything that might be carrying narcotics.

> ...that is about 290,000 registered and 4,000 unregistered general aviation aircraft, plus a great many commercial aircraft. We would have to intercept anything we didn't have adequate intelligence to go on. We would have a continuous 4,000 mile naval blockade of the coastline. We'd have to be able to intercept 160,000 documented, registered vessels and about 1/4 registry vessels which arrive each day at U.S. ports. We'd have to maintain a continuous radar surveillance. We'd need 32 additional E-2Cs for the Navy or the continuous use of 25 AWACS. This would have a rather adverse effect on our ability to carry out other missions all over the world. Also, without adequate intelligence, we wouldn't have any idea whether any of these 290,000 planes or whatever were actually carrying narcotics.17

There was wide support for this bill in the House of Representatives and in the public. Many in Congress could not understand why, with all the resources and manpower authorized to the Defense Department, the military would be incapable of such a

mission. Popular support for a more active role was even found in segments of the military. Fortunately, the bill was defeated in the Senate. Regardless, the Congress and the people are still looking to the military to provide some relief in the "War on Drugs".

It is important to note at this point that the military has been actively involved in the "Drug War" for sometime. Their primary role has been to support drug law enforcement agencies with loans of sophisticated equipment; to provide aerial, maritime and ground surveillance of drug trafficking personnel, vehicles, ships and aircraft; and to provide intelligence and communications to improve law enforcement effectiveness. Highlights of this support in 1985 included:

> Over 3000 sorties were flown for nearly 10,400 flight hours during airborne surveillance missions. The Navy E-2's provided 1,679 hours of aerial surveillance for the U.S. Customs Service along the Mexican border, the Gulf of Mexico and the off-shore waters of California and Florida. Frequently, U.S. Marine Corps OV-10's collocated with E-2's have performed complimentary operational support missions.
>
> Navy P-3's flew 4100 hours of long-range surface surveillance tracks throughout the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. S-3's flying from San Diego, California flew surveillance tracks off the coast of California and Mexico.
>
> The Navy additionally provided 347 ship (including PHM hydrofoil) days with USCG tactical law enforcement teams (TACLETS) embarked; and the towing of drug vessels permitted USCG cutters to remain on station. Three more Navy P-3A's with Air Force F-15 radars were turned over to U.S. Customs

Service during 1985. That is a total of four P-3A's that have been transferred to Customs.

The Marine Corps, in addition to 1,279 hours of OV-10 support, provided mobile ground radar surveillance as well as anti-personnel intrusion detection.

Air Force AWACS flew 1,308 hours of radar surveillance missions, many with customs personnel on board.

The Air Force operates two aerostat radars located at Cudjoe Key and Patrick AFB. These radars provide effective look-down capability against low-flying aircraft. Both aerostats, digitally linked to the Customs Service Miami C3 facility and the Tyndall Region Operations Control Center (ROCC), were operational over 10,000 hours in 1985.

The Air Force also loaned over 120 Communications Encryption Devices to the Customs Service and DEA.

While on State Active Duty and/or incidental to scheduled training, the National Guard conducted 207 missions (primarily aerial observation) in support of civilian drug enforcement authorities in 20 states. This compares to 14 states in 1984. During the year, National Guard air crew reports contributed to the destruction of almost 200,000 marijuana plants with a street value of over $260 million. As the number of participating states increases, there is growing awareness of the National Guard ability to support drug interdiction efforts.18

This is an impressive demonstration of support which speaks for itself. It is not the all-out military commitment to close the borders suggested by Congress, but it is more realistic and supports drug enforcement agencies.

Support of federal drug enforcement agencies has been very effective. The National Guard in particular, continues to

provide expanded drug enforcement support in several states. Memorandums of Understanding between state and National Guard officials have been developed in Texas, New Mexico, California and Arizona. The National Guard is unique in this respect because they are both a state force available to the Governor and a federal force available to the President. Due to this uniqueness they provide support in two statuses. One, on State Active Duty at the direction of their Governors, to assist state and local law enforcement; and two, during federally funded training missions. It is the policy of the National Guard Bureau to support drug enforcement operations wherever and whenever possible, as long as the support provided does not detract from training for wartime missions.19 The National Guard Bureau has made an extra effort to optimize the use of scheduled training to provide support, thereby obtaining double value for our tax dollar.

Military support to federal drug enforcement agencies has effectively served to curb some illicit drug traffic, but the question still persists, how extensive should the military role be? Is support enough, or should the military be expected to become more involved in search, seizure, and arrests (police actions)? In testimony to the Congress, DOD reported that:

> ...we will continue to support the interdiction of drugs coming into this country. We, however, believe the proper role for our military forces is to provide support so that civilian law enforcement agencies can make necessary arrests, searches and seizures. This will enhance the enforcement capabilities of these agencies

> and provide a proper focus for the armed forces without compromising the traditional separation of the military from civilian activities.20

This makes it clear that DOD is opposed to an expanded role, and does not desire to be pressed into civil police duties.

To learn about military attitudes, a survey was conducted of the US Army War College Class of 1987. Questions were asked to learn of their views about the role of the military in the Drug War. These questions were:

a. Should the military be used in the Drug War?

b. If yes, will participation impact on readiness?

c. Should equipment be provided to law enforcement agencies?

Forty-nine (49) percent of the respondents supported military efforts to contain the drug war; 39 percent disagreed. Only 36 percent felt that this mission would adversely effect combat readiness; while 62.9 percent were neutral or did not feel there would be a negative impact. With regards to equipment support, 72.9 percent were neutral or disagreed with lending equipment. Finally, of special interest, 50.8 percent indicated that special training would be required before the military could be employed.

Twenty-six percent of the respondents provided written comments for or against the mission. A sampling of their comments provide further interpretation of the survey. Those in favor of the mission said:

> Could be valuable training for military forces.

> The drug war is just that; a war. The military should be involved to defend the nation against this enemy.
>
> Use of the Military would provide task related training.
>
> Military forces have the overall mission for the defense of this Nation - if that should mean stopping illegal entry of drugs, so be it.
>
> Drugs may well be the #1 problem facing the United States. We must be prepared and in fact use all resources at our disposal, to include the Armed Forces.
>
> Drug traffickers, supported in some instances by foreign governments are inflicting heavy casualties within our society. This immediate threat to the internal integrity of our country justifies the use of military forces.21

Comments also covered the negative aspect of using the military in the drug war. A sampling of those who disagree with military involvement follow:

> I do not feel that the military, ideally, should do this. Unfortunately, the civilians do not have enough resources to do the mission.
>
> Coast Guard should continue to be used. AWACS, perhaps for air traffic monitoring, but no other military combat power unless the problem meets two conditions: (1) civilian authority simply cannot handle, and (2) military forces can be applied 'surgically' to drug offenders without collateral civilian casualties/destruction.
>
> There are numerous law enforcement agencies who should fight the war on drugs. It is not a military mission.
>
> Civilian drug enforcement agents should be used to combat the drug traffic. In certain instances the military could be used to provide augmentation.

> If the drug war mission is assigned to the military, additional appropriations and force structure authorizations must be provided.22

Thus in the USAWC "Class of 87" there is a wide variety of perceptions about the military role in the drug war. It is clear that most of the respondents supported augmentation of civilian authorities to do the job, but reject total military commitment. If the military is to expand its role, then additional resources, and primarily training in law enforcement techniques, would be required. It is felt these views are not different from the overall military leadership of our nation. Everyone understands the severity of the drug problem and its impact on the nation. If using the military is required then it will be done to the best of their ability. The difference of opinions comes clear when examining the overall mission of the military - that of national defense.

The mission of the Armed Forces is to provide a force which is staffed, trained and equipped to serve as a deterrent, and to secure our vital interests. If deterrence fails, the military must be prepared to fight and win. Providing support to law enforcement agencies in the drug war will not degrade the military capability to perform their other missions. In fact, as was pointed out by some of the survey respondents, such support may serve to enhance training opportunities. Expanding the military's role, however, as was almost legislated by the House of Representatives, lacks reason. As the Secretary of Defense pointed out, the role the House of Representatives wanted for the

military was next to impossible. It would be impossible to completely seal off the borders and interdict all the illicit drug traffic inbound to the U.S. To do so would use a major portion of the United State's military forces. Such an effort would seriously degrade our military capabilities to respond to crisis situations around the world. It could even serve as a signal to our adversaries that we were weak or vulnerable which would invite further intimidation and possible confrontation.

More significant than the above is the fact that the mission the House of Representatives evisioned is un-achievable, either by military force or other specially designed forces. Total eradication and interdiction will never work as long as we have large segments of our society demanding illegal drugs. Their influence on our political system will not allow us to close our borders, and suppliers will continue to exploit the lucrative market. The solution to the drug problem should probably be a combination of pressures on both users and suppliers with more effort on the demand side. When drugs become less desirable, then and only then will the suppliers loose a foothold in this country. The nation is moving in this direction with drug testing and other measures but the country has to become more aggressive. Every individual must pay a price if they want to use illicit drugs and law enforcement efforts will have to increase in order to be successful in reducing demand.

The military has led the way in reducing demand by requiring its members to submit to drug testing. They have also provided

educational and rehabilitation programs for first time offenders. The federal government is now expanding drug testing to all federal employees, and many public and private sector organizations have initiated similar programs. These programs will go a long way in setting a standard or model for other organizations to follow, and will help to reduce illegal drug use in America.

ENDNOTES

1. Thomas V. Cash, Drug Trends and Trafficking, DEA speech before the Annual membership meeting "Police Section Association of American Railroads", 7 October 1986.

2. Ibid, p. 1.

3. Ibid, p. 2.

4. Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College. Interdiction of Illegal Drug Traffic-US Army Support to Civil Authority. 15 August 1986. p. 4.

5. William F. Alden. Drug Enforcement Administration DEA, speech before the "American Society of Industrial Security" Transportation Security Workshop, 24 June 1986, p. 32.

6. Ibid, p. 39.

7. Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College, Interdiction of Illegal Drug Traffic-US Army Support to Civil Authorities, 15 August 1986 p. 20.

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9. Sam Meddis, Report:Pot USA's Top Cash Crop, USA Today, 10 January 1986.

10. Thomas V. Cash, Drug Trends and Trafficking, DEA Speech before the Annual membership meeting, "Police Section Association of American Railroads", 7 October 1986, p. 16.

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14. Section 502 H.R. 5484, 99th U.S. Congress, 15 September 1986. p. 37.

15. Chester H. Morgan, Maj USAF, Information paper subject: Passage of the 1986 Omnibus Drug Bill by the House of Representatives. undated.

16. Defense Issues, The National Crusade Against Drugs-Defining the Military Role, Volume 1, Number 64, 30 September 1986, p. 5.

17. Ibid, p. 5.

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