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System For Major Disasters

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William S. Sessions, Director

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The Cover:

The May 11, 1985, fire disaster at England's Bradford City football ground prompted the creation of the CRISIS computer system. (See article p. 8).

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Director's Message

May 1988, is the 27th anniversary of President John F. Kennedy's approval of the law designating May 15 as Peace Officers Memorial Day. The words at Gettysburg of another eloquent, and assassinated, President are appropriate to honor "those who gave their lives that this nation might live."

President Kennedy's predecessor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, had established May 1 as Law Day 3 years before. While the theme of the 1988 Law Day is "legal literacy," one of the purposes of Law Day is to recognize the "support. . . [of] those. . . persons charged with law enforcement." In the decade 1977 to 1986, the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting system has recorded 875 law enforcement officers feloniously killed. While law enforcement has reduced the 1979 high of 106 officers killed to a new low of 66 officers killed in 1986, this is still an unacceptable number, both in terms of the human tragedy involved and in sheer economics.

It is the duty, and the even greater moral obligation, of every law enforcement chief executive to see that the officers in his or her command have the very best training and equipment available to protect themselves in potentially deadly situations. Two of my predecessors, William H. Webster and Clarence M. Kelley, recognized and advocated the use of ballistic vests and training in night use of firearms. "The decline in officers killed is partially a result of technology, the development of Kevlar, the ballistic fiber used in soft body armor," according to FBI Director Webster, writing in this journal. Ten years before, Director Kelley pointed out that nighttime "and dimly lit situations predominate the encounters that prove fatal to law enforcement personnel." For this reason, the FBI then placed greater emphasis on training for these potentially dangerous nighttime encounters.

The loss of 875 officers in a decade is, and should be, sobering to every citizen. This represents more peace officers than all but the largest

communities in this country have on their rolls—it is just under the size of the largest police department in Virginia, for example.

The man who led the FBI's efforts to successfully end the gangster era's bloody reign of terror, J. Edgar Hoover, noted in one of the first Law Day messages, "The effectiveness of law is measured by the fairness, determination, and courage with which it is enforced. . . . Our society demands of the peace officer spotless integrity, uncommon bravery, and constant devotion to duty. It is fitting that Americans pause during the year to acknowledge a debt of gratitude to those who have been faithful to their trust."

It is also fitting that the law enforcement community, represented by 15 law enforcement organizations ranging from the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the National Sheriffs' Association to the Fraternal Order of Police and the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, has organized the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund to build a memorial to the thousands of officers who have given their lives to protect their fellow citizens since our Nation began.

I wholeheartedly support this memorial. As I said at the recent dedication of the FBI's Hall of Honor for fallen Special Agents, ". . . they could have chosen professions that paid far more, demanded much less, and presented few dangers. Instead they chose to carry the badge . . . and accepted the responsibility to do their duty." The same words of tribute apply to every peace officer in this land of ours built on the rule of law.



William S. Sessions
Director

A Terrorist Psychosocial Profile Past And Present

By

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As we grow older, so I am told, we tend to think and talk more of the simplicity of the good old days and begin to realize that according to the country western ballad, life does get more complicated when you pass the age of 16.

This article presents one aspect of law enforcement which was less complicated, or at least more clearly structured, several years ago. I will present my interpretation of how terrorist groups were constituted then and will cite the structure of the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) as a domestic example. I will use the Japanese Red Army (JRA) as an international model and discuss their hijacking of Japan Air Lines (JAL) 472 as an example of their success and terrorist sophistication of days gone by. After laying this foundation, I will cite some of the changes in the terrorist group structure.

The pool of potential college-educated, multilingual, middle class, and sophisticated international terrorists has been depleted by civil war and revolution. The universities and other centers of learning from which recruits

were drawn have been replaced by refugee camps and criminal street gangs. Within the United States, the recruiting by the left was affected by the end of the draft and U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. Today, the issues are problems in Central America and prison reform. These issues have less appeal and have resulted in a narrower base of support. However, the right-wing radicals have gained some ground in the Midwest and Northwest. Examples of terrorist operations reveal something about how terrorist personalities and their politics affect their group structure and the mechanics of each operation. Additionally, some thought will be given to the radicals on the right, like the Aryan Nations and the Ku Klux Klan. For the sake of clarity, the terms "left" and "right" refer to groups of opposite political ideals. Left-wing groups oppose the legitimate government and seek change; they deny the authority of the government. Those on the right want to maintain the status quo and oppose those who seek change; they deny the legitimacy of the opposition.¹ Finally, I

will provide you with some thoughts on the myth of contemporary suicidal terrorist dedication as evidenced by several recent events.

One Week In London

The changes in the demographics of the left, particularly with Middle Eastern groups, came to our attention in the late 1970's and were dramatically manifest to the world in the spring of 1980 during the Iranian Embassy siege. This 6-day hostage situation in the Iranian Embassy, near Hyde Park in London, was caused by terrorists who were dissidents from Khuzistan, a province they call Arabistan, in southwest Iran. The Khuzistans had expected to gain some degree of autonomy after the overthrow of the Shah. Instead, the persecution increased. Iraq used their hatred of the central government in Tehran and frustrations over their lack of progress toward autonomy to recruit them for an operation against an enemy upon whom they would soon declare war. These terrorists were ill-trained and misled into believing they would succeed



Special Agent Strentz

in freeing friends from Iranian jails and would return to their homes as heroes. These frustrated few citizens from Khuzistan have been characterized as immature, rural, ill-trained, and uneducated young men who had no idea of the complexity and gravity of the operation they had initiated. Simply because they were well-armed, they quickly took control of the embassy. However, an alarm was automatically sounded, and these terrorists were quickly trapped within the embassy without any help from their alleged allies in Iraq and Iran.

After 6 days of negotiations by Scotland Yard, the stress of the siege took its toll, and the terrorists killed one hostage, the youthful press attache, Abbas Lavasani. He had been arguing with the terrorists throughout the siege, and these arguments had become violent. Other hostages had tried to calm Lavasani, but he was adamant in his support for the Ayatollah. Some of the hostages believed he was intent on martyrdom. His overtly antagonistic relationship with the terrorists that led to his murder has given rise to the term "London Syndrome." Today, this term is used to express similar hostage-toward-hostage taker antagonism which results in death or injury to the hostage. The terrorists killed Lavasani around noon on the sixth day and placed his body outside the embassy several hours later. Soon after that, the British Special Air Service commandos assaulted the embassy and rescued the remaining hostages. During this assault, five of the six terrorists died.² The survivor, Ali Nejad, hid amongst the hostages during the assault. He remains in a British jail cell from which he regularly provides the free-world counterterrorist forces with a wealth of information.³

Subsequent to this incident, our allies in the Middle East and a Special Agent assigned to the Washington Field Office of the FBI, who has interviewed more Middle East terrorists than any other FBI Agent, verified the decrease in terrorist group sophistication. These sources agree that terrorist groups have changed rather dramatically. This new image is also echoed by another FBI Special Agent who lectures at the FBI Academy on the theory and politics of terrorism. Today, terrorist groups, particularly those in the Middle East (but not the Armenian groups, the Jewish Defense League, or the Puerto Rican groups in the United States) are using the young and the naive as their expendable front-line operators. The older group members are more educated and possibly more dedicated. But, they probably recognize that today's counterterrorist strategies and forces, like the German GSG-9, British and Australian SAS, French GIGN, and the Hostage Rescue Team of the FBI, are too sophisticated for them to combat successfully. To challenge these counterterrorist forces in a hostage situation guarantees failure and may mean death, a price they are clearly not willing to pay.⁴ We learned in Munich that hostage negotiations and SWAT skills are a necessity. The terrorists learned how unprepared we were then for such a confrontation. For several years, they continued to exploit our weakness. However, times have changed and we have learned from the mistakes at Munich.

Today Versus Yesterday

Terrorism is different today than it was yesterday, and it will, like every dynamic organization, change again by tomorrow. Terrorists learn new tactics

“We [in law enforcement] must be prepared always; the terrorist need to be lucky only once.”

and adapt and adjust to countermeasures developed by governments or airlines, or they die and are replaced by more dynamic individuals. One change is that today, terrorist organizations spend less money and time training than in the past. When they do train, it is for a specific operation; therefore, they find it difficult to deal with the unexpected.

A few years ago, several authorities published their research findings on the psychological profile of the terrorist groups the civilized world encountered in the 1970's. One book is that of Frederick Hacker entitled *Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies: Terror and Terrorism in our Time*.⁵ Charles A. Russell and Bowman H. Miller wrote an article with a similar message, which appeared in *Terrorism: An International Journal*, and was entitled "Profile of a Terrorist."⁶ The last article is one I wrote entitled "A Terrorist Organizational Profile: A Psychological Role Model." This was printed as chapter six in a book entitled *Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism*.⁷ Although each of us was working independently with different data bases, our findings showed a high level of concurrence.

It is because of this level of agree-

ment that I will discuss my article as a historical document which presents what terrorist groups were. To present the profile of left-wing terrorist groups using this 1970 prototype as a guide to current structure and activities would be like teaching someone to start a modern car by discussing the elements of setting the spark, throttle, and choke before turning the crank.

Yesterday on the Left

In the late 1960's and into the 1970's, the majority of American and international terrorist groups were composed of males and females who were flexible, college-educated, well-trained, urban, multilingual, well-traveled, and reasonably sophisticated middle-class young people. (See table 1.) They were disciplined, well-trained, and sophisticated enough to deal with last-minute alterations in plans; they could adjust to change and still complete the mission.

The Japanese Red Army in the 1970's was composed of people like Shigenobu Fusako, Haruo Wako, and Osamu Maruoka who were tactically trained by the then proficient Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and were middle-class college students from professional families.

Similarly, the German Baader-Meinhoff gang, the media name for this group that called themselves the Red Army Faction, was staffed by college students from good families who were also well trained. Ulrike Meinhoff had earned a master's degree, Horst Mahler was an attorney, and Gudrun Ensslin was the daughter of a Lutheran minister.⁸ The Palestinians could claim college types, such as Leila Khaled who, like some of her American counterparts, is now a suburban housewife with a family.⁹

In the United States, the membership of the Weather Underground and the SLA drew heavily from college students who harkened from upper middle-class families.¹⁰ Their operations were well-planned and their training thorough. Further, the demands of these organizations were well-written treatises of alleged injustices; each member knew the political justification for their activities, discussed world politics with arresting officers, and frequently argued their cause in courts of law. Thus, as discussed in the referenced articles and displayed in the chart, the group profile that emerged reflected organizations which were a blend of the highly motivated and well-

**Table 1
Demographic Profile of the 1960's
and 1970's Leftist Groups**

Leader	Opportunist or Criminal Element	Follower
Male or female	Male	Male or Female
No specific race or religion	No specific race or religion	No specific race or religion
College education or attendance	Limited education	College education or attendance
25-40	20-30	20-25
Middle class	Lower class	Middle class
Urban/sophisticated	Urban or rural with good street sense	Urban/sophisticated
Multilingual	Literate in native language	Multilingual
High verbal skills	High verbal skills	Good verbal skills
Well-trained perfectionist	Learned criminal skills	Well-trained
Dedicated	Selfish	Dedicated
Strong personality	Strong personality	Weak personality
Politically active prior to terrorist/criminal activity	Years of criminal activity/recruited from prison/politics are peripheral	Politically active prior to terrorist/criminal activity

“... to prevent terrorism, law enforcement must remain vigilant against a persistent but unsophisticated, untrained, and minimally dedicated enemy.”

educated members with the involvement of a criminal element.

The leader was a theoretician with a strong personality. Certainly, Ulrike Meinhoff fit this mold. The leader was generally assisted by a more volatile, less moral, more operationally oriented, and frequently a former felon, like Andreas Baader. In the United States, this person was at times a former convict, like Donald David DeFreeze in the SLA or Greg Daniel Adornetto in the San Francisco-based Emiliano Zapata Unit. The last element in this old prototype was, like the leader, a college student or graduate but was not quite as strong a personality as the leader. The Harries in the SLA come to mind as examples. Similar types of zealots are seen in other groups around the world.¹¹

There is a lot to be said in favor of this older prototype. Among other things, it enabled law enforcement to view these groups as a collection of individuals who did not always share the same motives, roles, or ideals.

The Japanese Red Army

But that was then and this is now. In those days, when a JRA operation was not initiated because of a security precaution, an unexpected obstacle, or an inability to arrive at a specific location on time, the groups were more likely to reorganize and strike again. The most successful terrorist hijacking of a commercial aircraft was conducted by the JRA in 1977 and is an example of this sophistication. This operation was successful because the JRA demands, \$6 million and the release of jailed friends in Japan, were met, and all involved made good their escape. Ten years later, with the exception of the recent arrest of Osamu Maruoko,

they are still free, and the money remains missing.

There is some evidence to indicate that in addition to a July 1973, hijacking of a JAL aircraft, the JRA made two other attempts, one in Rome and the other in Cairo, before the 1977 success. At these airports, alert security prevented terrorists from boarding the aircraft. Unfortunately, the JRA plan came together on Tuesday morning, September 28, 1977, when five of them cleared security in Bombay, India, with automatic pistols, hand grenades, and plastic explosives. They boarded the Bangkok-bound flight, and shortly after takeoff, diverted the DC 8 to Dacca, Bangladesh. Enroute, selected passengers were reseated, and specific belongings collected. At strategic times during the week on the torrid tarmac in Dacca, the terrorists returned most of these items and released some hostages. The terrorists made announcements to the passengers by using the public address system and speaking Japanese, English, and Arabic. The hijackers were courteous and extremely polite; they were careful not to antagonize their hostages. Passengers and crew were so effectively manipulated psychologically by them that upon release each hostage, at the request of the JRA, completed a critique of their experience and dutifully turned it in as they left the aircraft. The critiques included a review of the strengths versus the weaknesses of the operation, as well as recommendations to the subjects for their next hijacking. In each of their many hostage-taking incidents, the middle-class, college-educated men and women of the JRA were similarly successful. Additionally, their operations reflected a high level of discipline, training, organization, and flexibility.

Today on the Left

Unfortunately, the American media and some elements of the military have fixated on this 1970's prototype. They cite the infamous Ilich Ramirez-Sanchez, also known as "Carlos," as the jackal who is said to epitomize modern international terrorism. Ramirez-Sanchez, the assaulter of unprotected targets in the 1970's, has probably been dead for several years.

Unfortunately, we in law enforcement tend to think of our adversaries as well-trained, intelligent, disciplined, and dedicated individuals. It is difficult for us to accept the fact that lone and deranged gunmen probably kill more prominent world figures than do people who are engaged in complex terrorist conspiracies.¹² Yet, to quote the Irish Republican Army, when their attempt to kill Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher failed, "Today, we were unlucky. But remember, we have only to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always."¹³

Today, it seems that this luck, plus the great number of potential targets provided by a free society, the availability of weapons and explosives, and excessive publicity by the media, give the impression that terrorists are supermen who can and do strike at will, where and when they wish. In fact, a quick review of recent events seems to indicate the opposite.

Life in a free society has its price. Just as we are free to travel and tour for pleasure, the terrorist has the ability to ply his trade at his whim, when luck is with him.

A Profile of the Left in the Middle East

Recent Middle Eastern terrorist incidents, particularly the taking of hos-

tages, have occurred only when an already-lax security system was circumvented.¹⁴ Today, some of the Middle Eastern terrorists who attack Western interests are more likely to be poorly educated, a member of a very large family, unskilled and unemployable, illiterate, rural, undisciplined, and an ill-trained male refugee. They are young, age 17 to 23, and have grown up as members of street gangs. They know little of politics; they hate Americans and others who have made a success of this life. Yet, few are willing to engage in suicidal missions away from their homelands to learn what comes next. We represent what many of them would like to achieve and are a nation to which they would willingly move, if only they had the opportunity.

This new profile is displayed in table two and represents some significant differences. Among the changes are the absence of the specific criminal type and the much lower educational level of the followers. Further, their recruitment from refugee camps and street gangs rather than the university campus, with all that entails, is the most significant change.

Recent Events in the Middle East

As evidence of this, one need only look at those who assaulted TWA 847 in June 1985, the bungling of those on the Achille Lauro, or the individuals on Pan Am 73 who left most of their gear on the tarmac and had difficulty finding the cockpit. Additionally, a walk through the airports at Rome and Vienna will quickly reveal how much damage a trained team of dedicated individuals could have done.

Those who hijacked TWA 847 had intended to hijack an EIAI flight leaving for Israel. In spite of the wide publicity

EIAI gives to its security precautions, these terrorists did not know of these procedures. One gets the impression that they may never have been in an airport. Further, their tumultuous behavior in Athens would have alerted security forces in most Western airports. However, a post-incident review in Athens revealed that the staff was lax and did not know how to use their screening equipment. Once on board the aircraft, the hijackers unnecessarily abused their hostages, robbed them, were impulsive in their actions, were ill-trained, and displayed ignorance of routine aircraft operational procedures.¹⁵

Those on the Achille Lauro were discovered cleaning their weapons and had no knowledge of the language or country whose passports they carried. Once discovered, they ran amok and were undisciplined until Muhammed Abu Abbas arrived to take control and arrange their safe passage.¹⁶

The Palestinians who attempted to hijack Pan Am 073 lacked the sophistication to penetrate Pakistani passenger screening, and once on the aircraft, gave the impression that this was their first time in such an environment. They were illiterate and had limited mechanical aptitude. This ignorance caused a fatal turn of events when they could not comprehend the need for service of the auxiliary power unit and panicked when, after several hours of unattended operation, it failed. They had been warned of this possibility, yet did not understand the need. When the lights went dim and then went out, they began shooting. The one terrorist who had explosives attached to himself and was supposed to detonate them in a suicidal act did not. With his so-called suicidal peers, he tried to hide among the hostages and now languishes in a Pakistani prison. In the final analysis, many

of these terrorists panic and seek to save themselves.¹⁷

Finally, the Rome and Vienna airport settings provided the terrorists with hundreds of potential targets. Tragically, 20 died; however, of the 7 so-called suicidal terrorists, only 1 stood his ground and died. The other six were killed or captured while attempting an escape.¹⁸ As in London, those in custody are talking to whomever will listen.¹⁹

It is my impression that in each of these incidents, the commanders sent out what they thought was a suicidal team. Yet, under the stress of their self-induced brush with death, the veneer of training, discipline, and dedication vanished. Several of these terrorists have been in jail for a few years, and no attempts have been made to free them. Is this because they failed to die as they were supposed to and have thus been deserted by their leaders? Or is it that the organization lacks the resources and expertise to free them? In either case, one begins to see a clearer picture of today's terrorist and his not-so-vast support structure. They are individuals and organizations who succeed only when the system fails. While I am sure there are a number of well-trained, educated terrorists out there somewhere, this prototype, at the operational level, has not been seen during the 1977-1986 lull in JRA activities and remains unique to them. In recent years, the JRA has avoided hostage-taking or suicidal airport episodes in favor of stand-off rocket attacks. I suspect there are more car and truck bombs available for service than there are drivers to deliver the deadly cargo.

So today, the Middle East terrorists are mostly males who are unable to operate against Western security sys-

“ . . . terrorists are a concern because of their potential rather than their performance.”

tems. While one should never consciously underestimate the enemy, neither should one make them into supermen. The refugee terrorists from the Middle East succeed only against unprotected targets outside their homeland when their plan goes exactly as it was intended. Today, we are seeing excellent examples of the Irish Republican Army statement. To succeed, they must be lucky; to prevent terrorism, law enforcement must remain vigilant against a persistent but unsophisticated, untrained, and minimally dedicated enemy.

Most Middle Eastern terrorist types represent left-wing orientations. They want change and are prepared to kill, but not die, to achieve this goal. On the right, we see a similar lack of dedication and equally low education at the operations level. Unlike the left, which has changed since the turbulent 1960's and 1970's, the demographics of the right-wing terrorist have changed little over the years.

**Thunder on the Right:
Or Is It a Firecracker?**

I recall as a child hearing of the

activity of the Ku Klux Klan, and I remember an article in *Life* magazine which discussed the background of those arrested. I recall that many of them listed their occupation as a part-time service station attendant.

In Europe, as well as in North America, the neo-Nazis, and in the United States, the Klan and more current groups such as the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord (CSA) and the Aryan Nation, continue to attract the people who are easily manipulated to their rank and file. The role of the female in these groups is historically that of a servant to the male. Again, we see evidence of the insecure male who, in this example, does not consider a female as an equal. While there is some movement of the female to positions of responsibility in radical right-wing groups, their role still lags far behind those of females in left-wing radical organizations. These groups generally surface in times of economic and social change. They provide quick-fix solutions to complex problems for the easily manipulated. Their self-proclaimed messiah, who is usually very intelligent and well spoken, has the an-

swer to their problems. His answer focuses the attention of his followers away from the issue and onto a minority group whom he identifies as the real troublemakers, an ancient tactic called scapegoating.

The general philosophy of these organizations lends itself to the mind of a man who has failed and is seeking an excuse, a scapegoat. Their alleged evidence would convince a person of normal intelligence that the philosophy of the radical right is weak and caters to those looking to excuse social or economic failure. Their message has its listeners among the weak and intellectually lazy. Thus, the listeners are told of and believe in great conspiracies and the efforts of minority groups to dilute their race and rob them of their heritage. Today, their favorite text is the *Turner Diaries*, a well-written fictional account of their victory over the tyrannical, race-destroying system.²⁰

A Profile of the Right

A general profile of the membership of radical right-wing groups reflects people who have a limited education, are members of the racial and religious majority, and have experienced a social or economic failure. Their age ranges from teenagers to senior citizens. Maturity does not seem to cure those of the radical right. Just as Adolph Hitler appealed to young and old with his message which included hate and scapegoating, today the right in the United States does the same. An example of their rigid thought process can be seen in the Sheriff's Posse Comitatus' interpretation of the U.S. Constitution and their perception that only the local sheriff is a legitimate law enforcement officer. The leadership of the right, like the left, is generally well-educated, articulate, and dedicated. However, unlike the left, these leaders generally represent the racial and ethnic orientation of the majority population.

**Table 2
Demographic Profile of Middle East
Leftist Groups in the 1980's**

Leader	Follower
Male	Male
No specific race or religion	No specific race or religion
College education or attendance	Poorly educated/illiterate
30-45	17-25
Middle class	Lower class from a large family
Urban/sophisticated	of 9-15 children
Multilingual	Refugee/not comfortable outside
High verbal skills	of Middle East
Well-trained perfectionist	Poor verbal skills
Dedicated	Unskilled worker
Strong personality	Training poor to none
Politically active prior to	Limited dedication
terrorist/criminal activity	Criminally active in street gang
Opportunist or Criminal Element	Politically naive
Now an infrequent member	
as a specific entity	

Table 3
Demographic Profile of the Right Wing

Leader	Follower
Male	Male
White Protestant	White Protestant
College education or attendance	Limited formal education
35-50 plus	20-50 plus
Middle class	Lower and lower middle class
Urban/sophisticated	Urban or rural/unsophisticated
Literate in English	Literate in English
High verbal skills	Poor verbal skills
Well-trained perfectionist	Poor work skills
Strong controlled paranoid type personality	Weak personality/shared paranoid personality type
Politically active and articulate	Politically naive
Opportunist or Criminal Element	
Generally his skills are incorporated within the leader	

The violent activity of the right has been in the form of attacks on police officers, the robbery of banks and armored cars, and similar criminal acts. They have not attempted aircraft hijackings or other offenses which would put them in a situation requiring negotiations. The profile of these groups, presented in table 3, has changed little over the years. Additionally, while the left-wing radical community occupies itself with excessive planning, the radicals on the right seem to collect weapons and explosives.

We have, over the years, seen incidents involving cooperation between left-wing groups, such as the Lod airport massacre in May 1972, the Vienna OPEC oil ministers siege in December 1975, and the hijacking of Lufthansa 181 in October 1977. However, right-wing cooperation is more a reflection of their rhetoric than a political reality. Radical right-wing groups tend to lack the trust necessary for such operations. Perhaps it is the basic paranoia of these groups which prevents any extensive cooperation. Certainly, they talk of helping each other. On some of their video tapes, they speak of a great uprising of right-wing groups against the government. They claim that an attack

on one group will be considered an attack on all of them and that they will unite against the Federal Government. In my judgment, their basic lack of trust and their paranoia will preclude such an alliance. However, in their fantasies, such alliances are real and just an incident away from an absolute.

One could speculate on the fantasy lives of radicals at both ends of the political spectrum. The radical left enjoys the planning operations. Those on the radical right express their fantasies of power and control through their collection of great caches of weapons. They tend to plan less and shoot more.

Terror Today

To put modern terrorism in perspective, one should recall the metaphor of Brian Jenkins—terrorism is theatre. It's not what they do so much as it is the perception they create. Their bombings in the United States represent less than 3 percent of such incidents. We have had one kidnaping and a decreasing number of bank and armored car robberies. Most terrorist groups have low personal intelligence among their operators and equally poor intelligence about their targets. It is not the percentage of violence they repre-

sent which concerns us, but rather the random nature of their assaults. Mao said that terrorists should kill one to influence a thousand. So, terrorists are a concern because of their potential rather than their performance. They are a force to be reckoned with, but must be viewed within the perspective of reality. When they succeed, time and again, it is not because they are so good or well-trained or disciplined, but rather because one of us did not do our job as we should have.²¹ It is more than a matter of luck that is helping us win the war against terrorism. We **must** be prepared always; they need be lucky only once.

FBI

Footnotes

¹Personal interview with Special Agent Joseph Conley, Behavioral Science Unit, FBI Academy, Quantico, VA, June 9, 1987.

²*Sunday Times, Siege!* The Hamlyn Publishing Group Ltd., Astronaut House, Feltham, Middlesex, England, 1980.

³*Time*, April 7, 1987, p. 26.

⁴Personal interview, Special Agent Gary Noesner, Washington Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, DC, June 4, 1987.

⁵Frederick J. Hacker, *Crusaders, Criminals, Crazyies: Terror and Terrorism in our Time* (New York: Norton, 1976).

⁶Charles A. Russell, and Bowman H. Miller, "Profile of a Terrorist," *Terrorism*, vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 1977, pp. 17-34.

⁷Thomas Strentz, "A Terrorist Organizational Profile: A Psychological Role Model," ch. 6 in *Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism*, Y. Alexander and J. M. Gleason eds. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), pp. 86-104.

⁸Lillian Becker, *Hitler's Children* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1977).

⁹Conrad V. Hassel, "Terror—the Crime of the Privileged," *Terrorism*, vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 1977, pp. 1-16.

¹⁰Los Angeles Police Department, July 19, 1974, The Symbionese Liberation Army in Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA.

¹¹Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer* (New York: Harper and Row, 1952).

¹²Conrad V. Hassel, "The Political Assassin," *Journal of Police Science and Administration*, vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 399-403.

¹³*The Washington Post*, October 12, 1984, p. A1.

¹⁴*Time*, June 24, 1985, p. 20.

¹⁵*U.S.A. Today*, "17 Days: A Diary," July 1, 1985, p. 1.

¹⁶*Time*, October 21, 1985, pp. 22-23.

¹⁷*The Wall Street Journal*, June 15, 1987, p. 12.

¹⁸*Washington Times*, May 19, 1987.

¹⁹*The New York Times*, February 6, 1987, p. A6.

²⁰Andrew Macdonald, *The Turner Diaries* (Washington, DC: National Alliance, 1978).

²¹"The Agony of Pan Am Flight 73," *Newsweek*, September 15, 1986, pp. 18-23; "Hijacking Survivors: There Was No Rescue," *The Washington Post*, September 8, 1986, p. 1A.