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MANAGEMENT OF INMATE VIOLENCE: A CASE STUDY

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MANAGEMENT OF INMATE VIOLENCE: A CASE STUDY

November 1987

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FOREWORD

Violence in correctional institutions, like so many aspects of corrections, has changed dramatically during the past decade. It has assumed unprecedented growth in both frequency and severity. At the same time, prison violence has metastasized from a mostly collective phenomenon to a spate of acts committed by small groups or individual inmates. Clearly, these changes require strategies for managing inmate violence that differ from those designed to control large-scale disturbances. Most important, effective strategies are needed within the near future because the violent behavior plaguing corrections today shows little sign of abating.

In recent years, correctional practitioners have attempted to better manage inmate violence through various means; including direct supervision of inmates, enhanced procedures for classification, monitoring trouble spots with closed-circuit television, concentration of violence-prone inmates in special facilities, and tighter policies governing inmate movement. However, all too often these strategies have been implemented in a rather haphazard or piecemeal fashion. Moreover, few of these endeavors have been evaluated to determine whether they actually reduced violence.

In an effort to augment available information on this crucial subject, Correctional Services Group, Inc., under a grant from the National Institute of Justice, undertook a case study of inmate violence management at the Arizona State Prison Complex-Florence. What makes this study unique, and valuable to the field, is a change in administration that resulted in the introduction of a comprehensive approach to violence management at the complex. The new administration emphasized a team-oriented style of management and initiated improvements in the physical plant, security systems and equipment, staff

training, internal inmate classification, inmate supervision, and inmate programs and services. Consequently, the Florence facility offers an unusual opportunity to examine conditions, especially inmate violence, before and after this change in operations and assess the impact of the new management approach.

The two-year case study of inmate violence management at the Arizona State Prison Complex-Florence entailed interviews with numerous staff, surveys of both staff and inmates, and analyses of pertinent agency records. The findings of the case study are intended to relate the experiences of one correctional institution and thereby assist other correctional administrators in more effectively controlling inmate violence in their facilities.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This 24-month case study of inmate violence management at the Arizona State Prison Complex-Florence was funded by the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice. The study was conducted by Correctional Services Group, Inc., of Kansas City, Missouri, in order to document the experiences of one correctional system in controlling inmate violence and assist other correctional administrators in better managing their violence-prone inmates.

The case study could not have been completed without the efforts of numerous individuals who willingly provided their time and talents to this important project. The project director wishes to acknowledge the valuable contributions of these persons.

Correctional Services Group staff who participated in the case study included Karen L. Whitlow, who analyzed the survey responses and wrote the final report; Cindie A. Unger, who assisted in planning the case study and reviewed the draft final report; Peter Harakas, who typed several drafts of the case study report as well as all project correspondence; and Russell D. Mazouch, who managed technical support services and prepared the report for publication.

Thanks are also due to Timothy M. Unger, who developed computer programs for entering survey responses and tabulating and cross-tabulating survey data.

Several individuals at the Central Office of the Arizona Department of Corrections provided invaluable assistance during the case study. Director Samuel A. Lewis and Assistant Director John R. McFarland were highly supportive of the study, not only offering important information regarding events at Florence but also facilitating contacts with other agency staff. Dr. John P. Vivian, Administrator-Planning Bureau, reviewed the survey instruments and

coordinated collection of records data pertaining to inmate violence. Robert Sharpe, Administrator-Bureau of Data Management, and Andy Thaker, Analyst-Planning Bureau, also assisted in the collection of data from agency records. Alf Olsen, Project Leader-Bureau of Data Management, was instrumental in identifying the pool of individuals meeting case study requirements for the inmate survey.

Special thanks are also due to numerous persons at the Arizona State Prison Complex-Florence. Warden Lloyd Bramlett provided invaluable information about the complex under his tenure, afforded project staff access to his official memoranda, and encouraged his staff to cooperate fully with project staff. Assistant Warden Jim Thomas offered wide-ranging assistance during the case study and coordinated distribution of the survey instruments. Deputy Wardens John Avenenti, Alfred M. Grijalva, Robert Goldsmith, Joseph Martinez, and Sam Sublett answered a number of questions about operations at Florence and also shared their own views on conditions at the institution during the case study time frame. Dr. Robert Cassady, Administrator-Inmate Management, reviewed the survey instruments and suggested several ways of enhancing them. Patricia d'Entremont, Administrative Assistant, disseminated the survey instruments to staff and inmates, explaining the purpose of the case study and answering questions. Staff and inmates who completed the survey instruments are deserving of special appreciation, for their responses formed the basis for an important component of the case study.

The contribution of Dr. Lee Roy Black, former Director of the Missouri Department of Corrections and Human Resources and Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice at Long Beach State University, must also be recognized. Dr. Black interviewed a number of agency staff to obtain information crucial to this case study and spent many additional hours documenting the interviews for

project staff. Agency staff who participated in these interviews, offering both their time and candid observations, merit special gratitude.

Dr. David Ward, Professor of Sociology and Criminal Justice Studies at the University of Minnesota, assisted in developing the initial case study design and the instruments used to survey staff and inmates at Florence.

Finally, thanks must be extended to the National Institute of Justice for its support throughout this project. Annesley K. Schmidt served as project monitor for the Institute, providing insight into the case study design and reviewing all study products. The time and effort she expended on this study are greatly appreciated.

Robert A. Buchanan
Project Director

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

Correctional institutions have historically been troubled by inmate violence. In recent years, however, this violence has escalated, both in frequency and in severity. Moreover, this violence is increasingly committed by individuals rather than groups. The rise in inmate violence, coupled with the shift toward individualized acts, requires different management strategies than have previously been used by correctional administrators. At present, however, little information is available concerning what steps are being taken to control inmate violence and how effective these measures are.

To help bridge this informational gap, the National Institute of Justice awarded Correctional Services Group, Inc., a grant to conduct an 18-month case study of inmate violence management. The subject selected for this case study was the Arizona State Prison Complex (ASPC)-Florence, a maximum security institution comprising six units that house approximately 3,200 inmates. In November 1984, following a mass disturbance, ASPC-Florence experienced a complete change in administration, which resulted in a new, comprehensive approach to control the institution's growing violence problems. Thus, the Florence complex offered a unique opportunity to study a carefully devised plan to manage inmate violence and assess its effects.

Case Study Methodology

Because project staff could not control for the multitude of factors that might influence the incidence of inmate violence, it was not possible to employ a formal, experimental design to study violence management at ASPC-Florence. Consequently, project staff decided that the most effectual design would be an

evaluative comparison of conditions at the complex before and after the change in administration. A 24-month time frame was established for the case study. This time frame was then divided into two 12-month periods--one prior to the administrative change and one afterward--that would allow project staff to identify and assess changes at the institution.

In order to obtain a comprehensive account of conditions at ASPC-Florence during the case study time frame, project staff conducted three separate but interrelated activities:

- Interviews with current and former administrators and staff;
- Questionnaire survey of staff and inmates; and
- Analysis of agency records pertaining to inmate violence.

The interviews with agency staff were designed to identify changes introduced by the new administration and elicit practical assessments of these changes. Twenty-six staff members, ranging from the Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections to Correctional Service Officers at ASPC-Florence, participated in this part of the case study. The interviews were semi-structured in nature and averaged one hour in length. They covered both events and conditions at the complex prior to and following the change in administration.

To supplement information obtained from the interviews, a questionnaire was distributed to approximately 10% of the staff and inmates who had been at Florence during the entire case study time frame. All of these individuals had volunteered for the survey. Completed questionnaires were received from 42 staff and 111 inmates, or approximately 7% of each subsample population. Separate questionnaires were developed for staff and inmates, but for the most part the questionnaires differed only in regard to personal background elements. Both questionnaires were structured so as to obtain perceptions of

conditions at Florence before and after the administrative change. The questionnaires addressed such areas as security measures, inmate programs and services, violence-related behaviors, problems relating to violence, inmate gang activity, and personal safety. (See Technical Appendix A for copies of the questionnaire.)

The last, and most objective, activity in the case study entailed an analysis of departmental records pertaining to inmate violence. Project staff, with the assistance of agency personnel, collected and analyzed data for five variables normally associated with inmate violence:

- Inmate violent disciplinary infractions;
- Damage to property;
- Inmate grievances;
- Staff grievances; and
- Staff turnover.

Once again, data for the two time periods were compared to determine whether any differences existed.

The findings for each of these three activities are summarized below, followed by a brief discussion of the case study's import.

Staff Interview Findings

The interviews conducted with current and former staff of the Arizona Department of Corrections revealed considerable satisfaction with, and support for, the new administration at ASPC-Florence. Under the previous administration, conditions at the complex had been seen as deteriorating. According to staff interviewed, facilities had been in disrepair, security had been too lax, staffing had been inadequate, and inmate programming had been limited. As a result, staff morale had been low and turnover had been high.

Inmates were also dissatisfied, generating increases in violent and disruptive behavior.

The new administration, emphasizing a teamwork approach to institutional operations, solicited staff input in identifying problems related to inmate violence and preparing comprehensive strategies for managing it. Interviewees stated that the involvement of staff, combined with a greater backing for staff actions, strengthened morale.

Of even greater importance, staff said, were the policies and procedures instituted to reduce inmate violence. Many of these changes focused on Central Unit, where much of the past misconduct had occurred. Provisions for maintaining security in the unit--particularly the control of inmate movement--were greatly enhanced. In addition, double-celling was eliminated, and staffing was augmented. These improvements were also thought to have played a major role in lessening discontent and tension throughout the complex.

Other identified changes made by the new administration included:

- Repair and renovation of physical plants;
- Improved planning for emergencies;
- More training for staff;
- Greater delegation of responsibility to Deputy Wardens;
- Racial balancing of inmate housing and activities; and
- Enhanced programming and services for inmates.

Interviewed staff believed that these changes, taken together, promoted a more safe, secure, and orderly institution. Staff also stated that inmate violence had been reduced.

Questionnaire Survey Findings

The questionnaire survey of staff and inmates at ASPC-Florence found that each group held an intricate--and occasionally perplexing--set of ideas about conditions before and after the change in administration. Despite the complexity of their views, staff and inmate respondents demonstrated a surprising amount of consensus in their comparisons of conditions during the two time periods.

Substantial disagreement was found in just two areas. Inmates thought that poor administrators were an increasingly serious problem leading to violence, but staff believed the quality of administrators had improved. The inmates' perception is probably a reflection of their dislike of tightened security under the new administration. Most staff, in contrast, welcomed the increased security as well as other perceived improvements in policies and procedures. The other area of considerable disparity concerned the safety of the average inmate. Staff generally thought that the typical inmate was more safe following the administrative transition, most likely due to increased security and staff control. However, most inmates felt the average inmate was less safe. This perceived decrease in safety is probably the result of several factors. First, it is likely that a racial disturbance which occurred three months prior to the conduct of the survey influenced inmate views of conditions at Florence. Second, the divergent views may stem from differing degrees of personal involvement. Staff are usually not faced with the same daily concerns, fears, and events as inmates. Equally important, staff are able to assess conditions more objectively by examining incident reports and statistical data that place unusual occurrences into a more realistic perspective.

For the most part, however, staff perceptions coincided with those of inmates. Both respondent groups felt that the average staff member was safer after the change in administration. Staff were seen as having greater control over inmates, and staff were, according to self-report by both groups, subjected to fewer physical assaults. On the negative side, staff and inmates alike indicated that adequate inmate programming was a more serious problem, probably due to the burdensome demands associated with a larger prisoner population. On the whole, however, neither staff nor inmates perceived much substantial change--positive or negative--under the new administration.

Thus, the principal finding of the survey is that respondents perceived only slight changes after the administrative transition at ASPC-Florence. It should be noted, though, that most of these changes seemed to improve conditions for staff and the majority of inmates. The survey also found that the new administration managed most inmates effectively and that few participated in violence-related conduct. However, self-report data suggest the existence of a group of hard-core difficult-to-control inmates who continued to engage in violent, disruptive acts. This group presented a substantial risk to institutional security and order and appears to have elicited concern for personal safety--especially among inmate respondents--contributing greatly to the general perception that little change occurred under the new administration.

Records Analysis Findings

The analysis of agency records found that, following the change in administration at ASPC-Florence, positive change occurred for five variables associated with inmate violence. Examination of records for the before and after periods revealed a drop in violent rule infractions under the new

administration, with the rate per 100 inmates falling from 33 to 29. The analysis also indicates that this decline was probably not a result of system-wide changes in policies and procedures or transfers of Florence inmates. Decreases were also evident in regard to property damage, inmate grievances, staff grievances, and staff turnover data. These reductions are particularly noteworthy because they occurred during potentially turbulent times both within the Arizona Department of Corrections and at ASPC-Florence--a period when facilities were overcrowded and inmate gang activity was on the rise.

The decreases found in these variables seem to be more than coincidentally related to the changes in policies and procedures introduced by the new administration. Rather, they appear to be associated with these changes, although it is impossible to determine the strength of the relationship when all independent variables cannot be controlled. Nevertheless, it seems likely that strategies aimed at controlling inmate violence did contribute greatly to the reduction of various violent behaviors, the enhancement of personal safety, and the heightening of staff and inmate morale.

Case Study Conclusions

A review of the three case study activities reveals some discrepancy between the findings of the questionnaire survey and the results of the records analysis and staff interviews. The latter two activities found that the new administration had effected improvements in the management ot inmate violence and degree of safety at ASPC-Florence. However, neither staff nor inmates responding to the survey noted much change following the administrative transition.

Several factors may account for these variant findings. For instance, the difference may simply be a reflection of divergent perspectives. The staff

interviewed for the case study were predominantly supervisory and administrative personnel, while survey respondents were primarily line staff and inmates. Upper level staff have access to information and statistical data that provide a more all-inclusive picture of institutional operations and events. As a result, they are more likely than line staff or inmates to be cognizant of broad changes or trends in violence management. On the other hand, line staff and inmates may be alert to more information than administrators and supervisors, or recordkeeping systems. Inmates, for example, are aware of events that are not observed by staff and, thus, go unreported. Moreover, both inmates and line staff are on the front lines of policy implementation and know firsthand whether changes are being effected as intended. The most likely reason for the dissimilar findings, however, is a racial disturbance that occurred three months before the survey was conducted. The incident involved nearly 200 inmates and resulted in one inmate death. Despite a relatively long period of calm, it would not have been difficult for inmates and line staff to conclude that conditions were returning to their former state. In addition, psychological reactions to the disturbance were likely to have lingered for some time, thereby biasing the perceptions required to complete the survey. Equally important, the disturbance could not have influenced the other case study activities because it took place after the interviews were conducted and fell outside the time frame established for the records analysis.

Despite the case study's divergent findings, several basic conclusions can be drawn regarding the strategies developed to manage inmate violence at ASPC-Florence. First, it appears to have been effective to devise a broad-based approach to violence management. The new administration not only introduced measures to control violence but also took steps to alleviate conditions

conducive to violence. Consequently, its approach encompassed everything from improved physical facilities to increased inmate supervision to upgraded programs and services. Second, in spite of these measures, the administration did not seem to have much impact on line staff and inmate perceptions of conditions at Florence. Perceptions are difficult to influence, but clear explanation of the reasons for changes in institutional operations can be of assistance in implementing and ensuring the effectiveness of new policies and procedures. Finally, the case study findings suggest that a small group of especially violence-prone inmates remained difficult to manage following the change in administration. To maintain institutional security, safety, and order, such inmates should be housed in a special unit, like Florence's Cell Block 6, that permits total control of their environment.

INTRODUCTION: THE INMATE VIOLENCE DILEMMA

Introduction

Violent behavior by prison inmates is by no means a new phenomenon. However, until recently prison violence has been a relatively sporadic, collective occurrence. The violent, disruptive behavior plaguing American corrections today is unprecedented in terms of both its frequency and its individualized orientation. Moreover, it has grown increasingly severe, particularly among maximum security inmates. Weapons have replaced fists, and fights that used to end in beatings now lead to stabbings and murders.

Even more disturbing, the incidence of inmate violence in our nation's prisons continues to rise. For example, nationwide, between 1981 and 1984, the number of inmates killed by other inmates rose from 88 to 111, an increase of 26%. During this period, 22 staff died as a result of inmate attacks. Although the same number of staff deaths (7) occurred in both 1981 and 1984--resulting in no net increase--inmate murders of staff have begun to rise after dipping to a low of 2 in 1982.[1]

Another recent survey examined data on inmate assaults on staff that resulted in injury but not death. The 39 state systems able to provide data reported 6,047 assaults on staff during 1984. For the first half of 1985 alone, the corresponding figure was 3,351.[2]

This continuing escalation in violent behavior has an important impact on corrections. It has inevitably lead to greater concern for the safety of staff

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1 "Prison Violence Survey: Annual Data on Violent Deaths in Correctional Systems," Corrections Compendium (February 1986), pp. 11-15. Includes 46 states, Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP), and Puerto Rico.

2 "Prison Violence Survey," p. 12. Comparable data were not available from the FBOP.

and other inmates. And while any single act of violence disrupts institutional operations, repeated incidents threaten the existence of an orderly, secure, and humane correctional environment. Recurring violence can also thwart the goal of preparing inmates for release into the community since fear of victimization--psychological as well as physical--limits their opportunity to learn socially acceptable behaviors and live in relatively normalized surroundings. Management of violence-prone inmates has, consequently, become a major issue among correctional administrators.

Management of Inmate Violence

Unfortunately, violent behavior by individual prisoners has not been studied extensively, and the lack of reliable data has proven a great problem for administrators. Atlas notes, for example, that corrections texts written prior to the 1970s afforded little attention to individual acts of violence because such actions tended to be viewed as "personal aberrations" or consequences of conflicts on the streets. Further, relatively minor instances of violence were perceived as safety valves for releasing tension that might otherwise be directed at staff.[3]

Most research on prison violence has also focused on collective rather than individual actions. These two forms of disruptive behavior differ in many respects, so that while studies of collective violence have yielded a basis for understanding violence in prisons, further examination of individual violence is needed.

Management of inmates prone to violent behavior is highly dependent on an understanding of the nature and causes of violence in correctional

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[3] Randy Atlas, "Crime Site Selection for Assaults in Four Florida Prisons," Man-Environment Systems, Vol. XII, Nos. 2-3 (March/May 1982), p. 59.

institutions. While this is a complex relationship having no simple explanations, the American Correctional Association has identified two variables as strong influences in most serious disruptive incidents: the environment of correctional institutions and the characteristics of their inmates. Thus, in seeking strategies for more effective management of violent prisoners, it is important to investigate these two areas.

Numerous aspects of the correctional environment have been studied in regard to their relationship to violence. However, few consistent, significant associations have been found. For instance, various theories have attempted to link institutional design and incidents of violence. Although many studies have concluded that certain areas tend to be loci for assaultive behavior (e.g., housing units, where the opportunity for assault is immediate), others suggest that the location of disruptive incidents varies almost as greatly as the structure of each institution.[4] Consequently, no ideal type of design has been determined for solving the problem of violence. Nevertheless, many researchers agree that some strategies, such as reducing blind spots created by dead-end corridors and stairwells and increasing sight lines, can enable staff to control and supervise disruptive inmates more efficiently.

Many correctional practitioners also believe that inmate conduct can be better controlled in facilities designed to accommodate direct rather than indirect supervision. Direct supervision is considered to be a proactive response to inmate management, preventing misconduct before it happens. It relies on staff capability to supervise prisoners face to face rather than observing behavior from a secure control room. This concept assigns each officer the responsibility of controlling prisoner behavior in his or her unit while simultaneously minimizing tension. The role of management, in turn, is

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[4] Atlas, "Crime Site Selection," p. 65.

to structure both the design and the environment to facilitate staff ability to demonstrate proactive control.

In addition to examining the influence of institutional design on inmate violence, research has addressed other environmental concerns. However, inconsistencies have also been found in studies of the relationships between disruptive behavior and overcrowding, total area of living space, and housing type. At least one researcher has suggested that the lack of significant correlations between design and violence indicates that the most important element may be who is placed in the institution.[5]

Since the influence of the prison environment appears to be a less observable and potent factor than the characteristics of disruptive inmates themselves, numerous studies have focused on the new aggressive, violent offenders being incarcerated today. In general, today's inmates tend to be younger, to have committed more serious crimes, and to be part of a gang.

More specific attempts to define the disruptive inmates have also been made. A committee that studied management issues within Great Britain's prison system, for instance, noted three broad categories of prisoners presenting control problems: "prisoners who behave in a disorderly fashion themselves; prisoners who encourage others to misbehave; and those who suffer from some form of mental disturbance (especially if it predisposes them to violence...)."[6]

Quay, in his Adult Inmate Management Classification System, has separated offenders into five groups, two of which relate to disruptive inmates and approximate the groups defined by Great Britain's Control Review Committee.

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5 Randy Atlas, "Violence in Prison: A Product of Design," unpublished article (1980), p. 21.

6 Control Review Committee, Managing the Long-Term Prison System (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1984), p. 14.

Group I prisoners, according to Quay, tend to be confrontational, hostile to authority, easily bored, and unconcerned with the welfare of others. They also have a high rate of disciplinary infractions. Group II inmates are not directly confrontational, but are hostile to authority, manipulative, unreliable, and active behind the scenes of disturbances. They experience a moderate to high rate of disciplinary problems. Together, Quay estimates the two groups comprise 35 to 45% of the population in a secure institution.[7]

Although defining the violence-prone inmate can be somewhat problematic, even greater difficulty and controversy arise in identifying effective strategies for managing these inmates.

One of the major points of contention is whether violent inmates should be confined in a separate facility or dispersed among a correctional system's overall prisoner population. Many correctional practitioners advocate the operation of a secure facility exclusively for violence-prone prisoners. Such institutions, like the U.S. Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois, or the Minnesota Correctional Facility at Oak Park Heights, enable agencies to concentrate the resources important to meeting these inmates' special security and program needs. Advocates also assert that these institutions result in more appropriate security and less violence among the general population in other facilities. Both USP-Marion and Oak Park Heights have reported reductions in inmate violence within their respective institutions, as well as within their entire correctional systems, as a result of this concentration approach.[8]

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7 Herbert C. Quay, Managing Adult Inmates: Classification for Housing and Program Assignments, (College Park, Maryland: American Correctional Association, 1984), pp. 6-8.

8 See, e.g., "Oak Park Heights Sets High Super-Max Standards," National Prison Project Journal (Summer 1985), pp. 3-5, and U.S. Penitentiary-Marion, Illinois, Master Plan (July 1985), pp. 32ff.

Other practitioners believe the drawbacks of the concentration approach often outweigh its benefits. The British Control Review Committee, for example, acknowledges the need to segregate violence-prone prisoners occasionally, but cautions against using segregation as a long-term management strategy because it tends to increase inmate frustration. Instead, the Committee has proposed that small units be established to deal with prisoners presenting similar problems and having similar needs. To avoid segregating these inmates throughout their confinement, a practice that has been found to decrease disruptive behavior but does little to help prisoners resolve their failure to cope with normal prison life, the Committee recommends that these units serve as supportive facilities where prisoners can test their capacities for freedom and be guided back into the mainstream of the inmate population.[9]

Critics of the concentration approach have also asserted that it tends to create a self-fulfilling prophecy--prisoners labeled as the worst or most dangerous offenders often become even more difficult to manage.[10] Moreover, close confinement in a prison populated by violence-prone inmates can lead to serious psychological and physiological problems.[11]

Numerous other strategies for controlling violence--some highly controversial--have been suggested. Bowker has recommended that institutions collect data on inmate victimization and then analyze them to identify problem

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9 Control Review Committee, pp. 14-22.

10 Alvin J. Bronstein, "Super-Max Prisons Have Potential for Unnecessary Pain and Suffering," National Prison Project Journal (Summer 1985), p. 6.

11 See, e.g., David A. d'Atri, "Measuring Stress in Prison," in Confinement in Maximum Security, David Ward and Kenneth Schoen, eds. (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1981), and Carl Clements, "Crowded Prisons: A Review of Psychological and Environmental Effects," Law and Human Behavior, Vol. III, No. 3 (1979), pp. 217-225.

areas and allocate resources accordingly.[12] Other strategies include rewards for non-victimizing behavior, a greater therapeutic role for correctional officers, normalization of prison industries to reduce economic deprivation and the victimization associated with it, and improved visiting arrangements.

Perhaps the least controversial strategy for managing prison violence is the use of inmate classification. Many correctional administrators and researchers believe that the most efficient method for classifying inmates appropriately is an objective system, one that employs standardized, well-defined criteria to assess prisoners' needs and threats to others. Quay, for instance, in his Adult Internal Management Classification System, utilizes objective scoring instruments to sort inmates into five groups. Specific security measures and programming are provided for each type of inmate. A prisoner identified as a Group I type, one who is easily bored and hostile to authority, would be given nonrepetitive work assignments and individualized counseling based on behavioral contracts.[13] Quay's model relies on behavioral criteria to classify inmates. Other classification systems, such as the models developed by the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the National Institute of Corrections, employ demographic and legalistic factors that have demonstrated some validity in predicting violent behavior.[14]

The value of classification as a management tool lies in its proactive nature. Theoretically, it enables staff to identify aggressive, difficult-to-manage prisoners at the start of their incarceration. By addressing the risks

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12 Lee H. Bowker, "Victimizers and Victims in American Correctional Institutions," in The Pains of Imprisonment, Robert Johnson and Hans Toch, eds. (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1982), pp. 71-75.

13 Quay, pp. 18-19.

14 John Monahan, Predicting Violent Behavior: An Assessment of Clinical Techniques, Sage Library of Social Research, Vol. 114 (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1982), pp. 104-110.

presented by these inmates, problems can be reduced or alleviated before they get out of hand and disrupt institutional operations.

While this review of research on the control of prison violence has been relatively brief, it does point up the fact that strategies for managing violence-prone inmates are varied and far from generally accepted. However, given the increasing frequency and severity of disruptive incidents in today's prisons, further investigation of such strategies is needed.

Recent events within the Arizona Department of Corrections, particularly the Arizona State Prison Complex-Florence, have set the stage for such investigation. Although these events do not lend themselves to rigorous, controlled analysis, they do provide sufficient information to undertake a case study of inmate violence management and, thus, offer valuable insights to correctional practitioners.

The Arizona Situation

The Arizona Department of Corrections has not been unlike the national scene with respect to increasing trends in inmate violence. From 1981 to 1985, the overall incidence of inmate violence rose by 72%, while the system's prisoner population grew by approximately 60%. Increases were particularly dramatic for inmate deaths caused by other inmates (114%), inmate damage to property (139%), and inmate assaults on staff resulting in injury (219%).

However, the Arizona correctional system differs from many other systems in that the rate of inmate violence at the Arizona State Prison Complex (ASPC)-Florence has begun to decline in recent years. Historically, ASPC-Florence has been the subject of substantial inmate violence, annually averaging between 15 and 20 extremely serious incidents such as murder, escape, and riot, plus scores of lesser violent actions such as nonlethal assaults on staff,

homosexual rapes, and property destruction. In the opinion of many correctional experts, the institution was unmanageable and would continually experience high levels of violence. This belief was the result of several interrelated factors:

- Inadequate physical plant;
- Large numbers of inmate gang members;
- Insufficient and poorly trained staff;
- Inconsistently applied security procedures;
- Ineffective control of contraband;
- Inadequate inmate programs and services; and
- Most important, ineffective approach to inmate management.

In the fall of 1984, a new management team was assigned to ASPC-Florence. This team included a new complex Warden and new Deputy Wardens for most of the units. The new administration was charged with bringing about a dramatic reduction in inmate violence and disruption of facility activities. Accompanying this mandate was the support of the Department in the form of additional funding, increased staffing, and long-range commitment to building a new facility for the control and management of inmates prone to continual violence and disruption.

During the next year, agency staff and particularly the ASPC-Florence administration came to believe the management change had resulted in numerous improvements that helped to decrease inmate violence.

The selection of the Arizona Department of Corrections and ASPC-Florence as the subject for case study was based upon this drop in violence, along with a number of additional considerations, including:

- Interest of the agency in participating in the project;
- Magnitude of violent inmates based on the percentage of inmates meeting the prescribed definition;

- Types of violent inmates represented in the overall prisoner population;
- Amount and type of information on violent inmates previously collected by the agency;
- Apparent existence of management strategies addressing violent inmate operational issues;
- Litigation history pertaining to violent inmates;[15]
- Representativeness of the characteristics of the agency's violent inmates in relation to those of other correctional systems;
- Management philosophy of the Arizona correctional system;
- Types and number of correctional facilities and physical plant options at ASPC-Florence;
- Personnel deployment practices and staffing allocations;
- Policies and procedures for programs and services available to violent inmates; and
- Policies and procedures for security and control.

The case study of inmate management at ASPC-Florence was conducted over a two-year period. It was designed to identify specific changes instituted by the new administration, examine the impact of these changes on violence-related behaviors, and assess staff and inmate reactions to the changes. The case study involves three separate but interrelated components: (1) in-depth interviews with past and present administrators and staff, at both the Central Office and the institutional level; (2) questionnaire survey of institutional staff and inmates regarding conditions at ASPC-Florence before and after the administrative transition; and (3) analysis of agency records for 12 months preceding and 12 months following the change in management.

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15 Black et al. vs. Lewis et al. (1985), a class action suit challenging conditions of confinement in the Department's Administrative Segregation Unit at ASPC-Florence. The suit resulted in a consent decree affecting a variety of policies and procedures.

A CASE STUDY OF INMATE VIOLENCE MANAGEMENT AT THE ARIZONA STATE PRISON COMPLEX-FLORENCE

CHAPTER 1: INTERVIEWS WITH AGENCY ADMINISTRATORS AND STAFF

Introduction

In November 1984, a new management team assumed authority at the Arizona State Prison Complex-Florence (ASPC-Florence). The immediate cause of the change in administration was a major disturbance, including the killing of an inmate, during an unauthorized football game in the Central Unit recreation yard. However, prior to this incident, numerous, more fundamental problems had been seen as contributing to ineffective inmate management. Among the most notable problems reported were overcrowding, limited inmate programming, poor staff morale, inadequate staff training, minimal emergency response planning, inadequate security equipment, and deteriorating facilities.

The new administration, headed by Warden Lloyd Bramlett, stated that it took a number of concerted steps to improve conditions at the Florence complex. These steps included more controlled movement of inmates; segregation of gang leaders and inmate agitators; better programming for inmates; enhanced training for Correctional Service Officers; additional purchases of security and communications equipment; new policies and procedures for the emergency response team; and numerous improvements to the physical plant.

In order to obtain more detailed information about these reported improvements, as well as conditions at ASPC-Florence prior to the change in administration, a series of interviews was conducted with agency staff.

Interview Methodology

In preparing this case study, 26 current and former staff members of the Arizona Department of Corrections were interviewed by project consultant Lee Roy Black, Ph.D. Dr. Black is past Director of the Missouri Department of

Corrections and Human Resources and now serves as Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice at Long Beach State University.

Selection of persons to be interviewed was based primarily upon level of responsibility for operations at ASPC-Florence. It was important to talk with past and present executive staff at the Central Office in Phoenix, for example, because they were charged with developing policies and procedures at the Florence complex. Similarly, input from key administrators at ASPC-Florence--Wardens, Assistant Wardens, and Deputy Wardens--was crucial since they helped prepare policies and procedures and, more important, were responsible for implementing them. To ensure as broad a perspective as possible, numerous supervisory and line staff were also interviewed. In most instances, interviewees were selected by project staff. However, Department personnel did assist in identifying line staff who had worked at the complex prior to the change in administration and could provide comprehensive responses to interview questions. It should be noted, though, that the Department did not attempt to limit potential interviewees to staff who would be entirely supportive of the new administration.

Specific staff interviewed are listed below.

Central Office:

- Samuel A. Lewis, Director of Corrections
- John R. McFarland, Assistant Director of Corrections--Adult Institutions

ASPC-Florence:

- Lloyd E. Bramlett, Warden
- Jim Thomas, Assistant Warden
- Robert Goldsmith, Deputy Warden--Central Unit
- James Adams, Assistant Deputy Warden--Central Unit
- Joseph Martinez, Deputy Warden--South Unit

- Ernest Salazar, Assistant Deputy Warden--South Unit
- Alfred M. Grijalva, Deputy Warden--East Unit
- Sam Sublett, Deputy Warden--North
- John Avenenti, Deputy Warden--Cell Block 6
- Tim O'Connor, Commander--Tactical Response Unit/Chief Regional Training Officer
- Central Unit Staff--Security Director, 1 Shift Commander, 2 Correctional Service Officer II's, 1 Correctional Service Officer I, Correctional Program Supervisor, 1 Correctional Program Officer II, and Athletic Program Manager.
- South Unit Staff--Correctional Program Supervisor
- Cell Block 6 Staff--Security Captain

Other:

- Dr. James G. Ricketts, Former Director of Corrections
- Ellis C. MacDougall, Former Director of Corrections

Dr. Black also made several attempts to contact Donald Wawrzaszek, former Warden, ASPC-Florence, but found him unavailable for comment.

The interviews were conducted on-site between June 25 and August 4, 1986.[16] They averaged one hour in length and were semi-structured in nature. Project staff had prepared a list of topics to be addressed in each interview, but the topics were not formulated into specific questions or brought up in any pre-arranged sequence. The interviews covered both actual events and conditions and subjective assessments of institutional policies, procedures, and management.

Dr. Black also was afforded access to memoranda written by James Upchurch, who served as Acting Warden until Lloyd Bramlett's appointment, and to

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16 Former Director MacDougall was interviewed by telephone from his residence in South Carolina.

memoranda sent by Warden Bramlett to the Central Office in regard to security, operations, and physical plant needs.

Summary of Staff Interviews

The remainder of this chapter presents a summary of the information obtained by Dr. Black during his interviews with staff of the Arizona Department of Corrections. A time line depicting major events referenced in this summary is presented in Figure 1.

Conditions at ASPC-Florence Prior to November 1, 1984

The Arizona State Prison Complex at Florence is a large correctional facility of approximately 3,000 inmates located 75 miles southeast of Phoenix.[17] As shown in Figure 2, the main complex consists of five units:

- Cell Block 6 (administrative segregation/death row) 200 inmates
- Central Unit (maximum security) 950 inmates
- South Unit (high medium security) 600 inmates
- North Unit (medium security) 650 inmates
- East Unit (medium security) 600 inmates

Administration of the entire prison complex is the responsibility of the Warden, who reports to the Director of Corrections. The Warden is assisted by five Deputy Wardens, each charged with managing one of the complex's housing units.

ASPC-Florence has historically been perceived as an institution troubled by inmate violence. During the early 1980s, this situation grew even worse. From 1981 to 1985, inmate deaths caused by other prisoners climbed 114%, inmate

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[17] Picacho Work Center, which can house 200 inmates, is also part of ASPC-Florence. It is located approximately 40 miles south of the main complex and, for this reason, was not included in the case study.

Figure 1.

Time Line of Important Events in the ASPC-Florence Case Study



Figure 2.

Arizona State Prison Complex--Florence

BUILDING KEY

A. North Unit
1. Kitchen/Dining
2. Program
3. Isolation
4. Visiting, Gate
5. Dorms

B. North Unit — Trustee
6. Kitchen/Dining
7. Program
8. Dorms

C. Complex Support
9. Administration
10. Visiting
11. Warehouse/Support
12. Training Academy

D. Central Unit
13. Kitchen/Dining
14. Infirmary
15. Activity, Chapel
16. Yard Office
17. Cellblocks

E. IER Area
18. Dorm
19. Vocational Training

F. Industrial Yard

G. South Unit
20. Kitchen/Dining
21. Dorms

H. Cellblock 6



damage to property increased 139%, and inmate assaults on staff resulting in injury soared 219%. Both the Central Office in Phoenix and the administration at Florence attempted to check the rise of violence, but as these figures suggest, their efforts were less than successful.

The failure to reduce inmate violence, according to staff interviewed, was due primarily to political in-fighting, relatively frequent changes in administrative staff at both the departmental and the institutional level, and poor facility management.

Many staff expressed considerable dissatisfaction with the policies promoted by Ellis C. MacDougall, who served as Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections from January 1978 to February 1983. An Assistant Deputy Warden complained, for example, that Director MacDougall "would walk through the institution and state that inmates should be out of their cells 14 hours a day, without realizing the implications of such a policy for current staffing." Security staff also indicated that the Director generally had not been viewed very positively. He had been seen as "very liberal" and too accommodating of inmate and staff requests. Moreover, he had frequently made substantial changes in administrative personnel at the Florence complex, resulting in considerable anxiety among upper-level staff as well as procedural instability throughout the complex.

One of these administrative changes involved the termination of Robert Raines, who had served as Warden since October 1978. Warden Raines, according to Central Office administrative staff, had done a good job, given available resources. Although Director MacDougall was also relatively satisfied with Warden Raines' performance, he believed the complex needed to be run by someone with extensive experience within the Arizona correctional system, particularly at ASPC-Florence.

In Donald Wawrzaszek, he thought he had found the person he had been looking for. Mr. Wawrzaszek had come to the Arizona Department of Corrections from the New York State Police, where he had been an intelligence officer. In Phoenix, he had worked in internal affairs, focusing on identification and control of gang activities. He had later become a counselor at Florence and served as chief counselor during Warden Raines' tenure.

In September 1981, Director MacDougall appointed Mr. Wawrazaszek the new Warden of the Florence complex. Director MacDougall described Warden Wawrzaszek as "an able administrator who handled the gang situation successfully and related well to Native Americans." The violence that had plagued the complex when Director MacDougall assumed authority began to decrease and soon stabilized at "a relatively low level."

However, staff at ASPC-Florence were not as pleased with Warden Wawrzaszek's performance. As one Deputy Warden summed up the situation, "Donald Wawrzaszek was an inexperienced administrator who got in over his head." In addition, the new Warden did not get along well with the administrator of the Department's Adult Institutions division, and some staff claimed that the institution's needs were "deliberately ignored" as a result.

In the meantime, Director MacDougall left the Department in order to resume teaching duties at the University of South Carolina. He was replaced in February 1983 by Dr. James G. Ricketts, who was immediately confronted by problems that had been building up not only at Florence but throughout the correctional system. Director Ricketts' first order of business was to effect the Governor's directive to cut the Department's budget by 10%. The cuts came primarily from contracted services and resulted in nearly a 30% reduction in contract personnel.

The budget cuts were particularly devastating at that time, according to Director Ricketts, because the Department was experiencing a serious overcrowding problem. The system was already housing 800 prisoners in temporary facilities, and the net population was increasing by approximately 100 inmates per month. Any attempt to decrease the number of incoming prisoners was precluded by court mandates limiting the time the Department had to accept inmates. To Director Ricketts' dismay, the Governor was unwilling to challenge either the findings of the courts or the political clout of county jail administrators. Consequently, the Department was forced to request additional beds. However, even this action proved inadequate because the request was based on inmate population projections that turned out to be too low. Eventually, the system found itself with a shortfall of almost 600 beds.

Director Ricketts stated that the general attitude in the state legislature at that time had been favorable toward building new correctional facilities, but that legislators had been more willing to support construction of minimum security institutions, which were less costly, than medium and maximum security facilities, which were more needed by the Department.[18] Moreover, he said the legislature had been "very reluctant to provide the resources necessary to maintain and operate existing facilities," and physical conditions at ASPC-Florence had reflected this attitude during his tenure as Director.

At first Director Ricketts experienced only limited problems at the facility. The principal exceptions were Central Unit and Cell Block 6, the Department's Administrative Segregation Unit. He did not think these units were up to "proper standards" and needed special attention to upgrade the food,

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[18] This need was substantiated in a 1985 study completed by the Auditor General.

steam clean walls, and clean up human waste and garbage. Some improvements were subsequently made, but he still contended that more money was needed for maintenance and operations.

Florence staff interviewed for the case study confirmed the need for additional work on the physical plant. Perimeter security had suffered, they said, because of poor lighting, insufficient towers, and inadequate fencing. Door locks had also been a major problem. Staff in Cell Block 6 reported that there were frequent electrical malfunctions in cell doors but could that it had not been possible to obtain replacement parts since the company that built the motor for the locking system had gone out of business. Staff in Central Unit's Cell Block 2 stated that locking mechanisms there had been "shot"--all of the doors had opened simultaneously instead of individually to permit controlled inmate movement. They had not been able to get new parts either and had attempted to jury rig what was needed. All of the units had experienced trouble with their shower systems, staff in Cell Block 4 in Central Unit had been forced to climb a ladder because the elevator was inoperable, and interior roads and sidewalks throughout the facility had vacillated between dust bowls and mud traps.

Institutional operations were further hampered by insufficient staffing, which had been a problem for several years. Supervisory personnel at Central Unit, for example, complained that each shift had averaged only 1 staff member for every 120 inmates. The shortage had been particularly acute for Correctional Service Officers (CSO). The complex as a whole reported nearly 90 unfilled CSO positions, which had been appropriated as far back as 1980 when the prisoner population had been substantially smaller. To make matters worse, when Cell Block 6 had become operational in 1980, no new CSO positions had been appropriated because the unit was to assume both the lock-up function and the

associated staff from Central Unit. However, Cell Block 6 was a larger unit, and it had been necessary to staff it with additional CSO's from South and East Units. Altogether, 72 positions had been transferred to the Administration Segregation Unit. In the intervening years, lock-up areas had been re-established in Central Unit, requiring further shifts in personnel to meet intensive staffing requirements there. CSO shortages also plagued other units. Reductions in staff appropriations and difficulties in filling vacancies thwarted effective inmate supervision in South, North, and East Units. Also detrimental was the lack of sufficient Correctional Program Officers, support service personnel, and administrative staff.

A number of staff also believed that the facility had not been adequately prepared to handle emergency situations. They said CSO's had received virtually no training in emergency procedures and very little in other areas that would help them handle disruptive or violent incidents. In addition, ASPC-Florence, like other institutions within the state's correctional system, had relied heavily on a Special Control and Tactics (SCAT) Team to handle major disturbances. However, response time was described as very slow; 30 to 45 minutes had often been required to notify and assemble team members. Moreover, Florence SCAT Team members had been the only ones in the Department who had to purchase their own uniforms and equipment. Consequently, availability of tactical weapons prior to the change in administration was deemed "questionable" by one administrative official. Team morale had been low.

Another problem, according to numerous staff, had been inmate classification. Difficulties in appropriately classifying prisoners was thought to impede effective inmate management. Several staff members expressed dissatisfaction with Central Classification, believing that personnel there had not been cooperative, had failed to ensure adequate communication, and had not

observed existing policies and procedures. One Deputy Warden was very upset because Central Classification had often changed decisions made by the institutional placement committee. The Deputy Warden also complained that institutional staff had not received all the information needed to properly classify and place prisoners. In particular, he said they had often lacked information on inmate gang affiliations and extortion activities that had been obtained by Intelligence and Investigations staff. Substantial misclassification was believed to have occurred, posing unnecessary threats to institutional security, safety, and order. In fact, some staff felt inmates had been gaining the upper hand in the classification process. As one Sergeant stated, "Inmates were moving back and forth from one unit to another. They might be classified to go to another facility, and then they just moved to another unit here. A lot of inmates were upset about this situation too. The classification system was excellent when it was first set up, but we'd outgrown it. It needed to be revised."

Florence staff also recalled problems in keeping prisoners constructively occupied. South and Central Units had constantly complained that "a lot of inmates were just lying around with nothing to do." Director Ricketts thought that ARCOR (the Department's prison industry division) should be providing more jobs to take inmates out of the housing units and make more constructive use of available labor.

According to some staff, many inmates were actively trying to get out of work. For instance, they believed the large proportion of Central Unit inmates in protective custody (nearly one-third) had reflected attempts to avoid work while obtaining the same privileges as the general population. Others were convinced that misplacing or losing identification cards, which were needed for work, had become a game for inmates. "Inmates on gangs coming out to work on

grounds didn't all have ID's," one officer said. "This was just a way to get out of working. Inmates were not supposed to go to the store or visitation if they didn't have ID's, but they'd get officers to write them a pass to go anyway."

Other programming was also perceived as inadequate. For example, one recreational administrator complained of old equipment and the indifferent attitude of staff, including security personnel. He said that 150 to 200 inmates had generally just milled around the yard in Central Unit. Inmates had expressed some interest in weightlifting, but the equipment had not been adequate.

As a consequence of such conditions, staff morale was relatively low and turnover was increasing. Many personnel, especially line staff, felt the Wawrzaszek administration had provided them with too little support. As one Correctional Program Officer described the situation, "The administration sat in silence, lurking and ready to pounce on mistakes of subordinates but unwilling to give support when they were right." Other staff believed that not enough attention had been given to security. Officers in Central Unit complained of "very little control over the programs and activities of inmates." One disgruntled CSO stated that "if an officer fired a warning shot indicating an inmate was on the fence, that officer was sent home and investigated by the administration."

Many of the problems at ASPC-Florence apparently came to a head on October 6, 1984. On that day, approximately 300 inmates in Central Unit were released from their cells to watch or participate in a football game between two ethnic groups. According to staff, similar games had been played in the past. To enhance security in the recreation yard during such activities, extra CSO's were normally called in from nonessential posts. On this particular day,

however, only two additional CSO's were available, leaving inmate supervision noticeably understaffed. A disturbance broke out among inmates and quickly escalated into a riot. The SCAT team was called out, but almost 90 minutes passed before it reached the yard. By the time order was restored, one inmate had been killed and several others had been seriously injured.

All further activities for that day were cancelled, and Central Unit went on lockdown. Operations were gradually returned to normalcy over the next month as new policies and procedures were implemented. In the interim, a thorough search was made of the unit, and five interview teams talked with approximately one-half of the general population. Information obtained from the interviews enabled staff to identify and remove inmate leaders and agitators from the general population.

Director Ricketts indicated that he was very disturbed by the incident. He felt Florence staff had shown no common sense in allowing activities that heightened racial problems. Warden Wawrzaszek, in particular, had demonstrated poor judgment and a lack of administrative responsibility in ignoring warnings of possible trouble at the game and failing to be aware of events at the facility. As a result of the football incident and general dissatisfaction with the Warden's performance, Director Ricketts decided to dismiss Warden Wawrzaszek, naming Deputy Warden James Upchurch to serve as Acting Warden until a replacement was found.[19]

Conditions at ASPC-Florence After November 1, 1984

On October 16, 1984, Director Ricketts appointed Lloyd E. Bramlett as the new Warden at ASPC-Florence. Warden Bramlett had acquired extensive experience

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19 Several attempts were made to contact former Warden Wawrzaszek and discuss his tenure at ASPC-Florence. However, he was unavailable for comment.

within the Arizona Department of Corrections, having served as a Correctional Officer, Captain, Warden at several facilities, and administrator at the Central Office. He had also worked at the Florence complex for a number of years. Director Ricketts said he believed Lloyd Bramlett "knew more about Florence than anyone else" and was definitely the man for the job.

Warden Bramlett found the prison in "very poor condition" when he first arrived. Believing that change could best be effected by a team effort, he immediately began inspecting the institution and talking with staff about their needs. He supervised his Deputy Wardens by writing them informal letters regarding needed improvements. He would keep those letters in his desk and tear them up as changes were made. He said his usual approach with staff was to "instill pride by praising their efforts and not criticizing every little detail."

For their part, staff were pleased with the new Warden and his emphasis on teamwork. One Deputy Warden stated that "Lloyd Bramlett being named Warden is the best thing that could have happened here. He supports his staff and if you are running a unit, you are confident that he is behind you and knows you know what you're doing." Another Deputy Warden added, "Lloyd Bramlett has line experience and good insights--along with the good judgment to listen to others." Most staff also approved of what they perceived as an increased emphasis on security. Both the Warden and staff agreed that the situation at Florence improved "almost overnight."

At the same time, changes were occurring within the Department's Central Office. Construction of several new facilities, which were needed to house Arizona's growing prisoner population, had fallen behind schedule. The state legislature was extremely upset with the delays and blamed Director Ricketts for poor management. Eventually, Director Ricketts was asked to resign, and in

April 1985 the Governor appointed Samuel A. Lewis, Deputy Director of Corrections, to head the Department.

General Improvements Within the Institutional Complex

Once institutional operations had become more normalized and input from staff had been obtained, Warden Bramlett sent a long memorandum to the Central Office, listing "areas which urgently need attention to maintain a secure/ orderly operation." This was followed by a series of memos pertaining to more specific issues. He found Director Lewis, as well as Central Office personnel, to be generally supportive of his requests, and numerous changes were initiated at the facility as funding and personnel permitted. These included improvements in the following areas:

- Facility Perimeter--Lighting was upgraded. Walkways and towers were renovated where necessary, and radio monitors were placed in the towers. A 24-hour vehicle patrol was also instituted. Sand traps surrounding the perimeter were enhanced, and razor ribbon was added to areas considered subject to escape. In addition, an escape siren was installed.

- Support Services--Construction of a new waste water treatment plant, which is shared with the town of Florence, was initiated. A new boiler was installed. Funds were also appropriated to upgrade kitchen equipment and facilities, construct a new warehouse, and re-roof all complex buildings.

- Security Equipment--Most malfunctioning locking mechanisms were either repaired or replaced; the rest received funding for replacement. These improvements eliminated inmates' past practice of entering cells and units without the knowledge and authority of staff. Additional firearms, ammunition, and chemical agents were purchased. Closed-circuit television was positioned in areas not frequently monitored by staff. In addition, a portable video

camera with power pack and zoom lens was secured to aid in identification and concurrent deterrence. A facility-wide paging system was installed, and telephone beepers were issued to all Deputy Wardens and senior security staff.

- Staffing--New Deputy Wardens were assigned to East Unit and Cell Block 6. All vacant CSO positions (approximately 90) were filled, and salaries were raised to reduce high turnover and attract new personnel as needed. In addition, the best staff were concentrated in the most volatile areas of the complex. An Assistant Deputy Warden noted an increase in the "caliber" of staff, possibly due to a new selection program designed to screen out individuals unsuited to the high security environment at Florence. Also important is the fact that the administration gained more control over appropriated positions and was able to intervene before positions were eliminated by the Department of Personnel.

- Staff Training--In accordance with a departmental directive, all CSO's began receiving a good deal more training. They were required to complete six weeks of classes at the Correctional Officer Training Academy, followed by one week of on-the-job training. Officers also had to complete a minimum of 20 hours of in-service training per year. Annual weapons requalification was replaced by a quarterly examination. Training in emergency procedures was also stressed; all CSO's had to complete courses covering hostage survival, conflict management, and use of force.

- Tactical Support Unit--SCAT teams throughout the Department were replaced by Tactical Support Units (TSU's). TSU's were headquartered at major correctional complexes but were prepared to provide assistance system-wide. Team members had to pass an 80-hour certification course covering procedures for radio communications, hostage operations, riot control, and prisoner capture. Telephone beepers were also issued to team members to ensure a

maximum response time of 15 minutes to on-site disturbances. To boost team morale, the Department assumed the cost for uniforms and equipment.

- Security Policies and Procedures--Direct supervision of inmates was encouraged to enhance both security and staff-inmate relationships. Shakedowns of housing units were conducted as often as feasible. Regular security checks were instituted for all tunnels. Visitors and staff were searched on a random basis. Reports were required whenever staff used force on inmates, and reports were monitored and investigated when use of force seemed improper. All escapes and escape attempts were thoroughly investigated, followed by appropriate inmate disciplinary action and correction of the security problem. In addition, the administration instituted a strong policy on shooting: inmates attempting to escape might be shot if they failed to heed staff warnings. The administration also backed its support with letters of commendation. At the same time, the administration promised swift and fair disciplinary action when staff did not respond adequately to a potentially violent situation.

- Inmate Classification--A new objective classification system was implemented department-wide. The system assessed inmates' security, custody, and program requirements, enabling staff to place prisoners in institutions capable of meeting their needs. Since much of the violence that had occurred at Florence was the result of housing special needs inmates (e.g., mentally ill or mentally retarded) in the general population, the new classification system was seen as a means of not only reducing confrontations but also responding better to inmates' varying requirements. A concerted effort was made to identify and transfer those special needs inmates who were causing problems in the general population and would benefit from assignment to another environment. In addition, an internal classification system was initiated at the complex. This system separated inmates into four categories: predators,

victims, homosexuals, and political group/gang members. Incompatible groups were kept separate to thwart assaults and intimidation.

- Inmate Housing Assignments--A major effort was made to ensure racial balance within all housing units, and inmates' selection of roommates, where permitted, was carefully monitored to obtain a more balanced mix. As noted above, incompatible inmates were not housed together. In addition, inmates identified as gang leaders or agitators were segregated from the general population through placement in specially designated areas or the Administrative Segregation Unit. Some gang leaders were transferred to other institutions in the system or to facilities in other states.

- Inmate Movement--All movement of inmates was more tightly controlled. The pass system, which had been adhered to rather haphazardly in the past, was strictly enforced. Staff signatures had to be obtained at the start and end of any pass-related movement. Inmates also had to carry ID cards, and attempts were made to ensure that prisoners arrived at Florence with ID pictures. In addition, recreational activities were conducted on a scheduled basis, with a limitation on the maximum number of inmate participants. Sick call was held in the cell blocks to eliminate the movement and group gatherings associated with the previous practice of allowing inmates to go to the medical area.

- Inmate Disciplinary System--The new management team instituted provisions for a swift, fair, and judicious inmate disciplinary system. While the new team, like the former administration, lacked sufficient disciplinary cells to accommodate the varied infractions committed by the inmate population, it attempted to minimize the long-term use of both administrative segregation and disciplinary detention. This, in turn, served to develop an institutional environment whereby inmates understood "where staff were coming from" with

respect to administrative response to disciplinary violations. Staff also established a workable grievance procedure for inmates.

- Inmate Programs and Services--Major improvements were made in the area of programs and services, which had generally been perceived as inadequate in the past. Prison industries, maintenance, and custodial assignments were expanded to offer prisoners more constructive activities. In addition, a Jobs Committee was instituted to eliminate the arbitrariness of previous assignment and dismissal practices. Criteria for participation were based on good behavior, which, according to staff, proved "very meaningful" to inmates. The Committee also reduced staff favoritism or antagonism toward certain inmates by establishing a structured disciplinary system. The system used a progressive set of sanctions to deal with inmate problems on the job. Inmates were subject to pay reduction, suspension, and probationary employment before they could be dismissed, and termination had to be justified to the Jobs Committee. Policies also prohibited staff from appearing before the disciplinary committee and requesting that a violation be dropped. Staff reported limited job turnover since establishment of the Committee. Recreation, along with other organized activities, was structured to accommodate racial balancing. Inmates also had to obtain permission to form a team or play any games. Recreation areas were upgraded and zoned to accommodate activities for small, more easily managed groups, and additional equipment was acquired. To preclude their use as weapons, weights were welded into 45-pound units. Both access to health care and staff response to inmates' medical problems were enhanced to ensure adequate round-the-clock coverage. Food preparation was improved, and the frequent serving of meatloaf, a common complaint among inmates, eliminated. To lessen racial tensions, the administration also promoted cooperative efforts to celebrate ethnic holidays such as Cinco de Mayo and Juneteenth.

- Unit Budgeting--Shortly after the new administration assumed authority, the operating budget for ASPC-Florence was subdivided by housing unit. The Deputy Warden of each unit was given responsibility for managing his own budget. This change enabled the Deputy Wardens to establish and fund project priorities within their units. It also produced considerable financial savings complex-wide. For example, the units' past practice of hoarding consumable supplies, causing the institution to run over budget, was checked because the Deputy Wardens were accountable for expenditures. In addition, senior staff reported that the new budgetary system was perceived as further support from the administration, heightening staff morale. Wiser use of available funds, particularly provision of necessary commodities, also tended to promote positive feelings among inmates.

Whenever changes in policies and procedures were made, the new administration attempted to eliminate any contradictions with existing regulations. Moreover, a rumor control program was instituted to keep both staff and inmates apprised of the changes, along with their possible impact on the inmate population.

Specific Improvements Within Individual Units

A more complete understanding of the improvements made at ASPC-Florence can be gained by examining changes at individual units. These changes varied widely, depending on such factors as amount of damage committed by inmates, deficiencies in existing design, deterioration due to past neglect, type of inmates housed in the unit, and management philosophy of the previous unit administration.

- Central Unit--The most extensive changes occurred at Central Unit, the complex's maximum security facility. Substantial alterations were made to the physical plant, both because the facility was relatively old and because the prisoner population presented considerable security risks. For instance, lighting within the unit was improved, and expanded metal screens and plexiglass were placed in the dining hall to reduce fighting and food theft. The elevator in Cell Block 4 was repaired so that staff did not have to use a ladder to move between floors. Moreover, Cell Block 3 was outfitted to house troublesome prisoners and gang leaders who needed to be segregated from the rest of the population. A new door, along with five outdoor exercise pens, was added to the cell block to accommodate these inmates. The public address system in the recreation yard was improved, and a visual barrier was installed to obstruct communications and contact with inmates in the South Unit yard. The budget for maintenance activities was also increased, helping to ensure that the unit did not re-experience substantial physical deterioration. Funding for programs was increased nearly 200%, and space within the unit was provided for counselors' offices. In addition, double-celling was eliminated, which, according to staff, reduced problems throughout the complex. Finally, CSO vacancies were filled so that 6 to 7 personnel, instead of the previous 3, supervised each housing unit. A request for a Correctional Program Supervisor position, however, was not immediately appropriated, leaving the Assistant Deputy Warden with the added responsibility of supervising correctional program staff.

Response to these changes in Central Unit was very positive. One CSO stated that staff morale was very high and problems were at a minimum. Another security officer indicated that communication with inmates was much better, enabling staff to "know things were coming before they happened." Staff count

was reportedly up, and use of sick leave was down. Inmates in the unit also seemed to appreciate the improvements--the Assistant Deputy Warden said that grievances dropped from around 400 to 195 per month. Senior staff credited the changes at Central Unit for helping to stabilize the complex as a whole, much like the U.S. Penitentiary at Marion has served to reduce tension at other federal institutions.

- South Unit--Conditions at South Unit, a medium security facility, were also upgraded. The perimeter was expanded to make room for a hobbycraft/ inmate-owned business enterprise area. Funding also was obtained to retrofit one cell block in order to provide 38 detention cells. Certain materials and potential weapons in the vocational area were secured in a fenced area located under a guard tower. Within each individual housing area, bed space was increased to accommodate 4 additional inmates. In addition, considerable effort was made to enhance staff-inmate relationships. The Deputy Warden, Major, and unit Captains "walked the yard" regularly, and prisoners were encouraged to talk with staff rather than rely on the kite system (formal, written request).

Some problems, however, remained. For example, the only programming in South Unit was Alcoholics Anonymous, which met two hours a week. There also seemed to be some concern regarding adequate staffing. While the prisoner population rose from 423 to over 600, the number of counselors stayed at 4. Moreover, each dormitory was supervised by just one CSO.

Despite these concerns, the mood among staff was generally upbeat, and the Deputy Warden reported that administrative problems with staff were down. Violence also dropped even though the unit housed a large number of maximum security prisoners, including "a heavy concentration of the Aryan Brotherhood," one of the largest inmate gangs at ASPC-Florence. The Deputy Warden said that

gang activity decreased because members wanted to stay in South Unit rather than in maximum security or segregation.

- East Unit--Although the complex's newest facility, East Unit also underwent physical improvement. The quonset huts there, housing low medium security prisoners, proved "inherently flimsy" and subject to relatively rapid deterioration, requiring some renovation. Sidewalks, exterior lighting, and the unit's perimeter were upgraded. To help maintain the unit, the Deputy Warden initiated a Beautification Program, involving weekly inspection contests and additional privileges for contest winners. The facility also implemented the unit management concept. This strategy, according to the Deputy Warden, promoted communication with the inmate population by dividing the facility into smaller, more manageable areas. The classification of inmates assigned to East Unit was monitored more closely to assure that prisoners presented little risk of escape. Moreover, staffing was strengthened to provide better supervision in the yard. The only major problem reported by staff was the limited number of detention beds, which impeded efforts to secure younger inmates.

- North Unit--This minimum security facility, which also includes the complex's Special Program Unit, required several changes in its physical structures. These included improved perimeter security, upgraded kitchen areas, and removal of asbestos from two dormitory ceilings. A new shower hut was also constructed. Additional bed space was provided for both minimum security and special program inmates. More staff positions were allocated to the unit, eliminating the previous practice of checking various areas on a limited, periodic basis.

- Cell Block 6--Substantial modifications were also made to Cell Block 6, which houses all of the Department's administrative segregation prisoners and most of its death row inmates. The majority of these alterations stemmed

from the facility's relatively new but poor physical design. For example, the original design had included no water mains for firefighting, and the roof drainage collection system had been located directly above the electrical control panel in the main control room. These deficiencies were rectified. In addition, the interior exercise courtyard had been located near cell windows, creating the potential for incidents involving intimidation, assault, and contraband. Sixteen new exercise areas, located in fenced pens of approximately 300 square feet, were constructed outside the building. Moreover, the location of the unit's control rooms precluded direct surveillance of prisoner housing areas. To enhance inmate supervision in these areas, staff initiated periodic walk-throughs, and closed-circuit television cameras were installed. The cells in one wing were "hardened" to house especially disruptive and violent prisoners--secure furnishings were installed, and expanded metal grates were placed over cell doors. The unit's visitation area was also enclosed. In accordance with the consent decree in Black et al. vs. Lewis et al. (1985),[20] inmate programs and services were expanded and enhanced.

In the past, inmates confined in Cell Block 6 had been responsible for considerable physical damage to the facility. Consequently, broken windows had to be replaced, malfunctioning fixtures were repaired, and lights were secured. To help maintain a clean, damage-free environment, an inmate contract system was implemented, whereby prisoners received increased privileges in exchange for contract compliance.

The improved security and sanitation, according to the Deputy Warden, reduced "the feeling that the administration didn't care about staff." He also

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[20] Black et al. vs. Lewis et al. was an inmate class action suit challenging conditions of confinement in the Administrative Segregation Unit. The consent decree also mandated changes in classification, use of force, inmate communications, food service, and sanitation.

believed that these changes in the unit helped resolve another problem: trouble in getting staff to work there. Due to the new system of unit budgeting, the Deputy Director said that nearly all of the major problems there had been addressed.

Conclusion

Before the new administration assumed authority in November 1984, conditions at ASPC-Florence had seemed to be deteriorating. According to staff interviewed, facilities had been in disrepair, security had been too lax, staffing had been inadequate, and inmate programming had been limited. As a result, staff morale had been low and turnover had been high. Inmates had also been disgruntled, leading to continuing increases in destructive and disruptive behavior.

Following a riot in the Central Unit yard, the Florence complex underwent substantial changes. The most extensive revisions were made in Central Unit, where staff stated that security provisions and inmate management were greatly enhanced. These improvements, in turn, were thought to have played a major role in reducing discontent and tension throughout the complex. Other notable changes at the complex included:

- Repair and renovation of physical plants;
- Greater delegation of responsibility to Deputy Wardens;
- Strengthened policies and procedures for security;
- Improved planning for emergencies;
- Higher level of staffing;
- More training for staff;
- Segregation of gang leaders and inmate agitators;
- Racial balancing of inmate housing and activities; and

- Increased access to inmate programs and services.

Interviewed staff believed that, taken together, these changes promoted a more safe, secure, and orderly operation. Inmate violence, reportedly, decreased, and both staff and inmates felt a greater sense of personal safety. Interviewees also indicated that support from the administration and, subsequently, staff morale grew as Warden Bramlett's team approach took hold. On the whole, the situation at Florence was perceived as much improved.

CHAPTER 2:

QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY OF FACILITY STAFF AND INMATES

Introduction

While the interviews with agency staff offer a detailed account of conditions at ASPC-Florence before and after the administrative transition in November 1984, they rely primarily upon the knowledge and views of top-level personnel. Such limitation was important in obtaining a thorough description of administrative philosophy, policies, and procedures. This description, in turn, was instrumental in providing a framework for examining the management of inmate violence at Florence. The interviews, however, do not yield a complete picture of transition events and their consequences.

To flesh out the framework constructed from the staff interviews, it was necessary to secure additional information from those individuals most directly affected by changes in institutional operations: lower level staff and inmates. Specifically, it was important to ascertain whether intended changes in policies and procedures had filtered down to supervisory and line staff, along with the prisoner population itself; whether these changes were viewed as positive or negative; and whether staff and inmates perceived a greater amount of institutional and personal safety under the Bramlett administration. In essence, the question was whether inmate violence was seen as more effectively controlled following the change in administration. While the answers to these questions do not necessarily provide documentable evidence of improvement or deterioration, they do highlight perceptions that are likely to influence the actions of staff and inmates and, thus, affect the implementation of formally established policies and procedures. Moreover, these perceptions can be used to supplement analyses of agency records, which--due to staff unawareness of

violence, staff failure to report violations, or ineffectiveness of information systems--may underestimate the extent of inmate violence.

Survey Methodology

To obtain an in-depth assessment of staff and inmate perceptions of conditions at ASPC-Florence before and after the change in administration, project staff developed two detailed survey instruments: one designed for staff, the other for inmates.[21] As much as possible, the instruments were constructed to ask the same questions of each group. In some instances, however, the instruments differed. For example, only inmates were asked about participation in violence-related behaviors, and personal-background questions directed at staff necessarily diverged from those aimed at inmates. As a basis of comparison, many of the questions contained in each instrument were asked twice, once in regard to the period preceding the change in administration and once in regard to the period following the change. Each survey instrument was divided into four major sections: Personal Background, Current Conditions Relating to Violence, Previous Conditions Relating to Violence, and Perceived Changes at ASPC-Florence.

Draft survey instruments were sent for review to the Administrator of the Department's Planning Bureau in Phoenix and the Inmate Management Administrator at ASPC-Florence. Most of the suggested changes were then incorporated into a revised version of each survey instrument.

Given the case study's parameters, it was necessary to restrict potential respondents to staff and inmates who had been at ASPC-Florence for at least one year prior to and one year following the administrative transition. Consequently, neither the staff respondents nor the inmate respondents

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[21] A copy of each survey instrument is included in Technical Appendix A.

constitute random sample populations. However, the respondents are thought to be fairly representative of staff and inmates currently at the prison complex.

Through computer analysis conducted by the Department's Bureau of Data Management, 1,632 inmates were identified as being housed at the complex during both periods. Project staff decided to disseminate the survey instrument to a 10% subsample of this population, striving also for proportional distribution among five of the complex's housing units.[22] Respondents were then selected through two procedures. First, an advertisement soliciting volunteers was placed in the inmate newsletter. Those answering the ad were screened using the computer-generated list of inmates meeting the time-frame criteria. This process resulted in 66 potential respondents. Second, in order to obtain additional volunteers, caseworkers in the various housing units were asked to review the list of eligible inmates and contact those who might be willing to answer the questionnaire. This procedure netted another 94 inmates, completing the 10% subsample.

Staff respondents were subjected to the same time-frame criteria as were inmates. Again, a 10% subsample, or 50 staff, were sought. All respondents were volunteers who agreed to fill out the survey instrument after being familiarized with the case study during a regular staff briefing.

The survey instruments, together with cover letters assuring confidentiality and stamped envelopes addressed to project staff, were distributed to 50 staff and 160 inmates during the week of January 26, 1987. During the next three weeks, responses were received from 43 staff and 126 inmates. It was subsequently decided to omit one staff questionnaire from analysis because the respondent did not answer the section concerning conditions prior to the change

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[22] Picacho Work Center, which is located approximately 40 miles south of the main complex, was eliminated from consideration.

in administration. Fifteen inmate questionnaires were also eliminated either because numerous questions had been left blank or because the answers suggested the respondents had not taken the survey seriously. Ultimately, 42 staff questionnaires and 111 inmate questionnaires were found to be sufficiently complete and appropriate for analysis.

Questionnaire responses were then coded for computer entry. Separate tabulations were made for staff and inmate respondents. In addition, numerous cross tabulations, based primarily on personal background characteristics, were run to determine if any important differences in perception existed within each respondent subgroup. Complete cross tabulations were not run for every subgroup, only for those considered most important or likely to be most revealing. Partial cross tabulations (i.e., on selected questions) were performed on the remaining subgroups. Finally, cross tabulations based on housing unit assignment were limited to Cell Block 6 and Central and South Units, where the potential for violence was thought to be greatest due to inmates' high security classifications. To facilitate the reporting and understanding of the survey findings, only the tabulations of overall staff and inmate responses are presented in this chapter. Cross tabulations detailing the responses of the various staff and inmate subgroups have been included in Technical Appendix B to this case study for the benefit of those readers who wish to examine respondents' perceptions in greater depth.

In presenting the findings of the questionnaire survey, it is important to point out that the respondents' views on current conditions at ASPC-Florence are likely to have been influenced by an incident that occurred at the time the questionnaires were scheduled for distribution. On October 23, 1986, following a long period of relative calm at the complex, a white inmate was murdered by a black inmate in the Central Unit law library. The next day, apparently in

retaliation, several white inmates cornered a black inmate near South Unit and stabbed him. As word of the stabbing spread, whites and blacks congregated on opposite sides of the athletic field. A racial battle involving an estimated 200 prisoners ensued, leaving one inmate dead and eight others injured. As a result of this incident, conduct of the survey was postponed for approximately three months. Nevertheless, it would be unreasonable to assume that the disturbance, by virtue of its recency, did not introduce undue bias into the responses of both staff and inmates, especially in regard to viewpoints on inmate gangs, inmate racial conflict, inmate violence, and personal safety. While the incident will be mentioned in commentary on survey findings, the reader is also cautioned to keep this event in mind when drawing conclusions about the data presented in this section of the case study.

Findings of the Survey

The questionnaire survey of staff and inmates at ASPC-Florence yielded a wide variety of information about both the respondents and their views of inmate violence at the complex. Personal data regarding those completing the questionnaire are presented first in order to provide a backdrop against which to assess subsequent findings. The remainder of this section of the case study is devoted to respondents' perceptions of past and present conditions related to inmate violence at ASPC-Florence. These perceptions have been organized into the following areas:

- Changes in policies and procedures;
- Perceived safety at ASPC-Florence;
- Staff control over inmates;
- Serious problems leading to violence;
- Inmate-reported involvement in violence-related behaviors;

- Self-reported assaults by inmates on staff;
- Self-reported assaults by inmates on inmates; and
- Inmate gang activity.

All percentages in this section have been rounded to the nearest whole number.

Profile of Respondents

A comparative overview of staff and inmate respondents is presented in Table 1. A more detailed profile of each group is provided below.

Staff. Forty-two staff members completed all or nearly all of the staff survey instrument. In demographic terms, 83% of these staff were white; 7% were Latin; and the remaining 10% were divided almost equally among Native Americans, Asians, and blacks. In regard to age, 7% were 30 years old or younger, 40% were 31 to 40 years old, and 53% were 41 years old or older. Approximately 7% had received a high school diploma or its equivalent; 74% had completed some college courses; and 17% had been granted Bachelor's or Master's Degrees.

In terms of current job classification, respondents broke down as follows: administrators--2%; administrative staff--2%; security supervisors--26%; security staff--40%; program supervisors--7%; and program staff--21%.

Separated by current housing unit assignment, 57% of the staff respondents worked in Central Unit (maximum security); 17% in South Unit (high medium security); 12% in Cell Block 6 (Administrative Segregation Unit); 10% in North Unit (medium security); and 5% in East Unit (medium security).

Just over 26% of the staff respondents had worked at ASPC-Florence for between three and five years; 50% had worked there between six and ten years; and 24% had worked there more than ten years. Slightly more than 26% stated they had also been employed at other correctional institutions.

Table 1
Comparative Overview of Survey Respondents

Characteristic	Percent of Staff Respondents* (N = 42)	Percent of Inmate Respondents* (N = 111)
Race:		
White	83	69
Nonwhite	17	31
Age:		
30 or younger	7	30
Older than 30	93	70
Education:		
High school diploma or less	10	42
Some college	74	38
Post-secondary degree	17	19
Current Housing Unit:		
Central (maximum security)	57	40
South (high medium security)	17	21
North (medium security)	10	15
East (medium security)	5	10
Cell Block 6 (administrative segregation)	12	14
Time at ASPC-Florence:		
2-5 years	26	36
More than 5 years	74	64
Time at another correctional institution	26	41

*All percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number.

Inmates. One hundred eleven inmates completed all or nearly all of the inmate survey instrument. In terms of demographics, 69% of the inmate respondents were white; 14% were black; 7% were Latin; 3% Native American; and 1% were Asian. Approximately 6% identified their race as "other." In regard to age, 11% were 25 years old or younger; 19% were 26 to 30 years old; 21% were 31 to 35 years old; 25% were 36 to 40 years old; and 24% were more than 40 years old. Slightly under 15% had less than a high school education; 27% had received a high school diploma or its equivalent; 39% had completed some college courses; 19% had been granted Bachelor's or Master's Degrees.

Grouped by current housing assignment, 40% of the inmate respondents were living in Central Unit (maximum security); 21% in South Unit (high medium security); 15% in North Unit (medium security); 14% in Cell Block 6 (Administrative Segregation Unit); and 10% in East Unit (medium security).

Just over 63% stated that they had a job assignment, while only 35% reported involvement in program activities.

Homicide was the primary commitment offense for 31% of the inmate respondents; sexual offenses for 24%; robbery for 13%; kidnapping for 12% and assault for 6%.

Approximately 30% had served between three and five years at ASPC-Florence; 21% had served six to seven years; 18% had served eight to ten years; and 25% had served more than ten years. Just over 41% stated that they had also been confined in another correctional institution.

Survey Results

Changes in Policies and Procedures. Respondents to both the staff and the inmate survey instruments were asked whether the new administration had changed policies and procedures in 21 specified areas so as to decrease inmate violence

at ASPC-Florence. It was expected that staff would welcome the greater specification and control associated with the new policies and procedures, while inmates would view most changes as a curtailment of their freedom. As can be seen in Figure 3, staff did perceive more, positive results. More than 50% of the staff respondents thought that changes in policies and procedures aimed at reducing violence had taken place in nine areas:

- Staff training,
- Inmate classification,
- Security and custody,
- Staff qualifications,
- Inmate grievances,
- Recreation,
- Emergency procedures,
- Inspections, and
- Inmate access to legal system.

In general, these findings support the changes identified by staff interviewed for this case study. However, they do not reflect improvements cited for prison industries, work programs, food service, and health care. Also at odds with the information provided by interviewees is the fact that only 29% of the staff respondents perceived an increase in support from the administration.

In contrast to staff, a majority of the inmates responding to the survey did not think the new administration had made any changes in policies and procedures to reduce inmate violence. However, 47% thought such changes had occurred in the area of mail and telephone communications, and 39% perceived positive changes in regard to religious services. In addition, a plurality--44%--felt that administrative support for staff had grown.

Figure 3.

CHANGES IN POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
PERCEIVED AS HELPING TO REDUCE INMATE VIOLENCE



Perceived Safety at ASPC-Florence. Given the fact that both staff and inmate respondents to the survey perceived some positive change in policies and procedures at Florence after the administrative transition, an important question arises: Did these improvements also help to create a safer environment? Did individual staff and inmates believe that they, as well as others, were more safe as a result of the change in administration?

To find out, both survey instruments asked respondents to rate the safety of the average staff member and the average inmate before and after the new administration assumed authority. The results are presented in Table 2. As can be seen from this table, both staff and inmate respondents thought that the amount of safety had increased for the average staff member. However, while staff respondents perceived an improvement in safety for the average inmate, inmate respondents tended to believe safety for the average inmate had declined, a finding due, perhaps, to a racial disturbance that broke out a few months prior to the conduct of the survey.

Inmate respondents generally felt that the average staff member experienced a greater degree of safety than did the average inmate in both time periods, but, surprisingly, staff respondents thought that the average inmate had been safer than the average staff member before the change in administration.

Staff Control over Inmates. Staff and inmate respondents were also asked to indicate how much control staff had over inmates prior to the change in administration and how much afterward. As shown in Table 3, both staff and inmates thought that staff had more control over inmates under the new administration. For instance, as interviewed staff noted, inmate movement was more closely monitored through strict observance of the pass system. Staff

Table 2
Perceived Safety at ASPC-Florence
(Percent*)

Staff

Individual	Amount of Safety** 1	2	3	4	5
Average inmate before administrative change (N = 41)	2	17	56	22	2
Average inmate after administrative change (N = 42)	7	29	43	12	10
Average staff before administrative change (N = 41)	2	12	49	32	5
Average staff after administrative change (N = 42)	12	31	33	21	2

Inmates

Individual	Amount of Safety** 1	2	3	4	5
Average inmate before administrative change (N = 99)	8	28	35	18	10
Average inmate after administrative change (N = 104)	4	20	38	26	12
Average staff before administrative change (N = 100)	25	24	32	14	5
Average staff after administrative change (N = 104)	33	30	19	12	6

*All percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number.
**Based on Likert Scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = very safe, 5 = not safe at all

Table 3
Perceived Amount of Staff Control over Inmates
(Percent*)

Staff

Period	Amount of Control			
	None	Some	A Lot	Complete
Before administrative change	10	61	24	5
After administrative change	0	39	46	15

(N = 41)

Inmates

Period	Amount of Control			
	None	Some	A Lot	Complete
Before administrative change	8	39	44	9
After administrative change	4	42	44	11

(N = 110)

*All percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number.

respondents, however, perceived a slightly greater amount of control. Approximately 61% of the staff believed they had a lot or complete control over inmates after the administrative change, while 55% of the inmates agreed with this view. Even more important is the finding that staff responses for the two periods showed a noticeable shift toward greater control under the Bramlett administration. Inmate responses, on the other hand, reflected only slight change.

Serious Problems Leading to Inmate Violence. Respondents to both survey instruments were also asked to assess a list of conditions thought to cause violence and determine if, at ASPC-Florence, each condition was no problem, a minor problem, a moderate problem, or a serious problem. Once again, the survey instruments requested assessments of conditions before and after the change in administration. These questions produced some of the greatest dissimilarities between staff and inmate responses. Staff typically perceived serious problems relating to inmate behaviors--for example, drug and/or alcohol use and gang violence. In contrast, inmates tended to focus on programs and services such as work opportunities, health care, and food service. The only condition viewed as a serious problem by both groups was overcrowding. During the case study time frame, the average daily population increased approximately 10%, forcing the complex to operate at 105% of its design capacity. However, as can be seen in Figures 4 and 5, the proportion of staff who perceived overcrowding as a serious problem leading to inmate violence dropped slightly from 45% to 43% following the change in administration, but for inmates the proportion grew from 61% to 78%. In fact, staff generally believed that the severity of most problems at the complex had decreased, while inmates thought they had increased.

Figure 4.

SERIOUS PROBLEMS RELATING TO INMATE VIOLENCE AT ASPC-FLORENCE
(Staff)



Figure 5.

SERIOUS PROBLEMS RELATING TO INMATE VIOLENCE AT ASPC-FLORENCE
(Inmate)



The condition of concern to most staff was drug and/or alcohol use by inmates, a behavior frequently associated with violence.[23] Nearly 62% of the staff respondents indicated that drugs and/or alcohol was a serious problem in both the before and the after period. A much smaller proportion of inmates thought that drugs and alcohol presented a serious problem; moreover, this proportion fell from 27% to 18% following the change in administration. A much larger proportion of inmates viewed a lack of work opportunities as an increasingly serious problem leading to inmate violence, despite the fact that staff interviewed for this case study reported an expansion in work assignments. Approximately 76% cited insufficient work opportunities as a serious problem prior to the administrative transition; under the new administration, the proportion rose to 82%, reflecting, perhaps, the inability of the administration to create enough jobs to accommodate the growing inmate population. Staff responses also indicated an increase in the proportion of staff members perceiving lack of work opportunities as a serious problem conducive to violence, but the increase was slight, rising only from 24% to 26%. This concern about the relationship between work assignments and violence seems warranted since a close association has been found in prior research.[24]

Other noteworthy differences between staff and inmate perceptions of serious problems at the Florence complex included:

- A reduction in staff viewing poor administrators as a serious problem, while inmate responses rose slightly--a finding that probably

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23 See, for example, John Monahan, Predicting Violent Behavior: An Assessment of Clinical Techniques (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1981), pp. 110-111, and Timothy Flanagan, Long-Term Prisoners: Analysis of Institutional Incidents, Working Paper 21 (Albany, NY: Criminal Justice Research Center, 1980), p. 41.

24 See Joan Petersilia, "The Career Criminal Concept: Its Applicability to Prison Management" in Classification As a Management Tool: Theories and Models for Decision-Makers (College Park, MD: American Correctional Association, 1982), pp. 45-54.

reflects the new administration's enhanced security measures, cited by staff interviewed for this case study.

- A slight decline in both staff and inmates who thought gang violence was a serious problem.
- A substantial drop in staff perceiving violence among inmates as a serious problem, and a small decrease among inmate respondents.
- An upswing in both staff and inmates who view insufficient programming as a serious problem.

It should be noted that most of these perceptions regarding serious problems "dovetail" with those related to changes in policies and procedures to reduce violence. For instance, few staff or inmates noted positive changes pertaining to prison industries or institutional maintenance policies. Similarly, perceived improvements in inspection and security procedures may be associated with the view that inmate and gang violence have decreased.

Inmate-Reported Involvement in Violence-Related Behaviors. The inmate survey instrument included a self-report question on involvement in violence-related behaviors. As usual, inmate respondents were asked to indicate the extent of their involvement before and after the change in administration. As can be seen from Table 4, self-reported involvement in violence-related behaviors did not differ greatly between the two time periods, suggesting that the new administration had not had much impact--positive or negative--on these behaviors.

It is interesting to compare these self-report data with responses to another survey question that asked for estimates of inmate involvement in violence-related behaviors.[25] For instance, the high, self-reported figures concerning use of drugs and/or alcohol coincides with both staff and inmate estimates. Similarly, the self-report data appear to confirm both groups'

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[25] These estimates are detailed and discussed in Technical Appendix B.

Table 4
Inmate Self-Reported Involvement in Violence-Related Behaviors
Before and After the Change in Administration
(Percent)

Behavior	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently
Charged with minor violation:				
Before (N = 109)	30	44	10	16
After (N = 111)	27	39	17	17
Charged with major violation:				
Before (N = 109)	44	34	13	9
After (N = 111)	40	33	18	8
Assaulted by another inmate:				
Before (N = 109)	65	20	14	1
After (N = 111)	62	22	14	1
Verbally abused by staff:				
Before (N = 108)	33	31	26	10
After (N = 111)	25	24	32	18
Physically abused by staff:				
Before (N = 109)	76	15	7	2
After (N = 109)	73	17	6	3
Placed in detention:				
Before (N = 109)	48	28	16	7
After (N = 111)	42	31	20	7
Needed protective segregation:				
Before (N = 109)	71	11	7	11
After (N = 111)	72	9	8	11
Used drugs/alcohol:				
Before (N = 109)	55	28	15	3
After (N = 111)	53	27	18	2

relatively low estimates of assault by another inmate, physical abuse by staff, and need for protective segregation. However, inmate self-report relating to verbal abuse by staff and placement in disciplinary detention in the after period contradicts staff estimates, which indicated that relatively small proportions of inmates had been subjected to these actions.

Self-reported Assaults by Inmates on Staff. An important measure of violence at any correctional institution is inmate assaults on staff. To obtain a gauge of such incidents, the staff survey instrument included a self-report question on inmate assaults on staff before and after the change in administration. Responses to this question, summarized in Table 5, show a substantial reduction in the number of physical assaults experienced by staff. Approximately 86% of the staff respondents reported no assaults following the administrative change in contrast to 50% previously. However, the drop shown in Table - may be exaggerated somewhat due to the fact that no cut-off date was provided in the question pertaining to the before period and nearly three-fourths of the respondents had worked at ASPC-Florence for more than five years. Consequently, the incidence of assault prior to the administrative transition may have been slightly overreported. Nevertheless, it seems likely that a decline in inmate assaults on staff did occur.

This finding appears to be supported by inmate self-report data that showed a slight drop in charges of staff assault. Following the change of administration, the percent of inmates reporting charges of staff assault fell from 12 to 8. Moreover, no respondent had been charged with more than two assaults during the new administration. It is also worth noting that all of the inmates charged with assaulting a staff member after the administrative transition had reported similar charges for the before period.

Table 5
Inmate Assaults on Staff: Staff Self-Report
(Percent)

Period	Number of Assaults				
	0	1	2	3	4+
Before Administrative Change	50	24	10	2	14
After Administrative Change	86	7	7	0	0

N = 42

Assault Victim Profile. Using personal background data provided by the staff survey instrument, it was possible to construct a profile of those staff who had been assaulted by inmates prior to the change in administration:

- 72% were over 35 years old.
- 95% were white.
- 76% had earned a high school diploma and then completed some college courses.
- 81% had worked at ASPC-Florence for more than five years.
- 52% were security staff; 38% were security supervisors.
- 62% had been assigned to Central Unit.

This profile closely approximates that of the overall staff respondent population. (See Table 1.) The principal exception is an overrepresentation of security staff among assault victims, which is undoubtedly a consequence of their job function.

The survey responses of staff assaulted by inmates prior to the new administration were subjected to cross tabulation in order to obtain their special perspective on changes at ASPC-Florence. Several interesting findings emerged, including the following:

- Assault victims perceived an increase in safety for the average staff member after the change in administration, but this increase was not as great as that seen by non-victims.
- Assault victims were more likely than non-victims to be attacked by inmates under the new administration.
- Assault victims perceived a smaller increase in staff control over inmates than did non-victims.
- Assault victims were more likely than non-victims to indicate that administrative support for staff had grown since the change in administration.
- Assault victims were less likely than non-victims to think that inmate violence had increased during the Bramlett administration, but were just as likely as non-victims to see little change in the level of gang violence or inmate racial conflict.

- Assault victims were less likely than non-victims to view overcrowding, insufficient inmate programs, and insufficient work opportunities as serious problems related to violence.
- Assault victims thought that inmate use of drugs and/or alcohol, a major staff concern, had become a more serious problem, while non-victims believed this situation had improved.

Staff Assailant Profile. The survey also yielded some information about inmates charged with staff assault. Surprisingly, these inmates are more likely to be older rather than younger than 30 years of age, although the difference between the two age groups decreased following the administrative transition. Prior to the transition, inmates charged with assaulting staff were more likely to be white than nonwhite; afterward they were much more likely to be nonwhite. For both time periods, assailants were most likely to be housed in Central Unit. This finding was expected since Central Unit has been designated to house inmates classified as potentially assaultive due to a history of violent behavior. A substantial majority of assailants in both periods had job assignments, but slightly less than half were involved in program activities. Most inmates charged with staff assault had been incarcerated for homicide or robbery.

Self-reported Assaults by Inmates on Other Inmates. The inmate survey instrument also included a self-report question on charges of inmate assault both before and after the change in administration. Analysis of these self-report data found virtually no change in the percent of inmates charged with assaulting another inmate. However, as shown in Table 6, the percent charged with two assaults increased somewhat following the change in administration, while the percent charged with one assault or with four or more assaults declined slightly.

Table 6
Self-Reported Charges of Inmate Assaults on Other Inmates
(Percent)

Period	Number of Charges				
	0	1	2	3	4+
Before administrative change	80	11	3	4	2
After administrative change	81	7	7	4	0

N = 111

Assault Victim Profile. As with staff assaulted by inmates, a profile was developed for inmate assault victims prior to the change in administration:

- 68% were over 30 years old.
- 73% were white.
- 28% had been incarcerated for sex offenses, 28% for homicide.
- 50% were housed in Central Unit.
- 58% indicated that they had been assaulted only rarely.

It should be pointed out that this profile does not differ substantially from that of the overall inmate respondent population--notwithstanding the fact of having been assaulted. However, in assessing the nature of these victims and their perceptions, it should be noted that 37% reported being charged with inmate assault and 28% reported charges of staff assault prior to the change in administration.

Other notable findings concerning inmates assaulted by inmates included:

- The proportion of nonwhite victims increased following the administrative change.
- The proportion of assault victims housed in Central Unit dropped under the new administration, while the proportions in South Unit and Cell Block 6 rose.
- Assault victims believed that the average inmate was less safe under the Bramlett administration.
- Assault victims saw little change in the amount of staff control over inmates following the administrative transition.
- Most assault victims perceived greater administrative support for staff under the new administration.
- A majority of assault victims thought that inmate violence had increased.
- Assault victims, when compared with the overall inmate respondent population, reported feeling less need for protective segregation.

Inmate Assailant Profile. A profile was also constructed for inmates who reported being charged with assaulting other inmates. This subgroup comprised approximately 20% of the inmate respondent population for both time periods. Most assailants had been imprisoned for the same crimes as had their victims--sex offenses or homicide. This finding is not too surprising since approximately one-third of the victims had also been charged with inmate assault. While there was no difference between age groups before the Bramlett administration assumed authority, survey data indicate that, afterward, those charged with inmate assault were more likely to be younger than 30. The same finding was true of racial groups, with nonwhites the predominant assailants following the administrative transition. And while a plurality of those charged with inmate assault were housed in Central Unit during both periods, the proportion nearly doubled after the change in administration--a rather unexpected finding since both staff and inmate respondents, as well as interviewed staff, tended to think that safety at Central Unit had been enhanced. A majority of the assailants had job assignments during both time periods. However, only one-fourth were involved in programs during the before period, and this proportion decreased slightly after the change in administration. Lastly, of those inmates charged with inmate assault before the new administration assumed authority, 64% were again charged with assault afterward.

To a great extent, this profile of inmate assailants at ASPC-Florence conforms with the results of previous research on inmate misconduct, particularly violence. For example, most studies have concluded that age is significantly correlated with serious infractions, including violence, and that

the rate of infractions drops dramatically for inmates older than 30.[26] Race has also been found to be highly associated with violent infractions, although there is some question as to whether this relationship reflects actual inmate conduct or biased staff reporting. Black inmates, for instance, appear more likely to be involved in institutional violence, and much of this violence crosses interracial and ethnic lines, with whites most likely to be victims.[27] However, the strongest correlation with inmate violence has involved prior violent behavior, and this relationship has been found to strengthen with each violent act.[28] Thus, inmates incarcerated for violent offenses or convicted of violent infractions are more likely than other inmates to engage in violent conduct while imprisoned.

Inmate Gang Activity. Throughout the 1980s, gang activity has been an important concern at ASPC-Florence. As was noted in the staff interview chapter, one of the primary reasons for appointing Donald Wawrzaszek Warden of

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26 See, for example, John Monahan, Predicting Violent Behavior: An Assessment of Clinical Techniques (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1981), pp. 105-107; Timothy Flanagan, Long-Term Prisoners: Analysis of Institutional Incidents, Working Paper 21 (Albany, NY: Criminal Justice Research Center, 1980), p. 29; and Joan Petersilia, "The Career Criminal Concept: Its Applicability to Prison Management" in Classification As A Management Tool: Theories and Models For Decision-Makers (College Park, MD: American Correctional Association, 1982), pp. 45-54.

27 See Charles Silberman, Criminal Violence. Criminal Justice (New York: Random House, 1978), pp. 117-183; Timothy Flanagan, Long-Term Prisoners: Analysis of Institutional Incidents, Working Paper 21 (Albany, NY: Criminal Justice Research Center, 1980), pp. 43-44; Joan Petersilia, "The Career Criminal Concept: Its Applicability to Prison Management" in Classification As A Management Tool: Theories and Models For Decision-Makers (College Park, MD: American Correctional Association, 1982), pp. 45-54; and D. Fuller, T. Orsagh, and D. Raber, "Violence and Victimization Within the North Carolina Prison System," Paper presented at the 1977 meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences.

28 John Monahan, Predicting Violent Behavior: An Assessment of Clinical Techniques (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1981), pp. 104-105.

the complex was his knowledge of inmate gangs. Nearly one-half of the staff survey respondents perceived gang violence as a serious problem before the change in administration, but only one-third continued to view it as serious afterward. Because of the importance accorded inmate gangs at Florence, the staff and inmate survey instruments included several questions pertaining specifically to gangs.

The first question asked respondents to rate the amount of power associated with five inmate gangs both before and after the change in administration. Staff and inmates alike perceived little change in the power exerted by most gangs, which were judged to have moderate amounts of power.[29]

A second question focused on the amount of violence caused by inmate gangs during each time period, with respondents asked to rate the various gangs. Once again there appeared to be little change in the perceptions of either staff or inmates. Most gangs were thought to cause considerable violence in both periods.[9]

The last question regarding inmate gangs asked for respondents' opinions on some selected effects of gangs at ASPC-Florence before and after the administrative transition. Staff generally believed that gangs made it more difficult to control inmates. Among other things, gangs were thought to aggravate racial tensions, increase inmate violence, and introduce most drugs into the complex. Yet, as Table 7 reveals, staff did not see a substantial change in these negative effects after the administrative transition, except that mistrust of the administration due to perceived favoritism of gang members had lessened somewhat. Inmate respondents also acknowledged the same negative effects as did staff, but the proportion of inmates citing them was usually

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[29] Technical Appendix B provides a breakdown of respondents' perceptions of the amount of power and violence associated with specific gangs.

Table 7
Perceived Effects of Inmate Gangs
Before and After the Change in Administration
(Percent)

Effect	Staff		Inmates	
	Before (N=41)	After (N=41)	Before (N=105)	After (N=105)
Make it harder to control inmates	80	83	51	46
Make it easier to control inmates	12	10	29	31
Increase racial tension	93	98	77	73
Decrease racial tension	7	12	21	25
Bring in more drugs	95	100	62	62
Increase mistrust of administration	52	35	49	54
Increase power struggles	88	90	72	69
Decrease power struggles	5	7	22	18
Increase inmate violence	82	85	70	68
Decrease violence	8	15	24	27

much smaller. Moreover, in contrast to staff, inmates thought that gangs were slightly more likely to increase mistrust of the administration under the new administration. On the whole, they did not see much change in the effects associated with gangs. However, what minor differences they did perceive suggested a decline in negative effects, while staff reported just the opposite.

Conclusion

The questionnaire survey of staff and inmates at ASPC-Florence revealed that each group held an intricate--and occasionally perplexing--set of ideas about conditions before and after the change in administration. Staff respondents, for instance, indicated that poor administrators were a much less serious problem under the new administration, yet they perceived virtually no change in the level of administrative support for staff. Similarly, inmate respondents tended to perceive greater staff control over inmates yet saw no change in the proportion of inmates involved in violence-related behaviors or in the extent of inmate violence.

Despite the complexity of their views, staff and inmate respondents demonstrated a surprising amount of consensus in their comparisons of conditions during the two time periods. Substantial disagreement was found in just two areas. Inmates thought that poor administrators were an increasingly serious problem related to violence, but staff, as noted previously, believed the quality of administrators had improved. The inmates' perception is probably a reflection of their dislike of tightened security under the new administration. Most staff, in contrast, appeared to welcome the increased security as well as other perceived improvements in policies and procedures. The other area of considerable disparity concerned the safety of the average

inmate. Staff generally thought that the typical inmate was more safe following the administrative transition, most likely due to the increased security and staff control. However, most inmates felt the average inmate was less safe. This perceived decrease in safety is probably the result of several factors. First, it is likely that the racial disturbance which occurred three months prior to the conduct of the survey influenced inmate views of conditions at Florence. The recency of this incident may have overshadowed the previous months of relative calm. Moreover, the lingering effects of the incident may account for inmate perceptions of increases in racial conflict and inmate violence, further heightening fear of personal harm. The divergent views in this area may also stem from differing degrees of personal involvement. Staff are usually removed from the average inmate's existence. They are not faced with the same daily concerns, fears, and events. Equally important, they are able to assess the situation objectively by examining incident reports and statistical data that place unusual occurrences into a more realistic perspective. Inmates, lacking such distance and objectivity, are more likely to focus on out-of-the-ordinary events, and their resultant anxieties and apprehensions inevitably color their views and expectations.

For the most part, however, staff perceptions coincided with those of inmates. Both respondent groups felt that the average staff member was unquestionably safer after the change in administration. Staff were seen as having greater control over inmates, and staff were, according to self-report by both groups, subjected to fewer physical assaults. On the negative side, staff and inmates alike indicated that adequate inmate programming was a more serious problem, probably due to the burdensome demands associated with the larger prisoner population.

In most other areas addressed by the questionnaire, staff and inmates perceived no substantial change--positive or negative. These areas included gang-related violence, inmate involvement in violence-related behaviors, inmate-reported assaults on other inmates, inmate-reported involvement in violence-related behaviors, inmate use of drugs/alcohol, poor food service, and insufficient work opportunities.

Taken as a whole, then, both staff and inmate respondents perceived only slight changes after the administrative transition at ASPC-Florence. It should be noted, though, that most of these changes seemed to improve conditions for staff and the majority of inmates. The survey findings also indicate that the new administration was able to manage most inmates effectively and that few inmates at the Florence complex participated in violence-related conduct. However, the self-report data suggest the existence of a group of hard-core difficult-to-control inmates who continued to engage in violent, disruptive acts. It is most likely this group who presented the greatest risk to institutional security and order and, quite realistically, elicited concern for personal safety--especially among inmate respondents--and contributed greatly to the general perception that little change occurred under the new administration.

CHAPTER 3: ANALYSIS OF AGENCY RECORDS

Introduction

The final component of this case study of inmate violence management is an analysis of records kept by the Arizona Department of Corrections. The interviews with agency personnel and the questionnaire survey of ASPC-Florence staff and inmates offer a comprehensive view of conditions at the complex before and after the Bramlett administration assumed authority. In addition, the interviews and survey highlight both the changes made by the new administration and the effect of these changes. Increases in staff control over inmates and general institutional security appear to have resulted in a greater degree of safety for staff and most inmates. Nevertheless, this assessment is subjective, an accumulation of individuals' perceptions. While these perceptions are important in that they play a major role in determining the actions and reactions of staff and inmates, such views do not document any actual changes in the incidence of violence-related behaviors. In order to provide an objective framework for evaluating the new administration's impact on inmate violence, pertinent agency records were examined.

Methodology

As with the questionnaire survey, the analysis of agency records employed a before-and-after comparison. While time-series analysis would have provided a more accurate assessment of any changes in violence-related behavior, this approach was precluded by the lack of data for a sufficiently long enough interval following the change of administration. (Two years is generally recommended as the minimum time frame for each period.) However, the before-after design is frequently used to ascertain whether behaviors have been

influenced by a specific intervention and, consequently, is applicable for purposes of this case study. At the very least this methodology can indicate whether more complex statistical analysis would be warranted in the future.

To conduct the before-and-after comparison, project staff established two 12-month time frames. The first time frame, known as the "before period," ran from November 1, 1983, to October 31, 1984, or two weeks after the advent of the Bramlett administration. The second time frame, termed the "after period," covered November 1, 1984, to October 31, 1985. Data for each of the time frames could then be compared to determine whether any differences existed.

Whenever possible, data were collected automatically via the Arizona Information Management System (AIMS). In a few instances, however, data were not automated and had to be obtained manually. Data were collected for five variables normally associated with inmate violence:

- Inmate violent disciplinary infractions,
- Damage to property,
- Inmate grievances,
- Staff grievances, and
- Staff turnover.

Records Analysis

Inmate Violent Disciplinary Infractions

Perhaps the most accurate indicator of the level of inmate violence in a correctional institution is the number of violent incidents that are officially reported by staff. This is particularly true for serious incidents such as murder, injurious assault, rioting, escape, and arson, which are almost always recorded by staff. In examining agency records for this case study, considerable attention was afforded to violence-related infractions.

Twenty-two infractions within the Department's administrative regulations were identified as being related to inmate violence. These ranged from "intentional death/injury" and "physical assault" to "verbally threatening" and "careless destruction of property." Infraction data for the before period were manually collected and then automated. Data for the after period were automatically incorporated into AIMS. It should also be pointed out that, due to a reformatting of the AIMS coding structure, some infractions were coded slightly differently for the after period. For example, an attack on another inmate might be coded as "physical assault" in the before period but as "striking person" in the after period. However, this incongruity did not adversely affect the records analysis because similar infractions were generally grouped together or added to the whole prior to any comparison of time periods.

In general, ASPC-Florence experienced few serious incidents after the Bramlett administration assumed authority. Only one serious disturbance occurred during the after period, while three took place during the before period.[30] (The Department defines a serious disturbance as a situation in which either a large group of inmates threatens the safety, security, and welfare of the institution or a smaller group creates a similar threat through the taking of hostages. In either case, a tactical response unit is used to restore order.)

Serious disturbances, however, are not the only form of inmate violence, and certainly not the most common. To obtain a more accurate, and comprehensive, comparison of violence during the two time periods, reported incidents for all 22 violent infraction categories were totaled for each period. As can

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30 The racial disturbance in South Unit on October 24, 1986, which may have influenced survey responses, lies outside the case study time frame and was not included in the analysis of agency records.

be seen in Figure 6, a gradual, though somewhat erratic, decline in the number of infractions emerged after the change in administration. Moreover, this drop occurred in spite of the addition of 300 inmates to the complex population.

An even more revealing perspective is gained when these totals are redistributed into the 22 violent infraction categories, as done in Table 8.

Table 8
Violent Infractions at ASPC-Florence by Category

Infraction	11/01/83 to 10/31/84	11/01/84 to 10/31/85
Rioting	4	2
Intentional death/injury	8	2
Sexual assault/violence	5	1
Physical assault	41	81
Escape	12	6
Striking with intent to harm	25	9
Threaten with weapon	21	8
Arson	0	1
Threaten staff	121	124
Planning/participating in demonstration	57	55
Threaten homosexual assault	0	3
Possessing/manufacturing weapon	67	77
Throwing objects	76	100
Striking person	77	116
Verbally threatening	118	47
Deliberately set fire	24	17
Demonstrating	2	0
Threaten person	40	53
Fighting	142	94
Cause/set a fire	8	3
Destruction of property over $100	42	55
Careless destruction of property	6	5
Total	896	859

It is clear that the overall number of violence-related infractions declined only slightly during the after period. However, greater reductions typically were found among the most serious infractions. For example, incidents of rioting, intentional death/injury, and escape all dropped by at least 50%. The substantial increases in physical assault (nearly 100%) and

Figure 1. Total Violent Infractions at ASPC-Florence by Month
November 1983 - October 1985



striking person (50%) appear to be almost balanced by decreases in striking with intent to harm (64%) and fighting (34%). Still, these findings are probably not so much a reflection of alterations in the number of violent disciplinary infractions as the result of correctional officers and, in turn, disciplinary committees employing a different infraction nomenclature for essentially the same type of violent act.

What appears to be most important in terms of the findings is the substantial decrease in the number of serious violence-related infractions, which are generally one of the major criteria used to judge an administration's ability to manage violence. The importance of this criterion is evident in assessments of the riots that occurred in the nation's penitentiaries in the 1970s and early 1980s. For example, both Attica Prison in New York and McAllister Prison in Oklahoma experienced a large and tragic riot in the early 1970s. As a result of these incidents, most of the general public and correctional community tend to remember the administration and management of these institutions as being deficient in controlling inmate violence. However, the fact was that, prior to the riots, both of these institutions were known to have relatively low incidences of inmate violence, particularly with respect to assault on staff and other inmates. The point is that while large numbers of minor violent infractions may occur on a regular basis within a maximum security institution, they are to be anticipated as a product of the environment, the generally violent inmate population, and the expectations of inmates relative to maintaining their sense of identity and value while incarcerated in a high security setting. This is not to say that minor and moderate violent disciplinary infractions should be tolerated, but rather that they are likely to occur from time to time due to the nature of the inmate population. The only way to control such behavior would be to institute continual lockdowns within

the institution, which would be intolerable from both a legal and ethical standpoint, and would effect short- and long-range harm on inmates and staff alike.

As mentioned previously, ASPC-Florence had a history of serious violence-related infractions that appeared to be escalating at the time of the change of administration. Given the increase in gang activity, inmate population, influence of outside agitating organizations, and general unrest in the Department, it is important to note that the Bramlett administration was able to reduce serious infractions such as rioting, intentional death/injury, and escape during a potentially tumultuous period.

The drop in violence-related infractions is more clearly demonstrated when growth in the inmate population is taken into account by converting absolute numbers into rates per 100 inmates. Violent infraction rates for each of the two time frames are presented in Table 9.

Table 9
Violent Infractions at ASPC-Florence Per 100 Inmates

Infraction	11/01/83 to 10/31/84	11/01/84 to 10/31/85
Rioting	0.15	0.07
Intentional death/injury	0.30	0.07
Sexual assault/violence	0.19	0.03
Physical assault	1.53	2.75
Escape	0.45	0.20
Striking with intent to harm	0.93	0.30
Threaten with weapon	0.78	0.27
Arson	0.00	0.03
Threaten staff	4.52	4.21
Planning/participating in demonstration	2.13	1.87
Threaten homosexual assault	0.00	0.10
Possessing/manufacturing weapon	2.50	2.61
Throwing objects	2.84	3.39
Striking person	2.88	3.94
Verbally threatening	4.41	1.60
Deliberately set fire	0.90	0.58
Demonstrating	0.07	0.00
Threaten person	1.49	1.80
Fighting	5.30	3.19
Cause/set a fire	0.30	0.10
Destruction of property over $100	1.57	1.87
Careless destruction of property	0.22	0.17
Total	33.47	29.16

Here the overall decline in violent infractions is both more noticeable and more meaningful, falling from about 33.47 per 100 inmates in the before period to 29.16 per 100 inmates in the after period. Moreover, the large absolute increases in physical assault and striking person show just marginal growth as rates per 100 inmates. On the whole, the rate comparison suggests that the average inmate not only is less likely to commit a violent infraction under the new administration, but also is more safe from violence.

While a reduction in inmate violence at ASPC-Florence can be documented through agency records, this finding indicates only that the incidences of violence reported for the two time periods changed. It does not explain why;

that is, the decrease in violence is not necessarily attributed to the new administration. Without an experimental study design that controls for all independent variables, it is virtually impossible to demonstrate a direct causal relationship between the decline in violent infractions and the management approach instituted under the Bramlett administration. Lacking such a design, however, project staff examined two important factors that would afford a more revealing look at the association between the lower violence rate and the new administration. The first factor was violent infractions at other prison complexes operated by the Arizona Department of Corrections. The second factor was inmate transfers from ASPC-Florence to these other institutions.

It is possible that policy and procedural changes made by the Department and instituted system-wide--rather than initiated and implemented at Florence alone--played the major role in reducing violence. Consequently, violent infraction rates at ASPC-Florence were compared with those at two other prison complexes: ASPC-Perryville and ASPC-Tucson, which are primarily medium security institutions housing more than 1,000 inmates each. It was hypothesized that any system-wide changes aimed at controlling inmate violence would likely produce similar results at all three complexes.

To facilitate this comparative analysis, the 22 violence-related infractions were grouped into the 7 categories shown in Table 10 and converted into rates per 100 inmates. As can be seen from this table, the overall violent infraction rate for the two time periods fell at both Florence, 33.47 to 29.16, and Perryville, 29.20 to 23.62. At Tucson, the rate rose slightly from 43.76 to 44.45. In addition, changes in the rates for individual infraction categories varied noticeably among the complexes. For instance, only Florence and Perryville showed decreases in rioting/demonstration rate. And while Florence was found to have a lower intentional death/injury rate in the after

period, both Perryville and Tucson registered higher rates. On the whole, Florence was the most likely of the three complexes to experience decreased rates for the more serious infraction categories. Thus, it seems likely that system-wide changes to control violence did not produce the same results at these three complexes and probably did not play an important part in reducing inmate violence at Florence.

Table 10
Comparison of Violence-Related Infractions
at Arizona Prison Complexes
(Per 100 Inmates)

Infraction	ASPC-Florence	ASPC-Perryville	ASPC-Tucson
11/1/83-10/31/84			
Intentional death/injury	0.30	0.09	0.37
Escape	0.45	1.38	3.05
Rioting/demonstrations	2.35	2.96	0.83
Other assaultive incidents	13.67	8.54	14.06
Property destruction/arson	2.99	7.19	11.39
Threatening others	11.21	5.75	7.68
Weapons possession	2.50	3.32	6.38
Total	33.47	29.20	43.76
11/1/84-10/31/85			
Intentional death/injury	0.07	0.68	1.70
Escape	0.20	0.98	1.04
Rioting/demonstrations	1.93	1.96	3.25
Other assaultive incidents	13.61	8.90	15.90
Property destruction/arson	2.75	3.40	10.06
Threatening others	7.98	4.83	7.69
Weapons possession	2.61	3.47	6.43
Total	29.16	23.62	44.45

It is also possible, however, that following the riot in October 1983, violence-prone inmates at ASPC-Florence had been transferred to other institutions, essentially displacing inmate violence elsewhere in the system. Staff interviewed for this case study stated, in fact, that some gang leaders

had been transferred out of Florence, as had some special needs inmates. The institutions most likely to receive transfers from Florence are ASPC-Perryville and ASPC-Tucson. However, as the preceding comparative analysis revealed, the overall rate of violent infraction decreased at Perryville. And although the rate climbed slightly at Tucson, it did not increase enough to account for the drop at Florence. Equally important, available information indicates that most inmates transferred from Florence during the after period were moved because of a reduction in security and custody classification, not because of an attempt to redistribute violent inmates throughout the Arizona correctional system--an act that would not be readily accepted by Wardens of other facilities.

Damage to Property

Another variable associated with inmate violence is damage to property. It is not uncommon for inmates to damage or destroy property during major disturbances or to vent rage or exact revenge by wrecking property. As a result, agency records pertaining to property damage for the two time periods were also analyzed.

Damage to personal property, equipment, and the institutional physical plant at ASPC-Florence appears to have been reduced. Damage reports for the before period indicate that maintenance responded to 28 serious damage situations, totaling almost $400,000. During the after period, maintenance dealt with 21 such situations, resulting in $275,000 damage. Biasing these findings somewhat are $200,000 in damages that stemmed from a major disturbance in early 1984, midway through the before period.

This decrease appears to have stemmed from the installation of more secure fixtures, improvements in supervisory sight lines, greater use of closed-

circuit television, and increased control of inmate movement--all introduced by the Bramlett administration.

Inmate Grievances

Many correctional experts believe inmate grievances to be correlated with fear of violence from other inmates.[31] Although the Department's Central Office does not maintain automated records of grievances filed by inmates and the Florence complex does not tabulate filings, a partial analysis of this variable was attempted. Using estimates based upon caseworker records, project staff found that the number of inmate grievances filed at ASPC-Florence was lower in the after period than in the before period. It was estimated that between 1,800 and 1,900 filings occurred in the twelve months preceding the change in administration, while only 1,500 to 1,600 grievances were filed during the next twelve months. The nature of these grievances cannot be determined without examining each filing individually. However, it is likely that filings reflect inmates' perceptions of conditions at Florence. The results of the inmate survey indicate that although most respondents did not think the average inmate was any safer under the Bramlett administration, few viewed inmate violence as an increasingly serious problem. Based on survey results, it seems likely that grievance filings in the after period were less concerned with fear of violence than with poor food service, fewer work opportunities, and insufficient programs--all of which were perceived to be worsening under the Bramlett administration.

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31 See, for example, Hans Toch, Living in Prison: The Ecology of Survival (New York: The Free Press, 1977).

Staff Grievances

Grievances filed by staff at ASPC-Florence during the two time periods were also subjected to comparison. The number of filings dropped by nearly 62%, from 37 in the before period to 14 in the after period. This decline is particularly dramatic because staff, unlike inmates, typically file only one or two grievances apiece. The decrease in staff grievances is not surprising since both staff interviews and survey responses suggest that most conditions at the complex, especially those related to security and safety, improved following the change in administration.

Staff Turnover

The last variable examined in this component of the case study is staff turnover. Turnover of staff working in prisons is a function of a variety of factors, including inadequate pay and benefits, poor working environments, and, in recent years, fear of inmate assault. Discussions with agency staff and a review of available records determined that staff turnover at ASPC-Florence was reduced during the after period. The annual turnover rate for the before period was 29.8%. After the new administration assumed control, the rate decreased to 16.1%. Since salaries did not increase beyond normal cost-of-living raises, pay should not be considered a factor in staff turnover reductions. Similarly, the physical plant and working environment did not improve beyond the management changes instituted by the new administration. In addition, discussions with line staff support the notion that lower turnover rates were a consequence of reduced inmate violence at the institution. These staff pointed out that in the past it was widely believed the inmates ran the facility and that only the most serious violence would be dealt with by the old administration. In response, a large number of personnel requested transfers

to other Department institutions or simply resigned to seek positions outside the agency.

Conclusion

The analysis of agency records found that, after the administrative transition, positive change occurred at ASPC-Florence for five variables commonly associated with inmate violence. Examination of records pertaining to violent rule infractions, property damage, inmate grievances, staff grievances, and staff turnover showed decreasing incidences for all variables when the before and after periods were compared. Moreover, the decreases occurred during potentially turbulent times both within the Arizona Department of Corrections and at the Florence complex. These reductions seem to be more than coincidentally related to the changes in policies and procedures introduced by the Bramlett administration. Rather, they appear to be associated with these changes, although it is impossible to determine the strength of the relationship when all independent variables cannot be controlled. Nevertheless, it seems likely that strategies aimed at controlling inmate violence did reduce various types of violent behavior, enhance personal safety, and heighten staff and inmate morale. Such improvements may also be related to system-wide modifications in policies and procedures, or simply to the advent of change itself. Even so, the actions taken by the new administration are likely to have played a more important role because they were both more extensive and longer lived. Thus, the most objective component of the case study points to decreased inmate violence at ASPC-Florence, due primarily to the management approach initiated by the Bramlett administration.

CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDY CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

The case study of inmate violence at ASPC-Florence was intended, first, to identify changes introduced by the new administration to control violence and, second, to assess the effectiveness of these changes. Determining the strategies initiated by the Bramlett administration was relatively easy. Agency staff and memoranda provided a detailed account of actions taken to reduce inmate violence at the complex. Assessing the impact of these actions, as always, proved more difficult.

To conduct the assessment, case study staff decided the most effectual research design would be an evaluative comparison of factors commonly associated with inmate violence. This approach was designed to examine both causes of violence and outcomes of control strategies for the 12-month period preceding the administrative change and the 12-month period following it. To enhance the assessment and interpretation process, several measures of these factors were employed. As an objective measurement of outcomes, an analysis was conducted of agency records pertaining to violent rule infractions, property damage, inmate grievances, staff grievances, and staff turnover. To measure causes, along with outcomes, more subjective tools were employed: interviews with staff and questionnaire surveys of staff and inmates. These tools were subjective in that they relied primarily on individuals' perceptions and also required participants to reflect on conditions before the administrative transition. However, while the use of multiple measures was intended to strengthen the case study's validity, the measures sometimes provided dissimilar findings.

Case Study Summary

Interviews with agency administrators and staff, both current and former, yielded the most specific information about conditions at ASPC-Florence before and after the administrative change, as well as about strategies introduced to control inmate violence. The new administration's approach to violence management was founded upon teamwork--the inclusion of staff in the development and implementation of control strategies. Moreover, the approach was broad based, encompassing everything from physical facilities to staff training to inmate programs and services. More specifically, interviewees cited the following changes:

- Repair and renovation of physical plants;
- Delegation of greater responsibility to Deputy Wardens;
- Policies and procedures for strengthened security;
- Improved planning for emergencies;
- Higher level of staffing;
- More training for staff;
- Segregation of gang leaders and inmate agitators;
- Racial balancing of inmate housing and activities; and
- Increased inmate access to programs and services.

The new administration's emphasis on tightened security, combined with its concern for staff safety and professionalism, was well received by most personnel and helped to decrease the complex's previously high rate of staff turnover. In addition, some of the inmates' dissatisfaction--and resultant disruptive behavior--was alleviated by improving food service, medical care, and sanitation and by eliminating arbitrariness in work assignment and dismissal. More important, the administration's comprehensive management

approach, according to interviewed staff, had diminished the incidence of inmate violence.

These favorable outcomes were confirmed by the analysis of agency records. An examination of records pertaining to violence-related infractions, which had been steadily rising, found a drop in the rate of violations per 100 inmates; the rate fell from 33 in the 12 months prior the change in administration to 29 in the 12 months afterward. In addition, damage to personal property, equipment, and physical plant was reduced, primarily due to the structural improvements and greater inmate supervision initiated by the Bramlett administration. Agency records also indicate that the number of grievances filed by both inmates and staff decreased under the new administration despite growth in the inmate population and staff complement. Finally, the annual staff turnover rate declined nearly 14% in the 12 months following the change in administration.

While the staff interviews and records analysis indicated that the Bramlett administration instituted violence control strategies that effected positive outcomes, the survey of staff and inmates suggested minimal perception of improvement in either conditions conducive to violence or incidents of violence. For example, staff respondents continued to view alcohol and drug use by inmates as a serious problem leading to violence. Inmate respondents perceived a worsening in program accessibility and food service. Both staff and inmates believed that overcrowding remained a serious problem. Inmate-reported involvement in violence-related behaviors (e.g., disciplinary charges, assault on another inmate, assault by another inmate, physical abuse by staff) did not differ greatly before and after the administrative transition. Similarly, staff and inmate responses revealed no perceived change in inmate gang activity. Surprisingly, in spite of the new administration's emphasis on

teamwork, staff respondents saw no change in the level of administrative support.

The only substantial improvements noted by both staff and inmate respondents were greater staff control over inmates, fewer inmate assaults on staff, and increased safety for the average staff member. Staff also believed that the average inmate was safer under the new administration, but inmates perceived a lessening of safety.

Reasons for Case Study Disparities

What accounts for this discrepancy between the findings of the questionnaire survey and the results of the staff interviews and the records analysis? One possible explanation is divergent perspectives. The staff interviewed for this case study were primarily administrators and supervisors, while survey respondents were predominantly inmates and line staff. The former group is more distant from day-to-day operational activities and concerns and, consequently, does not have the same fears and expectations as line staff and inmates. Moreover, administrators and supervisors have access to information not readily available to line staff and not attainable at all by inmates. Statistical data concerning assault rates or program participation, for example, can reveal broad changes not easily discerned by a single individual. As a result, upper level staff are likely to form a more comprehensive and realistic view of conditions and place unusual occurrences into this context. Likewise, although the new administration emphasized teamwork, administrative and supervisory personnel were more likely than line staff and inmates to have obtained an all-inclusive picture of the administration's approach to inmate violence management. They also were more likely to have substantial input into the formulation of this approach and to have a greater understanding of its

rationale and specific components. It is possible, in other words, that many line staff and most inmates were unaware of some of the changes that had been effected by the new administration.

Another possible reason for the different findings of the measurement tools is that line staff and inmates may actually be more cognizant of violence-related conditions than are upper level staff and recordkeeping systems. In fact, this possibility was one of the principal reasons for conducting the questionnaire survey. Survey instruments are commonly employed to obtain descriptive information on prison conditions such as staff control, fear of victimization, program involvement, medical care, and food service.[32] Although these surveys do not proport to yield true pictures of conditions, they do provide something like a "climate reading," which can signal views conducive to violence. Self-report questions on inmate victimization serve another function. Compared with official records, these questions provide more complete--and usually accurate--information about what happens to inmates because staff are not likely to know about certain types of violence, such as extortion or sexual assault. Consequently, records may under-report violence-related behaviors, leaving upper level staff to conclude that violence has decreased when it has really increased or remained unchanged. Similarly, line staff, due to their close contact with the inmate population, may be more aware of inmate dissatisfaction and fear than are supervisors and administrators.

However, the most likely explanation for the discrepancy between the survey findings and the staff interviews and records analysis is a racial disturbance that occurred three months prior to the conduct of the survey. The incident, apparently a reaction to an interracial killing, involved

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32 See, for example, Martha R. Burt, Measuring Prison Results: Ways To Monitor and Evaluate Corrections Performance (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 1981).

approximately 200 inmates and resulted in the death of one inmate and serious injury to eight others. Research has shown that such events produce long-term effects on people's general attitudes,[33] and it would only be logical to assume that this disturbance biased the perceptions of survey respondents, whether or not they were involved in the incident itself. It would not be surprising, for instance, if the disturbance evoked widespread feeling that "things haven't changed any." This view, in turn, could easily awaken old fears and concerns for personal safety. Under such circumstances, inmates can overestimate the incidence of violence and the threat to their personal safety. Ultimately, this situation can become self-aggravating as inmates conclude that they must be continuously on guard against danger. One response to such fear, as Toch has pointed out, is to act aggressive in order to ward off potential violence.[34] However, this kind of reaction also serves to intensify inmates' perceptions of danger, further aggravating fear. In addition, it can actually result in violent behaviors, which may or may not be observed by staff. Inmates in a continual state of fear are likely to project their feelings onto others so that they believe everyone to be endangered. Moreover, their fears are likely to affect their perceptions of other institutional conditions, such as security, staff control, overcrowding, and mistreatment by staff. Line staff, too, may have been similarly biased by the disturbance, a reaction that may have been strengthened by growing inmate tension and fear.

Finally, in discussing the possible effects of the racial disturbance, it is important to point out that the incident took place after the staff interviews were conducted and at a point that lay outside the time frame for

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33 See, for instance, Stephan Isaac and William B. Michael, Handbook in Research and Evaluation (San Diego: EdITS Publishers, 1978).

34 Hans Toch, Living in Prison: The Ecology of Survival (New York: The Free Press, 1977), pp. 150-157.

the records analysis. Consequently, whatever its impact, it could have influenced only the findings of the questionnaire survey.

Import of the Case Study

Despite the variant findings of the case study, several basic conclusions can be drawn regarding the strategies developed to control inmate violence at ASPC-Florence. These conclusions, in turn, may also prove useful to the development and implementation of violence management efforts at other correctional facilities.

First, it appears to have been effective to devise a broad-based approach to inmate violence management. The Bramlett administration introduced numerous changes to improve the management of violence. Many of these changes focused on the facility itself. For example, perimeter security was upgraded through the addition of more lighting, renovation of towers, installation of escape detection devices, and initiation of a 24-hour vehicle patrol. Extensive changes also were made to the complex's maximum security unit. Interior lighting was improved, one cell block was hardened to house inmate agitators and gang leaders, and a visual barrier was installed in the recreation yard to obstruct contact with inmates in an adjacent unit. Closed-circuit television was positioned throughout the complex in areas not frequently monitored by staff.

The administration also increased staffing at Florence, filling all vacant correctional officer positions. Salaries were raised to reduce turnover and attract new personnel. In addition, the most experienced staff were concentrated in the complex's most volatile areas.

Increased staffing, in turn, helped to facilitate greater inmate supervision. Direct supervision was encouraged wherever feasible. All

movement of inmates was more tightly controlled. Policies governing the pass system and carrying of inmate identification cards were strictly enforced. In addition, recreational activities were conducted on a scheduled basis, with a limitation on participants.

The complex's emergency response capabilities were also enhanced. All correctional officers were required to complete courses in emergency procedures such as use of force, conflict management, and hostage survival. The emergency response team was provided additional training and equipment, and on-site response time was cut by approximately 20 minutes.

In addition to these strategies for controlling violence, the administration took steps to alleviate conditions conducive to violence. A key preventative measure was the improvement of inmate classification. The department implemented a new objective classification system that assessed inmates' security, custody, and program needs and enabled staff to place inmates in institutions capable of meeting their needs. Since much of the violence that had occurred at Florence resulted from housing special needs inmates in the general population, the new classification system served to reduce the potential for confrontations involving these inmates. In addition, the Bramlett administration initiated an internal classification system at Florence. This system separated incompatible groups--such as predators and victims--facilitating efforts to thwart intimidation and assaults.

Major improvements were also made in inmate programs and services. Prison industries, maintenance, and custodial assignments were expanded to afford increased access to inmates, and a jobs committee was established to eliminate arbitrariness in assignment and dismissal practices. In addition, all organized activities were structured to accommodate racial balancing. Access to medical care was extended, and food service was improved in response to

inmate complaints. The new administration also established a workable grievance procedure for inmates. Thus, the new administration attempted to address the violence problem from all sides.

Or nearly all sides. The questionnaire survey suggests that while the administration was able to effect a number of concrete changes at the complex, it had but slight impact on something less tangible--individuals' perceptions. People's perceptions, as well as the beliefs on which they are founded, are difficult, and sometimes impossible, to alter. Experience, as well as research, indicates that most change carries with it a fear of the unknown or, conversely, a threat to the familiar. When a correctional administration introduces changes in institutional routine, it creates tension and anxiety due to such fear or threat. It may also engender expectations that may or may not be met. Administrators need to be aware of these consequences and act to ameliorate them as much as possible. Credible justification for change can often help to lessen strain among staff and inmates alike, especially when change is intended for their benefit. In addition, rumor control systems can serve to dissipate exaggerated threats and unrealistic expectations. Communication, then, is the most effective means of influencing perceptions until intended results have been attained. Still, there is no guaranteed strategy for managing individuals' perceptions.

Finally, the findings of the questionnaire survey suggest that while the Bramlett administration was able to effectively mange most inmates, a small group continued to engage in violent behaviors despite the new control strategies. For instance, self-report data revealed that <u>all</u> of the inmates charged with assaulting a staff member after the administrative change had received similar charges previously. More than one-third of those inmates

reporting that they had been assaulted by other inmates also stated that they had been charged with assault.

The existence of a group of hard-core violence-prone inmates is hardly unique to ASPC-Florence. However, it does confirm the need for special units that permit total environmental control over such inmates. At Florence, for instance, inmates identified as perpetually disruptive are housed in Cell Block 6, which has been specifically outfitted and staffed to manage them. This unit is composed of three housing wings, each containing two 32-bed pods and one dayroom. Inmates are housed in single cells, where they spend at least 20 hours a day. Meals are delivered to the cells, as are some limited program activities. Recreation is permitted only on an individualized basis in fenced exercise pens. Cell security checks are made once an hour, with six additional checks conducted randomly. When out of their cells, inmates are restrained by handcuffs and supervised by two officers. The unit employs a voluntary contract system in managing inmates. If inmates meet conduct and sanitation requirements in the contract, they are afforded more freedom of movement and increased privileges. Inmates must meet all contract requirements to be considered for release from the unit. The use of such special units not only facilitates violence control but also helps to ensure the safety of staff and general population inmates.

The case study of inmate violence control at ASPC-Florence, thus, has served to highlight three important management strategies: a comprehensive response to the violence problem, explanation of operational changes and their objectives to staff and inmates, and segregation of inmates especially prone to violence.

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TECHNICAL APPENDIX A

SURVEY INSTRUMENTS

INMATE VIOLENCE MANAGEMENT CASE STUDY:
STAFF QUESTIONNAIRE

Correctional Services Group, Inc., a private firm in Kansas City, Missouri, is conducting a study of inmate violence at the Arizona State Prison Complex-Florence. The purpose of this study is to learn whether control of inmate violence today is better, worse, or about the same as it was before the current administration assumed authority in November 1984. The findings obtained from this study will then be used to improve correctional practices in other institutions. To arrive at any answers, we know that we need to do more than look at department records. It is also important to get the opinions and insights of people like you--individuals who work at this institution. The attached questionnaire is designed to give you the chance to express your opinions about a variety of issues related to inmate violence and personal safety.

This questionnaire is being given to numerous staff at ASPC-Florence so that we can collect as much information as possible. Filling out the questionnaire is completely voluntary. You will not be asked to identify yourself by name. If you choose to complete the questionnaire, please read all directions carefully and answer the questions as honestly as possible. After you have answered as many questions as you can, return the questionnaire to us by using the attached stamped, self-addressed envelope. All your responses will be held in strictest confidence.

Please return the questionnaire within two weeks of today's date. Thank you for your help.

Robert A. Buchanan, President
Correctional Services Group, Inc.

Do Not Write in This Column

INMATE VIOLENCE MANAGEMENT CASE STUDY (Staff Survey)

I. Personal Background

1. AGE AT LAST BIRTHDAY:

___ Under 21
___ 21-25
___ 26-30
___ 31-35
___ 36-40
___ 41-45
___ 46-50
___ 51-55
___ Over 55

___ 1

2. RACE:

___ American Indian (Tribe: _____)
___ Asian American
___ Black
___ Latino (Chicano, Puerto Rican, Cuban, etc.)
___ White
___ Other: _____

___ 2

3. ARE YOU A VETERAN OF THE MILITARY?

___ Yes
___ No

___ 3

4. WHAT IS THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION YOU HAVE COMPLETED?

___ Less Than 12 Years
___ 12 Years or High School Equivalency Program
___ Some College
___ Bachelor's Degree
___ Master's Degree
___ Ph.D.

___ 4

II. Correctional Experience

Do Not Write in This Column

1. HOW MANY YEARS HAVE YOU BEEN WORKING IN CORRECTIONS? 5

___ Less Than 1 Year
___ 1-2 Years
___ 3-5 Years
___ 6-10 Years
___ 11-15 Years
___ More Than 15 Years

2. HOW LONG HAVE YOU WORKED AT THE ARIZONA STATE PRISON COMPLEX-FLORENCE? 6

___ Less Than 1 Year
___ 1-2 Years
___ 3-5 Years
___ 6-10 Years
___ More Than 10 Years

3. HAVE YOU WORKED IN OTHER CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS? 7

___ Yes
___ No

4. WHAT IS YOUR CURRENT JOB CLASSIFICATION? 8

___ Administrator
___ Administrative staff
___ Security supervisor
___ Security staff
___ Program supervisor
___ Program staff
___ Support services supervisor
___ Support services staff

5. WHAT WAS YOUR JOB CLASSIFICATION BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY? 9

___ Administrator
___ Administrative staff
___ Security supervisor
___ Security staff
___ Program supervisor
___ Program staff
___ Support services supervisor
___ Support services staff

6. CURRENT UNIT ASSIGNMENT:

___ Central Unit
___ North Unit
___ South Unit
___ Special Program Unit
___ Cell Block 6
___ East Unit
___ Other: _____

Do Not Write in This Column

10

7. UNIT ASSIGNMENT BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY:

___ Central Unit
___ North Unit
___ South Unit
___ Special Program Unit
___ Cell Block 6
___ East Unit
___ Another institution
___ Not working in corrections
___ Other: _____

11

III. Current Conditions Relating to Violence

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS CONCERN CONDITIONS THAT HAVE EXISTED AT ASPC-FLORENCE SINCE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY IN NOVEMBER 1984.

1. FOR EACH CONDITION LISTED BELOW, PLEASE CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST SHOWS YOUR VIEW OF THIS CONDITION AT ASPC-FLORENCE SINCE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY.

	NOT A PROBLEM	MINOR PROBLEM	MODERATE PROBLEM	SERIOUS PROBLEM	DON'T KNOW	Do Not Write in This Column
Overcrowding	1	2	3	4	9	12
Poor health care	1	2	3	4	9	13
Poorly trained correctional staff	1	2	3	4	9	14
Violence among inmates	1	2	3	4	9	15
Inmate racial conflict	1	2	3	4	9	16
Inmate uprisings against prison conditions	1	2	3	4	9	17
Poor security	1	2	3	4	9	18
Not enough programs	1	2	3	4	9	19
Homosexuality	1	2	3	4	9	20
Inmate drug/alcohol use	1	2	3	4	9	21
Too many violent offenders	1	2	3	4	9	22
Gang violence	1	2	3	4	9	23
Too many young inmates	1	2	3	4	9	24
Poor administrators	1	2	3	4	9	25
Not enough work opportunities	1	2	3	4	9	26
Poor food service	1	2	3	4	9	27

2. ARE THERE ANY CONDITIONS RELATED TO VIOLENCE IN THIS COMPLEX THAT ARE NOT LISTED IN QUESTION 1?

Do Not Write in This Column

___ No
___ Yes WHAT ARE THOSE CONDITIONS? _____ 28

_____

_____

3. BELOW ARE SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THINGS THAT OCCUR IN MANY PRISONS. PLEASE GIVE YOUR BEST ROUGH ESTIMATE OF THE PERCENT OF INMATES AT ASPC-FLORENCE WHO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN EACH TYPE OF BEHAVIOR SINCE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY.

ESTIMATE WHAT PERCENT OF INMATES HERE HAVE:	CIRCLE ONE ANSWER						
Been assaulted by another inmate	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	29
Been verbally abused by staff	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	30
Been physically abused by staff	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	31
Been placed in Disciplinary Detention	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	32
Been placed in Protective Segregation	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	33
Informed on another inmate	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	34
Been victims of sexual assault	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	35
Assaulted another inmate	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	36
Been forced to perform sex by being threatened	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	37
Been members of inmate gangs	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	38
Used drugs or alcohol	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	39
Assaulted a staff member	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	40

4. TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK THE STAFF HAVE CONTROL OVER INMATES HERE?

___ They have no control over inmates
___ They have some control over inmates
___ They have a lot of control over inmates
___ They have total control over inmates 41

5. WE ARE ALSO INTERESTED IN HOW DANGEROUS YOU THINK VARIOUS INMATES AT ASPC-FLORENCE ARE. ON THE LINE SCALES BELOW, CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST SHOWS HOW DANGEROUS YOU THINK EACH TYPE OF INMATE IS NOW.

Do Not Write in This Column

HOW DANGEROUS IS:

The average inmate

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Not at all dangerous — Very dangerous

42

The average gang member

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Not at all dangerous — Very dangerous

43

Inmates with mental problems

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Not at all dangerous — Very dangerous

44

6. RANK THE THREE MOST IMPORTANT REASONS FOR INMATE VIOLENCE HERE SINCE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY. (Put a "1" by the most important reason, a "2" by the next most important reason, and a "3" by the third most important reason.)

___ Homosexual activity
___ Gambling activity
___ Drug activity
___ Strong-arm activity
___ Racial conflict
___ Gang activity
___ Staff treatment
___ Idleness/boredom

45

46

47

___ Other: _____

7. BELOW ARE SOME OF THE INMATE GANGS THAT ARE IN THIS COMPLEX. WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW POWERFUL YOU THINK EACH OF THESE GROUPS IS AND HOW MUCH YOU THINK THE GROUPS AFFECT THE AMOUNT OF VIOLENCE AT ASPC-FLORENCE.

Do Not Write in This Column

	For each group, circle one number that shows For each group, circle one number that shows how much <u>power</u> you think that group now has here.	For each group, circle one number that shows how much <u>violence</u> each group has caused here since the current administration assumed authority.		
Aryan Brotherhood	1 2 3 4 5 No power — Very powerful	1 2 3 4 5 No violence — Much violence	48	49
Bikers	1 2 3 4 5 No power — Very powerful	1 2 3 4 5 No violence — Much violence	50	51
La Familia	1 2 3 4 5 No power — Very powerful	1 2 3 4 5 No violence — Much violence	52	53
Mau Mau	1 2 3 4 5 No power — Very powerful	1 2 3 4 5 No violence — Much violence	54	55
Mexican Mafia	1 2 3 4 5 No power — Very powerful	1 2 3 4 5 No violence — Much violence	56	57
Other: _____	1 2 3 4 5 No power — Very powerful	1 2 3 4 5 No violence — Much violence	58	59

8. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT YOU THINK INMATE GANGS HAVE THE FOLLOWING EFFECTS AT ASPC-FLORENCE.

Do Not Write in This Column

	Yes	No	
Make it harder to control inmates	___	___	60
Make it easier to control inmates	___	___	61
Increase racial tension	___	___	62
Decrease racial tension	___	___	63
Bring in more drugs	___	___	64
Increase mistrust of administration because members appear to get special treatment from staff	___	___	65
Increase power struggles between groups	___	___	66
Decrease power struggles between groups	___	___	67
Increase inmate violence	___	___	68
Decrease inmate violence	___	___	69
Other: _____	___	___	70

9. WHAT DO YOU THINK ARE THE THREE MOST IMPORTANT REASONS THAT INMATES JOIN GANGS HERE? (Put a "1" by the most important reason, a "2" by the next most important reason, and a "3" by the third most important reason.)

___ Because they are pressured to join
___ Because they want to gain a sense of identity
___ Because they want to obtain protection
___ Because they want to get sexual favors
___ Because they want to strong arm other inmates
___ Because they want to get power
___ Because they belonged to the same gang on the outside
___ Other: _____

71
72
73

10. HOW SAFE IS THIS COMPLEX FOR THE AVERAGE STAFF MEMBER? CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ON EACH LINE SCALE

1	2	3	4	5	
Very Safe				Not at all safe	74

HOW SAFE IS THIS COMPLEX FOR THE AVERAGE INMATE?

1	2	3	4	5	
Very Safe				Not at all safe	75

11. HOW OFTEN HAVE YOU BEEN PHYSICALLY ASSAULTED HERE BY AN INMATE SINCE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY?

___ Never
___ Once
___ Twice
___ Three times
___ Four or more times

Do Not Write in This Column

76

12. HOW FREQUENTLY HAVE YOU BEEN VERBALLY ABUSED BY INMATES AT ASPC-FLORENCE SINCE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY?

___ Never
___ Rarely
___ Occasionally
___ Frequently

77

13. ARE THERE ANY PARTICULAR TIMES OF THE DAY THAT YOU DO NOT FEEL SAFE HERE?

___ No
___ Yes WHEN: _____ WHERE: _____

78

WHY DON'T YOU FEEL SAFE AT THESE TIMES: _____

_____

_____

IV. Perceived Changes at ASPC–Florence

Do Not Write in This Column

THE QUESTIONS BELOW ASK YOU TO COMPARE CONDITIONS AT ASPC-FLORENCE BEFORE AND AFTER THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY IN NOVEMBER 1984.

DO NOT COMPLETE THIS SECTION IF YOU WERE NOT EMPLOYED AT THIS COMPLEX PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 1, 1984.

1. ON THE LINE SCALES BELOW, CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST REFLECTS YOUR OPINION CONCERNING THE EXTENT THIS COMPLEX HAS CHANGED IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS SINCE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY. (If you believe no change has occurred, circle "3.")

	CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ON EACH LINE	
Staff control over inmates	1 2 3 4 5 (Less … More)	79
Staff training	1 2 3 4 5 (Less … More)	80
Staff support from administration	1 2 3 4 5 (Less … More)	81
Inmate racial tension	1 2 3 4 5 (Less … More)	82
Inmate violence	1 2 3 4 5 (Less … More)	83
Gang-related violence	1 2 3 4 5 (Less … More)	84

2. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT YOU THINK THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION HAS CHANGED POLICIES AND PROCEDURES IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS SO AS TO REDUCE VIOLENCE HERE.

Do Not Write in This Column

	Yes	No	
Mail/telephone communication	___	___	85
Staff training	___	___	86
Inmate classification	___	___	87
Security and custody	___	___	88
Visiting	___	___	89
Staff qualifications	___	___	90
Inmate grievances	___	___	91
Disciplinary procedures	___	___	92
Food service	___	___	93
Health care	___	___	94
Library use	___	___	95
Religious services	___	___	96
Recreation	___	___	97
Inmate orientation	___	___	98
Prison industries	___	___	99
Work programs (institutional maintenance)	___	___	100
Emergency procedures	___	___	101
Inspections	___	___	102
Inmate access to legal system	___	___	103
Vocational training	___	___	104
Educational programs	___	___	105

3. IN ADDITION TO THE ITEMS LISTED IN QUESTIONS 1 AND 2, CAN YOU THINK OF ANY CHANGES THAT HAVE ALLOWED STAFF TO HAVE GREATER CONTROL OVER INMATE VIOLENCE? (e.g., operational policies and procedures, facility renovations)

Do Not Write in This Column

106

V. Previous Conditions Relating to Violence

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE CONCERNED WITH CONDITIONS THAT EXISTED AT ASPC-FLORENCE BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY IN NOVEMBER 1984.

DO NOT COMPLETE THIS SECTION IF YOU WERE NOT EMPLOYED AT THIS COMPLEX PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 1, 1984.

Do Not Write in This Column

1. FOR EACH CONDITION LISTED BELOW, PLEASE CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST SHOWS YOUR VIEW OF THIS CONDITION AT THIS COMPLEX BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY.

	NOT A PROBLEM	MINOR PROBLEM	MODERATE PROBLEM	SERIOUS PROBLEM	DON'T KNOW	
Overcrowding	1	2	3	4	9	107
Poor health care	1	2	3	4	9	108
Poorly trained correctional staff	1	2	3	4	9	109
Violence among inmates	1	2	3	4	9	110
Inmate racial conflict	1	2	3	4	9	111
Inmate uprisings against prison conditions	1	2	3	4	9	112
Poor security	1	2	3	4	9	113
Not enough programs	1	2	3	4	9	114
Homosexuality	1	2	3	4	9	115
Inmate drug/alcohol use	1	2	3	4	9	116
Too many violent offenders	1	2	3	4	9	117
Gang violence	1	2	3	4	9	118
Too many young inmates	1	2	3	4	9	119
Poor administrators	1	2	3	4	9	120
Not enough work opportunities	1	2	3	4	9	121
Poor food service	1	2	3	4	9	122

2. WERE THERE ANY CONDITIONS RELATED TO VIOLENCE IN THIS COMPLEX THAT ARE NOT LISTED IN QUESTION 1?

Do Not Write in This Column

___ No
___ Yes WHAT WERE THOSE CONDITIONS? _____ 123

_____

_____

_____

3. BELOW ARE SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THINGS THAT OCCUR IN MANY PRISONS. PLEASE GIVE YOUR BEST ROUGH ESTIMATE OF THE PERCENT OF INMATES AT ASPC-FLORENCE WHO WERE INVOLVED IN EACH TYPE OF BEHAVIOR BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY.

ESTIMATE WHAT PERCENT OF INMATES HERE:	CIRCLE ONE						
Were assaulted by another inmate	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	124
Were verbally abused by staff	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	125
Were physically abused by staff	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	126
Were placed in disciplinary detention	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	127
Were placed in protective segregation	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	128
Informed on another inmate	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	129
Were victims of sexual assault	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	130
Assaulted another inmate	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	131
Were forced to perform sex by being threatened	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	132
Were members of inmate gangs	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	133
Used drugs or alcohol	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	134
Assaulted a staff member	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	135

4. WE ARE ALSO INTERESTED IN HOW DANGEROUS YOU THINK VARIOUS INMATES WERE BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY. ON THE LINES BELOW, CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST SHOWS HOW DANGEROUS YOU THINK EACH TYPE OF INMATE WAS THEN.

Do Not Write in This Column

HOW DANGEROUS WAS:	CIRCLE ONE NUMBER	
The average inmate	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at all dangerous ... Very dangerous	136
The average gang member	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at all dangerous ... Very dangerous	137
Inmates with mental problems	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at all dangerous ... Very dangerous	138

5. TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK THE STAFF HERE HAD CONTROL OVER INMATES HERE BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY?

___ They had no control over inmates
___ They had some control over inmates
___ They had a lot of control over inmates
___ They had total control over inmates

139

6. RANK THE THREE MOST IMPORTANT REASONS FOR INMATE VIOLENCE AT ASPC-FLORENCE BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY. (Put a "1" by the most important reason, a "2" by the next most important reason, and a "3" by the third most important reason.)

___ Homosexual activity
___ Gambling activity
___ Drug activity
___ Strong-arm activity
___ Racial conflict
___ Gang activity
___ Staff treatment
___ Idleness/boredom
___ Other: _____

140

141

142

7. RANK THE THREE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS CREATED THEN BY INMATES WITH MENTAL PROBLEMS. (Put a "1" by the most serious problem, a "2" by the next most serious problem, and a "3" by the third most serious problem.)

Do Not Write in This Column

___ Required extra staff time for closer observation
___ More likely to fight with inmates — 143
___ More likely to fight with staff
___ More difficult to discipline
___ Didn't understand prison rules — 144
___ More likely to be victimized by other inmates
___ Greater security risk
___ Other: _____ — 145

8. BELOW ARE SOME OF THE INMATE GANGS THAT WERE IN THIS PRISON BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY. WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW POWERFUL YOU THINK EACH OF THESE GROUPS WAS AND HOW MUCH YOU THINK THE GROUPS AFFECTED THE AMOUNT OF VIOLENCE AT ASPC-FLORENCE THEN.

	For each group, circle one number that shows how much power you think that group had here.	For each group, circle one number that shows how much violence each group caused.	
Aryan Brotherhood	1 2 3 4 5 No power — Very powerful	1 2 3 4 5 No violence — Much violence	146 147
Bikers	1 2 3 4 5 No power — Very powerful	1 2 3 4 5 No violence — Much violence	148 149
La Familia	1 2 3 4 5 No power — Very powerful	1 2 3 4 5 No violence — Much violence	150 151
Mau Mau	1 2 3 4 5 No power — Very powerful	1 2 3 4 5 No violence — Much violence	152 153
Mexican Mafia	1 2 3 4 5 No power — Very powerful	1 2 3 4 5 No violence — Much violence	154 155
Other: _____	1 2 3 4 5 No power — Very powerful	1 2 3 4 5 No violence — Much violence	156 157

9. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT YOU THINK INMATE GANGS HAD THE FOLLOWING EFFECTS HERE BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY.

Do Not Write in This Column

	Yes	No	
Made it harder to control inmates	___	___	158
Made it easier to control inmates	___	___	159
Increased racial tension	___	___	160
Decreased racial tension	___	___	161
Brought in more drugs	___	___	162
Increased mistrust of administration because members appeared to get special treatment from staff	___	___	163
Increased power struggles between groups	___	___	164
Decreased power struggles between groups	___	___	165
Increased inmate violence	___	___	166
Decreased inmate violence	___	___	167
Other: _____	___	___	168

10. WHAT DO YOU THINK WERE THE THREE MOST IMPORTANT REASONS THAT INMATES JOINED GANGS BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY? (Put a "1" by the most important reason, a "2" by the next most important reason, and a "3" by the third most important reason.)

___ Because they were pressured to join
___ Because they wanted to gain a sense of identity — 169
___ Because they wanted to obtain protection
___ Because they wanted to get sexual favors
___ Because they wanted to strong arm other inmates — 170
___ Because they wanted to get power
___ Because they belonged to the same gang on the outside
___ Other: _____ — 171

11. BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY, HOW SAFE WAS THIS COMPLEX FOR THE AVERAGE INMATE?

CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ON EACH LINE

1 2 3 4 5
Very Safe ... Not at all safe — 172

HOW SAFE WAS THIS COMPLEX FOR THE AVERAGE STAFF MEMBER?

1 2 3 4 5
Very Safe ... Not at all safe — 173

12. HOW OFTEN WERE YOU PHYSICALLY ASSAULTED HERE BY AN INMATE BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY?

___ Never
___ Once
___ Twice
___ Three times
___ Four or more times

Do Not Write in This Column

174

13. HOW FREQUENTLY WERE YOU VERBALLY ABUSED BY INMATES AT ASPC-FLORENCE BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY?

___ Never
___ Rarely
___ Occasionally
___ Frequently

175

14. WERE THERE ANY PARTICULAR TIMES OF THE DAY THAT YOU DID NOT FEEL SAFE HERE BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY?

___ No
___ Yes WHEN: _____ WHERE: _____

WHY DIDN'T YOU FEEL SAFE AT THESE TIMES: _____

_____

_____

176

___ 177 ___

THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.

INMATE VIOLENCE MANAGEMENT CASE STUDY:
INMATE QUESTIONNAIRE

Correctional Services Group, Inc., a private firm in Kansas City, Missouri, is conducting a study of inmate violence at the Arizona State Prison Complex-Florence. The purpose of this study is to learn whether control of inmate violence today is better, worse, or about the same as it was before the current administration assumed authority in November 1984. The findings obtained from this study will then be used to improve correctional practices in other institutions. To arrive at any answers, we know that we need to do more than look at department records. It is also important to get the opinions and insights of people like you--individuals who live at this institution. The attached questionnaire is designed to give you the chance to express your opinions about a variety of issues related to inmate violence and personal safety.

This questionnaire is being given to numerous inmates at ASPC-Florence so that we can collect as much information as possible. Filling out the questionnaire is completely voluntary. You will not be asked to identify yourself by name. If you choose to complete the questionnaire, please read all directions carefully and answer the questions as honestly as possible. After you have answered as many questions as you can, return the questionnaire to us by using the attached stamped, self-addressed envelope. **All your responses will be held in strictest confidence.**

Please return the questionnaire within two weeks of today's date. Thank you for your help.

Robert A. Buchanan, President
Correctional Services Group, Inc.

INMATE VIOLENCE MANAGEMENT CASE STUDY (Inmate Survey)

Do Not Write in This Column

I. Current Conditions Relating to Violence

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE ABOUT CONDITIONS AT ASPC-FLORENCE SINCE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY IN NOVEMBER 1984.

1. FOR EACH CONDITION LISTED BELOW, PLEASE CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST SHOWS YOUR VIEW OF THIS CONDITION AT ASPC-FLORENCE NOW.

FOR EXAMPLE: IF YOU THINK THE CONDITION IS "NOT A PROBLEM," YOU WOULD CIRCLE THE "1."

	NOT A PROBLEM	MINOR PROBLEM	MODERATE PROBLEM	SERIOUS PROBLEM	DON'T KNOW	
Overcrowding	1	2	3	4	9	1
Poor health care	1	2	3	4	9	2
Poorly trained correctional staff	1	2	3	4	9	3
Violence among inmates	1	2	3	4	9	4
Inmate racial conflict	1	2	3	4	9	5
Inmate uprisings against prison conditions	1	2	3	4	9	6
Poor security	1	2	3	4	9	7
Not enough programs	1	2	3	4	9	8
Homosexuality	1	2	3	4	9	9
Inmate drug/alcohol use	1	2	3	4	9	10
Too many violent offenders	1	2	3	4	9	11
Gang violence	1	2	3	4	9	12
Too many young inmates	1	2	3	4	9	13
Poor administrators	1	2	3	4	9	14
Not enough work opportunities	1	2	3	4	9	15
Poor food service	1	2	3	4	9	16

2. ARE THERE ANY CONDITIONS RELATED TO VIOLENCE AT THIS COMPLEX THAT ARE NOT LISTED IN QUESTION 1?

Do Not Write in This Column

___ No
___ Yes WHAT ARE THOSE CONDITIONS? _____ 17

_____

3. BELOW ARE SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THINGS THAT GO ON IN MANY PRISONS. PLEASE GIVE YOUR BEST GUESS AS TO THE PERCENT OF INMATES WHO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN EACH TYPE OF BEHAVIOR HERE SINCE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY.

FOR EXAMPLE: IF YOU THINK ABOUT 50% OF THE INMATES HERE USE DRUGS OR ALCOHOL, YOU WOULD CIRCLE 50%.

WHAT PERCENT OF INMATES HERE HAVE:	CIRCLE ONE ANSWER ON EACH LINE						
Been assaulted by another inmate	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	18
Been verbally abused by staff	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	19
Been physically abused by staff	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	20
Been placed in disciplinary detention	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	21
Been placed in protective segregation	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	22
Informed on another inmate	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	23
Been victims of sexual assault	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	24
Assaulted another inmate	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	25
Been forced to perform sex by being threatened	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	26
Been members of inmate gangs	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	27
Used drugs or alcohol	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	28
Assaulted a staff member	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	29

4. THE QUESTIONS BELOW ASK FOR YOUR OPINION ABOUT SAFETY AT THIS COMPLEX. TO THE RIGHT OF EACH QUESTION IS A LINE SCALE. EACH LINE SCALE HAS A SERIES OF NUMBERS THAT SHOW A RANGE OF OPINIONS ABOUT SAFETY. AS THE NUMBERS BECOME HIGHER, THEY SHOW A LESSER AMOUNT OF SAFETY. CIRCLE THE NUMBER ON EACH LINE SCALE THAT BEST SHOWS YOUR OPINION ABOUT SAFETY HERE.

Do Not Write in This Column

HOW SAFE IS THIS COMPLEX FOR THE AVERAGE INMATE?

1 2 3 4 5
Very Safe ... Not at all safe

30

HOW SAFE IS THIS COMPLEX FOR THE AVERAGE STAFF MEMBER?

1 2 3 4 5
Very Safe ... Not at all safe

31

5. WE ARE ALSO INTERESTED IN HOW OFTEN CERTAIN THINGS HAPPEN TO <u>YOU</u> PERSONALLY.

HOW OFTEN HAS THIS HAPPENED TO YOU AT THIS COMPLEX SINCE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY: CIRCLE ONE ANSWER ON EACH LINE

Written up for a minor rule violation	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently	32
Written up for a major rule violation	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently	33
Been a victim of assault	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently	34
Been verbally abused by staff	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently	35
Been physically abused by staff	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently	36
Been placed in disciplinary detention	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently	37
Believed you needed to be placed in protective segregation	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently	38
Been sexually assaulted	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently	39
Been forced to perform sex by being threatened with a beating	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently	40
Use drugs or alcohol	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently	41

6. ARE THERE ANY PARTICULAR TIMES OF THE DAY THAT YOU DO NOT FEEL SAFE HERE?

Do Not Write in This Column

___ No
___ Yes WHEN: _____ WHERE: _____ 42

WHY DON'T YOU FEEL SAFE AT THESE TIMES: _____

_____

_____

7. WE ARE ALSO INTERESTED IN HOW DANGEROUS YOU THINK VARIOUS INMATES HERE ARE NOW. ON THE LINE SCALES BELOW, CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST SHOWS HOW DANGEROUS YOU THINK EACH TYPE OF INMATE IS.

HOW DANGEROUS IS:

The average inmate — 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 — Not at all dangerous / Very dangerous — 43

The average gang member — 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 — Not at all dangerous / Very dangerous — 44

Inmates with mental problems — 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 — Not at all dangerous / Very dangerous — 45

8. HOW OFTEN HAVE YOU BEEN CHARGED WITH ASSAULTING ANOTHER INMATE AT THIS COMPLEX SINCE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY?

___ Never
___ Once
___ Twice
___ Three times
___ Four or more times

46

9. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING REASONS WERE RELATED TO YOUR BEING CHARGED WITH THESE ASSAULTS.

Do Not Write in This Column

	Yes	No	
Because of my race	___	___	47
Because I belong to a certain inmate group	___	___	48
Because I am an inmate leader	___	___	49
Because someone snitched on me	___	___	50
Because the staff wanted to harass me	___	___	51
Because I was guilty	___	___	52
Other: _____	___	___	53

10. HOW OFTEN HAVE YOU BEEN CHARGED WITH ASSAULTING A STAFF MEMBER AT THIS COMPLEX SINCE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY?

___ Never
___ Once
___ Twice
___ Three times
___ Four or more times

54

11. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT YOU THINK THE FOLLOWING REASONS WERE RELATED TO YOUR BEING CHARGED WITH THESE ASSAULTS.

	Yes	No	
Because of my race	___	___	55
Because I belong to a certain inmate group	___	___	56
Because I am an inmate leader	___	___	57
Because someone snitched on me	___	___	58
Because the staff wanted to harass me	___	___	59
Because the staff were trying to cover up their assault on me	___	___	60
Because I was guilty	___	___	61
Other: _____	___	___	62

12. TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK THE STAFF HERE HAVE CONTROL OVER INMATES NOW?

Do Not Write in This Column

___ They have no control over inmates
___ They have some control over inmates
___ They have a lot of control over inmates
___ They have total control over inmates

___ 63

13. WHAT ARE THE THREE MOST IMPORTANT REASONS FOR INMATE VIOLENCE HERE SINCE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY? (Put a "1" by the most important reason, a "2" by the next most important reason, and a "3" by the third most important reason.)

___ Homosexual activity
___ Gambling activity
___ Drug activity
___ Strong-arm activity
___ Racial conflict
___ Gang activity
___ Staff treatment
___ Idleness/boredom

___ 64

___ 65

___ 66

___ Other: _____

14. BELOW ARE SOME OF THE INMATE GANGS THAT ARE AT THIS PRISON COMPLEX. WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW POWERFUL YOU THINK EACH OF THESE GROUPS IS AND HOW MUCH YOU THINK THE GROUPS AFFECT THE AMOUNT OF VIOLENCE AT ASPC-FLORENCE.

Do Not Write in This Column

	For each group, circle one number that shows For each group, circle one number that shows how much power you think that group now has here.	For each group, circle one number that shows how much violence each group has caused here since the current administration assumed authority.	
Aryan Brotherhood	1 2 3 4 5 No power — Very powerful	1 2 3 4 5 No violence — Much violence	67 68
Bikers	1 2 3 4 5 No power — Very powerful	1 2 3 4 5 No violence — Much violence	69 70
La Familia	1 2 3 4 5 No power — Very powerful	1 2 3 4 5 No violence — Much violence	71 72
Mau Mau	1 2 3 4 5 No power — Very powerful	1 2 3 4 5 No violence — Much violence	73 74
Mexican Mafia	1 2 3 4 5 No power — Very powerful	1 2 3 4 5 No violence — Much violence	75 76
Other: _____	1 2 3 4 5 No power — Very powerful	1 2 3 4 5 No violence — Much violence	77 78

15. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT YOU THINK INMATE GANGS HAVE THE FOLLOWING EFFECTS AT ASPC-FLORENCE NOW.

Do Not Write in This Column

	Yes	No	
Make it harder to control inmates	___	___	79
Make it easier to control inmates	___	___	80
Increase racial tension	___	___	81
Decrease racial tension	___	___	82
Bring in more drugs	___	___	83
Increase mistrust of administration because members appear to get special treatment from staff	___	___	84
Increase power struggles between groups	___	___	85
Decrease power struggles between groups	___	___	86
Increase inmate violence	___	___	87
Decrease inmate violence	___	___	88
Other: _____	___	___	89

16. WHAT DO YOU THINK ARE THE THREE MOST IMPORTANT REASONS THAT INMATES JOIN GANGS HERE? (Put a "1" by the most important reason, a "2" by the next most important reason, and a "3" by the third most important reason.)

___ Because they are pressured to join
___ Because they want to gain a sense of identity — 90
___ Because they want to obtain protection
___ Because they want to get sexual favors
___ Because they want to strong arm other inmates — 91
___ Because they want to get power
___ Because they belonged to the same gang on the outside — 92
___ Other: _____

II. Perceived Changes at ASPC–Florence

Do Not Write in This Column

THE QUESTIONS BELOW ASK YOU TO COMPARE CONDITIONS AT ASPC-FLORENCE BEFORE AND AFTER THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY IN NOVEMBER 1984.

DO NOT COMPLETE THIS SECTION IF YOU WERE NOT DOING TIME AT THIS COMPLEX BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY.

1. ON EACH LINE SCALE BELOW, CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST SHOWS HOW MUCH YOU THINK THIS COMPLEX HAS CHANGED IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS SINCE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY? (If you believe no change has occurred, circle "3.")

Staff control over inmates	1 2 3 4 5 Less More	93
Staff training	1 2 3 4 5 Less More	94
Staff support from administration	1 2 3 4 5 Less More	95
Inmate racial tension	1 2 3 4 5 Less More	96
Inmate violence	1 2 3 4 5 Less More	97
Gang-related violence	1 2 3 4 5 Less More	98

2. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT YOU THINK THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION HAS CHANGED POLICIES AND PROCEDURES IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS SO AS TO REDUCE VIOLENCE HERE.

Do Not Write in This Column

	Yes	No	
Mail/telephone communication	—	—	99
Staff training	—	—	100
Inmate classification	—	—	101
Security and custody	—	—	102
Visiting	—	—	103
Staff qualifications	—	—	104
Inmate grievances	—	—	105
Disciplinary procedures	—	—	106
Food service	—	—	107
Health care	—	—	108
Library use	—	—	109
Religious services	—	—	110
Recreation	—	—	111
Inmate orientation	—	—	112
Prison industries	—	—	113
Work programs (institutional maintenance)	—	—	114
Emergency procedures	—	—	115
Inspections	—	—	116
Inmate access to legal system	—	—	117
Vocational training	—	—	118
Educational programs	—	—	119

III. Previous Conditions Relating to Violence

Do Not Write in This Column

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE ABOUT WITH CONDITIONS THAT EXISTED AT ASPC-FLORENCE BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY IN NOVEMBER 1984.

DO NOT ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS IF YOU WERE NOT DOING TIME AT THIS COMPLEX BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY.

1. FOR EACH CONDITION LISTED BELOW, PLEASE CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST SHOWS YOUR VIEW OF THIS CONDITION AT ASPC-FLORENCE BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY.

FOR EXAMPLE: IF YOU THINK THE CONDITION IS "NOT A PROBLEM," YOU WOULD CIRCLE THE "1."

	NOT A PROBLEM	MINOR PROBLEM	MODERATE PROBLEM	SERIOUS PROBLEM	DON'T KNOW	
Overcrowding	1	2	3	4	9	120
Poor health care	1	2	3	4	9	121
Poorly trained correctional staff	1	2	3	4	9	122
Violence among inmates	1	2	3	4	9	123
Inmate racial conflict	1	2	3	4	9	124
Inmate uprisings against prison conditions	1	2	3	4	9	125
Poor security	1	2	3	4	9	126
Not enough programs	1	2	3	4	9	127
Homosexuality	1	2	3	4	9	128
Inmate drug/alcohol use	1	2	3	4	9	129
Too many violent offenders	1	2	3	4	9	130
Gang violence	1	2	3	4	9	131
Too many young inmates	1	2	3	4	9	132
Poor administrators	1	2	3	4	9	133
Not enough work opportunities	1	2	3	4	9	134
Poor food service	1	2	3	4	9	135

2. WERE THERE ANY CONDITIONS RELATED TO VIOLENCE IN THIS COMPLEX THEN THAT ARE NOT LISTED IN QUESTION 1?

Do Not Write in This Column

___ Yes WHAT WERE THOSE CONDITIONS? _____

_____ 136

_____

_____

___ No

3. BELOW ARE SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THINGS THAT GO ON IN MANY PRISONS. PLEASE GIVE YOUR BEST GUESS AS TO OF THE PERCENT OF INMATES WHO WERE INVOLVED IN EACH TYPE OF BEHAVIOR HERE BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY.

FOR EXAMPLE: IF YOU THINK ABOUT 50% OF THE INMATES HERE USED DRUGS AND/OR ALCOHOL, YOU WOULD CIRCLE 50%.

WHAT PERCENT OF INMATES HERE:	CIRCLE ONE ANSWER ON EACH LINE						
Were assaulted by another inmate	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	137
Were verbally abused by staff	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	138
Were physically abused by staff	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	139
Were placed in Disciplinary Detention	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	140
Were placed in Protective Segregation	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	141
Informed on another inmate	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	142
Were victims of sexual assault	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	143
Assaulted another inmate	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	144
Were forced to perform sex by being threatened	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	145
Were members of inmate gangs	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	146
Used drugs or alcohol	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	147
Assaulted a staff member	0-5%	15%	30%	50%	70%	90-100%	148

4. THE QUESTIONS BELOW ASK FOR YOUR OPINION ABOUT SAFETY AT THIS COMPLEX. TO THE RIGHT OF EACH QUESTION IS A LINE SCALE. EACH LINE SCALE HAS A SERIES OF NUMBERS THAT SHOW A RANGE OF OPINIONS ABOUT SAFETY. AS THE NUMBERS BECOME HIGHER, THEY SHOW A LESSER AMOUNT OF SAFETY. CIRCLE THE NUMBER ON EACH LINE SCALE THAT BEST SHOWS YOUR OPINION ABOUT SAFETY HERE.

Do Not Write in This Column

HOW SAFE WAS THIS COMPLEX FOR THE AVERAGE INMATE BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY?	1 2 3 4 5 Very Safe ... Not at all safe	149
HOW SAFE WAS THIS COMPLEX FOR THE AVERAGE STAFF MEMBER THEN?	1 2 3 4 5 Very Safe ... Not at all safe	150

5. WE ARE ALSO INTERESTED IN HOW OFTEN CERTAIN THINGS HAPPENED TO YOU PERSONALLY AT THIS COMPLEX BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY.

HOW OFTEN DID THIS HAPPEN TO YOU: (CIRCLE ONE ANSWER ON EACH LINE)					
Were written up for a minor rule violation	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently	151
Were written up for a major rule violation	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently	152
Were a victim of assault	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently	153
Were verbally abused by staff	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently	154
Were physically abused by staff	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently	155
Were placed in disciplinary detention	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently	156
Believed you needed to be placed in protective segregation	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently	157
Were sexually assaulted	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently	158
Were forced to perform sex by being threatened with a beating	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently	159
Used drugs or alcohol	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently	160

6. WERE THERE ANY PARTICULAR TIMES OF THE DAY THAT YOU DID NOT FEEL SAFE HERE BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY?

Do Not Write in This Column

___ No
___ Yes WHEN: _____ WHERE: _____ 161

WHY DIDN'T YOU FEEL SAFE AT THESE TIMES: _____

_____

_____

7. WE ARE ALSO INTERESTED IN HOW DANGEROUS YOU THINK VARIOUS INMATES HERE WERE BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY. ON THE LINE SCALES BELOW, CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST SHOWS HOW DANGEROUS YOU THINK EACH TYPE OF INMATE WAS THEN.

HOW DANGEROUS WAS:	CIRCLE ONE NUMBER	
The average inmate	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at all dangerous ... Very dangerous	162
The average gang member	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at all dangerous ... Very dangerous	163
Inmates with mental problems	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at all dangerous ... Very dangerous	164

8. HOW OFTEN WERE YOU CHARGED WITH ASSAULTING ANOTHER INMATE AT ASPC-FLORENCE BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY?

___ Never
___ Once
___ Twice
___ Three times
___ Four or mour times

165

9. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT YOU THINK ANY OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS WERE RELATED TO YOUR BEING CHARGED WITH THESE ASSAULTS.

Do Not Write in This Column

	Yes	No	
Because of my race	___	___	166
Because I belonged to a certain inmate group	___	___	167
Because I was an inmate leader	___	___	168
Because someone snitched on me	___	___	169
Because the staff wanted to harass me	___	___	170
Because I was guilty	___	___	171
Other: _____	___	___	172

10. HOW OFTEN WERE YOU CHARGED WITH ASSAULTING A STAFF MEMBER AT ASPC-FLORENCE BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY?

___ Never
___ Once
___ Twice
___ Three times
___ Four or more times

173

11. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT ANY OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS WERE RELATED TO YOUR BEING CHARGED WITH THESE ASSAULTS.

	Yes	No	
Because of my race	___	___	174
Because I belonged to a certain inmate group	___	___	175
Because I was an inmate leader	___	___	176
Because someone snitched on me	___	___	177
Because the staff wanted to harass me	___	___	178
Because the staff were trying to cover up their assault on me	___	___	179
Because I was guilty	___	___	180
Other: _____	___	___	181

12. TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK THE STAFF HERE HAD CONTROL OVER INMATES BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY?

Do Not Write in This Column

___ They had no control over inmates
___ They had some control over inmates
___ They had a lot of control over inmates
___ They had total control over inmates

182

13. WHAT WERE THE THREE MOST IMPORTANT REASONS FOR INMATE VIOLENCE AT ASPC-FLORENCE BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY? (Put a "1" by the most important reason, a "2" by the next most important reason, and a "3" by the third most important reason.)

___ Homosexual activity
___ Gambling activity
___ Drug activity
___ Strong-arm activity
___ Racial conflict
___ Gang activity
___ Staff treatment
___ Idleness/boredom

183

184

185

___ Other: _____

14. BELOW ARE SOME OF THE INMATE GANGS THAT WERE IN THIS PRISON BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY. WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW POWERFUL YOU THINK EACH OF THESE GROUPS WAS AND HOW MUCH YOU THINK THE GROUPS AFFECTED THE AMOUNT OF VIOLENCE AT ASPC-FLORENCE THEN.

Do Not Write in This Column

	For each group, circle one number that shows how much <u>power</u> you think that group had here.	For each group, circle one number that shows how much <u>violence</u> each group caused.	
Aryan Brotherhood	1 2 3 4 5 No power — Very powerful	1 2 3 4 5 No violence — Much violence	186 187
Bikers	1 2 3 4 5 No power — Very powerful	1 2 3 4 5 No violence — Much violence	188 189
La Familia	1 2 3 4 5 No power — Very powerful	1 2 3 4 5 No violence — Much violence	190 191
Mau Mau	1 2 3 4 5 No power — Very powerful	1 2 3 4 5 No violence — Much violence	192 193
Mexican Mafia	1 2 3 4 5 No power — Very powerful	1 2 3 4 5 No violence — Much violence	194 195
Other: _____	1 2 3 4 5 No power — Very powerful	1 2 3 4 5 No violence — Much violence	196 197

15. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT YOU THINK INMATE GANGS HAD THE FOLLOWING EFFECTS AT ASPC-FLORENCE THEN.

Do Not Write in This Column

	Yes	No	
Made it harder to control inmates	___	___	198
Made it easier to control inmates	___	___	199
Increased racial tension	___	___	200
Decreased racial tension	___	___	201
Brought in more drugs	___	___	202
Increased mistrust of administration because members appeared to get special treatment from staff	___	___	203
Increased power struggles between groups	___	___	204
Decreased power struggles between groups	___	___	205
Increased inmate violence	___	___	206
Decreased inmate violence	___	___	207
Other: _____	___	___	208

16. WHAT DO YOU THINK WERE THE THREE MOST IMPORTANT REASONS THAT INMATES JOINED GANGS THEN? (Put a "1" by the most important reason, a "2" by the next most important reason, and a "3" by the third most important reason.)

___ Because they were pressured to join
___ Because they wanted to gain a sense of identity — 209
___ Because they wanted to obtain protection
___ Because they wanted to get sexual favors
___ Because they wanted to strong arm other inmates — 210
___ Because they wanted to get power
___ Because they belonged to the same gang on the outside — 211
___ Other: _____

IV. Personal Background

Do Not Write in This Column

IN ADDITION TO OPINIONS ABOUT CONDITIONS AT ASPC-FLORENCE, WE WOULD LIKE TO GET SOME INFORMATION ABOUT THE PEOPLE WHO ARE ANSWERING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE. QUESTIONS ABOUT PERSONAL BACKGROUND ARE BEING ASKED OF BOTH INMATES AND STAFF. YOUR ANSWERS WILL NOT BE USED TO IDENTIFY WHO YOU ARE. THIS INFORMATION IS NEEDED ONLY FOR RESEARCH PURPOSES. PLEASE TAKE A FEW ADDITIONAL MINUTES TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS THAT FOLLOW.

1. AGE AT LAST BIRTHDAY: ___ 212

___ Under 18
___ 18-21
___ 22-25
___ 26-30
___ 31-35
___ 36-40
___ 41-45
___ 46-50
___ 51-55
___ 56-60
___ OVER 60

2. RACE: ___ 213

___ American Indian (Tribe: _____)
___ Asian American
___ Black
___ Latino (Chicano, Puerto Rican, Cuban, etc.)
___ White
___ Other: _____

3. LEVEL OF EDUCATION COMPLETED (Check highest level completed): ___ 214

___ Less Than 8th Grade
___ Some High School
___ High School or High School Equivalency Program
___ Some College
___ College
___ Post-graduate Education

4. MARITAL STATUS: ___ 215

___ Never Married
___ Married
___ Divorced
___ Separated
___ Widowed

5. PRIMARY OFFENSE YOU ARE NOW DOING TIME FOR:

(If parole or probation violation, check original offense. If more than one offense, put a "1" by the most serious, and check additional offenses.)

Do Not Write in This Column

___ Arson
___ Assault
___ Bribery
___ Burglary/Criminal Trespass
___ Business/Commercial Frauds
___ Credit Card Fraud
___ Criminal Damage to Property
___ Drug Offenses
___ Escape
___ Forgery
___ Fraud
___ Homicide
___ Kidnapping
___ Obstruction of Public Administration
___ Offenses Against Public Order
___ Organized Crime and Fraud
___ Perjury
___ Sexual Offenses
___ Robbery
___ Theft
___ Weapons/Explosives
___ Other: _____

216

217

6. CURRENT HOUSING ASSIGNMENT:

___ Central Unit
___ North Unit
___ South Unit
___ Special Program Unit
___ Cell Block 6
___ East Unit

218

7. HOUSING ASSIGNMENT BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION ASSUMED AUTHORITY:

___ Central Unit
___ North Unit
___ South Unit
___ Special Program Unit
___ Cell Block 6
___ East Unit
___ Another institution
___ Not imprisoned

219

8. DO YOU CURRENTLY HAVE A JOB ASSIGNMENT?

___ Yes
___ No

220

9. ARE YOU CURRENTLY INVOLVED IN PROGRAM ACTIVITIES?

___ Yes
___ No

221

10. HOW MANY YEARS HAVE YOU SERVED SO FAR AT THIS COMPLEX FOR YOUR CURRENT OFFENSE? (If you were on parole, count the time you served before parole plus the time served since your return.)

Do Not Write in This Column

___ Less Than 1 Year
___ 1-2 Years
___ 3-5 Years
___ 6-7 Years
___ 8-10 Years
___ 11-16 Years
___ More Than 16 Years

222

11. HAVE YOU DONE TIME PREVIOUSLY AT ASPC-FLORENCE?

___ Yes
___ No

223

12. HAVE YOU EVER SERVED TIME IN ANOTHER ADULT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION?

___ Yes
___ No

224

___ 225 ___

THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO ANSWER THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.

TECHNICAL APPENDIX B

ADDITIONAL SURVEY RESULTS

To facilitate presentation and comprehension of the many findings of the questionnaire survey of staff and inmates at ASPC-Florence, only the most important results were reported in the survey section of the case study. This appendix contains responses to questions not covered in the text of the case study and cross tabulations performed in conjunction with the survey analysis.

General Perceptions of Change at ASPC-Florence

In regard to violence-related behavior, most staff respondents usually perceived less change--positive or negative--following the administrative transition than did inmate respondents, who tended to believe that the situation had worsened. As shown in Table 1, for example, 42% of the inmates thought gang-related violence had increased, while 45% of the staff indicated that the extent of violence had not changed at all. However, a substantial proportion of staff (36%) believed that more gang-related violence was occurring, and 36% of the inmates perceived no change.

Slightly more than 54% of the inmate respondents believed inmate racial tension had intensified, but 52% of the staff saw no change. These perceptions suggest that little positive effect stemmed from the new administration's efforts to attain racial balance in housing and programming, which were pointed out by staff interviewed for this case study.

Finally, 60% of the inmates indicated that inmate violence in general had escalated; in contrast, 43% of the staff thought the amount of inmate violence was nearly the same as before the Bramlett administration assumed authority. As noted earlier, though, people tend to focus their thoughts on the present

Table 1
Perceived Changes in Selected Conditions at ASPC-Florence
(Percent*)

Staff

Condition	Degree of Change**				
	1	2	3	4	5
Inmate racial tension	0	7	52	29	12
Inmate violence	7	17	43	29	5
Gang-related violence	7	12	45	24	12
Staff control over inmates	0	21	33	31	14
Staff training	2	14	45	29	10

(N = 42)

Inmates

Condition	Degree of Change**				
	1	2	3	4	5
Inmate racial tension	6	11	29	29	25
Inmate violence	6	15	19	34	26
Gang-related violence	6	16	36	20	22
Staff control over inmates	11	18	36	22	13
Staff training	22	10	45	15	7

(N = 108)

*All percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number.
**Based on Likert Scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = less, 3 = no change, and 5 = more

and recent past, so inmate perceptions in these areas may reflect reactions to the racial incident that occurred shortly before the survey was conducted.

Cross Tabulations. When staff perceptions of change were subjected to cross tabulation, however, some interesting distinctions emerged. For instance, white respondents typically perceived the incidence of violent behavior as stable, but nonwhite staff thought it had risen. Staff younger than age 36 were much more likely than older staff to view the extent of violence-related behavior as unchanged. Length of employment at the complex also appeared to make a difference, possibly because staff with longer tenure had established a baseline against which to measure violent incidents. Staff who had worked at Florence for more than five years generally believed violent behaviors had remained about the same, while newer staff thought they had grown. Yet staff who had never worked at another correctional institution were much more likely than those who had to indicate that violent behaviors had increased. Program staff were slightly more likely than security staff to view the level of violent behavior as unchanged.

Grouped by assignment to the same housing unit throughout the case study time frame, most staff saw gang-related violence at about the same level. However, all respondents from Cell Block 6 believed racial tension had grown, perhaps due to a class action suit involving charges of discrimination that was ongoing during the after period. A plurality of respondents from Cell Block 6 and from South Unit also viewed inmate violence as worse. It should be noted that few respondents fell into the Cell Block 6 subgroup. Consequently, their responses should not necessarily be interpreted as representative.

Cross tabulations for inmate respondents also revealed some noticeable differences. Whites were more likely than nonwhites to see a decrease in racial tension, although a majority of both groups thought tensions had

intensified. Nonwhites also perceived a slightly greater increase in gang-related violence than did whites. Inmate respondents who were age 30 or younger were more likely than older inmates to think that inmate violence had mounted, although an equally large proportion of both age groups saw increases in racial tension and gang-related violence. Likewise, inmates who had been incarcerated at ASPC-Florence for between two and five years were more likely than those with longer lengths of stay to believe that inmate violence had risen.

When inmates were examined according to placement in the same housing unit both before and after the change in administration, distinct differences in respondents' perceptions emerged. Inmates continually housed in Central Unit, where security procedures had been tightened considerably, were much more likely to view decreases in inmate racial tension, inmate violence, and gang-related violence--although a plurality still believed that inmate racial tension and inmate violence had increased. In contrast, a large majority of respondents in Cell Block 6 and of those in South Unit thought that racial tension and inmate violence had grown worse. The perception of both staff and inmates that violence in South Unit had escalated is probably associated with the fact that the unit had received a number of disruptive inmates from Central Unit in order to relieve overcrowding.

While staff and inmates differed widely in their views on inmate behaviors related to violence, less divergence existed in their perceptions of change associated with staff functions. (See Table 1.) For instance, approximately equal percentages of staff and inmate respondents thought that <u>staff control over inmates</u> had remained about the same (33% and 36%, respectively) or had increased (45% and 35%).

Approximately 45% of both groups believed that the amount of staff training had not changed, a rather surprising finding for staff in light of the additional hours mandated by the Department that was noted by staff interviewed for this case study.

Cross Tabulations. Once again cross tabulations of data reveal differences within staff respondent subgroups. Whites were more likely than nonwhites to perceive more control over inmates and more staff training following the change in administration. Nearly all nonwhites, in fact, thought that staff control had remained the same or decreased. A majority of staff under age 36 perceived no change in staff control over inmates, while a majority of older respondents thought that staff had more control. Younger staff were also somewhat more likely to see a decrease in administrative support, although an equal proportion, along with a plurality of older staff, believed the level of support had remained the same. Staff who had worked at the complex for five years or less generally saw no change in staff control over inmates, staff training, and administrative support. However, staff who had worked at Florence for more than five years tended to perceive improvements in these areas. Noticeable differences also emerged between staff who had been employed at other correctional institutions and those who had not. The former were slightly more likely to think that staff control had been strengthened, much more likely to view staff training as unchanged, and much more likely to believe administrative support had declined.

In terms of functional area, security staff generally perceived an increase in staff control over inmates, while a plurality of program staff indicated that the amount of control had dropped slightly. A much larger proportion of program staff than security staff also thought that administrative support had decreased, although nearly half of both groups saw

no change in the level of support. When respondents were grouped by rank, it was found that supervisory staff were more likely than line staff to believe that control over inmates had been augmented. In addition, supervisory staff, who typically have closer contact with administrators, were more likely to see an increase in support from the new administration.

Finally, housing unit assignment seemed to exert an important influence on staff perceptions, although the low number of respondents from Cell Block 6 cautions against definitive conclusions. When grouped by assignment to the same housing unit before and after the change in administration, respondents' perceptions differed considerably. For example, all staff assigned to Cell Block 6 and over one half of the staff in Central Unit believed that control over inmates had grown. However, close to one half of those in South Unit thought control had declined somewhat. A majority of staff in Central Unit and Cell Block 6 believed staff training had improved, but a majority in South Unit noted some deterioration. And while nearly half of the respondents from Central Unit perceived greater support from the administration--perhaps due to the attention given to problems there, as reported by staff interviewed for this case study--no staff in Cell Block 6 detected any change in the level of support, and a majority in South Unit believed administrative support had lessened, possibly due to resentment over the transfer of violence-prone inmates from Central Unit.

Interestingly, inmate respondents who were continuously housed in the same unit sometimes lent support to the staff findings. For example, almost half of the inmates in Central Unit thought that staff control had been tightened. In contrast to staff, however, the majority of inmates in South Unit and Cell Block 6 perceived no change in the amount of staff control. In regard to administrative support, nearly half of the inmate respondents in Central Unit,

like their staff counterparts, thought that the Bramlett administration provided staff with more support. On the other hand, inmates in South Unit believed administrative support had remained essentially unchanged rather than decreased, and Cell Block 6 inmates tended to think support for staff had grown rather than stayed the same. Unlike staff, a majority of inmates in all housing units saw no change in staff training.

Other cross tabulations also disclosed differing views among inmate respondents. Whites were more likely than nonwhites to believe that staff control had increased, while nonwhites tended to see greater administrative support than did whites. Inmates over age 30 generally perceived more staff control under the new administration; a plurality of younger inmates saw a drop in the amount of control. Similarly, inmates who had been confined at ASPC-Florence for longer than five years were much more likely than newer inmates to think that both staff control and administrative support had been strengthened.

Changes in Policies and Procedures

Cross Tabulations. Cross tabulations of staff responses yielded divergent findings on changes in policies and procedures to decrease inmate violence. For instance, staff who had worked at the Florence complex for more than five years were more likely than newer staff to perceive violence-reducing changes in policies and procedures pertaining to mail and telephone communication, staff training, library use, recreation, prison industries, and inmate access to legal system. Newer staff, on the other hand, were more likely to perceive changes in work programs and inspections. In general, security staff noted greater procedural changes aimed at violence reduction than did program staff. A much larger proportion of security staff pointed to improvements in inmate communications, inmate classification, health care, and inspections, while

program staff reacted substantially more positively only to inmate grievances and vocational training. Supervisory staff and line staff were in agreement about most changes in policies and procedures. However, supervisory staff were more likely to see improvements in emergency procedures and inspections, and a larger proportion of line staff perceived changes in health care.

Considerable discrepancy was found among staff when responses were examined based on continuing assignment to one housing unit. However, no definite conclusions can be reached in some instances due to the low number of respondents from Cell Block 6. In regard to security and custody, for example, a large majority of Central Unit staff noted improvement, while such change was reported by just half of the Cell Block 6 staff and only a third of South Unit staff. All respondents from Cell Block 6 thought changes in staff qualification requirements were aimed at decreasing inmate violence. However, only two-thirds of the Central Unit respondents and one-third of those in South Unit agreed with this view. In general, staff assigned to Central Unit were the most likely to perceive positive changes in policies and procedures; staff in South Unit, the least likely, perhaps due to a racial disturbance that occurred a few months before the survey was conducted.

Cross tabulations of inmate responses revealed little difference between demographic subgroups; there was almost universal agreement on the lack of improvement in all areas of institutional policies and procedures. Some notable exceptions:

- Inmates over age 30 were more likely than younger inmates to think that changes pertaining to security and custody had been made to reduce violence.
- Inmates confined at Florence for five years or less were more likely to perceive changes in recreation than were inmates with longer lengths of stay.
- White inmates were more likely than nonwhite inmates to note important changes in the area of inspections.

- Inmates involved in work assignments and/or program activities were more likely than nonparticipants to see changes in mail and telephone policies.

The most influential factor in inmate responses appeared to be housing unit assignment (i.e., assignment to the same unit throughout the case study time frame). South Unit respondents--like their staff counterparts--were the least likely subgroup to report improvements in policies and procedures. The only exceptions to this generalization were in the areas of vocational training and educational programs, although even here just one-fourth of the inmates responded positively. Central Unit inmates were the most likely to see changes in numerous areas, including inmate classification, security and custody, staff qualifications, staff training, and prison industries. Moreover, they were the housing unit subgroup to report change in health care. Again, only a small proportion noted these changes--typically one-third or less.

Perceived Safety at ASPC-Florence

Cross Tabulations. Cross tabulations of staff data were performed to determine if any differences in perceptions of safety existed among various respondent subgroups. When grouped by age, the data revealed that staff who were 36 or older were more likely than younger staff to believe that safety for both the average staff member and the average inmate had increased. In fact, a larger proportion of younger staff indicated that average staff safety had decreased than reported that average inmate safety had declined. Staff who had been employed at ASPC-Florence for more than five years thought average inmate safety had improved substantially, but newer staff, on the whole, perceived little change. However, while both groups viewed staff as being more safe under the Bramlett administration, newer staff saw slightly more improvement. Staff with experience in other correctional institutions perceived more

positive changes in average staff safety than did other staff. However, staff who had worked in other institutions were less likely to think that safety for the average inmate had been enhanced.

Although both security staff and program staff believed that staff safety had been augmented, program staff perceived more improvement. Still, program staff indicated that the average inmate was slightly more safe than the average staff member--even though inmate safety had not changed much. Security staff, on the other hand, perceived an increase in safety for the average inmate. Cross tabulation by rank also revealed some disparate perceptions of safety: while both supervisory staff and line staff perceived safer conditions for staff and inmates, supervisory saw greater changes and line staff generally believed inmates were safer than staff. In terms of housing unit assignment, staff continuously assigned to Central Unit indicated that safety had increased for staff and inmates alike. The few respondents from Cell Block 6 believed that the average staff member was slightly more safe under the new administration but saw no change for the average inmate. Respondents from South Unit felt safety had lessened for both staff and inmates.

Inmate respondents continuously housed in South Unit also indicated that average inmate safety had decreased; however, they thought staff safety had improved slightly. In general, respondents in all housing units believed that safety for the average staff member had been enhanced. With the exception of South Unit, inmates in all housing units perceived slightly safer conditions for the average inmate. But, again, responses from South Unit may have been biased by a serious racial incident that took place shortly before the survey. When grouped by race, both whites and nonwhites noted more safety for the average staff member but less for the average inmate. However, nonwhites perceived greater degrees of change than did whites.

Respondents to both questionnaires were also asked whether they ever felt a lack of safety at the complex and, if so, when and/or where. For purposes of comparison, the question was included in the section on conditions prior to the change in administration and the section on conditions following the change.

Staff responses pointed to a small increase in feelings of being unsafe at times, with affirmative answers rising from 47% to 58%. This increase held for all respondent subgroups with the exceptions of program staff and staff continuously assigned to Cell Block 6, who reported a drop. It is also worth noting that all respondents from South Unit stated they felt unsafe at times during both periods. Among the most commonly reported circumstances inducing unsafe feelings subsequent to the administrative transition were inmate activities in the Central Unit yard and supervision duties during meals, especially in Central Unit. This finding is somewhat surprising since safety for the average staff member in general and the staff at Central Unit in particular was believed to have increased and interviewed staff reported numerous improvements in security at Central Unit. However, many individuals working in correctional institutions experience stress and/or fear when overseeing large-scale movement on the yard or in dining halls, so this finding is not unique to the Florence case study.

In contrast, inmate respondents showed a decrease in feelings of being unsafe at times. Nearly 69% said they felt unsafe prior to the change in administration, while 60% acknowledged similar feelings afterward. This finding was true of all respondent subgroups except for inmates continuously housed in Cell Block 6, where there was no change among the large majority reporting unsafe feelings, and inmates in Central Unit, where--despite enhanced security measures--a slight increase occurred. As with staff, the most frequently mentioned circumstance evoking concern for safety was mealtimes in

the dining halls. Inmate respondents also expressed fear about nighttime activities, especially on the yard and in dormitory areas. This finding supports the results of other research studies on prison violence, which have concluded that housing units, particularly dormitories, and other areas where inmates are in close quarters tend to be more conducive to assault.[1] Inmates placed in protective segregation felt unsafe whenever they were "exposed" to the general population.

Perceived Dangerousness of Selected Types of Inmates

One element of perceptions of safety at the Florence complex is the degree of danger believed to be presented by inmates, especially those likely to engage in violent behavior. Is the increase in perceptions of staff safety, and the decrease in inmate safety, reflected in the way respondents viewed certain types of inmates? To ascertain if this was the case, the survey instruments asked staff and inmates to rate the degree of danger associated with three types of inmates: the average inmate, the average gang member, and the average inmate with mental problems. The question was included in both the section pertaining to conditions at the complex prior to the change in administration and the section concerned with conditions afterward. Responses to this question are detailed in Table 2.

As can be seen, staff perceived a decrease in the degree of danger presented by the average inmate under the new administration, but they noted almost no change for the average gang member or inmate with mental problems. Inmate respondents also thought that the average inmate had become slightly

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[1] See, for example, Randy Atlas, "Crime Site Selection for Assaults in Four Florida Prisons," Man-Environment Systems (March/May 1982), pp. 59-68, and Lee H. Bowker, "Victimizers and Victims in American Correctional Institutions" in The Pains of Imprisonment, R. Johnson and H. Toch, eds. (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982), pp. 63-76.

Table 2
Perceived Dangerousness of Selected Types of Inmates
Before and After the Change in Administration
(Percent*)

Staff

Type of Inmate	Degree of Dangerousness** 1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Average inmate before	5	10	31	31	17	7	0
Average inmate after	2	21	36	24	17	0	0
Average gang member before	2	2	7	19	38	14	17
Average gang member after	0	2	10	24	38	19	7
Average inmate with mental problems--before	0	5	12	21	19	14	29
Average inmate with mental problems--after	0	5	10	19	26	14	26

(N = 42)

Inmates

Type of Inmate	Degree of Dangerousness** 1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Average inmate before (N = 109)	6	28	31	24	9	2	0
Average inmate after (N = 111)	13	21	38	19	7	2	1
Average gang member before (N = 109)	2	11	17	21	19	16	14
Average gang member after (N = 109)	4	12	11	16	18	20	19
Average inmate with mental problems--before (N = 107)	5	18	11	16	22	12	16
Average inmate with mental problems--after (N = 108)	3	8	18	17	16	22	17

*All percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number.
**Based on Likert Scale of 1 to 7, with 1 = not at all dangerous and 7 = very dangerous.

less dangerous. However, while they noted no change in the dangerousness of the average inmate with mental problems, they indicated that the average gang member had grown a little more dangerous.

In addition to changes in perceptions over time, Table 2 shows differences between staff and inmate views of these inmate types. For instance, inmate respondents tended to think of the average inmate as less dangerous than did staff. On the other hand, inmates generally saw the average gang member as presenting a more extreme threat. However, staff were more likely than inmates to associate a high degree of dangerousness with the average inmate with mental problems. The view that mentally ill inmates are especially violence prone is quite common among corrections practitioners, although some research has found that mental illness is not related to violence in the absence of a history of violent behavior.[2]

Staff Control Over Inmates

Cross Tabulations. When subjected to cross tabulation, staff responses typically revealed no important disagreements among subgroups regarding the perception that staff had greater control over inmates under the new administration. The sole exception was staff continuously assigned to South Unit, who saw almost no change. However, there was some disparity about the amount of control staff had. For instance, white staff were more likely than nonwhite staff to think that staff had a lot or complete control. Similarly, supervisory staff were more likely than line staff to perceive a lot or complete staff control. And program staff, when compared with security staff, indicated much more often that staff had a lot of control over inmates.

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[2] See John Monahan, Predicting Violent Behavior: An Assessment of Clinical Techniques (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1981), pp. 112-118.

Cross tabulations of inmate responses tended to concur with the overall findings that staff control had increased only slightly. However, inmates continuously housed in Central Unit, where interviewed staff stated that security measures had been enhanced, reported a noticeable rise in staff control. Inmates in South Unit also observed greater staff control under the new administration--a perception contrary to survey responses from South Unit staff. And although both white and nonwhites thought that staff control had strengthened somewhat, nonwhites were more likely to view staff as having complete control.

Serious Problems Leading to Inmate Violence

Cross Tabulations. Cross tabulations of staff responses to the question on serious problems leading to violence at ASPC-Florence, again, found differing perceptions among subgroups. In terms of race, nonwhite staff were much more likely than white staff to see overcrowding and inmate racial conflict as increasingly serious problems, and while whites noted a drop in gang violence, nonwhites viewed this problem as basically unchanged. However, nonwhite staff were more likely to believe that alcohol and/or drug use by inmates had become a less serious problem. Staff over age 35 were more likely than younger staff to view overcrowding as a serious problem. In addition, there was a drop in the proportion of older staff who believed inmate racial conflict was a serious problem following the change in administration, while there was no change for younger staff.

Staff respondents who had worked at the complex for five or fewer years were more likely than longer-term staff to see an improvement in crowded conditions. Newer staff were also more likely to perceive a drop in inmate drug and/or alcohol use. However, a larger proportion of newer staff believed

that inmate racial conflict and gangs were increasingly serious problems leading to violence. Newer staff also expressed more concern about the lack of programming and work opportunities. Staff who had been employed at another correctional institution generally perceived a rise in inmate drug and/or alcohol use, while other staff noted a decline. Staff who had worked elsewhere were also more likely to see an increase in inmate racial conflict. Moreover, they did not think that the problems of gang violence and violence among inmates had changed much. In contrast, other staff indicated that the severity of these two problems had lessened. Finally, staff who had worked at other institutions were much less likely to view overcrowding as a serious problem under the Bramlett administration.

In general, security staff, when compared with program staff, were more likely to believe that the severity of problems had decreased in the areas of health care, inmate racial conflict, gang violence, work opportunities, and food service. On the other hand, program staff were more likely to view overcrowding and insufficient programs as increasingly serious problems. However, fewer program as well as security staff perceived violence among inmates as a serious problem following the change in administration. Several differences also were found between supervisory staff and line staff. For example, line staff tended to perceive greater problem severity in overcrowding and health care, while supervisory staff typically noted improvements in these areas. And line staff saw little change in the seriousness of inmate racial conflict although supervisory staff felt it had decreased somewhat. Both groups indicated that gang violence and violence among inmates had become less serious problems--but line staff reported a greater downward shift. Interestingly, no supervisory staff completing the survey ever perceived poor staff training as a serious problem. This finding may reflect the fact that

supervisory personnel were usually involved in the preparation and delivery of training programs.

Numerous discrepancies emerged when staff responses were examined based on continuous assignment to the same housing unit. In fact, noticeable differences between respondent subgroups were found in nearly every problem area:

- Staff from Central Unit were more likely than staff assigned elsewhere to view overcrowding as an increasingly serious problem under the new administration, despite the elimination of double bunking reported by staff interviewed for this case study and the transfer of inmates to South Unit.
- Staff from Central Unit and Cell Block 6 tended to think that inmate racial conflict had decreased in seriousness, but staff from South Unit indicated they had seen little change.
- Staff from Central Unit were more likely than other staff to state that gang violence had become a less serious problem.
- Staff from South Unit were much more likely than staff assigned elsewhere to indicate that a lack of programs was an increasingly serious problem, a finding supported by staff interviewed for this case study.
- Staff in all housing unit subgroups either saw improvement in the area of poor administrators or perceived little problem at all.

Again, in reporting these findings, it is important to note that the number of respondents from Cell Block 6 was quite small and that respondents from South may have been biased somewhat by a racial disturbance that occurred a few months prior to the survey.

Inmate responses were also cross-tabulated to determine if differences existed among subgroups' perceptions of serious problems leading to violence. As with overall inmate responses, subgroup data revealed greater concern with perceived institutional shortcomings than with inmate misconduct. Grouped by age, inmates who were 30 years old or younger thought that health care had become a more serious problem, while older inmates believed that health care had improved. In addition, substantially larger proportions of younger inmates felt that program and work opportunities, overcrowding, and staff

administrators had worsened. Older inmates were more likely than younger inmates to cite poor staff training as a serious problem. Similarly, inmates who had been imprisoned at Florence for more than five years were more likely than newer inmates to think that staff training presented an increasingly serious problem. Newer inmates, in contrast, were more likely to see poor administrators as a worsening problem. Newer inmates also were more likely to believe that health care and food service had improved. Both groups revealed substantial concern with overcrowding and its negative effects. In terms of race, both white and nonwhite respondents generally perceived a rise in serious problems. However, the proportion viewing problems as serious was nearly always higher for nonwhites.

The greatest differences in perceptions of serious problems occurred when inmates were broken down by continuous assignment to the same housing unit. For instance, respondents in Central Unit--like staff--indicated that overcrowding had become a more serious problem, those in South Unit saw no real change, and those in Cell Block 6 thought overcrowding was a less serious problem under the Bramlett administration. Inmates continuously housed in Central and South Units were more likely than inmates in other units to perceive poor staff training as a growing problem, while those in South Unit and Cell Block 6 were more likely to view poor administrators as an increasingly serious concern. The only areas in which housing subgroups seemed to agree were the lack of opportunities for programming and work assignments--substantial proportions in all units thought that problems in these areas had become more serious. Finally, it is worth noting that a large majority of respondents in South Unit indicated that most problems of concern to inmates were quite serious and, at best, had not worsened under the new administration.

Primary Reason for Inmate Violence. In addition to assessing conditions and problems related to inmate violence before and after the change in administration, respondents to both questionnaires were asked to review a list of reasons for inmate violence and rank them according to importance for each period. Their responses are summarized below in Table 3.

Table 3
Primary Reason for Inmate Violence at ASPC-Florence

	Before Administrative Change	After Administrative Change
Staff respondents (N = 40)	Drug activity (42%)	Drug activity (45%)
Inmate respondents (N = 91)	Racial conflict (27%)	Racial conflict, Staff treatment, Idleness (21% each)

As can be seen from this table, a near majority of staff identified drug activity as the primary reason for inmate violence both before and after the change in administration. The next most commonly cited reason was gang activity, mentioned by 30% in the before period and 20% in the after period. These findings suggest a drop in gang activity and a slight rise in drug activity among inmates.

In contrast to staff, inmates demonstrated little agreement on the primary reason for inmate violence. In regard to the before period, 27% cited racial conflict and 21% said gang activity; only 13% saw drug activity as the main reason. For the after period, inmates noticeably shifted the reason for violence away from their own behavior, with 21% of the respondents each attributing inmate violence to staff treatment, idleness, and racial conflict.

Cross Tabulations. Cross tabulations of staff responses revealed little variance in perceptions of the primary reason for inmate violence. A majority

of nearly all respondent subgroups named inmate drug activity as the principal reason in both the before and the after period. An association between drugs and violence has been found in prior research,[3] and, as staff respondents previously indicated, drug use has proven a serious problem at Florence. Consequently, drug use by inmates would seem to present a considerable threat to the institution's security, safety, and order.

If drug activity was not cited as the primary reason for inmate violence in the before period, staff were most likely to list gang activity. This was the case for staff who had been continuously assigned to Central Unit and Cell Block 6. Like most staff, however, the majority of respondents in Central and South Units perceived drug activity as the primary reason for violence in the after period. The few staff working continuously in Cell Block 6 split evenly between racial conflict and gang activity as the main reason for violence following the change in administration.

An examination of inmate responses by subgroup showed the sort of divergence that would be expected based on the overall tabulations summarized in Table -. Pluralities of respondents named gang activity and racial conflict as the primary reason for inmate violence in the before period. The only exception to this finding was inmates without a work assignment, who said, unsurprisingly, that idleness was the major reason. As with the overall inmate tabulations, subgroup responses for the after period tended to focus more on staff treatment and idleness as the principal reason for inmate violence. The association between idleness and violence is supported by prior research, which has concluded that a lack of planned activity affords inmates more time to sulk

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[3] See, for example, John Monahan, Predicting Violent Behavior: An Assessment of Clinical Techniques (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1981), pp. 110-111.

and scheme.[4] In addition, insufficient opportunities to participate in paid work assignments often result in economic inequalities that breed conflict and extortion.[5]

Results of the inmate cross tabulations are highlighted below in Table 4.

Table 4
Perceived Reason for Inmate Violence by Inmate Subgroup

Subgroup	Reason Before Administrative Change	Reason After Administrative Change
Age 30 or younger	Gang activity	Staff treatment
Older than age 30	Racial conflict	Racial conflict
≤ 5 years at Florence	Racial conflict	Racial conflict/staff treatment
> 5 years at Florence	Racial conflict	Idleness
White	Racial conflict	Racial conflict
Nonwhite	Racial conflict	Staff treatment
Always in Central Unit	Gang activity	Idleness
Always in South Unit	Racial conflict	Racial conflict
Always in Cell Block 6	Racial conflict	Racial conflict/staff treatment

Inmate Involvement in Violence-Related Behaviors. Respondents to both survey instruments were asked to estimate the percent of inmates who were involved in specified behaviors related to violence. Respondents were asked to provide estimates for the periods prior to and following the change of administration at ASPC-Florence. Tables 5 and 6 summarize the overall responses by staff and inmates. As reflected in Table 5, staff did not perceive any major

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4 Joan Petersilia, "The Career Criminal Concept: Its Applicability to Prison Management" in Classification As A Management Tool: Theories and Models For Decision-Makers (College Park, MD: American Correctional Association, 1982), pp. 45-54.

5 Lee H. Bowker, "Victimizers and Victims in American Correctional Institutions" in The Pains of Imprisonment, R. Johnson and H. Toch, eds. (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982), pp. 63-76.

Table 5
Staff Estimates of Inmates Involved in Violence-Related Behaviors
Before and After the Change in Administration
(Percent*)

Behavior	0-5%		15%		30%		50%		> 50%	
	Before	After	Before	After	Before	After	Before	After	Before	After
Been assaulted by inmate	24	45	42	33	22	10	12	10	0	2
Been verbally abused by staff	46	64	27	19	12	5	7	7	7	5
Been physically abused by staff	82	85	12	12	5	2	0	0	0	0
Been placed in disciplinary detention	17	16	46	40	17	27	7	2	12	12
Been placed in protective segregation	22	19	28	40	38	36	10	5	2	0
Informed on another inmate	24	31	32	29	20	24	20	17	5	0
Been sexually assaulted	42	67	39	24	17	10	0	0	2	0
Assaulted another inmate	24	38	32	36	32	21	10	0	2	5
Belong to inmate gang	12	10	12	22	38	32	22	15	15	22
Used drugs/alcohol	7	5	7	7	12	14	37	26	37	48
Assaulted staff member	51	62	27	21	15	7	5	10	2	0

Before: N = 41
After: N = 42

*All percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number.

Table 6
Inmate Estimates of Inmates Involved in Violence-Related Behaviors
Before and After the Change in Administration
(Percent*)

Behavior	0-5%		15%		30%		50%		> 50%	
	Before	After	Before	After	Before	After	Before	After	Before	After
Been assaulted by inmate	26	26	27	25	27	30	12	15	8	5
Been verbally abused by staff	16	14	24	12	22	16	18	24	20	35
Been physically abused by staff	37	32	29	33	22	23	4	5	7	7
Been placed in disciplinary detention	3	4	30	13	23	19	24	22	20	43
Been placed in protective segregation	14	9	28	16	28	38	19	27	11	10
Informed on another inmate	15	8	20	11	23	16	18	31	24	34
Been sexually assaulted	57	60	26	18	11	18	6	3	0	1
Assaulted another inmate	23	21	27	24	29	28	16	17	5	9
Belong to inmate gang	12	16	23	22	26	25	23	22	16	15
Used drugs/alcohol	7	6	18	14	23	17	23	18	28	45
Assaulted staff member	60	67	27	16	7	11	3	5	3	1

Before: N = 110
After: N = 109

*All percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number.

increases in inmate involvement in violence-related behavior following the administrative transition. Some decreases were noted, but these were not substantial either. In general, most staff did not think that a large proportion of inmates were involved in conduct related to violence. The sole exception to this generalization was drug and/or alcohol use, which a large majority of staff felt that most inmates engaged in during both periods. This finding is consistent with staff views that drug use was the primary reason for inmate violence throughout the case study time frame and that drug and/or alcohol use constituted a serious problem. Staff also thought that a substantial portion of the inmate population belonged to gangs and believed that this proportion had grown slightly following the change in administration.

However, inmate responses, shown in Table 6, reflected a considerable jump in the percent of inmates who thought at least one-half of the inmate population had been verbally abused by staff (38% to 59%), been placed in disciplinary detention (44% to 65%), and informed on another inmate (42% to 65%). Staff responses showed only slight decreases in these areas. On the whole, though, inmates perceived little change in inmate involvement in violence-related behaviors. Interestingly, the estimates provided by inmates and staff were usually quite similar.

Inmate-Reported Involvement in Violence-related Behaviors

Cross Tabulations. Self-report data on inmate involvement in violence-related behaviors were cross tabulated by race and housing unit. Differences between white and nonwhite responses for the two time periods were both few and minor. Among these divergences was a slight gain in the proportion of nonwhites who reported being victims of inmate assault, while a slight decline occurred among whites. In addition, nonwhite respondents were more likely to

state they experienced increased verbal abuse by staff, especially on a frequent basis. Following the change in administration, responses indicated that nonwhites were also more likely than whites to be ticketed for a major disciplinary violation.

Grouped by housing unit assignment, the self-report data revealed numerous dissimilarities, with reduced involvement characteristic only in Central Unit. Inmates who had been continuously housed in South Unit not only reported a larger increase in write-ups for major disciplinary violations than did other housing subgroups, but also said they were cited more frequently for such violations. Inmates who had always been housed in Central Unit reported a slight drop in assaults by another inmate, but those in South Unit and Cell Block 6 noted growing victimization. In regard to verbal abuse by staff, respondents in Central Unit and Cell Block 6 stated that a decrease had occurred, while those in South Unit reported an increased incidence. Central Unit was the only housing subgroup to indicate that physical abuse by staff had been reduced following the administrative change. It is also worth noting that respondents in South Unit, who reported no physical abuse by staff before the change in administration, believed that such abuse had grown more frequent afterward. Inmates in South Unit were also more likely than inmates housed elsewhere to feel a greater need to be placed in protective segregation under the Bramlett administration. Finally, inmates in Central Unit constituted the only housing unit subgroup to report reduced use of drugs and/or alcohol.

Verbal Abuse of Staff by Inmates. As noted previously, inmates reported--as well as perceived--an increase in verbal abuse by staff following the change in administration. Did staff, in turn, see any change in the incidence of verbal abuse by inmates? In both the before and after sections of the staff survey instrument, respondents were asked to indicate how frequently they

encountered verbal abuse from inmates. As shown in Figure 1, a noticeable downshift in incidents of verbal abuse was reported after the Bramlett administration assumed authority. The percent of staff stating they were frequently abused verbally dropped appreciably from 52% to 31%, while those experiencing verbal abuse only on rare occasions doubled from 12% to 24%.

Cross Tabulations. When these self-report data were subjected to cross tabulation, the decline in verbal abuse by inmates held true for all respondent subgroups but one--staff continuously assigned to South Unit, who reported no change. While almost all subgroups indicated that verbal abuse by inmates had diminished, the extent of the decrease sometimes varied. For example, security staff experienced a more extensive drop than did program staff. Similarly, supervisory staff, when compared with line staff, encountered much less verbal abuse under the new administration. Staff continuously assigned to Central Unit reported a greater decrease than staff in Cell Block 6, while those in South Unit, as mentioned earlier, perceived no change. However, this last finding cannot be considered definitive due to the limited number of respondents in Cell Block 6.

Self-Reported Assaults by Inmates on Staff

Cross Tabulations. Cross tabulations of staff self-report data on assaults by inmates found a decrease in assaults characteristic of every respondent subgroup. This analysis also indicated that some subgroups experienced more assaults by inmates than did others, even following the change in administration. For example, security staff were more likely than program staff to be assaulted. Line staff were slightly more likely than supervisory staff to be attacked. Staff who had worked at the complex for more than five years reported more assaults than did newer staff. And staff continuously

Figure 1.

STAFF REPORTING VERBAL ABUSE BY INMATES



assigned to Cell Block 6 and Central Unit were more likely than those assigned to South Unit to be assaulted by inmates; however, once again the cross tabulation by housing unit assignment must be viewed cautiously since few respondents worked in Cell Block 6 throughout the case study time frame.

Inmate Gang Activity

Table 7 presents staff and inmate perceptions of the amount of power associated with five major inmate gangs at ASPC-Florence. As can be seen, both respondent groups tended to think that the Aryan Brotherhood, a predominantly white gang, had lost some influence, although it was still viewed as the most powerful gang. Inmate respondents indicated that the Mau Mau's, a gang composed primarily of blacks, had gained a little power, but staff, again, saw almost no change.

Table 8 summarizes respondents' perceptions of the amount of violence caused by the same five gangs. Staff and inmates alike noted a decrease in violence by the Aryan Brotherhood, but both indicated that the Mau Mau gang caused more violence following the change in administration.

Table 7
Power Associated with Selected Inmate Gangs
Before and After the Change in Administration (Percent)

Staff

Gang	Amount of Power* 1	2	3	4	5
Aryan Brotherhood:					
Before (N = 42)	2	5	12	36	45
After (N = 42)	2	2	21	43	31
Bikers:					
Before (N = 41)	2	37	39	17	5
After (N = 40)	8	45	25	20	2
La Familia:					
Before (N = 39)	15	20	44	18	3
After (N = 39)	5	28	46	15	5
Mau Mau:					
Before (N = 41)	22	32	29	15	2
After (N = 41)	17	39	27	15	2
Mexican Mafia:					
Before (N = 42)	5	5	31	36	24
After (N = 42)	2	14	33	29	21

Inmates

Gang	Amount of Power* 1	2	3	4	5
Aryan Brotherhood:					
Before (N = 103)	6	8	28	26	32
After (N = 103)	6	18	20	32	23
Bikers:					
Before (N = 101)	28	33	24	8	8
After (N = 101)	26	31	29	9	6
La Familia:					
Before (N = 102)	26	30	17	19	8
After (N = 99)	22	22	28	15	12
Mau Mau:					
Before (N = 103)	21	32	26	14	7
After (N = 100)	18	29	27	19	7
Mexican Mafia:					
Before (N = 103)	11	19	23	19	27
After (N = 101)	12	20	26	25	18

*Based on a Likert Scale of 1 to 5, with 1 = No Power and 5 = Very Powerful