

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FINAL EVALUATION REPORT OF THE PROFESSIONAL TRAINING WORKSHOPS

Submitted to: National Institute of Justice under Grant Award #86-IJ-CX-0003

Submitted by: Police Management Association

Submitted on: June 30, 1987

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SECTION I. INTRODUCTION

In January, 1986, the Police Management Association (PMA) received a continuation grant award from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to conduct a series of eight two-day management training seminars over a 14 month period. This award followed a previous NIJ 10-month award to PMA to conduct six one-day training seminars. A major recommendation resulting from the original project was to expand the training period to include one additional day.

Start up activities included convening the project's Site Selection Committee in January to review and select eight U.S. cities as primary training sites. PMA had received four written requests for the training during 1986. Because it was anticipated that the majority of host departments would select NIJ's "Improving Police Management" (IPM) training program for presentation, the IPM course was updated in the early planning stages to include some of NIJ's latest research findings in the major topic areas.

This specialized training course was targeted to middle and upper level law enforcement managers and participant selection was left to the discretion of the host department(s).

Evaluation instruments were designed for the participants and for the chiefs of each host department. Results of these evaluations are presented herein, as well as other succinct information deemed important to overall project history.

Recommendations are addressed to both PMA and NIJ, in the event that future projects of this nature are anticipated.

SECTION II. PROJECT BACKGROUND INFORMATION

A. Description of the Police Management Association

Incorporated in the District of Columbia in 1980, the Police Management Association (PMA) is a private, nonprofit, international membership organization. Membership is increasing rapidly and PMA currently has enrolled over 1500 law enforcement personnel in the United States and twelve other countries. Recruiting efforts are targeted to middle managers ranking from sergeant through executive heads of police agencies, as well as civilian law enforcement personnel who qualify also within PMA's four membership categories.

Challenged with the complex problems of policing and guided by six principles, PMA seeks to upgrade police management and ultimately to professionalize policing at all levels.

PMA believes that through continual research, experimentation, and exchanges of ideas through public discussion and debate, development of a professional body of knowledge about policing will be enhanced.

In addition to conducting management training seminars, PMA publishes a newsletter, and readership reaches well beyond its membership. An annual conference draws together both an international membership and representatives of major law enforcement organizations in the U.S. Through membership, a host of benefits are offered. To further one of PMA's goals -- to upgrade police management -- the Research in Brief (RIBS) publications of the National Institute of Justice are mailed regularly to its membership.

B. Project History

The "Improving Police Management" (IPM) workshop series was developed originally through the Research Utilization Program supported by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ). Prior to 1981, the IPM program was conducted in three days and attended by top criminal justice policymakers and administrators in a multistate area. NIJ then began to look at less costly ways to conduct training and disseminate research findings.

In late 1984, the Police Foundation requested and received funding from NIJ to present six one-day training workshops for police middle managers and executives. The grant was contracted directly to the Police Management Association (PMA) because of its unique qualifications to conduct such workshops.

Offering police departments a shopping list of several NIJ-approved training programs, PMA sponsored four IPM seminars and two Differential Police Response workshops in ten months during 1985.

Pleased with the overall success of these one-day seminars, PMA applied for and received direct funding from NIJ to present eight, two-day training programs. Extending the course for at least one additional day was a major recommendation stemming from PMA's 1985 training evaluation report to NIJ. PMA strongly urged interested police agencies to select the "Improving Police Management" training from among the course offerings, because of the comprehensive update and revisions planned for the course materials. Moreover, the program's trainers had exhaustive knowledge about each training topic as

well as each other's training methods. Thus, historical familiarity with the program enabled PMA and the trainers to plan and conduct the specialized training in an efficient, effective, and flexible manner.

SECTION III. SCOPE OF WORK

A. Site Selection

An ad-hoc Site Selection Committee, comprised of two PMA members/practitioners, project staff, and NIJ's project monitor, convened in January, 1986 with the mission to identify the project's eight primary training sites. Several criteria were used in the selection process: seasonal considerations, geographic location, and verbal or written invitations from interested police departments.

Primary sites selected and tentatively scheduled at this meeting were: St. Petersburg, FL, Charleston, SC, Chicago, IL, Northern California, Tucson, AZ, New York/Nassau County, NY, Portland, OR, and Birmingham, AL. Secondary sites were identified as Fort Wayne, IN, Boston, MA, Duluth, MN and Richmond, VA.

Because of conflicting scheduling problems, some departments needed to rearrange training dates. In two instances, departments elected not to host an IPM seminar. Even with several delayed cancellations, PMA reports that with its secondary training sites on standby, no major obstacles were encountered in program implementation.

PMA conducted its eight IPM training programs chronologically in the following cities: St. Petersburg, FL, Chicago, IL, Charleston, SC, Fort Wayne, IN, Nassau County NY, Honolulu, Hawaii, Tucson, AZ, and Birmingham, AL. Six of the eight primary sites chosen by the Site Selection Committee and one secondary site (Fort Wayne, IN) hosted a training seminar.

PMA requested and received permission from NIJ to present its sixth IPM training course to the Honolulu, Hawaii Police Department, since Honolulu was the venue for PMA's annual conference and the Honolulu Police Department had requested the training seminar during 1985. Because all sites were firmly scheduled, PMA was unable to accommodate them at that time. Scheduling these two events back-to-back in Honolulu eased the burden of repeated, remote travel for project staff and trainers who had planned to attend both events.

PMA's project workplan called for conducting eight training seminars in 14 months. Adherence to this timetable was easily accomplished, even with unanticipated program deviations at several sites.

B. Curriculum Development

Although the project's grant indicated that nine training topics would be offered for departmental course selection, PMA's projection that the "Improving Police Management" (IPM) course offering would be selected by the majority of chiefs of police across all sites, bore out. PMA recommended the IPM training program to each seminar host because of several factors: the IPM program incorporates many segments of other NIJ's course offerings; the IPM program was to be substantially updated; and, to PMA's best knowledge, none of the remaining course topics on NIJ's suggested list had been updated since the early 80's.

As a result, only two training sites requested other course syllabuses for review. One of these two departments elected not to host a seminar, while the other selected the IPM program

following review of the various syllabuses.

Shortly following the Site Selection Committee meeting, project staff met with Mr. Jerome Miron, National Sheriffs' Association, and NIJ-certified IPM Trainer, to review the outline for the IPM training program. A 12-session outline was submitted, accompanied by time schedules for each session. Mr. Miron indicated that he was revising and updating the 1985 IPM Handbook to incorporate some of NIJ's latest research. Included among these updates were selected chapters from the recently published Patrol Deployment, "Issues and Practices in Criminal Justice," National Institute of Justice, September 1985; "Evaluation of the DPR Field Test," Executive Summary, Thomas McEwen and Edward Connors, Research Management Associates, Alexandria, VA, 1984; "Synthesizing and Extending the Results of Police Patrol Studies," Larson, 1985; and, "Responding to the Needs and Rights of Crime Victims: Managing Criminal Investigations," Jerome Miron, National Sheriffs' Association.

Following endorsement of Miron's updated materials by project staff and PMA's other principal IPM course trainer, Mr. William Bieck, Houston, TX Police Department, the IPM course syllabus was prepared, and the 194-page Handbook edited and printed in late February for PMA's initial seminar presentation scheduled on March 6 and 7. (See Appendices A & B)

Project staff designed a calligraphed certificate of completion which was forwarded to participants following training. See Appendix E for a facsimile.

C. Participant and Trainer Selection

PMA targeted the training to middle and upper level law enforcement managers. One or more departments hosted each seminar and inviting participation from surrounding departments, in most cases, those within drivable distance. Leeway for variance in participant selection was left to the discretion of chiefs of each department represented. For instance, a large city department having over 1000 sworn officers might elect to offer the training to more sergeants than a small, rural department with only 20 sworn officers. At many of the seminars, this proved to be the case. So, smaller departments usually appointed higher ranking officer(s) to attend the seminar, since the managerial issues addressed by the trainers often were the responsibility of lieutenants, captains, or even higher ranking officers.

Information on ranks represented at the training seminars are reported for each site in Section IV. B.

Three of NIJ's certified IPM trainers were available to present the IPM course over the project period. This scarcity of IPM course trainers fortunately presented no major obstacle to program implementation, mainly because the course was designed for two trainers only. Those trainers contracted during the previous year's project, Mr. Jerome Miron, National Sheriffs' Association, and Mr. William Bieck, Houston, TX Police Department, were contracted again by PMA to present the course over the 14-month project period. Mr. Miron updated the course materials and prepared the course syllabus while PMA developed

the draft training schedule. Dr. Victor Strecher, Professor of Criminal Justice, Sam Houston State University, agreed to be an alternate trainer in the event neither of the primary trainers were available.

D. Pre-seminar Activities

PMA's workplan called for the project director, trainers, and its Board member/practitioner to schedule a meeting with representatives of the host department(s) one day before seminar initiation. During these meetings, project staff were given an overview of law enforcement roles and services in the community, lines of command, and the area's political climate. Because differences existed, of course, among the various departments represented at the seminars, it was believed that such variations should be pointed out before training commenced.

For instance, some agency heads were appointed under civil service qualifications, while others were elected or hand-picked for the position. Rank structures differed among participants due to departmental size, resulting in managers having similar responsibilities and duties but holding disparate ranks.

Departmental size and differences in jurisdictional areas i.e., urban, rural, suburban, would also affect beat configuration patterns among seminar participants.

These briefings played a vital role in ensuring that all project staff were well informed of participants' geographic areas, political arenas, and functional differences.

E. Evaluation Design

Trainer Miron designed an evaluation instrument corresponding to the revised training materials. Miron submitted the survey instrument to PMA along with the revised course materials. PMA reviewed and approved the evaluation design, making no changes at this time.

Following the initial seminar held in March, minor revisions were made to the evaluation forms. For instance, staff performed a content analysis on responses received from two open-ended questions at the form's conclusion, having determined that participant responses could be aggregated into a multiple choice format. With the improved design, open-ended responses were decreased to one question only. The evaluation forms covering each session held over the two days contained 68 separate items to score or rank. (A copy of the evaluation instrument is attached as Appendix C.)

The second component of the project's evaluation methodology was the "Chiefs' Followup Survey." Designed with the input of trainer Bieck, the one-page survey sought to collect seminar followup information from chiefs of police of each department/ agency represented in the seminars. A similar form was initiated during PMA's 1985 training cycle, but later discarded in favor of a telephone survey. PMA believed that the 1985 telephone survey may not have included a representative sample of departmental chiefs. In light of this reservation, staff restored its original methodology. This survey instrument is included as Appendix D.

SECTION IV. IMPROVING POLICE MANAGEMENT TRAINING SEMINARS

A. Key Events and Evaluation Results

1. St. Petersburg, Florida

In June, 1985, The Florida Institute of Law Enforcement contacted the Police Management Association (PMA) and expressed interest in co-sponsoring one of PMA's management training seminars with the St. Petersburg Police Department.

At that time PMA had firmly scheduled all of its seminars for the remainder of 1985, but was planning to submit another grant proposal to the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), requesting funding for another seminar series. This series, however, would be held over two days, rather than one day -- a key recommendation stemming from the evaluation report.

Upon notification of grant award in December 1985, PMA contacted the St. Petersburg Police Department and Florida Institute of Law Enforcement (FILE), scheduling the first of its series of eight seminars for March, 1986.

PMA's Seminar Coordinator made a site visit in February to confer with assigned liaison personnel of the two sponsoring agencies. The Bilmore Beach Hotel, Treasure Island, FL, was selected as the training locale and registration fees were set at $25.00 per student to cover expenses of daily luncheons and related local delivery expenses. At that time, enrollment was projected at 100 participants.

Address labels of PMA's Florida membership were mailed to FILE to aid participant recruitment. In addition, the St. Petersburg Police Department provided FILE with a mailing list of

surrounding police departments. Three weeks before the seminar date, FILE designed and mailed flyers announcing the seminar to all persons on these two lists. The "Improving Police Management" course was approved by the Florida Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission for local dollar funding.

PMA was disappointed when informed only a few days before the seminar that projected attendance of 100 fell far short. Only 49 participants had registered. PMA immediately reported registration to the NIJ Project Monitor who gave approval to proceed with the seminar on March 6-7.

On day one, PMA's Board President briefed participants on the National Institute of Justice' and PMA's respective mission in presenting the IPM seminar. Results of the St. Petersburg, FL participant evaluation follow.

ST. PETERSBURG, FLORIDA

Participants by Rank (N=49)

Chief: 2 Captain: 5 Lieutenant: 8
Sergeant: 25 Line Personnel: 1
Civilian: 8

Assess on a 5-point scale (5=excellent; 1=very poor) the sessions from the following perspective: Clarity -- Was the information clearly presented? Specificity -- Was it an appropriate level of new ideas and approaches, or did the presentation suggest another approach to you? Relevancy -- Is the information relevant to you, your job and your agency? Presenter's delivery -- style?

Session 1: Introduction and Orientation

	Mean	Range	N
Clarity	4.5	1-5	43
Specificity	4.3	3-5	42
Relevancy	4.1	3-5	43
Presenter's Delivery	4.5	3-5	43

Session 2: Context for Improving Police Management

Clarity	4.3	3-5	42
Specificity	4.3	3-5	42
Relevancy	4.3	3-5	42
Presenter's Delivery	4.6	3-5	42

Session 3: Group Task

Clarity	4.0	3-5	43
Specificity	3.9	2-5	43
Relevancy	3.9	2-5	43
Time for Task	3.7	2-5	43

Session 4: Why Do People Call the Police?

Clarity	4.2	1-5	42
Specificity	4.0	1-5	42
Relevancy	3.9	1-5	42
Presenter's Delivery	4.2	1-5	42

Session 5: How Do Departments Respond to Calls?

Clarity	4.2	2-5	43
Specificity	4.1	3-5	43
Relevancy	4.1	3-5	42
Presenter's Delivery	4.4	3-5	43

Session 6: Summary/Conclusion - DAY ONE

Clarity	4.2	1-5	41
Specificity	4.1	1-5	41
Relevancy	4.1	1-5	41
Presenter's Delivery	4.3	2-5	41

DAY TWO:

Session 7: Patrol Deployment

	Mean	Range	N
Clarity	4.1	2-5	39
Specificity	3.9	2-5	39
Relevancy	3.9	2-5	39
Presenter's Delivery	4.3	3-5	39

Session 8: Case Study - Patrol Deployment

Clarity	4.2	3-5	40
Specificity	3.9	2-5	40
Relevancy	4.0	2-5	40
Presenter's Delivery	4.3	3-5	40

Session 9: What Do Managers Want Patrol Units To Do When Deployed?

Clarity	4.2	2-5	38
Specificity	3.8	2-5	38
Relevancy	3.8	1-5	38
Presenter's Delivery	4.2	2-5	38

Session 10: Responding to the Needs and Rights of Crime Victims - Criminal Investigations

Clarity	4.2	2-5	38
Specificity	4.0	2-5	38
Relevancy	4.0	2-5	38
Presenter's Delivery	4.3	2-5	38

Session 11: A Management Plan to Improve Police Operations

Clarity	4.3	3-5	21
Specificity	4.1	2-5	21
Relevancy	4.2	2-5	21
Presenter's Delivery	4.0	2-5	20

WORKSHOP FLOW AND ACTIVITIES

Time Allotted	3.9	2-5	38
Opportunity for Questions	4.2	2-5	38
Relevancy of Visual Aids	3.1	1-5	36
Use of text for each session	4.2	2-5	38

Sequence of sessions	4.1	3-5	39
Transition of sessions	4.0	2-5	39
Utility of small group work	4.0	2-5	38
Utility of individual work	3.6	1-5	37
Time for small group work	3.5	1-5	38
Time for individual work	3.5	1-5	36
The Participant Handbook	4.5	3-5	38
Visual Aids	3.0	1-5	37
Handouts	3.6	1-5	38
Task worksheets	3.6	1-5	38

IMPACT OF WORKSHOP

How informative was workshop?	3.9	2-5	39
How useful was workshop?	3.6	2-5	39
How relevant was information presented to your agency?	3.6	2-5	39

COMMENTS/SUGGESTIONS

What were the stronger features of this workshop? (This was an open-ended question. A content analysis was done, and numbers given here are number of times stated)

Quality of trainers = 20
Selection/Relevance of topics = 11
Course Handbook = 5
Group Tasks/Group Interaction = 4
Patrol Deployment session = 4
Differential Police Response session = 4

Thirty one students responded to this question, with some offering several comments. Additional comments included: low training cost; physical facility; refreshments and luncheons.

What were the weaker features of this workshop? (This was an open-ended question. A content analysis was done, and numbers given here are number of times stated).

Insufficient time for lectures = 7
Insufficient time for group sessions = 8
Course not relevant = 6
Lack of/poor visual aids = 6
Other = 9

Thirty-five students responded to this question. Other responses included: too much lecture vs. hands-on group; not enough breaks; non-adherence to schedule.

Other Comments/Suggestions:

Twenty-nine additional comments were received. For the most part, these comments reflect the same observations noted in the two questions above. Students from one department indicated that since their department is in the final stages of accreditation, the topics have been covered many times in the past. Other suggestions were: make the evaluation form anonymous to increase constructive criticism; have name tags for easier recognition; direct seminar to upper level managers who may have more impact on areas discussed; add alternative solutions to specific problems; spend less time on manpower allocation; eliminate Session 10 (criminal investigations).

2. Chicago, Illinois

Chicago was identified by the Site Selection Committee as a primary site for the IPM training course. Although a tentative seminar schedule listed Chicago as the venue for a May seminar, because of conflicts at the third site (Charleston, SC) seminar dates were switched.

PMA contacted the Cook County Office of the Sheriff in early February to discuss whether a need was perceived for the IPM training in the Chicago area. The Sheriff's Office agreed to review course materials at that time. PMA suggested that the Chicago Police Department co-host the seminar. This suggestion was agreed to and PMA scheduled tentative training dates of April 17 and 18. A liaison person was assigned by the Cook County Office of the Sheriff to interact with project staff.

Following review of the course materials, both the Cook County Sheriff's Office and the Chicago Police Department approved the training and mailed out the IPM syllabus, a letter of invitation, and registration forms to departmental heads in the tri-state area. Seminar fees of $50.00 were set for each participant. This fee included local service delivery and a one year membership in PMA, as approved by NIJ's Training and Testing Division's Director.

During PMA's site visit on April 3rd, several minor logistical problems and concerns were noted and resolved.

On April 17, the seminar opened with 90 participants, representing 26 areawide departments. A PMA Board member and female captain from the Peoria, IL Police Department, opened the

seminar with an overview of the National Institute of Justice' training sponsorship role and a description of PMA's membership services. NIJ's Summary Report, "Reducing Fear of Crime in Houston and Newark," was disseminated to each participant.

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Participants by Rank (N=90)

Superintendent/Deputy Superintendent: 3
Chief/Deputy Chief: 12 Commander/Major: 6
Captain: 8 Lieutenant: 32
Sergeant/M. Sergeant: 23 Corporal: 4
Civilian: 2

Assess on a 5-point scale (5=excellent; 1=very poor) the sessions from the following perspective: Clarity -- Was the information clearly presented? Specificity -- Was it an appropriate level of new ideas and approaches, or did the presentation suggest another approach to you? Relevancy -- Is the information relevant to you, your job and your agency? Presenter's delivery -- style?

Session 1: Introduction and Orientation

	Mean	Range	N
Clarity	4.3	3-5	63
Specificity	4.0	2-5	62
Relevancy	4.0	1-5	62
Presenter's Delivery	4.4	3-5	62

Session 2: Context for Improving Police Management

Clarity	4.3	3-5	64
Specificity	4.1	1-5	63
Relevancy	4.3	1-5	63
Presenter's Delivery	4.5	3-5	63

Session 3: Group Task

Clarity	3.9	1-5	64
Specificity	3.9	1-5	63
Relevancy	4.1	1-5	63
Time for Task	3.7	1-5	63

Session 4: Why Do People Call the Police?

Clarity	4.0	1-5	64
Specificity	3.7	1-5	64
Relevancy	3.7	1-5	64
Presenter's Delivery	4.0	1-5	64

Session 5: How Do Departments Respond to Calls?

Clarity	3.7	2-5	64
Specificity	3.7	2-5	64
Relevancy	3.7	1-5	63
Presenter s Delivery	4.1	1-5	64

Session 6: Summary/Conclusion - DAY ONE

Clarity	4.0	1-5	55
Specificity	3.8	1-5	55
Relevancy	3.9	1-5	55
Presenter's Delivery	4.1	2-5	55

DAY TWO:

Session 7: Patrol Deployment

	Mean	Range	N
Clarity	4.1	2-5	64
Specificity	4.0	2-5	62
Relevancy	4.1	1-5	63
Presenter's Delivery	4.2	2-5	63

Session 8: Case Study - Patrol Deployment

Clarity	3.7	1-5	66
Specificity	3.7	1-5	66
Relevancy	3.6	1-5	66
Presenter's Delivery	3.8	1-5	66

Session 9: What Do Managers Want Patrol Units To Do When Deployed?

Clarity	3.8	1-5	61
Specificity	3.6	1-5	59
Relevancy	3.6	1-5	61
Presenter's Delivery	3.8	1-5	60

Session 10: Responding to the Needs and Rights of Crime Victims - Criminal Investigations

Clarity	4.0	1-5	47
Specificity	3.9	1-5	47
Relevancy	3.9	1-5	47
Presenter's Delivery	4.0	1-5	45

Session 11: A Management Plan to Improve Police Operations

Clarity	4.1	1-5	36
Specificity	3.9	2-5	36
Relevancy	4.1	1-5	35
Presenter's Delivery	3.8	2-5	33

WORKSHOP FLOW AND ACTIVITIES

Time Allotted	3.7	1-5	60
Opportunity for Questions	4.1	2-5	60
Relevancy of Visual Aids	3.1	1-5	55
Use of text for each session	3.7	1-5	61

Sequence of sessions	3.7	1-5	63
Transition of sessions	3.8	1-5	63
Utility of small group work	3.6	1-5	62
Utility of individual work	3.4	1-5	56
Time for small group work	3.4	1-5	62
Time for individual work	3.4	1-5	56
The Participant Handbook	4.4	3-5	63
Visual Aids	2.9	1-5	50
Handouts	3.3	1-5	43
Task worksheets	3.4	1-5	52

IMPACT OF WORKSHOP

How informative was workshop?	3.9	1-5	63
How useful was workshop?	3.7	1-5	63
How relevant was information presented to your agency?	3.9	2-5	64

COMMENTS/SUGGESTIONS

What were the stronger features of this workshop?

A. Presenters' Delivery = 40
B. Topics Covered = 37
C. Course Handbook = 41
D. Group Interaction = 36
E. Other (please specify) = 3

Other stronger features mentioned were the focus on current issues, presenter/audience rapport and interaction, and amenities provided.

What were the weaker features of this workshop?

A. Insufficient time for lectures = 13
B. Insufficient time for group sessions = 15
C. Course Not relevant to my department/agency = 5
D. Additional Visual Aids needed = 28
E. Other (please specify) = 17

Other weaker features mentioned were digression of speakers, lectures slow moving or narrowly focused, one complaint about instructor participation in group sessions, program either too long or too short, program applicable mostly to larger agencies, and group too large for meaningful group interaction.

Please add here other comments/suggestions on the workshop.

Thirty-nine participants offered one or more comments. Fourteen of these offered positive feedback on the speakers or course, while five persons offered negative comments on speakers/course. Six persons commented specifically that the information presented was too basic, suggesting instructors focus on current topics, not LEAA history, Kansas City Patrol Experiment, or the Rand Study. Remaining comments reinforced stronger or weaker features noted above.

C. Charleston, South Carolina

The Charleston, SC Police Department was selected by the Site Selection Committee to host an "Improving Police Management" training seminar. PMA discussed the program with the Department's Chief in early February and agreed to mail the IPM course syllabus developed for the previous year's one-day IPM training program, since the program's new syllabus was in the development process. Following review of the sample syllabus and training schedule, PMA was told to proceed with planning activities. A liaison person was appointed by the Chief to coordinate with PMA and IPM training was scheduled for April 17 and 18.

In late March, PMA was informed by the Charleston Police Department that conflicts had arisen, preventing April training. The seminar was then rescheduled to May 22-23, dates originally set for the Chicago, Illinois seminar. Co-hosts in Chicago readily agreed to switch training dates.

Training was scheduled at a hotel close to the Police Department and registration fees of $30.00 per student were assessed which covered expenses for two lunches and other local delivery services. As the case at most other sites, the training rooms were available free of charge, since the hotel's catering service would be used.

PMA experienced a minor problem when the registration form and course information was mailed by the Charleston Police Department to outlying departments before it had been reviewed by PMA staff. Although cautioned that the course syllabus was not

yet updated, registration information included a description of the previous year's training program, which did not accurately reflect the updated material. However, the Department agreed to forward a corrected syllabus to participants as registration was received.

PMA's Seminar Coordinator made a preliminary site visit to Charleston on May 12th. No impediments to program implementation were perceived.

Case study materials, prepared by trainer Miron, were used for the first time in Charleston. In addition, selected segments of the NIJ's "Crime File" film series were viewed by participants in conjunction with the session "Responding to the Needs and Rights of Crime Victims: Criminal Investigations."

Forty-nine participants attended the seminar, representing twelve law enforcement agencies in South Carolina, Georgia, and North Carolina. A PMA Board member and Captain in the Raleigh, NC Police Department presented opening remarks about NIJ and PMA.

Staff reports that because of long distance driving, some participants left early on the second day. This, coupled with an the fact that many participants did not complete Day 2 evaluation forms, resulted in low response rates for these sessions.

CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA

Participants by Rank (N=49)

Chief: 1 Deputy Sheriff: 2 Captain: 4
Lieutenant: 8 Sergeant: 26 Civilian: 1
Line Personnel: 7

Assess on a 5-point scale (5=excellent; 1=very poor) the sessions from the following perspective: Clarity -- Was the information clearly presented? Specificity -- Was it an appropriate level of new ideas and approaches, or did the presentation suggest another approach to you? Relevancy -- Is the information relevant to you, your job and your agency? Presenter's delivery -- style?

Session 1: Introduction and Orientation

	Mean	Range	N
Clarity	4.7	3-5	40
Specificity	4.5	3-5	40
Relevancy	4.4	3-5	40
Presenter's Delivery	4.6	3-5	40

Session 2: Context for Improving Police Management

Clarity	4.6	3-5	40
Specificity	4.4	3-5	40
Relevancy	4.3	3-5	40
Presenter's Delivery	4.6	3-5	40

Session 3: Group Task

Clarity	4.4	2-5	40
Specificity	4.3	3-5	40
Relevancy	4.3	2-5	40
Time for Task	4.4	3-5	40

Session 4: Why Do People Call the Police?

Clarity	4.4	3-5	40
Specificity	4.2	2-5	40
Relevancy	3.9	1-5	40
Presenter's Delivery	4.4	2-5	40

Session 5: How Do Departments Respond to Calls?

Clarity	4.2	2-5	40
Specificity	4.1	1-5	40
Relevancy	3.8	1-5	40
Presenter's Delivery	4.1	1-5	40

Session 6: Summary/Conclusion - DAY ONE

Clarity	4.2	2-5	38
Specificity	4.2	2-5	38
Relevancy	4.1	2-5	38
Presenter's Delivery	4.3	2-5	38

DAY TWO:

Session 7: Patrol Deployment

	Mean	Range	N
Clarity	4.5	3-5	25
Specificity	4.2	3-5	25
Relevancy	4.1	3-5	25
Presenter's Delivery	4.3	3-5	25

Session 8: Case Study - Patrol Deployment

Clarity	4.4	3-5	25
Specificity	4.1	2-5	25
Relevancy	4.0	2-5	25
Presenter's Delivery	4.5	3-5	25

Session 9: What Do Managers Want Patrol Units To Do When Deployed?

Clarity	4.4	2-5	24
Specificity	4.2	3-5	24
Relevancy	4.1	1-5	24
Presenter's Delivery	4.2	2-5	24

Session 10: Responding to the Needs and Rights of Crime Victims - Criminal Investigations

Clarity	4.6	4-5	23
Specificity	4.5	4-5	22
Relevancy	4.3	3-5	22
Presenter's Delivery	4.6	4-5	23

Session 11: A Management Plan to Improve Police Operations

Clarity	4.5	3-5	15
Specificity	4.4	3-5	15
Relevancy	4.3	3-5	15
Presenter's Delivery	4.5	3-5	15

WORKSHOP FLOW AND ACTIVITIES

Time Allotted	4.1	2-5	24
Opportunity for Questions	4.2	3-5	24
Relevancy of Visual Aids	3.9	1-5	24
Use of text for each session	3.8	2-5	24

Sequence of sessions	4.4	3-5	23
Transition of sessions	4.5	3-5	24
Utility of small group work	4.4	3-5	24
Utility of individual work	4.4	3-5	23
Time for small group work	4.1	2-5	24
Time for individual work	4.1	1-5	22
The Participant Handbook	4.5	2-5	24
Visual Aids	4.1	1-5	24
Handouts	4.5	3-5	24
Task worksheets	4.4	3-5	24

IMPACT OF WORKSHOP

How informative was workshop?	4.3	3-5	24
How useful was workshop?	3.8	2-5	24
How relevant was information presented to your agency?	3.6	2-5	24

COMMENTS/SUGGESTIONS

What were the stronger features of this workshop?

A. Presenters' Delivery = 14
B. Topics Covered = 5
C. Course Handbook = 14
D. Group Interaction = 11
E. Other (please specify) = 0

Twenty-one students responded to this question, choosing one or more features.

What were the weaker features of this workshop?

A. Insufficient time for lectures = 7
B. Insufficient time for group sessions = 5
C. Course Not relevant to my department/agency = 7
D. Additional Visual Aids needed = 9
E. Other (please specify) = 7

Twenty-two students responded here, choosing one or more features. Other weaker features specified were: too much time spent on certain topics; smoking policy needed; speakers were a little dry; workshop needed more time.

Please add here other comments/suggestions on the workshop.

Nine additional comments were offered. Most noted the workshop's high quality. Other suggestions were: add smoking sections; clarify abbreviations; give information on how supervisors can gain respect from their staff; disagree with using nonprofessionals for dispatching; add more days to course and overhead slides for note-taking.

4. Fort Wayne, Indiana

PMA had originally scheduled a June seminar in New York, co-hosted by the New York City and Nassau County Police Departments. In early May, the invitation was declined because maximum departmental resources were committed to the Statue of Liberty Centennial Celebration activities. However, the door was left open to reschedule another training date.

The Fort Wayne, Indiana Police Department, identified by the Site Selection Committee as a secondary site, was immediately contacted. The Chief of Police expressed interest in the IPM training course and requested review of the training materials. Following departmental approval, liaison was provided to interact with PMA staff for seminar planning. Brochures describing the IPM training program were mailed to surrounding departments, as well as to several law enforcement agencies in Ohio and Michigan. Registration fees were set at $30 per person. A site visit was made by PMA's Seminar Coordinator in early June when the facilities were perceived to be appropriate for the training.

Sixty-three participants attended the seminar. As was the case at most training sites, some participants left early on the second training day because of long distance driving needs. In spite of PMA's ongoing efforts to increase evaluation returns and completions, this remained a problem.

Fort Wayne's Chief of Police and one of PMA's course trainers were interviewed by a local television station. Each gave their views on ways that management training, such as the IPM course, can improve the quality of policing.

FORT WAYNE, INDIANA

Participants by Rank: N=63

Chief/Deputy Chief: 10 Captain: 12 Sheriff: 1
Lieutenant: 18 Sergeant/M. Sergeant: 19
Inspector/Major: 2 Civilian: 1

Assess on a 5-point scale (5=excellent; 1=very poor) the sessions from the following perspective: Clarity -- Was the information clearly presented? Specificity -- Was it an appropriate level of new ideas and approaches, or did the presentation suggest another approach to you? Relevancy -- Is the information relevant to you, your job and your agency? Presenter's delivery -- style?

Session 1: Introduction and Orientation

	Mean	Range	N
Clarity	4.4	3-5	56
Specificity	4.2	1-5	56
Relevancy	4.1	1-5	56
Presenter's Delivery	4.5	3-5	56

Session 2: Context for Improving Police Management

Clarity	4.4	3-5	56
Specificity	4.2	2-5	56
Relevancy	4.3	2-5	56
Presenter's Delivery	4.4	3-5	55

Session 3: Group Task

Clarity	3.9	2-5	55
Specificity	4.0	2-5	55
Relevancy	4.2	2-5	55
Time for Task	3.8	2-5	55

Session 4: Why Do People Call the Police?

Clarity	4.0	2-5	54
Specificity	3.8	1-5	54
Relevancy	3.9	1-5	54
Presenter's Delivery	4.1	2-5	54

Session 5: How Do Departments Respond to Calls?

Clarity	4.1	2-5	42
Specificity	3.9	2-5	42
Relevancy	4.1	2-5	42
Presenter's Delivery	4.1	2-5	42

Session 6: Summary/Conclusion - DAY ONE

Clarity	4.4	3-5	44
Specificity	4.1	2-5	44
Relevancy	4.2	3-5	44
Presenter's Delivery	4.3	3-5	44

DAY TWO:

Session 7: Patrol Deployment

	Mean	Range	N
Clarity	4.3	3-5	43
Specificity	4.2	2-5	42
Relevancy	4.1	2-5	42
Presenter's Delivery	4.4	3-5	42

Session 8: Case Study - Patrol Deployment

Clarity	4.2	2-5	40
Specificity	4.2	2-5	39
Relevancy	4.2	2-5	39
Presenter's Delivery	4.5	3-5	39

Session 9: What Do Managers Want Patrol Units To Do When Deployed?

Clarity	4.3	1-5	37
Specificity	4.2	1-5	36
Relevancy	4.1	1-5	36
Presenter's Delivery	4.3	1-5	36

Session 10: Responding to the Needs and Rights of Crime Victims - Criminal Investigations

Clarity	4.5	3-5	29
Specificity	4.4	3-5	28
Relevancy	4.4	3-5	29
Presenter's Delivery	4.6	3-5	29

Session 11: A Management Plan to Improve Police Operations

Clarity	4.5	3-5	24
Specificity	4.3	3-5	24
Relevancy	4.3	3-5	24
Presenter's Delivery	4.2	2-5	24

WORKSHOP FLOW AND ACTIVITIES

Time Allotted	3.9	2-5	43
Opportunity for Questions	4.4	3-5	43
Relevancy of Visual Aids	3.7	2-5	43
Use of text for each session	4.1	2-5	43

Sequence of sessions	4.2	1-5	42
Transition of sessions	4.3	1-5	42
Utility of small group work	3.9	1-5	43
Utility of individual work	4.0	1-5	42
Time for small group work	3.6	1-5	42
Time for individual work	3.6	1-5	43
The Participant Handbook	4.5	3-5	42
Visual Aids	3.7	2-5	42
Handouts	4.2	2-5	41
Task worksheets	4.0	1-5	42

IMPACT OF WORKSHOP

How informative was workshop?	4.2	2-5	43
How useful was workshop?	4.0	2-5	32
How relevant was information presented to your agency?	3.9	2-5	42

COMMENTS/SUGGESTIONS

What were the stronger features of this workshop?

A. Presenters' Delivery = 32
B. Topics Covered = 24
C. Course Handbook = 6
D. Group Interaction = 17
E. Other (please specify) = 0

Thirty-eight respondents selected one or more stronger areas. Presenters' delivery was view as the workshop's stronger feature. This is reflected also on individual session scores.

What were the weaker features of this workshop?

A. Insufficient time for lectures = 11
B. Insufficient time for group sessions = 18
C. Course Not relevant to my department/agency = 6
D. Additional Visual Aids needed = 16
E. Other (please specify) = 6

Thirty responses were received to this question. The need to allot additional time to group sessions is evident. Again, this is reflected also in the averages of the group task scores.

Please add here other comments/suggestions on the workshop.

Twenty-one comments/suggestions were offered. Seven commented favorably on the overall seminar or on the quality of instructors. Additional comments noted a lack of cooperation from some group task members;

irrelevancy of workshop to one tradition-oriented department; need for more in-depth look at topics; need to offer sources of information; and need for an additional day for the seminar.

5. Nassau County, New York

As mentioned previously, Nassau County was selected to host a seminar after New York City's Police Department had indicated that none of PMA's suggested training dates were feasible for 1986, because of the Statue of Liberty celebrations, previous training priorities and influx of new recruits. Nassau County Police Department had remained eager to receive the training, although there was some coordination delays within the Department because of personnel vacations. Following course review, on September 4, PMA received a written request from the Nassau County Police Commissioner to present the program on September 29 and 30. The Commanding Officer of the Nassau County Police Academy was directed to coordinate the seminar program. On September 16, all commands of city and village police departments within the Port Washington Police District, having the rank of Captain and above, were requested to attend. In retrospect, selection of higher ranking participants does not appear to be appropriate for the Port Washington District, as evaluation results and findings indicate.

Eight surrounding departments, including one participant from the New York City Police Department, were represented by 81 officers. No tuition fees were assessed since Nassau County Police Department provided both training facilities and service provisions over the two day period.

Introductory remarks were offered by one of PMA's Board members -- Undersheriff of Essex County, NJ. His remarks focused on NIJ's sponsorship of the seminar series and PMA's membership

services.

Trainer Miron prepared several new case studies for the Nassau County seminar audience, "The Changing Roles of Law Enforcement Managers," and "The Law Enforcement Manager as Resource Allocator."

NASSAU COUNTY, NEW YORK

Participants by Rank (N=80)

Dep. Commissioner/Commissioner: 3
Chief/Asst. Chief/Dep. Chief: 16 Dep. Insp./Inspector: 27
Captain: 8 Det. Lt./Lt.: 19 Det. Sgt./Sergeant: 7

Assess on a 5-point scale (5=excellent; 1=very poor) the sessions from the following perspective: Clarity -- Was the information clearly presented? Specificity -- Was it an appropriate level of new ideas and approaches, or did the presentation suggest another approach to you? Relevancy -- Is the information relevant to you, your job and your agency? Presenter's delivery -- style?

Session 1: Introduction and Orientation

	Mean	Range	N
Clarity	3.9	1-5	52
Specificity	3.7	1-5	51
Relevancy	3.6	2-5	51
Presenter's Delivery	3.9	1-5	51

Session 2: Context for Improving Police Management

Clarity	4.1	2-5	52
Specificity	3.9	2-5	50
Relevancy	4.1	2-5	51
Presenter's Delivery	4.1	2-5	51

Session 3: Group Task

Clarity	3.6	1-5	52
Specificity	3.5	1-5	51
Relevancy	3.8	2-5	51
Time for Task	2.9	1-5	51

Session 4: Why Do People Call the Police?

Clarity	3.5	1-5	49
Specificity	3.4	1-5	48
Relevancy	3.0	1-5	48
Presenter's Delivery	3.2	1-5	48

Session 5: How Do Departments Respond to Calls?

Clarity	3.4	1-5	40
Specificity	3.2	1-5	39
Relevancy	3.0	1-5	40
Presenter's Delivery	3.4	1-5	39

Session 6: Summary/Conclusion - DAY ONE

Clarity	3.5	1-5	32
Specificity	3.4	1-5	31
Relevancy	3.1	1-5	31
Presenter's Delivery	3.6	1-5	31

DAY TWO:

Session 7: Patrol Deployment

	Mean	Range	N
Clarity	3.4	1-5	39
Specificity	3.3	1-5	39
Relevancy	3.0	1-5	39
Presenter's Delivery	3.4	1-5	38

Session 8: Case Study - Patrol Deployment

Clarity	3.4	1-5	39
Specificity	3.3	1-5	39
Relevancy	3.2	1-5	39
Presenter's Delivery	3.7	2-5	39

Session 9: What Do Managers Want Patrol Units To Do When Deployed?

Clarity	3.7	1-5	39
Specificity	3.4	1-5	39
Relevancy	3.5	1-5	39
Presenter's Delivery	3.9	2-5	39

NOTE: Session 10: Responding to the Needs and Rights of Crime Victims - Criminal Investigations and Session 11: A Management Plan to Improve Police Operations, were not held because of schedule runovers.

WORKSHOP FLOW AND ACTIVITIES

Time Allotted	3.3	1-5	39
Opportunity for Questions	3.6	1-5	39
Relevancy of Visual Aids	3.2	1-5	39
Use of text for each session	3.2	2-5	38
Sequence of sessions	3.2	1-5	37
Transition of sessions	3.2	1-5	37
Utility of small group work	3.3	1-5	39
Utility of individual work	3.6	1-5	39
Time for small group work	3.2	1-5	39
Time for individual work	3.2	2-5	38

The Participant Handbook	3.5	1-5	40
Visual Aids	3.0	1-5	39
Handouts	3.5	1-5	39
Task worksheets	3.0	1-5	37

IMPACT OF WORKSHOP

How informative was workshop?	2.9	1-5	38
How useful was workshop?	2.6	1-5	38
How relevant was information presented to your agency?	2.7	1-5	38

COMMENTS/SUGGESTIONS

What were the stronger features of this workshop?

A. Presenters' Delivery = 23
B. Topics Covered = 7
C. Course Handbook = 12
D. Group Interaction = 26
E. Other (please specify) = 3

Forty-one students reponded to this question. Some chose one or more feature as being stronger than another. The three "Other" comments were that the second day's sessions were far more interesting than day one; the seminar can be considered a success if it results in thinking about the situations; and, only one of the presenters' delivery was a strong feature.

What were the weaker features of this workshop?

A. Insufficient time for lectures = 4
B. Insufficient time for group sessions = 18
C. Course Not relevant to my department/agency = 20
D. Additional Visual Aids needed = 4
E. Other (please specify) = 6

Thirty-four students responded here, with some participants selecting more than one feature. "Other" weaker features included: the course was too basic; no new material.

Please add here other comments/suggestions on the workshop.

Twenty-two comments/suggestions were offered. Thirteen described the level of presentation as being far too basic for the high level of students. Other comments included too much lecture time; insufficient group task time; evaluation form difficult to complete since because presenters did not give lecture titles; the futility of spending 3-4 hours explaining charts that can be read from the textbook.

6. Honolulu, Hawaii

The Honolulu Police Department had requested the "Improving Police Management" management training program during PMA's 1985 training cycle. PMA was unable to accommodate the request at that time because of its full training schedule.

Although Honolulu was not targeted as either a primary or secondary training site, the late seminar cancellation of the Portland, OR Police Department because of the chief's unexpected resignation, coupled with the inability of Multonomah Co., OR Sheriff's Department to serve as an alternate site, led PMA to reconsider the Honolulu Police Department's request. In August, PMA's Executive Director visited Honolulu on other business and met with the Department's Director of Training. At that meeting, the IPM course materials was favorably reviewed and November 6-7, 1986 was tentatively scheduled as training dates, contingent upon approval of NIJ for project staff to conduct the seminar in Honolulu. Written approval was received shortly thereafter, and coordination efforts begun.

Registration fees were not assessed because the Honolulu Police Department decided that participants would be responsible for their own lunches over the two days. However, expenditures for other service provisions were assumed by the Police Department.

In September, PMA forwarded its list of departmental roles and responsibilities and logistical models to the Department. Letters of invitation to nine other agencies were mailed by HPD in October, suggesting that participants hold the rank of Captain

and above. An interesting comparison can be drawn between officer ranks at the Nassau County, NY seminar and those in attendance in Honolulu. Although quite similar in rank, because of differing geographical and social factors, evaluation results are quite disparate.

A site visit was made the first of November. Program trainers and other project staff met with the Training Division Director on November 5 for the pre-seminar briefing.

PMA's Board President presented the introductory remarks on opening day. Eighty-seven participants attended the training, including 71 officers of the Honolulu Police Department and 16 attendees from other agencies. Evaluation results below reflect that the IPM program was well received, achieving some of the highest scores across all seminar sites.

It is noted here that low response rates for Sessions 10 and 11 can be attributed, in part, to an error in collating the evaluation form. I.e., this page was collated as page 5 (last page) instead of page 2.

HONOLULU, HAWAII

Participants by Rank (N=71)

Chief, Asst. Chief/Deputy Chief: 4 Major/Inspector: 21
Captain: 28 Lieutenant: 6 Federal/Other Personnel: 10
Sheriff Department personnel: 2

Assess on a 5-point scale (5=excellent; 1=very poor) the sessions from the following perspective: Clarity -- Was the information clearly presented? Specificity -- Was it an appropriate level of new ideas and approaches, or did the presentation suggest another approach to you? Relevancy -- Is the information relevant to you, your job and your agency? Presenter's delivery -- style?

Session 1: Introduction and Orientation

	Mean	Range	N
Clarity	4.2	3-5	51
Specificity	4.0	3-5	51
Relevancy	4.1	2-5	51
Presenter's Delivery	4.3	2-5	51

Session 2: Context for Improving Police Management

Clarity	4.3	3-5	51
Specificity	4.1	3-5	51
Relevancy	4.1	1-5	51
Presenter's Delivery	4.3	2-5	51

Session 3: Group Task

Clarity	3.7	2-5	51
Specificity	3.8	2-5	51
Relevancy	3.8	1-5	51
Time for Task	3.7	2-5	51

Session 4: Why Do People Call the Police?

Clarity	4.3	3-5	51
Specificity	4.2	2-5	51
Relevancy	4.3	3-5	51
Presenter's Delivery	4.4	3-5	51

Session 5: How Do Departments Respond to Calls?

Clarity	4.2	1-5	51
Specificity	4.1	2-5	51
Relevancy	4.3	3-5	51
Presenter's Delivery	4.4	3-5	51

Session 6: Summary/Conclusion - DAY ONE

Clarity	4.3	3-5	44
Specificity	4.1	3-5	44
Relevancy	4.2	3-5	44
Presenter's Delivery	4.4	3-5	44

DAY TWO:

Session 7: Patrol Deployment

	Mean	Range	N
Clarity	4.4	3-5	43
Specificity	4.3	3-5	43
Relevancy	4.3	2-5	43
Presenter's Delivery	4.5	3-5	43

Session 8: Case Study - Patrol Deployment

Clarity	4.3	3-5	41
Specificity	4.2	3-5	41
Relevancy	4.3	3-5	41
Presenter's Delivery	4.5	3-5	41

Session 9: What Do Managers Want Patrol Units To Do When Deployed?

Clarity	4.3	3-5	40
Specificity	4.2	3-5	39
Relevancy	4.2	3-5	40
Presenter's Delivery	4.4	3-5	40

Session 10: Responding to the Needs and Rights of Crime Victims - Criminal Investigations

Clarity	4.1	3-5	22
Specificity	4.2	3-5	21
Relevancy	4.1	3-5	21
Presenter's Delivery	4.4	3-5	21

Session 11: A Management Plan to Improve Police Operations

Clarity	4.2	3-5	22
Specificity	4.2	3-5	21
Relevancy	4.3	3-5	21
Presenter's Delivery	4.3	3-5	21

WORKSHOP FLOW AND ACTIVITIES

Time Allotted	4.1	3-5	43
Opportunity for Questions	4.3	3-5	43
Relevancy of Visual Aids	4.1	3-5	43
Use of text for each session	3.8	2-5	43

Sequence of sessions	4.2	3-5	42
Transition of sessions	4.1	3-5	43
Utility of small group work	4.1	3-5	42
Utility of individual work	3.7	1-5	40
Time for small group work	3.7	2-5	42
Time for individual work	3.7	1-5	40
The Participant Handbook	4.6	3-5	43
Visual Aids	4.0	2-5	43
Handouts	4.4	3-5	43
Task worksheets	4.2	3-5	42

IMPACT OF WORKSHOP

How informative was workshop?	4.2	3-5	43
How useful was workshop?	4.1	3-5	43
How relevant was information presented to your agency?	4.1	2-5	43

COMMENTS/SUGGESTIONS

What were the stronger features of this workshop?

A. Presenters' Delivery = 32
B. Topics Covered = 22
C. Course Handbook = 27
D. Group Interaction = 14
E. Other (please specify) = 1

Forty-one students responded to this question and some checked one or more features. The "other" suggestion is included below in "Other Comments/Suggestions."

What were the weaker features of this workshop?

A. Insufficient time for lectures = 14
B. Insufficient time for group sessions = 11
C. Course Not relevant to my department/agency = 2
D. Additional Visual Aids needed = 18
E. Other (please specify) = 4

Thirty-three participants responded to this question, with some selecting one or more features. "Other" weaker features are included below in "Other Comments/ Suggestions.

Please add here other comments/suggestions on the workshop.

Other comments were: add more group sessions; need for additional involvement of students/dialogue and visual aids; instructors should repeat questions asked before responding; add another day. The remaining comments complimented the instructors and excellent program.

7. Tucson, Arizona

The Tucson, AZ Police Department, selected as a primary site because of its earlier request for IPM training, received a broad overview of departmental training responsibilities in February. Ongoing liaison over the 10- month period produced an expectation of no impediments to program implementation.

PMA approved registration materials and the course synopsis designed by the Department in early November. A site visit was not scheduled for several reasons -- the lengthy preparation phase, the long-term professional relationship between project and departmental staff, and the fact that the seminar was scheduled at the Marana, AZ Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.

Two occurrences during the week before the seminar was scheduled appear to have contributed, in part, to the weak evaluation scores received from participants. One of the IPM course trainers indicated he would not be available to train, due to grave family illness. PMA was able to employ its alternate trainer as a replacement. It is noted here that the alternate trainer had not been used during this grant period -- the period during which the IPM course materials was revised, substantially updated, and training extended for an additional day. Although this trainer had received the new materials, little time was available for preparation and coordination with PMA's regular trainer.

The second factor which is perceived relevant to the weak evaluation scores is the large number of participants (114) who

registered for the training. If attendance gets too large, it is difficult to physically manage breakout group sessions. In fact, the federal training facility was unable to offer a larger room. PMA and the Tucson Police Department considered dividing registrants into two separate seminars, i.e., conducting another IPM seminar within 9-12 weeks. This idea was discarded because of the inconveniences involved in returning registration monies, cancelling sleeping accommodations, etc. Because of this overenrollment, no group or individual breakout sessions were held at the seminar. Thirty-three law enforcement agencies in four states were represented by the 114 participants.

One group session, "Case Study: - Patrol Deployment" was replaced by a presentation from Inspector Edward J. Spurlock, Metropolitan Washington, DC, on the Department's "Repeat Offender Project" (ROP). Inspector Spurlock had been invited to the seminar to act in the role of PMA practitioner. Interestingly, the ROP presentation received conspiciously higher evaluation ratings than any course component.

The course agenda was amended substantially to accommodate the late trainer substitution. Therefore, the Tucson seminar evaluation results reflect a quite different program than that planned originally.

An impromptu presentation was given on the second training day, highlighting the Pima County Sheriff's Department's volunteer augmentation program. This program was informally requested by participants, following an earlier discussion on cutback management and reported as well received.

TUCSON, ARIZONA

Participants by Rank (N=114):

Chief, Asst. Chief, Deputy Chief: 12 Captain: 24
Commander, Asst. Commander: 3 Lieutenant: 42
Sergeant: 25 Other/Civilian Agency Personnel: 8

Assess on a 5-point scale (5=excellent; 1=very poor) the sessions from the following perspective: Clarity -- Was the information clearly presented? Specificity -- Was it an appropriate level of new ideas and approaches, or did the presentation suggest another approach to you? Relevancy -- Is the information relevant to you, your job and your agency? Presenter's delivery -- style?

Session 1: Introduction and Orientation

	Mean	Range	N
Clarity	3.6	2-5	84
Specificity	3.4	2-5	83
Relevancy	3.6	1-5	83
Presenter's Delivery	3.6	1-5	84

Session 2: Context for Improving Police Management

Clarity	3.6	2-5	82
Specificity	3.3	2-5	81
Relevancy	3.5	1-5	81
Presenter's Delivery	3.8	2-5	82

NOTE: Session 3: Why Do People Call the Police? was not addressed. Instead, the trainer lectured on the history of policing from 1900-1970 and on limited resources.

Session 4: How Do Departments Respond to Calls?

Clarity	3.9	2-5	83
Specificity	3.8	2-5	82
Relevancy	3.8	1-5	82
Presenter's Delivery	4.0	2-5	83

Session 5: Summary/Conclusion - DAY ONE

Clarity	3.5	1-5	68
Specificity	3.5	1-5	68
Relevancy	3.5	1-5	68
Presenter's Delivery	3.8	3-5	68

DAY TWO:

Session 6: Directed Patrol*

Clarity	3.7	1-5	66
Specificity	3.3	1-5	66
Relevancy	3.3	1-5	67
Presenter's Delivery	3.3	1-5	67

*Substituted for session on Patrol Deployment

Session 7: Overview: Repeat Offender Project*

Clarity	4.5	1-5	66
Specificity	4.4	1-5	66
Relevancy	4.3	1-5	67
Presenter's Delivery	4.7	1-5	67

*Substituted for group sessions on "Case Study - Patrol Deployment"

Following the above presentation, the trainer lectured on a variety of topics which did not correspond to the evaluation form. For this reason and because of the low response rates for the scheduled sessions, the scores are omitted.

WORKSHOP FLOW AND ACTIVITIES

Time Allotted	3.5	1-5	47
Opportunity for Questions	3.9	2-5	46
Relevancy of Visual Aids	3.5	2-5	46
Use of text for each session	3.0	1-5	46
Sequence of sessions	3.1	1-5	44
Transition of sessions	3.1	1-5	44
Utility of small group work	N/A		
Utility of individual work	N/A		
Time for small group work	N/A		
Time for individual work	N/A		

NOTE: Because of the large number of participants enrolled (114) and the resulting lack of breakout room space, no group or individual sessions were held in Tucson.

The Participant Handbook	4.6	2-5	48
Visual Aids	3.4	2-5	48
Handouts	3.8	2-5	49
Task worksheets	N/A		

IMPACT OF WORKSHOP

How informative was workshop?	3.4	1-5	60
How useful was workshop?	3.4	1-5	60
How relevant was information presented to your agency?	3.4	1-5	60

COMMENTS/SUGGESTIONS

What were the stronger features of this workshop?

A. Presenters' Delivery = 36
B. Topics Covered = 27
C. Course Handbook = 30
D. Group Interaction = 5
E. Other (please specify) = 4

Fifty-four participants responded to this question, with some selecting more than one feature. The "Other" features specified were the Repeat Offender Project overview presented by Inspector Edward J. Spurlock, Metropolitan Washington, DC Police Department.

What were the weaker features of this workshop?

A. Insufficient time for lectures = 10
B. Insufficient time for group sessions = 15
C. Course not relevant to my department/agency = 19
D. Additional Visual Aids needed = 20
E. Other (please specify) = 21

Fifty-three persons selected one or more weaker feature. Nine persons adding "Other" weak features said that the group was too large to have the scheduled group sessions. Others commented that the curriculum was fragmented or not followed, or that the instruction was too brief or too academic.

Please add here other comments/suggestions on the workshop.

Thirty-three participants offered additional comments, some of which were quite lengthy. For the most part, the participants reiterated stronger and weaker features listed above. Other remarks focused on the overemphasis on past studies, which detracted from time better spent on how to implement new techniques. Several participants felt that topics were raced over and not fully explained, while others viewed the second day's session as much more informative than those held on the first day. Finally, there were several complaints about the remote location of the training facility.

8. Birmingham, Alabama

The Site Selection Committee selected Birmingham for the final seminar. Its southerly location was perceived to be well-suited for winter travel.

In October, the Director of the Training Division was forwarded the IPM coursebook and syllabus for review, and cautioned to tailor student selection according to level of responsibility by rank, since PMA was sensitive to the possibility of a possible reoccurrence of inappropriate student selection as experienced in Nassau County, NY.

Following departmental review, PMA was invited to hold the seminar on January 15-16, 1987. Meeting rooms were arranged at a local hotel and registration fees were set at $25.00 per student. The Police Academy published a brochure relative to the seminar and announced anticipated attendance of more than 100 in mid-December. Since outstanding liaison and cooperation was offered by the Birmingham Police Department, no preliminary site visit was required by PMA staff.

Eighty-five participants, representing three states (Alabama, Tennessee, Mississippi) and seventeen departments, attended the two day training program. A PMA Board member and Captain in the Raleigh, NC Police Department, agreed to serve as practitioner in Birmingham, and delivered the seminar's opening remarks.

Birmingham's local television station televised select portions of the training on the evening news, as well as a brief interview with PMA's Executive Director.

BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA

Participants by Rank (N=85)

Chief/Asst. Chief/Deputy Chief: 9 Major/Inspector: 4
Captain: 16 Lieutenant: 16 Sergeant: 37
Training Officers: 3

Assess on a 5-point scale (5=excellent; 1=very poor) the sessions from the following perspective: Clarity -- Was the information clearly presented? Specificity -- Was it an appropriate level of new ideas and approaches, or did the presentation suggest another approach to you? Relevancy -- Is the information relevant to you, your job and your agency? Presenter's delivery -- style?

Session 1: Introduction and Orientation

	Mean	Range	N
Clarity	4.4	3-5	71
Specificity	4.3	2-5	67
Relevancy	4.2	2-5	67
Presenter's Delivery	4.4	2-5	66

Session 2: Context for Improving Police Management

Clarity	4.4	3-5	69
Specificity	4.2	2-5	67
Relevancy	4.1	2-5	66
Presenter's Delivery	4.4	2-5	66

Session 3: Group Task

Clarity	4.3	2-5	69
Specificity	4.2	2-5	69
Relevancy	4.2	2-5	67
Time for Task	4.2	1-5	67

Session 4: Why Do People Call the Police?

Clarity	4.4	3-5	68
Specificity	4.3	3-5	69
Relevancy	4.4	3-5	68
Presenter's Delivery	4.4	3-5	67

Session 5: How Do Departments Respond to Calls?

Clarity	4.4	3-5	70
Specificity	4.4	3-5	67
Relevancy	4.3	2-5	68
Presenter's Delivery	4.4	2-5	66

Session 6: Summary/Conclusion - DAY ONE

Clarity	4.5	2-5	69
Specificity	4.3	2-5	66
Relevancy	4.2	2-5	67
Presenter's Delivery	4.4	2-5	66

DAY TWO:

Session 7: Patrol Deployment

	Mean	Range	N
Clarity	4.4	3-5	58
Specificity	4.3	3-5	57
Relevancy	4.3	2-5	57
Presenter's Delivery	4.4	3-5	57

Session 8: Case Study - Patrol Deployment

Clarity	4.3	2-5	58
Specificity	4.2	2-5	57
Relevancy	4.2	1-5	57
Presenter's Delivery	4.3	1-5	57

Session 9: What Do Managers Want Patrol Units To Do When Deployed?

Clarity	4.3	2-5	57
Specificity	4.2	2-5	56
Relevancy	4.2	1-5	56
Presenter's Delivery	4.2	1-5	56

Session 10: Responding to the Needs and Rights of Crime Victims - Criminal Investigations

Clarity	4.4	3-5	58
Specificity	4.3	3-5	57
Relevancy	4.3	1-5	57
Presenter's Delivery	4.4	3-5	57

Session 11: A Management Plan to Improve Police Operations

Clarity	4.3	3-5	50
Specificity	4.2	2-5	48
Relevancy	4.2	1-5	49
Presenter's Delivery	4.2	2-5	48

WORKSHOP FLOW AND ACTIVITIES

Time Allotted	3.9	2-5	57
Opportunity for Questions	4.1	2-5	55
Relevancy of Visual Aids	3.9	1-5	55
Use of text for each session	4.0	2-5	55

Sequence of sessions	4.2	2-5	58
Transition of sessions	4.2	2-5	57
Utility of small group work	4.1	1-5	55
Utility of individual work	3.9	1-5	53
Time for small group work	4.0	1-5	55
Time for individual work	3.9	1-5	53
The Participant Handbook	4.5	3-5	58
Visual Aids	3.9	1-5	57
Handouts	4.4	2-5	57
Task worksheets	4.3	2-5	56

IMPACT OF WORKSHOP

How informative was workshop?	4.2	2-5	56
How useful was workshop?	3.9	1-5	56
How relevant was information presented to your agency?	4.1	1-5	56

COMMENTS/SUGGESTIONS

What were the stronger features of this workshop?

A. Presenters' Delivery = 34
B. Topics Covered = 29
C. Course Handbook = 28
D. Group Interaction = 22
E. Other (please specify) = 3

Fifty-six participants responded to this question, with some selecting one of more stronger features. The "other" features specified the professional presentation; exposure to new studies and review of older research in a historical perspective; and the need for more time for instruction.

What were the weaker features of this workshop?

A. Insufficient time for lectures = 19
B. Insufficient time for group sessions = 9
C. Course Not relevant to my department/agency = 8
D. Additional Visual Aids needed = 20
E. Other (please specify) = 8

Forty-six participants responded to this question. The eight "other" features addressed the need to give additional study summaries in lieu of research design details and need for more group/individual work. Lack of visual aids was noted also, and the need to repeat questions asked.

Please add here other comments/suggestions on the workshop.

Twenty-two participants offered other comments on the workshop. Most comments reinforced one of the stronger or weaker areas noted above. Additional suggestions were the need for more breaks, disallow smoking during classes, provide note pads to participants. Three respondents suggested that instructors incorporate opposing views to the Rand Study when discussing this report.

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS AND RANK - BY SITE

	Chief*	Insp/Major/ Commander	Capt.	Lt.	Sgt.	Civilian	Other**	N
FL	2		5	8	25	8	1	49
IL	15	6	8	32	23	2	4	90
SC	1		4	8	26	1	9	49
IN	10	2	12	18	19	1	1	63
NY	19	27	8	19	7			80
HA	4	21	28	6			12	71
AZ	12	3	24	42	25		8	114
AL	9	4	16	16	37		3	85
	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	----
TOTAL:	72	63	105	149	162	12	38	601

*Category includes Deputy or Assistant Chief, Commissioner, or Superintendent.

**Category includes sheriff department personnel, line or military personnel.

SECTION V. CHIEFS' FOLLOWUP SURVEY

A. Overview

Because PMA was eager to assess the impact of the "Improving Police Management" training program at each site, a brief followup survey form was designed and mailed to the chief of each department/agency which participated in the training.

Consisting of five questions which assessed whether the course both positively influenced participating managers, or induced changes within each department, the survey was modeled on one which project staff had discarded during the previous year's training and replaced with a telephone survey. While realizing the difficulties of measuring change after a relatively short period of time; nonetheless, PMA believed that information collected from the survey results would serve as an adjunct to the participants' on-site evaluation and aid in program development.

The survey instrument was not finalized until Summer, '86. By then, three of the seminars had already been held -- in March, April, and May. It is felt that late survey adminstration within these three departments contributed substantially to the lower response rates received at the first three sites. Second requests were mailed to each nonrespondent but these requests did not adhere to any specific schedule. Nonetheless, PMA achieved an overall 60 percent response rate across all sites.

The following information presents response rates by each training site, survey results, and analysis. A copy of the Followup Survey Form is included as Appendix D.

B. Response Rates by Training Site

Site	# Agencies Surveyed	# Agencies Responded	Response Rate
St. Petersburg, FL	16	6	38%
Chicago, IL	26	13	50%
Charleston, South Carolina	12	7	58%
Fort Wayne, Indiana	17	11	65%
Nassau County, New York	8	3	38%
Honolulu, Hawaii	10	6	60%
Tucson, Arizona	33	26	79%
Birmingham, Alabama	17	11	65%
Total:	139	83	

Mean Response Rate = 60%

C. Survey Data and Analysis

Question 1:

Based on feedback you received about the IPM seminar, was the training worthwhile?

	YES	NO (explain)
FL	5	1
IL	12	1
SC	6	1
NY	2	1
IN	11	--
HI	6	--
AZ	16	7
AL	11	--
TOTAL:	69	11

An overwhelming majority of respondents felt that the IPM training was worthwhile. Those who stated that training was not worthwhile indicated a variety of reasons for their belief. Several indicated the training was not timely, i.e., too basic or previously reviewed. Other reasons stated by some respondents trained at the same site are contradictory. For example, it was stated that the information was of more value to both smaller departments and to larger departments.

Question 2:

Was the information presented during the IPM seminar compatible with your managerial philosophy?

	YES	NO (explain)
FL	5	--
IL	13	--
SC	5	1
NY	2	--
IN	10	1
HI	6	--
AZ	24	5
AL	9	3
TOTAL:	74	10

The majority of respondents felt the information presented was compatible with their managerial philosophy. Reasons given for incompatibility varied from "political differences" to "sheriff deputies must make house calls," (referring to differential police response presentation) and "class too large; oriented to larger departments."

Question 3:

Did the IPM seminar provoke the types of discussions among your officers that could result in positive change and improved management within your agency?

	YES	NO (explain)
FL	4	2
IL	13	--
SC	7	--
NY	1	1
IN	11	--
HI	4*	1*
AZ	15	5
AL	10	1
	--	--
	65	10

Respondents clearly believed that the seminar could result in positive change and improved management within their agencies. One respondent from a Hawaii police agency indicated both "yes" and "no," further explaining that time is needed to see how information can be applied in improved ways. Again, political control and budget limitations were cited as reasons for stating "no," as well as that some departments routinely practice the management principles presented.

Question 4:

Aside from programs discussed during the seminar that are already in place in your department, are there now new programs (e.g., beat reconfiguration, resource allocation, crime analysis, differential police response, etc.) you would like to see implemented as a result of information presented during this seminar?

	YES specify:	DPR	Resource Allocation	Beat Reconfig.	Crime Analysis	Other	No
FL	3	3			1		2
IL	7	2	3		1	2	5
SC	2	1	1				4
NY							3
IN	9	5	4	3	4		1
HI	4	1	1	1		1	2
AZ	17	8	7	7	3	2	9
AL	6	3	1	2	1		4
	---	--	--	--	--	--	--
TOTAL:	48	23	17	13	10	5	30

Results here indicated that there is a strong movement for change within police departments which participated in the seminar series. Differential police response and resource allocation were the training topics which generated the most interest. Peripheral topics mentioned under "other" focused mainly on community-oriented policing and team building techniques.

Six of the 48 respondents, or 13 percent, noted that changes are being currently proposed or implemented as a direct result of the IPM seminar.

Question 5: Could you suggest other training topics that would be relevant for future IPM seminars?

Chiefs suggested a wide variety of topics for future training. A content analysis was done and the topics mentioned most frequently were the following.

Investigations: 6	Legal/Liability Issues: 6
Personnel Issues: 11	Resource Allocation: 5
Computerization: 5	
Supervision: 6	

SECTION VI. FINDINGS AND SITE COMPARISONS

Several limitations are necessarily imposed before presenting the project's major findings.

PMA used no sophisticated methods for data analysis. Computer equipment was available only during the last three months of the project when most evaluation results had been tabulated manually. Time constraints prohibited computer entry of the vast amount of data already analyzed.

Because of program changes at several training sites, aggregation of certain results and comparisons across sites are precluded for most of the training sessions.

Confusion was expressed by some participants about when a given session ended and another began. (Trainers occasionally failed to announce the next course topic.) While mean scores may be affected by this to some degree, differences across sites cannot be attributed wholly to this confusion.

The evaluator is an employee of the Police Management Association and has worked on PMA's training grants over the past two years. Although attending only one of the current seminars, it is believed that through historical knowledge of the project's activities and ongoing communication with project staff, a fair and valid measure of results are offered.

Participants were asked to assess the eleven individual training sessions, along with perceptions about workshop flow and activities, and workshop impact on a 5 point scale with 5 = excellent and 1 = very poor. An assessment of stronger and weaker features of the workshop was requested also. Sixty-three

separate items were ranked and space for additional comments or suggestions provided. (See evaluation form included as Appendix C).

For reasons cited above, comparisons are not offered across sites for the eleven training sessions. However, site comparisons are displayed on evaluation returns, workshop flow and activities, workshop impact results, and participants' perceptions of stronger and weaker seminar features. The reader is cautioned here to bear in mind when interpreting evaluation results, the wide disparities in participant attendance across sites. Another caveat necessary to data interpretation is, that for the most part, the project's eleven individual training sessions received higher ratings than the results displayed in the tables which follow. It is necessary for the reader to view individual site results in concert with the following analyses.

TABLE 1

EVALUATION RESPONSE RATES: ALL SITES

Site	% Evaluation Return	Highest Number Responses Given*	Lowest Number Responses Given*
St. Petersburg, FL Participants = 49	88%	43	20
Chicago, IL Participants = 90	73%	66	33
Charleston, SC Participants = 49	82%	40	15
Fort Wayne, IN Participants = 63	86%	56	24
Nassau County, NY Participants = 80	65%	52	31
Honolulu, HA Participants = 71	72%	51	21
Tucson, AZ Participants = 114	74%	84	66
Birmingham, AL Participants = 85	84%	71	48

*Highest and lowest number of responses represent those received for any given training session.

o On-site evaluation return rates were highest in St. Petersburg, FL (88%), Fort Wayne, IN (86%), and Birmingham, AL (84%). Lower returns are evident from the other sites, with Nassau County, NY having the lowest rate (65%).

o A wide degree of fluctuation in number of responses across sites is evident. This is attributed to two factors: some participants completed the evaluation form presented for one training day only; and, project staff reported that because of long distance driving needs at several sites, many participants left early.

o Highest and lowest return rates correlate, for the most part, to agenda position of training topics with morning topics on Day One scored most often and late afternoon topics presented on Day Two scored by fewer participants. See individual site results for further clarification.

o No correlation is apparent between number of participants and percentage of evaluation returns.

TABLE 2

WORKSHOP FLOW AND ACTIVITIES COMPARISONS BY SITE

	FL	IL	SC	IN	NY	HA	AZ	AL
Lectures/Presentations								
Time allotted	3.9	3.7	4.1	3.9	3.3	4.1	3.5	3.9
Opportunity for questions	4.2	4.1	4.2	4.4	3.6	4.3	3.9	4.1
Relevancy of Visual aids	3.1	3.1	3.9	3.7	3.2	4.1	3.5	3.9
Use of text in sessions	4.2	3.7	3.8	4.1	3.2	3.8	3.0	4.0
Workshop Flow								
Sequence of sessions	4.1	3.7	4.4	4.2	3.2	4.2	3.1	4.2
Transition of sessions	4.0	3.8	4.5	4.3	3.2	4.1	3.1	4.2
Small Group Work/Individual Work								
Small group work utility	4.0	3.6	4.4	3.9	3.3	4.1	N/A*	4.1
Individual work utility	3.8	3.4	4.4	4.0	3.6	3.7	N/A*	3.9
Small group work - time	3.5	3.4	4.1	3.6	3.2	3.7	N/A*	4.0
Individual work - time	3.5	3.4	4.1	3.6	3.2	3.7	N/A*	3.9
Materials								
Participant handbook	4.5	4.4	4.5	4.5	3.5	4.6	4.6	4.5
Visual aids	3.0	2.9	4.1	3.7	3.0	4.0	3.4	3.9
Handouts	3.6	3.3	4.5	4.2	3.5	4.4	3.8	4.4
Task worksheets	3.6	3.4	4.4	4.0	3.0	4.2	N/A*	4.3

*Due to participant overenrollment, no group or individual breakout sessions were held at the Tucson, Arizona seminar.

o Respondents in South Carolina and Hawaii ranked time allotted for lectures/presentations as 4.1 on the 5 to 1 scale, or very good. The remaining sites ranked this lower, with New York participants scoring lecture time 3.3.

o At each training site, opportunity for questions was rated the highest in the lecture/presentation series of questions, reflecting well on the trainers to clarify or discuss the information presented.

o Congruent with the weaker features noted on Table 3, relevancy of visual aids received average ratings across sites, with the exception of Hawaii, where respondents rated visual aids higher (4.1).

o Use of the text (course handbook) in sessions received very good scores in Florida (4.2), Indiana (4.1), and Alabama (4.0). The remaining five sites scored use of text in the average range.

o Sequence and transition of sessions was perceived as very good in Florida, South Carolina, Indiana, Hawaii, and Alabama, about average in Illinois, and barely average in New York, and Arizona. This finding is consistent with mean scores assigned by participants to individual topic sessions.

o South Carolina respondents rated small and individual group work the highest, perceiving these sessions as very good for both utility and time. Consistent with other ratings, New York respondents rated these sessions the lowest.

o Excellent ratings were received for the participant handbook at every site except New York.

o Scores allocated for visual aids are consistent with those assigned to "relevancy of visual aids" noted above.

o A wide disparity of responses is noted for handouts, ranging from 4.5 in South Carolina to 3.5 in New York.

o Task worksheets for group and individual sessions were ranked higher in South Carolina, Alabama and Indiana than in other sites.

TABLE 3
WORKSHOP IMPACT: SITE COMPARISONS

	FL	IL	SC	IN	NY	HA	AZ	AL
How informative?	3.9	3.9	4.3	4.2	2.9	4.2	3.4	4.2
How useful?	3.6	3.7	3.8	4.0	2.6	4.1	3.4	3.9
How relevant to your agency?	3.6	3.9	3.6	3.9	2.7	4.1	3.4	4.1

o Seminar participants in South Carolina, Indiana, and Alabama scored the workshop's impact as very informative, giving mean scores of 4.3, 4.2, and 4.2 respectively, while average ratings were received from workshop participants in Florida (3.9), Illinois (3.9), and Arizona (3.4). Workshop impact was seen as less informative (2.9) by Nassau County, New York participants -- a finding consistent with additional comments offered at this site.

o Usefulness of the workshop was ranked highest in Hawaii (4.1) and Indiana (4.0). Again, the remaining sites rated workshop usefulness about average, with the exception of New York participants, who clearly did not find the training useful.

o Relevancy to participants' agencies was rated the highest in Hawaii and Alabama (both 4.1). Ratings from remaining sites are consistent with those mentioned above.

TABLE 4

STRONGER FEATURES SELECTED BY PARTICIPANTS:
SITE COMPARISONS

	FL	IL	SC	IN	NY	HA	AZ	AL	N
Presenters' Delivery	20	40	14	32	23	32	36	34	231
Topics Covered	11	37	5	24	7	22	27	29	162
Course Handbook	5	41	14	6	12	27	30	28	163
Group Interaction	4	36	11	17	26	14	5	22	135
Other*	3	3	0	0	3	1	4	3	17

NOTE: Some respondents chose one or more feature. For actual number of respondents, see individual site results.

*An overview of "other" features is provided in individual site results.

TABLE 5

WEAKER FEATURES SELECTED BY PARTICIPANTS:
SITE COMPARISONS

	FL	IL	SC	IN	NY	HA	AZ	AL	N
Insufficient Lecture Time	7	13	7	11	4	14	10	19	85
Insufficient Group Time	8	15	5	18	18	11	15	9	99
Course not Relevant to Agency	6	5	7	6	20	2	19	8	73
Additional Visual Aids Needed	6	28	9	16	4	18	20	20	121
Other*	9	17	7	6	6	4	21	8	78

NOTE: Some respondents chose one or more feature. For actual number of respondents, see evaluation results by individual site.

*An overview of "other" features is provided in individual site results.

o The presenters' delivery was clearly perceived by participants as the workshops' strongest feature -- selected by 231 participants across sites. This finding is enhanced by reviewing presenters' scores for individual sessions at each site. Exceptions to this are noted at the Nassau County, NY and Tucson, Arizona seminars. However, the unscheduled "Repeat Offender Project" session, presented in Tucson by an Inspector of the Metropolitan Washington, DC Police Department, received the highest ratings there, and may have influenced selection of presenters' delivery as the strongest feature. Other sites selecting presenters' delivery as stronger were Florida, Indiana, Hawaii, and Alabama, with South Carolina participants choosing it as many times as the course handbook.

o Topics covered at the seminars and the course handbook were selected about evenly as stronger features, and substantially less times the presenters' delivery.

o Although group interaction was selected least as a stronger feature, this program component was the favorite in Nassau County, NY. An interesting adjunct finding is that Nassau County participants also selected "insufficient group time" as one of the program's weaker features. Whether group interaction was perceived as the camaraderie among officers during breaks and luncheons, or as interaction occurring in the scheduled group sessions, or a combination of both, is unknown.

o A distinct need for additional visual aids was perceived at the seminars. This need was checked by 121 participants across sites, and considered the weakest feature in Chicago, South Carolina, Honolulu, Tucson, and Arizona -- 5 of the 8 sites.

o Consistent with overall low scores received for "time for task" at individual sites, 99 participants reinforced the weakness imposed by schedule overruns by selecting "insufficient group time" as one of the program's weaker features.

o Insufficient lecture time was perceived by 85 participants with nearly one-third of Birmingham respondents choosing it as a weaker feature.

o Seventy-three respondents felt that the "Improving Police Management" course was not relevant to their agency. Compatible with key events and individual site evaluation results, Nassau Co., NY respondents (N=20) felt this the program's weakest feature, while only 5 Honolulu respondents considered this a weakness.

SECTION VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Police Management Association (PMA) has successfully completed another series of management training seminars. With notification received recently of an NIJ supplemental award to conduct four additional seminars, future efforts should focus on:

o Updating the training materials to include recent research findings. Participants often stated that information presented was out-of-date, previously known, or too elementary. Updated materials should be reviewed by the NIJ program monitor, all trainers, and PMA staff prior to program implementation.

o Ensuring that future seminar audiences are in need of the training. This can be accomplished best through closer communication with host agencies. A course syllabus should be mailed by host agencies to surrounding departments well in advance of the seminar for in-depth review. Many participants reported the training as too basic or not relevant to their agency.

o Refining the course schedule to protect against schedule overruns by the trainers. These overruns have been the rule rather than the exception, precluding conduct of scheduled sessions at many training sites.

o Targeting audience size in a more manageable fashion. At several sites, overenrollment prohibited holding the scheduled group sessions, resulting in participant dissappointment with the program outcome.

o Incorporating additional visual aids into the trainers' presentations. This was one of the major needs perceived by participants across sites. AV equipment could be requested from the host department(s).

o Redesigning the participant evaluation instruments. For a variety of reasons, separate instruments for Day One and Day Two resulted in many participants completing only one instrument. Additionally, PMA should consider reducing the number of evaluation responses requested (68 currently used) and carefully planning the evaluation methodology.

o Incorporating a mechanism to increase evaluation returns. For instance, participants can be asked to rate each session before proceeding to the next. In this fashion, memory recall would be improved, rather than requesting completion of the form at conclusion of the day's training.

o Considering use of an additional, alternate trainer. Currently, only one alternate trainer is available and instances may arise when either none or only one regular trainer is available.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
National Institute of Justice

S Y L L A B U S O F

THE POLICE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCE

IMPROVING POLICE MANAGEMENT: A CONFERENCE FOR MID-LEVEL AND SENIOR EXECUTIVES

A Joint Program of the National Institute of Justice
and The Police Management Association
Washington, DC

March, 1986

APPENDIX A



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THE POLICE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
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IMPROVING POLICE MANAGEMENT: A CONFERENCE FOR MID-LEVEL ANI SENIOR EXECUTIVES

PARTICIPANT HANDBOOK

Prepared by

H. JEROME MIRON
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March, 1986

This Handbook was prepared for PMA with assistance from a grant from the National Institute of Justice, whose Director is Mr. James K. Stewart, U. S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Table of Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This Handbook was prepared by H. Jerome Miron with the assistance and collaboration of Mr. William Bieck.

Guidance in the development of the PMA Professional Conference Program has been provided by Mr. John Lucey, NIJ, Ms. Roberta Lesh, PMA Executive Director, and members of the Board of Directors of PMA.

Much of the material contained in this text builds upon the prior work and publications of the National Institute of Justice. Of particular importance have been the NIJ texts produced from 1976 - 1983 on such topics as "Managing Criminal Investigations", "Managing Patrol Operations", "Improving Police Management", "Managing the Pressures of Inflation in Criminal Justice", "Cutback Management in the Criminal Justice System", and "Differential Response to Police Calls for Service".

Updated information has been gleaned from other sources. These updates include information derived from recently published NIJ documents such as "Patrol Deployment" by Levine and McEwen (1985) and "Synthesizing and Extending the Results of Police Patrol Studies" by Larson (1985).

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Director, Victim Assistance Program
National Sheriffs' Association
Alexandria, Virginia

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Houston, Texas Police Department
Houston, Texas

March, 1986

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PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCE

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10:15	Break
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4:45	Summary/Conclusion of Day I

DAY II

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12:15 pm	Luncheon
1:15	What Do You Want Officers To Do When Deployed?
2:30	Break
2:45	Responding to Crime Victims' Needs and Rights: Managing Criminal Investigations
4:00	An Agency Management Plan
4:50	Conclusion of Conference

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The presentation will begin with a description of the multiple roles of a law enforcement executive, then move to a discussion of the issues that impact these roles.

Following this session, Session 3 will direct participants to the performance of a small group problem-identification process and task.

These sessions will form the basis and context for the remainder of the Conference wherein the dominant question will be: What have research and practices in the law enforcement community suggested as answers or insights into the problems to be faced by police executives in the near future?

SESSION 3

GROUP PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION: TASK, PROCESS, REPORT

Summary

In this session, participants will be given a task to perform in a small group, a process to be used in the group to complete the task, and, one representative from the group should be prepared to give a verbal report to the Conference about the results of the group's work.

The task statement is: Take the list of 10 issues from the previous session; each group, following the same problem identification process, will list in writing four (4) specific problems that their agency faces now or in the near future that are related to any one or more of these 10 issues. The list of specific problems must be rank-ordered from most important and immediate problem to less important and future problem. Upon completion of the listing of each of the four (4) problems, if time permits, the group should follow the same process to list--beside each of the problems--suggested objectives or steps to resolve the problem by managers in the agency.

The group structure is: Those from similar agencies and/or those from the same size agency will form working groups of 6-8 members. Groups can cluster at the same table in the main training room or choose to use the small group breakout rooms. One member of the group must be selected to report back to the full Conference. The report should take about 3 minutes.

The recommended group process is: The next two pages describe a group problem identification process called Nominal Group Technique. Follow this process and, within the allotted time, the group should be able to reach sufficient consensus for reporting back to the full Conference.

The time frames for this task are: 55 minutes for the task; 35 minutes for reports by all representatives of each group.

SESSION 4

WHY DO PEOPLE CALL THE POLICE?
A REVIEW OF CALLS-FOR-SERVICE

Summary

As much as 90% of the workload for patrol and investigations is generated as a result of phone calls to police communication's centers.

For several years, researchers at the University of North Carolina and Indiana University have been analyzing incoming calls for service in over 25 municipal and county jurisdictions. Their purposes are to identify reasons why people call the police, classify calls and response procedures, and recommend ways to improve the process of classification and police response strategies.

NIJ built upon some of the results of this research in its development and testing of the Differential Police Response to Calls For Service Program which was carried out by the Garden Grove, CA Police Department, Greensboro, NC Police Department, and the Toledo Ohio Police Division.

One of the essential steps in the DPR Program was that each agency had to classify incoming calls for service in a uniform common manner.

Using the data derived from the University research and the findings from the DPR Program, we have created two tables that can act as a common classification scheme for police agencies.

Further, using data derived from other sources, we will also present information about how selected categories of calls fall into different patterns: by time of day, day of week, and other variables.

Two objectives guide this presentation:

1. To understand the need for revising call classification schemes so that appropriate judgements can be made about patrol and investigative workload;

2. To understand the multiple variables that need to be considered so as to forecast workload and deploy units according to needs as determined by workload factors.

The next session will adress a third objective which is also integrally linked to this session: What type(s) of police responses (mobile or nonmobile) are suitable for what category(-ies) of calls?

SESSION 5

HOW DO DEPARTMENTS RESPOND TO CALLS?

Summary

In this session, a brief presentation will be made about the recent findings from the Differential Police Response to Calls for Service Field Test (DPR).

The **Executive Summary** of the **Evaluation of DPR** is reprinted in this section.

Using the information derived from **Session 4** and some of the findings from the **DPR Evaluation** presentation, this session will conclude with a participant group task.

Each group will be the same as the groups used in **Session 3.** The groups will follow the same problem-solving process used in Session 3.

The **task statement** for this session's group work is:

- Your group is to select **one of the 13 Calls for Service Categories** discussed in Session 4.

- Your group is to identify at least seven **types** of calls that fit within the definition of your chosen category.

- Your group is to determine for each **type** of call, the **police response to each type** according to the following options of response: (1) immediate mobile response; (2) delayed mobile response; and (3) non-mobile responses.

A Policy-Planning Matrix for this task is attached which should be completed as the report from the group.

SESSION 6

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: DAY I

SUMMARY

This session will be used to summarize the work of Day I, prepare for Day II, and complete appropriate evaluation forms.

SESSION 7

PATROL DEPLOYMENT

Summary

Using materials recently published by the National Institute of Justice and other information, a presentation will be given that explores several issues associated with the deployment of the patrol service.

Among the issues to be examined are:

- The need for analysis of patrol operations;
- Issues associated with patrol operations;
- Questions associated with a review of operations, particularly, the question: How many patrol units does the agency actually need to deploy per shift?
- How to analyze workload and calculate answers to patrol deployment questions;
- What are the techniques that can provide reasonable solutions to these issues.

Most of the information needed to discuss matters of patrol deployment have been documented in a recent report: "Patrol Deployment" by Levine and McEwen. Two of the most important chapters of this report are reprinted as reference materials for this session.

SESSION 8

A PATROL DEPLOYMENT PLAN:
A CASE STUDY FOR SMALL GROUPS

Summary

In this session, a patrol deployment plan derived from real data in a medium sized urban police department (approximately 350 employees) will be presented.

The plan will be presented as a case study for your small group.

Using the case study, each group will perform the same task which is to analyze the study and the assumptions that are implicit in the data.

From the group analysis, the group must agree on ways to respond to the fact that the local government will not be able to fund or support the 23 patrol units that are listed as the required number of units in the case study.

Therefore, your analysis must be able to produce a deployment plan that will, in effect, be able to deploy only 15 units...or a reduction in the number listed in the case study plan.

SESSION 9

WHAT DO MANAGERS WANT PATROL UNITS TO DO WHEN DEPLOYED?

Summary

In this session, a presentation will be given that focuses on the essential question: What is Patrol? What should Patrol do? How should I think, as a manager, about patrol planning, operations, and evaluation?

In effect, these three questions can be reduced to the one question that forms the title of this session.

Several interlocking themes and ideas form the flow of the presenttion:

- Crime analysis as the process by which information about crime or problems that need to be addressed by patrol operations;
- The issue of preventive versus directed patrol;
- The issue of uncommitted patrol time;
- The prospect of redirecting patrol time so that directed or managed patrol operations are done in and efficient and effective manner;
- Examples of Directed Patrol Programs
- Some observations on specialized patrol wherein units and personnel are freed from calls-for-service responsibilities in order to perform other duties associated with problem solving and crime suppression and interdiction.

The materials in the text discuss each of these logically related issues.

SESSION 10

RESPONDING TO THE NEEDS AND RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS: MANAGING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

Summary

This session will present information about the needs and appropriate state statutes governing victim rights and the role of law enforcement agencies in responding to such needs and rights. By definition, then, these new developments associated with victims have a direct relationship with the tasks of patrol in the conduct of initial investigations, the tasks of investigators in the follow-up phase and case preparation phase of the continuing investigation, and, finally, with the overall management of the patrol and investigative process.

By focusing on the victim (and or witness) as the principle client of the law enforcement agency, a more clear and specific set of new operational tasks and management issues surface for the law enforcement agency.

In outline, this session will address the following topics:

- National data about the extent of crime victimization;
- The meaning of victimization;
- The doctrine of victims' rights;
- Statutory legislation in your state;
- Summary of victim's needs;
- Definition of a criminal investigation and role of the victim and witness;
- The criminal investigation process and case processing from call for service to parole;
- The roles of initial investigators (patrol) and follow-up investigators (detectives)

SESSION 11

A PRELIMINARY MANAGEMENT PLAN TO IMPROVE POLICE OPERATIONS

Summary

In this session, participants will work individually or as members of the same management team from an individual agency and complete the outline of a preliminary management plan to improve some aspect of the agency's law enforcement operation.

As an individual--or as a team--you will select only one area for use in the plan. In this workshop, we have addressed the following topics or areas of interest for law enforcement managers:

- 10 critical issues affecting management;
- Classification and analysis of calls-for-service;
- Differential response to calls-for-service;
- Patrol workload analysis, deployment and scheduling;
- Crime analysis;
- Patrol management and directed patrol planning;
- Crime victims' rights and law enforcement response;
- Investigative management.

You are to choose any one or a part of any one of these broad areas of interest.

In developing your individual or agency management plan, we ask that you write your ideas or suggestions according to the following list:

- Policies...that may need to be developed or revised to address the chosen area;
- Procedures...i.e., who does what and under what circumstances in order to carry out the policy;
- Protocols...i.e., those written agreements that have to be used in order to obtain proper coordination of efforts with other justice system agencies, governmental agencies, or non-governmental groups so that your policies and procedures are understood by these others;
- Supervision...i.e., who is the specific supervisor of the procedure and what is the chain of command for accountability purposes;

- Training...i.e., what type of training and for what employees will be needed to ensure that employees have the requsite knowledge and skill to carry out the policies, procedures, protocols, and supervisory duties;

- Public education and awareness programs...i.e., if the area chosen requires an interaction between the agency and the public (governmental officials, interest groups, citizens, and the media) in order to foster and implement policies, procedures, and protocols, what type of public relations or education will be done.

There are six pages for your notes; one page for each part of the preliminary plan.

On this page list the area or topic you choose:

If time permits, we may have one or more of you or a team present their ideas.

SESSION 12

CONCLUSION OF CONFERENCE

Summary

This session will complete the Conference. Participants will finish their Conference Evaluation Form and hand it to the trainers or the PMA representatives.

A brief presentation will be made about the current and future plans of the Police Management Association.

POLICE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
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APPENDIX B

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
National Institute of Justice

THE POLICE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCE

IMPROVING POLICE MANAGEMENT: A CONFERENCE FOR MID-LEVEL AND SENIOR EXECUTIVES

A Joint Program of the National Institute of Justice
and The Police Management Association
Washington, DC

March, 1986

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PARTICIPANT HANDBOOK

Prepared by

H. JEROME MIRON
WILLIAM BIECK

March, 1986

This Handbook was prepared for PMA with assistance from a grant from the National Institute of Justice, whose Director is Mr. James K. Stewart, U. S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

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ROLES OF POLICE MANAGERS

Definition: Manager:

--the one in charge of a formal organization or one of its sub-units...

--the one vested with formal authority over the organization or unit...

--and this authority is the basic foundation to accomplish four purposes.

Purposes of the Job of Manager:

--to ensure that the organization or its units deliver specific services efficiently;

--to ensure that the organization serves the ends of those persons who control it: to interpret their preferences, and to combine these to produce statements that guide decision making in the organization;

--to act as the key communication link between the organization and its environment;

--to carry out responsibility for the operation of the organization's status system...i.e., to determine who has authority to do what, who is accountable, and how work it to be divided and coordinated.

Operational Roles of the Job of Manager:

These basic purposes are observable in the manager's daily work through several interrelated roles performed by them at all levels in the organization.



THE TEN MANAGERIAL ROLES*

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* Mintzberg, Henry, The Nature of Managerial Work. New York: Harper and Row, 1973...and subseqent editions and other articles by Mintzberg

ROLES OF A MANAGER

The issue of how a manager actually manages is complicated by the fact that there is little, if any, specific treatment of this topic in management texts. Most texts on police management or administration follow the classical school of management theory and discuss what the patrol manager should do: plan, organize, direct, coordinate, staff, budget. Other texts emphasize one aspect of the job of the manager; the manager as a leader or motivator or the manager as a decisionmaker. As yet, no study or text has answered the deceptively simple question: what do police managers do when they manage their operations?

MYTHS

- Managers are reflective, systematic planners.
- Managers organize, coordinate, and orchestrate the activities of their agencies and have few defined or regular duties.
- Managers depend on documented, aggregated information reports which they read, digest, and use in rational decisionmaking.

REALITIES

- Managers work at an unrelenting pace.
- Daily activities are characterized by brevity, variety, and fragmentation.
- Managers prefer live action and face-to-face communication.
- Managers are attracted to and use the verbal media extensively.
- Much activity is divided between the office and organization on the one hand, and an external network of outside contacts, on the other.
- The open-ended nature of the job suggests that managers in general are unable to control the majority of their daily activities.

Figure 1
OVERVIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM ACTIVITIES FOR FELONY OFFENSES *



* SOURCE: National Baseline Information on Offender Processing Costs Project (1984) Developed by: Jefferson Institute for Justice Studies; Research Management Associates; and, Institute for Economic Policy Studies. For: National Institute of Justice, Washington, DC

ISSUES AFFECTING POLICE MANAGEMENT

1. The Deficit Control Act of 1984: Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and federal budget cutbacks for the period 1986 - 1991.

2. The Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1984: "Garcia"

3. The Liability Insurance Crisis and Civil and Criminal Liability Issues Affecting Police and Law Enforcement

4. The Victims Movement: New Statutes, New Penalities--Thurman and Sorichetti

5. State and Local Law Enforcement Training Needs in the United States: FBI National Assessment

6. Cutback Management and Strategic Planning

7. Pressure Towards Accreditation of Agencies

8. Crime Rate Increases

9. Non-Crime Services

10. Employee, Citizen, and Community Expectations

These ten issues will directly influence and affect the multiple roles of a police manager. Some issues, under certain circumstances, will enhance some roles; other issues will mute other roles. Thus, a "contingency style" of management will be fostered--a style that says, in effect, management will have to be flexible enough to be responsive to multiple but important problems.

The overriding question then becomes: What can I learn from others that will prepare me for my current and future role as a law enforcement executive?

A second important question is implicit in the first question: What can I learn from my colleagues here that anticipates my managerial response(s) to current or future issues affecting my job?

These last two questions will form the basis for the next session's work and the subsequent sessions of this Conference.

SESSION 3

GROUP PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION: TASK, PROCESS, REPORT

Summary

In this session, participants will be given a task to perform in a small group, a process to be used in the group to complete the task, and, one representative from the group should be prepared to give a verbal report to the Conference about the results of the group's work.

The task statement is: Take the list of 10 issues from the previous session; each group, following the same problem identification process, will list in writing four (4) specific problems that their agency faces now or in the near future that are related to any one or more of these 10 issues. The list of specific problems must be rank-ordered from most important and immediate problem to less important and future problem. Upon completion of the listing of each of the four (4) problems, if time permits, the group should follow the same process to list--beside each of the problems--suggested objectives or steps to resolve the problem by managers in the agency.

The group structure is: Those from similar agencies and/or those from the same size agency will form working groups of 6-8 members. Groups can cluster at the same table in the main training room or choose to use the small group breakout rooms. One member of the group must be selected to report back to the full Conference. The report should take about 3 minutes.

The recommended group process is: The next two pages describe a group problem identification process called Nominal Group Technique. Follow this process and, within the allotted time, the group should be able to reach sufficient consensus for reporting back to the full Conference.

The time frames for this task are: 55 minutes for the task; 35 minutes for reports by all representatives of each group.

NOTES:

NOMINAL GROUP TECHNIQUE: STEPS *

1. Individual Generation of Ideas in Writing
   Each individual re-reads the task statement. Each individual takes about 7 minutes to list in writing his or her individual response to the statement. This is done silently and independently; simply jot down ideas or phrases that come to mind.

2. Choose a Representative for the Conference Report
   This should take no more than 1 minute; a volunteer will be adequate. The Rep should take notes from what follows next.

3. Round-Robin Listing of Written Ideas
   Each individual states his or her ideas until each member has presented his or her comments. Merely state the idea; there should be no debate or lengthy clarifications. The important thing is to have ideas or problems listed by the Rep on a chart for all to see. This should take about 15-20 minutes--no more.

4. Clarification of Ideas Listed on Chart(s)
   Statements that need clarification are clarified--but no lengthy discussions need take place. If necessary or useful some ideas may be consolidated if the statements are similar or redundant. This process should take about 15 minutes--possibly more.

5. Priority Voting
   The Rep then asks the group to vote on the clarified statements. Four (4) rank ordered choices must be made. Voting is done as follows: Rank #1 = Most Important and Most Immediate; #2 = Most Important Future; #3 Less Important and Most Immediate; #4 = Less Important and Less Immediate. Each member merely lists a 1, 2, 3, or 4 behind four of the statements. The Rep tallies the scores. **REMEMBER THAT THE TALLY WILL SHOW THAT THE LOWEST SCORE IS THE HIGHEST RANK.** This should take about 4-5 minutes.

6. **IF TIME PERMITS**, Discussion of Voting Outcomes
   Open discussion is used to examine inconsistencies in the voting pattern, and to justify or evaluate different positions, and, rediscuss items which are perceived to have too many votes or too few votes. If time permits, the group may, after discussion, vote again using the process described in step 5.

7. Reporting
   The Rep will list the four (4) statements on a single flip chart page for use in making a verbal report to the Conference. Charts will be posted in the Conference Room for others to review and compare with other Reports.

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* Source: Wharton School of Business: Unpublished

NOTES

SESSION 4

WHY DO PEOPLE CALL THE POLICE?
A REVIEW OF CALLS-FOR-SERVICE

Summary

As much as 90% of the workload for patrol and investigations is generated as a result of phone calls to police communication's centers.

For several years, researchers at the University of North Carolina and Indiana University have been analyzing incoming calls for service in over 25 municipal and county jurisdictions. Their purposes are to identify reasons why people call the police, classify calls and response procedures, and recommend ways to improve the process of classification and police response strategies.

NIJ built upon some of the results of this research in its development and testing of the Differential Police Response to Calls For Service Program which was carried out by the Garden Grove, CA Police Department, Greensboro, NC Police Department, and the Toledo Ohio Police Division.

One of the essential steps in the DPR Program was that each agency had to classify incoming calls for service in a uniform common manner.

Using the data derived from the University research and the findings from the DPR Program, we have created two tables that can act as a common classification scheme for police agencies.

Further, using data derived from other sources, we will also present information about how selected categories of calls fall into different patterns: by time of day, day of week, and other variables.

Two objectives guide this presentation:

1. To understand the need for revising call classification schemes so that appropriate judgements can be made about patrol and investigative workload;

2. To understand the multiple variables that need to be considered so as to forecast workload and deploy units according to needs as determined by workload factors.

The next session will adress a third objective which is also integrally linked to this session: What type(s) of police responses (mobile or nonmobile) are suitable for what category(-ies) of calls?

BACKGROUND

- Research on calls has been done in over 25 jurisdictions. The volume of calls per jurisdiction ranged from over 500,000 dispatched calls to about 13,000 dispatched calls per year.

- Analysis was done by: reviewing dispatch tapes of calls; reviewing and tracking calls through communication to field; examination of incident and crime reports done in response to call; interviewing samples of originating callers; interviewing communications and patrol personnel and other techniques of analysis.

- Among the results of analysis were:

    - **People called the police because they perceived that there was a problem that they discovered or were involved in that they believed required police attention.**

    - **Analysis of the "problems" revealed that all calls could be classified into a common scheme--regardless of the demographics or other variables of the multiple jurisdictions studied.**

- These findings can be used to understand later studies about reporting crimes to the police. For instance, in December, 1985 listed on the next pages indicated that only 35% of all Part I Crimes are reported to the police. One could arguably conclude from this report and the other research that: (1) People call the police when they believe that there is a problem that requires police attention--and only then! or (2) Some people do not call the police to report crime because they believe that the crime does not warrant police attention or that the police are unable or unwilling to do anything!

- If police managers choose to meet citizen expectations and to raise the confidence of victims of crime so that calls are made, then the managers must begin to analyze the nature of the incoming calls.

- Table 1 and Table 2 present the results of a call classification scheme that can be a step in the process of call analysis.

REPORTING CRIMES TO THE POLICE: Summary Tables from Special Report, Bureau of Justice Statistics, December, 1985, 633 Indiana Avenue, Washington, DC 20531, Special Report #NCJ-99432

[Of the 37,115,000 crimes that took place in 1983, as estimated from the National Crime Survey, 35% or 12,880,000 were reported to police. Other specific findings are reprinted in this NSAVAP Summary. These findings are based on interviews conducted twice a year with approximately 128,000 persons ages twelve and older in 60,000 households, conducted as part of the ongoing National Crime Survey (NCS). The tables reprinted here identify whether crime was reported in 1983 by type of crime and percent of victimization and the percent of crimes reported by selected victim characteristics.]

PERCENT OF CRIME REPORTED TO POLICE, 1983

Type of crime	Total number of victimizations	Percent of victimizations			
		Reported to police	Not reported to police	Don't know/not ascertained	Total
All crimes	37,115,000	35%	64%	1%	100%
Crimes of violence	6,015,000	48%	51%	1%	100%
Rape	154,000	47	52	---	100
Robbery	1,133,000	52	47	1	100
Aggravated assault	1,588,000	58	40	2	100
Simple assault	3,141,000	41	58	1	100
Crimes of theft	14,657,000	26%	72%	2%	100%
Purse Snatching	177,000	51	48	---	100
Pocket Picking	386,000	29	70	---	100
Larceny without contact	14,095,000	26	72	2	100
Household crimes	16,442,000	37%	62%	1%	100%
Burglary	6,065,000	49	50	1	100
Household larceny	9,114,000	25	74	1	100
Motor vehicle theft	1,264,000	69	31	---	100

Note: Crime categories include attempted crimes. --Too few cases to obtain statistically reliable data.
Figures may not add to total because of rounding.

Distributed by the National Sheriffs' Association Victim Assistance Program, 1450 Duke Street, Alexandria, VA 22314 (703) 836-7827

PERCENT OF CRIME REPORTED TO POLICE BY VICTIM CHARACTERISTICS, 1983

Victim characteristics[a]	Percent reported to police									
	All crimes	Crimes of violence				Crimes of theft	Household crimes			
		Total[b]	Robbery	Aggravated assault	Simple assault		Total	Burglary	Household larceny	Motor vehicle theft
Sex										
Male	35%	45%	45%	55%	38%	26%	38%	49%	27%	69%
Female	34	53	65	66	45	27	37	49	23	67
Race										
White	34	47	50	57	41	27	37	48	26	68
Black	37	54	58	63	41	26	39	52	22	70
Age										
12-19	22	38	41	48	32	13	26	33	18	40
20-39	36	51	54	60	44	29	36	48	23	68
40-64	40	57	58	73	50	33	41	51	29	72
65 and above	38	49	73	--	--	36	37	48	25	65
Family income										
Less than $10,000	33	48	50	60	41	26	32	41	20	62
$10,000-$19,999	35	48	48	59	41	26	37	49	25	67
$20,000-$29,999	36	50	53	65	41	25	41	54	29	77
$30,000 and above	35	45	56	49	40	27	42	57	29	68
Level of education										
Elementary	26	36	40	51	28	14	35	45	24	68
Some high school	31	47	54	56	38	19	34	45	22	69
High school graduate	37	51	56	59	46	29	38	48	26	71
Some college	37	53	56	67	46	30	37	49	25	66
College graduate	38	46	51	53	41	34	41	54	28	67

--Too few cases to obtain statistically reliable data.

[a]Characteristics are those of respondent for crimes of violence and crimes of theft and of head of household for household crimes. Income is that of the family for all types of crime. Education is years completed for crimes of violence and cirmes of theft and years attended for household crimes. [b]Includes rape, which is not displayed as a separate entry because of the small number in the sample.

TABLE 1

	PROBLEM CATEGORY	DEFINITION	%	RANK
1.	VIOLENT CRIME	One person injures another in a manner that involves criminal liability	4%	9
2.	INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT	Persons involved in a dispute or altercation	8%	6
3.	MEDICAL PROBLEMS	Persons who are ill or injured	1%	11
4.	NONVIOLENT CRIME	Non-physical injury or damage in a manner that involves criminal liability	14%	2
5.	TRAFFIC PROBLEMS	Hazards, congestion, or dangers associated with vehicular movement other than traffic accidents and motor vehicle accidents	21%	1
6.	PUBLIC NUISANCE	Unpleasant or annoying circumstance	10%	5
7.	SUSPICIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES	Situations that citizens (or officers) perceive as threatening, peculiar, or puzzling	5%	8
8.	DEPENDENT PERSON	Persons thought unable to care for themselves; includes children and adults	1%	12
9.	PUBLIC MORALS CRIME	Violation of legal standards of right conduct	2%	10
10.	ASSISTANCE	All other problems or situations in which citizens request help	12%	3
11.	INFORMATION REQUEST	Person wants information from police	11%	4
12.	INFORMATION FOR POLICE	Someone provides information to police; includes alarm calls	6%	7
13.	INTERNAL POLICE OPERATIONS	Police provide information to each other; includes records checks, warrant checks, etc. No direct service to a caller as such.	1%	13

Notes: Within each category there will be separate types of calls that fit the category definition. Types within all categories may total to between 150-268 types.

Percentages listed are averages from an analysis of the data from the jurisdictions plus other data developed by the author. May not add to 100% because single call may have been classified as more than one problem. Only the highest classification was used in this summary that accomodated the definition of the category. For example, an original call about a traffic problem or accident may result in a later charge of manslaughter (violent crime) or an interpersonal conflict may turn into a spousal assault (violent crime).

TABLE 2

Table 1 may be used to analyze the relationship of calls as classified to the conventional definition of the mission of a law enforcement agency. Many texts describe the mission or objectives of law enforcement agencies as: crime control and prevention, order maintenance, service delivery, and traffic control and management.

Mission/Function	Categories from Table 1	Table 1 % of Calls
CRIME CONTROL	Violent Crime, Nonviolent Crime, Public Morals Crime, Suspicious Circumstances, Warrants, and Officer Assists. These last two items are included in Category 12 and 13.	36%
ORDER MAINTENANCE	Interpersonal Conflicts, Public Nuisance, Dependent Persons.	19%
SERVICE	Medical Problems, Assistance, Information Request	24%
TRAFFIC	Traffic Problems	21%

NOTE

Many texts often cite as fact that, nationally, crime-related calls for service amount to between 15%-20% of incoming calls. The remainder of the of the non-crime calls for service workload is computed as between 80%-85%. This is due to the classification scheme used in these studies. Most of these studies defined crime as UCR Part I Index Crimes, which list only major crimes. Our classification system includes all types of of crime as well as other types that relate, from the caller's perspective, to potential crime, e.g., suspicious circumstances, warrants checks, etc.

VIOLENT CRIME



NONVIOLENT CRIME



PART II CRIME



TOTAL CALLS FOR SERVICE



SELECTED TABLES FROM:

"PATROL DEPLOYMENT"
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE:
ISSUES AND PRACTICES

Margaret J. Levine
and
J. Thomas McEwen

September, 1985

Exhibit 2.5 and 2.6 listed on the next pages display samples of calls-for-service data by hours of the day and day of week.

Exhibit 2.7 displays a sample distribution of patrol units by calls-for-service, hours of day, hourly workload, and percentage of total units assigned by shift to shift workload.

These charts are helpful in analyzing the pattern of incoming calls for service. IF a manager wanted to know more details about these patterns, the analyst would have to take the call classification scheme discussed earlier, and analyze the different types of calls in each category by hour of day, day of week, and shift workload.

EXHIBIT 2.5

SAMPLE 24-HOUR GRAPH OF WORKLOAD DISTRIBUTION



EXHIBIT 2.7

SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION OF MANPOWER BY HOURLY WORKLOAD

HOURS BY SHIFT	CALLS FOR SERVICE	PERCENT OF TOTAL HOURLY WORKLOAD	PERCENT OF MANPOWER ASSIGNED
0700 - 0759	58	2.11	DAY SHIFT
0800 - 0859	77	2.80	
0900 - 0959	90	3.28	29.27
1000 - 1059	100	3.64	
1100 - 1159	107	3.90	
1200 - 1259	117	4.26	
1300 - 1359	123	4.48	
1400 - 1459	132	4.80	
1500 - 1559	158	5.75	EVENING SHIFT
1600 - 1659	153	5.57	
1700 - 1759	165	6.01	47.03
1800 - 1859	172	6.26	
1900 - 1959	161	5.86	
2000 - 2059	164	5.97	
2100 - 2159	164	5.97	
2200 - 2259	155	5.64	
2300 - 2359	159	5.79	MIDNIGHT SHIFT
2400 - 0059	118	4.30	
0100 - 0159	101	3.68	23.68
0200 - 0259	90	3.28	
0300 - 0359	60	2.18	
0400 - 0459	45	1.64	
0500 - 0559	37	1.35	
0600 - 0659	40	1.46	
TOTAL	2,746	99.98*	99.98*

*Total does not equal 100 percent because of rounding.

EXHIBIT 2.6

SAMPLE WORKLOAD BY DAY OF WEEK



Source: Reading, Pennsylvania, Bureau of Police. Analysis of Dispatch Data, 1981. Average number of calls dispatched in 1981 by day: Sunday, 115.7; Monday, 110.6; Tuesday, 111.3; Wednesday, 114.0; Thursday, 118.4; Friday, 132.7; Saturday, 144.8.

SELECTED TABLES AND GRAPHS FROM:

"RESPONSE TIME ANALYSIS"
KANSAS CITY MISSOURI POLICE DEPARTMENT
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, DC
September, 1978

These tables and graphs will be used to analyze the relationship between 949 Part I Crimes, reporting times associated with these calls, dispatch time of the call(s), travel time to the call(s), victim characteristics associated with the call(s), and arrest and arrest probabilities associated with these variables.

This data will be used in conjunction with other data in order to explore further the characteristics of calls, the processing of calls, and the necessity for police managers to develop more carefully classification and analytic procedures so that they can understand the nature of incoming calls and the limits of mobile responses to calls.

Table A-7.-- Time statistics for response time intervals.

Crime Category		Reporting	Dispatch	Travel	Total
All Part I Crimes	Md	6:17	2:50	5:34	18:5
	$\bar{X}$	3:46:42	4:56	6:11	3:57:50
	SD	38:15:28	6:23	3:53	38:15:41
	Min.	1:04	0:16	0:06	2:24
	Max.	*999:00:10	53:48	30:13	999:10:58
	N	918	931	948	918
	%	48.1	21.0	30.9	100.0
Involvement Crimes	Md	5:09	2:16	4:00	12:53
	$\bar{X}$	41:38	3:38	4:56	50:04
	SD	4:07:28	4:49	3:26	4:07:12
	Min.	1:04	0:16	0:06	2:24
	Max.	48:00:53	43:31	30:13	48:05:13
	N	338	344	352	339
	%	44.5	22.3	33.2	100.0
Discovery Crimes	Md	10:11	3:19	6:14	22:41
	$\bar{X}$	5:34:33	5:42	6:56	5:47:47
	SD	47:57:07	7:03	3:57	47:59:41
	Min.	1:05	0:32	0:26	3:52
	Max.	999:00:10	53:48	30:07	999:10:58
	N	580	587	596	579
	%	50.2	20.2	29.6	100.0

* Actual reporting delay exceeded 999 hours in one incident of discovery larceny. 999 was used for computational purposes.

Table A - 8.-- Time statistics for response time intervals.

Crime Category		Reporting	Dispatch	Travel	Total
Crimes Discovered By Citizens	Md	10:13	3:24	6:21	23:09
	$\bar{X}$	5: 43:24	5:47	6:58	5: 56:48
	SD	48: 34:36	7:07	3:57	48: 37:15
	Min.	1:05	0:32	0: 26	3:52
	Max.	*999: 00:10	53: 48	30: 07	999: 10:58
	N	565	572	581	564
	%	51.2	20.0	28.8	100.0
Crimes Detected By Alarms	Md	—	1:57	4:42	—
	$\bar{X}$	—	2:03	5:29	—
	SD	—	0:39	3:49	—
	Min.	—	0:46	2:01	—
	Max.	—	3:24	14:37	—
	N	—	15	15	—
	%	—	—	—	—

* Actual reporting delay exceeded 999 hours in one incident of discovery larceny. 999 was used for computational purposes.

Table A-9.-- Time statistics for response time intervals.

Crime Category		Reporting	Dispatch	Travel	Total
Discovery Burglary (no alarms)	Md	10:11	3:14	6:37	23:21
	$\bar{X}$	4:06:19	5:55	7:13	4:19:31
	SD	22:34:00	7:33	4:08	22:34:16
	Min.	1:05	0:35	1:04	3:52
	Max.	248:23:13	53:48	30:07	248:38:58
	N	295	298	302	295
	%	50.0	19.7	30.3	100.0
Discovery Larceny (no alarms)	Md	10:18	3:03	6:12	22:18
	$\bar{X}$	9:47:24	5:13	6:45	9:59:26
	SD	76:38:34	6:27	3:37	76:38:40
	Min.	1:07	0:32	0:26	5:31
	Max.	*999:00:10	43:14	20:36	999:10:58
	N	201	203	206	201
	%	54.6	18.5	27.0	100.1
Discovery Auto Theft (no alarms)	Md	10:11	4:31	5:40	24:46
	$\bar{X}$	47:42	6:52	6:35	1:01:36
	SD	2:52:20	7:00	4:01	2:54:21
	Min.	1:09	1:06	0:45	7:42
	Max.	20:00:13	35:43	22:01	20:17:45
	N	69	71	73	68
	%	46.4	25.8	27.9	100.1

* Actual reporting delay exceeded 999 hours in one incident of discovery larceny. 999 was used for computational purposes.

Table A-10.-- Time statistics for response time intervals.

Crime Category		Reporting	Dispatch	Travel	Total
Violent Involvement	Md	5:06	2:00	3:31	11:58
	$\bar{X}$	28:25	3:12	4:11	35:44
	SD	1: 56:25	4:15	2:50	1: 56:59
	Min.	1:04	0:23	0:06	2:24
	Max.	15: 56: 10	34:42	18:20	16: 07:18
	N	211	214	221	212
	%	47.3	21.3	31.4	100.0
Nonviolent Involvement	Md	5:11	2:46	5:48	14:48
	$\bar{X}$	1: 03:34	4:22	6:10	1: 14:01
	SD	6: 14:44	5:33	3:57	6: 14:16
	Min.	1:06	0:16	0:11	4:06
	Max.	48: 00:53	43:31	30:13	48: 05:13
	N	127	130	131	127
	%	39.9	23.8	36.3	100.0

Table A-11.-- Time statistics for response time intervals.

Crime Category		Reporting	Dispatch	Travel	Total
Rape	Md	6:11	3:46	4:10	13:42
	$\bar{X}$	34:02	3:30	4:42	42:15
	SD	1:17:46	1:48	2:37	1:17:58
	Min.	1:08	1:01	1:51	6:29
	Max.	4:00:06	6:07	10:36	4:08:05
	N	9	10	10	9
	%	48.9	20.0	31.1	100.0
Robbery	Md	4:18	1:55	3:27	11:34
	$\bar{X}$	18:12	3:05	4:04	25:15
	SD	1:10:16	3:52	2:52	1:10:47
	Min.	1:04	0:23	0:06	2:24
	Max.	12:01:07	25:42	18:20	12:10:57
	N	122	122	127	123
	%	46.2	21.6	32.2	100.0
Aggravated Assault	Md	5:06	2:00	3:34	12:17
	$\bar{X}$	43:23	3:20	4:19	51:06
	SD	2:45:43	4:58	2:49	2:46:40
	Min.	1:05	0:38	1:03	3:25
	Max.	15:56:10	34:42	13:17	16:07:18
	N	80	82	84	80
	%	48.8	21.1	30.1	100.0

Table A-12.-- Time statistics for response time intervals.

Crime Category		Reporting	Dispatch	Travel	Time
Involvement Burglary	Md	2:29	2:35	2:49	11:44
	$\bar{X}$	4:45	3:02	4:11	11:57
	SD	4:09	2:07	4:57	6:45
	Min.	1:08	0:49	0:11	4:06
	Max.	15:09	10:40	30:13	34:51
	N	35	35	35	35
	%	37.7	29.3	33.0	100.0
Involvement Larceny	Md	5:14	2:50	6:31	17:07
	$\bar{X}$	1:15:26	4:50	6:56	1:27:06
	SD	7:10:24	6:27	3:20	7:09:20
	Min.	1:06	0:16	1:04	4:56
	Max.	48:00:53	43:31	20:09	48:05:13
	N	88	90	91	88
	%	40.8	21.7	37.6	100.1
Involvement Auto Theft	Md	1:48	3:54	6:02	14:40
	$\bar{X}$	5:17:07	5:06	6:16	5:29:15
	SD	10:28:51	3:38	1:25	10:32:56
	Min.	1:13	1:57	4:27	9:01
	Max.	21:00:23	10:34	7:41	21:18:38
	N	4	5	5	4
	%	40.7	23.7	35.7	100.1

Table 3-1.-- Part I crime data base with number of incidents, incidents with arrests, incidents with response-related arrests, and percentages of each by type of crime.

Type of Crime	Data Base		Incidents with Arrests		Incidents with Response-related Arrests	
	N	Percent	N	Rate*	N	Rate*
Involvement Crimes	352	37.0	100	28.4	27	7.7
Violent Involvement	221	23.3	45	20.4	12	5.4
Rapes	10	1.1	3	30.0	1	10.0
Robberies	127	13.4	10	7.9	6	4.7
Aggravated Assaults	84	8.9	32	38.1	5	6.0
Nonviolent Involvement	131	13.8	55	42.0	15	11.5
Burglaries	35	3.7	16	45.7	12	34.3
Larcenies	91	9.6	38	41.8	2	2.2
Auto Thefts	5	0.5	1	20.0	1	20.0
Discovery Crimes	597	62.9	13	2.2	8	1.3
Citizen Discovered	582	61.3	6	1.0	1	0.2
Burglaries	302	31.8	5	1.7	1	0.3
Larcenies	206	21.7	1	0.5	0	0.0
Auto Thefts	74	7.8	0	0.0	0	0.0
Alarm Detected	15	1.6	7	46.7	7	46.7
Burglaries	15	1.6	7	46.7	7	46.7
All Part I Crimes	949		113	11.9	35	3.7

*Percent of all cases by crime type.



Figure 3 - 2.-- Probability of an arrest or a response-related arrest for Part I Involvement crimes at reporting times of 0 to 30 minutes.



Figure 3-3.-- Probability of an arrest for Part I involvement crimes, violent crimes, and nonviolent involvement crimes at reporting times of 0 to 30 minutes.



Figure 3-4.-- Probability of a response-related arrest for Part I involvement crimes, violent crimes, and nonviolent involvement crimes at reporting times of 0 to 30 minutes.



Figure 3-5.--Probability of an arrest for all violent crimes, robbery, and aggravated assault at reporting times of 0 to 30 minutes.



Figure 3-6.-- Probability of an arrest for involvement burglary and involvement larceny at reporting times of 0 to 30 minutes.



Figure 3-7.-- Probability of a response-related arrest for robbery and aggravated assault at reporting times of 0 to 30 minutes.



Figure 3-8.-- Probability of a response-related arrest for all Part I nonviolent involvement crimes, involvement burglary and involvement larceny at reporting times of 0 to 30 minutes.



Figure 3 - 9.-- Probability of a response-related arrest for Part I involvement crimes, violent crimes, and nonviolent involvement crimes at travel times of 0 to 30 minutes.



Figure 3-10.-- Probability of an arrest or a response-related arrest for involvement burglary at travel times of 0 to 30 minutes.



Figure 3-11.-- Probability of a response-related arrest for Part I involvement crimes, Part I involvement crimes reported in 1 to 2 minutes, and Part I involvement crimes reported in 3 to 9 minutes at travel times of 0 to 30 minutes.

Table 5-1.-- Part I crime data base with number of incidents, incidents with witnesses, and percentage by type of crime.

Type of Crime	Data Base	Incidents with Witnesses	
	N	N	Percent
Involvement Crimes	352	171	48.6
Violent Involvement	221	110	49.8
Rapes	10	3	30.0
Robberies	127	61	48.0
Aggravated Assaults	84	46	54.8
Nonviolent Involvement	131	61	46.6
Burglaries	35	22	62.9
Larcenies	91	36	39.6
Auto Thefts	5	3	60.0
Discovery Crimes	597	26	4.4
Burglaries	317	14	4.4
Larcenies	206	11	5.3
Auto Thefts	74	1	1.4
All Part I Crimes	949	197	20.8



Figure 5 - 2.-- Probability of witness availability for Part I involvement crimes at reporting times of 0 to 30 minutes.



Figure 5 - 3.-- Probability of witness availability for Part I involvement crimes and violent crimes at travel times of 0 to 30 minutes.

SESSION 5

HOW DO DEPARTMENTS RESPOND TO CALLS?

Summary

In this session, a brief presentation will be made about the recent findings from the Differential Police Response to Calls for Service Field Test (DPR).

The **Executive Summary** of the **Evaluation of DPR** is reprinted in this section.

Using the information derived from **Session** 4 and some of the findings from the **DPR Evaluation** presentation, this session will conclude with a participant group task.

Each group will be the same as the groups used in **Session** 3. The groups will follow the same problem-solving process used in Session 3.

The **task statement** for this session's group work is:

- Your group is to select **one of the 13 Calls for Service Categories** discussed in Session 4.

- Your group is to identify at least seven **types** of calls that fit within the definition of your chosen category.

- Your group is to determine for each **type** of call, the **police response to each type** according to the following options of response: (1) immediate mobile response; (2) delayed mobile response; and (3) non-mobile responses.

A Policy-Planning Matrix for this task is attached which should be completed as the report from the group.

TABLE 1

	PROBLEM CATEGORY	DEFINITION	%	RANK
1.	VIOLENT CRIME	One person injures another in a manner that involves criminal liability	4%	9
2.	INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT	Persons involved in a dispute or altercation	8%	6
3.	MEDICAL PROBLEMS	Persons who are ill or injured	1%	11
4.	NONVIOLENT CRIME	Non-physical injury or damage in a manner that involves criminal liability	14%	2
5.	TRAFFIC PROBLEMS	Hazards, congestion, or dangers associated with vehicular movement other than traffic accidents and motor vehicle accidents	21%	1
6.	PUBLIC NUISANCE	Unpleasant or annoying circumstance	10%	5
7.	SUSPICIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES	Situations that citizens (or officers) perceive as threatening, peculiar, or puzzling	5%	8
8.	DEPENDENT PERSON	Persons thought unable to care for themselves; includes children and adults	1%	12
9.	PUBLIC MORALS CRIME	Violation of legal standards of right conduct	2%	10
10.	ASSISTANCE	All other problems or situations in which citizens request help	12%	3
11.	INFORMATION REQUEST	Person wants information from police	11%	4
12.	INFORMATION FOR POLICE	Someone provides information to police; includes alarm calls	6%	7
13.	INTERNAL POLICE OPERATIONS	Police provide information to each other; includes records checks, warrant checks, etc. No direct service to a caller as such.	1%	13

Notes: Within each category there will be separate types of calls that fit the category definition. Types within all categories may total to between 150-268 types.

Percentages listed are averages from an analysis of the data from the jurisdictions plus other data developed by the author. May not add to 100% because single call may have been classified as more than one problem. Only the highest classification was used in this summary that accomodated the definition of the category. For example, an original call about a traffic problem or accident may result in a later charge of manslaughter (violent crime) or an interpersonal conflict may turn into a spousal assault (violent crime).

EXAMPLES OF ALTERNATIVES

- IMMEDIATE MOBILE RESPONSE OPTIONS
  - one-person mobile unit
  - two-person mobile unit
  - one or more units
  - non-sworn units
- DELAYED MOBILE RESPONSE OPTIONS
  - one-person mobile unit delayed for a set period, e.g. one hour
  - two-person mobile unit delayed for a set period, e.g., one hour
  - a mobile unit that is scheduled to respond beyond a given set peiod, e.g., next day appointment
  - a roving mobile unit that is sent outside the beat to another beat within a scheduled appointment, e.g., within next three hours or within next eight hours
- NON-MOBILE RESPONSE OPTIONS
  - telephone report-taking by Teleserv Unit or Expeditor Unit
  - citizen walk-in to report at station
  - citizen mail-in report
  - referral of call to other agency
  - telephone "counselling" by non-sworn police paraprofessional or civilian employee or volunteer;
  - services provided at station by paraprofessionals, civilian staff, or volunteers for walk-in clients

A POLICY-PLANNING MATRIX

CATEGORY CHOSEN: 1 of 13 Only: _____

TYPES	CALL CHARACTERISTICS	IMMEDIATE (DEFINE)	DELAYED (DEFINE)	NONMOBILE (DEFINE)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

"EVALUATION OF THE DPR FIELD TEST"

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EVALUATION OF THE DIFFERENTIAL POLICE RESPONSE FIELD TEST

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This chapter provides a summary of the National Institute of Justice Differential Police Response Field Test. It includes brief descriptions of the test objectives, planning and implementation processes, evaluation approach and results, and major conclusions. The summary also highlights special considerations and future implications of particular interest to police planners and decision makers who wish to introduce a comprehensive DPR system, or to improve the effectiveness of existing alternative services.

PROBLEM STATEMENT

Reductions in police department budgets have occurred in many cities at the same time that citizen demand for police service has increased. Police departments have been under pressure to maintain or improve their quality of service, reduce response times to urgent calls, and develop new strategies for crime prevention; yet it is often no longer possible to hire more officers to handle increasing work loads.

Many departments have attempted to cope with these problems by diverting a number of non-emergency calls form immediate mobile response units to alternative responses such as telephone report units and delayed mobile responses. However, most departments did not carefully and systematically plan for a comprehensive system to handle all calls for service -- a system which included call classification, intake processing and alternative service delivery. The optimal use of a wide range of possible alternatives needed to be demonstrated, tested, evaluated, and ultimately accepted by both police personnel and the public. A comprehensive field test was needed to determine the best way to (1) develop and match appropriate alternative responses with various types of calls for service; (2) implement procedures and training that encouraged the effective use of these alternatives; (3) assess the impact of the alternatives on police patrol practices; and (4) offer a model that could be successfully replicated by police departments throughout the country.

THE DIFFERENTIAL POLICE RESPONSE FIELD TEST: OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH

In order to test the utility of a comprehensive police response system for managing calls for service, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) designed the Differential Police Response (DPR) Field Test Program in October 1980. The test was subsequently implemented in the cities of Garden Grove, California; Greensboro, North Carolina; and Toledo, Ohio under controlled, experimental conditions. The field test was coordinated by NIJ, with program design and implementation directed by the Office of Development, Testing and Dissemination; and the evaluation design and management under the Office of Program Evaluation.

Reproduced from *Evaluation of the Differential Police Response Field Test* by Thomas McEwen *et al.*, 1984.

As with other NIJ field tests, the overall purposes of the DPR test were to (1) develop information on the effectiveness of specific criminal justice practices; (2) add to the knowledge base of law enforcement; and (3) contribute to improved policy decision making.

The most outstanding tribute to the success of the DPR project is that the police departments in all three cities have fully institutionalized the changes made during the test, and have gone on to develop new programs to make best use of the time and resources saved as a result of adopting effective alternatives to immediate mobile response.

Evaluation Approach for the DPR Test

Research Management Associates, Inc. (RMA) was selected in June 1981 as the national evaluator for the DPR study. The evaluation grant was awarded prior to the selection of the test sites, which provided positive long-range benefits for the evaluation by enabling RMA to use an approach which was more formative ("hands-on") than summative ("hands-off"). Thus, the evaluators were engaged to participate in the actual design of the project.

Intensive activities by the evaluation team during the planning phase increased the success of subsequent interventions in the project, and assured that a valid and complete evaluation could be conducted during the project's test phase. Involvement in the planning phase of any project, of course, can create the potential for the evaluators to become advocates in program activities. However, the RMA team viewed its primary role as one of providing information to program managers for their consideration as they designed or changed their activities. The evaluation team remained as objective as possible throughout the project, endeavoring to provide information in an unbiased manner so that activities could be evaluated to give results with a high degree of confidence.

A unique characteristic of the DPR Field Test was its design as a two-phase process. The first, or planning phase, lasted eight months and included the development and implementation of new call classification systems. The second, or test phase, took place over a ten-month period and involved the introduction of alternative responses. Because of this two-phase approach, one evaluation was conducted of the changes in the police communications centers, and separate evaluation was conducted for the implementation of the response alternatives.

Objectives of the DPR Test

The two overall objectives of the DPR test were (1) to increase the efficiency of the management of calls for service; and (2) to maintain or improve citizen satisfaction.

The first objective involved the following underlying expectations, or subobjectives:

- Reduce the number of non-emergency calls for service handled by immediate mobile response;
- Increase the number of non-emergency calls for service handled by a telephone reporting unit, by delayed mobile responses, or by other alternative responses;
- Decrease the amount of time patrol units spent answering calls for service, and increase the amount of time available for crime prevention or other activities; and
- Increase the availability of patrol units to respond rapidly to emergency calls.

The second objective addressed the need to determine how many and what types of calls could be handled by alternative responses without adversely affecting citizen satisfaction with police service. It was hypothesized that if calls were carefully screened, if citizens were informed of potential delays, and if alternatives were appropriate and timely, citizen satisfaction might not decrease. Thus, the second objective included the following subobjectives:

- Provide satisfactory explanations to citizens at call intake on the nature of the police response to their calls; and
- Provide satisfactory responses to citizens for resolving their calls for service.

Evaluation Objectives

The major objectives of the evaluation were as follows:

- Assess the impact of the differential response system on police practices;
- Assess the impact of the differential response system on citizens; and
- Assess the transferability of the program.

With regard to accomplishment of the evaluation objectives, determining the effect of the differential response system on the role of the telecommunicator was considered to be of particular importance. Call taker and dispatcher understanding and acceptance of the new call classification systems, and of the philosophy behind providing alternative services, would

be key to both productive intra-departmental relations and favorable public perception of the services. For this reason, the NIJ test design document recognized that the greatest emphasis should be placed on the changes in the communications centers.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CITIES

Demographic Characteristics

One consideration in the evaluation design was the demographic differences across the three sites. While many of the same alternative responses were implemented in all three cities, the evaluation did not attempt to make extensive comparisons of results across sites, but instead highlighted how a DPR approach can actually operate in three different environments.

The city of Toledo is an older, industrial and "blue collar" city. It has a population of 354,000. Of the three sites, Toledo has the most significant number of older residents who have lived in Toledo most of their lives. Garden Grove is the "newest" of the three site cities, incorporated in 1956 with the police department formed i 1957. With a population of 123,300 in 17.4 square miles, Garden Grove is the most developed and densely populated of the three sites. Greensboro is a blend of urban, rural, and suburban. The second largest city in North Carolina, Greensboro has a population of 155,600. In contrast to Garden Grove which has 3.2 persons per housing unit, Greensboro has only 2.5 persons per housing unit.

Several other factors are of particular interest because of their direct impact on the police departments and the project. Toledo's economy suffered more than the other two cities during the nation's recent recession. Because of its heavy dependence on the automobile industry, unemployment reached 12 percent during the project. The city laid off 200 employees, including 30 civilian police personnel (two thirds of its civilian staff). Also, sworn personnel in Toledo were 13 percent below authorized strength at the beginning of the project, and none of the police departments had increased staffing in several years. Garden Grove had a policy of rigid fiscal restraint due to the advent of Proposition 13; Greensboro also had a policy of keeping the tax rate low.

Police Department and Communications Center Characteristics

With regard to the ratio of officers to citizens, Garden Grove (156 sworn personnel), with the fewest sworn personnel, had one officer for every 814 residents, while Toledo (634 sworn personnel), with the greatest contingent of sworn personnel, had one officer for every 559 residents. Greensboro (367 sworn personnel), had a rate of one officer for every 423 residents. In terms of crime rate, the three sites were very close, with Garden Grove having a rate of about 83 Part I offenses committed per 1,000

population, Greensboro with a rate of about 81 offenses, and Toledo with a rate of about 87 offenses.

The Garden Grove Police Department differed from the other two sites in that the patrol personnel were deployed according to a team policing model. All field services were essentially self-contained in the three teams which geographically subdivided the city.

The police personnel in the three sites also had somewhat different characteristics. In Toledo and Greensboro, personnel tended to be older and more tenured. It was not unusual to meet patrol officers having ten or twelve years with the department. By way of contrast, in Garden Grove, many officers had been with the department for less than five years as reflected by the departments's turnover rate of more than 40 percent, a figure consistent with other police departments in Southern California due to the favorable job market for experienced officers.

Of particular interest to the DPR evaluation were the following differences among the three sites in communications center staffing and operation:

- Toledo's communications center was staffed entirely by sworn personnel. All dispatch positions were reserved for sergeants; call taker positions were filled by patrol officers.

- The Greensboro and Garden Grove communications centers were staffed entirely by civilians.

- Toledo operated a manual call for service processing system, while both Greensboro and Garden Grove used computer-aided dispatch (CAD) systems.

- Calls for service into all three communications centers were at record levels.

- Annual workloads for calls for service dispatched to the field ranged from 280 calls per officer in Garden Grove to 382 in Greensboro, and 503 in Toledo.

- Prior to DPR, Toledo and Greensboro handled only a limited number of calls for service for minor property offenses over the telephone, and Garden Grove had never taken incident reports over the telephone.

PHASE I: PRE-IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT

New Call Classification Systems

Prior to DPR, the three sites, like most policed departments, operated with traditional "10 code" call classification systems. When most calls receive an immediate mobile dispatch, these systems are adequate. However, in order to respond to calls for service with appropriate cost-effective alternatives, a new system was needed.

Each department developed its own internal planning committee, and three cluster conferences were held during the course of several months to design a call classification model.

In terms of degree of implementation, the objective of introducing a new call classification system was achieved by all three sites. Together, the three departments designed a generic model that included call event categories; and call descriptors, such as time of occurrence, likelihood of apprehension, and availability of witnesses. The three departments then tailored the model to meet their local needs, requirements, and capabilities. Although the final systems were not identical, the important point is that the principles were the same and the variations were minor.

Call Classification Codes

The next step in the process was to develop call classification codes which summarized the types of calls, descriptive elements, and selected responses. All three sites successfully designed a call classification code, although they differed in their approach to the problem and reached different conclusions on the complexity needed.

The call codes allowed call takers to match call information with the appropriate police response. The codes were numeric characters that aided in rapid designation of characteristics. The numeric codes were also helpful in record keeping, further analysis of the classification systems, and monitoring by supervisors. In Garden Grove, for example, a four-digit call code was implemented, which provided the general type of call as the first character, the time of occurrence information as the second character, the injury information as the third character, and the selected response as the fourth character.

Call Intake Procedures

Intake Processing. In order to classify calls appropriately under the DPR system, call intake operators were required to obtain much more information from callers than with the "10 code" system. The departments were expected to take steps to improve the intake and processing of calls to ensure that telecommunicators were adequately trained and prepared.

In line with this objective, each department developed the following products:

- Written guidelines on the new classification systems and procedures;
- A set of standardized questions, tailored to each site, to facilitate the classification of calls;
- Standardized explanations for informing citizens of the appropriate responses; and
- New call intake forms.

In order to assist with the revision of call intake procedures, Greensboro and Garden Grove initiated task forces which consisted of sworn and civilian personnel representing all key divisions, particularly patrol and communications. These task forces worked effectively in both departments and helped increase the project's acceptability throughout the departments.

Monitoring. One of the most critical methodological steps prior to implementation of the alternative response phase was to review actual phone conversations between citizens and call takers. These reviews enabled the departments to assess current information obtained and determine how much additional information was required. Supervisory review of telephone conversations between citizens and call takers was also part of the new telecommunicator evaluation procedures developed by each site.

Training and Testing

Each department devoted an extensive amount of planning time to prepare for training of personnel in the new call classification system and procedures. The degree of implementation for this training component was excellent at all three sites. Among the most successful training methods were the use of easy-to-use manuals and flip charts, and various simulation and role play techniques. All three sites also developed training and orientation programs for other personnel including field officers, members of other departments, and city administrators.

The next major step in the process was to pre-test the call classification systems and review intake procedures. During this four-month period, call takers used the new system to query citizens, and selected appropriate responses, but did not dispatch the alternatives selected. Again, all telecommunicators were closely monitored by communications supervisors, project staff, and the evaluation team.

Telecommunicators were surveyed at the beginning of the project and at the end of the call classification development phase. A third telecommunicator survey was conducted toward the end of the full

implementation test. These surveys included questions on call intake policies and procedures, training, job satisfaction, and other DPR changes. Patrol officers were also surveyed on two occasions.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS FROM PHASE I

The experience of the three sites in regard to call classification and call intake processing can be summarized as follows:

- The DPR Field Test sites successfully developed a generic model for call classification systems which can be modified by any police department to meet local needs.

- The three sites successfully tested and implemented new call classifications systems which can be modified by any police department to meet local needs.

- Successful call classification systems may be simple or complex. A more complex system may be desirable when (1) there are more alternatives available; and (2) the department wants to consider more types of calls and characteristics for matching with alternatives.

- The new call classification systems and intake procedures (1) increased the amount of information obtained from callers; (2) provided callers with more accurate information on what to expect in terms of the response to their calls; and (3) provided patrol officers with more detailed information on calls prior to arrival at the scene.

- The time to develop the new call classification systems was underestimated. More time was required to review the current systems and develop the most appropriate call characteristics.

- Input for the new systems was needed from telecommunicators as well as from field operations personnel and other management personnel in the department.

- The new call classification systems and call intake procedures, well-documented in department manuals, resulted in more standardization, uniformity, and accountability in the way telecommunicators handled citizen calls for service.

- The three sites developed effective procedures for monitoring and assessing the performance of telecommunicators.

THE TEST PHASE: IMPLEMENTATION OF ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES

This phase involved the matching of citizen needs, as defined in the new call classification systems, with appropriate police responses.

Differential Response Alternatives

The NIJ Test Design required that the police departments implement the following differential response alternatives:

- Telephone report unit for taking reports over the telephone;
- Procedures for a delayed mobile response (holding calls for 30 to 60 minutes);
- Procedures for referring calls to other agencies; and
- At least one other alternative response technique from the following possibilities: scheduled appointment walk-in, or mail-in.

Each of these alternative responses was implemented to some degree, and with some individual variation, at the three test sites. All three sites set priorities for the use of immediate mobile response, delayed mobile response, telephone report units, external referrals, and walk-in responses. Garden Grove and Greensboro solicited mail-in responses. Greensboro also set appointments and made internal referrals. Toledo used a communications callback procedure, an innovative alternative in which an officer called the offending party with a warning in "barking dog" and "noisy party" situations.

The actual experimental designs by which the alternatives were tested differed at each of the sites, but all were handled so calls were dispatched either to a traditional response or to an experimental alternative. True emergency calls for service were not part of the experiment, but were dispatched in the normal expeditious manner, generally to mobile units in the field.

Evaluation Considerations

Measurable Periods. In all three sites there was at least a three-month lag between implementation of the new call classification systems and the actual field tests for the call alternatives. This allowed a sufficient period for the communications center personnel to become accustomed to the new procedures. The evaluation of the field test could

then proceed without having to be concerned about separating the effects of the communications center changes from the effects of the alternatives.

There were occurrences at all three sites during both phases of the project which dictated when each site was able to implement its call classification system and the call alternatives. These included the city personnel layoffs in Toledo and the establishment of a Project Advisory Board in Greensboro. However, because each step in the various project objectives was clearly delineated, the differences in schedules at the three sites produced no adverse effects on the evaluation activities.

Project Objectives. It was believed that stated objectives were necessary in order to assess the worthiness of the changes made in all phases of the project. On the other hand, the research nature of the project made it difficult for the project personnel to quantify their objectives with any precision. For example, one of the aims was to determine how many calls could be diverted to the alternatives, yet there was no reliable information with which to predict what the number of eligible calls would be. Without this information it was not possible to develop other quantitative objectives for the impact on unit utilization, decreases in average travel time, and other related measures. In the evaluation, these values were calculated from the actual experiences of the sites, and in some cases comparisons were made with previous performance. Project objectives were developed to cover all critical areas of the project; however, many of these objectives were, by necessity, process-oriented.

Randomization. All three departments stated in their grant applications that they would conduct a field test with a randomization procedure as part of the evaluation design. Two important results made possible through randomization were that (1) comparisons on control and experimental groups could be made during the same period, eliminating the possible effects of a number of outside influences; and (2) "before/during" comparisons of citizen satisfaction could be made. The combination of these two advantages offered the strongest possible evaluation design for the DPR Field Test.

Implementation of Alternatives

Each site used a different method to achieve randomization and implement alternative responses. In Toledo, this was accomplished by having one call taker position designated as experimental. In Garden Grove, the CAD system automatically alternated calls for service between traditional dispatching and experimental alternatives. The design in Greensboro was more elaborate, and involved dividing four shifts of call takers into two groups. The first group of call takers dispatched calls in the traditional, pre-DPR manner for four days in a row to constitute a control group. The second, or experimental group, dispatched calls using the new DPR criteria.

The experiments were monitored by on-site personnel from the evaluation

team. Subsequent analysis showed that the design was carried out as planned, and the control and experimental groups proved comparable.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS FOR POLICE PRACTICES

The first evaluation objective was to assess the impact of the differential response system on police practices. Major conclusions from this assessment are as follows:

- In all three sites there was a sizable reduction in the number of non-emergency calls handled by immediate dispatch of mobile units.

On non-experimental days in Greensboro, for example, only 10.4 percent of dispatched calls were handled by alternative responses. The use of alternatives was almost doubled on experimental days--19.5 percent of all calls were handled by non-patrol responses, primarily the telephone report unit. Larceny reports constituted the major type of calls taken by the telephone report units; however, there were increases in the burglary category, public nuisance, and over thirty other call types not handled by telephone on control days. In addition, 26.9 percent of all calls on experimental days were classified as eligible for the alternative of a delayed mobile response.. Thus, a total of 46.4 percent of all cuts could have received an alternative response. Similar benefits were experienced in Toledo and Garden Grove.

- The objective to increase the amount of time available for patrol units to devote to crime prevention, directed patrol, and other activities was achieved at all three sites.

For example, in Garden Grove there was a 40 percent increase in the number of field-initiated reports taken as a result of DPR. A special study in Toledo found that patrol units were on calls for service 19.6 percent of the time during the test phase. If these alternatives had not been available in Toledo, patrol units would have handled about 6,325 more calls, increasing unit utilization to 22.8 percent. In a large police department such as Toledo, a three percent reduction in patrol unit utilization is important and would have been difficult to achieve without the DPR project. If the department had desired to respond to all calls without alternatives but reduce unit utilization to 19.6 percent by adding patrol units, about two more units per shift would have been necessary. Staffing two units per shift would have required at least ten additional officers, which is considerably more than the four assigned to the telephone report unit.

- Proper screening under the new call classification systems allowed call takers and patrol officers to respond quickly when needed. however, travel time to emergency calls was not significantly reduced at all three sites.

- Particular attention needs to be given to the impact of the DPR system on telecommunicators. The conclusions from an analysis of the role of the telecommunicators in the DPR project can be summarized as follows:

  - The use of civilian call takers and dispatchers had many more advantages than disadvantages. Civilian call takers were better educated, had higher retention rates, and were hired at lower costs, than sworn personnel.

  - Patrol officer satisfaction with telecommunicators at all three sites improved as a result of the DPR project.

  - Improvements made in environmental working conditions at all three communications centers resulted in positive changes in the job satisfaction and morale of many telecommunicators.

  - A DPR project imposes standards, uniformity and consistency on telecommunicators which may initially be resisted. Such resistance should be anticipated and telecommunicators should be included extensively in the planning and design of the project and in developing and delivering the DPR training.

  - Monitoring was a very useful tool for communications center managers to assess call takers. This procedure called for frequent sampling of the calls and a formal assessment of how well the call takers handled them.

  - The telecommunicators at all three sites lacked a comprehensive career development plan. Call taker and dispatcher positions need to be upgraded; the promotional picture needs to be improved; subsequently, selection standards need to be upgraded.

- The findings show that the alternatives are less costly than the traditional response of sending out a mobile unit to calls for service. Moreover, the productivity levels are much higher for personnel using the alternatives, such as TRU, in comparison to traditional mobile patrol.

- The use of evidence technicians in Greensboro has highly successful. These technicians, who were non-sworn personnel, were dispatched (as an alternative to using a sworn police unit) to handle the initial calls, write the crime reports, and gather evidence. They were able to handle over 18 percent of non-mobile responses, primarily for burglary, vandalism, and larceny calls.

- Mail-in reports were not found to successful. The volume at which the were used was very low over the test period, and they were not well distributed throughout the cities.

- Elimination of service was one additional successful alternative. In Greensboro, prior to the test phase, escort services averaged 100 per week. The department made the decision to eliminate these services as much as possible, and reduced them to 20 per week during the DPR test phase.

- The task force approach was successful. The Response Advisory Board in Greensboro achieved good policy and operational procedures for the alternatives and aided the institutionalization of the project within the police department. Disadvantages to this approach were that it delayed test implementation, and reached decisions which made for a more conservative approach to the test.

CITIZEN SATISFACTION WITH THE DPR SYSTEM

Methodology

The second primary evaluation objective was to assess the impact of the differential response system on citizens. To assess this impact, surveys were conducted throughout the project at all three sites of citizens who had received some type of service for a non-emergency incident. During the baseline period, the primary aim of the surveys was to determine the level of citizen satisfaction with the call takers, and to estimate what percentage would have been willing to accept some type of alternative to the immediate dispatch of a patrol unit. In Greensboro and Toledo, where telephone report units were already taking some minor reports over the phone, a sample of citizens was surveyed to determine their satisfaction levels with this telephone service.

During the field tests, the citizen surveys were aimed at determining the levels of satisfaction with the variety of service alternatives that were implemented. Opinions of citizens in the experimental group receiving the alternative services were compared to opinions of citizens in the

control group receiving immediate mobile responses. In addition, some comparisons were made with the surveys conducted during the baseline period.

The dispatch records were the source documents for selecting the citizens to be surveyed. In Toledo, the selection process was manual; at the other two sites, daily lists of calls from the CAD system served as the sampling frame. In all, over 11,930 citizens were surveyed at all three sites.

CONCLUSIONS WITH REGARD TO CITIZEN SATISFACTION

Pre-Implementation Surveys

- The most significant findings from the baseline data were that citizens expressed an overall high willingness to accept alternatives other than the immediate dispatch of a patrol unit to non-emergency calls. Citizens were asked whether they would have been willing to accept the alternatives of telephone reports, arranging an appointment, mailing in a report, or coming to the department to file a report in person. In Garden Grove, 61.8 percent reported that at least one alternative was acceptable. In Greensboro, 42.4 percent, and in Toledo 29.2 percent said that at least one alternative was acceptable.

- At all sites, the most acceptable alternative was setting an appointment, and the least acceptable was mailing in a report.

- Many citizens stated they would have been willing to wait longer for a response in a number of situations. Nearly half the respondents in Garden Grove were willing to wait more than an hour longer.

- Citizens were more willing to accept an alternative on a property-related call (burglary, larceny) rather than a call involving a person event or potential threat (assault, domestic).

Citizen Survey During Test Period

- During the test phase, citizen satisfaction with the alternatives remained high. Satisfaction exceeded over 90 percent for all options except for the walk-in response in Garden Grove, which had an 88 percent satisfaction level.

- Satisfaction levels are directly related to whether the caller was informed that a delay might occur.

- Communicator style was an important factor in citizen satisfaction with the telephone report unit alternative. A special study in Greensboro showed that the most important attributes were being precise, friendly, non-argumentative and attentive.

- There was a high citizen satisfaction level with mobile responses by cadets in Garden Grove.

TRANSFERABILITY OF THE DPR PROJECT: MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

Key Factors in the Success of the Field Test

The third broad evaluation objective was to assess the transferability of the DPR program. The major evaluation results presented in this summary clearly support the conclusion that the DPR model can be successfully adapted to meet the needs of police departments in a wide range of environments.

The evaluators have selected the following points as key to the success of DPR at the three sites:

- The original Test Design document was very clear and readable. This is a credit to the NIJ staff who worked on the development of the project.

- The planning, execution, and staffing of the projects at all three sites, and the support and commitment of the chiefs, was excellent.

- There were no other major programs introduced at the three sites during the project which could have diluted the attention of the chiefs and staff from DPR.

- There was no turnover of chiefs or project staff at any of the three sites during the project.

- There were no threats from internal (unions, elected officials) or external (citizens, media) sources at the three sites during the project.

Managing a DPR System

Two important concepts with regard to managing a DPR system should be emphasized: (1) there needs to be a logical, sequential plan for developing and implementing the system; and (2) other police department programs and components must be considered and included simultaneously in the planning effort. One of the most important considerations in this regard is how to make the best use of the patrol time which becomes available when calls are diverted to alternatives.

A plan for implementing a system of alternative responses to calls for service should include the following components as the framework:

- Call classification and alternative response process. This component is the basis for all other components. First, sound policies must be developed for call screening, call classification and call prioritizing in order to select alternatives which meet citizen demand. Second, the full range of alternative responses needs to be developed. This will enable emergency calls to receive rapid attention while non-emergencies are handled in a manner that meets both police department and citizen needs.

- Patrol allocation plan. This plan needs to keep in mind important factors such as minimizing response time to urgent calls; equalizing workload; reducing inter-beat dispatches; and reducing unnecessary backup coverage.

- Criminal investigations support. The degree to which patrol officers are involved in crime scene investigation and reporting needs to be considered. Allowances must be made in the allocation plan for the greater average service time spent on calls requiring patrol officer investigation.

- Crime analysis support of patrol operations. The degree to which this type of support is present is a key component in directing patrol activity.

- Directed patrol activity. It is possible to structure the other components so that as much as 50 to 60 percent of all officers' time can be devoted to directed patrol. Some police chiefs are concerned that city administrators will view this as an opportunity to reduce authorized personnel. However, worthwhile and effective directed patrol programs, when planned and proposed as part of DPR, can counteract this possibility.

- Monitoring. "Monitoring" is used in a broad sense to include review and evaluation. These activities are

essential to determine whether communications personnel and patrol resources are being used according to the comprehensive plan.

Future Implications

The greatest implications for police departments resulting from the DPR research are in the area of policy and personnel development. The major trends perceived by the evaluation team are summarized below:

- There is a need to reduce the total volume of calls coming in to emergency call takers. At all three test sites, nearly half the calls to the communications centers were for information only. Departments may need to mount a public education program to help the public distinguish between the various police assistance telephone numbers. Call screening systems and policies could divert all information only calls from telecommunicators to less skilled, lower-cost positions.

- One of the most significant implications of DPR for the future is the control it affords management over the traditionally autonomous telecommunicators. As a result, communications centers will be able to achieve greater uniformity, standardization, and accountability.

- In the event of a city-wide crisis, a DPR system can enable the majority of officers to contain a volatile situation while all but emergency calls are diverted to alternative responses.

- Significant personnel development implications can be derived from the evaluation results, which indicate many advantages to using civilian telecommunicators.

- Better qualified personnel can be attracted to communications center work with the advent of sophisticated computer technology for call taking and dispatching, improvements in pay and career development opportunities, and improved work environments.

- DPR has interesting legal implications. With regard to police negligence, historical case law indicates that the police are not negligent for not responding to citizens in general. Thus, diverting calls to alternatives is permissible; in addition, DPR diverts only non-emergency calls. But if a dispatcher promises a unit and one does not respond, this situation, unlike DPR, could result in a negligence finding and in some circumstances, vicarious liability to the department and the city. The DPR model advocates informing all callers

of any potential delay whether by a patrol unit or an alternative.

- Because the DPR call classification system can provide more accurate descriptions of situations to patrol officers, the management and control of patrol backups may be improved. Such backups are often used without the dispatcher's knowledge, and clearly have cost implications.

- Another implication for patrol officers is that when a significant number of calls are diverted to alternatives, the officers and their supervisors will have more freedom for self-initiated activities. A new breed of recruit who is more resourceful than regimental may be attracted to police work as a result.

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE EVALUATION

Summary of Key Findings

- Police departments can achieve a sizeable reduction in the number of non-emergency calls for service handled by immediate mobile dispatch, without sacrificing citizen satisfaction. The field test demonstrated that up to 46.4 percent of all calls could have received alternative responses.

- The DPR model can be successfully adapted to meet the needs of police departments in a wide range of environments. All three sites decided to institutionalize the changes made as a result of the field test.

- The generic model for call classification systems developed during the field test can be modified by any police department to meet local needs. The model is comprised of (1) a set of call event categories covering virtually all types of citizen calls, and (2) a list of key call characteristics needed to determine the most appropriate police response.

- A successful call classification system can be simple, as in Garden Grove, or more complex, as in Greensboro. A more complex system may be desirable when (1) there are more alternative responses available; and (2) there are more types of calls and characteristics which the department wants considered when selecting alternatives.

- The results of the baseline citizen surveys showed an overall high public willingness to accept alternatives to immediate dispatch of a patrol unit for non-emergency calls. When asked about the alternatives of arranging an appointment, having a report taken by telephone, coming to the department to report an incident or mailing in a report, 61.8 percent in Garden Grove, 42.4 percent in Greensboro, and 29.2 percent in Toledo indicated a willingness to accept at least one alternative. Although the percentage was somewhat lower in Toledo, it represents a significant volume of calls, and the difference may be due to demographic variables. The most acceptable alternatives were appointments and telephone reports.

- The baseline surveys also showed that three out of four callers were willing to accept delays of up to an hour in officer response time to non-emergency calls.

- Citizens indicated a greater willingness to accept alternatives for property-related calls (e.g., burglary, larceny) and assistance calls than for calls involving potential danger or threats to the person, such as assaults or domestic disputes.

- During the test phase, citizen satisfaction with the initial conversations with call takers was very high. Satisfaction with call takers among citizens in the experimental groups receiving mobile responses exceeded 95 percent at all three sites; for those receiving delayed mobile responses, satisfaction with call takers was 92.1 percent in Greensboro, 99.0 percent in Garden Grove, and 97.4 percent in Toledo. Citizens receiving telephone report unit (TRU) responses in Greensboro and Toledo expressed satisfaction levels for initial call taker conversations of 95.8 and 96.5 percent, respectively; and 97.3 percent of Garden Grove callers who received an expeditor unit response indicated satisfaction with call takers.

- Citizen satisfaction with the alternative services provided was also very high. An average of 95.4 percent at all three sites were satisfied with mobile responses during the test phase. Satisfaction with the delayed mobile response alternative averaged 94.4 percent; and an average of 94.2 percent expressed satisfaction with telephone report and expeditor unit services received.

- The tradeoffs among various alternative responses in terms of citizen satisfaction appear to be in the intensity of the satisfaction levels. In Greensboro, for example, 69.8 percent of the mobile experimental

group said they were "very satisfied" with the services provided, as compared to 60.4 percent for the TRU and 57.1 percent for the delayed mobile response.

- Alternative responses are less costly than traditional mobile responses and productivity levels are much higher for personnel using alternatives. In a city like Toledo, the number of calls that could be handled by a four-person telephone report unit would require ten officers to handle by immediate mobile response.

- The advantages of civilianizing call taker and dispatch positions outweigh the disadvantages. Civilians usually can be hired and trained at lower costs, have higher retention rates, and are better educated.

- Implementing new call classification systems and intake procedures for DPR, including the training of telecommunicators, development of written guidelines, and monitoring by supervisors, can achieve the following results:

- Increase the amount off useful information obtained from callers.

- Better prepare officers on what to expect at the scene, and reduce unnecessary backups.

- Maintain or improve citizen satisfaction by preparing callers for the type of response to expect.

- Increase uniformity of procedures, and improve the accountability of telecommunications personnel.

- Increase patrol officer satisfaction with call takers and dispatchers.

- The importance of the role of telecommunicator in police operations frequently has been underestimated. The DPR field test confirms similar conclusions supported by previous research (Tien, 1977; Cahn and Tien, 1980; Kansas City Police Department Directed Patrol Project, 1980; McEwen, 1982) that increased attention to call taker training and other needs must be addressed to achieve maximum use of alternative responses.

- In addition to providing thorough training in the use of new call classification systems, upgrading the role of the telecommunicator needs to include involving telecommunicators in project planning and the training of others, improving promotional and career development

opportunities, improving the working environment, and upgrading selection standards.

Supplementary Findings

- The use of civilian evidence technicians to handle initial calls for certain property crimes can be a highly successful alternative. Evidence technicians in Greensboro were able to process 18 percent of all non-mobile responses.

- Travel time to emergency calls was not significantly reduced as a result of DPR; however, the new call classification systems did enable patrol officers to respond quickly when needed for true emergency calls.

- The use of mail-in reports did not prove to be a successful alternative response. Communications call-back procedures, where the call taker telephones the offending party with a warning, can be an effective alternative in "barking dog", noisy party" and similar situations.

Implications for Police Policy

- A comprehensive plan for DPR needs to address how to make the best use of the increased patrol time that becomes available when calls are directed to alternatives. Opportunities to use this time for directed patrol or increased crime prevention efforts can be created a a result of DPR.

- Formal experimental designs are possible in a police department and should be used more often to test changes prior to full implementation.

- Changes in the role and activities of the patrol officer will occur as a result of DPR. The amount of time patrol officers spend answering trivial calls will be reduced, a higher percentage of calls answered will be true emergencies, and more officer time will become available for other programs such as directed patrol and crime prevention.

- Personnel issues which need to be addressed include:

    - The advantages and cost savings possible by using civilians in positions such as call takers, dispatchers, evidence technicians and other support positions.

- The need to elevate the status of call takers and dispatchers in the organizational structure.

Suggestions for Implementation Planning

- Gain the commitment of the police chief to DPR as a departmental priority.
- Develop a comprehensive plan that anticipates the impact of DPR on other departments and programs, and its effect on the overall patrol allocation plan.
- Include telecommunicators on the internal planning committee, as well as civilians and officers from all key divisions, especially patrol and communications; and involve project evaluators in the planning phase.
- Allow sufficient time for the development and testing of the new call classification codes and intake procedures, and include a full range of alternative responses.
- Provide thorough training for telecommunicators in the new system and involve them in the training of others. Clearly written manuals, flipcharts, and simulation and role play exercises are recommended techniques.
- Pre-test the new system for two or three months by having call takers code and select alternatives but not dispatch the alternatives. Monitor call taker/citizen conversations and address areas where communication style needs improvement. Review intake procedures and revise as needed.
- Consider the importance of the length of commitment possible when selecting a DPR project supervisor. At all three sites there was no turnover in key project staff, which greatly aided implementation of the DPR systems.
- Anticipate the need to deal with possible internal (union) and external (media, citizen) pressures. Consider forming a broad-based advisory board, which can foster acceptance of the DPR system within the department and in the community.

SESSION 6

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: DAY I

SUMMARY

This session will be used to summarize the work of Day I, prepare for Day II, and complete appropriate evaluation forms.

SESSION 7

PATROL DEPLOYMENT

Summary

Using materials recently published by the National Institute of Justice and other information, a presentation will be given that explores several issues associated with the deployment of the patrol service.

Among the issues to be examined are:

- The need for analysis of patrol operations;
- Issues associated with patrol operations;
- Questions associated with a review of operations, particularly, the question: How many patrol units does the agency actually need to deploy per shift?
- How to analyze workload and calculate answers to patrol deployment questions;
- What are the techniques that can provide reasonable solutions to these issues.

Most of the information needed to discuss matters of patrol deployment have been documented in a recent report: "Patrol Deployment" by Levine and McEwen. Two of the most important chapters of this report are reprinted as reference materials for this session.

U.S. Department of Justice
National Institute of Justice
Office of Communication and Research Utilization

Patrol Deployment

by

Margaret J. Levine
and
J. Thomas McEwen

September 1985

Issues and Practices in Criminal Justice is a publication series of the National Institute of Justice. Designed for the criminal justice professional, each *Issues and Practices* report presents the program options and management issues in a topic area, based on a review of research and evaluation findings, operational experience, and expert opinion in the subject. The intent is to provide criminal justice managers and administrators with the information to make informed choices in planning, implementing and improving programs and practice.

Prepared for the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice by Abt Associates Inc., under contract #J-LEAA-011-81. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Chapter 2: Analyzing the Current Patrol Plan

What Can Management Learn From Analyzing the Patrol Plan?

Patrol resource allocation plans should be evaluated in terms of their contribution to the attainment of such law enforcement goals as crime suppression, recovery of stolen property, preservation of the peace, responding to non-criminal service requests, and arrest. That is, the analysis should assess how well the patrol plan helps resolve the problems with which the police are supposed to contend.

Paradoxically, while most police departments spend well over half their budget on the patrol function and devote over half their manpower to staffing a Patrol Division, they rarely take the time to look for deficiencies or needed improvements in their patrol plan. Chaiken believes this negligence occurs primarily because "patrol is conducted routinely and continuously by the lowest-level officers in the department and is unlikely to be the subject of public praise or concern, whether it operates efficiently or not."[1] Other researchers attribute it to the fact that law enforcement goals are usually stated only in general terms, and, thus, few reliable methods exist for operationalizing and measuring the impact of patrol allocation plans on these goals.[2] Finally, our own telephone survey of 32 departments which conduct patrol plan analyses revealed other disincentives. Departments cited the time needed to collect and collate the requisite data, the expense of the total evaluation process, pre-existing union contract conditions, and the lack of personnel with the necessary skills and background as being some of the most difficult problems facing them in deciding to implement an evaluation.

In spite of these constraints, departments can benefit from examining their patrol force allocation plans. Perhaps one of the most useful results of a patrol plan analysis is the information it provides top administrators about the operations of their agency. Today, many police managers find themselves coping with the backlash against the growth in dollars and personnel that was typical of municipal government in the 1960's and early 1970's. Because marginal personnel and budgetary increases or recommendations for cutbacks have replaced this history of expansion, proper use of resources is one of the most important tasks that must be accomplished by police administrators. The patrol planning process will inform managers as to the actual demands being placed upon their personnel and will give them a realistic picture of the options available for resource allocation based upon the best match between resources and demands. Further, a thorough patrol plan analysis will show administrators weaknesses in such areas as shift staffing and beat or sector configuration. By considering these outcomes, administrators may find ways to realize even a small percentage increase in the efficiency of personnel utilization that will not only yield significant monetary savings but will also help contain the cost of providing services.

The comprehensiveness of a department's data base will become readily apparent with the onset of the evaluation process. Shortcomings may be identified in the data collection forms themselves, the type of data being collected, or the storage and retrieval procedures. Such findings have implications not only for a department's ability to conduct a patrol force allocation assessment but also for its ability to perform other complementary analyses (e.g., strategic crime analysis). The investment of time and personnel will seem well worth the effort when managers can easily access valuable information to improve both the efficiency and effectiveness of their agency.

A patrol plan analysis may suggest the need for policy review. For example, managers may find that, in order to maintain a maximum delay of thirty minutes for calls held in queue, they will have to prescribe different responses for some calls normally handled by uniformed patrol, e.g., telephone reporting, walk-in reports or community service officers. A change from two-officer to one-officer units may be warranted if there is a need to reduce beat size to minimize response time without increasing manpower. Overlay shifts might have to be added or reporting hours adjusted if the analysis shows significant increases or changes in the pattern of calls for service. In sum, with a patrol plan analysis management can identify departmental policies that may need modification if operational goals are to be achieved.

Measuring the goals of police patrol is not always a clear process. Such goals as reducing auto thefts by ten percent or increasing Part I arrests by fifteen percent are easily calculated measures of departmental success; however, the achievement of other objectives such as satisfying citizen expectations of police service, improving officer morale, providing the community with a sense of security, or enhancing officer safety cannot be so readily ascertained. As a consequence, standards of performance that have been shown to be reliable measures of proficient patrol operations have evolved. Among the most commonly cited performance criteria are balanced workload,

response time to emergency calls, time available for officer-initiated activities, availability of back-up assistance, and frequency of cross-beat dispatches. From an analysis based on quantitative measures such as these, a manager can subjectively evaluate how adequately his resource utilization plan contributes to the satisfaction of law enforcement goals. Of course, the usefulness of the performance estimates produced by the analysis must be interpreted by persons who are familiar with departmental operations so that anomalies in the data can be pinpointed and their implications weighed (e.g., the Headquarters beat being a high crime/fast response time area because of telephone or walk-in reports).

Despite all the benefits that can be accrued from a patrol plan analysis, one caveat is in order. Patrol planning *cannot* stand alone. To be effective it must be part of a more far-reaching effort toward sound departmental management that considers the systematic interrelationship of patrol with other police functions. Patrol resources cannot be managed without a calls for service management program; a calls for service management plan cannot be instituted without consideration of the patrol resource allocation plan; and criminal investigations cannot be managed if calls for service are not controlled and the patrol response and role in handling those calls is not defined.

Addressing Issues in Patrol Operations

Police managers, particularly those responsible for uniformed patrol, are called upon to resolve a wide variety of issues. Typical questions that they must consider include whether the number of patrol personnel is adequate for the workload, whether response time to emergency calls is acceptable to the public, whether a better officer work schedule is possible, and whether there is sufficient patrol time available for a new patrol program, such as directed patrol, to be introduced.

Exhibit 2.1 illustrates the process of issue resolution, from issue identification through monitoring and periodic review. The origin of an issue (e.g., an external source such as an elected official or an internal source such as a new chief of police) can have a direct bearing on how it is approached for analysis, the staffing assignments made to resolve it, the analytic technique used, and the subsequent actions taken. This chapter discusses the sources of issues about patrol operations and demonstrates how an issue can affect staffing choices, data requirements, and analytic options. The remainder of the report provides an in-depth, issue-focused review of analysis techniques (Chapters Three and Four) and a summary of the steps and organizational constituents necessary for developing alternatives, making changes, and monitoring the new plan.

How Issues Arise

Issues affecting patrol operations can arise from either external or internal sources. Examples of each are as follows:

- External Sources
  - Elected Officials
  - Annexations
  - Layoffs
  - Legal Decisions
  - Community Groups
- Internal Sources
  - New Chief of Police
  - Promotions
  - Unions

External sources are influences over which the police department has no direct control but which cause an operational change to be considered. An annexation to a city usually means a need for increased police personnel and changes to the patrol allocation plan. For example, the City of Charlotte, North Carolina, has experienced several annexations over the last ten years, resulting in additions in patrol personnel for the police department. These increases were based on the anticipated workload from the newly annexed areas as measured by calls for service, crime, and other workload indicators.

Layoffs are another externally imposed change which can necessitate reassignment of officers and reallocation of patrol personnel. In some cities, police officers have been laid off, with the result that fewer services could be provided by the department. In 1981, the City of Toledo, Ohio, due to fiscal problems, was forced to lay off over two-hundred civilian personnel, including over thirty civilians assigned to the police department. The police department had to staff the vacated positions by transferring patrol officers, with the result that fewer units could be provided for response to citizens' calls for service and crime prevention activities.

Most police departments face annual increases in citizens' calls for service. Some departments have reacted to this external influence by establishing alternative procedures for handling calls for service, as will be discussed in Chapter Three, while other departments have tried to persuade the city to increase their authorized strength so that more patrol personnel can be fielded.

Outside parties such as city officials and community groups are also sources of issues about patrol operations. It is not unusual for persons seeking public office to include the objective of reducing crime or improving police services in their platforms. In addition, many municipal

EXHIBIT 2.1

THE PROCESS OF ISSUE RESOLUTION



governments have Public Safety Committees which deal with citizen concerns about police, fire, and emergency medical services. The committee members, having a genuine interest in the patrol operations of the police department, often raise questions on how the delivery of police services to the citizens can be improved. The desire for a special crime prevention program, such as foot patrol or directed patrol, is typical of the issues posed from these committees. A somewhat related situation occurs when an individual event, such as a heinous crime or a crime wave, triggers an inquiry which results in a change in patrol operations. Finally, community groups may want a substation to service a particular area of the city and may pressure city officials and Public Safety Committees for action. Establishing a substation usually has the dual effect of increasing the authorized number of supervisory positions in the department and reallocating patrol personnel.

Internal police department influences are the second major source from which issues about patrol operations can arise. Some police departments conduct regular reviews of patrol operations. This examination may be assigned to an individual in the department, to a committee comprised of key commanders in the department, or to a section of the department such as the Planning and Research Unit. Key questions asked during such a review include the following:

- Has an increase in the relief factor created a shortage of available officers for patrol?
- How busy are the patrol units?
- Is the average travel time to emergency calls acceptable?
- Is there unequal workload among beats and units?
- How often are all units busy?
- Has there been an increase in workload?
- Is there sufficient time for crime prevention activities?

This initial review may raise other issues for further consideration, with the eventual result that changes are made to patrol operations. Indeed, it is rare for an analysis to indicate that there are no patrol allocation problems. Whether or not a further study of the problems is warranted is the decision of the department managers reviewing the analysis.

An evaluation of patrol operations can occur when there are changes in the key management personnel of a department. For example, when a new Chief of Police is appointed, particularly one from outside the department, concerns about field operations can be expected. Promotions within the department and reassignments of key personnel can also lead to a review of patrol operations. In these instances, the newly assigned personnel may bring their own ideas about operational programs which they would like to implement and, as a result, the issues are raised to determine whether these ideas are viable alternatives to the current operations.

A final way in which issues arise internally is pressure from police unions interested in improving the well being of patrol officers in the department. Typical issues from a police union center are whether officer schedules are adequate, whether the number of two-officer units should be changed, and whether more officers are needed in patrol to meet the objectives of the department and provide sufficient officer safety. These issues may evolve as part of contract negotiations when the union presents its analysis of patrol operations containing suggestions for modifications. In response, the police department management may also present an analysis.

Planning for Issue Resolution

The impetus for studying an issue is influenced by the source's span of control. For example, city officials control the budget. The issues being raised by city officials often, therefore, are budget related. Proposed police budget increases must be reviewed by city officials who, in response, may suggest alternatives for the department to consider that would not result in a budget increase. The city may favor a Telephone Response Unit for a police department, recognizing that this approach to handling calls for service reduces the need for more officers in the field. On the other hand, a budget increase for more officers may be approved if it is believed that citizens want a personal officer response rather than having their reports taken over the telephone.

In contrast, the police department management controls the allocation of patrol resources. They can consider changes in the allocation of personnel by geographic areas, by time of day, or by day of week. They can also consider changes in officer work schedules and in the mix of one-officer and two-officer units. Alternative dispatch procedures governing when nonemergency calls can be delayed and when to send back-up units are also controlled by the department management. However, the department management has constraints on these considerations as reflected by the terms of union agreements, the acceptance of changes by city officials and citizens, and the potential impact on officer morale. These constraints have a direct bearing on the issues which evolve within a police department. If the union agreement specifies the officer work schedule, then the issue of schedule changes can be addressed only through negotiations which usually occur at contract renewal time. This example illustrates both the

derivation of union influences from the contract agreement and the pressures that the union can place on department management, using the contract as a foundation.

Since changes in departmental operations have a major impact on police personnel and citizens alike, patrol issues must be given serious consideration. They always require careful analysis in order to develop alternatives and select the most appropriate course of action. The procedure for addressing a particular issue or group of issues can be divided into the following three components:

- Staffing
- Data Requirements
- Analysis Approach

Staffing

Special care must be taken by the department in selecting the staff who will be responsible for addressing a particular issue or group of issues. An individual or a section of the police department, such as the Planning and Research Unit, is usually given the responsibility for conducting the patrol analysis. Many times an advisory board is formed to assist in the development of alternatives and to approve any plan which evolves. In considering issues about the need for new beat boundaries, for example, the advisory board may be comprised of representatives from field operations, communications, data processing, and the Planning and Research Unit. If the issue is the work schedule of officers, then a union representative may be included on the advisory board.

A consultant or expert also may be hired to address an issue of particular importance to the city. When the issue has been raised by persons outside the police department, such as city officials, the use of a consultant is particularly relevant. In this case, the consultant acts as the analyst as well as the developer of alternatives for the city and police to consider. As an example, the City of Dallas, Texas, hired a consultant to determine whether the police department should have an increase in authorized officer positions. (See Chapter Four for a discussion of this study.)

If the department routinely performs a periodic review of its patrol operations, then the selection of staff may be eased. That is, there may already be persons in the department familiar with the requirements and procedures of the process since analyses have been performed in the past. Such a pool of expertise will be invaluable, not only in conducting the patrol plan review but also in recognizing inconspicuous problems before they become major issues.

Regardless of whether an individual, section of the department, or consultant has the responsibility for addressing the issue, the person(s) collecting the data, conducting the analysis, and developing alternative resolutions should have a range of skills and background relevant to the problem. Analytical skills and practical experience in field operations are general prerequisites that should be considered. Operational experience is needed because it gives the individual a 'real world' perspective both on possible solutions to an issue and on the alternatives that might be acceptable to officers in the field. For example, beat redesign should always be accomplished by someone familiar with the community's geography and, in particular, with any recent changes in streets, traffic flow, new buildings, residential developments, and other physical conditions that can affect beat design.

Analytical skills are necessary not only to ensure that comprehensive consideration is given to the types of analyses that can be performed, but also to assure that correct formulas are applied and accurate calculations made. For more difficult issues such as determining the number of officers needed to satisfy travel time or queuing delay objectives, these skills may include data processing, mathematics, and systems analysis. For simpler issues, the analyst may only need an aptitude for understanding the statistics on incoming calls, average elapsed times, and other measures which are relevant to the issue being addressed.

Data Requirements

It is difficult for the management of a police department to document the full range of activities performed by patrol officers during an eight hour shift. In general, officers are on their own much of the time. Their work is not an assembly line process but, instead, is usually determined by the volume of citizens' calls they must handle and by special duties, such as specific crime prevention activities or funeral escorts, which their supervisor assigns at the start of their tour of duty. While the supervisor generally has some idea of what his subordinates are doing, he is often in charge of six to eight geographically dispersed officers and obviously cannot know their activities at all times. In view of these circumstances, the department's management must determine patrol units' workload demands by analyzing such source documents as dispatch cards, duty rosters, officer activity logs, traffic tickets, and field interview reports.

Collecting data about officers' workload is the first step departments should take in analyzing the existing patrol resource allocation plan. However, in order to ensure that the proper data are collected and later make evaluative judgments about the adequacy of the patrol plan in han-

dling workload, the department must define what it means by workload. Typically, workload is divided into three categories: citizens' calls for service; self-initiated activities; and administrative activities. The category emphasized in an analysis will depend on the issue, but departments will usually need to collect data on all three. For example, computer models frequently used in patrol planning need information on all patrol officers' activities that make them unavailable to answer calls for service.

A common question of interest to patrol supervisors is, "How busy are the units on my shift?"[3] This issue of unit utilization is important not only because it affects a supervisor's ability to initiate specialized activities such as directed patrol and crime prevention on his shift, but also because it influences other operational considerations such as call queuing and dispatch delays. The supervisor's question can be answered by performing a simple mathematical computation:[4]

$$\text{Unit Utilization} = \frac{\text{Workload (in hours)}}{\text{Unit Hours}}$$

Multiplying by 100 yields the percent of time a patrol car is busy on the type of work counted in "workload." Using this formula, it is apparent that changes in the definition of workload could have a major impact on a supervisor's perception of how busy the units on his shift are.

The issue to be addressed also determines data requirements. For example, if the issue concerns the average response time to calls for service, then data on the time calls are received in the Communications Center and the time the patrol units arrive at the scene are needed. Further, the department should have a priority system in Communications so that the average response time for emergency calls, as compared to non-emergency calls, can be determined. The response time issue is more difficult to address if the department does not have a priority system or if officers do not reliably notify the dispatcher upon their arrival at the scene.

At the outset, a determination must be made regarding what specific data are needed and whether the database currently exists. Typically, data about calls for service (CFS), time expended, non-CFS officer activities, backup units required, staffing schedules and actual units fielded, and response time will be required. These data may be supplemented by measures such as area of patrol districts and sectors, length of patrolled streets, manpower availability factors, and average preventive patrol and response speeds, as well as by information pertaining to policies about call delays and dispatching priorities, administrative demands on patrol officers, and manpower authorization levels.

Many police departments routinely gather these former types of data; however, for those agencies that have not routinized such data collection procedures, there are automated data processing systems that can capture and store the information, or it may be collated and tallied by hand using the source documents discussed below. For the small department that finds it difficult to commit personnel to data collection and analysis tasks, the low call-for-service workload during the early morning hours can be used by dispatchers and call takers to compile and analyze workload information.

Dispatch cards. The dispatch cards, prepared by Communications Center personnel, are a key source of information useful in measuring both the types of activities patrol units perform and the amount of time they require. A dispatch card is completed whenever an officer either responds to an incident or initiates some activity on his/her own. It usually shows such details as (1) the type of call; (2) the location of the incident; (3) the unit(s) assigned; (4) the time the call was received at the Communications Center and the time the unit was dispatched, arrived on the scene, and completed the call; and (5) the disposition of the call. Several key performance measures for patrol units can be calculated using these data from dispatch cards, for example:

- the total number of calls;
- average travel time;
- average time at the scene;
- unit utilization; and
- how frequently *all* units are busy.

Some of these measures may be further refined according to the type of call, priority, specific unit, area of the jurisdiction, day of the week, and time of day.

Dispatch tickets, while containing many valuable descriptors, should not be the sole data source for a patrol allocation analysis because they do not reflect all patrol activities. Often officers are asked to perform administrative duties such as delivering legal papers to the State's Attorney or transporting evidence to a lab. Rather than filling out a dispatch card for these assignments, dispatchers may use a system of status cards to indicate (for their own purposes) that the unit is not available to respond to calls for service. The same may be true when officers have to appear in court during their tour of duty. And sometimes, though it is against policy in most departments, officers themselves do not report to the dispatcher that they are out of service, for example when they stop to assist a citizen, issue a traffic citation, or complete a report. Likewise, they do not always report their arrival on the scene of a call to the dispatcher. Without this data

element, it is impossible to calculate travel time, response time, or on-scene time—three key indicators of a patrol plan's adequacy. Thus, if a department were to rely only on dispatch cards to assess how officers spend their time, the results of its analysis would be inaccurate because the cards do not capture the full extent of patrol activities.

Duty rosters. For the purposes of a patrol plan analysis, it is important to determine the *actual* number of officers and units fielded. An accurate accounting is necessary if a true picture of a department's ability to handle call for service demands, maintain a reasonable relief factor, and meet performance objectives (such as a three minute response time to emergencies and a maximum forty-five minute delay on non-emergency calls) is to be obtained. Some analysts mistakenly assume that the patrol plan itself indicates this number; however, what the plan shows is the number of officers and units that are *supposed* to be fielded. In reality, because of holidays, vacation, sick leave, or injury, this is often not the actual number on duty. The analyst must consult the duty roster to obtain the true number of officers reporting for work each day and the actual number of units fielded.

Duty rosters are a source of other valuable information in addition to the correct number of officers and units fielded. For example, they tell the analyst how many units are assigned to an area and how many of the units are one-officer versus two. These data are important because they are input for some of the analytic models and because they influence departmental and officer productivity measures. Some rosters also specify special non- call for service activities undertaken on a shift, including station duty, parade security, funeral escorts, court appearances, and substitute crossing guard duty, for example. Such information helps round out the full description of departmental workload. Finally, the duty roster may indicate the reasons why the actual deployment does not match the recommended deployment—vacation, holiday, regular day off, sickness, injury, etc.

Officer activity logs. One tool used by some departments to document patrol operations more completely is the Officer Activity Log. Patrol officers may be required either to account for their full eight hours of work or to record only those activities that are not dispatched via the communications Center. While Officer Activity Logs collect useful information, they are called "cheat sheets" by many who use them; they do not enjoy a reputation for infallibility in police departments. It is not uncommon for officers to inflate or deflate the amount of time shown as spent on particular activities, depending on the priorities of their supervisor and commander. In addition, if officers think that they are being evaluated on the basis of their logs, they are likely to become more proactive than they would otherwise be, and their logs would document more work being performed than is normally the case. Finally, because the logs are viewed as an unnecessary, extra paperwork burden by the rank and file, officers may not be as careful as they should be in filling them out.

To remedy these shortcomings, some departments use a sampling procedure in which officers are assigned on a rotating schedule to complete the logs. The advantage of this approach is that officers may be more conscientious if they know that they will have to use the logs only temporarily. Other departments, in an effort to ensure that officers know their logs are not intended for performance evaluation, use a planning unit instead of an operational or personnel unit to administer the data collection process. Arrangements such as not requiring a supervisor's signature and providing a drop-off box not only protect the confidentiality of the information but are meant to encourage officers to be more accurate in their reporting. Even so, this data source must be used with caution.

Traffic citations and field interview reports. Other helpful sources of information about patrol activities are traffic citations and field interview reports. Traffic citations not only can help a department pinpoint locations of traffic problems within its jurisdiction, but they can also serve as a basis for determining, to a limited degree, the frequency and utility of this officer-initiated activity and the time spent on it. Field interview reports can be used in a similar way. They may be studied not only to suggest areas of potential criminal activity, but also to further identify how much work is initiated by the officers themselves. Data gleaned from analyzing traffic citations and field interview reports may serve as a basis for directed patrol assignments. They should also be combined with the details of dispatch cards and Officer Activity Logs to give as complete a picture of total workload as possible. Thorough documentation of all patrol activities is an essential prerequisite to developing a patrol plan that both reflects the best match between resources and demands and results in an equitable and balanced distribution of the workload.

Availability of The Data: How About a Sample?

Computer-aided dispatch systems automatically capture data about officers' activities and departmental performance measures. For departments which do not have that type of system, dispatch tickets and other data sources will have to be manually tabulated or keypunched for analysis. One of the assumptions in all of the discussion so far has been that the necessary data are readily available for the analysis. In reality, this will not always be the case.

Depending on the issue being addressed, the data on which to base a decision for or against an operational change may not be available. When an issue demands data that are not available, the department management must decide whether the issue is of sufficient importance to warrant a special data collection effort. In this section, the technique of sampling will be discussed as a data collection procedure.

The advantages of sampling include the following:

- Sampling can provide reliable information.
- Sampling is a relatively quick way of obtaining information.
- Sampling is less expensive than a complete analysis of the data.

An example of the effective use of sampling is provided by the experience of the Albuquerque, New Mexico, Police Department under its Managing Patrol Operations (MPO) project. Prior to the MPO project, the police department did not keypunch any of its dispatch tickets. As a result, the department management did not have *any* information about its patrol operations. Basic information on the number of citizen calls, the average travel time to emergency calls, the average service time, and the geographic distribution of calls was not known.

As part of the MPO project, the project analyst developed a sampling procedure to obtain information from dispatch cards so that an evaluation of the patrol plan could be made. This procedure was employed throughout the duration of the project, by taking samples of dispatch tickets at six month intervals beginning with the July-December 1978 period, and ending with the January-June 1980 period. The procedure was the same with each sample. Over a six month period, there are 549 patrol shifts (183 days times 3 shifts per day). Of that total, the analyst *randomly selected* 113 shifts as a representative 20 percent sample. The sample was taken so that an equal number of each day of the week was included. The dispatch cards for the sampled shifts were then removed from storage and all were coded by graduate students from the local university. Information taken from each ticket included date, day of week, shift, unit(s) assigned, type of call, time of dispatch, time of arrival, and time completed. The types of activities reflected in the dispatches were divided into the following four major categories:

- **Citizen Calls For Service**—Those calls which originated in the 911 system as citizen requests for assistance.
- **Back-up Calls**—Dispatch tickets for all assist units required for the calls for service.
- **Self-Initiated Activities**—Dispatch tickets for self-initiated activities generated by the patrol units.
- **Administrative Activities**—Dispatch tickets for all administrative activities performed by the patrol units.

Keypunching was contracted to a local firm which specialized in data entry. Together, the coding and the keypunching operations for each sample required approximately five weeks to complete.

Tabulations were developed on the University of New Mexico computer to generate a complete analysis of key performance measures for patrol. For the first time in over ten years, the department management was able to have basic statistics on its patrol operations. The analysis showed a considerably greater volume of citizen calls for service than the management previously believed the department received. Based on the results of the sample, significant changes were made in the geographic distribution of officers, the percentage of officers assigned to each shift, and the work schedules of the officers.

The Sacramento, California, Police Department, also a participant in the MPO program, provides another example of sampling. There, the city Data Processing Section had responsibility for keying dispatch tickets for the department. Because of cutbacks in budget and personnel, a cost reduction procedure was implemented whereby every other day of dispatch tickets was keypunched. The procedure of keying every other day of dispatch tickets represents a *systematic sample*. Based on this sample, the police department received a series of reports which gave information on its patrol deployment on a monthly, quarterly, and annual basis. These reports served to support periodic changes in patrol operations in the department.

A final example, in which changes were implemented in the Patrol Division of the Lynchburg, Virginia, Police Department as the result of sampling dispatch tickets, is described by David Scalf.[5] The sample size was 12.5 percent of a 288 day period, taken by selecting every eighth day of this period. Information from the dispatch card included the date, nature of the call, beat, units assigned, location, time the call was received, time dispatched, time of arrival, time cleared, and final disposition. On the basis of this analysis, a new beat design was developed and implemented by the department.

Samples are often appropriate for finding out how patrol officers spend their time. A sample of officers can be selected to complete a daily log for a one- or two-month period. In some departments, a daily log is completed every day by all officers. The criticism of this approach is that officers quickly tire of the log and begin to record unreliable information. The advantage of a sample is that

officers may be more likely to provide accurate information over a shorter period of time—particularly if they have been told of the importance of the data from the logs.

In summary, the objective of a sample is to lessen the data collection task while assuring the validity of the data base that will be used for analysis. For most agencies, a sample of 2500-3500 dispatch cards will be adequate for determining temporal and beat service demand patterns. This sample can be supplemented with aggregate daily service call totals to determine daily CFS variations. Sampling techniques have been found to be a beneficial procedure for obtaining information about a patrol plan. In the departments that have employed sampling procedures, the results have been reliable enough to serve as a basis for decisionmaking and changes in the patrol plan.[6]

Analysis Approach

The department's data processing capabilities, staffing resources, and the availability of the requisite data influence the choice of analytic technique. The analysis approach also is dependent on the complexity of the issue under consideration. At one extreme, the analysis may be completely manual while, at the other extreme, it may require computer modeling. For example, the analysis of whether there are supervision inequities is almost entirely a manual process in which data are collected on the number of officers and the number of sergeants in different geographical commands of the department; afterward the ratios are calculated by hand. A comparison then determines inequities. On the other hand, if the issue is the number of patrol units required so that the probability of a delay (that is, the probability of all units being busy) remains below a given threshold, then a computer may be required because of the complexity of the calculations. This section presents an overview of several analysis approaches whose application will be described in greater detail in Chapters Three and Four.

Dispatch ticket analysis. As discussed, one of the key data sources for analysis of patrol operations is the dispatch ticket completed on all citizen calls for service. The dispatch ticket contains a wealth of information on the call including the type of call, the unit assigned, the time of arrival, and the time the call was completed. By analyzing these data, the department management can obtain a very good picture of how patrol units are spending their time during a tour of duty. Police managers are usually interested in the following summary statistics that can be calculated from dispatch cards:

- total number of calls for service;
- number of calls for service by hour, shift, beat, and reporting area;
- average dispatch delay (in minutes);
- average travel time (in minutes);
- average on-scene time (in minutes);
- average service time (in minutes);
- average number of back-up units per call;
- unit utilization;
- probability that all units are busy; and
- average number of free units.

The *number of calls for service* is, of course, simply a count of the number of dispatch tickets completed for the basic patrol units. The only complication in obtaining this figure occurs when the department's policy is to prepare a separate dispatch ticket for back-up units rather than listing them on the original dispatch ticket. Under this circumstance, it may be difficult to link together the records of the distinct units dispatched to the same call, so it is advisable to develop separate counts for the first unit sent and the back-up units.

The *average dispatch delay* is calculated using the time that elapses between a call's arrival in the Communications Center and a patrol unit's dispatch. Similarly, the *average travel time* is based on the time between the dispatch of a patrol unit and its arrival on the scene. It is obviously important for the officer in the patrol unit to notify the dispatcher upon arrival at the scene in order for these statistics to be calculated. The *average response time* is defined as the dispatch delay time plus the travel time and is another common statistic for patrol analysis. The *average on-scene time* is the elapsed period between time of arrival at the scene and final completion of the call. Finally, the *average service time* is defined as the travel time plus on-scene time. The service time represents the total time that the unit is working on the call and unavailable for other assignments. It should be noted that the service time can be calculated from the time of dispatch and time of completion; therefore, it does not depend on patrol officers informing the dispatcher of their arrival at the scene.

While these statistics are easy to calculate, a more difficult problem for the analyst is to put the statistics into a meaningful framework. For example, the average dispatch delay, average travel time, and average on-scene time are usually more beneficial if they are calculated by a call's priority class. Most departments have a three priority system, with Priority 1 calls being emergencies, Priority 2 calls being those needing immediate attention, and Priority 3 calls being everything else. A more comprehensive picture of workload demands, however, can be obtained from a seven-priority system using the following codes: 1- EMERGENCY (lights and/or siren); 2-

URGENT (exceed posted speed limits with caution, but do not use lights or siren); 3- IMMEDIATE (proceed without delay, but do not exceed posted speed limits); 4- DIVERTABLE (may be given to Telephone Reporting Unit, community service officers, etc.); 5- QUEUABLE (may be stacked and thus delayed for a period of time); 6- REFERABLE (may be handled by another agency); 7- NO RESPONSE (information only). An analysis using this expanded priority system will give departments a clearer, more exact representation of their workload and will enable managers to make more informed decisions about their personnel needs.

In addition to preparing the statistics by priority class, this information should be summarized by individual patrol unit, by geographic area, by hour of day or shift, by day of week, or by combinations of these variables. The determination of how the statistics are developed and presented will usually depend on the issue being addressed and can be expected to change from one issue to another. For example, the issue may be the average travel time to emergency calls in one area of the city. In this case, the statistics should be developed by geographic area so that the travel time in the area under question can be compared with that in other areas of the city. If, on the other hand, the issue is the distribution of workload, then the statistics should be developed for each patrol unit and beat on the shift in question.

The department management may decide to produce a set of monthly or quarterly reports from dispatch ticket information in order to monitor field activities. A good example of part of a monthly report is provided in Exhibits 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 which show data for Zone 2 in the Jacksonville, Florida, Sheriff's Department. Exhibit 2.2, for Zone 2 on Fridays during January 1982, presents a detailed summary of all the statistics listed above plus several other measures which will be discussed in Chapter Four on multiple objectives. The exhibit provides statistics for the five different time periods which coincide with the overlapping shifts of the department. It helps illustrate how to calculate the statistics on unit utilization, the probability of all units being simultaneously busy, and the average number of free units. Unit utilization has been previously defined as:

$$\text{Unit Utilization} = \frac{\text{Workload (in hours)}}{\text{Unit Hours}}$$

As an example of this calculation, consider the information in the Shift 1 column (0700-1500) of Exhibit 2.2 which gives the average number of beat units as 14.2, the average number of calls per hour as 9.2, and the average service time (including back-up units) as 36.5 minutes. The workload is then calculated as:

$$\text{Workload} = 9.2 \text{ calls} \times \frac{36.5 \text{ minutes per call}}{60 \text{ minutes per hour}}$$

$$= 5.6 \text{ hours.}$$

And

$$\text{Unit Utilization} = \frac{5.6 \text{ hours}}{14.2 \text{ unit hours}}$$

$$= 0.394$$

$$= 39.4\%.$$

In other words, on average, the patrol units were spending 39.4 percent of their tour of duty on citizen calls for service during Shift 1. Unit utilization for other shifts or an overall utilization statistic can be calculated from the data in Exhibit 2.2.

The *average number of free units* represent the average number of units that a dispatcher will find available each time a call for service must be dispatched. This average depends on the number of units fielded, the amount of call for service and non- call for service work, the average service time, and the dispatching policy of the department in regard to when back-up units are assigned. Rather than trying to determine the number of free units directly from the data, an estimate can be obtained with the information on the amount of total workload. Extending the above example, the amount of call for service workload each hour averages 9.2 calls times 36.5 minutes, which equals 5.6 hours of patrol unit work. In addition, the department has estimated that each unit spends about 10 minutes per hour on non- call for service activities, for a total of 2.4 hours (14.2 units fielded times 10 minutes) of non- call for service work per hour. Combining these figures gives a total of 8.0 hours of work for each hour of the shift. If only eight patrol units are fielded, then all eight units would always be busy; there would be no extra time. Since there are 14.2 units fielded, this means that the average number of free units is 6.2 (14.2 units - 8 units).[7]

Formally, the average number of free units is calculated as:

$$\text{Free Units} = \text{Total Units} - \frac{\text{Total Workload}}{\text{in Unit Hours.}}$$

While this statistic is more complicated to understand, it provides an insight into patrol operations in terms of how many units are usually available.

From a mathematical viewpoint, the calculation of the probability of all units being busy simultaneously is even

EXHIBIT 2.2

OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF
PATROL RESOURCE ALLOCATION
PLANNING AND RESEARCH
JANUARY 1982

DATA SUMMARY: ZONE 2 FRIDAY	SHIFT 1 0700-1459	SHIFT 2A 1500-1629	SHIFT 2B 1630-2259	SHIFT 3A 2300-0029	SHIFT 3B 0030-0659	AVERAGE
AVERAGE NO. BEAT UNITS	14.2	15.0	21.2	20.6	14.4	16.8
AVERAGE NO. CALLS/HOUR	9.2	13.2	15.8	17.2	7.5	11.2
NON-CFS TIME (MIN/HOUR)	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0
PERCENT OF 1 UNIT CALLS	83.4	86.9	77.7	76.0	74.0	79.1
AVERAGE SERVICE TIME - 1 UNIT	29.8	27.1	28.8	25.1	27.4	28.4
PERCENT OF 2 UNIT CALLS	16.6	13.1	22.3	24.0	26.0	20.9
AVERAGE SERVICE TIME - 2ND UNIT	40.0	69.2	38.5	30.3	26.7	37.6
PERCENT OF PRIORITY 1 CALLS	10.9	8.0	12.6	11.1	12.3	11.6
PERCENT OF PRIORITY 2 CALLS	20.0	20.0	34.9	41.7	43.5	32.5
PERCENT OF PRIORITY 3 CALLS	69.1	72.0	52.6	47.2	44.2	55.9
AVERAGE NO. UNITS DISPATCHED/CFS	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.2
AVERAGE SERVICE TIME/CFS/UNIT	31.2	32.0	30.7	26.1	27.3	29.9
AVERAGE SERVICE TIME/CFS	36.5	36.2	37.4	32.4	34.4	36.2
ACTUAL WORK/UNIT:						
CFS TIME	23.6	31.9	27.8	27.0	17.8	24.5
NON-CFS TIME	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0
UNCOMMITTED TIME	26.4	18.2	22.2	23.0	32.2	25.5
AVERAGE NO. OF FREE CARS	6.3	4.5	7.8	7.9	7.7	7.1
PROBABILITY OF ALL UNITS SIMULTANEOUSLY BUSY	3.7	13.8	3.7	4.1	1.0	4.0
PRIORITY 1 CALLS:						
DISPATCH DELAY (MIN)	1.5	.0	1.1	1.6	1.2	1.3
TRAVEL TIME (MIN)	4.4	.0	6.5	4.2	4.8	5.3
RESPONSE TIME (MIN)	5.9	.0	7.6	5.7	6.0	6.6
PRIORITY 2 CALLS:						
DISPATCH DELAY (MIN)	2.7	2.7	2.1	3.2	5.1	3.2
TRAVEL TIME (MIN)	7.8	10.3	6.4	6.3	5.7	6.8
RESPONSE TIME (MIN)	10.5	13.1	8.5	9.5	10.8	9.8
PRIORITY 3 CALLS:						
DISPATCH DELAY (MIN)	6.0	6.4	5.6	3.8	8.5	6.1
TRAVEL TIME (MIN)	8.9	9.2	8.3	7.3	6.6	8.3
RESPONSE TIME (MIN)	15.0	15.6	14.0	11.1	15.1	14.4
AVERAGE PRIORITIES:						
DISPATCH DELAY (MIN)	5.0	5.6	3.8	3.2	6.1	4.6
TRAVEL TIME (MIN)	8.2	9.4	7.4	6.4	6.0	7.4
RESPONSE TIME (MIN)	13.2	15.0	11.1	9.6	12.0	12.1
ZONE SQUARE MILES	230.00					
AVERAGE RESPONSE SPEED	30.00					
ZONE STREET MILES	768.10					
AVERAGE PATROL SPEED	20.00					

EXHIBIT 2.3
OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF
PATROL RESOURCE ALLOCATION
PLANNING AND RESEARCH
JANUARY 1982

ALLOCATION SUMMARY: ZONE 2	SHIFT 1 0700-1459	SHIFT 2A 1500-1629	SHIFT 2B 1630-2259	SHIFT 3A 2300-0029	SHIFT 3B 0030-0659	AVERAGE
PROBABILITY OF ALL CARS SIMULTANEOUSLY BUSY:						
MONDAY	1.5	28.3	1.5	.6	.1	1.6
TUESDAY	1.2	77.3	6.1	.8	.0	2.6
WEDNESDAY	.6	52.9	8.2	.1	.1	1.3
THURSDAY	6.1	12.8	.7	.0	.0	1.2
FRIDAY	3.7	13.8	3.7	4.1	1.0	4.0
SATURDAY	9.0	91.2	3.2	34.1	3.3	9.1
SUNDAY	14.5	100.0	4.1	.0	2.9	4.8
AVERAGE	3.4	44.7	3.4	.8	.3	3.8
AVERAGE NO. OF FREE UNITS:						
MONDAY	7.3	3.5	9.1	8.9	8.8	8.0
TUESDAY	8.0	1.6	6.7	9.4	10.1	7.9
WEDNESDAY	8.0	2.2	6.3	11.5	9.1	7.7
THURSDAY	6.0	4.8	10.4	12.1	9.8	8.5
FRIDAY	6.3	4.5	7.8	7.9	7.7	7.1
SATURDAY	5.4	.7	8.0	3.7	6.4	6.0
SUNDAY	4.0	.0	6.6	11.4	6.3	5.5
AVERAGE	6.3	2.4	7.8	9.1	8.1	7.1
ACTUAL WORKLOAD/UNIT/HOUR:						
MONDAY	31.0	46.3	32.3	28.9	18.8	29.6
TUESDAY	29.2	84.1	39.9	31.0	20.3	32.0
WEDNESDAY	28.0	50.2	40.4	24.6	20.3	31.2
THURSDAY	36.6	41.9	32.3	25.4	19.7	30.8
FRIDAY	33.6	41.9	37.8	37.0	27.8	34.5
SATURDAY	37.6	57.1	34.5	47.9	33.0	37.3
SUNDAY	37.1	60.0	34.4	31.9	31.6	34.4
AVERAGE	33.3	49.8	35.9	31.5	25.1	33.0
AVERAGE CALLS FOR SERVICE:						
MONDAY	10.2	11.3	13.8	12.5	4.3	9.8
TUESDAY	9.0	14.7	14.7	14.0	7.0	10.7
WEDNESDAY	8.8	11.3	15.0	12.3	5.0	9.8
THURSDAY	9.6	15.5	16.7	13.8	4.9	10.9
FRIDAY	9.2	13.2	15.8	17.2	7.5	11.2
SATURDAY	10.2	15.3	12.9	17.5	8.3	11.2
SUNDAY	7.0	9.3	10.3	9.5	8.1	8.5
AVERAGE	9.1	12.9	14.0	13.9	6.6	10.3
AVERAGE NO. BEAT UNITS:						
MONDAY	15.0	15.3	19.8	17.3	12.8	15.8
TUESDAY	15.5	15.8	20.0	19.5	15.3	16.9
WEDNESDAY	15.0	13.5	19.3	19.5	13.8	16.0
THURSDAY	15.3	18.0	22.5	21.0	14.5	17.4
FRIDAY	14.2	15.0	21.2	20.6	14.4	16.6
SATURDAY	14.4	14.4	18.8	18.6	14.2	15.8
SUNDAY	10.4	10.6	15.4	18.0	13.2	13.0
AVERAGE	14.1	14.3	19.5	19.2	14.0	15.9

EXHIBIT 2.4

OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF
PATROL RESOURCE ALLOCATION
PLANNING AND RESEARCH
JANUARY 1982

ZONE 2 AVG CALLS FOR SERVICE



TIME BLOCKS

SHIFT 1 : 0700-1459

SHIFT 2A : 1500-1629

SHIFT 2B : 1630-2259

SHIFT 3A : 2300-0029

SHIFT 3B : 0030-0659

more complicated than the above example. For this reason, the exact equation for its calculation will not be given in this text.[8] As shown in Exhibit 2.2, this probability has been calculated to be 3.7 percent for Shift 1. This figure can be interpreted as meaning that approximately 3.7 percent of all incoming calls will have to be delayed for some period of time because all units are busy on other work.

Deployment by workload analysis. Depending on the issue, workload analysis, may involve a study of only calls for service or of both calls for service and the amount of time officers are engaged in routine patrol, administrative duties, and personal business.[9] In addition to allocating resources, the information base resulting from a workload analysis can be used for planning directed patrol activities as well as preventive patrol strategies.

A standard method for analyzing the workload pattern of a department is to depict the hourly fluctuation of calls for service on 24-hour and 7-day graphs, the former showing demands by each hour of the day and the latter demands by each day of the week. The 24-hour graphs are likely to display a workload cycle whose peaks and valleys recur with an almost predictable regularity that corresponds to the public's typical daily routine. That is, when most people are sleeping during the early morning hours, patrol workload normally is low; it progressively rises through the afternoon hours until midnight when it begins tapering off.[10] The 7-day graph, likewise, will illustrate a pattern: there is less variation in workload among the days of the week than there is among the hours of each individual day. Fridays and Saturdays will show a somewhat higher demand for service, as will days near holidays. On Sundays, the workload will be lighter than on Saturday. (See Exhibits 2.5 and 2.6) Some departments prepare 168-hour graphs showing all the hours of the week, instead of two separate graphs.

A temporal allocation of manpower can be attained by calculating for every day the percentage of the total workload occurring during each shift and then assigning a comparable percentage of the available officers to the shifts.[11] Manpower can be distributed geographically using a similar process. That is, the first step is to determine the workload in each district or sector, next calculate the portion of the shift's workload handled in each area, and finally assign manpower accordingly. (See Exhibit 2.7)

While an adequate distribution of current manpower can be attained via this simple calls for service workload analysis, there are several elements that it fails to consider. For example, time spent on calls for service, as a proportion of total patrol man-hours available, is particularly important for departments wishing to implement a directed patrol program or expand patrol's follow-up investigation activities, because they will want to ensure that officers are not committed to responding to calls for service for their entire tour of duty. Furthermore, without time information, it is difficult to determine the adequacy of existing manpower levels. According to the Police Task Force of the 1973 National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals:

> Experience shows that using the number of calls for service . . . without regard for time expended is of little or no value in determining workload. For example, the same number of service calls . . . may occur on two different shifts. All the activities on one shift, however, may take twice as long as (those) on the other shift. Therefore, using only the number of incidents would indicate falsely that the workload was the same on both watches.[12]

Another shortcoming of using this level of analysis is that it does not take into account such factors as response time, dispatch delays, calls requiring back-up or multiple units, or the appropriateness of geographic boundaries.[13] To varying degrees, these factors can affect citizens' perception of police performance and officer morale, as well as the number of officers needed to sufficiently staff the patrol function. Nonetheless, once an analysis has calculated the number of calls for service, identified the distribution of demands by time of day and day of week, and allocated the workload on a geographic basis, many agencies decide how to distribute patrol personnel. Others, however, use the calls for service model as an input to more in-depth workload analyses. (See Exhibit 2.8)

Computer models for patrol planning. Computer assisted allocation models have existed since the late 1960's, but it was not until the mid- to late 70's that programs were perfected sufficiently to make them attractive and popular among law enforcement agencies. They are particularly useful in resolving multiple issue problems, as will be demonstrated in detail in Chapter Four. Perhaps the most widely recognized and used models are the Patrol Car Allocation Model (PCAM) developed at the Rand Corporation, Hypercube Queuing Model developed at Public Systems Evaluation, Inc., and PATROL PLAN/BEAT PLAN developed at The Institute for Public Program Analysis. The advantages of these automated patrol allocation models are that:

- they are performance-oriented, thereby allowing the police planner designing staff distributions to specify acceptable standards of performance, such as maximum delays in dispatching calls for service or a desirable amount of time for directed patrol; and

EXHIBIT 2.5

SAMPLE 24-HOUR GRAPH OF WORKLOAD DISTRIBUTION



EXHIBIT 2.6

SAMPLE WORKLOAD BY DAY OF WEEK



Source: Reading, Pennsylvania, Bureau of Police. Analysis of Dispatch Data, 1981. Average number of calls dispatched in 1981 by day: Sunday, 115.7; Monday, 110.6; Tuesday, 111.3; Wednesday, 114.0; Thursday, 118.4; Friday, 132.7; Saturday, 144.8.

EXHIBIT 2.7

SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION OF MANPOWER BY HOURLY WORKLOAD

HOURS BY SHIFT	CALLS FOR SERVICE	PERCENT OF TOTAL HOURLY WORKLOAD	PERCENT OF MANPOWER ASSIGNED
0700 - 0759	58	2.11	DAY SHIFT
0800 - 0859	77	2.80	
0900 - 0959	90	3.28	29.27
1000 - 1059	100	3.64	
1100 - 1159	107	3.90	
1200 - 1259	117	4.26	
1300 - 1359	123	4.48	
1400 - 1459	132	4.80	
1500 - 1559	158	5.75	EVENING SHIFT
1600 - 1659	153	5.57	
1700 - 1759	165	6.01	47.03
1800 - 1859	172	6.26	
1900 - 1959	161	5.86	
2000 - 2059	164	5.97	
2100 - 2159	164	5.97	
2200 - 2259	155	5.64	
2300 - 2359	159	5.79	MIDNIGHT SHIFT
2400 - 0059	118	4.30	
0100 - 0159	101	3.68	23.68
0200 - 0259	90	3.28	
0300 - 0359	60	2.18	
0400 - 0459	45	1.64	
0500 - 0559	37	1.35	
0600 - 0659	40	1.46	
TOTAL	2,746	99.98*	99.98*

*Total does not equal 100 percent because of rounding.

EXHIBIT 2.8

USE OF THE BASIC CALLS FOR SERVICE MODEL AS INPUT TO FURTHER ANALYSIS



SOURCE: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, *Managing Patrol Operations: Participant's Handbook*, by Donald F. Cawley et. al. (Washington, D.C.: University Research Corporation, 1977), p. 64.

- they can perform complex probability calculations that take into consideration both the random nature of demands for police service as well as the interaction of diverse factors affecting patrol performance.

There are some drawbacks, however. Departments must have the appropriate computer hardware, or (as in Springfield, Missouri) be able to buy time from another agency that has the right equipment.[14] The approaches may be costly, both in terms of gathering the requisite data and implementing an actual computer run. One department in our study, even with a computer expert on staff, reported that its software went into an infinite loop, costing several thousand dollars in rented computer time. Finally, departments may have to invest time and money in acquiring or training staff to work with the models. A basic familiarity with data processing concepts, the capability to work with an automated system, the ability to collect and organize data for calculations, and the ability to read and analyze output reports are essential staff skills.

For many types of routine tabulations, specialized programs such as PCAM, Hypercube, PATROL/PLAN, and BEAT/PLAN are not needed. SAS, the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), or any computer program that provides mean and standard deviation statistics and can compute crosstabulations, can be used to analyze workload and develop schedules.[15] The advantages to standard statistical packages are that (1) they are already installed on many university computers and are thus readily accessible; (2) some can be run on microcomputers; and (3) they are not expensive to run. While the specialized computer models do allow convenient interactive decision testing, this capability is not entirely lost with the application of SAS or SPSS. Once the basic data are collected and tabulated, various scenarios can be tested with a hand calculator.

Issues and Objectives

One of the underlying assumptions of patrol plan analysis models is that the police department management can articulate performance objectives for its field operations. *It cannot be overemphasized that the number of patrol units needed by day of week and shift is a function of these objectives.* For example, more patrol units are required to satisfy an objective of responding to calls in less than 3 minutes on average than an objective of responding in less than 5 minutes on average.

Dividing the work of patrol units into the following three general categories will provide a framework for developing performance objectives:

- Call For Service (CFS) Work
- Non- Call For Service (Non-CFS) Work
- Uncommitted Time

By way of review, CFS work is the amount of time a patrol unit devotes to handling citizen calls for service. Non-CFS work is the amount of time during which a patrol unit is occupied with activities other than calls for service. During this time, the unit is not available to respond to calls. Non-CFS work is defined by the department but typically includes activities such as administrative duties, self-initiated work, and meals. Uncommitted time is the remaining period during which the unit is not busy on a specific activity and is available for a citizen call for service.

Based on these definitions, several performance measures including, for example, average travel time, unit utilization, queue delay by priority, and average number of units available can be described. Police department managers have the responsibility of selecting the most appropriate measures for their patrol operations (e.g., response time) and then specifying objectives for the selected measures (e.g., three minute average response time to emergencies). Only when this step is accomplished can the analysis provide information of use to the department.

FOOTNOTES

1. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, *Patrol Allocation Methodology for Police Departments*, by Jan Chaiken (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, September 1975), p. 1.
2. National Science Foundation, Division of Advanced Productivity Research and Technology, *How to Set Up Shop for the Use of the Hypercube System*, by Allen D. Gill et. al. (St. Louis, MO: The Institute for Public Program Analysis, October 1977), p. 8.
3. The terms "units" or "patrol units" refer only to those persons assigned to basic patrol duty. While the tactical squad, detectives, and traffic officers may patrol and may respond to some calls, they are not thought of as patrol units per se, and, thus, are not considered in the discussion in this text unless otherwise specified. Supervisory patrol units are likewise not included among patrol units because they do not routinely respond to calls for service. However, because supervisors are often called upon to provide back-up on domestic disputes and assaults, departments may want to consider them in calculating unit utilization.
4. In this calculation, unit hours are the total patrol vehicle hours during any specified time period. For example, if there are 5 officers working on an 8 hour shift, and each patrol vehicle has one officer, then the unit hours for that shift equal 40.
5. David R. Scalf, "Manpower Deployment: An Alternative Approach," in *The Police Chief* (Gaithersburg, MD: International Association of Chiefs of Police, December 1978).
6. For additional information on sampling, see William G. Cochran, *Sampling Techniques* (New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, 1977).
7. The exhibit shows 6.3 units which is slightly higher than this calculation due to roundoff error.
8. For discussion of this calculation, see Jan M. Chaiken et. al., *Criminal Justice Models: An Overview* (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, October 1975).
9. U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, *Improving Patrol Productivity, Volume I: Routine Patrol* by William Gay, Theodore Scheil, and Stephen Schack (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1977), p.p. 29-30.
10. Friday and Saturday nights typically are busier than other evenings, with activity extending beyond the midnight hour, while Sunday afternoons and evenings frequently have fewer calls for service.
11. If the analysis shows that certain days of the week or hours of the day have unique workload demands, departments can deploy special overlap shifts or institute delayed reporting times. Many departments offer Sundays off as an incentive to officers working irregular or unpopular duty. For an in-depth discussion on scheduling, see U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, *Issues and Practices in Police Work Scheduling*, by William Stenzel and R. Michael Buren (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 1983).
12. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Police Task Force, *Police*, by Edward M. Davis (Chairman) et. al. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 202.
13. The calls for service workload approach can be used as a basis for evaluating and redesigning beat boundaries in an effort to balance workload, though again some caution is in order because of the absence of time expended data and data on traffic flow patterns and natural boundaries that might affect access to some areas.

    The first step in designing beat boundaries is to divide the jurisdiction into reporting areas, usually census tracts. Reporting areas are then numbered and a count of the incidents occurring in each reporting area is made. A data collection period of 28 days is normally sufficient but will not account for seasonal variability. Once the data are collected, individual reporting areas can be grouped into beats containing equal portions of work.

    Workload is likely to fluctuate across areas by hour of the day. That is, some areas will be busier during the morning hours than they are at night, while others will be busier at night than they are in the morning. Thus, the geographic assessment should be broken down by shifts so that the end result will be beat boundaries that correspond to temporal workload demands.
14. If a department is not automated and wishes to purchase or lease equipment for a patrol plan analysis, a systems analyst should be consulted. The police department management should be able to specify in detail exactly what it wants the automated sytem to produce—now and for the expected life of the system. The analyst will be able to recommend appropriate hardware and software based on the department's requirements.
15. For additional information on the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, see *SPSS[x] User's Guide: A Complete Guide to SPSS[x] Language and Operations*, by SPSS Inc. (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1983) or SPSS/PC for the IBM PC/XT by SPSS Inc., 444 North Michigan Ave., Chicago, IL.

Chapter 3: Addressing Single Issues

Introduction

The emergence of a single issue or problem can prompt the analysis of one feature of a police department's patrol plan. In fact, most evaluations do begin with a one-issue focus but frequently expand to a complete in-depth study of the patrol plan. This chapter examines individual issues associated with determining how many officers are needed to meet predefined objectives, developing officer schedules to match workload, forming beats for equal workload, and relieving workload from patrol officers. For discussion purposes, the examples have been simplified to illustrate the techniques for resolving the issues. In actual practice, several issues may have to be considered simultaneously and the number of possible alternative solutions may be large. Chapter Four addresses these more complex situations.

Before discussing some of the typical issues in patrol allocation planning, a brief look at how an issue can turn into a "non-issue" is in order. A good example is average response time to calls for service. Suppose that an analysis of the dispatch cards shows that the average response time is nine minutes—a figure which, in most jurisdictions, would be considered too high. A more relevant analysis should center on what the average response time is by call priority. It may be found that, on emergency calls, the average response time is less than two minutes, while the average for non-emergency calls is much greater. In fact, as will be discussed later, non-emergency calls may be delayed intentionally when the unit in the area of responsibility is busy. Determining the response time to emergency calls in this case reduces the problem to a non-issue. That is, the real objective in most departments is to have a rapid response to emergency calls, while a rapid response to non-emergency calls is not as important. If rapid response to emergency calls is already being achieved, then there is no response time problem even though the overall response time is high.

The Issue of Patrol Size

One of the most important questions which police department managers must address is, "How many officers are needed in the patrol force?" The experiences of a city in the northeastern portion of the country illustrate how this issue can be resolved. The department approached the problem of patrol size in an objective manner, beginning with the establishment of a key patrol plan objective on unit utilization and progressing in a systematic manner to an estimate of patrol size needed to meet this objective.

The question of patrol size arose in this city because of concurrent decreases in department strength over a ten year period and continued increases in calls for service. The police union had complained for several years that officers were becoming so busy on citizen calls for service that patrol crime prevention activities were being neglected. After considerable discussion on how busy patrol units should be on calls for service, the following objective was established:

- There should be sufficient units on duty so that the average unit utilization on calls for service will not exceed 30 percent.

In addition to this objective, several other key features of the patrol plan analysis were established:

- The determination of patrol size would be based on the call for service activities of the previous summer.
- The patrol force would switch to straight shifts, as opposed to rotating shifts.
- A mix of 70 percent one-officer and 30 percent two-officer units would be established for each shift.
- The Traffic Unit in the department would be merged into Patrol and all officers would handle traffic accidents.

There were specific reasons for prescribing each of these features. First, the summer months were particularly busy in previous years, and it was believed that there should be sufficient patrol personnel available during these months to handle the workload. A four-week period during August was selected for analysis. City representatives believed that straight shifts were more efficient and did not waste valuable patrol resources. The straight shifts were acceptable to the police union as long as shift selection was based on seniority and there was an opportunity to switch shifts every six months. Finally, the desire for a mix of one-officer and two-officer units was based on the types of calls which were being handled by the department; about 30 percent of the calls required two officers at the scene because of potential dangers.

Using this key objective and the other desired features of the patrol plan, Exhibit 3.1 shows the basic data for the four-week period under analysis and the calculations for determining the number of officers. The first portion of the exhibit shows the *total* number of initial calls for service, assists, and traffic accidents by shift for the four weeks, along with the average times for these activities

EXHIBIT 3.1

AN EXAMPLE OF DATA FOR DETERMINING PATROL FORCE SIZE

	Midnights	Days	Evenings
1. Workload Data			
Calls For Service	1,027	1,614	2,059
Average Time (Min.)	32 min.	28 min.	33 min.
Assists	225	273	463
Average Time (Min.)	22 min	20 min.	18 min.
Traffic Accidents	109	129	150
Average Time (Min.)	63 min.	58 min.	60 min.
2. Hours of Work For Entire 4-Week Period	769 hrs.	969 hrs.	1,421 hrs.
Average Hours of Work Per Shift	27.5 hrs.	34.6 hrs	50.8 hrs.
3. Units Needed for 30 Percent Average Utilization	12 units	15 units	21 units
4. Number of 1-Officer Units	8 units	11 units	15 units
Number of 2-Officer Units	4 units	4 units	6 units
5. Number of Officers Needed Per Shift	16 officers	19 officers	27 officers
6. Total Number of Officers Needed (Relief Factor =	35 officers	42 officers	59 officers

for each shift. Traffic accidents have been listed separately to measure the impact of merging the Traffic Unit into the patrol force.

With these activities and average times, the total amount of work for the patrol force amounts to about 769 hours for the midnight-8 a.m. period; 969 hours for the 8 a.m.-4 p.m. period; and 1,421 hours for the 4 p.m.-midnight shift. Since a 28-day period was being studied, the average work *per shift* amounts to 27.5 hours; 34.6 hours; and 50.8 hours, respectively.

To calculate the number of units needed to meet the desired objective, the formula on unit utilization, as presented in Chapter Two, must be reworked to solve for the number of units:

$$\frac{\text{Average Hours of Work Per Shift}}{(\text{Shift Length})(\text{Unit Utilization})} = \text{Number of Units Needed}$$

For the midnight to 8 a.m. shift, the calculation is as follows:

$$\frac{27.5 \text{ hours}}{(8 \text{ hours})(30\%)} = 11.5 \text{ units}$$

This answer must be rounded to 12 units since fractions of units are not possible. Similar calculations for the other two shifts give results of 15 units and 21 units, respectively. Exhibit 3.1 shows the number of officers needed for these shifts under the decision of a 70%-30% split between one-officer/two-officer units.

The final line in the exhibit multiplies the number of officers needed by the department's relief factor of 2.2 to give a total of 35 officers for the midnight-8 a.m. shift; 42 officers for the 8 a.m.-4 p.m. shift; and 59 officers for the 4 p.m.-midnight shift. A total of 136 officers would

therefore be required to meet the objective of an average 30 percent unit utilization.

In summary, a basic approach to solving the problem, "How many officers are needed?" can be generalized from this example as follows:

Step 1. Set an objective for patrol performance; in this example, the performance measure of unit utilization was selected.

Step 2. Select a time period to be analyzed.

Step 3. Determine the call for service workload for this time period.

Step 4. Calculate the number of units needed based on the workload and the selected objective.

Step 5. Calculate the number of on-duty officers needed per shift based on the required mix of one-officer/two-officer units.

Step 6. Multiply by the relief factor to obtain the total number of officers needed.

By following this step-by-step approach, the department in our example was able to show that it needed an increase in authorized officer strength to meet its desired objective. If an objective other than unit utilization had been selected, the same steps would have been followed to determine the number of units needed, but the calculations would have been different.

While this generalized approach does offer a solution to the problem at hand, it has several shortcomings that must be considered. Most importantly, the selection of a single objective, such as unit utilization, to frame patrol size does not reflect tradeoffs between objectives. For example, the analysis does not estimate the average travel time to calls for each shift. The allocation of 12 units on the midnight-8 a.m. shift may result in unacceptably high average travel time to incidents. As will be discussed in the next chapter, several objectives can be established and the number of units needed to meet all objectives can be calculated. Usually, this more comprehensive approach to determining the number of officers needed should be followed, even though it may require more detailed data collection and more sophisticated analysis.

Selection of a 30 percent unit utilization objective is also subject to criticism. While many departments have established objectives of 30 to 40 percent unit utilization, there is no universal rule to guide the choice of a percentage; in the above example, the department had no formal justification for its selection of 30 percent. Before determining specific objectives, a department should consider the "big picture" of patrol resource allocation and should have specific plans for the entire shift of units. Some time will be required for administrative duties such as roll calls, court appearances, and meals. Time for other programs, such as increased investigative time and directed patrol, should also be considered. In sum, substantial attention should be given to defining what the police department's mangers want to achieve with a complete patrol plan. These desires should then be reflected in specific objectives for the analysis.

Picking one limited time period for analysis can present problems, too. The selection of the summer season for analysis in the above example has the advantage of planning for the "worst case." Because of the experiences of this city in prior summers, the choice was a good one; however, it does raise the question of what happens during the remainder of the year when there is less call for service activity. During the slower months, other activities, such as providing in-service training or scheduling more crime prevention programs, could be pursued. The one-month approach taken in this example reinforces the need for a complete plan for using patrol resources.

Another decision in this example that is open to question is the mix of one-officer and two-officer units. Research into this question offers little assistance, since support can be found for having all one-officer units, all two-officer units, or a mixture. The mix chosen by our example city was reasonable. That distribution was based on the types of calls handled by the department, with the assumption that potentially serious calls, such as fights and disturbances, would be handled by two-officer units. In addition, the geographic distribution of these serious calls was studied and the two-officer units were assigned to areas with the more serious calls.

Finally, the impact of officer scheduling was not considered in this example. A good schedule may mean that fewer officers are needed to meet the objective than shown in Exhibit 3.1. The issue of officer scheduling is discussed in the next section of this chapter.

There are several ways to improve upon the calculations in Exhibit 3.1 and thereby lessen the shortcomings cited above. For example, the use of the prior summer's workload overlooks the possibility that more calls may occur in the next summer. If the history of the city shows, for example, a five percent increase per year, the base numbers on calls for service in the exhibit should be increased by this amount. The effect would then be a five percent increase in the number of officers needed.

Another alternative is to determine the number of units needed by four-hour periods and day of week. The midnight-4 a.m. period is almost always busier than the 4 a.m.-8 a.m. period, and weekends are usually busier than weekdays. A more complete analysis by four-hour segments during the week may have resulted in slightly different results than shown in the exhibit.

Even with these criticisms, the general step-by-step approach presented in this example holds true. Its application simply requires a department to adapt it to the local issues and patrol features under consideration.

The Issue of Officer Scheduling

The work schedule of officers is a common issue in patrol operations. The police department in Springfield, Missouri, under its Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program (ICAP) provides an example of how a department can improve its officer scheduling. In Springfield, the officers worked a fixed shift schedule which meant that they did not rotate through the shifts on a regular basis. The objective of the department was to:

- Develop a schedule that proportionately matches workload with officers.

In fact, the advantage of the fixed shift plan in Springfield was that this objective could be partially achieved by transferring officers from one shift to another.

Prior to the ICAP program, there was an imbalance between the proportion of officers assigned on the watches and the proportion of workload for the watches. As part of the ICAP program, changes were made in the schedule to match the number of officers with the workload demand. Table 3-1 summarizes the improvements which were accomplished.

This table shows that, prior to the ICAP program, the patrol officers were almost equally scheduled across the three watches. During the ICAP program, the distribution of officers was more in line with their workload. If the old plan had been retained, a difference of 19.5 percentage points between the workload and the officer schedule would have continued. With the new schedule, this difference was reduced to 10.9 percent. The table also shows that even more improvements could be made by shifting personnel from the night watch to the day watch.

After determining the number of officers that should be assigned on a given shift, the next step is to develop actual work schedules for the officers. A particularly useful microcomputer program called SCHEDULE/PLAN was developed by The Institute for Public Program Analysis (TIPPA) for the specific purpose of generating officer schedules. While SCHEDULE/PLAN is available for microcomputers, the schedules which it produces can also be developed with a manual procedure. That is, the SCHEDULE/PLAN program duplicates a manual process of scheduling.[1]

One option of this program allows the user to provide the workload by day of week for a given shift and the number of officers to be scheduled. The program then determines the schedule which best matches officers to workload, given that all officers must have two days off in a row. As an example, suppose that seven officers are to be scheduled for the day watch and that the workload as measured by the number of last year's calls for service during this watch was as follows:

Day	Number of Calls	Percent
Sunday	353	10.3
Monday	546	15.9
Tuesday	513	14.9
Wednesday	500	14.5
Thursday	518	15.1
Friday	576	16.7
Saturday	433	12.6

This information serves as input to the SCHEDULE/PLAN program. The output from the SCHEDULE/PLAN program then provides the following schedule for the seven officers:

Officers	Sun.	Mon.	Tues.	Wed.	Thurs.	Fri.	Sat.
1	X	O	O	X	X	X	X
1	X	X	O	O	X	X	X
1	X	X	X	O	O	X	X
1	X	X	X	X	O	O	X
3	O	X	X	X	X	X	O
On-Duty	4	6	5	5	5	6	4
Percent	11.43	17.14	14.29	14.29	14.29	17.14	11.43

TABLE 3-1

SCHEDULE CHANGES IN SPRINGFIELD, MISSOURI

	Workload	Distribution of Officers Prior to ICAP Program	Distribution of Officers During ICAP Program
Day Watch 7 a.m. - 3 p.m.	28.5%	35.0%	23.1%
Afternoon Watch 3 p.m. - 11 p.m.	42.2%	32.5%	43.5%
Night Watch 11 p.m. - 7 a.m.	29.2%	32.5%	33.4%
Total Percentage Deviation Between Workload and Staffing		19.5% Points	10.9% Points

SOURCE: Neal R. Berger and William G. Gay, *A Case Study Evaluation of the Implementation of the Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program in Springfield, Missouri* (Washington, D.C.: University City Science Center, March 1981), p. 77.

In this figure, an "X" represents a day worked and an "0" represents a day off. Three officers have Saturday-Sunday off; one officer has Monday-Tuesday; one officer has Tuesday-Wednesday; one officer has Wednesday-Thursday; and one officer has Thursday-Friday. The department management has the responsibility of determining which officers are assigned to these individual slots.

With 7 officers, there are 35 officer-days available each week; the percentages across the bottom of the table show the distribution of the officer days. The greatest percentage of officers are scheduled on the two days (Monday and Friday) with the greatest percentage of workload. Comparing these percentages with the workload data shows that the total deviation is only 6.74 percentage points, a good match between personnel and workload.

In summary, one scheduling approach for police departments with fixed shifts is to (1) allocate officers across the three shifts based on workload percentages and (2) develop officer schedules which match the percentage of officers on each shift with the day of week workload. There are, however, many other alternatives to developing officer schedules besides the fixed bracket approach just described. The report, *Issues and Practices in Police Work Scheduling* by Stenzel and Buren, is an excellent source which summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of different types of schedules currently in use around the country.[2]

As with the previous example, the approach in this example has the disadvantage of not showing the effects of these changes on other patrol performance measures such as travel time and unit utilization. In a complete analysis, the changes in these measures should be determined. In addition, it is advisable to conduct an evaluation of whether officer productivity has increased. Some of the elements in this type of evaluation might be:

- average number of hours of sick leave;
- average response time to emergency calls;
- number of Part I and Part II arrests;
- number of Part I clearances;
- number of traffic citations;
- number of officer separations from the department;
- number of neighborhood group meetings attended by field patrol personnel.

Such a study should compare these elements prior to and after implementation of the new schedule.

The Issue of Unequal Workload

Another issue frequently raised in police departments concerns whether the patrol beats can be changed to provide a more equitable distribution of workload among the patrol units. As discussed in Chapter Two, the term "workload" can include a variety of activities. A common approach is to define workload as the amount of time that patrol units spend on citizen calls for service. Another approach is to expand this definition to include crime prevention

activities and other self-initiated activities related to patrol. Before studying the issue of unequal workload, the appropriate definition of workload must be identified. Assuming that this has been accomplished, the following discussion shows the steps involved in redesigning patrol beats.

The main data collection effort for a beat redesign is to develop workload statistics by *reporting areas*, defined as small geographic areas which can be combined to form beats. The reporting areas may be census tracts, square grids, or some other geographic subdivision developed by the city or the police department. The advantage of using census tracts is that subsequent analysis may be performed on the relationship of beat activity with demographic statistics from the most recent census.

The tabulation of workload by reporting areas is a straightforward process in which a period of time, such as the previous year or the previous summer, is selected and workload statistics are generated for each reporting area based on the address of the incidents. The percentage of workload for each reporting area is then calculated to determine the distribution of the work. As stated in Chapter Two, the workload included in this analysis should be only that of the basic patrol units and should not include calls for supervisors, traffic units, or other specialized units.

Once the tabulations are made, the reporting areas can be combined to form new beats, usually with the aim of equalizing workload. In practice, there is an underlying objective to alter the existing beats as little as possible and still provide a more equitable workload distribution. For managers, the revised beat design is more likely to gain approval if the amount of change is small, and for patrol officers, a shorter learning period is needed if the new beats have few changes.

New beats can also be developed with the assistance of computer models, such as the Hypercube or BEAT/PLAN programs which are discussed more fully in the next chapter. These models were designed for the specific purpose of assisting in the development of beats. To work with these models, the user must already have a beat configuration in mind. The program is given a description of the design, along with the workload data, and it then estimates measures of patrol performances. The advantages of this approach are that the program can calculate a variety of performance measures, in addition to measures of equalized workload, and can show the effects of revisions on the beat design.

With either approach to the redesign of the beats, the question arises as to what is meant by "equal workload." There are two common measures:

- Deviations from the average.
- Difference between the busiest and least busy beats.

To show the use of these measures, consider the following hypothetical example which gives the percentages of workload for two proposed five-beat designs of the same geographical command:

Design No. 1		Design No. 2	
Beat Designation	Percentage Workload	Beat Designation	Percentage Workload
Beat A	22%	Beat A'	25%
Beat B	18%	Beat B'	21%
Beat C	15%	Beat C'	20%
Beat D	22%	Beat D'	19%
Beat E	23%	Beat E'	15%
	100%		100%

With 5 beats, the perfect design under an objective of equalized workload would have each beat with exactly 20 percent of the workload. Deviations from the average of 20 percent are a measure of how equal the workloads are. Under Design 1, Beat A is two percentage points *above* the average; Beat B is two percentage points *below* average; Beat C is five percent *below* average; Beat D is two percentage points *above* average; and Beat E is three percentage points *above* average. Over all 5 beats, the total amount of deviation is 14 percentage points or an "average deviation" of 2.8 percentage points. With Design 2, the average deviation is 2.4 percentage points. With this measure, the decision would be to implement Design 2, since it has the lower average deviation.

The other measure of equal workload is the difference between the busiest and least busy beats. In Design 1, the busiest beat is Beat E with 23 percent of the workload and the least busy beat is Beat C with 15 percent, for a difference of 8 percentage points. With Design 2, the difference is 10 percentage points. Therefore, with this measure, Design 1 should be selected.

These examples illustrate that the definition of "equal workload" can affect the eventual decision of which beat plan is best. If management is concerned with the overall picture, then the measure of average deviation should be selected since it reflects this concern. If, on the other hand, management is concerned that no beat deviate greatly from the average, then the second measure should be used.

In this discussion, it has been assumed that there were no other issues to be considered. That is, no changes in the number of personnel, officer scheduling, or other aspects of the patrol plan were contemplated. This assumption is realistic, since it is frequently the case that the number of personnel cannot be changed and that the officers' schedule is also fixed. A disadvantage of addressing only one issue is that undesirable consequences may occur. For example, with either of the above proposed designs, some beats may cover large geographical areas because of low activity. The result may be that the travel time in these areas will be much greater than the overall average. In the analysis for this issue, it may be advisable to address the impact on the average travel time as a part of the study. That is, the initial issue of equal workload may lead to a consideration of other factors in the patrol plan.

The Issue of Relieving Officer Workload

While several factors have affected the operations of police departments and other government agencies in the past few years, fiscal constraints have had the greatest impact on police services. Cutbacks in funding have been the primary reason most police departments have placed increasing demands on officers. As a result of these financial problems, police departments have faced layoffs and hiring freezes at the same time as they have had to deal with attrition, increasing numbers of calls for service, and increasing accountability requirements.

The need to provide services in a time of diminished resources has forced law enforcement agencies to ask some critical questions such as:

- How can the agency maintain a desirable level and quality of service when financial support is limited or being reduced?
- Must service be reduced, and, if so, where?
- How will citizens react to changes in services?

To effectively cope under these circumstances, which Charles Levine has called "cutback management,"[3] police administrators need to reevaluate traditional methods of service delivery. Levine stresses the need to question time-honored approaches in operations and administration and to formulate flexible solutions to problems of productivity and effectiveness.

In addition to fiscal difficulties, there are other important reasons why police departments have become interested in relieving officer workload. First, studies have shown improvements both in productivity and officer morale when inequities in workload are minimized and when fluctuations are evened out.[4] Second, in order to introduce new programs, such as directed patrol and Managing Criminal Investigations, police departments must recapture blocks of officer patrol time. Both of these programs require the commitment of more time on the part of patrol officers and cannot be implemented successfully without reducing or restructuring officers' workload. Furthermore, many of these innovative programs are popular with officers because they increase the proportion of time spent on serious police work and direct "nuisance calls" to be handled in other ways.

Each of the alternatives that will be discussed challenges traditional methods of handling calls for services. When properly implemented, however, all have been found to relieve officer workload and improve productivity without adversely affecting citizen satisfaction. Most of them require expansion and formalization of processes that many departments are already using on an informal or sporadic basis and, as such, they do not represent wide departures from current operating procedures.

Alternatives to Traditional Mobile Response

There are a number of alternatives available to reduce officer workload and increase productivity. Nearly all of these alternatives to traditional mobile response contain some mechanism to produce more time for officers to perform other activities. They have been developed and tested by the National Institute of Justice under programs such as Differential Police Response (DPR), Managing Patrol Operations (MPO), Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program (ICAP), and Managing Criminal Investigations (MCI), and they include:

- Telephone Report Units (known variously as TeleServe Units, Expeditor Units, Telecom);
- delayed mobile response (stacking calls, setting appointments);
- referral to other sections (inside or outside the department);
- walk-in reports;
- use of non-sworn personnel in lieu of patrol officers (e.g., civilian evidence technicians, animal control officers, community service specialists).

One of the major purposes of developing alternative response strategies is that those calls requiring rapid mobile response can receive priority, while other calls are handled by methods which both satisfy the citizen and accomplish the needs of the department. Each is intended to be used in addition to providing immediate mobile response for handling the emergencies which account for only 5 to 10 percent of all calls.

A prioritization scheme for choosing the appropriate response to all calls is integral to the development of call alternatives. The system of prioritization at police departments that have developed Telephone Report Units, delayed mobile responses, and other alternatives is generally based on a number of factors, including: the time of the incident (in-progress, just occurred, or cold); the presence or absence of injuries (actual, probable, or potential); and the appropriate response mode for that particular event category (e.g., immediate mobile, delayed, telephone, walk-in). Many of the departments that have implemented call alternatives have found that successful implementation required the support and understanding of all staff, especially in Communications. Also, steering or advisory committees, made up of staff from all levels, guided the implementation effort.

Telephone report units. One of the most effective call alternative strategies for relieving officer workload is the Telephone Report Unit (TRU), in which reports are handled over the telephone rather than by a patrol officer dispatched to the scene. A TRU typically consists of several call takers, often light duty officers or civilian employees, who record reports over the phone, generally during the day and evening. A police department must consider what the most appropriate staffing pattern is for a TRU. This decision usually requires a special study by the department to resolve how busy the Unit will be, what the availability of limited duty personnel is expected to be, whether the city would authorize additional civilian personnel, and other related questions.

In order for a Telephone Report Unit to operate effectively, several procedures must first be established, including:

(1) A call classification system and prioritization scheme so that call takers can properly classify incoming calls and choose the appropriate response.

(2) A method by which calls will be diverted from Communications to the TRU.

(3) A training program on the new procedures and call classification scheme for call takers and dispatchers.

(4) A training program for patrol officers and personnel from other departments who must be familiar with the new procedures.

Depending on the types of calls that are handled by TRU, they have been found to record from 35 to 45 percent of all reports taken by a department.[5] Citizens' satisfaction with police service as a result of having their reports taken over the phone has not suffered, and the workload relieved from officers has allowed large blocks of time to be recaptured for other activities.

The most thorough implementation of Telephone Report Units and accompanying changes in communications took place as part of the National Institute of Justice's Differential Police Response project in Greensboro, North Carolina; Garden Grove, California; and Toledo, Ohio. All three sites first established call classification schemes which provided information on the nature of the incident, time of its occurrence, presence of injuries, amount of property damage or loss, and type of assistance requested. Flip charts for each code were then developed to assist call takers in asking proper questions for that type of incident. After asking a series of structured questions and using the flip charts, the call taker could decide the most appropriate classification and response, ranging from an immediate dispatch of a patrol unit to non-mobile responses such as TRU or walk-in reports. Each site determined which types of calls could be handled adequately over the phone. Garden Grove, for example, selected the following types of reports: missing persons; runaways (over the age of 14); petty thefts; vehicle burglaries; grand thefts; simple assaults (suspect not at the scene); indecent exposures (victim left the scene); traffic accidents (victim came to the department); vandalism; and incident-information reports.

The increase in productivity attributed to the TRU has varied as a result of the types of calls the TRU takes. Under LEAA's Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program, at least 20 departments set up Telephone Report Units. Results from the evaluations of some of these TRUs show that they handled from 10.5 percent of a department's workload in Fairfax County, Virginia, to 19 percent on the first watch and 13 percent overall in Springfield, Missouri; 15 percent of all calls in Nashville, Tennessee; and 23.1 percent of all reports in Virginia Beach, Virginia.[6] Higher productivity was found for TRUs established in Albuquerque, New Mexico, Charlotte, North Carolina, and Sacramento, California.[7] The TRUs in these three departments handled between 30 and 40 percent of their total crime reports. In Garden Grove, California, Toledo, Ohio, and Greensboro, North Carolina, TRUs were found to handle 30 percent of all reports shortly after implementation, growing to 35 percent within a few months.[8]

In addition to the volume of work that Telephone Report Units can handle, they afford major savings in the amount of time taken to complete a report. Nashville's TeleServ Unit handled calls, on the average, in 16 minutes, compared to 34 minutes average time for a patrol car.[9] In the Hartford, Connecticut, Police Department, which implemented a Managing Calls for Service Program modeled on the ICAP program, it was found that a TeleServ Unit, staffed exclusively with light duty officers, provided the department with a savings of 7.57 work years in just a

year's time. Furthermore, administrators in Hartford figured that, given the savings on vehicle maintenance costs and supervisory requirements with the TeleServe Unit, the annual savings afforded by the Unit is $200,000 per year.[10]

As a result of this savings in time and cost, many departments have shown large increases in patrol officer self-initiated activity and arrests. When the development of TRUs and other call alternatives is accompanied by a directed patrol activity program, the increases have been most striking. For example, after increasing directed patrol efforts through time made available by its TRU, Hartford experienced a 55 percent increase in stops of suspicious persons, resulting in a 129 percent increase in arrests. The police department also enjoyed a 34.5 percent increase in officer initiated stops of vehicles for traffic violations, with an accompanying increase in arrests of 246 percent.[11]

Delayed response. A delayed mobile response means that the presence of a police officer is required at the scene, but the incident is of a sufficiently minor nature that a rapid dispatch is not necessary. Types of calls that may fall into this category are larcenies and burglaries that occurred several days previous to the request for service, unoccupied suspicious vehicle calls, and vandalism calls. Virtually all Communications Centers in police departments have policies for delaying calls for service. In the past, these policies were applied only if all patrol units were busy. Now, the current trend is to develop formal delayed response strategies which specify what types of calls can be delayed, under what circumstances, and for how long. Delayed response is generally based on a number of factors, such as the seriousness of the call; time of the incident (whether in-progress, just occurred, or cold); presence or absence of injuries (actual, probable, or potential); and amount of damages. Under appropriate circumstances, a dispatch may be delayed until the patrol unit in the area of responsibility is available to take the call. Most departments' policies state a maximum delay time, such as 30 or 45 minutes, after which the closest available unit is assigned to the call.

While the delayed mobile response does not directly reduce officer workload, it does help make the existing workload more manageable. It increases the likelihood that officers will receive calls in their area of assignment, resulting in fewer cross-beat dispatches and making officers more aware of activities in their assigned areas. Further, an officer does not have to be interrupted while on another assignment, such as another call or a directed patrol activity. Instead the officer can complete the assignment and then handle the delayed call.

In Greensboro, North Carolina, calls falling into the Priority 2 category are held up to 30 minutes or until the appropriate patrol unit returns to service, whichever comes first. If, after 30 minutes, the unit is still unavailable, the call can be assigned to a unit from an adjoining beat. In Greensboro, a patrol unit should always arrive within 45 minutes of the time a call is taken. Incidents in this category include those which involve minor injuries; those in which an injured victim has been removed from the scene and is already receiving medical attention; property damage incidents; and any other situations where the immediate presence of a sworn officer is not required but an officer at the scene is desirable. Greensboro found that over 30 percent of all of its dispatched calls were eligible for a delayed mobile response.[12]

In every delayed response call, it is imperative that the call taker inform the citizen that an officer will not arrive immediately but within some stated timeframe (e.g., one hour or 30 minutes). Call takers may be reluctant to inform citizens that it may be an hour before a patrol car arrives. However, if citizens expect an officer will arrive sooner than he does, this will lead to citizen dissatisfaction. In those Differential Police Response sites where this was noted to be a problem, once the call takers correctly informed the citizen as to the expected police arrival time, citizen satisfaction was no longer adversely affected.

Use of non-sworn personnel/referrals/elimination of response. Referral of calls to more appropriate departments or agencies can also offer a significant reduction in officer workload. Similarly, services that have been traditionally offered by the police department, but that are not necessarily law enforcement work, can be eliminated and thereby provide substantial recovery of patrol time.

As part of the Differential Police Response (DPR) project, civilian members of the Greensboro Police Department were trained to take reports that had been routinely handled by sworn officers. These civilians included evidence technicians, community service specialists, animal control officers, and parking enforcement officers. (Some departments have police reserves that can be used for these assignments.) The citizen was always informed by the Communications Center call taker that a civilian specialist would be dispatched to take the report. If the call could be more appropriately handled by a specialized police unit, such as the Juvenile Bureau, the citizen was informed that someone from that unit would call them back. Call takers were also trained in making referrals to appropriate community service agencies in the city.

Elimination of an on-scene response to certain types of calls can offer a substantial savings in patrol time. For

example, in Greensboro, prior to the DPR project, the patrol officers were handling an average of 100 escort calls per month, where businesses requested escorts to make bank deposits. Under the DPR project, these calls were virtually eliminated, with a resultant savings of about 50 hours of patrol time per month.[13] The police department contacted all the businesses prior to the discontinuation of the service to explain the need for this policy change.. While there were some complaints, most merchants understood the problems of the police department and readily agreed to the elimination of the escort service.

Similarly, Hartford found that a great deal of time went into responding to open fire hydrants, electrical inspections, and various other activities that could be more appropriately handled by other city departments. As part of its Managing Calls for Service Program, these non-police functions were transferred to the Housing and Fire Departments. In addition, the police department trained its Communications staff in crisis intervention techniques, general rules on landlord/tenant relations, diagnoses of emergency medical problems, and other areas, so that they could more accurately make referrals and choose alternative call responses.

Walk-In reports. Requesting a citizen to come to the police department in person to fill out a report offers yet another method to reduce officer workload. Frequently, the types of calls handled by walk-in reports could be handled by the Telephone Report Unit, but in order to reduce the workload in TRUs, the call taker can inform citizens that for certain problems, such as lost property, their report can be taken in person by coming to the department.

FOOTNOTES

1. For a discussion of this process, see U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, *Work Schedule Design Handbook: Methods for Assigning Employees' Work Shifts and Days Off* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, August 1978).

2. U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, *Issues and Practices in Police Work Scheduling*, by William Stenzel and R. Michael Buren (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 1983).

3. Charles H. Levine, *Cutback Management in the Criminal Justice System: A Manual of Readings* (Washington, D.C.: University Research Corporation, 1982).

4. See Berger and Gay, *op. cit.*; J. Thomas McEwen, *An Evaluation Report on the Managing Patrol Operations Field Test* (Alexandria, VA: Research Management Associates, Inc., 1982); and J. Thomas McEwen, *An Evaluation Report on Differential Police Response* (Alexandria, VA: Research Management Associates, Inc., 1984).

5. See J. Thomas McEwen, *op. cit.*, 1984.

6. Major Carroll D. Buracker, "Tele-Serv," in the *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, Vol. 47, No. 1 (January 1978), p.p. 6-10; Berger and Gay, *op. cit.*; John F. Schnelle et. al., *A Comprehensive Evaluation of a Personnel Time-Efficiency Program in a Metropolitan Police Department: An Organizational Behavior Perspective* (Nashville, TN: Nashville, Tennessee, Police Department and Middle Tennessee State University, 1981); and Virginia Beach, Virginia, Police Department, *Telephone Reporting Unit: Analysis of Its Structure and Operation* (1979), an unpublished report.

7. J. Thomas McEwen, *An Evaluation Report on the Managing Patrol Operations Field Test* (Alexandria, VA: Research Management Associates, Inc., 1982).

8. J. Thomas McEwen, *An Evaluation Report on Differential Police Response* (Alexandria, VA: Research Management Associates, Inc., 1984).

9. John F. Schnelle et. al., *op. cit.*

10. Hartford, Connecticut, Police Department, *Managing Calls for Police Services* (June 1981), an unpublished report.

11. *Ibid.*

12. J. Thomas McEwen, *op. cit.*, 1984. 14. Ibid.

13. *Ibid.*.

SESSION 8

A PATROL DEPLOYMENT PLAN: A CASE STUDY FOR SMALL GROUPS

Summary

In this session, a patrol deployment plan derived from real data in a medium sized urban police department (approximately 350 employees) will be presented.

The plan will be presented as a case study for your small group.

Using the case study, each group will perform the same task which is to analyze the study and the assumptions that are implicit in the data.

From the group analysis, the group must agree on ways to respond to the fact that the local government will not be able to fund or support the 23 patrol units that are listed as the required number of units in the case study.

Therefore, your analysis must be able to produce a deployment plan that will, in effect, be able to deploy only 15 units...or a reduction in the number listed in the case study plan.

CASE STUDY

This agency serves a population of about 155,000 persons in a police jurisdiction of about 17 square miles.

In 1985, there were about 265 sworn and about 85 nonsworn employees.

An analysis of the average manyear is as follows for sworn personnel per shift:

The work shift is 8 hours.

Total hours needed to staff a shift: 365 days x 8 hours: 2,920 hours

Total available hours per sworn officer on shift per year: 1,600 hours

Relief factor, therefore, is: 1.82

Calculations for <u>availability</u> are as follows:

Days Off	832 hours	(104 x 8)
Vacation	80	(10 x 8)
Sick	72	(9 x 8)
Injury	24	(3 x 8)
Lt Duty	24	(3 x 8)
Comp Time	24	(3 x 8)
Holidays	80	(10 x 8)
LWOP	8	(1 x 8)
Discipline	8	(1 x 8)
Admin Leave	8	(1 x 8)
Training	160	(20 x 8)
Total	1,320 hours	(165 days)

1,320 minus 2,920 = 1,600 hours or 200 days is the equivalent of a manyear of work. This translates into a relief factor of 1.82.

For every unit to be covered in a calendar year (365 days) of a given shift (8 hours), the agency needs to deploy 1.82 persons per unit need.

Deployment Plan:
Busiest Shift: 1600 - 2400

Agency decides to develop its deployment plan by using data from the busiest shift and the busiest month of the year. In this case, the shift is 1600 - 2400; the busiest month of the year was August with 2,315 dispatched calls for service.

The steps the agency followed are as follows:

1. 2,315 CFS (August: base month/busiest month)
2. x 12 months to extrapolate for the coming year
3. = 27,780 CFS projected for next 12 months
4. x .05 forecasted increase for next 12 months (5%)
5. = 1,389 + 27,780 = 29,169 total forecasted CFS
6. 29,169 total CFS
7. x .75 which is calculated as the 45 minute processing time needed to respond to and complet a single CFS. 45 minutes is .75 of an hour.
8. = 21,876.75 hours needed to process all forecasted CFS
9. x .66 or 66% utilization time needed for non CFS work. Agency policy is that 1/3 of shift work or 33% is to be used in CFS work and 2/3 or 66% is to be used in non CFS work by patrol.
10. = 14,438.65 hours needed to do non CFS work
11. = 21,876.75 hours CFS + 14,438.65 hours non CFS work = 36,315.10 total hours of work needed to be done in next 12 months
12. = 36,315.10 divided by one manyear in hours or 1,600 hours =
13. 22.69 or 23 units needed to be deployed during the 1600 - 2400 shift each day of the next twelve months.

The agency policy is to respond to every call for service by a mobile response.

YOUR TASK IS TO DEVELOP A PLAN THAT WILL DEPLOY NO MORE THAN 15 UNITS IN THIS SHIFT.

NOTES

SESSION 9

WHAT DO MANAGERS WANT PATROL UNITS TO DO WHEN DEPLOYED?

Summary

In this session, a presentation will be given that focuses on the essential question: What is Patrol? What should Patrol do? How should I think, as a manager, about patrol planning, operations, and evaluation?

In effect, these three questions can be reduced to the one question that forms the title of this session.

Several interlocking themes and ideas form the flow of the presenttion:

- Crime analysis as the process by which information about crime or problems that need to be addressed by patrol operations;
- The issue of preventive versus directed patrol;
- The issue of uncommitted patrol time;
- The prospect of redirecting patrol time so that directed or managed patrol operations are done in and efficient and effective manner;
- Examples of Directed Patrol Programs
- Some observations on specialized patrol wherein units and personnel are freed from calls-for-service responsibilities in order to perform other duties associated with problem solving and crime suppression and interdiction.

The materials in the text discuss each of these logically related issues.

CRIME ANALYSIS

In 1973, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals urged that:

> Every police department should improve its crime analysis capability by utilizing information provided by its information system within the department. Crime analysis may include the utilization of the following:
>
> 1. Methods of operation of individual criminals;
> 2. Pattern recognition;
> 3. Field interrogation and arrest data;
> 4. Crime report data;
> 5. Incident report information;
> 6. Dispatch information; and,
> 7. Traffic reports, both accidents and citations.

These elements must be carefully screened for information that should be routinely recorded for crime analysis.

The effective and efficient use of patrol resources (generally 60-70% of total department strength) is dependent upon the commitment to a crime (problem) analysis capability. Without the information/recommendations provided by such a unit, it is unlikely that the large amount of non-committed time will be productively used.

WHAT IS CRIME ANALYSIS

"Crime Analysis is a set of systematic analytical processes directed towards predicting criminal trends (in both individual and aggregate situations) for the purpose of reducing crime in a cost-effective manner." (California Crime Techological Research Foundation, Training Workbook: The Crime Analysis Process, LEAA, 1975).

"Crime Analysis is the process of systematically examining recent crime incidents and criminal behavior in an effort to identify crime patterns and characteristics so as to permit the effective deployment of personnel and resources and the adoption of appropriate strategies and tactics." (Improving Patrol Productivity.)

REASONS FOR FORMALIZING CRIME ANALYSIS PROCESS

- Increases objectivity;
- Facilitates better coordination between operational units;
- Assigns responsibility for the analytical function;
- Promotes inter- and intra-agency communication;
- Reduces time required to determine patterns; and
- Improves capability to identify trends.

FIVE BASIC COMPONENTS OF CRIME ANALYSIS PROCESS

- Data collection and collation;
- Data analysis;
- Data output (reports);
- Feedback and;
- Evaluation of patrol strategies.

PERFORMANCE OUTCOMES OF CRIME ANALYSIS

- Increase the number of cases cleared by arrest;
- Provide investigative leads to detectives;
- Improve operational data for patrol operations;
- Furnish support data to public awareness and involvement programs;
- Supply enforcement related data to urban planning, building, permits and codes, transportation systems, construction, etc.;
- Identify evolving or existent crime patterns;
- Provide supporting data for recommended crime control programs; and
- Furnish trend data for law enforcement planning, targeting, budgeting, and resource allocation.

COLLECTION - ANALYSIS - DISTRIBUTION




INPUT
THROUGHPUT
OUTPUT
DATA BASE
• Patrol
• Investigative
• Special investigative
• Support services
• Outside sources
CRIME ANALYSIS
• Strategy information
• Crime pattern/ trend information
• Known offender information
• Crime overviews and general information
• Wanted/arrested information
• Evaluation of strategy results

CRIME ANALYSIS - TYPES OF REPORTS ISSUED

- Crime trends;
- Geographic temporal patterns;
- Crime specific overviews;
- Modus operandi (category and individual);
- Known offender monitoring;
- Daily crime listings and commentaries;
- "Wanted" person information; and
- Special crime reports.

CRIME SPECIFIC OVERVIEW CONTENT

- Facts of problem;
- Facets to be considered;
- Modus operandi by criminal category;
- Property disposal possibilities;
- Develop operational objectives for response program;
- Suspect information; and
- Victim information.

EVALUATION OF CRIME ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES

- Promptness of problem identification;
- Completeness of analysis;
- Usefulness and logic of information presentation; and
- Promptness of information dissemination.

DECISIONS TO BE MADE REGARDING CRIME ANALYSIS CAPABILITY

- Responsibilities to be assigned;
- Organizational placement;
- Staffing;
- Equipment availability;
- Measures of performance;
- Crime analysis unit relationship to staff commanders;
- Information flow; and
- Record changes.

ANTICIPATED OUTCOME

Police managers will receive data and recommended courses of action that will facilitate the development of effective strategies and tactics to maximize the productive use of "non-committed" time.

TRADITIONAL PATROL BELIEFS

For over 150 years police administrators believed that a good patrol force was one that was:

- Omnipresent
- Random
- Rapid Responding.

The above characteristics were deemed critical to fulfilling the patrol mission of:

- Preventing Crime
- Apprehending Criminals
- Protecting Life and Property
- Delivering Satisfactory Service to Citizens
- Maintaining Community Sense of Well Being.

PREVENTIVE PATROL

The heart of the traditional patrol model was "preventive patrol." This type of patrol was performed (or not) during the periods of "non-committed" time.

Preventive patrol may be defined as a random and haphazard patrol activity which is initiated (or not) at the discretion of the individual police officer.

Importantly, "preventive patrol" was more than an activity; it was actually a state of mind.

LIKELY RESULTS OF SUCH PATROL

- Uninformed/non-responsive patrol
- Inequitable levels of service
- Inappropriate priorities of attention
- Self determined delays in service
- Lack of service/problem-solving continuity
- Potential escalation of pressing field problems.

FRESH LOOK AT PATROL

In the light of research findings, and conventional wisdom, many police administrators began asking such questions as:

- what are we now doing
- who is doing it
- why are we doing it
- who else can do it
- how might we do it better
- what do we need in order to do it better
- what should we be doing?

The answers to those questions would constitute the base upon which a COHERENT PATROL POLICY would be developed which would be implemented systematically by patrol managers and officers.

At the very least, such a program would require that the police manager:

- establish responsive allocation policies
- determine priorities
- coordinate and direct activities
- install appropriate records
- evaluate performance
- develop rapport - internal and external.

GENERAL COMMENTS REGARDING NONCOMMITTED TIME

DEFINITION

Noncommitted time is that portion of the total time which is not spent on calls for service, administrative assignments, personal reliefs, or other required duties.

PROBLEMS

Noncommitted time is difficult to "collect" because it:

- batches - (frequently when least needed)
- does not occur in uninterrupted intervals of sufficient duration.

AMOUNT OF IT

In many agencies the noncommitted time (available time) amounts to 40-50% of the total patrol time.

MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENT

Police managers must critically examine the noncommitted time issue with the view of:

- increasing it
- redistributing it
- effectively using it.

ACQUIRED TIME

The block of noncommitted time should be considered total agency time. This time must be productively used to achieve the agency's mission.

Whether the time is used by enhancing the role of the uniformed officer assigned to routine patrol duties or by creating specialized patrols to address short-term specific goals is a decision to be made by agency management.

PRESSURES ASSOCIATED WITH NONCOMMITTED TIME

With all of the noncommitted time available and the number of programs available to choose from, care must be exercised that an agency does not embark upon so many changes that little is accomplished except to dilute the effectiveness of management programs and efforts.

Chaos resulting from an excess of management programs is as disruptive as it is in a preventive patrol mode.

In short,

> THE MANAGER MUST DISCIPLINE HIM/HERSELF AND THE ORGANIZATION TO DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN WHICH WILL BE IMPLEMENTED INCREMENTALLY IN THE BEST WAY TO ACHIEVE ESTABLISHED OBJECTIVES WITHIN AN ACCEPTABLE PERIOD OF TIME.

WHAT IS "DIRECTED PATROL"

Discussion

Lacking a precise definition, the term "directed patrol" means different things in different agencies.

In the MPO, and this training program, the term "directed patrol" is viewed as a concept of patrol management rather than an activity.

Definition

DIRECTED PATROL MEANS THAT THE ACTIVITIES THAT ARE TO BE PERFORMED BY PATROL UNITS DURING NONCOMMITTED BLOCKS OF TIME ARE: (1) ACTIVITIES THAT ARE INITIATED AND/OR APPROVED BY PATROL MANAGERS AND (2) ARE ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AT ACCOMPLISHING EITHER A SPECIFIC AND DEFINED SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVE OR ARE ACTIVITIES DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF APPROVED LONG-TERM MISSION OBJECTIVES.

Two "Directed Patrol" Activities

Thus, the concept of directed patrol embraces two distinct types of activities:

- general/mission patrol
- specific/proactive patrol.

CHARLOTTE, NC - MPO TEST SITE "DIRECTED PATROL" PROGRAM

In developing their "directed patrol" program, the managers of the Charlotte Police Department recognized the need to distinguish between patrol activities performed during "noncommitted" time. They drew the distinction this way:

Directed Activities (General/Mission)

Those activities which are broader, more general, and difficult to measure on a short-term basis.

Examples of this activity included: crime prevention projects, school resource (liaison) work, community relations programs, etc.

Directed Patrol

Those activities which are designed to affect particular police problems--its objectives are specific, short-term, and "field oriented" (i.e., crime, traffic, etc.).

Objective - making the patrol function more effective by assigning officers to work on known problems in an organized and systematic way.

Concept - the "concept" of directed patrol seeks to:

- provide more precise identification and description of problems through crime analysis
- provide more rigorous and systematic planning of tactics to address target problems
- provide an evaluation phase to assess the impact of various tactics upon target problems.

MANAGEMENT DECISIONS

REGARDING "SPECIFIC/PROACTIVE" PATROL

- "Specific/proactive" patrol assignments are more important and more productive than some calls for service

- Team commanders may designate field units as unavailable to respond to calls for service or respond only to "emergency" calls

- Specific program objectives are to be established for each plan implemented (including duration and cost objectives)

- Crime analysis must provide a detailed crime/problem analysis and monitor the results of the specific/proactive activity

- Plan to be developed using team participation

- Plan to be formally evaluated at conclusion of program

- Specific/proactive operational plans must be reduced to writing and be approved by field commanders.

PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS--CHARLOTTE, NC

Identification of Problem

- Crime analysis to identify problems and trends and provide results of detailed analysis
- Crime analysis report to contain:
  - type and method of problem
  - when and where does problem occur
  - victim characteristics
  - m.o.'s
  - description of suspects and vehicles
  - who identified the problem
  - recommendations regarding tactics.

Develop Plan (Team Participation)

- Select target
- Devise tactical plan--describe attack methods
- Be imaginative in exploring alternative tactics
- Tap all available information sources concerning problems
- Involve working officers in the development.

Review and Approve Plan

The tactical plan is to be reduced to written form. (See attached "Directed Patrol Tactical Plan" format.)

The plan must be approved by the team commander and bureau commander, approved plans are forwarded to the bureau chief and to crime analysis for monitoring.

Implementing Plan

- Information on plan (current information) provided at roll call
- Involved officers must review crime analysis report and written tactical plan
- Information sharing is critical
- Proper entry of availability status for CFS is critical.

Monitoring Plan

- Crime analysis to issue regular monitoring reports; each report to indicate:
  - changes in crime roles or patterns
  - other changes in target problem (and evaluate those changes with respect to other areas in the city and historical data for the target area)
  - parallel trends throughout the city.

Evaluation of Plan

- Team must submit an evaluation report on plan at least on a monthly basis (See attached: Directed Patrol Evaluation Report)
- The evaluation should also report upon:
  - amount of time expended on target
  - impact and effectiveness on target problem
  - accuracy of crime analysis information provides for problem and plan
  - use by teams of information provided
  - implementation of plan in accord with written program.

CHARLOTTE POLICE DEPARTMENT DIRECTED PATROL TACTICAL PLAN

Analysis ID # [/] [ ] Initial Plan [ ] Plan Revision Proposed Implementation Date: [/ /19]

riefly describe the problem which this plan addresses.

ist the objectives which you intend to achieve with this tactic. At least one of the stated objectives should specify a quantitative change n the target problem.

)escribe, in detail, the directed patrol tactic to be implemented. This description should include the following information: Number of personnel to be used; Locations of assignments; Time periods to be covered (specify days and hours); Mobility and uniform of officers (e.g. uniformed officers on bicycles, plain clothes in unmarked vehicles, etc.); Special equipment, if any.

For how long does the team propose to employ this tactical plan? When or under what conditions will this plan be terminated?

nitted / /19 .

Team

Tactical plan [ ] approved, [ ] rejected for revision: [ ] rejected; / /19 .

Commander, Bureau

Tactical plan reviewed / /19

Commander, Operations Division

CHARLOTTE POLICE DEPARTMENT DIRECTED PATROL EVALUATION REPORT

Crime Analysis ID # [/]

[ ] Termination of Tactic
[ ] Revision of Tactical Plan
[ ] Routine report

1. If termination or revision of tactic is proposed, explain why.

2. How much officer time was assigned to this task

   a. since the last report?

      [ ] officer-hours between [/ /19] and [/ /19]

   b. since the tactic was begun (cumulative total)?

      [ ] officer-hours between [/ /19] and [/ /19]

3. Describe and discuss the reasons for any alterations in or deviations from the Directed Patrol Tactical Plan.

4. To what extent were the objectives stated in the Directed Patrol Tactical Plan achieved?

5. What factors might account for the success or failure of the tactic to achieve the stated objectives?

6. What other results were produced by implementing the tactic? (e.g. arrests, cases cleared, etc.)

7. In your estimation, is the tactic employed a valuable or useful one? [ ] yes [ ] no

8. Would you use this tactic again? [ ] yes [ ] no

9. Observations and comments:

Submitted ___/___/19___; _____; Commander, _____ Team

Bureau Commander's response:

___/___/19___; _____; Commander, _____ _____ Bureau

Reviewed ___/___/19___; _____; Commander, Operations Division

DIRECTED DETERRENT PATROL

NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT

Features of this program include:

- Noncommitted time is directed at crime occurrences;
- Program developed based upon crime analysis inputs and patrol officer/commander experience
- Target crimes are selected;
- Specific written tactics are developed and tested on a monthly basis;
- Directed deterrent "runs" (D-Runs) are established and are dispatcher issued and controlled (as are "calls for service");
- Detailed instructions are issued to patrol officers as to how the "run" will be conducted;
- These "D-Runs" can only be interrupted by the officer when he encounters an incident requiring an immediate response or by the dispatcher when an emergency call occurs in the D-Run area and;
- A "D-Run" findings and recommendations report is prepared at the conclusion of each.

SAMPLE

DIRECTED PATROL PATTERN SHEET

RUN NUMBER: 821
SECTOR: EDWARD

PROBLEM: COMMERCIAL BURGLARY

Step 1: LOCATION: Grand and Quinnipiac
TACTIC: Park car. Check fronts and backs by walking to bridge and back to car.

Step 2: LOCATION: Grand and Clinton
Park car at Firestone. Check fronts and backs by walking one side of street to front and back to other side of street.

Step 3: LOCATION: Grand between Clinton and Ferry
TACTIC: Park at Ferry and Grand and walk to the church between Atwater and Bright and back to car; check fronts and backs of buildings.

Step 4: LOCATION: Grand between Quinnipiac and James
TACTIC: Ride entire length at 5 mph., checking fronts and backs as appropriate. One swing in each direction.

Step 5: LOCATION:
TACTIC:

SPECIAL NOTES:

ESTIMATED TIME REQUIRED FOR RUN - 45-50 min.

Green lights will be used by the officer while assigned to a deterrent run.

INSTRUCTION SHEET ORIGINATED BY:

APPROVED BY:

DATE:

DIRECTED DETERRENT PATROL PLANNING CYCLE



COMMUNITY ORIENTED PATROL

SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

Salient features of this program:

- Places considerable responsibility on patrol officer to analyze and develop patrol tactics.
- A "beat profile" is developed by each officer.
- The beat profile analyzes the community's structure with respect to:
    - Socioeconomic condition
    - Cultural diversity
    - Institutions
    - Organizations
    - Leaders
    - Police problems:
        - Crime
        - Traffic
        - Order maintenance
        - Noncriminal demands.
- Patrol officer initiative and discretion encouraged.
- Personnel performance evaluations modified to reflect broader responsibilities.
- Prompt dissemination of crime analysis information.
- Development of a community resources manual for referral purposes.
- Supervisors perform as facilitators and advisors.

DIRECTED INTERACTIVE PATROL

KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI

- Background
  - Developed by Operations Bureau Task Force in 1974,
  - Focused on crimes of robbery and residential burglaries; and
  - Identified 15 patrol activities that have an impact on crime.
- General Approach
  - Patrol deployment
  - Situational analysis
  - Crime attack strategies
  - Community involvement
  - Evaluation.
- Specific Needs - Control of Available Time
  - Calls for service given various priorities
  - Alternate means of reporting incidents.
- Sector Flexibility - Sergeant's Discretion
  - Decide upon best use of sector personnel involving calls for service and directed activities
  - "Manpower Utilization Forecast" - computer printout of anticipated workload for a month
  - Confer with other sectors to identify mutual needs and commitments
  - Dispatchers must be advised of assignment decisions.
- Four Groupings and 15 Activities

1. Community Education

   - Crime information
   - Community meetings
   - Crime Prevention displays
   - Community newspaper activities.

2. Community Organization Programs

   - Operation identification
   - Security surveys
   - Block watchers.

3. Tactical Deployment

   - Safe walkways
   - Decoy operations
   - Garage and swap sales
   - Tac II alarms.

4. Case Processing

   - Solvability factors
   - Concealed cameras
   - Identification kits
   - Height strips/description pads.

- Developed process and product measures

- Program attempts to deal with both internal capability and external (citizen) participation

SPLIT-FORCE PATROL

WILMINGTON, DELAWARE

Salient features of this program:

- Establishment of a "basic patrol" element which responds to calls for service and performs only limited, directed patrol.
- Establishment of a "structured patrol" element which is dedicated to crime control activities and responds only to the most serious calls for service.
- Through a "push-pull" scheduling system a total of six shifts of duty result each day for basic patrol.*
- Six alternate sector configurations are implemented each day and change every four hours.
- Basic car sectors were designated "response sectors" to reflect their primary responsibilities.
- Calls for service are given priorities and are dispatched on a first-come, first-serve basis by assignment to the first available and appropriate unit--irrespective of response sector assignment.
- Structured patrol is a specialized unit within patrol services.
- Assignments to the structure unit are routinely and regularly made (every four months).

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*Based upon temporal demands and using both PCAM and hypercube, shifts are adjusted by either "pulling" units up earlier in time or "pushing" units out later in time.

DEFINITION - SPECIALIZED PATROL

Specialized patrol activities are defined as the activities of officers who are relieved of the responsibility of handling routine calls for service in order to concentrate on specific crime problems.

ESTABLISHING A SPECIALIZED PATROL

The following issues must be examined by management in considering the need for a specialized patrol operation:

- Could regular patrol forces modify their operations to handle the problem?
- Is there an adequate crime analysis capability to identify crime problems and to provide support to specialized patrol operations?
- Does the jurisdiction have a constituency which regularly produces crime problems of a magnitude and duration that would occupy a specialized unit's available time?
- Are manpower resources and equipment available?
- Are there contractual constraints?
- Can organizational conflict be kept to an acceptable level?
- What has the experience of other police agencies with similar units been?

PURPOSES

Deterrence of suppressible crimes and the on-site apprehension of offenders.

SUPPRESSIBLE CRIMES

Crimes which can be viewed in person or monitored by electronic surveillance, at locations where the police have a legitimate right to be, and crimes which can be potentially affected by planned police operations are suppressible crimes. For example, such crimes include: street robbery, commercial robbery, purse snatchings, residential burglary, and commercial burglary.

STAFFING CONSIDERATIONS

- There will be many volunteer applicants with a wide range of motives.
- Selection criteria need to be developed and formalized by management.
- Selection criteria should take into account personality and skill.
- Selection of supervisory and command personnel is the most critical choice to be made by management.

SELECTION AND CHOICES OF TACTICAL RESPONSES

The selection of a tactical response by management should be the product of a management analysis of crime problems and available resources. Some specific questions to answer when conducting such an analysis for decisionmaking are:

- Are there temporal and geographic constraints that define a pattern?
- Can the crime be observed by police or monitored by electronic devices?
- Are there method of operations patterns that may lead to a development of suspect identity?
- Is there a victim typology that lends itself to prediction of occurrence or lends itself to decoy or possible target observation?
- Can current informant information be used or does it have to be cultivated?
- Is the identity of a suspect known or is there information that may lead to suspect recognition by police?
- What tactics in neighborhoods with similar demographics have worked in the past?
- Is needed manpower and equipment available?
- Will assistance be required from citizens or private firms?
- Will cooperation be required from other departmental units or other law enforcement agencies?
- How will this operation affect other specialized patrol unit agencies?
- Is the objective to move or suppress the problem; to investigate it; or to apprehend a suspect while a crime is in progress?

SPECIALIZED PATROL*

PROJECT FAMILIES

- Low Visibility Patrols

  ASSUMPTION: less visible police presence will lead to increases in apprehension and reduction in target crimes.

  METHOD: civilian dress and/or mechanical device tactics.

- High Visibility Patrols

  ASSUMPTION: increased uniformed police presence will deter crime and increase the chances of apprehending criminals.

  METHOD: use of uniformed tactical units.

- Combined High/Low Visibility Patrols

  ASSUMPTION: increased uniformed presence combined with less visible police presence will deter crime and increase apprehension rates.

  METHOD: uniform tactical units in combination with civilian dress and/or mechanical device tactics.

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*National Evaluation Program: Traditional Patrol, June, 1976, pp. 40-41.

SPECIALIZED PATROL TACTICS AND TARGET CRIMES*

Target Crime	Tactical Alternatives
Street robbery	Uniformed tactical patrol; Decoy operations; Suspect surveillance; Area surveillance.
Commercial robbery	Physical stake-outs; Electronic stake-outs; Uniformed tactical patrol; Area surveillance; Suspect surveillance.
Residential robbery	Uniformed tactical patrol; Area surveillance; Suspect surveillance.
Purse snatches	Uniformed tactical patrol; Area surveillance; Suspect surveillance; Decoys.
Residential burglary	Uniformed tactical patrol; Area surveillance; Suspect surveillance.
Commercial burglary	Uniformed tactical patrol; Physical stake-outs; Electronic stake-outs; Suspect surveillance; Area surveillance.
Vehicle theft	Uniformed tactical patrol; Area surveillance; Suspect surveillance; Decoy operations.
Theft from vehicles	Uniformed tactical patrol; Decoy operations; Area surveillance.
Rape	Decoy operations; Uniformed tactical patrol; Suspect surveillance; Area surveillance.

* Improving Patrol Productivity, Vol. II, p. 81.

MAINTAINING THE OPERATION

Once a tactic has been selected and the operation implemented, it is necessary to provide management with constant data support about:

- the crime problem;
- related criminal activities; and
- the peripheral effects of the operation.

Operations maintenance should be provided by crime analysis through the regular reporting to management of the following events:

- Target or related crimes committed in the target area;
- Any target crime with similar M.O. or suspect description;
- Crime displacement;
- Arrests and clearances by other units;
- Pertinent field interview information;
- Any historical information on problem;
- Intelligence on possible suspects;
- Mapping support;
- Intelligence on narcotics or fencing activities which may be related to the crime pattern; and
- Evaluation of the project.

SOME SUGGESTED PERFORMANCE MEASURES*

To determine the deterrent effect, measure the changes in reported target crime rates in a particular area:

- Before, during, and after the program
- Compared with the prior three years
- Compared with a selected control area
- Target crime rate in balance of jurisdiction
- Target crime rate in adjoining areas
- When crime occurs - temporal displacement
- Crime rates of non-target crimes
- Etc.

To determine apprehension effectiveness, measure the:

- Number of arrests for target crime
- Number of arrests accepted for prosecution
- Number of arrests leading to conviction
- Importance of particular arrests
- Number of hours spent per arrest
- Number of arrests for target crime compared with number reported
- Number of reported crimes cleared
- Etc.

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*Improving Patrol Productivity, Vol. II, pp. 117-119.

Successful Programs Have Allowed For:

- Advanced planning
- Cooperation between departmental units
- Careful selection of personnel
- High quality supervisors
- Training of personnel
- Effective equipment use
- Adequate financial support
- Flexibility in operations to meet changes.

General Findings - Specialized Patrol

- Evaluations of performance and effectiveness have proven inconclusive.
- There is a need to relate successful tactics to the category of crime.
- Police officials believe programs are effective.

Outcome

Clearly conceived patrol programs that direct resources at identified crime and problem patterns on a geographic and temporal basis can have a favorable impact upon crime occurrences in the community.

SESSION 10

RESPONDING TO THE NEEDS AND RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS: MANAGING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

Summary

This session will present information about the needs and appropriate state statutes governing victim rights and the role of law enforcement agencies in responding to such needs and rights. By definition, then, these new developments associated with victims have a direct relationship with the tasks of patrol in the conduct of initial investigations, the tasks of investigators in the follow-up phase and case preparation phase of the continuing investigation, and, finally, with the overall management of the patrol and investigative process.

By focusing on the victim (and or witness) as the principle client of the law enforcement agency, a more clear and specific set of new operational tasks and management issues surface for the law enforcement agency.

In outline, this session will address the following topics:

- National data about the extent of crime victimization;
- The meaning of victimization;
- The doctrine of victims' rights;
- Statutory legislation in your state;
- Summary of victim's needs;
- Definition of a criminal investigation and role of the victim and witness;
- The criminal investigation process and case processing from call for service to parole;
- The roles of initial investigators (patrol) and follow-up investigators (detectives)

DEFINITION OF VICTIM

One who has been injured physically, financially, or emotionally as the result of the commission of a crime. The definition also includes family members of a child victimized by the commission of a crime and the surviving relatives of a homicide victim. Source: "Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982" and most state statutes that define eligibility for victim compensation or define a Bill of Rights for Victims.

EXTENT OF VICTIMIZATION: DATA SOURCES

NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (NCS): Biannual survey/interviews of 128,000 individuals 12 years and older in 60,000 households. Reports usually published for each year.
UNIFORM CRIME REPORT (UCR): Annual report by FBI of reported crimes by Part I Categories (similar categories are used in the NCS); reports are generated volunatrily by about 98% of all state, county, and municipal law enforcement agencies in the USA.

DATA ABOUT VICTIMIZATION

NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY (NCS)		YEAR	UNIFORM CRIME REPORT (UCR)	% UCR/NCS
Incidents	Households		Reported Incidents	Incidents
41,455,000	24,900,000	1981	13,290,300	32.0%
39,800,000	24,800,000	1982	12,857,218	32.3%
36,900,000	23,621,000	1983	12,070,200	32.7%
34,323,000	22,786,000	1984	11,881,800	34.6%

REPORTING CRIMES TO THE POLICE: Summary Tables from Special Report, Bureau of Justice Statistics, December, 1985, 633 Indiana Avenue, Washington, DC 20531, Special Report #NCJ-99432

{Of the 37,115,000 crimes that took place in 1983, as estimated from the National Crime Survey, 35% or 12,880,000 were reported to police. Other specific findings are reprinted in this NSAVAP Summary. These findings are based on interviews conducted twice a year with approximately 128,000 persons ages twelve and older in 60,000 households, conducted as part of the ongoing National Crime Survey (NCS). The tables reprinted here identify whether crime was reported in 1983 by type of crime and percent of victimization and the percent of crimes reported by selected victim characteristics.}

PERCENT OF CRIME REPORTED TO POLICE, 1983

Type of crime	Total number of victimizations	Percent of victimizations			
		Reported to police	Not reported to police	Don't know/not ascertained	Total
All crimes	37,115,000	35%	64%	1%	100%
Crimes of violence	6,015,000	48%	51%	1%	100%
Rape	154,000	47	52	---	100
Robbery	1,133,000	52	47	1	100
Aggravated assault	1,588,000	58	40	2	100
Simple assault	3,141,000	41	58	1	100
Crimes of theft	14,657,000	26%	72%	2%	100%
Purse Snatching	177,000	51	48	---	100
Pocket Picking	386,000	29	70	---	100
Larceny without contact	14,095,000	26	72	2	100
Household crimes	16,442,000	37%	62%	1%	100%
Burglary	6,065,000	49	50	1	100
Household larceny	9,114,000	25	74	1	100
Motor vehicle theft	1,264,000	69	31	---	100

Note: Crime categories include attempted crimes. --Too few cases to obtain statistically reliable data.
Figures may not add to total because of rounding.

Distributed by the National Sheriffs' Association Victim Assistance Program, 1450 Duke Street, Alexandria, VA 22314 (703) 836-7827

Table 13. Most important reason for not reporting to police, 1983

Most important reason	All crimes	Crimes of violence				Crimes of theft			Household crimes					
		Total	Robbery	Aggravated assault	Simple assault	Total	Completed	Attempted	Total	Completed	Attempted	Burglary	Household larceny	Motor vehicle theft
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Not serious														
Object recovered or offender unsuccessful	5	5	14	4	3	4	2	33	5	2	21	8	3	22
Did not think it important enough	30	22	15	20	26	30	30	24	32	34	22	21	38	13
Nothing could be done														
Didn't realize crime happened until later	7	1	—	—	—	7	7	5	8	9	8	11	7	9
Property hard to recover due to lack of identification number	4	—	—	—	—	5	5	—	5	6	—	3	7	—
Lack of proof, no way to find/identify offender	16	8	16	9	5	17	17	14	16	16	16	17	16	18
Police wouldn't do anything														
Police wouldn't think it was important enough—wouldn't want to be bothered	7	5	5	4	5	8	6	5	8	8	7	7	8	8
Police would be inefficient, insensitive	4	5	9	5	3	2	2	3	5	5	5	6	4	8
Reported to someone else	11	11	8	9	13	18	19	6	4	3	6	7	2	—
Private/personal matter or took care of it myself	9	28	13	33	30	4	4	3	8	8	4	8	7	10
Did not want to take time, too inconvenient	2	2	—	3	1	2	2	—	2	2	2	2	2	—
Afraid of reprisal by offender or his family or friends	1	4	5	4	4	0	0	—	1	1	—	1	0	—
Other	7	11	11	9	10	6	7	5	7	7	7	9	6	6

Note: Figures may not add to total because of rounding
—Too few cases to obtain statistically reliable data.

Table 14. Most important reason for reporting to police, 1983

Most important reason	All crimes	Crimes of violence				Crimes of theft			Household crimes					
		Total	Robbery	Aggravated assault	Simple assault	Total	Completed	Attempted	Total	Completed	Attempted	Burglary	Household larceny	Motor vehicle theft
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Economic														
In order to collect insurance	8	—	—	—	—	12	12	—	7	8	4	6	9	9
Desire to recover property	32	6	21	—	—	43	44	—	35	40	—	26	37	63
Obligation														
Because it was a crime	8	7	9	4	7	8	8	—	9	8	12	12	7	6
Because you felt it was your duty	7	8	7	11	8	7	6	23	7	6	7	7	7	4
To keep it from happening again	20	31	22	33	35	14	14	24	19	17	32	23	19	7
To stop or prevent this incident from happening	9	18	15	17	19	4	4	—	9	7	24	12	8	4
To punish offender	7	14	11	16	12	4	4	—	7	6	9	8	6	5
There was evidence or proof	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	1	—	—	1	—
Need for help after incident due to injury	1	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Other	8	14	10	11	18	8	7	—	6	6	10	7	7	—

Note: Figures may not add to total because of rounding.
—Too few cases to obtain statistically reliable data.

Source: Special Report, Bureau of Justice Statistics, December, 1985
633 Indiana Avenue, Washington, DC 20531, Special Report #NCJ-99432

CRIME AS A PERSONAL CRISIS

- CRIME AS A CRISIS

--Crisis: a threatening life experience which seriously disrupts personnal and social functioning.

--"The key word in this definition is 'threat'...a severe threat to the self may result in eating or sleep disturbances, inability to engage in usual social interactions, inability to think clearly or to concentrate, or inability to work. In a very real sense, a threatening event can directly and adversely affect the functional integrity of the person..."

"The Psychological Impact of Personal Crime"
Morton Bard Ph. D.

--Crisis researchers have demonstrated that the ability of an individual to adapt to and handle a crisis depends on the meaning of the stressful experience and the nature of the victims experiences immediately after the threat.

--Not all stressful life experiences have a crisis impact, e.g., death after a prolonged illness which enables a spouse or relative to be prepared for the death.

--However, threatening life experiences that are sudden and unanticipated, unpredictable, and random or arbitrary are qualities of a crisis that frequently produce or provoke a shattering impact on the individuals sense of self and ability to function with others.

--Most crimes, by definition and action, are sudden, unpredictable, and arbitrary...most crimes produce a crisis in the victims life.

PERSONAL CRIME AS VIOLATION OF SELF

One way to gain some insight into the psychological impact of crime victimization is to construct a model (Figure 2). In this model, personal crimes have increasingly complex elements for the severity of the stress. These crimes are seen as violations of self, that is, as events in which the individuals self is violated outside personal control. The violation increases in severity as the threat to self becomes more direct, culminating in the ultimate violation of homicide--the destruction of self.

Burglary

A burglary is an example of a crisis-inducing violation of the self. People usually regard their homes or apartments as representatives of themselves. In an important symbolic sense, their homes are extensions of themselves. Home is, in the most primitive sense, both nest and castle. Particularly in a densely populated, highly complex environment, it is the place that offers security. When that nest is befouled by a burglary, often it is not so much the fact that money or possessions have been taken that causes the distress. Is is more that a part of the self has been intruded upon or violated.

Robbery

In robbery, a more complex violation of self takes place. While in burglary the victim is not directly involved, in robbery the violation of self occurs in a more intimate encounter between the victim and the criminal. In this crime, not only is an extension of the self taken from the victim (property, money, etc.) but she or he is also coercively deprived of independence and autonomy, the ability to determine one's own fate. Under threat of violence, the victim surrenders autonomy and control, and his or her fate rests unpredictably in the hands of a threatening other. This situation must have a profound ego impact.

Robbery with Physical Assault

Now let us go a step further on the scale of violation of self to assault and robbery. Here there is a double threat: the loss of control, the loss of independence, the removal of something one sees symbolically as part of the self--but now with a new ingredient. An injury is inflicted on the body, the envelop of the self. The external part of the self is injured. It is painful not only physically; the inner being is injured as well. This physical evidence reminds victims that they are forced to surrender their autonomy and also that they have been made to feel less than adequate. The physical injury is the visible reminder of their helplessness to protect or defend themselves.

Rape and Sexual Assault

In the crime of rape, the victim is not only deprived of autonomy and control and experiences manipulation and often injury to the envelop of the self, but also suffers intrusion of inner space, the most sacred and privat repository of the self. It does not matter which body orifice is breached;

symbolically, they are much the same. Victims of sexual assault experience the assault as asexual. The threat to self is so direct and so extreme that survival alone is uppermost.

Homicide

This crime is unquestionably the ultimate violation of self. The self is destroyed and ceases to exist. For the survivors of the homicide victim, the victims death is extremely stressful. Cross-cultural research indicates that the death of a family member or of a close friend is a stress of the greatest magnitude. The sudden and unpredictable loss of an important person often has profound effects of the survivor. Crisis intervention techniques not only benefit the survivor personally, but also lessen the degree of dysfunction.

FIGURE 2

VIOLATION OF SELF IN PERSONAL CRIMES

BURGLARY	ROBBERY	ROBBERY WITH PHYSICAL ASSAULT	RAPE	HOMICIDE
(1) VIOLATES EXTENSION OF SELF	(1) VIOLATES EXTENSION OF SELF	(1) VIOLATES EXTENSION OF SELF	(1) VIOLATES EXTENSION OF SELF	(1) ULTIMATE VIOLATION: DESTRUCTION OF SELF
	(2) LOSS OF AUTONOMY	(2) LOSS OF AUTONOMY	(2) LOSS OF AUTONOMY	
		(3) INJURY TO EXTERNAL SELF	(3) INJURY TO EXTERNAL SELF	
			(4) VIOLATES INTERNAL SELF	

----------INCREASING PYSCHOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY/SEVERITY OF STRESS----------

SOURCE: "THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF PERSONAL CRIME" MORTON BARD PH.D., IN VICTIM WITNESS PROGRAMS: HUMAN SERVICES OF THE 80S, EMILIO C. VIANO, EDITOR (1981)

GENERAL STAGES OF CRISIS REACTIONS

- Crisis reactions may vary with the person and the circumstances of the crime as a crisis event. There are, generally, three stages of reaction: initial disorganization, a period of struggle to achieve balance, and, finally, stability. The three stages are not discrete; there are periods of overlap; there is often movement back and forth for short periods of time.

- Stage One: Initial Impact

A relatively short period which may last from a matter of hours to days; characterized by shock and feelings of being fragmented; numb, disoriented, feelings of helplessness and disbelief; a natural reaction and not abnormal or idiosyncratic. This imapct is experienced, to some degree, by all victims of personal crime.

- Stage Two: Recoil

The beginning of the process of repair and healing which never proceeds smoothly; victims may experience feeling of being discouraged and that life may not return to pre-crime levels of functioning; the beginning of being able to put the event into some form of perspective; victim begins to cope with the meaning of vulnerability, reality and loss resulting from the crime event; this waxing and waning between emotions is a normal part of the reparative process.

- Stage Three: Reorganization

The victim begins to achieve a state of balance both internally and in relation to the environment; fear and anger diminish; emotional energy is now invested in constructive pursuits. The more serious the violation, the longer it takes the victim to achieve stability.

RESPONSE BY OTHERS TO CRISIS REACTION STAGES

Responses to crisis reactions--crisis intervention by others--are best done by the supportative and positive behavior of others: on-scene officers, victim assistance personnel, friends, family, neighbors, and even strangers.

The crisis has been produced by the intentional threatening behavior of another person. The best antidote to the intentional hurtful act by another is the intentionally compassionate and helpful act by another.

But, those who would be helpful must be alert to the burdens imposed by their helping role--good intentions alone are insufficient. Supportive and positive behavior is manifested by carefully chosen words, actions, and guidance.

SOME HELPING BEHAVIOR: WORDS AND ACTIONS

LISTENING/VENTILATION

It is extremely important to allow victims to discharge their feelings. The helper should not stifle the victims impulse to speak of the crime, even if it seems repetitive at first. Listening with acceptance and without passing judgement is the single most supportive act that the helper can perform.

DIRECTION

Victims feel helpless and disordered immediately after the crime. It is difficult for them to deal with abstractions. Normally self-reliant people may need to be told what to do. The helper should avoid imposing a moral tone on what may appear to be an infantile need for direction.

SECOND GUESSING

Victims are extremely sensitive to behavior by others which seems to question their motives or behavior at the time of the crime. Helpers should not ask questions out of idle curiosity, particularly questions which may seem to the victim to be accusatory. Questions such as "Why didn't you scream?" should be avoided.

GUILT

Victims often feel guilty and ashamed, not because of complicity in the crime, but because of the need to explain what happened. Such expressions are usually temporary. Rather than attempting to argue the victim out of such feelings, the helper should accept them as a passing part of the reparative process.

ANGER

Expressions of anger are appropriate and probably beneficial. A dilemma exists for those who try to help when anger is directed at them. But the expression of anger is likely to be an acknowledgement by the victim that he or she trusts the listener enough to express the feeling. Helpers should never personalize the anger. The victim is using anger only as an avenue for needed expression.

RESCUE FANTASY

This fantasy is a common pitfall for many who help others. If helpers indulge in this fantasy, they may unwittingly encourage the victims dependence long after it is necessary. Really helping requires sensitivity and discipline. It is easy to exploit a vulnerable victim for the gratification of personal needs.

CONCLUSION

In sum, effective crisis intervention can reduce much of the pain, and long term disability that can follow in the wake of crime victimization. Supportive human relationships, informed by crisis theory, can reduce the need for intervention by mental health professionals long after the crime. In the period immediately after the threat, what others say and do has great importance. Friends, relatives and criminal justice professionals can be very effective in facilitating the reparative process for victims. Most victims--like most people--are strong and resilient; their emotional and social difficulties following victimization are natural and usually temporary. But in order to weather their difficulties with relative ease, they need the help of those who care and who know how to help.

20th CENTURY OBSERVATIONS OF THE ROLE OF THE VICTIM

1931: Wickersham Commission

"Hardships suffered by victims may affect in some cases the victim's whole attitude toward the administration of public justice"

1934: Supreme Court Justice Benjamin N. Cordoza

"Justice, though due to the accused, is due the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is a filament. We are to keep the balance true"
(Snyder v Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122)

1938: American Bar Association

"The state owes it to the witness (and victim) to make the circumstances of his sacrifice as comfortable as possible"

1951: Michigan Governor's Study Commission

"The inept handling which victims often receive following a sex crime is at the root of much of the reluctance of parents to file complaints; the experience at this stage can be worse than the experience of the crime itself"

1965: California

Enactment of the first state statute in the U.S. providing for state compensation for victims of violent crime

1967: President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice

Pioneered the use of victim surveys and recommended nationwide adoption of crime compensation programs

1970-
1979: LEAA Grant Programs

Distribution of about $50 million in grants and contracts to support research, demonstrations, training and assistance to further the objectives of improving the manner in which the local justice system serve victims and witnesses

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

- Substantial body of literature: victim surveys; psychological studies and practices; victimology; historical studies; case law; state statutes; victim rights legislation; Annual Crime Victims Week.

- President's Task Force on Victims of Crime: 1982-1983

- Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence: 1983-1984

- Justice Assistance Act of 1984

- Victims of Crime Act of 1984

- Victim Witness Protection Act of 1982

- Office for Victims of Crime/Office of Justice Programs

- National Association Efforts:

  National Organization for Victim Assistance
  National Sheriffs' Association
  National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives
  National District Attorneys' Association
  American Bar Association
  National Conference of the Judiciary
  National Conference of Special Court Judges
  National Judicial College
  National Center for Women's Police Studies
  National Association of State Directors of Law Enforcement Training

EMERGING DOCTRINE ON VICTIM RIGHTS

- STANDING

The right that an individual has or is given to initiate and maintain a cause of action in a proceeding at law.

The individual must have a personal stake in the outcome of the proceeding so as to assure a finder of fact and a court that there will be the presentation of concrete facts that allege and support the claim that harm has been done to one. These facts sharpen the adversary proceeding between the accuser and the accused. The proceeding, coupled with confrontation between accuser and accused and evaluated by cross-examinations, must result in a presentation of the issues so that the court can make its judgements.

Standing means, therefore, that:

- personal harm is done
- concrete information and evidence is presented
- the one harmed must participate directly
- the one harmed must have a personal stake in the outcome of the proceeding

While the doctrine of standing is usually used in reference to civil litigation, scholars have begun to promote the idea that a "standing" for criminal victims in state and local criminal justice proceedings is valid and can--and often is--granted by state statutes.

The victim is personally harmed; the victim initiates the report to authorities, the victim possess direct information; the victim may be the evidence; the victim is examined and required to testify; the victim is cross examined; the victim seeks restitution, retribution, or reparation...without the victim there is no proceeding.

VICTIM STANDING AND RIGHT OF DUE PROCESS

- STANDING may trigger some procedural rights regarding the decision-making and the administration of the process of the victim's case through the justice system;

- DUE PROCESS rights refer to those guarantees that one has when one has standing at law. These rights, at a minimum, are:

  --Adequate and timely notice about various proceedings coupled with some form of instruction or guidance as to the role to be performed by the victim;

  --Opportunity to present evidence, information, and interests in the proceedings;

  --Adequate and timely notification about the outcomes of the proceedings.

- STANDING plus DUE PROCESS result in PARTY STATUS for a victim. This combination means, practically, that a victim may have certain specific rights. Since a right is an advantage which compels or directs a related duty or obligation, then, it may be argued that justice system representatives may have the duty to provide to the victim, notifications, advice, information, counsel, and instructions about what they are entitled to do and what they may be entitled to expect from various justice system representatives from the moment of report of the crime to the conclusion of the victim's "case" at parole.

- Examples of state laws which reinforce this notion of victim standing, due process, and victim-as-a-party-to-proceedings are presented and discussed below.

CURRENT LEGISLATION ENACTED

- 43 states plus the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands have established victim compensation programs. In 1984 alone, approximately $68.0 million was awarded to victims of crime.

- 28 states have legislation that make some provision for ensuring that general victim or victim/witness services be provided at the local level.

- 31 states have enacted Bills of Rights for Victims.

- 34 states have passed legislation requiring the use of a Victim Impact Statement which is submitted by the victim to describe the medical, financial and emotional injuries caused by an offender. Usually submitted as part of the Presentence Investigation Report. May be used as part of the crime report case-file.

- 19 states empower the victim to give a verbal statement (similar to the VIS); this is often termed "the right of allocution".

- 11 states empower the victim to participate, in some form, in a Plea Bargaining Process.

- 27 states authorize the victim to participate in parole hearings either by a written statement or allocution.

- 32 states have enacted legislation which either requires that restitution to the victim be ordered or mandates that restitution be considered at sentencing. 22 states mandate restitution as a condition of probation.

- At least 31 states have enacted laws that require officials of the justice system to notify victims about various proceedings. Specific notifications are required for such actions as: arrest, case-status, bail, pre-trial release, plea agreements, probation, sentencing, parole, pardon, escapes, work release, trial, continuances, and final dispositions.

- At least 27 states have enacted laws that strengthen law enforcement and court responses to pre-trial intimidation and post-trial retaliation against victims and witnesses.

PROPOSED VICTIM LEGISLATION

- Victim's right to privacy and protection from harassment as a result of disclosure of victim's data;

- Victim's attendance at trial court and right not to be sequestered except in special instances;

- Speedy trial rule and speedy disposition rule for victim's cases;

- Victim's Bill of Rights or piecemeal legislation regarding children as victims or witnesses, including:

  --amending child competency requirements;

  --amending hearsay admissibility requirements;

  --requiring counselors or guardians ad litem for children;

  --extending the statute of limitations for crimes against children;

  --requiring speedy trials for offenses against children;

  --protecting children's privacy during prosecution;

  --using and admitting into proceedings video-taped depositions or testimonies of children;

  --authorizing employers in child-caring occupations to obtain access to records of arrest and conviction of sex-related offenses of prospective employees;

  --mandating background checks of employees working with children.

- Compensation for counselling victims and confidentiality shields for such counselors;

- Enacting, or extending by statute, laws that authorize warrantless arrests for misdemeanor spousal assaults; authorizing arrest as a preferred intervention in spousal assaults or domestic violence;

- Tightening up by law or procedure the enforcement and investigation of abuse, neglect, and exploitation of the elderly under the doctrine that elder abuse is a criminal act.

Summary of State Crime Victims Legislation—July 1985
Alabama - Minnesota

KEY

I—Introduced Bills
B—Bill of Rights
X—Enacted Legislation
B/X—Bill of Rights/Individual Statute

LEGISLATION	TOTAL (50 States)	AL	AK	AZ	AR	CA	CO	CT	DE	DC	FL	GA	HI	ID	IL	IN	IA	KS	KY	LA	ME	MD	MA	MI	MN
1. Funding for Services	28[1]	X	X	X	X	X	B/X	X	X	–	X	–	–	–	X	X	–	–	X	–	I	–	B	–	X
2 Funding/ Domestic Violence	49	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	–	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
3 Funding/Sexual Assault	19[2]	X	X	–	–	X	X	–	X	–	–	X	–	–	X	–	X	–	–	–	X	X	–	I	X
4 Compensation	44[3]	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	–	X	–	X	X	X	X	X	X	–	X	X	X	X
5 Bill of Rights	31[4]	–	X	–	X	X	X	–	X	–	X	–	–	X	X	X	–	–	–	X	X	–	X	X	X
6 Victim/Witness Information	29	–	B	–	B	B	B	X	B	–	B	–	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	X	B	B	
7. Protection from Intimidation	27	X	B	–	B/X	X	B/X	–	B/X	–	B	–	–	X	–	–	–	X	–	–	B	–	B	–	B
8 Property Return	24	–	–	–	B/X	X	B/X	–	B	–	B	–	–	B	B	–	X	X	–	–	B	–	B	–	–
9 Secure Waiting Areas	17	–	–	–	B	X	B	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	–	–
10 Employer Intercession	21	–	B	–	B	X	B	–	B	–	B	–	–	–	X	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	B	–
11 Creditor Intercession	3	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	–	–
12 Speedy Disposition/Trial	10[5]	–	–	–	–	X	B	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	–	–
13 Victim Impact Statement	34	–	B	X	X	B	B	X	X	–	B/X	X	–	B	X	X	–	X	–	–	B	X	B	B	B
14 Victim Statement of Opinion	9	–	–	X	–	B	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	–	B
15 Allocution/ Oral Statement Sentencing	19	–	–	–	–	B	B/X	X	–	–	B	X	–	B	X	X	–	–	–	–	B	–	B	B	B
16 Plea Bargain Participation/ Consultation	10	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	–
17 Court Attendance	9[6]	X	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	B	X	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	X	–	B	–
18 Parole Hearing/VIS	19	X	B	X	X	X	X	–	–	–	–	X	–	B	B	–	–	–	I	–	–	X	X	B	–
19 Parole Allocution	10	–	–	X	X	X	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	B	–	–	–	I	–	–	X	–	B	–
20 Restitution/ General	46	X	X	X	X	X	B/X	X	X	–	B	X	X	B/X	X	–	X	X	–	X	B/X	X	B	B	B
21 Restitution a Condition of Probation/ Parole/ Work Release	24	X	X	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	B/X	X	–	–	–	–	X	X	–	X	B	X	–	I	B
22 Mandatory Restitution	32	X	–	X	X	B/X	X	X	X	–	B	X	–	B	X	X	X	X	X	–	B	–	–	–	–
23 Notification/ Court Proceedings/Schedule Changes	22	–	B	X	B	–	B	X	B	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	B	–
24. Notification/ Pre-Trial Release	9	–	–	–	–	–	B	–	–	–	B	–	–	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
25 Notification/Bail	4	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Funding includes general appropriations, fines, penalty assessments and executive department appropriations.
[2] The National Coalition Against Sexual Assault (NCASA) estimates that 34 states have sexual assault funding.
[3] Arkansas law permits compensation on a county basis; Utah's compensation program only covers drunk driving victims. Nebraska's program did not receive funding for FY 85—86 due to state budgetary problems.
[4] Indiana and Oklahoma have passed a package of legislation considered an omnibus Victim Rights statute; Oregon's Victim Rights are outlined in the victim services funding statute.
[5] State Judicial policy in Oregon states that no civil case is allowed to go forth if a criminal trial is pending.
[6] Florida currently has a citizens' initiative pending to make court attendance a constitutional change.

Summary of State Crime Victims Legislation—July 1985

Alabama - Minnesota *(continued)*

KEY

I—Introduced Bills X—Enacted Legislation
B—Bill of Rights B/X—Bill of Rights/Individual Statute

LEGISLATION	TOTAL (50 States)	AL	AK	AZ	AR	CA	CO	CT	DE	DC	FL	GA	HI	ID	IL	IN	IA	KS	KY	LA	ME	MD	MA	MI	MN
26. Notification/ Plea Agreements	8	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	B
27. Notification/ Sentencing	12	–	–	X	–	B	–	X	–	–	B	–	–	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	B	–	–	B	B
28. Notification/ Final Disposition	11	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	–	–
29. Notification/ Parole Hearings	28	X	B	X	X	B	X	X	–	–	B	X	X	B/X	B/X	X	–	–	–	–	–	X	X	B	B
30. Notification/ Pardon	10	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	B
31. Notification/ Work Release	9	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	X	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
32. Notification/ General Release/Felony	17	–	–	–	–	–	B	X	–	–	–	–	X	B	B	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	B	B
33. Notification/ Escape	10	–	–	–	X	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	B	–
34. Counselor Confidentiality/ General	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
35. Counselor Confidentiality/ Domestic Violence	8	–	–	–	–	I	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	–
36. Counselor Confidentiality/ Sexual Assault	18	–	–	–	–	X	–	X	–	–	X	–	–	–	X	–	X	–	–	–	X	–	X	X	X
37. Victim Privacy/ Address Protection	4	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	X	–	B	–
38. Notoriety-for-Profit	32	X	X	X	–	X	B	X	B/X	–	X	X	–	X	X	X	X	–	X	X	–	–	X	–	X
39. Children's Bill of Rights	3[7]	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	I	–	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
40. Child Videotaped Closed Circuit Testimony & Depositions	24	X	–	–	X	X	–	X	X	–	–	X	X	–	–	X	X	X	X	X	–	X	I	I	–
41. Children/Funding Services	7	–	X	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	X	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	–
42. Child Competency	10	X	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	X
43. Missing Childrens Act	12	X	–	–	X	–	–	X	X	–	X	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	X	I	–	–
44. Child/Statute Limitations	6[8]	–	X	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	X	I	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	X
45. Child/Background Check	6	X	X	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	X
46. Child/Hearsay Admissibility	10	–	X	X	X	X	X	–	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	I	–	–	–	–	–	–	X
47. Child Speedy Trial	4	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	–
48. Child Privacy Protection	3	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
49. Child Counselor/Court Proceedings	10	–	–	–	X	–	B	–	–	–	B/X	–	X	X	–	–	X	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
50. Domestic Violence/ Protection Orders	17	X	X	X	–	X	–	–	–	–	X	X	–	–	–	–	X	–	X	I	–	–	–	–	X

FOOTNOTES:

[7] Iowa enacted a package of Children's Rights in 1985 considered an omnibus Children's Bill of Rights.

[8] California law provides that the statute of limitations for all felonies is to be based on the severity of the crime. 1984 amendments eliminated the statute of limitations for crimes where the punishment is life imprisonment.

Summary of State Crime Victims Legislation—July 1985
Mississippi - Wyoming

KEY

I—Introduced Bills X—Enacted Legislation
B—Bill of Rights B/X—Bill of Rights/Individual Statute

LEGISLATION	MS	MO	MT	NE	NV	NH	NJ	NM	NY	NC	ND	OH	OK	OR	PA	RI	SC	SD	TN	TX	UT	VT	VA	WA	WV	WI	WY
1. Funding for Services	–	X	–	–	–	–	X	–	X	X	–	X	X	X	X	X	X	–	–	X	–	–	X	X	–	X	–
2. Funding/ Domestic Violence	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	–	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
3. Funding/Sexual Assault	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	X	–	X	–	X	–	–	X	–	X	–	–	X	–	I	X	–	–	–	–
4. Compensation	–	X	X	X	X	I	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	–	X	X	X	I	X	X	X	X	X
5. Bill of Rights	–	–	X	X	X	–	I	–	X	I	–	X	X	X	X	X	X	–	–	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	–
6. Victim/Witness Information	–	–	–	B	B	–	–	–	B	–	–	B	X	X	B/X	B	B	–	–	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	–
7. Protection from Intimidation	–	–	–	B	B/X	–	X	–	B/X	–	–	B	X	–	B	B	B	–	–	B	B	–	B	B	B	B/X	–
8. Property Return	–	–	–	B	B	–	–	–	B/X	–	–	B	–	X	B	B	B	X	–	–	–	–	B	B	B	B	–
9. Secure Waiting Areas	–	–	–	B	B	–	–	–	B	–	–	B	–	–	B	B	B	–	–	–	–	–	B	B	B	B	–
10. Employer Intercession	–	–	–	B	–	–	–	–	B/X	–	–	B	–	X	–	B	B	–	–	–	B	–	B	B	B	B/X	–
11. Creditor Intercession	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
12. Speedy Disposition/Trial	–	–	–	B	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	B	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	B	–
13. Victim Impact Statement	–	–	X	X	X	X	–	–	X	–	–	B/X	–	X	B	B	B	–	–	B	–	B	X	B	B	X	–
14. Victim Statement of Opinion	–	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	X	–	–	B	–	–	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
15. Allocution/ Oral Statement Sentencing	–	–	–	–	–	X	I	–	–	–	–	B	–	–	–	B	–	–	–	B	–	B	–	B	B	–	–
16. Plea Bargain Participation/ Consultation	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	B	–	–	–	–	X	–	I	B	X	–	–	B	–	–	–	B	–	–
17. Court Attendance	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	–	–	–	B	–	–	–
18. Parole Hearing/VIS	–	–	–	–	–	X	X	–	X	–	–	B	–	–	I	X	B	–	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
19. Parole Allocution	–	–	–	–	–	X	X	–	–	–	–	B	–	–	I	I	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
20. Restitution/ General	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	–	B	–	X	X	B/X	B	B	B	B	X	X
21. Restitution a Condition of Probation/ Parole/ Work Release	X	I	X	–	X	–	–	–	X	X	–	–	–	–	B/I	X	–	–	–	X	X	B	–	–	B	X	X
22. Mandatory Restitution	–	–	X	–	X	–	I	X	B	X	–	–	X	–	–	–	B	X	X	X	X	B	B	B	B	–	X
23. Notification/ Court Proceedings/Schedule Changes	–	–	–	B	B	–	–	–	B	–	–	B/X	–	–	B	B	B	–	–	B	B	–	B	B	B	B	–
24. Notification/ Pre-Trial Release	–	–	–	–	B	–	–	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	B	–
25. Notification/Bail	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	–	–	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

Summary of State Crime Victims Legislation—July 1985

Mississippi - Wyoming *(continued)*

KEY

I—Introduced Bills X—Enacted Legislation
B—Bill of Rights B/X—Bill of Rights/Individual Statute

LEGISLATION	MS	MO	MT	NE	NV	NH	NJ	NM	NY	NC	ND	OH	OK	OR	PA	RI	SC	SD	TN	TX	UT	VT	VA	WA	WV	WI	WY
26. Notification/ Plea Agreements	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	–	–	B	–	–	–	–	B	–	–
27. Notification/ Sentencing	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	B	–	–
28. Notification/ Final Disposition	–	–	–	B	B	–	–	–	B	–	–	B	–	–	B	B	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	B	–
29. Notification/ Parole Hearings	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	X	X	–	–	B	X	–	B	B/X	B	–	–	B	X	–	–	B	–	–	–
30. Notification/ Pardon	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	X	–	B	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	–	B	–
31. Notification/ Work Release	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	B	B	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	–	–	–
32. Notification/ General Release/Felony	–	–	–	B	B/X	–	–	X	X	–	–	–	–	–	B	B	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	–	–	–
33. Notification/ Escape	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	X	I	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	B	–	–	–
34. Counselor Confidentiality/ General	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
35. Counselor Confidentiality/ Domestic Violence	–	X	–	–	–	X	–	–	X	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
36. Counselor Confidentiality/ Sexual Assault	–	–	–	–	–	X	X	–	X	–	X	X	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	X	–	X	–
37. Victim Privacy/ Address Protection	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	I	–
38. Notoriety-for Profit	–	–	X	X	–	–	X	X	X	–	–	B	X	X	–	B/X	X	X	–	X	X	X	–	–	X	–	X	–
39. Children's Bill of Rights	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	I	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	X	–	X	–
40. Child Videotaped Closed Circuit Testimony & Depositions	–	X	–	–	X	X	–	X	X	–	–	I	X	–	I	–	B	–	X	X	X	–	–	–	–	X	–
41. Children/Funding Services	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	I	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
42. Child Competency	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	X	–
43. Missing Children's Act	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	I	–	–	–	–	–	I	–	X	–	–	X	–	–	X	–	–	–	–
44. Child/Statute Limitations	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	I	–	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	–
45. Child/Background Check	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
46. Child/Hearsay Admissibility	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	X	–	I	–	–	–	–	X	X	–	–	–	–	–	–
47. Child Speedy Trial	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	I	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	X	–
48. Child Privacy Protection	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	X	–
49. Child Counselor/Court Proceedings	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	X	–	–	–	–	I	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	X	–
50. Domestic Violence/ Protection Orders	–	–	–	–	–	–	X	–	X	–	X	–	X	–	X	–	X	–	–	X	–	–	–	X	–	–	–

THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS

Definition:

The total police effort to collect facts that lead to the identification, apprehension, and the arrest of an offender and the organization of these facts in a way that presents evidence of guilt so that successful prosecution of the offender may occur.

Outcome of the Process:

To increase the ratio of convictions to arrest.

Example: If in a given period there are 100 arrests and 20 convictions from this pool, the ratio is .20; if a well managed criminal investigation process is guided by the outcome measure listed above, then, the process should aim at improving this ratio. For example, in a given period, the 100 arrests should result in 40 convictions or double the ratio from .20 to .40.

Essential Characteristic of Process and Outcome:

The process depends on the collection and use of information;

Specific types of information are sought: solvability factors and convictability factors;

The source of information for solvability or convictability are primarily victims, witnesses and suspect/defendants;

Without the willing cooperation of victims or witnesses to report, collaborate, identify and testify, there is no effective process, and ratios of convictions to arrests will decline.

Without the victim, there is no criminal justice system.

Job-Objectives of Investigators and Investigation Process:

Interview victims (and witnesses) so that solvabilty information is obtained, and, simultaneously, interview the victim so that their needs and rights are responded to in a manner that fosters their continual role in the investigation and prosecution of an offender.

TASKS OF FIRST RESPONDER

1. Assure the victim and family that they are safe and will be protected.

2. Assure them that they did on wrong and that the agency or others can assist them.

3. Interview in a positive manner; avoid impression that they are being interrogated.

4. Understand and empathize with the possible crisis reactions that may be experienced by victims or families. Behave in a positive manner.

5. Stabilize the victim. Provide immediate emergency services or emergency support as needed.

6. Focus on the victim. State: "I'm sorry it happened". "I'm glad you're all right". "You did nothing wrong".

7. Direct the victim about what is being done, how it is being done, and why it is being done. Here the "it" refers to any procedures (including interviewing as well as crime scene search or processing) that your or your colleagues are doing.

8. Explain several times what your role is, what you are doing and how your questions can be of help to the victim. By involving the victim in a direct, explanation-filled manner, you will be giving the victim an opportunity to gain some control over the crime event and its aftermath.

9. Prepare the victim for a wide range of feelings, responses, and emotions. Victims will predictably experience these reactions. Reassure them that such reactions or responses are generally normal and that "ventilation" of feelings is one way of coping and recovering from crime and its effects.

10. Advise the victim about what happens next. Victims or their families should be informed about post-investigation processes such as line-ups, photo reviews/mug shot reviews, post arrest procedures, etc.

11. Assure privacy. Ask permission to speak to victims--don't assume that permission. Avoid interruptions by others. Treat the victim as an individual whose privacy, personal control and autonomy, and private property or even his life was intentionally violated by the actions of an offender. Don't interviw victims in such a manner that a second type of violation occurs.

12. Help the victim to recover by constantly advising them--after the initial investigation--about the progress of the case being investigated. There may be little or no leads. Yet, each victim wants to know how "his" or "her" case is progressing. Keeping them informed is one way of helping the victim recover his or her control over life. Being consulted and advised is one of life's more pleasant feelings.

13. Promote problem resolution with the victim. Listen, clarify, and correct false impressions or false hopes or false guilt.

14. Help the victim focus on pressing priorities that need attention. Explore options and solutions with victims so that a plan of action for assistance is created when such plans are needed.

15. Direct the victim to his or her own support system to help them. Coping skills of victims depend on a number of factors: age, life-style, economic status, families, sex, etc. Refer the victim to other support systems whether public or private.

16. End the interview by making sure that the victim feels safe and that they have written or verbal information needed to help them. Victims shouldn't be left alone unless they insist.

THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION SYSTEM AND OUTCOMES



Figure 1
OVERVIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM ACTIVITIES FOR FELONY OFFENSES *



* SOURCE: National Baseline Information on Offender Processing Costs Project (1984) Developed by: Jefferson Institute for Justice Studies; Research Management Associates; and, Institute for Economic Policy Studies. For: National Institute of Justice, Washington, DC

Figure 2A
ACTIVITY MAP FROM POLICE NOTIFICATION TO PRETRIAL DETENTION



Figure 2B
ACTIVITY MAP FROM PROSECUTION TO ARRAIGNMENT



Figure 2C
ACTIVITY MAP FROM ARRAIGNMENT TO PRE-SENTENCE INVESTIGATION



Figure 2D
ACTIVITY MAP FROM SENTENCING TO RELEASE



SESSION 11

A PRELIMINARY MANAGEMENT PLAN TO IMPROVE POLICE OPERATIONS

Summary

In this session, participants will work individually or as members of the same management team from an individual agency and complete the outline of a preliminary management plan to improve some aspect of the agency's law enforcement operation.

As an individual--or as a team--you will select only one area for use in the plan. In this workshop, we have addressed the following topics or areas of interest for law enforcement managers:

- 10 critical issues affecting management;
- Classification and analysis of calls-for-service;
- Differential response to calls-for-service;
- Patrol workload analysis, deployment and scheduling;
- Crime analysis;
- Patrol management and directed patrol planning;
- Crime victims' rights and law enforcement response;
- Investigative management.

You are to choose any one or a part of any one of these broad areas of interest.

In developing your individual or agency management plan, we ask that you write your ideas or suggestions according to the following list:

- Policies...that may need to be developed or revised to address the chosen area;
- Procedures...i.e., who does what and under what circumstances in order to carry out the policy;
- Protocols...i.e., those written agreements that have to be used in order to obtain proper coordination of efforts with other justice system agencies, governmental agencies, or non-governmental groups so that your policies and procedures are understood by these others;
- Supervision...i.e., who is the specific supervisor of the procedure and what is the chain of command for accountability purposes;

- Training...i.e., what type of training and for what employees will be needed to ensure that employees have the requsite knowledge and skill to carry out the policies, procedures, protocols, and supervisory duties;

- Public education and awareness programs...i.e., if the area chosen requires an interaction between the agency and the public (governmental officials, interest groups, citizens, and the media) in order to foster and implement policies, procedures, and protocols, what type of public relations or education will be done.

There are six pages for your notes; one page for each part of the preliminary plan.

On this page list the area or topic you choose:

If time permits, we may have one or more of you or a team present their ideas.

TOPIC: _____

POLICIES:

TOPIC: _____

PROCEDURES

TOPIC: _____

PROTOCOLS

TOPIC: _____

SUPERVISION

TOPIC: _____

TRAINING:

TOPIC:

PUBLIC EDUCATION

SESSION 12

CONCLUSION OF CONFERENCE

Summary

This session will complete the Conference. Participants will finish their Conference Evaluation Form and hand it to the trainers or the PMA representatives.

A brief presentation will be made about the current and future plans of the Police Management Association.

IMPROVING POLICE MANAGEMENT PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCE
EVALUATION FORM

DAY ONE

NAME: _____

CURRENT POSITION TITLE: _____

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES IN YOUR DEPARTMENT _____

DATE/LOCATION _____

Your responses to the following questions will help us to improve the quality and delivery of this workshop. Read each item carefully, circle the rating which most accurately reflects your assessment, and please provide any comments, suggestions or recommendations you wish.

Assess on a 5-point scale (5 = excellent; 1 = very poor) the sessions from the following perspective: Clarity -- Was the information clearly presented? Specificity -- Was it an appropriate level of new ideas and approaches, or did the presentation suggest another approach to you? Relevancy -- Is the information relevant to you, your job and your agency? Presenter's delivery style?

1. INDIVIDUAL SESSIONS

Session 1: INTRODUCTION AND ORIENTATION

--Clarity	5	4	3	2	1
--Specificity	5	4	3	2	1
--Relevancy	5	4	3	2	1
--Presenter's Delivery	5	4	3	2	1

Session 2: CONTEXT FOR IMPROVING POLICE MANAGEMENT

--Clarity	5	4	3	2	1
--Specificity	5	4	3	2	1
--Relevancy	5	4	3	2	1
--Presenter's Delivery	5	4	3	2	1

Session 3: GROUP TASK

--Clarity	5	4	3	2	1
--Specificity	5	4	3	2	1
--Relevancy	5	4	3	2	1
--Time for Task	5	4	3	2	1

Session 4: WHY DO PEOPLE CALL THE POLICE?

--Clarity	5	4	3	2	1
--Specificity	5	4	3	2	1
--Relevancy	5	4	3	2	1
--Presenter's Delivery	5	4	3	2	1

Session 5: HOW DO DEPARTMENTS RESPOND TO CALLS?

--Clarity	5	4	3	2	1
--Specificity	5	4	3	2	1
--Relevancy	5	4	3	2	1
--Presenter's Delivery	5	4	3	2	1

Session 6: SUMMARY/CONCLUSION: DAY I

--Clarity	5	4	3	2	1
--Specificity	5	4	3	2	1
--Relevancy	5	4	3	2	1
--Presenter's Delivery	5	4	3	2	1

IMPROVING POLICE MANAGEMENT PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCE
EVALUATION FORM

DAY TWO

NAME AND RANK: _____

DEPARTMENT: _____

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES IN YOUR DEPARTMENT _____

Your responses to the following questions will help us to improve the quality and delivery of this workshop. Read each item carefully, circle the rating which most accurately reflects your assessment, and please provide any comments, suggestions or recommendations you wish.

Assess on a 5-point scale (5 = excellent; 1 = very poor) the sessions from the following perspective: Clarity -- Was the information clearly presented? Specificity -- Was it an appropriate level of new ideas and approaches, or did the presentation suggest another approach to you? Relevancy -- Is the information relevant to you, your job and your agency? Presenter's delivery style?

1. INDIVIDUAL SESSIONS

Session 7: PATROL DEPLOYMENT

--Clarity	5	4	3	2	1
--Specificity	5	4	3	2	1
--Relevancy	5	4	3	2	1
--Presenter's Delivery	5	4	3	2	1

Session 8: CASE STUDY: PATROL DEPLOYMENT

--Clarity	5	4	3	2	1
--Specificity	5	4	3	2	1
--Relevancy	5	4	3	2	1
--Presenter's Delivery	5	4	3	2	1

Session 9: WHAT DO MANAGERS WANT PATROL UNITS TO DO WHEN DEPLOYED?

--Clarity	5	4	3	2	1
--Specificity	5	4	3	2	1
--Relevancy	5	4	3	2	1
--Presenter's Delivery	5	4	3	2	1

Session 10: RESPONDING TO THE NEEDS AND RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS: CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

--Clarity	5	4	3	2	1
--Specificity	5	4	3	2	1
--Relevancy	5	4	3	2	1
--Presenter's Delivery	5	4	3	2	1

Session 11: A MANAGEMENT PLAN TO IMPROVE POLICE OPERATIONS

--Clarity	5	4	3	2	1
--Specificity	5	4	3	2	1
--Relevancy	5	4	3	2	1
--Time for Task	5	4	3	2	1

2. WORKSHOP FLOW AND ACTIVITIES

Please indicate your level of satisfaction on a 5-point scale (5 = very satisfied; 1 = very dissatisfied) with the activities and processes of this workshop listed below:

Lectures/Presentations

Time allotted	5	4	3	2	1
Opportunity for questions	5	4	3	2	1
Relevancy of visual aids	5	4	3	2	1
Use of text in Handbook for each session	5	4	3	2	1

Workshop Flow

Sequence of sessions	5	4	3	2	1
Transition from one session to next	5	4	3	2	1

Small Group Work/Individual Work

Utility of small group work	5	4	3	2	1
Utility of individual work	5	4	3	2	1
Time allotted for small group work	5	4	3	2	1
Time allotted for individual work	5	4	3	2	1

Materials

The Participant Handbook	5	4	3	2	1
Visual Aids	5	4	3	2	1
Handouts	5	4	3	2	1
Task worksheets	5	4	3	2	1

3. IMPACT OF WORKSHOP

How informative was the total workshop to you?

Very Informative 5 4 3 2 1 Uninformative

How useful was the total workshop to you?

Very useful 5 4 3 2 1 Useless

How relevant was the information presented in this workshop to your agency?

Very relevant 5 4 3 2 1 Irrelevant

4. What were the **stronger** features of this workshop?
(Check all that apply)

A. Presenters' Delivery _____ B. Topics Covered _____

C. Course Handbook _____ D. Group Interaction _____

E. Other (Please specify) _____

_____

5. What were the **weaker** features of this workshop?
(Check all that apply)

A. Insufficient Time Allotted for Lectures _____

B. Insufficient Time Allotted for Group Sessions _____

C. Course Not Relevant to My Department/Agency _____

D. Additional Visual Aids Needed _____

E. Other (Please specify) _____

_____

6. Please add here other comments/suggestions you may have on the workshop.

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

July, 1986

CHIEFS' FOLLOW-UP SURVEY TO THE IMPROVING POLICE MANAGEMENT SEMINAR

AGENCY NAME: _____ DATE: _____

NAME, RANK, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF PERSON COMPLETING SURVEY: _____

_____

1. Based on feedback you received about the IPM seminar, was the training worthwhile?

   YES ____ NO ____

   If NO, please explain: _____

   _____

2. Was the information presented during the IPM seminar compatible with your managerial philosophy?

   YES ____ NO ____

   If NO, please explain: _____

   _____

3. Did the IPM seminar provoke the types of discussions among your officers that could result in positive change and improved management within your agency?

   YES ____ NO ____

   If NO, please explain: _____

   _____

4. Aside from programs discussed during the IPM seminar that are already in place in your department, are there now new programs (e.g., beat reconfiguration, resource allocation, crime analysis, differential police response, etc.) you would like to see implemented as a result of information presented during this seminar?

   YES (please specify): _____

   _____

   NO ____

5. Could you suggest other training topics that would be relevant for future IPM seminars.

   _____ _____

   _____ _____

PLEASE RETURN THIS FORM BY AUGUST 30, 1986 TO: POLICE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
1001 22nd St., N.W., Suite 200
Washington, DC 20037
(202) 833-1460

THANK YOU!

APPENDIX D

PMA

has participated in

IMPROVING POLICE MANAGEMENT

Sponsored by:

POLICE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE

Hosted by:

St. Petersburg Police Department

Florida Institute for Law Enforcement

March 6-7, 1986

Edward J. Spurlock

President
Police Management Association

James K. Stewart

Director
National Institute of Justice