


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RESPONSES TO COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE
IN THREAT OR ACT

A Review of Research Information and
Applications, For the Use of Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice Officers
who face Incidents of Collective Violence
in Several Key Sectors of American Society

S. D. Vestermark, Jr.
Editor

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Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
United States Department of Justice

VOLUME I
COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE
IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

U.S. Department of Justice
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FOREWORD

^{Six}
The ~~seven~~ chapters here are the Final Report of a review of research and development on the prevention and control of collective violence. Conducted for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the United States Department of Justice, this review has as its basic purpose the appraisal of research and development conducted during the period 1968-1970 on the role of law enforcement and criminal justice agencies in:

- .1 Preventing and controlling collective violence in educational institutions, at all levels from grade school to college;
- .2 Preventing and controlling collective violence which results from the activities of extremist organizations and youth gangs.

A general look has also been taken at the state of pertinent knowledge in the several central topical areas during the decade of the 1960's. For the purpose of this study, "collective violence" is defined as

THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE BY A COLLECTIVITY OF INDIVIDUALS THAT RESULTS OR IS INTENDED TO RESULT IN THE INJURY OR FORCIBLE RESTRAINT OR INTIMIDATION OF A PERSON OR PERSONS OR THE DESTRUCTION OR FORCIBLE SEIZURE OF PROPERTY.

The first four chapters of this report consider responses to collective violence in the high schools (Chapter I), in the grade schools (Chapter II), and in colleges and universities (Chapter IV). Chapter III is a special consultant's paper by an inner-city teacher, who wrote this paper as part of an effort to fill serious gaps in knowledge about both collective and individual violence in the grade school setting.

Chapter V and VI consider responses to violence which results from the actions of extremist organizations, who systematically plan and execute violence against persons and property as a strategy for achieving political, social and economic objectives (Chapter V), and violence which results from the actions of urban and suburban youth gangs (Chapter VI). ~~Chapter VII provides a summary.~~

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overview of possible responses to the major types of collective violence considered in this report. Practical experience and practical measures are emphasized in this summary overview.

When the central topical concerns of this study are compared with each other, in terms of the relative adequacy of the knowledge available to provide operationally oriented prescriptions for measures to deal with threats or acts of collective violence in each area, there are noteworthy differences which are immediately evident. Among educational institutions, colleges and universities have received by far the most attention of those concerned with controlling collective violence, yet it is clearly the high school and grade school which are the emerging problems for the early 1970's. Much more research, development, and subsequent analysis needs to be performed on the various problems of anticipating and controlling violence in all high schools and in the inner-city grade school. On the problem of collective violence related to group or gang activity, there is more information, and for far longer periods, than for educational institutions. Yet much of this information is spotty or sensitive, and it presents serious practical problems for those who wish to use it as the basis for openly disseminable operational guidelines.

As is so often the case, much available information is about past events, and may or may not be fully pertinent to what major operational problems law enforcement and criminal justice agencies will face in the future. Furthermore, much available information reflects particular interests or biases of its originators. In the interest of providing maximum immediate use for what information does exist today, the researchers who prepared these chapters therefore had to make a number of clear decisions about standards of method and inference. In most cases these will be clearly evident in the text.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Although collective violence in American society has recently become of intense concern to both public officials and private scholars, there are still major gaps in the research knowledge and recorded practical experience required to guide law enforcement and criminal justice officers in meeting the problems this violence brings. In preparing this report, therefore, it was necessary to turn to a number of individuals who could provide particular perspectives from their special experience or researches in particular problems of collective violence. The research staff gratefully acknowledge the particular assistance of the following individuals and agencies, all of whom gave far more than was asked of them:

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Having received such generous help from so many individuals and agencies, the editor and research staff must emphasize that the interpretations in this report are their own and do not purport to be those of any agency or official.

The Editor

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RESPONSES TO COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE
IN THREAT OR ACT

Chapter I

COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE IN THE HIGH SCHOOLS

CHAPTER I

PART I

HIGH SCHOOLS AS A CONCERN FOR
THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER

Part I

HIGH SCHOOLS AS A CONCERN FOR
THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER

Why Are High Schools a Special Concern?

Professionalism versus personal feelings. It is not unusual for the law enforcement officer to face the need to separate personal feelings from official duties. What officer who is a father has not had to resist personal emotions when dealing with child molesters or rapists? What officer who owns property after years of hard work can feel easily in control when confronted with the arsonist who burns homes? What officer working with juveniles can avoid applying at least a few of his or her own deeply held theories about children? After all, we were all children once, and we all have memories about how we grew up. And, what officer, when faced with the murder of a close colleague and subsequent apprehension of the "cop-killer," can take a totally "detached" view of his responsibilities? All told, one of the most difficult, constantly recurring challenges of the law enforcement officer's job, at whatever level of responsibility, is maintaining the professional detachment required to carry out society's expectations of how he will protect it-- while he is living in that society as a member and caring deeply about what happens to it.

The special place of the American high school. Even so, the present-day problem of violence in the secondary schools adds a special twist to the demands of being a law enforcement officer. As with other areas of responsibility, violence in high schools will sometimes be presented as a problem of suppressing a dangerous situation or enforcing statute, or as a problem in prevention. In its simplest terms, high school violence can be viewed by the police administrator simply as one requiring a certain allocation of manpower and physical resources to deal with a threatening problem. In this respect, high school violence is only one more of today's problems which make demands on scarce law enforcement resources. But what gives the problem of high school violence its special twist is the critical place of high schools in American society. When dealing with high schools--as with any

schools--law enforcement officers are dealing with one of the key social institutions through which American society tries to define and insure its future. This fact is certainly well understood by the underground theoreticians who are attempting to create revolutionary ferment and conflict in the American school:

School is a genetic mechanism for society, a kind of DNA process that continually recreates styles, skills, values, hangups--and so keeps the whole thing going. The dying part of society--the society that has been--molds the emerging society more or less in its own image, and fashions the society that will be.¹

In explaining why these students are especially vulnerable to "going radical", social critics emphasize the special place occupied by high schoolers and college students in today's America:

The radicalization of youth is enhanced by the peculiar social position of high school and college students, who have achieved some degree of independence from family authority but are not yet subject to the discipline of work institutions. The high school and college situation is, on the one hand, extremely authoritarian but, on the other hand, functions to segregate young people, maintaining them in a peculiar limbo combining dependency with irresponsibility. The impact of the cultural crisis on the school situation is to make really vast numbers of young people ready for new and more liberating ideas, while they have the freedom and energy to spend time in examination and criticism of prevailing values and ideologies.²

For the law enforcement officer, the point of this passage is that at the heart of the push toward radical dissent by some high school and college students is the pressure created by the organization of American society itself. For the radical social critic, it is the system of and crisis in American life which force kids to rebel and which provide the directions and possibilities for rebellion.

The difference between these views and that of the law enforcement officer is, of course, that the law enforcement officer is duty bound to protect what he sees as a basically sound system for guaranteeing the future by training the young in the

¹Jerry Farber, The Student as Nigger (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., Pocket Books, 1970), p. 18.

²Richard Flacks, "Young Intelligentsia in Revolt," Trans-action VII, 8 (June 1970), p. 52.

present. The revolutionary or radical critic views the school as a repressive stifler of youth, which must be fundamentally "restructured", often at the cost of violence. Therefore, especially when the law enforcement officer is dealing with deliberately provoked and orchestrated violence in the school, he is in a very direct sense engaged in a struggle over who's definition of society and its future is to prevail.

Whether the violence is "provoked" or "natural" and "spontaneous", however, high school violence is a special challenge for law enforcement. Throughout American society, the secondary school (including both the public high school and the "private", "prep", "independent", and parochial schools) is the last period during which the oncoming adolescent generation is legally required to be in school. High school, then, marks the widely recognized point at which Americans emerge from childhood into a range of adult rights and responsibilities. This coincides with the time when the secondary school student is coming into full physical maturity and physical power, and when he is thus able to project himself visibly into adult concerns. This adolescent power is the base for the major teenage consumption industry in clothes, records, cars, and recreation which so influences the mass media image of the American high schooler as taste setter. Because of this social as well as physical onset of maturity, it can certainly be said that the problems of high school youth dominate the larger local public's thoughts about "what is happening in the schools."

Not only are high schools universal as a gateway through which a new American generation passes, they are also often the focus of local community attention about the school system. In the large inner city, the high schools are today often the focal points of particular battles for community control, because the community knows that the high school is often the last available chance for a kid to make it farther up the ladder of achievement than could his parents. In the smaller city of mid-America, the high school is often the dominant focus for normal community life. The high school is where the basketball or football games are played; it often has the only auditorium for civic meetings or cultural events; it is, at graduation time, the most visible way in which new adult citizens are created. Regardless of what happened to students earlier in their education, the high

school exerts a unique demand on the attention of anyone concerned about schools.

High Schools are especially vulnerable to violence. Although high schools represent the oldest compulsory student age group in the community, and often represent the largest single spending of community resources on particular school units, they are especially vulnerable to violence. On first impression, it might be thought that the age of the students and the resources poured into the high schools would be factors leading to greater stability. Not only are the students older and more mature, but this maturity can be used by administrators to encourage elaborate command-and-control mechanisms, in the form of student government, club, and team activities. (This is not to deny that these activities may have independent educational values.) Given the right approach, older students are more likely to accept greater demands for discipline. Working against these factors for stability are, however, other factors which make the high school vulnerable to violence. Perhaps the most significant of these are

- the coupling of physical maturity to emotional explosiveness, which is characteristic of adolescence;
- the tendency of high schoolers to form relatively tight closed systems of peer group pressures and values; and
- the demands coming into the world of high school from the outside world.

These facts make more numerous possibilities for both spontaneous and planned outbursts of individual violence--the older student has more "options for violence" open to him than does the younger student. These facts also mean that the high school is much more a "miniature society" than are schools with younger students. In elementary schools, there appears to be much more direct access to students when violence erupts. Violence is smaller in scope, more confined to brief interpersonal outbursts, and subject to immediate and forceful intervention by teachers. By contrast, violence in high school can involve not only small cliques but major subgroups of the school. It can be triggered and reinforced by patterns of student-to-student communication and action from which teachers and administrators can be systematically excluded. It can take forms which can

be directly, physically dangerous to anyone who attempts to intervene. It can be incited by students or outsiders who understand and manipulate the real social system that controls student relations in the school. Precisely because the students are older and the social life of the school more complicated, the high school is vulnerable to violence in some of the same ways that whole societies are vulnerable. This is why law enforcement officers working with high school violence may well feel that they are dealing with a potentially revolutionary situation or, sometimes, with guerrilla warfare. Sometimes they are.

Relations Between Police and School

In the high school the police officer's role is similar to that of an American military advisor overseas. If those who are close to the situation--teachers and administrators--have difficulties controlling violence erupting in the small society of the high school, then the law enforcement officer's problems are truly similar to those of the military advisor working overseas to cope with guerrilla insurgency. In one major respect, the law enforcement officer has a problem even more complex than that of the military advisor. Unlike the friendly government overseas, the local high school board, school administrator, and teacher are frequently unlikely to be receptive to the presence or actions of the police who have so reluctantly been called into the situation. They are likely to resist police advice or assistance where the indicators of explosive potential are too apparent to be ignored--regardless of whether violence is being systematically incited. How, then, does the law enforcement officer address violence in high schools? What does he do when he must intervene? How does he work with the teachers and administrators who are supposed to be those adults most in touch with what is happening in the school?

In trying to answer these questions, it is not improper to liken the role of the law enforcement officer in dealing with the schools to that of the overseas military advisor working to combat insurgency in a strange country. This interim report will not be concerned with making formal comparisons of these two kinds of jobs. Rather, the comparison is worth keeping in mind because it highlights a very important general dilemma law officers have in working with schools.

Schools are a basic social institution widely seen to be a primary concern not of policemen but of educators. Only under certain specific conditions are police to be concerned with the schools, and only to deal with certain problems do they physically enter schools. By and large, the schools are not a "socially legitimate" concern of law enforcement officers. These social restrictions on police in the schools appear clearly in the differing opinions among schoolmen about when to use police in dealing with school disruptions. A 1968 study of school administrators in the 50 states by Nation's Schools magazine reported that "in the event of a serious disturbance" in the local high school, 61% of those who answered said that the police "should be involved right away," while 39% said that "the police should be involved as a last resort."³ Consistent with this is a finding from the 1970 survey conducted by the Policy Institute of the Syracuse University Research Corporation.⁴ High school principals were asked to evaluate this statement:

The mere presence of uniformed police inside a school building is often a cause rather than a deterrent of school disruption.

Of the 683 principals who replied, 47% agreed, only 22% disagreed, and 30% neither agreed nor disagreed.⁵ Surveys such as these suggest that not only are

³"Opinion Poll, September 1968: Student Unrest will Spread to High Schools, Many Fear," Nation's Schools, LXXXII, 3 (September 1968), p. 71, emphases added. Nation's Schools describes this survey as one which is "conducted monthly by the editorial staff of Nation's Schools, ... based on a 4 percent proportional sampling of 16,000 school administrators in 50 states. It brought a 40 percent response." Ibid.

⁴Syracuse University Research Corporation, Disruption in Urban Public Secondary Schools (Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Research Corporation Final Report OEC-0-70-3444(508), August, 1970), funded by the U. S. Office of Education. The statement discussed here appeared as Item 92 on the survey questionnaire which was sent out to 2,000 mostly central city high schools. The questionnaires went out in the early Summer of 1970; 683, or about 35%, came back in time to be used in the study report.

⁵Ibid., p. E-42. The main text written by the Syracuse analysts emphasizes that "an impressive half of the principals" agreed with the statement. (Ibid., p. 44). It is perhaps more useful to interpret this agreement as one part of a deep division or uncertainty about the proper role of the police in the schools.

many key school personnel uncertain about how to use the police, but that once police have been brought into the school, this represents an open acknowledgment that those legitimately in charge of the schools--the school people--have failed. When the police come into a school, they come into a highly charged situation, in which the officials who have called them in can be expected to show anxieties and even hostilities about the need to use them. When added to the wide belief that the presence of police is inherently provocative, these attitudes make the police distinctly unwelcome in many high schools.

This is why school administrators around the country today are attempting to find substitutes for the police presence in school. Whether these substitutes are called "sentries," "monitors," "community aides," "para-police," "security personnel," or "auxiliary police," they have one basic purpose--to avoid the necessity of putting uniformed police Regulars in the high school.

Not surprisingly, the Syracuse study found that those high schools which use uniformed police on a regular basis are those which reflect the special problems most in prominence in present-day American life. These problems set those schools apart from the comfortable pictures of what American high schools and "youth culture" are like. Table I-1 (page 14) summarizes the Syracuse study data.⁶

General tactical problems from the police-school relationship. Given the deep controversy and division of opinion which exists about the use of police in the schools, the law enforcement officer is very much in the position of an American overseas military advisor working in a strange country--but under **ADDITIONAL HANDICAPS**. Like the American overseas military advisor, the law enforcement officer must be very sensitive to relationships with intermediaries. Often the best way the police officer can work to prevent or contain school violence is through school personnel, while he himself maintains a "low visibility posture," just as overseas, the American military advisor has his "counterpart," often a proud,

⁶Ibid., p. E-39, Table 26. With minor changes, this Table is given here as in the Syracuse report. Note that the Syracuse study is not necessarily representative of all American high schools since it concentrated on urban high schools.

Table I-1

TRENDS IN THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
40 HIGH SCHOOLS IN WHICH UNIFORMED
POLICE ARE REGULARLY USED:

Syracuse Study, 1970

Schools in which uniformed police are found regularly are most apt to:

- .1 Be in larger cities (greater than 100,000)
- .2 Have larger student bodies (greater than 2,000)
- .3 Have more black students (greater than 25%)
- .4 Have fewer white students (less than 26%)
- .5 Have larger staffs (over 100)
- .6 Have more black staff members (6-25%)
- .7 Have fewer white staff members (50-90%)

independent-minded native of the "host country." At home, the law officer has to work with and through professionals to whom society has entrusted the schools. These are teachers, administrators, other professionals such as guidance counselors, and school boards (who are, of course, frequently elected). Unlike the military counterpart, however, the professional educator shares no joint pride in profession with the police; indeed, his pride is in keeping the world of the school totally separate from that of the police.

Furthermore, just as a native knows his country's ways better than a foreigner, who may often be attracted only by what is unusual or dramatic, so will the school professional know the school better than the policeman. The school professional's tactical intelligence will often be much better than the police officer's. And since the police officer is working with schools as only part of his concerns, his tactical intelligence will be shaped by incidents which directly involve him in the schools. He is much less likely to have a continuing, coherent, effectively utilizable tactical picture of the school situation over time, especially when the school people avoid involvement with him.

General problems of values and the law. The similarity to the American military advisor is not merely a matter of tactics or practicalities. Just as is the case when an American goes overseas to work with an established, recognized government which has acknowledged jurisdiction over its own citizens, so the law enforcement officer in the school situation is sharply limited by the already-existing rights of students, teachers, administrators, and overall school organizations. These legal and institutional limits on the police constitute an especially difficult problem in the present, for it is only recently that many of them are being spelled out. Only recently, for example, have codifications been attempted for the emerging law on student dress, student protest, student trespass, and the rights of student petition. Thus, in performing what he takes to be his duty, the law officer may find that what had seemed a clear course through open country has suddenly become a legal thicket, and that he is entangled in ways he had not imagined. He must therefore be aware of how evolving law affects what he can do--as well as what his counterpart in the school administration can do. Only recently have a few studies become available for his instruction.⁷

⁷Examples of school-oriented materials which are useful for police administrators and relatively easy to obtain are:

Robert L. Ackerly, The Reasonable Exercise of Authority (Washington: The National Association of Secondary School Principals, 1201 16th St., N. W., Washington, D. C. 20036, 1969);

Alan R. Blackmer, An Inquiry into Student Unrest in Independent Secondary Schools (Boston: National Association of Independent Schools, 4 Liberty Square, Boston, Mass. 02109, 1970);

EPS/NSBA Policy Information Clearinghouse, EPS/NSBA Educational Policies Resource Kit; Topic: JC--Student Rights and Responsibilities (Waterford, Conn.: The Educational Policies Service, National School Boards Association, 152 Cross Road, Waterford, Conn. 06385, Catalog Number 70-7, March 1970).

Institute of Continuing Legal Education, Dissent and Discipline in Secondary Schools; Course Materials (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Institute of Continuing Legal Education, Hutchins Hall, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1970);

Institute for Development of Educational Activities (I/D/E/A), Dissent and Disruption in the Schools: A Handbook for School Administrators (Melbourne, Fla.: Institute for Development of Educational Activities, Inc., Information and Services Division, P. O. Box 446, Melbourne, Fla. 32901, 1969);

National School Public Relations Association, High School Student Unrest: How to Anticipate Protest, Channel Activism, and Protect Student Rights (Washington: National School Public Relations Association, 1201 16th St., N. W., Washington, D. C. 20036, 1969).

The high school intensifies certain standard problems in police operations. In ways strikingly similar to the American military advisor overseas, the law enforcement officer in the high school will experience special tactical and legal requirements. Because of these special requirements, high school violence presents special problems of:

- gathering intelligence;
- maintaining good working relationships with those who have primary responsibilities for the schools;
- effectively making entrée into dangerous situations;
- defining and limiting the scope of police operations; and,
- getting out as quickly as possible.

The basic theme of this chapter is that high school violence intensifies and complicates these operational requirements--the classic operational requirements of police work.

Available Research Information: How This Chapter is Organized

Deficiencies, biases, and problems in research information. The purpose of this chapter is to present a first evaluation of the present state of social science research and development, as it can be used by law enforcement personnel in preventing, moderating, or controlling violence in secondary schools. It must be recognized that there is an important body of responsible opinion which holds that some violence is a likely part of any rapid and complex process of social change or social readjustment, especially in localities where there is basic disagreement about the directions change should take. Police officials are well advised, therefore, to avoid an image or an attitude which presents their plans, their men, and their operations as ready to suppress or repress all violence. Police work is, by its nature, devoted to maintaining a tranquil social order. But particularly in working with the high schools, in communities where the high school has been made, in effect, a laboratory for social changes which the rest of the community is unwilling to accept, the police official or patrolman will find that his real job is either to prevent violence or to moderate it. Yet he will also

find that there will be many interests at work with the purpose of casting the police in the role of suppressors or repressors. Provoking a heavy-handed police response to ongoing violence often serves the interests of those who would maintain and intensify social conflict in order to guide social changes in special directions, in pursuit of their private dreams and fantasies.

Ideally, what is needed for the basic police purpose of preventing or moderating and controlling high school violence is a set of relatively explicit, tested, "how-to-do-it" procedures which derive directly from systematic investigation of the particular kinds of violence which are to be found in the American high school today. Instead, what is available is often research of a quite different sort. In appraising the present state of systematic knowledge on student unrest, the staff of the Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence at Brandeis University say this:

... We shall assume that our readers are interested in finding out what aspects of student unrest are being looked into by various social scientists, what they have come up with, and where there seem to be gaps in topics studied. Using this approach, we have found that most of the writings appear to be theoretical and are concerned with the issues and goals of student protests; fewer contributions involve an analysis of the participants, and these are usually based on survey analyses; and still fewer contributions involve analyses of the process of student protest.⁸

Although they are looking at a somewhat broader set of issues than were the Lemberg analysts, the writers of this present chapter find that this statement is also an accurate summary of the general state of knowledge about violence in the schools. What are most needed--systematic, data-based studies of the actual processes of different specific kinds of student violence--are least in evidence. Instead, much attention has been given to the ideological and political reasons for violent events in the high school.

⁸Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence, "On Student Activity--and Faculty Too?", Confrontation: A Newsletter from the Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence (April 1970) (Waltham, Mass.: The Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence, Brandeis University, 1970), p. 2, emphasis in the original.

Thus, while racial integration is widely recognized as a critical factor in producing violence among high school students, there is relatively little systematically organized information about how different kinds of racial clashes occur as specific events with specifically different kinds of histories and different tactical requirements for prevention and control. And racially related violence has received probably the most attention of social scientists and other systematic analysts. On such types as violence associated with ideological protests emanating from the high school New Left (largely a group of white students), it is possible to find much fascinated attention given to what the students are saying and demanding. There is much less systematic knowledge about what types of individuals are involved in violent disruptions, and exactly what kinds of individuals do what kinds of things in what kinds of ways to shut down a school.

In systematically reviewing and summarizing the knowledge about high school violence which has been accumulating during the period 1968-1970, the writers of this chapter will have frequent occasion to call attention to this basic unevenness in the quality and quantity of available information. From time to time they will also have occasion to call attention to disagreements among different analysts of the same basic problem. The reader of this chapter should keep constantly in mind that until very recently, the problem of high school violence has been largely seen as secondary to other concerns of the researcher. Much of the early literature on high school violence was written from the point of view of the social worker, or the student of gangs, or the educator who had to deal with violence and disruption as part of a more general concern with "discipline" in the school. In this last case--the educator concerned about "discipline"--violence was often seen as a problem of deviant individuals and small groups. If the need arose, they could, in the end, be permanently removed from school. It has only been very recently that violence in the high school has been seen as a major social problem connected with other major social problems. Consequently, any current research report which attempts to summarize the rapidly expanding body of work of the last two years will necessarily reflect the problems of a research field in flux.

The several parts of this chapter. Since Part I of this chapter has been intended to provide an overview of the difficulties inherent in making high school violence a police concern, these problems of data and method have remained largely under the surface. In Part II, however, they are much more prominent concerns. Part II presents a specific review of what police roles have been and might be in violent incidents in the high school, as these may be drawn from the different kinds of information available from the research work and direct experience of 1968-1970. Where there are deficiencies in the kinds of data available, or disagreements among researchers even when data are available, these deficiencies and disagreements will be clearly noted. Sometimes the reader--who may be a police official or government administrator charged with planning or operational responsibilities--will be left to draw his own conclusions about what the available information may mean.

Similarly, Part III, which presents some first steps toward systematically describing the general types of violent incidents which may draw police attention, will reflect these problems of data and method. Part III outlines the first results of an attempt to develop one unified scheme for looking at the kinds of violence which must be of concern to police today. The importance of developing such a scheme lies in the power it can give to both planning and operations. A unified, exhaustive descriptive scheme allows the official in both planning and operations to know whether he has planned for all the types of situations that are realistically possible. It allows him to determine the kinds of "mixes" of human and material resources he may be required to deploy, to deal with complex threat situations which may come in more than one form. In the absence of detailed research on all the different types of violent situations which may arise, however, it is difficult to know whether schemes such as those presented in Part III are a true reflection of what exists--or to some significant degree only collections of categories which contain a number of "empty boxes," in which nothing really happens. More will be said about this problem in Part III.

In view of the admitted deficiencies in research and development on high school violence during the period 1968-1970, it seemed useful to conclude this

chapter with a relatively brief annotated bibliography. The purpose of this bibliography is to guide key law enforcement personnel to those present-day materials which would accomplish one or more of the following purposes:

- presenting critical research findings which could be directly applied to the planning and conduct of preventive or moderating strategies for dealing with high school violence;
- providing examples of the kinds of critical research which can be used as the basis for inferring useful strategies or tactics in coping with high school violence; and,
- sensitizing law enforcement personnel to the kinds of problems and issues they will encounter in working with educators and students at the high school level.

An important feature of this bibliography is that it includes a number of studies and analyses by educators. Implicit and explicit in these works by educators are several characteristic images of law enforcement personnel, to which police at all levels of command should be sensitive.

The law enforcement professional reading in this bibliography will discover one related set of themes occurring time and again. In a sense, these themes are the principal policy recommendations of this chapter. Put bluntly, they are these simple propositions:

- .1 Uniformed police should stay out of high schools.
- .2 If uniformed police come into the high schools, they should do so:
 - .a In accordance with continuing liaison, planning, and intelligence stemming from regularized relationships with key school personnel and established contingency plans drawn up between the schools and police;
 - .b Except for the force required to deal effectively with particular violent incidents, in the lowest visibility posture feasible;
 - .c With full use of an already developed group of non-uniformed police auxiliaries, but without compromising the standing these auxiliaries may have with school personnel and students.
- .3 Uniformed police should get out of high schools as quickly as possible.

CHAPTER I

PART II

THE POLICE ROLE IN VIOLENT INCIDENTS

PART II

THE POLICE ROLE IN VIOLENT INCIDENTS

A. The "Incident" of Collective Violence

The "Violent Incident" as the
Measuring Unit of Violence

In terms of the specific actions which responsible persons must take, the fundamental objective of attempts to prevent and control high school violence is to prevent or control violent incidents. As with violence occurring in other sectors of society, high school violence takes concrete form as a specific, actionable problem in the violent incident, and in the discernible events which lead to it, which occur as part of it, and which follow it. The whole tradition of not only American science but of American law points toward the incident as the critical focus of planning and operations. In science, "causes" and "effects" are traced ultimately to and from some openly observable event in human behavior or in the physical world which forms the environment of behavior. In law, it is the overt act which forms the real or implied reference of all attempts to assign accountability, to impute motives, and to trace rights and responsibilities. The law constantly distinguishes between intention, thought, and idea on the one hand and behavior on the other--even though intention may be a factor in mitigating guilt and in assigning the punishment for behavior.

"Violence" is often described less precisely. There is a certain tendency to talk generally about the "violence problem" about how different "societies" are more or less "violent," about how certain kinds of group styles and individual personality traits "predispose" towards violence. As a problem for responsible officials, however, violence comes as a very precise set of occurrences, which must be met in terms of their specific requirements. In the present study, COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE is defined as

the THREAT or USE OF FORCE by a COLLECTIVITY of individuals that RESULTS or IS INTENDED TO RESULT in the INJURY or FORCIBLE RESTRAINT or INTIMIDATION OF A PERSON OR PERSONS or the DESTRUCTION or FORCIBLE SEIZURE OF PROPERTY.

While complex in the sense that it covers a range of issues, this definition is relatively precise. Underlying the different elements of this definition is the problem created by groups of individuals acting either in concert or as individual elements in a collective event who employ physical coercion to interfere with rights granted under the law. The physical coercion may be a threat or an act. It may or may not have physical outcomes, but physical outcomes which deprive others of rights are always implicit. The rights which may be deprived by the threat or act of physical coercion are not just those of the personal physical safety or integrity of others. They also include the right of individuals or of groups to preserve their bodies and property free from the fear that they will be unlawfully and forcibly violated.

In the high school, collective violence can come in a variety of forms. It can appear in that smallest of all acts of collective violence, the two-person altercation or fight, and there will be times when violence on this small a scale can lead to or be part of much larger collective violence in the school. Not infrequently the two-person fight, when between members of contending races, can quickly evolve into a massive racial clash between the major factions of a school. Sometimes high school violence erupts among larger groups, as in the racial brawl, or in the collective protest that turns into "trashing" the school and surrounding areas, or in the athletic contest that becomes superheated. Sometimes collective violence will be orchestrated by agitators, from within or outside the student body.

As with other violent incidents, the violent incident in high school occurs when individuals resort to physical coercion to interfere with others. In high school, this interference can be as general as depriving students of their rights to a safe and orderly educational environment, or it can be as specific as assault and theft, by one person on another. It can seem to erupt almost spontaneously from the normal tensions and difficulties of high school life, as when people bump into each other in crowded halls, or it can be ideologically directed by a cadre of individuals who seek to turn school conditions to their own purposes. As with other types of collective violence, high school violence becomes a problem to the school administrator and teachers--and to the police--when it comes to official

notice in the form of a concrete incident, in which threat or force have been applied to individuals or property in the school.

Because violence occurs in the form of definable incidents, and because incidents must be the focus of planning and operations to prevent or control violence, the violent incident is the basic measure of violence, in the high school and elsewhere. As the basic measure or unit of violence, incidents can relatively easily be subjected to quantitative and qualitative treatment. The frequency of incidents per unit of time provides one way of describing the degree to which violence is a problem in the school. The intensity, scope, and duration of incidents provide others. Grouping incidents by their basic type tells something about what may be causing different types of incidents in different schools, thus pointing to flexible, variable sets of strategies and tactics to be applied to different types of school situations.

Part II of this chapter is concerned, therefore, with the kinds of incidents which may confront school and law enforcement personnel in the high school, and with what police, working with school people, can do about them. One major task of Part II is to move toward a more systematic understanding of the different types of violent incidents which are problems in high schools. The purpose of this systematic analysis and understanding is to provide the necessary logical framework upon which to organize available research knowledge, to produce systematic guidance for the police in incidents of high school violence. The reader will note, however, that formal analysis of incident types will be held to a minimum in Part II and reserved for Part III of this chapter. The content of Part II will, instead, move quickly from this general overview of the meaning of "violent incident," into the specifics of the law enforcement officer's role before, during, and after violent incidents in the high school.

Two Types: SITUATIONAL and GUIDED Incidents

"Police Notice," crime reporting, and the problem of defining "types."
The basic practical reason for distinguishing different types of violent incidents is that through the discoveries of regularities, differences, and patterns, present experience can be turned toward more effective planning for future operations.

This is, in fact, the fundamental purpose of any intelligence activity. Gathering information about incidents of high school violence will be a special problem for police, however, because the resistance to police presence in the schools and police relationships with the schools intensifies the already relatively great selectivity in the information which police receive.

It is well known to police commissioners and commanders as well as to patrolmen on the beat that official information on the types and rates of crime in an area will frequently be composed only of incidents which have "come to Police Notice." Many crimes go unreported to police, for various reasons. The good local police intelligence unit will know about at least some of these crimes-- even if they are frequently blocked from further movement because no complainant can be found who is willing to bring action. In other cases, police intelligence will be only partially aware of incidents in certain categories. Often other demands on limited police resources will limit police abilities to find out exactly what are the incident rates in these categories of crime.

Any general analytic framework for describing categories of "crime" from available statistics must, then, enable the user to think beyond the deficiencies built into the data he uses to construct it. In the case of the high school, much current police information is likely to reflect a number of highly variable decisions which school administrators have made about when to call the police into a situation. Therefore, in constructing any general framework of types of collective violence which may be applied to high school incidents, there is a critical need to use information which does not depend exclusively on police-school relationships. For this reason, the present analytic framework is derived in part from a variety of non-police sources. These include not only the general body of social science literature on "collective behavior" and life in the schools, but more specifically applicable information which has been gathered by a number of private and university research organizations. A crucial characteristic of this framework is that it is based as closely as possible on an attempt to describe in general language the real world differences among types of violent incidents. These "real world differences" are part of the social life of individuals in school and elsewhere, and exist

apart from violent incidents--even though violent incidents necessarily reflect these qualities of social life.

SITUATIONAL versus GUIDED incidents of collective violence. Perhaps the simplest "real world" difference between basic types of collective violence is whether someone or some group consciously intended a violent incident to happen in the way it did. Conscious intent is a crucial legal question, and it is also an intuitive reference point which people take in trying to explain what happened to them. As people grope for the meaning of what happens to them, they constantly distinguish between whether an event was "random," "chance," "fate," or "in the nature of things," or whether it was caused by something over which they had control. This distinction is sometimes blurred in bizarre ways, as when after a horrible natural disaster, people search for scapegoats against which to vent their feelings.⁹ That this can later be recognized as "scapegoating" only underscores the basic distinction which people do, in fact, make.

This real world distinction has special meanings for the contemporary high school, where there are a great many possibilities for violent incidents. Some incidents of violence just seem to come out of the "way high schools are" today. In the jam-packed large urban high school, the hallways and stairs can be physically dangerous places to be during class changes--and the possibility always exists that totally inadvertently, a member of one racial or cultural minority can bump into another. Is it fair to say that the resulting incident was provoked in the same way as a racial clash instigated by student militants asserting their "pride"? Intelligent school and police recognition of what is going on insists that the answer be "No." How, then, is it possible to sort out what really happened, so that causes and consequences can be meaningfully incorporated into a diagnosis of the school?

⁹ An example of what can happen--an example taken deliberately from outside present-day America--is the attack on the Korean minority in Japan, after the Tokyo earthquake and fire of 1923. See N. F. Busch, Two Minutes to Noon: The Story of the Great Tokyo Earthquake and Fire (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962).

The approach taken here is to apply a simple distinction to what is happening in the school. On the one hand, certain violent incidents may RESULT FROM THE STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF STUDENT LIFE IN THE SCHOOL, AS THIS LIFE IS SHAPED BY THE MUTUAL, DAILY INTERDEPENDENCE OF PEOPLE. These incidents may be called incidents of SITUATIONAL VIOLENCE, because they are products of the total situation in a school. In a sense, given the necessary combination of factors--overcrowding, understaffing, clashing racial minorities, rising aspirations thwarted by poverty conditions at home--violent incidents are inevitable. They would have come whether or not specific individuals consciously tried to provoke them. This does NOT mean individuals should not be held responsible for what happens. But it DOES mean that in working to control and eliminate incidents of this type, it is critically important to recognize how the total situation in a school can generate incidents.

On the other hand, certain incidents do RESULT FROM SOME CONSCIOUS ATTEMPT TO PRECIPITATE AND DIRECT VIOLENCE. These may be called incidents of GUIDED VIOLENCE. They may be deliberately provoked by students or by outsiders. In some instances, these provocations may play upon existing vulnerabilities of the high school to situational violence. This suggests one danger which should be avoided in the use of the term "guided violence:" the danger of assuming that those guiding the violent incident have an altogether well worked out mental scenario of what it is they are trying to accomplish. A particularly difficult-to-control form of guided violence occurs when it is essentially not issue-oriented. In these instances, the adolescent agitator may simply be fishing in troubled waters, in the attempt to create conflict and crisis which will open a number of mutually reinforcing possibilities for destabilizing the school. Adults are likely to be overly reactive to this type of provocation, by trying to find logic and ideology where there is only a diffuse fantasy of anarchy and confusion in the mind of the student or adolescent agitator. A clever student or outside adolescent agent provocateur may sense that the authorities are indeed searching for these motives where there are none. He will then try to portray the authorities as engaging in "paranoid persecution" of innocent youth.

As with all logical or analytic constructions, then, the two basic types of violent incident--SITUATIONAL and GUIDED--must be carefully used in practice. The power of this distinction will be given more detailed examination in Part III of this chapter. For the moment, the distinction will be used to group loosely all the different types of violent incident which may occur in high schools so that police and school officials can more easily discern the common patterns--and basic differences--among what seems at the outset to be an extremely varied and complex group of possibilities for violence.

An Approach to Police Planning and Operations:
BEFORE, DURING, and AFTER Violent Incidents

The remaining portion of Part II applies the distinction between situational and guided violence to the actual problems police face in the high schools. In doing this, one additional logical device will be used: the separation of both police concerns and actual incidents into BEFORE, DURING, and AFTER phases. That is, every actual incident of high school violence is conceived as establishing certain police planning and intelligence functions BEFORE it occurs, certain police operations DURING its occurrence, and certain police and criminal justice operations and evaluations functions AFTER its occurrence. Existing literature pertaining to the police role in high school violence will be reviewed and summarized as it is appropriate to each of these major time phases of a violent incident.

To some degree, the separation of police and criminal justice actions into these three time phases is artificial, just as it is to some degree artificial to demarcate an incident into three phases. If police and school planning is adequate, all incidents should stay in the BEFORE phase. When an incident begins, it may be already establishing the preconditions for other incidents. Thus, in describing incidents and police actions to deal with them, there is a certain arbitrariness in determining the boundaries of time phases, and a certain real need to think of all three phases at once.

Nevertheless, the BEFORE-DURING-AFTER model appears to be an efficient way for leading both police and school officials toward the existing research information on how incidents unfold over time, and what is required over time to deal with them. The reader should keep in mind that given the present state of knowledge, it has not been possible to develop all the implications and values of the BEFORE-DURING-AFTER model of incidents and police actions, just as it has not been possible to treat in detail all the implications of separating types of incident into "situational" and "guided" forms. For the moment, the objective is to get a large amount of quite varied research information into the hands of those who need it.

B. BEFORE Violent Incidents

Planning for police roles in the control of possible violent situations is, for reasons brought out earlier in this chapter, likely to be a complex matter. The varieties of confrontation in schools are numerous and call for an equally numerous variety of responsive tactics. By law, tradition and public sentiment, the schools constitute a very special sort of jurisdiction, under the intervening authority of school boards and administrators who have many--though changing--rights and responsibilities. Control by police of an actually or potentially violent situation in such a jurisdiction presents problems that do not arise in the streets and in other more "public" places. Finally, the collectivity whose violent potential is the subject of concern consists exclusively of adolescents whose perceptions of the issues, views of responsibility and authority, and response to the application of power are likely to be different from what could be expected of a street crowd of more random age distribution.

The review presented in this section addresses some of the main points police commanders might usefully consider in planning for possible high school confrontations, as these are expressed in or inferable from the recent research literature. The planning considerations treated below are organized under three logical headings:

1. The image of the policeman as guardian of public order in the schools and the bearing that this might have on his effectiveness in his legitimate law enforcement role.
2. Coordinated planning by school authorities and police commanders.
3. Strategic intelligence and indicators of potential violence.

The Image of the Policeman as Guardian of Public Order in the Schools

There is a widespread belief, frequently cited though never formally tested, that the use of police enforcement in high schools is potentially contributory to a continuing atmosphere of violence. Regardless of the validity of this belief, the very existence of the notion indicates that policemen have image problems that could well hamper their effectiveness in situations where they must act.

In a very general fashion, a high school principal¹⁰ has brought together the elements of this image problem:

One of the things that I learned from ... previous trouble was that police don't help a darned bit until you actually have a problem. They just antagonize people prior to that time.

The "people" who are antagonized, in many cases, will include both students and school staff, as well as--in many cases--members of the community. For the school administrator and his staff, the use of police enforcement is likely to symbolize a failure of their own authority and effectiveness. For the students and the surrounding community, the use of police enforcement may well exemplify the repressiveness of the society against which they had directed their protest.

The existence of these attitudes in no way negates the probability that police assistance will be necessary for the control of potentially violent confrontations. Given this probability, it would seem useful to seek ways of reducing hostility toward police, wherever possible. The recent literature on school

¹⁰As quoted in Kenneth L. Fish, Conflict and Dissent in the High School (New York: The Bruce Publishing Company; London: Collier-Macmillan, Limited, 1970), p. 52.

violence provides few clues as to the main issues of police-educator and police-student relationships and for suggestions on how to cope with them.

In the case of relationships between police officials and educators, the literature is virtually unanimous in underscoring the need for a mutual trust that specifically respects the authority of each side (thereby reducing the educator's anxiety about the need for police intervention). Furthermore, it is strongly suggested by most writers that all prior planning of the roles of police and school personnel take into account the authority and capabilities of each side, so that a maximally coordinated and efficient joint effort can be achieved.¹¹ The development of such a mutual trust and the planning of complementary and coordinated roles can take place only if there is close and continuing communication between school and police authorities well in advance of any threatening confrontation. These points are emphasized by a school attorney, Thomas A. Shannon:¹²

...if the principal and the police have a confidential "emergency plan," and it is reviewed from time to time with the police, the joint, overall competency of the principal "under fire" will be greatly enhanced... Moreover, the "emergency plan" should be reviewed regularly ... by the agencies which will implement it. Once an "emergency plan" is formulated, it is easy to become somewhat complacent--but personnel change and memories fade, so it is crucial that reviews ... be conducted on a regular basis.

The article from which the above-cited passage was drawn is distinguished in the recent literature by the emphasis and detail with which it addresses police-school communication and coordination. As a rule, these points are neglected or passed over very lightly, especially by those writing for a school readership. It seems likely that, in many cases, the initiative for joint planning may have to be exercised by public legal or police authorities, rather than by school officials. This initiative will be implemented the more effectively when all efforts are made to reduce the understandable anxieties of school officials over the apparent loss of their authority and control.

¹¹This point is addressed at greater length in the discussion of operations during a violent incident (see pp. 60-63).

¹²Thomas A. Shannon, "Legal Aspects of Confrontation," Journal of Secondary Education, XLV, 5 (May 1970) pp. 195-201, at pp. 198-199.

The image of the policeman in the eyes of the student and of the general public presents a complex problem with a considerable bearing on his effectiveness in planning for, and responding to, school violence. Much of the recent literature emphasizes the degree to which uniformed law officers raise "red flags" by their mere presence in school corridors. Frequently, too, it is pointed out that the generally negative image of police enforcement is made even more negative when the student body is drawn largely from black or other minority communities.¹³ Whatever the possible means for reducing the hostility to police presence in the schools, it is necessary, in the view of many contemporary observers, to accept the fact that this hostility is part of a broader social condition--and therefore not completely reducible. As one group of observers¹⁴ put it:

The individual patrolman must recognize that for some time to come he will be viewed by members of the center city community not as an individual but as an oppressive symbol of the dominant white society... the depth of hostility between the police and the ghetto resident means that the policeman will have to persist in his efforts to be "a good cop" without any significant rewards in terms of appreciation from the community he serves.

There seems to be a broad essential agreement that a police presence in the schools for the purpose of enforcement will never be seen as completely "acceptable" by students, regardless of their social background.

One common experimental approach to improving the general image of the police, in the eyes of students--and specifically in the school setting--is the routine assignment of police officers in counseling and teaching positions. Such programs have been in existence in some cities for many years and interest in them has been rising.¹⁵ A general evaluative article¹⁶ on these programs was published in a recent issue of the National Education

¹³Fish, op. cit., p. 53.

¹⁴James S. Campbell, et al., Law and Order Reconsidered (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 299-300.

¹⁵A later subsection of this chapter, on "Possible Student Roles in Coordinated School Security Planning..." considers in more detail programs which place police in closer relationships with the schools. See below, pp. 37-48.

¹⁶D. W. Robinson, "Police in the Schools," Today's Education, LIX, 7 (October 1970) pp. 18-22.

Association journal, Today's Education. This article brings together many of the basic and working assumptions of police-in-school programs, describes some of the programs and quotes a broad sample of opinion on their effectiveness. What the article does not provide is any systematic test of their effectiveness (this failure, unfortunately, is shared with most of the literature in the field of high school violence). If a rough analysis of opinions expressed by educators and others concerned with the schools may be taken as a sort of "test," the results are inconclusive. Little hard evidence is produced to show that the image of the policeman in his potential enforcement role is enhanced notably by a "police-in-residence" program.

To summarize the relatively sparse research findings on the image of the policeman as guardian of public order in the schools, it is possible to adduce a few general propositions:

- . 1 The coordinated planning of police and school authorities to meet the challenge of school confrontations will be enhanced by a due recognition of the legitimate authority of each side.
- . 2 The establishment of mutual trust and good working relationships between police and school authorities will depend, in large degree, upon the existence of close and continuing communication.
- . 3 To a considerable extent, hostility toward police in their enforcement role in the schools is irreducible, especially in poor and minority group communities.
- . 4 But, wherever possible, the obvious "red flags" (e.g., an all white police patrol in a predominantly black school) should be avoided.
- . 5 On balance, the "best" image of policemen as law enforcers in school encounters will be established by the fair and moderate application of statutory powers in response to clear violations of the law.

Coordinated Planning by Police and School Authorities

There is very little published material on police planning specifically for confrontations in high schools. By contrast, school authorities at all levels have written at some length on the response options for dealing with the contingencies of an increasingly tense world of high schools. In the degree that the police commander wishes to coordinate his own planning with that of school authorities, he should be aware of the thinking of the latter.

Many state education departments have drawn up policies, plans and model standing operation procedures for dealing with school confrontations.¹⁷ These "packages" normally contain a statement of minimal standards of order, a statement of the legitimate authority of principals and other school officials, and citations of state law supporting this authority. In addition, there are guides to specific actions by principals, teachers, supporting school staff and, when they are on the scene, police at different levels of confrontation. Little experience in implementing these state planning packages has been documented. Regardless of their effectiveness, however, the state plans would appear to be important materials for police readers, if only on the grounds that they illustrate the main lines of thinking of educators in coping with the problems of high school violence.

In one particularly thoughtful article, a school attorney, Thomas A. Shannon,¹⁸ has suggested a series of tactical questions that educators ought to consider in planning to cope with school confrontations. Many of the questions lie within the purview of school, not police, authority. Nevertheless, they address issues that would probably be useful to police commanders in developing their own thinking about the problem. Moreover, at several points there would appear to be issues relevant to the law enforcement task or on which police advice might

¹⁷Some of these are abstracted in: National School Public Relations Association, High School Student Unrest, 1969, pp. 27-48; and in Institute for Development of Educational Activities (I/D/E/A), Dissent and Disruption in the Schools, 1969.

¹⁸Shannon, op. cit.

be useful. As a careful and comprehensive frame of reference for thinking about school confrontations, Shannon's 16 questions deserve a brief paraphrase:

1. Who are the student activists?
2. What are their demands?
3. Are they organized?
4. Do they plan disorder in the school or will disorder be an accidental byproduct of their activities?
5. Are there nonstudent participants?
6. If there are outsiders, are they in clear leadership?
7. How effective (i. e., in influencing the crowd) are the leaders?
8. Is the leadership staying "on target" in regard to the issues or seeking to expand or divert the issues (e. g., from control of lunchroom menus to control of curriculum committees)?
9. Are the demands negotiable and the leaders reasonable?
10. Will negotiation with a confronting group or their leaders legitimize them or enhance their credibility beyond present levels?
11. Will negotiation set undesirable precedents for the future?
12. Is the student confronting group (or its issue) supported by the broader community?
13. How does the community look upon the high school?
14. What impact will negotiations/agreements with student confronting groups have on teacher morale?
15. How do most of the students look upon the confrontation and its issues?
16. How does the school board look upon the confrontation and its issues?

It is obvious that many of these questions address concerns that are within the purview of police interest and responsibility. For example, the question of outside leadership impinges upon that of trespass laws; similarly, the question of

broader community interest raises the possibility that the school confrontation is part of a broader pattern, with potential ramifications in the streets and other public places where police authority is exclusive and unequivocal. Even beyond those questions bearing directly on obvious police roles, this frame of reference is important in conveying the concerns of educators with whom police commanders will have to coordinate. Further, it provides a useful paradigm for generating questions that might be of more direct relevance to the police role in the prevention and control of violence in the high schools.

Possible Student Roles in Coordinated School Security Planning by Police and School Authorities

Insofar as current literature discusses police-school planning for the various emergencies which could lead to collective violence, it tends to consider the problem of planning as one which exists between the police and school authorities. The possible major and positive role of the student body--the largest single element of any school--in all phases of school security operations, beginning with planning, has received less systematic conceptual analysis or practical test, although there is widespread interest in developing police-school programs in which students themselves can have a major part. A number of programs for "involving" students in school security exist today; many give attention not only to planning before incidents of violence and crime, but also to roles students may have during and after these incidents.

"Junior Police" or "Security Patrols." There is, of course, widespread journalistic interest in reporting "junior police" or "student security patrol" programs at the junior and senior high level. Typical of this kind of report is the story captioned "All Kids Want To Be The Good Guy" in a nationally distributed Sunday-supplement magazine, where the Student Security Patrol at Woodbourne Junior High in Baltimore, Maryland is portrayed as putting "the troublemakers in the lawman's position."¹⁹ The school security officer in charge of this patrol is

¹⁹ George Kannar, "All Kids Want To Be The Good Guy", Parade, April 18, 1971, pp. 18-19, at p. 18.

quoted as saying that as a result of this program, "gang wars are averted, drugs have almost vanished, and vandalism is down an astounding 99 percent."²⁰ The basis of the Woodbourne concept is the use of the aggressive, troublemaking boys of this large, inner city school, to perform primary security functions, which include breaking up fights, policing hallways, and working in both intelligence and tactical support of police operations in and around the school. The Woodbourne Student Security Patrol appears, in this light, to be both protective and rehabilitative.

Beyond the clear tendencies of such articles to be uncritically enthusiastic, there are several problems created by this kind of report. Possibly the Woodbourne concept is well adapted to the specific customs and styles of the immediate feeder areas which send students to this particular inner city school. Would the concept work in another kind of inner city school environment, with different dominant cultural styles? Would it work in a large suburban high school, or in a large consolidated school drawing from quite different feeder communities?²¹ Only systematic testing and evaluation could tell. Furthermore, there is a critical policy issue in the degree to which students should overtly police fellow students, and be exposed to the role- and peer-group conflicts which often result. This becomes a particularly grave issue when students are formally sanctioned to use force against other students. The Woodbourne article reports a responsible school official who is in close touch with Woodbourne as observing that the school security officer in immediate charge "has managed to give membership in the patrol an aura of something to aspire to, not a job for finks or stool pigeons. The kids who associate with him learn a new respect for police authority."²² A fair question to ask here would be, then, whether this officer's techniques are

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ It should be noted that some school systems which bus students have experimented with using school safety patrols to keep order aboard the school buses. There appears to be little available, systematic data on the effectiveness of this use of school safety patrols.

²² Kannar, loc. cit., p. 19.

a result of special personality traits which are in short supply, or whether there are systematic methods which could be used in extending his apparent success to a variety of other jurisdictions, with a variety of other personnel?

The School Resource Officer. Instead of forming what could be too easily characterized as "junior police" adjuncts, a number of law enforcement agencies appear to be experimenting with the use of officers in school liaison roles. A good example of these programs is the School Resource Officer (SRO) program now operating in all ten junior high schools of Tucson, Arizona. In the explanatory brochure issued by the Tucson Police Department, the origins of the SRO program are traced to a 1962 study of the Flint, Michigan juvenile delinquency control program by the Tucson Police.²³ Placement of the SRO at the junior high level

was decided on the basis of needs. Analysis of available delinquency statistics clearly illustrated the fact that youthful anti-social behavior begins to blossom forth to a great degree during junior high school years. Additionally, we were confronted with the realization that up to 90% of pre-delinquent tendencies appear at some interval prior to the age of eleven.²⁴

Functioning from a regular office and role in the junior high school, the SRO is concerned not only with his school's premises and population, but with the surrounding community. His normal areas of responsibility include prevention of delinquent behavior by both day and night, investigation of violations, referral of youth problems to appropriate agencies outside the law enforcement and criminal justice sector, and conduct of formal classroom education in citizenship responsibilities, in both the home junior high school and in feeder elementary schools.²⁵ The SRO program is openly premised upon delinquency prevention and control;

²³ Tucson Police Department, School Resource... Delinquency, Prevention, and Control (Tucson, Ariz.: Police Department [n. d., current in 1971]), p. 2.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 3. Here as so often elsewhere, it must be observed that in order to anticipate and control events in the high school, it is crucial to begin work at the junior high ages.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 6-10.

thus, among the SRO's daytime duties are "surveillance and the prevention of gang fights, disturbances, liquor violations, bicycle theft, shoplifting, vandalism, auto theft."²⁶

The Tucson Police report themselves well satisfied with the results of this program; even during the 1963 pilot period, it had been observed that

- .1 Closer communication and coordination had been developed between the school, the police and numerous community agencies.
- .2 A well founded respect for our laws has been established in the minds of many of our youngsters. The School Resource Officer had become a friend and not an enemy to be feared.
- .3 Preventive efforts had proven to be partial cure to delinquent behavior. Additionally, child molesting had decreased.²⁷

It should be noted, however, that the SRO concept has its critics. Some critics of this form of police-school programs are especially fearful of the access school resource officers have to school information about potential delinquents:

It is this access to personal and often confidential records that has stirred the most severe criticism of these projects from civil liberties groups, churches, parent-teacher organizations, and other agencies interested in civil rights.

The entire concept of school liaison programs should be examined closely by police administrators. In view of manpower shortages, general administrative responsibilities, and particularly in view of the possibility that the officer will become the school disciplinary officer rather than a "friend" to students, police administrators should seek other means to provide services to youths in school.²⁸

²⁶ Ibid., p. 5.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 4.

²⁸ Jesse R. James and George H. Shepard, "Police Work with Children" in George D. Eastman and Esther M. Eastman (eds.), Municipal Police Administration (Washington: International City Management Association, the Municipal Management Series, 1969), p. 155.

That this may be too narrowly focused a criticism is suggested by one of the few presently available, carefully controlled opinion survey studies of the impacts of school liaison officers upon the attitudes of those in and around the schools. During late 1968 and early 1970, Bouma, Williams, and Dingman administered an "Attitude Toward Police" questionnaire to over 3,000 Michigan students in grades five through twelve.²⁹ These students were located in two school districts which had the Michigan State Police "police-school liaison officer" program, and in one control district without the program. Not only did they find overwhelmingly favorable opinions of the liaison program by students, school officials, and community adults whom they interviewed; they report a complex finding of great interest for police and school officials who are attempting to chart policies in today's difficult social climate:

... while pro-police sentiments stayed pretty much the same or decreased slightly from 1968 to 1970 in the program schools, in the control school without a police-counselor the pro-police sentiments showed a considerable decrease. Further, pro-teacher sentiments in the program schools markedly decreased during that period. Although one might have hoped for an improvement of attitudes toward the police, given a socio-cultural situation when pro-police and pro-teacher sentiments were declining, this maintenance of favorable police attitudes can be considered a contribution of the police-counselor program.³⁰

An important general implication of this finding needs highlighting here: too often, the crucial justification of innovative programs which extend law enforcement and criminal justice agencies into the community hinges on whether there are immediately expectable, measurable positive impacts. In the climate of the early 1970's, however, the best that may be sometimes attempted is to "hold the line," while carefully laying the base for future positive impacts. And it may well be that holding the line against further decline in favorable student attitudes toward law enforcement and criminal justice is a benefit which far outweighs possible

²⁹ Donald H. Bouma, Donald G. Williams, and Daniel J. Dingman, An Evaluation of a Police-School Liaison Program as a Factor in Changing Student Attitudes toward Police and Law Enforcement (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan Department of State Police, September, 1970).

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 46-47, emphases added.

fears from adult activists that police-school programs may open the schools to improper police penetration. Ultimately, local political authorities will have to weigh these values and decide for themselves whether and how police liaison programs may be useful for their schools and police departments.

Student Assistance in Total School Security Plans: An Evolving Program.

A currently evolving program which recognizes many of the problems of allying the police and the schools is the new comprehensive school security program of the Prince George's County, Maryland Public Schools. Prince George's is a most unusual "County" school system. Located immediately east and south of Washington, D. C., the 160,000 students in the Prince George's Public Schools live at the precise point where the ways of the Upper South meet the developing Northeastern Metropolis which begins in Boston, Massachusetts and ends at Richmond, Virginia. A rapidly growing system, the Prince George's schools exist in almost all the major presently known American social settings--from rural tobacco country to citified suburb to emerging slum. Major groups from the Washington, D. C. inner city Black ghetto are now moving across the border into this already complex social environment. Significant problems of both individual and collective violence are to be expected in such a dynamic situation, and the Prince George's County school system has not been without them.

After a particularly rough incident of violence at a high school athletic contest in late 1970, the Prince George's Superintendent of Schools took a step which is frequently useful in American society: he appointed a committee, which became known as the Committee on Police Assistance for Security at School Sponsored Activities. Composed of representatives of school principals, students, parent-teacher associations, the Prince George's County Police (the principal local police agency), school athletic interests, and top-level school administrative officials, this Committee set out to find more acceptable and more effective ways for bringing law enforcement agencies into working relationships with the schools.³¹ The Committee's task had been made especially urgent by increasing

³¹ A senior member of the research team which wrote this chapter was invited to sit as a consultant member of this Committee, and except for the very
(Footnote continued, next page)

evidence that high school students would actively oppose further school use of police, as traditional police tactical doctrines prescribed this use.

Both the origins and the final product of this Committee tell much about the special problems of police-school relations in many local American jurisdictions. A striking fact about the origin of this Committee was that it stemmed from decisions and appointments made by the School Superintendent acting on behalf of the Board of Education. Although in this particular case the Prince George's County Board of Education is appointed by the Governor of Maryland and not elected by the voters of the County, the important fact is that in common with many local American school boards, the Prince George's Board of Education has statutory authority and autonomy which make it in important ways independent of full control by the local governmental executive and legislative agencies which control other sectors of public policy. That the County Police would place a representative on a Committee appointed by the School Superintendent and later enter into special agreements with him regarding police support for emergent school security policies only reflects the frequent fact that in dealing with the schools, the police are dealing with a special, semi-independent branch of government, with its own strongly vested rights and traditions deriving from the special status education has traditionally enjoyed in the concerns of the American citizen.

This, in turn, gives the final product of this Committee special interest. What the Committee finally did was take a completely new look at the whole problem of police-youth relations which center on the schools. In doing this, the Committee was, by implication, exploring many other issues of police-community relations. Its final product, a new program for school security, embodied in a set of "Guidelines for School Security" which were quickly approved by the Board of Education, represents an attempt to develop new general attitudes and standards which can govern police-student and police-youth relations in the community

(Footnote 31, continued)

first meeting, he participated in all Committee work and in the various community presentations which came from it. This appears to have been one of the relatively few occasions so far when specialized research on the prevention of school violence has been immediately applied to the design of programs involving the schools and the police in coordinated, comprehensive efforts to control this violence.

formed by the school. Thus, the schools become smaller laboratories for larger community efforts to redefine relations with the police because the schools, themselves, are small communities. But since direct authority over these small communities is vested by law in school officials, any police attempts to work with the resources contained in these communities must be based in effective working relationships with these specially insulated officials. The manner in which the Prince George's Committee did its work and defined its final product reflects this fact widespread on the American scene. Time and again, the American law enforcement planner will find that effective institutional approaches to community youth must begin with an effective address to educators, who shape the major institutional form of community youth life outside the family.

For those who might wish to draw upon them for ideas, the "Guidelines for School Security" developed in Prince George's County are to be found in their entirety as the Appendix to this Chapter.³² Whether or not they wish to study them or use them in detail, however, police commanders with responsibilities for school security planning may well wish to consider several noteworthy principles contained in these "Guidelines," since in the near future--when eighteen-year-olds are voting and the full effects of the "youth movement" and campus protest reach the public schools--police planners may find these principles one of the more effective avenues of approach open to them.

Underlying the Prince George's "Guidelines" are these fundamental statements about what a school is--or should be--in America of the 1970's:

A school is a total community of individuals, each of whom has a responsibility for participating in a total, positively-oriented program of school security. (Section II. A.)

School security is therefore part of the larger school citizenship program, in which all members of the school participate as members of the school community. School security programs are not negative, repressive instruments to limit the freedom of individuals. School security programs are, instead, programs which recognize that each member of the school community has both responsibilities and rights. (Section II. B.)

³²Below, pp. 93-108.

In the broadest sense, the school community consists of students, faculty, administrative personnel, the custodial staff, and all other members of the larger community who are called upon to participate in school life. Thus, the police are members of the larger community who, from time to time, may be asked to function in the school community. While police never surrender their legal rights and responsibilities when entering the school community, they do function, at least temporarily, as members of a school community, and their presence in schools must be understood from that point of view. (Section II. C.)

In an approach to school security which is oriented to the school community, the police are but one group with rights and responsibilities. They are not outsiders who are brought in as a last resort. Rather, police are one of several key groups in school security, each of which has a distinctive role to play in dealing with problems for which it has special competence and responsibility. (Section II. D.)

From this general statement of philosophy, the Prince George's "Guidelines" move directly to operational concerns. For general planning and specific supervision of school security operations, a School Security Committee is established in each high school. Composed of representatives of all major constituent groups in the school community, including a permanently assigned police liaison officer from the County Police, the School Security Committee acts as the "school principal's primary advisory group on all technical problems of school security" (Section I. B. 2.). While preserving final authority with the principal--consistent with laws which vest that authority and responsibility in him--the "Guidelines" now offer the principal a technical resource forum for dealing with all problems of planning for and managing the varied security problems which he may encounter today.

Not only is the School Security Committee charged with drawing up a School Security Plan in which police perform clearly understood and agreed roles, the School Security Committee is also to supervise another distinctive element of the Prince George's program: the group of "School Service Aides" which will be established within the student body of each high school. These Aides will be given primary "school host" roles to perform at all school athletic contests and social events, as specified in great detail in Sections IV and V of the "Guidelines."

Readers familiar with the controversies which sometimes attend use of students in school security functions--to which partial reference was made in the earlier discussion of the Woodbourne Junior High Student Security Patrol--will note that great care has been taken in the "Guidelines" to limit and define the Aides' functions, and to see their functions as part of the responsibilities of citizenship to which school citizenship programs today seek meaningful student exposure. But the key emphasis here is on meaningful exposure, to real responsibilities. Adults are frequently ready to support citizenship training as long as it involves the harmless role-playing of student council politics, or is carefully isolated and insulated from risk. In contrast, youthful citizens appear more and more to seek citizenship responsibilities which can involve them in the real conflicts of role and values which go with actual citizenship. Thus, as the Committee writing the Prince George's "Guidelines" became more deeply involved in its work, it found that because of the County's proximity to Washington, D. C., numbers of high school students were going in to observe the various peaceful and violent demonstrations which had become a fixture of the capital city's life since 1967. These students were returning with stories about police and student marshals' tactics, and with intelligent interest in how their own experiences might be applied in stabilizing their own school environments, particularly when outsiders come in to accelerate or create violent incidents which can close the schools.

The "Guidelines" therefore emphasize careful democratic selection of the School Service Aides, and intensive practical training in the whole range of situations and personal dilemmas they are likely to encounter as they perform their separate, distinct, non-police role in school security (Sections VI and VII). Some of this training assumes that the student Aides will be in conflict management situations with fellow students at least as strenuous as those in which they have seen their age-peers engaged as demonstration marshals in Washington. Part of this training must include, therefore, familiarization with police techniques and tactics, and establishment of person-to-person working relationships between carefully selected police officers and student Aides.

Will the Aide program and the larger Prince George's approach to the "total" high school security problem work? More will be known soon if, indeed, the County schools can proceed with their plan to install this total program in ten pilot high schools beginning in the Fall of 1971.³³ In advance of this actual experience, however, the Prince George's effort has several points to commend it to the police commander faced with planning high school security now.

First, throughout the Prince George's program the emphasis is on careful advance planning, specification of roles and missions, and a deliberate desire to eliminate the police image as "heavies," as "enforcers," who come in, heat up the action, and make it all even more exciting and interesting. Police experienced in high school outbursts of violence know without being told that the excitement brought by sudden introduction of police into a school is often viewed as an additional thrill by those who want trouble.

Second, the emphasis on the school as a total community may offer the police a new positive role to perform in that community, provided that students will accept a broadened definition of their own responsibilities as well as rights. Whether students can be brought to accept this broadened view of their school is one of the most difficult social questions of this era. There are lots of seemingly easy dodges still available, including the increasingly less relevant and meaningful plea that kids should not be forced to "rat" on other kids. When the "kids" are now voting at eighteen, they are also on the threshold of discovering how difficult are the community responsibilities that go with full citizenship. However much or little the "kids" are willing to broaden their perceptions of their role in their school community, the police will be inescapably involved in one way or another in dealing with the consequences.

Third, the Prince George's plan implicitly recognizes that even if conventional police practices are to be applied to school security planning--and particularly to effective planning to deal with high school violence--there is an urgent

³³This pilot program includes a scientific evaluation of program effectiveness in reducing violent incidents at high school activities.

need to encourage development of a more positive, more cooperative tone in many high schools. Establishment of school security committees and school service aides is at least one way of trying to create an infrastructure of security leadership within the school, so that there is someone beyond the often overloaded principal to whom law enforcement officials can turn for at least quiet, low-profile, behind-the-scenes help. This does not mean that police commanders can or should expect student tactical support when they enter a school under emergency conditions. In fact, the Prince George's plan specifically suspends Aide functions when police must officially enter a crisis situation (Section I. B. 3.). What this structure does imply is, however, that the school is no longer from a police point of view a disorganized, incoherent tangle of erupting elements. At the very least, the members of a school where there is a within-school security structure should be able to provide effective and continuing intelligence to a total security planning effort. Proper provision of these enhanced intelligence capabilities can be, standing alone, a critical factor in reducing the likelihood of major collective violence.

Strategic Intelligence and Indicators of Potential Violence³⁴

Perhaps it belabors the obvious to emphasize the importance of strategic intelligence, yet this importance cannot be overrated. Regardless of whether it ever becomes necessary to intervene, the police commander must maintain a good current knowledge of what is going on in the schools within his jurisdiction. Most broadly, the strategic intelligence file, whatever its sources, should provide the commander with information on:

- Tensions in the student bodies--both those clearly arising out of the school situation and those "imported" from the community and the broader society.
- Leadership (by individuals and groups, both from within and from outside the school) capable of organizing militant groups and provoking unlawful or violent mass actions by students.

³⁴The emphasis in this section is on background intelligence, to facilitate prior planning of possible police roles in possible encounters. A later section of this chapter (pp. 53-59) discusses tactical intelligence to guide police operations during existing violent incidents.

- Principal themes of protest, which could provide the specific issues for demonstrations and other mass actions.
- Strategies for coping with school tensions--both those of school administrators and those of other concerned community agencies.
- The status of various indicators of possible violence, developed from experience in schools, generally, and from experience in schools within the commander's jurisdiction.
- The physical setting in the schools--the staging areas and the routes of movement of potential disrupter groups.
- The daily routines of the schools--particularly the patterns of assembly and dispersal--to pinpoint likely times for mass action.

A file of intelligence on these and other areas of information will support the police commander in:

- Developing contingency plans for operations in various kinds of foreseeable violent situations.
- Allocating manpower and materiel to the general area of policing high schools, both on a current and a contingency basis.
- Coordinating with school authorities, to
 - provide advice, where possible and appropriate, on management of existing and foreseeable crises.
 - develop joint contingency plans involving various kinds and levels of police participation.
 - arrange for the exchange of tactical intelligence in the event that serious trouble develops.

Little has been written on the subject of strategic police intelligence, specifically in the high school context. One fairly recent pamphlet of the International Association of Chiefs of Police³⁵ provides a generalized outline of considerations, sources and methods of intelligence on civil disorder. This document, literally in outline form, provides a structure for an intelligence system at the department level. Some highlights of its recommendations include:

- Limitation of access to the chief of police and to members of the intelligence unit.

³⁵Operational Guidelines: Community Tensions and Civil Disturbances (Washington: Management and Research Division, International Association of Chiefs of Police, July 1967), pp. 6-7.

- Systematic collection and analysis of protest literature and other materials aimed at influencing public opinion.
- The assignment of intelligence unit personnel as observers at demonstrations and rallies.
- The development of a broad base of sources, drawn from every sector of community activity.
- Systematic collection of maps, building plans and other aids for the prediction of spatial distributions of disturbances.
- Development of community background information to establish indicators of potential trouble.

In the case of the schools, the point cannot be made too strongly that much of the strategic intelligence must come from the administration and the staff. Quite aside from the fact that schools are special jurisdictions, subject to the authority and responsibility of a well-defined administrative system, the "undercover" tactics of intelligence are largely foreclosed by the obvious difficulties of "planting" police observers who could blend into a background of adolescents. The basic information must therefore come from persons who are continuously and intimately associated with the school--most notably the principal and his staff. The importance of good police-school communication, a continuing theme in this chapter, is therefore reiterated.

On one primary aspect of strategic intelligence--the indicators of possible or impending disturbance in the schools--there has been some research and writing. Unfortunately, most of the materials on this subject have been produced by, and from the point of view of, educators. As a guide to police commanders, therefore, such materials can only be of very general use, perhaps principally to help in the formulation of more specific questions and intelligence categories. It should be kept in mind, moreover, that these lists of indicators represent, for the most part, a cataloging of experience, with little attempt at formal (i. e., statistical or experimental) testing. Nevertheless, there is enough correspondence on many of the indicators among the lists to suggest that they are drawn from a broadly shared base of experience and common sense.

A typical list of indicators was drawn up by the Bureau of Administrative Leadership Services of the Pennsylvania Department of Education.³⁶ This list groups specific indicators into three substantive categories and one residual (miscellaneous) category. The substantive categories can be summarized as follows:

- School dissatisfactions (i. e., issues likely to be raised):
Teacher/administrator malfeasance; poor teaching methods; poor curriculum; tracking; inequities in treatment of minorities; objectionable disciplinary procedures.
- Lawlessness: Increase in police/student contacts; increase in school vandalism; increase in use of alcohol and drugs; weapon-carrying by students; rumors of conflict; threats to teachers.
- Student actions: Use of delegations to present a point of view; various changes in the absentee pattern; interethnic conflict; appearance of an underground newspaper; growing and consistent infractions against school regulations; reports of emotional statements made in classrooms; far-out clothing/hair styles; high school student participation in activist college student organizations.

In thinking about the foregoing (or any other) list of indicators, it is well to remember that these reflect largely untested experience. What has been reported as experience in Pennsylvania may well be different from what could be reported as experience in New Mexico. Further, many of the "indicators" may happen to be listed simply because they did appear at about the same time as the manifestations of high school violence. Without a more careful demonstration of specific linkage with the violence, such "indicators" may not be any more predictive than, say, the appearance on the market--at about the same time--of a new brand of bubblegum.

Obviously, the police commander, or anyone else who seeks to think seriously and constructively about the environments and conditions of high school

³⁶ As reproduced in Institute for Development of Educational Activities, Inc. (I/D/E/A), Dissent and Disruption in the Schools (1969), pp. 29-30.

violence will want to define possible indicators in a fashion reflecting the realities of the specific high schools in his jurisdiction. At a bare minimum, the definition of indicators--and their use--by the police commander should involve the cooperation of school administrative personnel and of other persons and agencies actively and continuously in contact with the student population of the community.

C. DURING Violent Incidents

When a violent incident occurs, the dilemmas and ambiguities of the police role must be faced directly. If it is generally true, as suggested elsewhere in this chapter, that police intervention is best kept to a minimum, it is also true that the existence of violence is perforce a police concern. If the distinction between "situational violence" and "guided violence" is important in prognosticating possible incidents, it is equally important in deciding how actual incidents must be handled. And if the traditional prerogatives and legal obligations of principals must be considered in planning for possible responses to school violence, they become one of the primary concerns when police action is inevitable.

Available research literature dealing with actual confrontations--and especially literature providing practical guidelines for dealing with such situations--is quite rare, and most of it has been written for, and from the point of view of, educators, rather than police. Implications for police roles must, in consequence, be derived secondarily from the educator's view of the environment. This would seem generally appropriate, if the primacy of the educator's responsibility for the school and its pupils is to be accepted, but it also underscores the need for close and continuing communication between police and school personnel.

From another point of view, a review of recent (1968-70) literature regarding high school violence--and especially violence that can be described as "guided" or "provoked"--calls forth some areas where police concern should be more manifest. These areas are intelligence and tactics. When police are actually called in to control a situation within the school, this generally will have happened because the situation has gone beyond the competence and resources of

the school administrators. At this point, it is absolutely indispensable that the police have, and act upon, their own understanding of what is happening and what must be done about it.

The review that follows is intended to provide the police reader with insights from the available literature which:

- .1 will orient him to the high school environment as it is seen by those who work in it daily;
- .2 will orient him to prevailing points of view among principals and others who must cope with potential and actual violence before it becomes a matter of police attention; and
- .3 will make manifest the most important gaps in analysis, knowledge and understanding of the process of induced violence in the high schools.

Tactical Intelligence: A Primary and Continuing Need

If the police commander is to exercise his responsibilities properly, whether or not he enters a high school situation, the obvious prime requisite is a good base of tactical intelligence. The problems in acquiring and maintaining this base are many and complex. More obvious limitations³⁷ on the development of good operating intelligence on any civil disturbance include shortages of manpower and resources, the legal and constitutional restraints of a free society and, in the case of the high schools, the intervening authority of the principal and the school board. The existence of such problems, however, in no way negates the importance of tactical intelligence.³⁸

³⁷J. F. Coates ("Some New Approaches to Riot, Mob and Crowd Control," pp. 127-139 in Law Enforcement Science and Technology, II, IITRI, 1969) discusses many of these limitations briefly, but lucidly.

³⁸An exhaustive outline of considerations, questions, sources and methods of intelligence on civil disturbances generally is provided in Operational Guidelines: Community Tension and Civil Disturbance (Washington: Management and Research Division, International Association of Chiefs of Police, July 1967), pp. 6-7.

It is suggested that two important sources of operational intelligence may be usefully employed to provide the police commander with guides to action and to keep him informed about the current status of schools in his jurisdiction. The first of these sources is an accumulating record of eyewitness accounts and of operational experience regarding the development and actual outbreaks of violence--especially provoked violence. The second source is the continuing situational estimate of principals and other school personnel, for whom an awareness of trouble, actual or potential, is a professional responsibility.

A survey of the literature on school violence in the period 1968-70 turns up a singular irony: STUDENT RIOTERS HAVE DEVELOPED MORE SYSTEMATIC THEORIES OF POLICE TACTICS THAN POLICE HAVE OF RIOTER TACTICS--OR AT LEAST, THE RIOTERS HAVE WRITTEN AND DISSEMINATED MORE THAN HAVE POLICE. A glance at the flourishing world of high school underground journalism will show the degree to which school disrupters have thought about, theorized on and written about the anti-disturbance strategies and tactics of police authorities. Whether or not these theories are completely accurate, they reflect a considerable sensitivity and tactical sense.

To take a single example, the New York High School Student Union has disseminated a leaflet³⁹ which provides the participant in disturbances with a full scenario of likely police actions and responses through the course of events from confrontation to arrest and booking. Opening with a section entitled "Confrontation," describing common "stop-and-frisk" tactics, the leaflet goes on to counsel general silence under different kinds of interrogation. Under headings titled "Preparation for a Demonstration" and "In a Demonstration," useful information is provided on self-protection from nightsticks, tear gas and mace, and

³⁹ Reprinted in full on pp. 110-114 in John Birmingham (ed.), Our Time is Now: Notes from the High School Underground (New York: Praeger, 1970).

In the Alternative Press Index, issued periodically by the Radical Research Center at Carleton College, regular headings such as "Repressive Tactics," "Arrest," etc., group scores of titles that suggest that the underground press is generally assiduous in collecting, maintaining and disseminating current intelligence on law enforcement operations.

on the alleged presence and probable tactics of police agents provocateurs. In sections dealing with arrest and interrogation, there is a full treatment of the kinds of information that will be sought by the police, the tactics of interrogation and the rights of the arrestee.

This sort of "operating manual," based upon thorough intelligence (whatever the degree of its current accuracy) can be written largely from the accumulated observations and experiences of participants in past actions; no "undercover" work is necessary. If any analogous compilation of POLICE OBSERVATIONS OF CURRENT DISRUPTER TACTICS has ever been assembled, it is certainly not in the public domain and probably has not had very wide private circulation.

It can hardly be asserted that disrupters and other leaders of disturbances--in high schools or elsewhere--will display the same pattern and predictability of tactics commonly observed in law enforcement personnel; for one thing, the former are not bound by legal and constitutional restraints. Nonetheless, there are evidences of some degree of regularity and pattern in the development of high school confrontations. For example, in a report published by the National Association of Secondary School Principals⁴⁰ on high school disorder, the question of pattern and predictability is put thus:

- Remember that disruptive events are rarely carefully planned or programmed. Disruption is triggered often by the smallest, apparently insignificant occurrence. ...

[BUT]

- Know potential disrupters personally and develop a "feel" for how each one might react in a tense situation.

While denying the frequency of a "guiding hand," the author asserts the need to develop a "feel"--in effect, a predictive feel--for the behavior of known disrupters. This is tactical intelligence developed by the observer. In this particular case,

⁴⁰ Stephen K. Bailey, Disruption in Urban Public Secondary Schools (Washington: National Association of Secondary School Principals, Nov. 1970), p. 51. [Note: This is an abridgement of the Syracuse Report, op. cit.]

the intelligence belongs to a principal, not a police commander, but it illustrates the kind of information that can feasibly, and should, be gathered for the diagnosis and reaction to actual or potential situations of violence.

Evidence exists, furthermore, that much of the disruption and violence in high schools of the late 1960's fell into a partly discernible pattern of development. Witness, for example, the self-aware and very analytic account,⁴¹ by an organizer, of the development, through use of issues and organization, of a "movement" in New York high schools:

We'd been organizing in the high schools for two years already-- there was a small group of people who had been around that long-- but we had never related our programs to the schools that much. You know, we had been talking about "stop imperialism; stop aggression," but they were just words. So we went into the schools to talk about the schools. And it started out with some very Mickey Mouse stuff. You know, about dress codes ... From there we quickly got into free speech stuff. Because no matter where you start in the high schools, you have to get into free speech, because they won't let you say anything. They won't let you give out papers... In the beginning it was all very exciting. We were a new thing--it started with 300 kinds at the founding convention. And then we were all big for the revolution. But in a month or two it started to really fumble. And then the teachers' strike started. ... And here the teachers' strike was really heavy stuff... Of course we were against the strike because it was racist. So during the strike, the Student Union went around opening up schools. Parent groups and the Board of Ed ... couldn't keep the schools open. ... But when we opened a school, we could put kids into and actually run it. So we did that and we gained momentum.

Much of the foregoing account rests, probably, on hindsight. Nonetheless, the analysis betrays a strong awareness of the interplay between "hot" issues and mass organization. A similar awareness, on a current basis, would have provided an important framework of operational intelligence--first, for the school authorities, and second, for police commanders in the event of necessary intervention.

⁴¹ From an interview with Robby Newton (by courtesy of Smuff, 1, no. 2) reprinted in John Birmingham (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 15.

It would seem obvious that the best source of tactical intelligence on a given incident will be a well informed school administrator. If anyone knows what is happening (i. e., as defined by issues, leadership, level of current or probable violence, etc.) in a given school, it will be the principal, along with others who share a daily involvement with that school. Clearly, the quality of the intelligence will vary, for the degree of "touch" maintained by school administrators will vary.

A report on a racial disturbance which occurred in the school system of White Plains, N. Y.⁴² in March 1968 provides a detailed account of administrator diagnosis and response. Again, of course, this report is written from hindsight, yet it provides evidence that the principal of White Plains High School, his staff and the school system administrators had made systematic attempts:

- to examine the issues and determine realistic responses.
- to assess the probabilities of actual violence (as opposed to the simple infractions and illegalities represented in marches and unauthorized assemblies).
- to evaluate the level of actual violence and respond in a measured fashion.
- to maintain a minute-by-minute touch with the developing situation.
- to keep police authorities informed of the developing situation and alert for possible intervention.

Overall, the White Plains narrative illustrates the development and use of good tactical intelligence by school authorities and the effective communication of that intelligence to police. It would appear that White Plains police authorities had much the same view of the situation:

According to Police Chief Henry, the rapport with the schools was good. Men were on hand to deal with the situation if it became

⁴² White Plains Board of Education, High School Racial Confrontation: A Study of the White Plains, New York, Student Boycott. Student Unrest and Changing Student-Staff Relationships in the White Plains Public Schools, September 1967 to December 1968 (White Plains, N. Y.: Board of Education, 1969).

necessary. However, there was nothing serious enough to warrant the police taking action on their own. . . . He indicated that really serious disturbances tend to be created when authorities intervene in situations with which they do not have the resources to deal. His feeling was that Superintendent (of schools) Johnson was [well] advised to handle the matter as he did, rather than try dealing with a group of that size without proper resources.⁴³

A review of literature bearing upon collective violence in the high schools through the last two years of the 1960's provides a summary lesson in the matter of tactical police intelligence which can be expressed in a few general propositions:

- .1 There is a lack of documented experience on the dynamics of confrontation in the high school situation. This potentially valuable aspect of tactical intelligence is treated only in the most cursory fashion, in the police literature, as a set of general propositions about the "choreography" of agitation.⁴⁴
- .2 Conversely, student demonstrators have well formulated theories--grounded in experience-- about the probable tactics of police.
- .3 An effective school administrator knows the backgrounds, and predicts the outcomes, of violence in his school--and probably better than anyone else. The school administration should be considered the prime source of tactical intelligence in the event of violent incidents, and channels of communication should be established to ensure the timely sharing of this intelligence with cooperating police authorities.
- .4 Even when actual police intervention is improbable, the cooperating police authorities should be kept abreast of the situation, as well as of the nature of, and reasons for, the administrative response.

In addition to these general propositions and guidelines, it should be noted that there are certain specialized intelligence services which police and school authorities may require in support of their joint efforts to define as well as control certain complex situations. A recent case from New York City

⁴³ White Plains Board of Education, op. cit., pp. 35-36.

⁴⁴ See the reviewer's commentary on Rex Applegate's Riot Control in the annotated bibliography to this chapter, below, p. 111.

provides an excellent example.⁴⁵ On Friday, March 12, 1971, a high school principal alerted the appropriate security officials that a number of students of Puerto Rican origin were demanding that the school be closed, to protest the alleged killing of three "innocent students" on the campus of the University of Puerto Rico in San Juan that day. Emotions were high; there was some prospect of violence. Unbeknown to the principal, school security officials, and, probably, cognizant police commanders was the fact that both English and Spanish language media were already carrying true accounts of what had actually happened. What had actually happened was that two law enforcement officers and one ROTC Cadet had been killed in an outburst of campus violence in San Juan. These facts were easily available from the English language radio (for example, the "All News" coverage of WCBS) by noon, and from El Tiempo, a major Spanish language daily, by early Friday afternoon.

An excellent tactic for correcting the student misperceptions which were being used to instigate this protest, and its possibilities of violence, would have been to have made the true facts immediately available from the Spanish language media. This would have required immediate access to an ongoing Spanish language monitoring service, which could have stated the true situation and immediately invited the students to correct their impressions against evidence being presented to them in Spanish. A non-Spanish speaking official could have been alerted to the need to consult this Spanish monitoring service by his own check of the English media--or by checking with a "situation room" which was monitoring the English media.

It goes without saying that few cities have such capabilities easily available for tactical support of efforts to control dangerous school situations. Nevertheless, the "rumor control centers" which have been used in recent major civil disorders provide ample evidence of the needs for extending this type of support service to school officials and police working with the schools.

⁴⁵ This case was witnessed at the time by a writer of this chapter, who was consulting with security officials of the New York City Board of Education.

Making the Entrée

When police intervention within the high school has become inevitable-- either because it has been requested by school authorities or because it is warranted by a clear emergency, the personnel responsible for making the entree will face certain legal, jurisdictional and tactical problems. In varying degrees, these problems are addressed in recent research literature.

There is a fundamental, though resolvable, division of responsibility under law between school authorities and police authorities in the matter of high school disturbances. In the first place, there is the body of legal tradition that invests school authorities with rights and responsibilities in loco parentis. To be sure, the rights have been considerably foreshortened by recent court decisions⁴⁶ explicitly extending constitutional guarantees to students within the school. But the question of responsibilities has not seen a parallel change. It would appear that principals continue to bear the traditional liabilities for the health and safety of their students. The persistence of responsibility could be a complicating factor in a principal's decision to call police and in his relationships with a police commander on school grounds. On the other hand, there is the simple statutory requirement that the police enforce the law, moving against actionable offenses, where they occur. This statutory responsibility is put perhaps most directly in a recent pamphlet of the American Civil Liberties Union:⁴⁷

Where disciplinary problems involving breaches of the law are rampant, schools cannot be considered sacrosanct against policemen and the proper function of law officers cannot be impeded in crime detection.

⁴⁶ For example, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U. S. 503 (1969) the U. S. Supreme Court ruled that student expression of opinions could not be abridged except upon clear evidence that such expression is materially interfering with appropriate discipline in the operation of the school or colliding with the rights of others. See, for a good summary of this case, Institute for Development of Educational Activities (I/D/E/A), Dissent and Disruption in the Schools: A Handbook for Administrators (Melbourne, Fla.: I/D/E/A, 1969).

⁴⁷ Enclosed in EPS/NSBA Educational Policies Resource Kit 70-7, 1970.

Current literature suggests that this division of responsibility does not often obtrude as an explicit barrier to police-school cooperation. Nonetheless, at another level, school administrators appear generally troubled about the role of police in their jurisdictions. It is recognized--in the words of one educator--⁴⁸ that when police are called:

There is an implicit transfer of authority to the chief of police or whoever else is in charge. The principal--and those above him in the ... administration--should understand that authority now rests with the police chief, not with the principal.

It is only human that this transfer of authority, or its mere prospect, would be undesirable to an administrator, perhaps making him reluctant to call police when there is clear need or perhaps causing him to withdraw his vital cooperation. Here again, good continuing communication would seem to be the obvious way to forestall or cope with this conflict. Another approach to the problem--reported at some length in the literature--is the prior establishment of clearly defined and appropriate roles for police and school authorities. Examples of policies that define such roles are provided in a recent survey by the National School Public Relations Association.⁴⁹ The California state plan, as outlined in the NSPRA survey, emphasizes the parallel roles of police and school authorities at various points in the development of a school riot. Basically, the principal's role entails reasserting his authority and "reading the riot act" (i. e., provisions of the state code covering unlawful behavior in schools). The police role, in addition to taking such measures as are necessary to control of the situation, entails communicating by word and action a complete support of the principal's statutory authority.

Prior agreement between school administrators and the police on contingency plans for handling disturbances is emphasized in the available literature.

⁴⁸ Kenneth L. Fish, Conflict and Dissent in the High Schools (New York: The Bruce Publishing Co.; London: Collier-Macmillan, Ltd., 1970), pp. 52-53.

⁴⁹ High School Student Unrest (Washington: Education USA, Special Report, 1969), pp. 27-48.

Fish,⁵⁰ for example, sums up the case (from the principal's point of view) in the following terms:

The principal, superintendent, and police officials ought to meet well in advance of any trouble and discuss the possibilities of disorder, the point at which to call police, and what training and attitudes the police officers are likely to bring to bear upon the situation.

Such prior agreement, along with carefully worked out role definitions, would seem to be the most effective way of assuring a smooth, coordinated, efficient and minimally violent response to a school disturbance.

Even after it is determined that a police presence is necessary, there are several options in regard to the kind, purposes and personnel of the intervention. For example, the initial entrance may be specifically for the purpose of exercising normal police routines in direct confrontation of disorderly students; it may be for the purpose of dealing directly only with outsiders or selected identified ring-leaders; or it may be for the purpose of assessing the situation--and perhaps advising school personnel-- and intervening only in the event of extreme emergency. The presence of police as "low profile" observers and possible backup force is described in the account of the White Plains incident.⁵¹ In this case, a police sergeant and several patrolmen, all dressed in plain clothes, had been stationed in a room adjacent to a scene of tension. When trouble appeared imminent and the police were prepared to act, the school staff negotiated continued withholding of force and managed to deal with the situation. In this case there was, by all evidence, good contingency planning, good coordination and excellent communication between school and police.

Based upon findings in the published research literature, it is possible to state tentatively and very generally the following propositions in regard to the entrance of police to disturbed high schools:

⁵⁰ Fish, op. cit., p. 53.

⁵¹ White Plains Board of Education, op. cit., p. 20.

- .1 Prior communication and joint planning between school administrators is absolutely essential if the entrance of police is to be made with maximally efficient use of capabilities of both school and police.
- .2 A clear prior understanding of the operational roles and responsibilities of school and police personnel should exist before entrée.
- .3 Police entrance to a disturbed school may be effected at any of several stages--ranging from passive disobedience to raging violence--and for purposes ranging from observation and back-up force to downright intervention; the police entrée should be made with the lowest possible profile, but with clear planning for any necessary shift in tactics.

The Police-Student Confrontation

Two points are emphasized in the research literature on high school violence:

- Once police action has become necessary, the initiative must rest in the hands of the police commander.
- Direct police action must be applied specifically and solely for the restoration of order and for the enforcement of statutes--not for the enforcement of internal school discipline.

In regard to the first point, the California state plan⁵² is typical and explicit in its guidelines. The roles--throughout the course of a disturbance--of the principal, the administrative staff, teachers, custodial staff, clerical staff and selected parent observers are defined very carefully. In the event of a police action, all but the principal are removed from any major communication with dissident students. The principal communicates to the extent of asserting school authority, issuing warnings and making final appeals for order. All matters involving physical contact with students are entrusted to the police. Wherever such contact is mentioned in defining the roles of other persons, it is in the form of an explicit prohibition.

⁵² High School Student Unrest, op. cit., 41-45.

The second point--the legitimate areas of police enforcement--underlies many of the anxieties and disputes regarding the role of police in the schools. On the police side, there has long been a certain reluctance to accept as legitimate the responsibility of the law officer to maintain routine school discipline, simply because such responsibility is extraneous to the normal police mission. This point of view was expressed succinctly, for example, by Deputy Chief Tilmon B. O'Bryant,⁵³ of the Metropolitan Police, District of Columbia:

The first responsibility of the police [in the schools] is to protect the students, the faculty, and the citizens residing in the area surrounding the schools, and to protect the property of the schools and of the citizens. ...

Deputy Chief O'Bryant follows this simple statement of responsibility with a warning against entangling police personnel and operations with goals that belong properly to the schools.

On the other hand, the need to limit police action to clear emergencies and obvious violations of the law is underscored by the suspicions of civil liberties groups (and major segments of the general public) that law officers may use their powers abusively, or may be used abusively by school authorities. This suspicion is reflected in the paraphrase of a statement by the Arizona Civil Liberties Union,⁵⁴ which expressed the fear of:

...the indiscriminate interrogation of students; ...the establishment of a network of informers; and the use of police officers as school disciplinarians.

In summary, the current thinking on the police role in schools justifies the assertion that police--when directly confronting school rioters--should limit their attention to clearly actionable offenses and to undeniable hazards to the safety of people and property.

⁵³ As quoted by D. W. Robinson in "Police in the Schools," Today's Education (LIX, no. 7, October 1970, 18-22), p. 22.

⁵⁴ As quoted by D. W. Robinson, Ibid., p. 20.

It is precisely in the area of tactics that the available literature is weakest--understandably, since most of it has been produced by and for educators. Two points do seem salient, however:

- There are situational factors--school architecture and space use patterns, for example--that bear important relationships to the course of events in a confrontation.
- Experience--at least as documented in the educators' literature--indicates that the separation of ringleaders and disruptors (whenever they are clearly visible) from the mass of participants is a fast and effective "cooling" tactic.

Situational factors relating to the development of violence in any given school should be easily identifiable to its principal, if he has thought about, and planned for, a possible confrontation. The intelligence background that should have been developed in communication with school authorities before any action by police could usefully include any aspects of school architecture, customary patterns of assembly and dispersal of the student body (i. e., on a normal day, as opposed to the patterns that may have developed during the period of tension), cliquing and ganging among students, the presence of outsiders, and many other factors. That principals do, indeed, think very practically about these matters can be seen in the reflections of one of them, Dr. Kenneth L. Fish:⁵⁵

There are a number of lessons to be learned from the City High School story. A clear and practical one is that the cafeteria is the hot spot. This is the most problem-prone area in a school, and the lunch hour is the most critical time of day. Most of the principals in the scores of disrupted high schools ... would testify to this.

A second message that emerges from this is to avoid holding mass protest meetings or confrontations ... during the school day. This should not be interpreted as advice to avoid communication and negotiation. Far from it. These processes should and must occur, but under optimum conditions. ... A mass meeting of 300 people excited about emotionally charged issues will probably turn into a shouting match.

⁵⁵ Fish, op. cit., p. 29.

Obviously, Dr. Fish's remarks are directed at principals. Yet, when the situation reaches proportions demanding police attention, the police commander might well ponder (and consult the principal in regard to) such questions as the tactics of evacuating a disrupted cafeteria, the barricade and patrol tactics necessary to prevent the congregation of large numbers of students in any central location (especially a "hot" one like the cafeteria), or the means required to disband a large and potentially riotous crowd.

The general layout of a school property--buildings and grounds--requires attention in planning tactics. The large number of exits in White Plains High School was cited, for instance, as a major problem in the control of the student body.⁵⁶ Another example of conscious attention to layout in the design of tactics is provided by the patrolling procedures of the special police squad assigned to Kettering High School in Detroit, Michigan. In this case, a sprawling campus surrounding a one-story building is covered by a highly mobile patrol on motor-scooters, whose riders can quickly reach and disperse unlawful and threatening assemblies of people.⁵⁷

Where the violent incident clearly falls into the "provoked" category--where there are visible "cheerleaders" and "orchestrators"--the common wisdom calls for the separation of ringleaders from the mass of students. The various state contingency plans deal with this problem in various ways.⁵⁸ For example, the Delaware plan provides a tactic for identifying "hardcore" demonstrators and isolating them from the mass, simply by applying the definition to students who refuse to return to class, ordering such students immediately from the school and requesting the arrest of those who do not leave. The California plan instructs the principal to ask students to separate themselves into "hard core demonstrators" and those willing to return to class. In the case of the former group, a variety of approaches, ranging from warning, through suspension

⁵⁶White Plains Board of Education, op. cit., p. 37.

⁵⁷Syracuse University Research Corporation, op. cit., p. 45.

⁵⁸High School Student Unrest, op. cit., pp. 27-45.

and arrest are prescribed. In addition, the state plans pay explicit attention to outsiders, who may well be agitators and, in any case, do not help the situation by their presence.

Here again, the tactics are those that belong properly to the school administration. Nevertheless, the very presence in school of a police force indicates the necessity for cooperating with, advising on, or modifying the principal's plan. The plan, therefore, becomes a consideration in tactical design.

Command-control and communication assume a major importance in any serious outbreak, whether in a high school or anywhere else. In a school, bells and public address systems are crucial elements of potential order or disorder. The bell system, in most schools, inspires an almost reflexive mass movement of students--for class change, fire drill or dismissal. In the wrong hands it can be used for obvious mischief. Similarly, the public address system can be used to produce order or to provoke crisis. These two systems are given explicit attention in the various state plans. The Wisconsin plan, further, provides for a cut-off of all student access to telephones, in order to prevent the congregation of parents, friends, and, perhaps, non-student activists outside the school.⁵⁹ When a force of police move into a school, the problem of effective and orderly communication is compounded, of course, in the degree that new channels and communicators are added. Operational communications must be passed among members of the force; it may be desirable to maintain communications between dispersed elements both of the police and of the school staff; and both police and school staff may need to communicate to students. Obviously, a major problem in organizing equipment and procedures must be addressed in designing tactics.

Dealing with the large majority of students who have a minimal role or none at all in the disturbance (except, perhaps, for their presence on the scene) will usually be within the capabilities of the school staff. Nonetheless, given varying levels of confusion--and maybe violence--police assistance may be

⁵⁹High School Student Unrest, op. cit., p. 41.

required. Every one of the state plans cited in the NASSP document (High School Student Unrest) calls for the return of students to their classrooms and, where necessary, their retention in class until the incident is under control. The movement of large numbers of students from some central point to dispersed classrooms, especially if a hardcore contingent opposes this action, may require police coordination and protection.

In the degree that it is addressed at all, the question of what the police actually do in direct confrontations is answered by most writers with two fairly obvious injunctions:

- Use absolutely the minimum force necessary to get the situation under control.
- In socially (usually racially) tense situations, do nothing and say nothing that will exacerbate the underlying problem.⁶⁰

The literature leaves untouched many other obvious questions in respect to specific police actions and options. Some of the most obvious would include:

- The size of the intervening force, given different kinds of violent incidents.
- Patterns of force deployment (e. g., central formations vs. dispersed formations, stations vs. patrols, etc.), given different kinds of violent incidents and their settings.
- Arrest/no arrest policies, as designed to fit given situations and to complement and support school administrators' emergency plans; the use of citations and parent referrals.

These and many other questions of tactical policy and practice can only be answered by a comprehensive survey of police and justice agencies.

In summary, the published literature is very thin in regard to the tactics of police-student confrontations in high schools. The following, very general

⁶⁰ See Fish, op. cit., p. 53, on the importance of racial balance in police units sent into high schools.

propositions seem justified by the little documentation that is available:

- .1 The police task must be carried out under the dominant initiative of the police commander, though it should be coordinated with the school administrator's plan.
- .2 Police action should be aimed solely and specifically at the emergency and at clearly unlawful behavior, rather than at offenses merely contravening school discipline.
- .3 The tactical plan should be framed, as far as possible, well in advance of need, and it should take into account such factors as the physical layout and space-use patterns of the school, as well as the principal's experience and hunches on how to avoid and minimize trouble.
- .4 Careful planning and use of communications is important. All facilities should be in the control and under the coordination of the police commander and the principal, to permit clear communication, at need, within and between all groups involved, and to prevent their malicious use by disrupters.
- .5 "Hardcore" disrupters must be separated from the mass of students and removed from the building--either by voluntary exit or, after warning, by arrest.
- .6 In general, the restoration of peace and the safety of the students is best served by a dispersal to classrooms. In certain situations it may be necessary to provide police support and direction for this dispersal.
- .7 It is important to avoid all deeds and utterances that could lead to a charge of "police brutality" or "racism."

After Control is Established

Beyond the oft-repeated position that police should be withdrawn as quickly as possible, the literature has little to say on what must be done to stabilize the situation and prevent the recurrence of trouble. When the main force should leave, whether a hall patrol should be left behind, and how much of a patrol should be left in the adjacent streets are all questions for which there are only few and vague answers.

In some cases, the principal or the board of education may close down the school for a "cooling" period. This cooling off period will certainly buy time for the planning of strategies to avoid recurrences of violence. On the other hand, it may well turn out to present its own version of civil disturbance. Many of the issues underlying the school incident may be the subject of broader concern. An example of such broader issues is, of course, racial tension. Professor Alan F. Westin⁶¹ estimated that more than one-third of all high school protests occurring in a four month period during 1969 had roots in racial tension. The closing of a riot-torn school under these circumstances, no matter how justified from the point of view of the school, may provide the fuel for a broader street confrontation. This possibility should be kept in mind by both school and police authorities, when they are planning their next moves.

Whenever the school resumes operations, there remains the question (largely unanswered) of the level and kind of police presence. Most of the recent educators' research emphasizes the importance of mobilizing broader community resources to deal with tense situations. For example, the Syracuse report,⁶² in a section entitled "Engagement of a School's Natural Community," suggests a number of ways in which the people and service organizations of a school's feeder areas might be called upon to help out--to reduce or prevent, as well as to respond to tensions in the high school. One of these ways is through the formation of a standing (as opposed to ad hoc) crisis group, including school personnel, students, parents, community leaders (no mention is made, by the way, of police commanders) and others, to plan and implement strategies of crisis avoidance and management. Another recommendation was the establishment of a corps of paid, neighborhood-based security aides at the school. Such aides, patrolling the halls, would (with powers not specified) seek to maintain order among the pupils and regulate the access of outsiders.

⁶¹ As quoted by Fish, op. cit., p. 9.

⁶² Syracuse University Research Corporation, op. cit., pp. 54-58.

If these and other community involvement plans are implemented in a situation where police have had a hand, it would seem obvious that the local commander or his representatives should cooperate and provide advice. At the very least, when civilian security aides are bearing the main burden of school patrol, police advice and cooperation are clearly indicated. More generally, the police are, after all, a community resource and should properly take a hand in dealing with problems that are in their legally defined purview of responsibility. How this can be done specifically in the aftermath of a school crisis is, unfortunately, not spelled out in the available literature.

One remaining area of consideration on the police role in the aftermath of a violent incident arises out of the distinction between "situational" and "provoked" violence. Logically (unfortunately, the documented experience is not available) it would seem important to design school-block and within-school tactics to respond to the basic nature of the disturbance. Without suggesting that "situational" or "provoked" backgrounds are mutually exclusive,⁶³ the relative importance of intentional agitation, from an identifiable source, should be considered. When, as was the case in the New York City disturbances of 1969,⁶⁴ there is an identifiable corps of organizers, the tactic of choice may well be to prevent its members from aggregating and "firing up" a crowd. By contrast, when the issue is more broadly and diffusely felt by a majority of the students, the removal, isolation or other treatment of leaders may have less of an effect.

⁶³ One example of how this distinction can break down is provided by Fish (op. cit., p. 161), who points out that some "...potential outside agitators are the ... dropouts and pushouts." In other words, the "provokers" may be among the victims of the "situation."

⁶⁴ Robby Newton's claim (Birmingham, ed., op. cit. p. 18) that a "... few hundred [Student Union organizers] can close the schools down..." may be slightly exaggerated, yet organized agitation was clearly effective in this case.

D. AFTER Violent Incidents

When the violent incident is over and the police have withdrawn from the high school--then what? What happens in the aftermath of police intervention will be influenced by:

- The nature of the violent incident and the course of events in the police-student confrontation--the acts, issues and provocations; the nature of the police action and its results; and the perceptions of what happened held by the police, by the students and by the school personnel.
- Issues, attitudes and tensions in the surrounding community--community perceptions of the incident and of the roles of all concerned (police, students and school personnel); prevailing attitudes toward order and dissent, collective violence, and responses and countermeasures, more generally; and perceptions of the relationship between the issues of the school confrontation and those concerning the broader community.
- Issues and attitudes in the nation, as a whole--for instance, the prevailing popular views and the emerging legal interpretations of the rights of students and the authority of school administrators; the climate of popular opinion and public policy on matters of order and dissent; and the possible relationships between the issues of the specific confrontation and those of broader national concern.

THE SPECIFICS OF EDUCATOR, STUDENT, POLICE AND PROSECUTING ATTORNEY PERCEPTIONS OF THE "RETURN TO NORMALCY" ARE VITAL ELEMENTS IN SHAPING AFTERMATH. Each of the possible views of reality has its consequences for action and reaction:

- Do educators or students, or both, see the newly peaceful situation as STALEMATE?
- Or as A LULL TO PERMIT TWO ARMED CAMPS TO REARM? (And the POLICE TO PONDER MORE RAPID, MORE EFFECTIVE INTERVENTION on the next go-round?)

- Or as AN END TO CONFLICT, A PERIOD IN WHICH THE WHOLE SORRY MATTER CAN BE SWEEPED UNDER THE RUG, WHERE IT WILL SAFELY REMAIN?
- Or as AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE PARTICULAR ISSUES underlying the confrontation?
- Or--least likely and yet potentially most promising--AS A WORKING BASE FROM WHICH TO DRAW COMMUNITY, LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, EDUCATORS AND STUDENTS TOGETHER IN COMMON CAUSE?

After violence, as much as before it erupted, the key to subsequent events really lies in the perceptions and behavior of school administrators, faculty and students. If these groups are demonstrably working together, the very fact of their unity is persuasive in the community. Thus, REGARDLESS OF POLICE EXPECTATIONS OF THE FUTURE, if the perception of the situation in the high school is that a stalemate has been reached, student resentments and faculty and administrator anxieties will be conducive to further violence, situational or provoked. Students who took part in the initial violence need not be present for the emotional atmosphere of stalemate to hang over the student body as a goad. This would appear to be one of the dangers of relying on closing the school after police intervention for a cooling off period.⁶⁵ Moreover, in such a setting educators, administrators and the police are unlikely to think in terms of preventive cooperation and judicious planning for future contingencies.

⁶⁵ Kenneth L. Fish. Conflict and Dissent in the High Schools (New York: The Bruce Publishing Company; London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1970), p. 53, recommends closing the school as a possibly suitable alternative or sequel to calling the police. In the immediate context of that recommendation, his concern with the pros and cons fails to deal with the smouldering propensities of a stalemate. No focused discussion of this point has been found in the literature, although thoughtful reading of, for example, Libarle and Seligson (eds.) The High School Revolutionaries (New York: Random House, 1970), or John Birmingham (ed.) Our Time is Now. Notes from the High School Underground (New York: Praeger, 1970), documents student perceptions of individual civil group resentment, unrest and reaction, i. e., stalemate. See also Fish, op. cit., pp. 21-22, discussion of the "Westville High School disturbances."

Since student, faculty and administrator reactions to police presence in the educational establishment are overwhelmingly negative,⁶⁶ if the quiet after violent confrontation is interpreted as a lull in which the opposing camps--the Establishment and the Students--regroup their forces and rearm, the aftermath of violence would appear to have a high likelihood of producing new and perhaps more bitter violence. Students have expressed variations on the regrouping/rearming theme; administrators and faculties have not overtly voiced the view in the materials examined. Where such a mood prevails, the likelihood of renewed violence is high.⁶⁷ Predictably, the police will again be on call, this time to deal with more bitter, better experienced combatants who now probably are armed with a knowledge of their rights.

The unreality of the ostrich view is patently obvious. Even where it is less apparent, the radical students have recognized the possibility--in their eyes, the actuality--of this approach and lampooned it in devastating prose. Administrators who close their minds to a need to resolve some of the issues which surfaced with violence miss constructive opportunities to take preventive measures to plan for minimally provocative responses to violence.

In the best of circumstances, educators will see in the return to "normalcy" the opportunity to resolve the particular issues of the moment and to enlist administrators, faculty and students in an exploration of meaningful concerns and

⁶⁶ The negative view is amply documented in student and educator writings. The exceptional case is of an understanding of mutual, continuing efforts to prevent violent confrontation such as is described in High School Racial Confrontation (White Plains, N. Y.: White Plains Board of Education, 1969).

⁶⁷ See Libarle and Seligson (eds.), op. cit., p. xvi, for a description of the Edcouch Texas High School situation as an example. At Edcouch the school administration had called in the police and the National Guard to arrest the students. Although the courts later overthrew the actions of the administration and the school board, the authoritarian rules which provoked the Mexican-American student demonstration persist. The editorial comment on aftermath is "The ill will and animosity between the administration and the students remain." The description of the Seaford High School (Delaware) black student sit-in and the subsequent Board of Education special meeting in which it was decided that future disruptions would be handled by suspensions, expulsions and police action can also be read in this light.

acceptable solutions. Even in this ideal instance, it continues to be a bold innovative stroke for a school board, a superintendent or a principal to involve the police and the law enforcement officials in such exploration and planning.⁶⁸

All of the alternative perceptions of the post-violence situation in the high school have important implications for, and are in turn affected by, the tactics and behavior of the police in putting down the violence and the prosecutors in applying legal sanctions after the fact. On the scene choices have to be made by the administrators and by the police. OPTIONS ADOPTED have implications for the immediate context, as we have noted earlier; they ALSO HAVE a LONG RANGE INFLUENCE.

It is incumbent, therefore, upon the police and other law enforcement officials as well as the educators to maintain a current awareness and comprehension of the changing legal interpretations of student freedoms and educator authority. The police chief and the patrolmen need to know what educator decisions concerning the use of police in controlling violence may be successfully challenged in the courts, and how to communicate their knowledge, with constructive alternative suggestions, persuasively to educators. Actions taken by police and prosecuting attorneys at the behest of school authorities, which subsequently are overruled by the courts, contribute nothing satisfactory to the aftermath of violence.⁶⁹ The legal options available to high school principals when confrontation occurs have been summarized recently for principals as follows:

⁶⁸ See the White Plains case study, High School Racial Confrontation, for an illustration of the preventive value of pre-disruption planning between school administrators and the police.

⁶⁹ Good sources of current understanding of the constitutional interpretations which protect students and limit educator authority include: William E. Griffiths, "Student Constitutional Rights: The Role of the Principal," The Bulletin of the National Association of Secondary School Principals, LII, 329 (September 1968) pp. 30-37; Edward Dauber, The Developing Law in the Academic Community on Matters Involving Students and Teachers (Boston: National Association of Independent Schools, September 1969); EPS/NSBA Policy Educational Policies Resource Kit: JC--Student Rights and Responsibilities (Waterford, Conn.: Information Clearing

(Continued, next page)

1. Enforcing school regulations which delineate standards of acceptable student conduct necessary to preserve educational decorum;
2. Arranging for the enforcement of the criminal law by law enforcement authorities; and
3. Resorting to the civil law to control conduct through injunctions or wardship orders, or citations for contempt of court for violations of court orders.⁷⁰

This is standard, of course. The advice to principals which is given in this same context is worth consideration by the patrolman and the police chief:

THE USE OF ANY OF THESE THREE LEGAL TOOLS IS THE APPLICATION OF LAWFULLY CONSTITUTED POWER. AND THE EFFECTIVE APPLICATION OF POWER IS A DELICATE MATTER ... THE PROBLEM IS SELECTING THE RIGHT SCHOOL REGULATION OR LAW, UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES, WHICH WILL BEST HANDLE THE BEHAVIOR PROBLEMS ALWAYS GENERATED BY CONFRONTATION....⁷¹

Both police and educators will be well advised to take thought for the long range implications as well as the short range consequences of any of the available options.

If the high school principal has come across and heeded advice all too rarely given in the literature examined, he will have developed

... as quietly and unobtrusively as possible, a plan of action with local law enforcement officers and prosecuting attorneys. If order cannot be maintained, if the normal functions of the high school are interrupted and cannot be restored, and if educational

Footnote 69 (Continued)

House, EPS/NSBA, March 1970); Dissent and Discipline in Secondary Schools: Course Materials (Ann Arbor, Mich.: The Institute of Continuing Legal Education, 1970); and Student Protest and the Law, and Student Protest and the Law II: The 1970 Scene (Ann Arbor, Mich.: The Institute of Continuing Legal Education, 1970); Thomas A. Shannon, "Legal Aspects of Confrontation," Journal of Secondary Education, XLV, 5 (May 1970) pp. 195-201.

⁷⁰ Thomas A. Shannon, op. cit., 197.

⁷¹ Shannon, Idem. Emphasis added.

objectives cannot be attained... [the only] acceptable alternative is to call for assistance... only the police can give.

... The kind of cooperation between the principal and the police to handle the problem in the best manner possible will not be as readily developed in the heat and passion of an actual school disturbance... However, if the principal and the police have a confidential "emergency plan," and it is reviewed from time to time with the police...⁷²

the conditions exist for cooperation which enables police and educators to work together to prevent or minimize undesirable aftermath effects.

The treatment of the high school student by police and by educators before, during and after a violent disturbance in the school does indeed influence the course of events and the nature of consequences. Brammer's advice, meant as a preventive, is also a useful cue for police in their on-going relations with teen-agers:

We should treat teen-agers as mature and responsible; but they should then be held as strictly accountable for their acts as an adult...⁷³

⁷² Shannon, op. cit., 198.

⁷³ Brammer, op. cit., 21.

CHAPTER I

PART III

TYPES OF VIOLENT INCIDENTS WHICH MAY
DRAW POLICE ATTENTION

Steps Toward a Unified Framework for
Defining and Coping with Violence

PART III

TYPES OF VIOLENT INCIDENT WHICH MAY
DRAW POLICE ATTENTION

Why Think About "Types" of Violent Incident?

Law enforcement and criminal justice officers develop certain ways of mentally grouping together the great variety of particular cases with which they must deal. As with other areas of work which require managing a great many different sorts of events, the work of law enforcement and criminal justice requires the development of a professional perspective which permits placing different sorts of experience into a relatively small number of categories. The reason for this is simple: a man cannot think of everything at once, and to make "sense" of what is happening every day, he must develop a way of systematically organizing, of systematically "sorting," his experience, so that he can refer the constant barrage of new experience back to some stable framework he carries with him from situation to situation.)

Just as in so many other professions, the law enforcement and criminal justice professional feels a deep inner need to make sense of his experience by organizing it into different types. When working with high school violence, he knows, for example, that in some kinds of schools (the large urban high school), he is very likely to encounter types of violent incidents which are associated with racial clashes. He knows that in other kinds of high schools (white suburban), he is likely to encounter the New Left protester, who generates types of school violence based on ideologies or intellectual programs. But he knows also that there will be times when racial factors somehow combine with protest ideologies to create a continual series of violent incidents. He may sense that in important ways, this third type of violence is not quite like "strictly racial" or "strictly ideological" violence. It is like both of them, yet it is neither one of them.

Here the thoughtful law enforcement and criminal justice professional will experience the need for a more complete set of types to use in thinking about

violence in the high school. Particularly when he is relatively senior in the command or administrative chain, he is aware that violent incidents come in many forms. They reflect social changes which may not have begun when he was in high school. They come in great numbers, stretching already thin police and court facilities. They require careful forward planning with touchy school officials--yet situations can vary so widely and involve such relatively new and complex factors (for example, the spreading drug traffic; the school being integrated by "bussing"), that a professional can be baffled as to how best to plan. So, the official in charge must hunt for similarities and differences among the kinds of situations for which he must conduct planning and operations. He hunts for one unified scheme for looking at the kinds of high school violence which confront police and criminal justice officials. To have such a unified, exhaustive descriptive scheme allows the responsible official to know whether he has planned for all the situations that are realistically possible. He needs such a scheme especially when he can't be sure, because of the rapid course of events, that he has thought of all the ways in which situations do vary. A good descriptive scheme will allow him to think systematically about what may happen, even when it has not yet happened, so that the uncertainty inherent in non-experienced but knowable future possibilities can be reduced.

The kind of scheme needed for both planning and operations has various names. Sometimes it is called a "conceptual framework." Sometimes it may be called a "typology," which is one word for a "systematically integrated set of types." By whatever name, a systematic framework for thinking about a complex variety of events should enable the observer to reduce these events to a few types, which, taken together, account for all the basic variations of which it is useful to take account. Barton's words are helpful and directly applicable here, even though he was concerned with analyzing types of disasters, and not types of violent incidents:

The best way to develop understanding of this set of events is to find several basic dimensions on which these situations vary, which will help account for a wide range of differences. Combinations of positions on these dimensions will then constitute

types; members of each type will behave in a similar way, if we have chosen the dimensions well.⁷⁴

For those who must plan for high school violence, what are the important dimensions which seem to underly the similarities and differences among types of violent incidents? There are many possibilities. One might be size of school. Another might be the degree to which different racial groups--in different racial mixes--are present. Still another might be the degree to which there is ongoing community conflict and violence in the sending area from which students come to the high school. The purpose of this final and relatively short Part of this chapter will be to suggest that there are a certain few critical dimensions in describing and planning for operations against high school violence. These are included in the dimensions common to all types of collective violence which form the subjects of this collection of studies.

Choosing the Dimensions and Defining the Types of High School Violence

The basic distinction: SITUATIONAL versus GUIDED incidents. Attempts to put different events of human behavior into an organized set of types must quickly solve a basic question of what to emphasize. Often, the causes of a collective experience--whether it is collective violence or, for example, the much larger collective stress that goes with major disasters--overshadow the actual human event itself. A fire, earthquake, tornado, plague, tidal wave, or nuclear bombing is an event of great drama. There is a strong temptation to see each set of human consequences as coming uniquely from the particular dramatic incident, and to forget that human responses may have characteristic similarities even though the physical causes are vividly different. So it is with violent incidents. It is easy to become worried about the particularities of the special racial problems of a high school, and with "race" as a "cause" of "violence," and to forget

⁷⁴ Allen H. Barton, Communities in Disaster: A Sociological Analysis of Collective Stress Situations (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1969), p. 37, emphasis added.

that racial problems may be part of something much larger, which can be discovered only by comparing seemingly different kinds of violent incident. Similarly, it is possible to become both fascinated and furious with the high school agitator, and to lose sight of the possibility that protest may be part of something much more general in the organization and structure of the high school. But what takes the emphasis in trying to think systematically about violent incidents? Will it be the causes, in all their complexity? Will it be the violent incidents themselves, in all their variety? Can a way be found of distinguishing incidents by their different causes, without having the causes dominate the analysis of the ways in which the incidents themselves actually vary as real world events?

The working solution used here has been to make a basic set of distinctions among major types and subtypes of violent incident, according to what happens in the incident and what are the immediate causes of what happens, as these immediate causes can be most generally described. The primary emphasis is on what happens in the incident, and the secondary emphasis is on the immediate cause. In this chapter, the basic distinction between major types of violence has been the distinction between SITUATIONAL VIOLENCE, which results from the structure and organization of student life in the school, as this life is shaped by the mutual, daily interdependence of people, and GUIDED VIOLENCE, which results from some conscious attempt to precipitate and direct violence in the school. In Part II. A. of this chapter (above, pages 23-30, especially pages 27-29), there is a more detailed discussion of this distinction, and applications of this distinction will be found throughout Part II.

The power of this working distinction is that it permits an open focusing on the content and style of what is actually happening in the incident, as these are related to immediate causes actually working in the high school, without losing sight of the fact that in some situations, a great many things are happening all at once, which could make many other kinds of distinctions artificial. Take, for example, the problem of describing a racial incident. Just to label an incident "racial," and to isolate it from other types of incident, is often to lose sight of the fact that "race" is a part of the overall "situation" in many large center city high schools. As a part of the high school situation, "race" can erupt in spontaneous

clashes among members of different groups (thus leading to what can only be described as Situational Violence). Or, it can be part of the preconditions for skilled, articulate exploitation by agents of Black pride, the New Left, or other issue-oriented movements which are trying to provoke Guided Violence. Intelligent law enforcement and criminal justice response to "racial" violence must be prepared to make and work from the distinction between Situational and Guided Violence in racial incidents. Without making this distinction, these agencies can be dangerously overly reactive, or dangerously underreactive, or simply irrelevant in their responses to what is actually happening in the school.

But to note that in the case of racial incidents there can be both Situational and Guided components is immediately to raise the question of how to differentiate the two. What are the indicators of each major form, and when is one form in process of becoming the other? Do the two forms ever exist side-by-side? To answer such questions, it is necessary to look at the whole range of incidents grouped under the distinction between Situational and Guided incidents. When this is done, an important new set of facts appears to emerge. Not only is it possible to distinguish an additional and clearly demarcated set of subtypes, but these subtypes appear to exist in a definite relation to each other, such that the analysis of violent incidents can move all the way from a "pure type" of Situational Incident to a "pure type" of Guided Incident, with many variations between them. This is important not only for the researcher, who is trying to analyze all possible types and subtypes of violence; it is important for the planning and operating official, who must be as precise as possible about what it is to which he is responding, in each of the varied situations in which he must commit his resources.

The best way of approaching the total list of types and subtypes as they have so far emerged from present knowledge is to give them in outline form, as is done in Table I-2, page 86. It should be made clear at this point that these types are still in the process of development and application, and that when applied across the whole range of collective violence may prove of less use in the analysis of non-school-related violence. Given these cautions, what can the user learn from this framework of types about violent incidents in the high school, as subjects of police planning and operations?

Table I-2

MAJOR TYPES AND SUBTYPES OF VIOLENT INCIDENT
IN THE HIGH SCHOOL, GROUPED BY CONTENT OF
THE INCIDENT AND BY THE IMMEDIATE LOCATION
OF "CAUSES" IN THE ONGOING LIFE OF THE SCHOOL

- I. SITUATIONAL VIOLENCE--resulting from the structure and organization of students in school, centering on the mutual, daily interdependence of people
 - A. "Normal" to the school
 1. Accidental
 - a. Non issue-oriented
 - b. Issue-oriented
 2. Provoked
 - a. Non issue-oriented
 - b. Issue-oriented
 - B. "Abnormal" to the school
 1. Accidental
 - a. Non issue-oriented
 - b. Issue-oriented
 2. Provoked
 - a. Non issue-oriented
 - b. Issue-oriented
- II. GUIDED VIOLENCE--resulting from some conscious attempt to precipitate and direct violence
 - A. Provoked by SITUATIONAL factors (this probably the "cross-over case" from SITUATIONAL to GUIDED violence)
 1. Enhanced by students
 - a. Non issue-oriented
 - b. Issue-oriented
 2. Enhanced by outsiders
 - a. Non issue-oriented
 - b. Issue-oriented
 - B. Provoked by LEADERS or ORGANIZED GROUPS
 1. By students, acting as students
 - a. Non issue-oriented
 - b. Issue-oriented
 2. By students assuming a distinctive leadership role (e. g. : invoking "legal rights" of petition)
 - a. Non issue-oriented
 - b. Issue-oriented
 3. By students and outsiders acting jointly
 - a. Non issue-oriented (e. g. : gang fight influence)
 - b. Issue-oriented
 4. By outsiders in the first instance
 - a. Non issue-oriented
 - b. Issue-oriented (e. g. : outsiders as agents provocateurs)

From SITUATIONAL to GUIDED incidents. Responsible officials can use the types of violence listed in Table I-2 to reach a clearer understanding of the fundamental legal and operational question which confronts them before, during, and after incidents. The question can be simply put: To what degree are incidents the products of conscious attempts to provoke them, as contrasted with being products of the general situation in the school? The difficulty in answering the question begins, of course, in trying to say what "general situation" might mean. The school official often knows full well that some specific instigators of violence are in every real sense a product of the "general situation"--yet he cannot ignore these troublesome individuals who may have been problems to him for months on end. For law enforcement and criminal justice officials, the problem is even more complex. Often lacking proper liaison and tactical intelligence from school people, these officials will have difficulty in distinguishing who are the instigators, who are the followers, and what are the channels through which these individuals reflect or exploit the general situation in the school.

As school agitators increasingly attempt to goad police and court officials into overreaction and "repression," it becomes especially crucial for the law enforcement and criminal justice official to be able to distinguish the specific contributions made by "leaders," "followers," and "general situation." A fundamental objective of the school agitator must be to create an increasingly less stable, less safe school environment. Where no climate of Situational Violence already exists in a school, it may be useful to the agitator to try to create one, as part of a phased movement toward creating and sustaining Guided Violence in the school. Where there is a climate of Situational Violence, it offers obvious opportunities for exploitation by the instigator of Guided Violence. From the outset, however, police, legal, and school officials must be able to follow events occurring in the different channels which can lead from Situational to Guided Violence, as these channels are more or less consciously used by instigators. And this requires that all officials be able to see that some incidents are, in fact, not Guided but Situational. This ability is a necessary part of the armament of all officials against instigators of violence, for one clear implication of the underground literature school violence is that in the absence of enough instigators

to enter all schools, a desirable interim strategy is to create a "paranoid style" in school administration, in which officials react constantly and oppressively against imagined disrupters of school life.

So it must be clearly understood that not all violence starts as Situational and becomes Guided. The progression from Situational to Guided Violence, as outlined in Table I-2 and discussed here, is simply a set of possibilities, inherent in this way of analytically examining different types of violent situation. Nevertheless, these possibilities provide one device for systematically surveying all the different types of violent incident which may be of concern to responsible officials.

Reading down Table I-2, the list begins with that type of violence which is most closely the product of the "normal" state of affairs in the school. Note that the general type of Situational Violence is broken into two major subtypes: Normal and Abnormal. The difference between Normal and Abnormal is simply one of frequency of particular incidents. Thus, collisions and fights growing out of traffic jams in crowded hallways may be a daily fixture of life in a high school. They are in this sense normal; in addition, they are accidental; and when not between members of contending racial, social class, or ideological factions, best described as non issue-oriented. While annoying and potentially dangerous, they may be the nearest thing to what is truly "normal" and "accidental" in the daily professional lives of those officials who must deal with them. In some schools, provoked incidents may be Normal, Situational features of school life. These will be particularly frequent in special schools for adolescents with emotional problems (for example, the old "600" category schools of New York City). There, clashes among students and between students and officials may be routine, and quite consciously the product of individual impulses--even though these impulses may be "uncontrollable" and may be understood as such by school personnel. They will be particularly difficult to control, however, when protest ideology is grafted onto adolescent impulse, and Provoked, Normal, Situational incidents take on an issue-orientation as a rationalization for violence.

"Abnormal" Situational Incidents are that type of Situational Incident which strikes responsible officials as unusual but not necessarily attributable to anything but the total school situation. A school undergoing changes in its racial constituency is likely to experience an outbreak of racial clashes, hitherto unknown in the history of the school. For the sensitive principal, one of the most grave tactical indicators he must correctly read in the contemporary school world is the first racially-related or racially attributable incident. Did it occur accidentally? If accidentally, it may be the first taste of what will soon become a "normal" pattern of accidental collisions. Was it provoked? If so, are student or outside elements moving to use the tactical opportunity afforded by racial change to create an atmosphere of manipulable violence? In either of these cases, or in other imaginable cases, the outlook will be bleak for all responsible officials in the short term. But much can hinge on whether officials define this incident as abnormal but accidental and issue-oriented within the (changing) school situation, or whether they see it as abnormal but deliberately provoked around issues.

Quite a different kind of Abnormal Situational Incident can occur during the overheated high school athletic contest. There, adolescent emotions can lead to fights and rapidly spreading collective violence which has little ultimate reference to issues, even though it may have been provoked by an insult, or a bad break in the game, or by some symbolic provocation, such as degrading one contender's school symbol. Such incidents can create more problems for the provocateur than for the official who must control them, although initial damage may be greater to the official. The provocateur (whether ideologically oriented or simply bent on a prank or angry at the "enemy") may discover that once the violence has begun, it cannot be controlled for any purpose. It becomes a riot which must be put down with careful and conventional applications of tactical police force.

The Abnormal Situational Incident may be the first clue officials have that elements are at work to create violence in the school, for the very newness of an incident in the experience of responsible persons should cause them to look carefully at its causes. The critical question which must be asked in the aftermath of an Abnormal but apparently Situational case is: Does this constitute a

CONTINUED

1 of 5

"cross-over point" or "cross-over event" in a movement toward Guided Violence based initially on Situational factors? In short, is the violence assignable to Type I. B. or to Type II. A. ? On the answer to this depend many legal and operational questions. Are instigators working to trap officials into overreaction? Who should be held legally answerable? Should attempts be made to penetrate whatever group or movement is entering the school? What are the rights of officials to bring actions, when much of the evidence may be hearsay? How are instigators using potentially only marginal issues--such as matters of dress, matters of lunch time behavior, matters of smoking regulations--as platforms for more fundamental issues in governing school life? What are the ultimate objectives of the instigators? Are they to achieve change through violence, or simply to destroy the school as a functioning organization of people and facilities?

Further careful distinctions are in order once it has been determined that, in fact, attempts are being made to guide violence, either by provoking it or by enhancing it. Situational Violence normal to school life may simply be enhanced by provocateurs for their purposes. Racially-related clashes lend themselves to enhancement, as measured by an increase in their frequency and damage, by either students or non-student outsiders. The process of enhancing Situational Violence will, in this case, be based largely on issues--for example, Black Pride, Chicano Power, Revolutionary Demands. For purposes of restoring perspective on the current fascination with ideology by high school revolutionaries, it may be well for the responsible official to remember that some cases of Guided Violence, enhanced through exploitation of Situational factors, may be essentially non issue-oriented. An example here would be those occasional groups of tough marginal students--well known to high school people but the subject of little systematic study--who enjoy provoking violent incidents at sports contests simply because they enjoy violence and action for its own sake. A nice riot is all they want!

The other end of the list of types of violence is reached, of course, when Guided Violence is systematically provoked by leaders or organized groups. There are many specific possibilities, and the list under Type II. B. can probably be completed with relative ease by experienced professionals in schools, law enforcement, and criminal justice. What needs pointing out here is only that the classic

image of instigated violence--that is, violence which is provoked by outsiders using specific issues to cause trouble--occurs as only one (II. B. 4. b.) of many categories of leader- or group-provoked violence. Responsible officials will do well to avoid making this one category their only real working category for thinking about Guided Violence in the high school. It may be part of the "strategy" of essentially anarchistic, psychotic students to cause officials to adopt just this one explanatory type.

A concluding comment on this working typology. The user of this framework of types will note that no attempt has been made to give concrete illustrations for each subtype. In many instances, a particular subtype may be highly suggestive to experienced professionals, and the authors of this chapter would welcome learning from such individuals whether this typology did, indeed, enable them to remember and to organize their own experience more efficiently. It should also be repeated that this framework of types is still in process of development and test, and that its application to incidents of violence outside educational institutions may reveal deficiencies and limitations which are not readily apparent at this time. For the moment, the typology serves its purpose if all those responsible for coping with the problems of high school violence can be assisted in organizing the very different kinds of violence with which they seem increasingly to be confronted. Between Type I. A. 1. a., the Non Issue-Oriented, Accidental Incident Normal to the Situation, and Type IV. B. 4. b., the Issue-Oriented, Outsider- Provoked Incident of Guided Violence, there are many specific differences among violent incidents in the high school. A critical measure of adult response to high school violence must be, then, whether responsible adults can correctly define the nature of the incident, and quickly fit the exact response to the exact type of problem.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I

GUIDELINES FOR SCHOOL SECURITY

as developed by the

COMMITTEE ON POLICE ASSISTANCE FOR SECURITY
AT SCHOOL SPONSORED ACTIVITIES
PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS

and approved by the

BOARD OF EDUCATION
PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY
MARYLAND

June 1971

GUIDELINES FOR SCHOOL SECURITY

I. PURPOSE AND DEFINITIONS

A. Purpose

School people are becoming increasingly aware of the need to have more definitive policy and procedures in regard to school sponsored activities. Although Prince George's County has been fortunate in not experiencing widespread disruption, it is prudent and wise to establish acceptable principles and guidelines which will promote the maintenance of the kind of school environment which is conducive to the fulfillment of the purposes for which schools are established; namely, the effective and efficient education of boys and girls. Such guidelines should evolve through the active participation of members of the professional staff and representatives from various segments of the community. The Superintendent of Schools, in dealing with these concerns, appointed a committee to develop a county-wide policy for providing security at school activities.

The intent of these guidelines is to embody values and policy to assist responsible individuals in dealing with or preventing disruptive situations at school activities. Although these guidelines will prescribe specific programs and courses of action, they are not to be substituted for careful on-the-scene judgments by responsible school officials.

These policies and procedures should be helpful at several levels, as a resource for general planning procedure and as guides to concrete action should serious disruptions occur. Indeed, these guidelines should have a wide range of application from preventive measures and minor incidents to more serious disturbances.

B. Definitions

1. A SCHOOL SECURITY PROGRAM is a total set of security plans and procedures positively oriented to a specific school community, which consists of students, teachers, administrative officials, parents, custodial staff, and those members of the larger community, including police, who from time to time may be called upon to support those members of the regular school community who are charged with security functions.

- I. . B. 2. The SCHOOL SECURITY COMMITTEE consists of 8 members and is the school principal's primary advisory group on all technical problems of school security. The membership consists of:
- The principal;
 - One Student Representative chosen from the school's group of School Service Aides;
 - One Student Representative of the school's Student Council.
 - One Faculty Representative, who is also designated as Faculty Advisor to the School Service Aides in that school;
 - One designee of the School PTA, who may be the PTA President;
 - One County Police Liaison Officer;
 - One Liaison Representative from the Office of Security Services;
 - One Liaison Representative from the Office of Student Concerns.
3. The SCHOOL SERVICE AIDE is a duly selected and trained member of the student body who performs a defined school security role in accordance with the total school security program and the duties and responsibilities outlined in these guidelines.

The sole function of a School Service Aide is to assist the administration of the school during school-sponsored athletic events and social functions for the purpose of maintaining a wholesome environment. Should at any time the attitude reflected during such school activities necessitate the calling upon assistance of the Police Department, the call for which shall be at the sole discretion of the principal, or, in his absence, his designee, the School Service Aide's function, responsibilities and duties shall be suspended for the duration of such activity.

C. General Legal Interpretation Regarding School Service Aides

School Service Aides may be utilized only for school sponsored activities. The School Service Aides will have neither power of arrest nor the authority to act unilaterally in the name of the school.

Nothing contained herein should be interpreted as infringing upon the principal's responsibility for assuring the safety and security of his school. School Service Aides should be viewed as part of the total school security program and not as the primary body for controlling student behavior. By defining and delimiting the area of responsibility of the School Service Aide, it is believed that their success will be assured.

II. GENERAL SECURITY POLICY FOR THE SCHOOL COMMUNITY

- A school is a total community of individuals, each of whom has a responsibility for participating in a total, positively-oriented program of school security.
- School security is therefore part of the larger school citizenship program, in which all members of the school participate as members of the school community. School security programs are not negative, repressive instruments to limit the freedom of individuals. School security programs are, instead, programs which recognize that each member of the school community has both responsibilities *and* rights.
- In the broadest sense, the school community consists of students, faculty, administrative personnel, parents, the custodial staff, and all other members of the larger community who are called upon to participate in school life. Thus, the police are members of the larger community who, from time to time, may be asked to function in the school community. While police never surrender their legal rights and responsibilities when entering the school community, they do function, at least temporarily, as members of a school community, and their presence in schools must be understood from that point of view.
- In an approach to school security which is oriented to the school community, the police are but one group with rights and responsibilities. They are not outsiders who are brought in as a last resort. Rather, police are one of several key groups in school security, each of which has a distinctive role to play in dealing with problems for which it has special competence and responsibility.
 - A school security program therefore involves students, teachers, administrative officers, custodial staff, parents and peace officers from the larger community.
 - For different situations, different groups in the school security plan will have primary responsibility.
 - The primary responsibility for maintaining a school community where individual growth, learning and harmonious community life are the dominant values lies in the hands of students, faculty, and administration working collaboratively in regular ways.

- II. D. 4. In those parts of the school day where they are especially appropriate, a group to be known as "School Service Aides" will have the responsibility for community security functions. Working according to plans drawn in advance with faculty and administration, and coordinating their plans and actions through the School Security Committee, School Service Aides will have primary responsibility for hosting school athletic and social activities.
5. As part of the total school security services plan, faculty, administrative personnel, and police will have appropriate functions to provide *in support of* the School Service Aides. All phases of this support, as well as all use of School Service Aides, will be subject to the decision and judgment of the school principal, to whom the good order of the school is entrusted by law. But the principal should be guided in his judgments by the total school security services plan, which has been worked out by representatives of the school community meeting to advise him. In ongoing operations, the principal, School Service Aides, and all other members of the school community involved will be in timely communication and practice timely coordination of actions.
6. In a total school security services plan which involves all members of the school community, the police will have missions agreed in advance. While the entry of police into a school is always at the discretion of the principal, unless there is some clearly obvious danger requiring direct police action, a school security services plan which is oriented to the school community recognizes that the police role should be limited to those missions for which the police are professionally trained and legally responsible. Police are members of and participants in a total plan, in which they have specific, limited missions, at definable times.

III. THE SCHOOL SECURITY COMMITTEE

A. Membership

The membership of the School Security Committee has been defined in Section I.B.2., above.

B. Functions

As primary advisory group to the principal on all technical security problems, the School Security Committee:

- III. B. 1. Develops, in consultation with the School Service Aides, a total security plan oriented to the total school community and all of its activities;
2. Identifies and proposes timely policies and general solutions for particular school security problems;
3. Oversees the functioning of the School Service Aide Program in the school;
4. Provides centralized coordination for all security functions, varying from those of the routine school day or activity, to those which become important in times of emergency.
5. Acts, when required, as a referee of the election process through which the School Service Aides are selected, so that it can be guaranteed that the Aides have been chosen in conformity to the democratic procedures outlined in Section VI A and B, below. This is a crucial reserve function of the School Security Committee, since it is of absolute importance that the chosen Aides truly, democratically reflect the community composition of the student body.

IV. THE CONCEPT OF THE "SCHOOL SERVICE AIDE"

It is the intent of the Public School System of Prince George's County to support the development of a group of School Service Aides in each high school. These Service Aides will have primary responsibility for maintaining those athletic, recreational and social values which enhance the enjoyment and safety of all participants in school sponsored activities. "Participants" mean all individuals physically present on the scene, because everyone at the school function is necessarily "involved" in some way.

Functions of the School Service Aide should not normally include direct involvement or performance in areas exclusive of athletic and social functions. To delineate further, the School Service Aides should not be used as hall monitors, or in the capacity of checking school lavatories. Nor should the School Service Aide be enlisted in searching personal property areas such as student lockers or assisting in the investigation of school thefts. Furthermore, the School Service Aides should not be considered as a subordinate club, organization, division, or component of the local or regional student council, since their functions in the school community are a new, distinct, and specialized area of student responsibility. In participating in school security activities, the student council will be represented by a delegate who sits as a regular member of the School Security Committee. Nothing in this provision should be construed, however, as limiting or inhibiting the desirable cooperation and coordination which should exist between the School Service Aides and the school student council.

IV. It is conceivable that these students, through their active involvement in a service function, with guidance from responsible professionals, will develop deeper concepts of law enforcement, responsible participation, liberty, equality and justice, and the dynamic influence of social change on these concepts. It is our belief that students, as part of their citizenship training and as an exercise of their rights as citizens, should play a significant part in the maintenance of order, peace and safety in the school setting. Indeed, these policies and procedures may be considered as a part of the effort to create new viable models for civic education.

V. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SCHOOL SERVICE AIDE

A. General

Operating at all times under policy set by the Board of Education and the Superintendent of Schools, with authority delegated by the principal, and acting in communication and coordination with the principal and representatives of the School Security Committee, the School Service Aide will function as the primary host at selected school activities, and particularly at athletic contests and social occasions, including dances. In addition, the School Service Aide may function at such other times as the principal, School Security Committee, and representatives of the Aides mutually agree, consistent with general policies governing the use of School Service Aides.

B. Specific

The specific responsibilities of the School Service Aide will include, but not necessarily be limited to, the following:

1. At school athletic contests, School Service Aides of the home school will:
 - a. Act as the official school hosts for non-team visitors from other school(s), and work to set an overall tone to the athletic contest so that accepted values of sportsmanship can be maximized for all at the game.
 - b. Cooperate with coaching staffs, to assist in hosting members of the visiting team at all times they are present at the home school.
 - c. Cooperate with coaching staffs, to assist members of the home team in maintaining the values which govern athletic contests.
 - d. Help spectators locate their places and seats quickly and safely, and throughout the game, assist all spectators who have special needs for information or emergency aid.

- V. B. 1.
 - e. Courteously guide spectators in orderly and prompt departure from the completed game.
 - f. Maintain general observation of the crowd at all phases of the contest, particularly so that potential emergencies can be quickly anticipated.
 - g. Be alert for any individuals who attend the game for the specific purpose of disrupting it or harassing anyone present, so that these disruptive individuals or groups can be brought under control quietly and efficiently, in conformity to those procedures the School Service Aides, the principal, and the School Security Committee have mutually accepted.
 - h. In accordance with general procedures and lessons learned from their training, make the first official approach to disruptive individuals or groups, unless the situation has progressed to the point where immediate additional support is clearly needed.
 - i. Through their duly chosen School Service Aide officers whenever possible, maintain constant contact with the principal and the School Security Committee representatives on the scene, so that all responsible for the game can maintain a continuing, accurate understanding of the general situation in the crowd.
2. At school social functions, School Service Aides of the home school will:
 - a. In conjunction with authorized chaperones, act as official school hosts for all participants in the occasion, and work to set an overall tone which will maximize the enjoyment for everyone present.
 - b. Perform whatever management functions which it has been agreed by sponsors and school officials that they should perform. This may particularly include taking tickets and determining the identities of non-school visitors.
 - c. Maintain general observation of the function, so that participants may have whatever assistance is required and so that potential emergencies may be quickly determined.
 - d. Maintain continuing contact with other official persons charged with the safety and good order of the occasion.
 - e. In accordance with general procedures and lessons learned from their training, make the first official approach to disruptive individuals or groups, unless the situation has progressed to the point where immediate additional support is clearly needed.
 - f. Understand their particular roles in whatever plans they have participated in preparing for emergencies.

- V. B. 3. At both athletic and school activities, School Service Aides from visiting schools may perform some portions of some or all of the above functions, provided that there has been clear advance planning and continuing coordination with the School Aide officers and other responsible individuals from the home school.

VI. SELECTION OF SCHOOL SERVICE AIDES

A. General Philosophy Governing Selection

The selection process designed for choosing School Service Aides represents a different and unusual direction for student groups.

Choosing the "right" student or, for that matter, the individual best suited for an elected position of any sort proves often to be a difficult task. Given the limited political experience of junior and senior high school students, sound, mature judgment, involving school elections in general, becomes a much desired but not frequently attained goal.

Students, in the role of their own critics, are quick to point out that many of their representatives, whether they be student government officers or class officers, are not representative or are just not "their kind of people." In addition, well qualified, sensitive and well-intentioned students frequently reject the complete electoral process of school elections, claiming student speeches, posters, and campaigning as being indicative of unreal performances. To these students, the circus atmosphere of school elections is both frightening and in poor taste.

Above all, though, the principles of democracy, inherent in our government must be conveyed, taught and practiced in this document, which is based heavily on the concept of self-government, and in the selection process, which is critical to the success of the project.

Therefore, the School Security Committee will act throughout the operational year of the project as a general review board regarding procedural disputes affecting the School Service Aides.

In the event that any member or members of the school community seriously question the selection process followed or indeed the representative nature of the School Service Aides, the School Security Committee would convene and render judgment on the issue or dispute so stated.

VI. B. Representation

In each of the attendance areas of the pilot schools selected for the project, care will be taken to develop at least five geographical boundary regions or neighborhood areas. These geographic regions will be determined on the basis of separate community divisions within the school attendance areas. This will help to assure representation from all segments of the school population. Furthermore, the principle of equal representation will act as a guide in arriving at the number of representatives of aides from each of the geographic areas.

The desired number of geographical areas from which Aides are to be selected is *five*. The total number of Aides selected in each school should be *not less than 30 and no larger than 50*.

- a. Where schools have an enrollment of fewer than 1,500 students, the number from each region will be set at at least six, giving a total group of at least 30 students serving as School Service Aides.
- b. Where school enrollment is over 1,500 students, there will be no more than 10 students from each of the five areas. This indicates a total of no more than 50 students for schools with large enrollments.

Where the number of areas is less than or greater than 5, proportionate increases or reductions shall be made in the number of Aides chosen from each geographical area, so that the total number of Aides will fall between 30 and 50 in number.

C. General Requirements

1. All students, regardless of grade average, past record, sex, etc., will be eligible.
2. Given the sensitive, official nature of the functions they will perform, School Service Aides must agree, in writing, that before they can serve they will successfully complete a brief period of formal training at school locations, under official school supervision.

Successful completion of this training program is a requirement for further participation in the School Service Aide Program.

School Service Aides must have their parent's or guardian's written consent to participation in the School Service Aide Program.

- VI. C. 3. All students who desire membership must complete a general application. These applications will be reviewed by all students who have applied. In the event that a greater number of applications than positions are received, *all* applicants will democratically screen eligibles until the appropriate representative number is reached. The total group of applicants will meet as an "ad hoc" committee and vote by secret ballot until the above action has been completed.
4. When the final selection has been completed, each geographic area will select a team leader. The five team leaders will act as the administrative board of directors for all School Security Aides within the school.
5. Vacancies will be filled when a simple majority has agreed on a new applicant.

D. Performance of Duties

1. Responsibility for supervising and advising the School Service Aides will rest with the School Security Committee.
2. Disciplinary procedures:
- a. In the event that a School Service Aide is disciplined for an infraction of school rules and/or regulations which does not result in suspension, his infraction and case will be referred by the principal to the whole group of School Service Aides for their consideration and appropriate action.
- b. In the event that a School Service Aide is suspended from school, he is automatically suspended from service as a School Service Aide and for as long as his suspension from school, and his reinstatement to service as a School Service Aide after return to school is subject to majority confirmation by the whole group of School Service Aides.

VII. SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SCHOOL SERVICE AIDES

A. Education in Self-Government

Great care should be taken to advertise membership in the School Service Aides Committee as a meaningful participation in the governing of school matters. The concepts of self-government and practical civic education must be broken down into simple components and publicized within the school.

VII. B. General Course Content and Credit

It is imperative that course credit be given for participation as a School Service Aide. The Project Committee recommends that involvement in the total program be incorporated into a modified social studies course. The details of such a course should include seminar topics of the following nature:

1. General Topics

- a. Sociology.
b. Behavioral Psychology.
c. Criminology.

2. Specific Topics

- a. Authority, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution.
b. Human Relations.
c. Vandalism in Schools and Society.
d. School Law.
e. Students' Rights to Due Process.
f. Role of Police in Society.
g. Neighborhood Trends.
h. Nature of Crowds.
i. Demonstrations in Contemporary Society.
j. Human Rights
k. Nature of Prejudice and Discrimination.
l. Justice under Law.

3. Certification in First Aid and Civil Defense

Members of the group should carry certification in at least one, but preferably both areas.

4. Laboratory Experience

Successful completion of this laboratory training is a mandatory prerequisite for participation in the School Service Aide Program. Much of this training will be given prior to and in anticipation of the formal academic content.

- a. Orientation to a concept of positive school service, in which security functions are part of a much larger process of maintaining and developing a school community where individuals have the best possible chance for personal development.
- b. General analysis and debate of those questions which surround "serving the school as an official representative" and "performing security services" in today's climate of opinion.

- VII. B. 4. c. Orientation to the school laws of Maryland and Prince George's County, so that the rules governing all individuals in the school system may be more clearly understood.
- d. Analysis of the different types of emergency which may confront Aides, and how Aides should respond to these different types of situations. Role-playing and other laboratory experiences will be provided in the subjects of emergency operations and "conflict management."
- e. Familiarization with the evolving responsibilities of the School Service Aide.
- f. Instruction in preparation of school security plans and in communication and coordination with other elements of school security planning, especially the principal and his representatives.
- g. Practical training, under direction of specially assigned police officers, in those police functions which Service Aides may experience in performing their own functions. This training will emphasize standard police practices and how regularized, understood-in-advance practices are the core of any emergency operation.
- h. Under the direction of police personnel, practical training for selected Aides in devices appropriate to their functions, especially the use of portable radio communication instruments.
- i. Laboratory and workshop experiences in the psychology of interpersonal encounters and general human relations, with particular emphasis on training Aides to withstand the psychological pressures that both peers and others may bring to bear on them in a variety of situations.
- j. Laboratory and workshop experiences in communication and control procedures among the total group of School Aides, and between the Aides and other official representatives. These experiences will explore alternative forms for developing an effective command structure among the Aides, drawing on materials ranging from traditional organizational models, including the military, to recent experiences of student crowd marshals and youth patrols.
- k. Leadership training, and its relation to personal standards of physical health.
- l. Discussion, analysis, and instruction designed to sensitize Aides and all others to acceptable rules of etiquette and behavior, which can guide the behavior of all individuals at school functions, and of which School Service Aides may properly be an example.

VII. B. 5. Field Trips

A number of trips to related areas will be planned. In addition, effort will be made to offer seminars at local colleges and/or government agencies.

C. Incentives and Awards

1. Distinctive Identification

Upon successful completion of the training program and preferably at time of graduation from it, each School Service Aide will be issued appropriate identification and an appropriate item of uniform, to be carried and worn while performing his official functions. It is desirable that the uniform item be distinctive, uniform among all schools, and in conformity to prevailing standards of acceptability. It is recommended that the uniform be a standard blazer, with the coat of arms of Prince George's County and the lettering "School Service Aide."

2. Awards

Awards for outstanding service in this area should be determined. Also, the area of related training programs and scholarship offerings should be investigated and all information made available to members.

**SAMPLE APPLICATION FORM
FOR
SCHOOL SERVICE AIDE**

Name _____
Last
First
Initial

Address _____

Age _____ Grade _____ School _____

Home Phone _____ Parent's or Guardian's Name _____

Address _____

Signature of Applicant _____

Parent's or Guardian's Signature _____

1. Do you desire to be of assistance to others? Yes _____ No _____
2. Do you feel you can honestly represent your school and assist in maintaining a wholesome environment at school-sponsored social functions and athletic events?
Yes _____ No _____
3. Do you promise to obey the regulations agreed upon by the majority of the members of this group?
Yes _____ No _____
4. Do you agree to participate in and successfully complete the mandatory laboratory experience required for Aide training?
Yes _____ No _____

OPTIONAL

You may attach a short written statement of why membership in this group is important to you or you may elect to give your ideas orally when the group is making the final selection of applicants.

**A SELECTED ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
ON VIOLENCE IN THE HIGH SCHOOLS**

The following references are meant to be only a sampling of the kinds of publication which now exist on the problem of violence in the high schools. In no sense is this a complete bibliography. Rather, it is intended to point out a few of the more accessible items which are now available for police training programs and operations planning.

The reader will note that this bibliography follows a standard format. Each page contains one and only one reference. Under each reference is an abstract of the work. The first paragraph of this abstract is a "Summary" of the essential content of the work. The second paragraph, headed "Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers," is an appraisal of the value of the work for various law enforcement and criminal justice purposes.

The decision to follow this standard format came from the desire of the authors of this report to provide readers with easy-to-use, readily accessible, detachable reference listings, which could be quickly turned to individual needs in different jurisdictions.

APPLEGATE, Rex. Riot Control--Materiel and Techniques (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpolé Books, 1969). 311 pages + index.

Summary. This is a revision of Col. Applegate's earlier Crowd and Riot Control, and like that earlier volume, will become a standard police reference. The techniques and hardware presented in the earlier book are updated in the light of current research, technology, and recent police experiences. Throughout, Applegate insists on the necessity and applicability of military principles. Explicit applications of military tactics are made to the different phases of controlling collective disturbances. New to the present volume is a substantial treatment of how various Communist street tactics are orchestrated by leaders, and what civil authorities must do to counter them. As in the earlier volume, Applegate devotes major attention to the most recent developments in police technology, including especially the use of chemical irritants, communications devices, and new forms of physical restraint (for example, the disposable plastic handcuff). The Radical or New Left critic who gets his hands on this book is likely to misread Applegate's approach as being essentially "militarism" or "repression" in disguise. In fact, Col. Applegate asserts that he wants the "fires of violence... dominated and extinguished by civil law enforcement, not by a continuous military presence" (p. xi).

Usefulness for Law Enforcement Officers. Looking only at the missions police personnel may find themselves performing in schools, there is a striking deficiency in this book: although published in 1969, IT GIVES NO ATTENTION TO SCHOOLS AND STUDENTS AS SPECIAL CASES. In part, this reflects Col. Applegate's apparent acceptance of the basic police doctrine that only in a very limited sense should police be concerned with WHY rioters riot. While he acknowledges Communist abilities to control certain situations on the street, he largely ignores the many other ways in which riots and disturbances can be provoked from persistent background factors, especially in off-the-street situations. Mass situations involving racial minorities or adolescents particularly require careful analysis and some modifications of police tactics and human-to-human approaches. Although the technical "how-to-do-it" approach is eminently practical and will insure wide police readership, the book's basic failure to assimilate certain contemporary disturbance situations into tactical doctrine means that police may be misled into thinking they have answers when they don't. Schools and colleges particularly require careful tactical reappraisal, especially since so many school officials resist any kind of police presence or involvement. Particularly in the case of large urban schools and colleges--as with the evolving racial warfare in some large cities--the police confront what are, in fact, "new" challenges. Although police in the past have had to deal with school difficulties and similar problems, these problems remain "new" to the degree that they have not been systematically reduced to valid doctrine, and to the degree that a number of forces at work in contemporary society have actually presented police with qualitatively new situations.

BIRMINGHAM, John (ed.), Our Time is Now. Notes from the High School Underground (New York: Praeger, 1970). 262 pages + xii. Introduction by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.

Summary. Our Time is Now is a collection of edited quotes from the underground press, integrated with narrative and comment from editor John Birmingham. Birmingham's qualification for the task is detailed in the first of the selections, "Discovering the Underground," which describes his progress from editor of the "overground" Hackensack, New York High School "Voice" to editor of the "underground" Smuff. This progress is marked by Birmingham's discovery of the underground press in its varied shapes and forms. The reprints, carefully chosen, are a formidable source of insights into student leadership perceptions of actual and ideal high school student roles, of telling issues and of STUDENT UNDERGROUND STRATEGY AND TACTICS. Selection Three, "The Student as a Nigger" (pp. 55-58) is the source of that frequently used catchphrase for high school student protesters. The excerpt headed "Fold This Up and Carry It With You" (pp. 110-114) from a High School Student Union Leaflet printed in New York City is one every police administrator and cop should read. Even the subheadings thereof are expressive: "Cop-frontation;" "Don't Talk to Investigators!" "Preparation for a Demonstration;" "In a Demonstration;" "When You're Busted;" "In Captivity;" "Arraignment (for people sixteen and over);" and "Helping Your Friends."

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. We strongly recommend that police administrators, trainers, and patrolmen have access to and READ Our Time is Now. FAMILIARITY WITH THE THINKING AND FEELING OF THE STUDENT UNDERGROUND--regardless of the validity or error of specific perceptions--IS VITAL TO THE POLICE DEFINITION OF THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE POSSIBLE POLICE ROLE IN SITUATIONS INVOLVING HIGH SCHOOL VIOLENCE.

BLACKMER, Alan R. An Inquiry into Student Unrest in Independent Secondary Schools (Boston: National Association of Independent Schools, 1970). 86 pages + 6 pages of tables.

Summary. Blackmer, a Dean Emeritus of Phillips Academy (Andover) and Research Associate of the NAIS' Study of the American Independent School, reports the findings of a study of the "nature and forms of student disenchantment and unrest" in the nation's NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS. Data sources were: 1) a questionnaire sent to heads, faculties, students, parents of students of a randomly selected sample of nonpublic schools; 2) 75 letters from heads of schools responding to a request for information on constructive responses made by their schools to student concerns; 3) materials from student-edited newspapers, 1968-1969; 4) reports of the staff of A Study of the American Independent School (NAIS) on their day-long visits to 50 nonpublic schools in the District of Columbia and 18 states, and 5) attendance at various conferences in which student unrest was a topic of discussion. The random sampling of nonpublic schools deliberately overrepresents schools in Northeastern United States, and boarding schools, on the grounds that evidence available points to greater student discontent in that area, and in boarding schools, than elsewhere in the country excepting possibly the West Coast, and in day schools. Heads of 113 schools responded to the questionnaire, as did 543 teachers, 835 students of both sexes, and 748 parents. The data suggests a positive correlation between academic aptitude and expressed student discontent. Children of more affluent parents may be more prone to disenchantment than the children of the poor.

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. The study has no OPERATIONAL UTILITY FOR THE POLICE. There is no reporting here of student resort to collective violence nor of school administration resort to calling the police, nor is there any mention of potential violence or needed cooperation and collaboration with police officials. The first chapter, pointing up the complexity of student unrest, may, nonetheless, be of special use or interest to the police administrator. AVAILABILITY OF THE PAMPHLET TO POLICE TRAINERS IS RECOMMENDED, since it provides an inexpensive, readable source of some wonderful examples of student writing and student justifications. Considerations peculiar to the nonpublic school can easily be recognized and disregarded without violence to the work or its potential value as training material.

FISH, Kenneth L. Conflict and Dissent in the High Schools (New York: The Bruce Publishing Company; London: Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1970). 187 pages, including footnotes, appendices.

Summary. Conflict and Dissent in the High Schools is a report to the general interested reader of Fish's 1969 six-month study of twenty-five "high schools in which tensions had built up to explosive proportions." Fish has a Ph. D. from Harvard in Education and sixteen years of experience as a high school principal. The study was financed by Ford Foundation and the Montclair Board of Education, which along with the National Association of Secondary School Principals served as sponsor. Four brief case studies are presented, illustrating explosive situations in schools each of which has distinct and significant characteristics. With the exception of Montclair High School in New Jersey, of which Fish was principal at the time of the disorders described, the schools are deliberately not identifiable. A summary of findings includes the following: (1) BOTH BLACK AND WHITE STUDENTS ARE INVOLVED IN THE CURRENT U. S. HIGH SCHOOL REVOLUTION; (2) RACISM on the one hand and the ACTION-ETHIC of our young people, on the other, ARE PRIME FACTORS in this revolution; (3) lessons learned include: (1) "...the CAFETERIA IS THE HOT SPOT... and the LUNCH HOUR IS THE MOST CRITICAL TIME OF DAY..." (p. 29); (b) MASS MEETINGS AND CONFRONTATIONS IN SCHOOL DURING THE SCHOOL DAY ARE TO BE AVOIDED (p. 29); (c) SEGREGATED SCHOOLS--even all-white schools--ARE HARDLY IMMUNE to violence; (d) a TWO-FOLD STRATEGY IN HANDLING EXPLOSIVE SITUATIONS IS USEFUL: first, recognize existing factions; second, set the scene so that leaders of the factions can work on the problem as their problem (pp. 33-34); (e) EDUCATORS NEED TO EXERCISE GOOD JUDGEMENT regarding a show of strength and backing up a show of strength; "...IF DISORDER HAS REACHED THE POINT WHERE THE SCHOOL AUTHORITIES HAVE LOST CONTROL... POLICE SHOULD BE CALLED." (p. 52); (f) CLOSING THE SCHOOL IS AN ALTERNATIVE TO CALLING THE POLICE; it also may be used as a "cooling off" sequel to calling the police.

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. With moderation and without hostility to law enforcement personnel, Fish presents the thoughtful high school educator's assessment of the implications and problems of calling the police into high school conflict. Fish acknowledges the real need for cooperative, collaborative working communication between the police and school administrators. Yet his observations on the effects of police in the school are of great value in helping law enforcement personnel understand why school personnel so resist the idea of police in the schools. Fish's contribution will be especially valuable in those Departments and Police Academies where commanders and patrolmen must be trained in walking the fine line between too early and too late entry into high school conflict, and where they must be helped in understanding the built-in perceptions and biases of school personnel. Clear, readable prose and absence of annoying jargon make this work attractive for direct incorporation into police training programs.

HAVIGHURST, Robert J., Frank L. Smith and David E. Wilder, A Profile of the Large-City High School: A report of a study of the high schools in America's largest cities conducted for the National Association of Secondary School Principals by its National Committee on Secondary Education. (Washington, D. C.: National Association of Secondary School Principals, November, 1970). National Committee Paper Number Three. (This is a Conference Edition and will be available only in limited numbers.)

Summary. A Profile of the Large-City High School reports the findings of a questionnaire survey addressed to approximately 700 high schools in U. S. cities of populations of 300,000 and over. The questionnaire went out in Spring, 1969 to 45 cities determined on the basis of the 1960 census to be of the appropriate size. The study included, thus, 22 cities with populations of 300,000 to 500,000; 18 cities with populations of 500,000 to 1,000,000 and 5 cities with populations of 1,000,000 and over. The intent was descriptive; the areas of major interest were: 1) characteristics of the student population; 2) instructional procedures; 3) relations of high school to environment. Responses were received by July 1969 from 670 of the approximately 700 high schools circularized. The report covers: 1. research purpose and design; 2. a typology of high schools; 3. major goals of city high schools; 4. high school structure and organization; 5. staff characteristics; 6. curriculum; 7. student activities programs; 8. STUDENT ACTIVISM AND CONFLICT; 9. SCHOOL-COMMUNITY RELATIONS; 10. a summary statement on contemporary and future big-city schools. Four case studies are included: the cities covered are Detroit; Kansas City; New York; and (a non-city) Dade County, Florida. A copy of the questionnaire is bound in the volume, along with two pages of definitions of terms as used in the study.

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. POLICE ADMINISTRATOR and TRAINER attention is called particularly to Chapter 8, Student Activism and Conflict, reporting on frequency of and issues in large-city high conflict; "who confronts whom?" forms of confrontation; demands; conflict resolution; and school-community relations. Note the finding that: "... resorting to police assistance is less frequent among high-status, all-white and high-status, all-black schools than elsewhere, possibly because the neighborhood and the people associated with schools of this kind are not in the habit of calling the police. And possibly, too, their academic orientation gives them unusual confidence in the power of discussion to resolve conflicts of all kinds..." (p. 8-13) Both the body of the report and the Case Studies are well written potential enhancers of a balanced view of the situation as of 1969, IF USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH SUCH OTHER MATERIALS AS THE RELEVANT REPRINTS IN, FOR EXAMPLE Birmingham, John (ed.), Our Time is Now. Notes from the High School Underground (New York: Praeger, 1970). A Profile of the Large-City High School, however, has no OPERATIONAL utility for the police.

LIBARLE, Marc and Tom Seligson (eds.), The High School Revolutionaries (New York: Random House--a Scanlan's Book, 1970). 276 pages + xxxi.

Summary. Editors Libarle and Seligson, teachers in the New York City public school system in Spring 1969, observed, in their own words, that "most of what was being written on high school students was interpretive and written by adults. As teachers, we felt that what was being written was misleading and insensitive..." Convinced of the ability of high school radicals to speak for themselves, the editors spent the summer of 1969 collecting materials and interviewing high school students across the nation. The Center for Research and Education in American Liberties at Columbia University did the newspaper clippings which provided reportorial coverage for use in this volume. George Leonard's Education and Ecstasy is acknowledged in the preface as a stimulating, innovative, creative source. Student writers printed here say "their thing" on the radicals of the suburbs, the black students, cultures in conflict--i. e., "traditional" culture and the new youth culture, religion as youth sees it, the radicals of the junior high school, the movement in the private schools, "the politics of the high school movement," school level women's liberation, and the intellectuality of the high school drop out. Some of the student authors are familiar figures in the adult gallery of the high school movement scene: Joshua and Toby Mamis, for example, or Michael Marqusee or Paula Smith. On the whole, themes and styles of expression have a familiar ring--yet some of these statements have a less spontaneous, more contrived, "set piece" ring than do the quotes from the underground press reprinted in Birmingham, John (ed.), Our Time is Now. Notes from the High School Underground (New York: Praeger, 1970).

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. This collection has OPERATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE POLICE ONLY BY INFERENCE. Birmingham's collection may be a better source of insights and understanding, although both volumes contain selections which can only be described as having a high potential for raising hackles and reinforcing stereotypes which are, at best, obstructions to innovative police thinking about CONSTRUCTIVE POLICE ACTION IN SITUATIONS OF HIGH SCHOOL VIOLENCE. We recommend awareness of this collection, but caution in its use. Used with the right degree of caution, the essays in this collection can be helpful in preparing both law enforcement and criminal justice officers for the kinds of direct arguments they are likely to get into as they try to work with high school agitators.

National School Public Relations Association. High School Student Unrest (Washington, D. C.: National School Public Relations Association. Education U. S. A. Special Report, 1969). 48 pages.

Summary. This is a fast-paced summary of the issues and factors in student unrest, with recommendations and comments. Some facts and figures are included, in a patchwork fashion. Experiences of school administrators are quoted. Features not usually encountered in the materials on high school unrest include a discussion of "How to Listen Creatively" (pp. 8-9) and "New Organizations Spur Listening," (pp. 9-10). The "shall notes" are detailed. "Keeping Up with Court Decisions" is stressed (pp. 21-23). Policy statements are discussed and illustrated: note that few such statements, in 1969, related to violent protest.

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. The pamphlet communicates what SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS are "thinking for publication." Little of its content concerns the actual handling of erupting violence. See, however, "School Prepared Guidelines for Handling Student Disorders," particularly p. 38, under "Violence and the Police," and pp. 39-41, "Student Demonstration Control Plan (Wisconsin);" also pp. 41-48, "Proposed Plan to Cope with Student Unrest and Disturbance (California)."

New Jersey, State of, Federation Ad Hoc Committee Report. Student Activism-- and Involvement in the Educational Program (Trenton, N. J.: New Jersey State Federation of District Boards of Education, January 1970). 58 pages, including appendices.

Summary. Readable, low keyed and carefully presented, this short report considers students as "a special interest group within our segmented society"--even more "special" in their lack of access to peaceful, legitimate channels for the communication of their perceptions of their interests. A brief analysis of factors in student unrest, congruent with prevailing views, is followed by an (incomplete) list of some thirty issues raised by student groups, running the gamut from dress codes to "the system". Committee conclusions are presented, and recommendations made and summarized. The recommendations involve sincerity, solid legal grounding, communication, a goal focus, the establishment of satisfactory channels for handling complaints, stress on student needs. Appendices provide: (1) a local community study model; (2) statements of sample policies; (3) an example of a grievance procedure for students and parents; (4) a teacher-evaluation form for students; (5) an excerpt on the White Plains experience with militancy; and (6) a selected bibliography on "strategies for coping with student confrontation."

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. This report is a guide to the ideal handling of student activism as a creative force, but not a manual on "how to do it." Concern focuses on the school and the parents. In general, the problem addressed is the peaceful, non-violent settlement of grievance. There is little consideration of situations in which violence is or has occurred, or to enlisting police understanding and support and improving police/school/student relations. See, however, p. 40 for school administration handling of "student disturbances that have reached proportions which cannot be handled through normal disciplinary procedures..." in which the police are the last resort. Utility to the force is IN SENSITIZING POLICE TO HIGH SCHOOL SITUATIONS IN WHICH EDUCATORS SHOULD BE EXPLORING SOLUTIONS SHORT OF CALLING IN THE POLICE; the report can be drawn upon to develop such training materials.

Report of the School Study Panel to the Human Relations Council Serving the Greater Trenton Area (Trenton, New Jersey, 1968).

Summary. Disturbances at Trenton's only public high school, on December 12, 1967, were studied by a panel appointed by the Mayor, City Council, and Board of Education at the instance of the Human Relations Council Serving the Greater Trenton Area. Although the panel held its first meeting on December 26, 1967, its members included within the scope of their mandate the study of incidents which occurred in February and April of 1968. Data for the study were collected in interviews conducted with "persons affiliated with the school system, the student body, parents of students, interested citizens or persons of stature within the general academic community." Roughly one hundred people were heard by the panel; the number included the Mayor and the Director of Public Safety, both of whom were interviewed several times, and extended meetings with "different representative groups of students. . . ." The report probes the community and school context of the December 12th. incident and the subsequent outbreaks. Roughly three-fourths of the report describes findings and makes recommendations for changes in the Board of Education, in the Office of the Superintendent, in the High School Administration, among Faculty for increased personal involvement of the student in his school and community, for community relations and so on. Defects in the disciplinary system, although not the sole or even the primary cause of the violent incidents, are frankly and fully explored.

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. The major utility for police administrators and training personnel is in the analysis and description of the community context of the disorders, and in the discussion of the incidents (see pages 3-16). The specifics of police action in the initial incident in themselves and as a reflection of counterproductive educator/police relations merit careful attention (see pages 10, 16.) IT SHOULD BE NOTED, TOO, THAT THE RECOMMENDATIONS DEAL NOT AT ALL WITH THE POTENTIAL OR ACTUAL ROLES OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SAFETY OR THE POLICE IN THE COMMUNITY OR THE SCHOOL, BUT TREAT THE PROBLEM AS AN EDUCATIONAL AND RACIAL MATTER.

SHANNON, Thomas A. "Legal Aspects of Confrontation," Journal of Secondary Education, 45, No. 5 (May 1970) 195-201.

Summary. Shannon, the School's Attorney for the San Diego Unified School District, and Legal Counsel for the California Association of School Administrators, has written concisely and readably on confrontation in a high school setting. "Confrontation" is here defined as "an attempt to replace reasonable discussion with raw power in an open and infamous manner." To some readers the naked definition will seem an unpromising beginning to balanced discussion--it is to be hoped that they do read beyond the first sentence, which may well have done its author a disservice. Shannon places his exploration of the legal aspects of confrontation in the context of succinct, realistic statements of the preconditions in a high school for this type of crisis. To the predictable remarks on the responsibilities of the high school principal, this attorney has added a pointed reminder of the need for balanced professional judgment: "...you do not use a 10-gauge shotgun to kill a pesky mosquito; on the other hand, you do not take on a snarling, enraged bear with a flyswatter." As an aid to making a balanced professional judgment, a thought provoking partial list of crucial questions is provided. The article ends with A RARE AND UNUSUAL DISCUSSION OF THE HIGH SCHOOL PRINCIPAL AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES, part of which is generally applicable and part of which is specific to California.

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. This should be REQUIRED READING FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, AND AN ITEM ON THEIR LIST OF READINGS TO RECOMMEND TO COMMUNITY LEADERS AND EDUCATORS.

Syracuse University Research Corporation. Disruption in Urban Public Secondary Schools (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Research Corporation, Final Report, OEC-0-70-3444(508), August 1970) 2 vols.

Summary. This is a two-volume report of a study of "the causes of violent unrest and educational disruption in a fair sample of the nation's urban high schools," prepared for the U. S. Office of Education in early 1970 and focusing on the identification of successful strategies for the handling of such unrest and disruption. Volume II defines "A School Disruption" as "ANY EVENT WHICH SIGNIFICANTLY INTERRUPTS THE EDUCATION OF STUDENTS...." (page 2). Common examples cited include student boycotts, walkout, strikes; similar behavior on the part of teachers; property destruction; confrontations in which physical violence is used; rioting, and so on. Volume II provides an annotated bibliography of sixteen items selected as "particularly helpful" sources for the use of interested parties but not intended to be complete or comprehensive. Site visits were made to 27 public high schools in 19 large cities, with a total school population (in the 27 schools) of 60,000 students. A questionnaire also was sent to all public secondary schools in the United States with a reported enrollment of 750 or more students which are located in a city or "other less-than-county political jurisdiction of at least 50,000 persons." The dimensions of the disruption problem are treated in the report, as are causes and strategies for response. The materials are useful, but nothing novel or original emerges.

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. Part IV, A. 1. (Strategies for Response: Control Devices; Police, Frisks, and Searches) is a roughly one and one-third page comment which police administrators, trainers and patrolmen MIGHT PROFITABLY READ. (pp. 44-45). The discussion (44-45) of the Kettering Senior High School (Detroit) use of police assigned on a permanent basis will be of interest. By and large, however, the report describes and analyzes violence in the high schools, and strategies of dealing with it, in ways which are covered in a fair body of available and perhaps more easily accessible and handled literature. TRAINERS AND POLICE ADMINISTRATORS SHOULD KNOW THAT THIS WORK EXISTS; ITS CONTENTS, HOWEVER, ARE OF NO GREAT HELP TO THEM OR TO THE PATROLMEN IN DEALING WITH THE BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER OF THE ERUPTION OF VIOLENCE IN THE HIGH SCHOOL.

Task Force on Urban Education of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Urban School Crisis: The Problem and Solutions Proposed by the HEW Urban Education Task Force. Submitted to HEW Secretary Robert H. Finch, January 5, 1970 (as reproduced in Washington, D. C. by Washington Monitoring Service, Editors of Education USA; copies available from the National School Public Relations Association).

Summary. Urban School Crisis is reproduced from the Congressional Record of 19 and 20 January 1970, where it was placed by Rep. Jeffery Cohelan (D-Calif.). This Report of a Task Force formed in March 1969, although considered a "definitive work" on city schools and their problems, was not slated by HEW for general distribution. The editors of Education U. S. A. and the National School Public Relations Association have made it available to the interested public. It is a carefully documented analysis of the state of urban education as of 1969, with a wealth of charts and tables presenting demographic and socio-economic data. Perhaps the most important information and judgments the report makes accessible to public servants deal with the character of inner-city living (p. 30); the urban education system (pp. 31-33); increasing problems of the system (pp. 33-34); problems of perception: the teacher's perception of his students, the community perceptions of students and teachers, the teacher's and administrator's perceptions of the system (pp. 34-39). Attention is called to the discussion of political problems (p. 43); to the exposition of roles of various elements of the community (pp. 49-53); and to considerations of functions, funding and administration on pp. 54 and ff. A useful bibliography is provided on pp. 62-63.

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. Police administrators and teachers in the police training program will find this report a useful source of insights and of summaries of some of the relevant literature. The type size makes the charts and tables even heavier going than they might normally be for most readers, even professionals. VIOLENCE IN THE SCHOOLS, and police response to it as a potentiality or an actuality, is NOT discussed; the report has no operational utility in that context.

WATSON, Nelson A. (ed.), Police and the Changing Community: Selected Readings (Washington, D. C.: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1965). 240 pages.

Summary. Articles in Police and the Changing Community are, with one exception, reprints from The Police Chief. The exception is Dr. William P. Brown's "The Police and Community Conflict," reprinted with the permission of the National Conference of Christians and Jews, as one of the several papers subsumed under "I. Basic Thoughts." Other topical headings are: "II. Public Viewpoints (6/63);" "V. Anarchy on Campus (4/65);" "VI. Police-Community Law Enforcement (9/64);" "VIII. Police Planning;" "IX. Police and Group Behavior;" "X. Moral Aspects of Law Enforcement." Contributors include police officials, sociologists, criminologists, legislators and others. Racial unrest is the major focus of attention; the underlying theme is the omnipresence in our society of social change and the resistance and conflict it generates. The police goal is clearly stated in the foreword as the maintenance of order and the prevention or containment of violence; the papers selected illustrate some differences of interpretation of that goal.

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. Police handling of violence in the high schools is not a specific concern of any of the reprints. ("V. Anarchy on Campus" deals with the University of California at Berkeley demonstrations of Fall, 1964. Its utility is diminished by an overemphasis on the "conspiracy" theme.) The general tenor of the articles is useful in orienting POLICE ADMINISTRATORS and PATROLMEN to problems of their relationship with their communities and to ways of developing public understanding and competence. The two reprints on "The Police and the Schools" (pp. 170-178) point up the need for and value of teacher education by the police force. A thoughtful, similar current article focusing on potential and actual constructive police roles in high school disorders would be useful. Similarly, the two reprints on "Police and Group Behavior," currently useful for police administrators but perhaps at too high a level of abstraction for many members of the force, need updating in the light of more recent theoretical developments. Role theory has advanced sufficiently since the second of these was written to permit a more dynamic approach to roles. A less abstract article with some concrete examples drawn from case studies of high school and university violence would be more meaningful to the force as a whole.

WESTIN, Alan F. "Facing the Issues." In the Danforth Foundation and the Ford Foundation, The School and the Democratic Environment (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 65-82.

Summary. Alan F. Westin is Professor of Public Law and Government at Columbia University and Director of the Columbia University and Teachers College Center for Research and Education in American Liberties. This article is a report of findings of a survey of militancy at the high school level made as part of ongoing attempts to create new models of civic education. It contains a summary of the history of civic education in the United States, a short, suggestive description of "a steady stream of serious student protests" TRACED BACK TO THE 1870's, a pointed critique of class-based teaching (or nonteaching) of the realities of the political process, a discussion of current school-community problems, and a set of recommendations for constructively reforming the "conservative," "rigid," American public school. Westin notes:

My general conclusion is that a significant part--though by no means all--of current student unrest stems from anti-democratic teaching and administration within our schools and from school-aggravated tensions for the larger society over issues such as racial conflict and political dissent.

(p. 78)

Education innovation, educator training and experience in conflict resolution, and an opening up of student participation in and without civic education courses are proposed as the only viable solutions.

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. Presentation and content are interesting; there is, however, nothing here except by speculation and inference which concerns the roles of police administrators or patrolmen in the handling of violence in the high school. Nevertheless, Westin provides a perspective on the history and causes of student unrest which police officers and criminal justice personnel may read with profit, particularly if they think student unrest is a totally "new" thing in American society.

The White Plains Board of Education. High School Racial Confrontation: A Study of the White Plains, New York, Student Boycott. Student Unrest and Changing Student-Staff Relationships in the White Plains Public Schools, September 1967 to December 1968. 71 pages, including appendix.

Summary. This study was made at the request of the White Plains Board of Education. Supported by the Danforth Foundation, and directed by Professor Dan Dodson of the Center for Human Relations and Community Studies, New York University, it is an attempt at a reasonable reconstruction and analysis of the intermittent two weeks of racial disturbances which began on March 26, 1968 in the White Plains, New York, school system. Dodson documents outside "presence" in the situation as well as internal tensions and controlled reactions of administrators. Three explanatory hypotheses are considered: Dodson concludes that SOCIAL CLASS ISSUES WERE PART OF, BUT NOT BASIC TO, THE INCIDENT; that YOUTHFUL "TESTING OUT OF NEW ROLES" WAS ONLY PARTIALLY A MOTIVATOR; and that A BREAKDOWN IN SCHOOL AUTHORITY WAS NOT A PRIME FACTOR. IDEOLOGY IS IDENTIFIED AS A PRIME MOTIVATOR; legitimate black grievances within the school system and the community resulted in action in the framework of the "militancy revolution."

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. For police administrators and the police force, the lessons here are (1) the "feel" of cooperation between police and education officials; (2) the importance of police restraint; (3) the discussion (p. 55) of the relationship between the "why" of this incident and the way in which the educators handled it. The material is useful and well presented.

WHITLA, Dean K. and Janet P. Hanley. One Nation, Indivisible? (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Education Development Center, 1968). 338 pages and appendices.

Summary. One Nation, Indivisible is a two volume typescript evaluation report of an experiment in nationwide instructional materials dealing with racial conflict. The nationwide television based course of study was made available to the schools in May 1968, by Education Development Center, a nonprofit organization, in the form of five consecutive days of approximately half hour TV programs for grades 7-12. The materials include five student programs created from existing films, primarily documentaries, a teacher training manual, a student manual, and three teacher training films. All materials were prepared in various U. S. universities. Distribution was through National Educational Television to local educational stations. The idea grew out of the success of curriculum materials and tapes originally designed by Educational Development Center for Washington, D. C. schools to use in reducing tensions after the riots of April 5 and 6 and the burial of Reverend Martin Luther King, April 9, 1968. Sensitive reproduction and analysis of interview data from the evaluation gives this report a utility far broader than the context of the instructional program at issue.

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. We recommend this two volume report to police training program instructors as a source of considerable insightful interview material on the feelings of both white and black students of junior high school age regarding racial problems in the United States. Attention is called particularly to: (1) the discussion of consistent themes that emerged in interviews with the young as the program began (p. ix); (2) "Two Lives: One Story" (pp. 1-19): verbatim report of interviews with a black boy in a metropolitan inner city junior high and a black 11th grade girl also in a large metropolitan inner city school; (3) pre- and post-test responses to the item "Police brutality has been greatly exaggerated by ghetto dwellers" (see p. 105) and to the item "Riots are planned by a few angry leaders" (see p. 105); (4) interview quotes and analysis, beginning on p. 110; see particularly p. 143, on the "fear of violence" and other patterns of thought and feeling. The material lends itself to imaginative use in developing empathy and comprehension.

WITKIN, Irving. Diary of a Teacher: The Crisis at George Washington High School (New York: United Federation of Teachers, 260 Park Avenue South, 10010, 1970).

Summary. Compiled by the Dean of Boys at George Washington High School, New York City, from his own and other teachers' diaries and logs, this easy-to-read large pamphlet provides a simple running record of the major incidents of violence and stress which occurred in the school during the period January through June, 1970, and for the month of October in that year. The purpose is to show how a relative minority of students, stimulated and led by outsiders, can disrupt a high school whose total enrollment is "close to 4,700." During the Spring and later, at the beginning of the Fall (at which time the Diary went to press), assaults, fires, threats, and the resulting pandemonium in the school and nearby community resulted not only in repeated closings of the school but in an atmosphere which made it nearly impossible to conduct effective educational programs when the school was open. "[In] a real sense [the Diary is] a collective effort by the United Federation of Teachers chapter at George Washington High School." (Page 5) The chapter contributed to the maintenance of a continuing incident log, an excellent example of which is the final summary for Monday Morning, March 16, 1970 (page 27). In the end, the compilers of this Diary hope that its graphic documentation will demonstrate how violence becomes self-perpetuating and how specific reforms, including elimination of outside agitators and their in-school allies, are prerequisites to restoring order within a school such as George Washington.

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. Although motivated in part as a brief for changes in conditions which now are seen by the authors to lead to school violence, Diary of a Teacher has these crucial lessons for the law enforcement officer--particularly the officer concerned with planning for or conducting operations against massive collective violence in the large city high school:

- .1 It precisely traces the effects which outside activists can have in disrupting a school, and provides specific case materials on the tactics these agitators use. It provides a number of critical indicators of the tactics of disruption to which police intelligence specialists should be paying close and continuing attention.
- .2 In its detailed enumeration of just what happens in a "violent" high school, this Diary suggests the kinds of information about incidents which school administrators and police commanders need to be able to digest rapidly on a daily basis, and which, in most jurisdictions, they appear largely incapable of efficiently reducing to usable incident logs through effective centralized reportage.
- .3 In its unfolding horror, Diary of a Teacher demonstrates the size the problem of collective violence can assume in a high school. It should be required reading for all personnel who will be specially assigned to troubled high schools. This required reading should be

guided by such study questions as "What happened to isolate the administration, teachers, and students into groups which it became increasingly more difficult to coordinate and govern?"

ZACK, Jacob B. "Restless Youth--What's the Message?" NAASP Bulletin, 54 (May 1970), 146-58.

Summary. Zack, who is assistant superintendent in charge of coordinating high schools in the New York City public school system, deals here with two responses of alienated youth of high school age: withdrawal into detachment and the drug scene, and student activism--the latter of course being a healthy response. The issues identified are those commonly perceived by commentators. Zack sees the racial justice/civil rights issue as the most militant and most likely to continue "without major change." He notes changes in the forms of protest, and proposes INVOLVEMENT--of students, parents, and the community--as the key to a solution. The working of the consultative councils in the high schools and the city-wide council, with their composition of student, parent and teacher representatives, is praised, on the basis of short term experience. The use of a student affairs coordinator is suggested as helpful, and procedures for reaching parents on an emergency basis are recommended. Zack calls upon educators, and by implication, police administrators, to be alert, accepting and resilient. He sees the need for a think-tank as a NASSP agency in the current crisis.

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. Two points directly bear on police action in violent situations. As Zack puts it:

...If we must use police, security guards, or other means of protection, then we must use them even as we seek constructive ways of responding to responsible young people expressing their discontent. The answer to demands to remove protection is that it will be removed just as soon as it is not needed or that it will be decreased just as quickly as safety permits. (pp. 153-154)

The article is well written. Without belaboring the point, Zack does make clear the responsibilities of educators (administrators and teachers) and of parents and teachers in the schools. The police role is by implication LIMITED TO PROTECTION FROM VIOLENCE. Judicious handling of potentially violent situations is a continuing requirement. The existence of this article widens the accessibility of readable materials which police administrators and patrolmen can handle with pleasure and profit. But it does not provide ways and means of police handling of violence in the high school.

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Chapter II

COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE IN THE GRADE SCHOOLS

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Part I

GRADE SCHOOLS AS A CONCERN FOR
THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER

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THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER

Why? And Why Inner-City
Schools, in Particular?

Who would have thought even a decade ago that grade school children--grade schoolers!--might be daily disrupting classrooms and school assemblies, defying school rules in corridors and on playgrounds, and tearing up school lunch-rooms, in schools across the nation? Who would have expected to find children from the first to the fifth grades, or any of the preadolescents in grades five through seven, on picket lines, or desegregating public facilities, with or without the knowledge and consent of their parents? A decade ago, collective violence in the grade school setting--even in the inner-city--seemed highly improbable. In the decade of the 1970's, while the likelihood seems less remote, the need to examine possibilities, probabilities and sources of such collective violence is receiving little if any recognition from law enforcement officers, educators, parents or community and national leaders. Delinquency and individual violence rather than protest and group or collective violence in the grade school environment continue to be the focus of concern.

Available information on the grade school is all but empty of any attempt to come to grips with indicators that grade schooler involvement in collective violence is a real possibility today. Even the most recent research and guidance materials and teacher training textbooks say little about violence in the grade schools or involving grade schoolers. They focus on the delinquent¹ behavior of

¹The term "delinquent" is used in guidance texts both as a general descriptive term and as a term of legal judgment. In referring to delinquent behavior thusly, guidance texts tend to blur the distinction inherent in the legal usage of the term and to place treatment of legal delinquency in the hands of school officials. While desirable from the point of view of the general rule of keeping police out of schools, this tendency also makes the relationships between police and school officials ambiguous, particularly because, in many jurisdictions, police have quite specific rights with regard to adjudged delinquents.

individuals, or the disruptive behavior of groups--matters which do not normally come to the attention of the law enforcement officer, but are handled in the school setting, by teachers, guidance personnel and administrators. Autobiographical accounts of grade school life by teachers and pupils do not treat the subject. Nor is collective violence involving grade schoolers directly mentioned in a recent, widely read parents' handbook on how to change the schools.² Yet, it became apparent early in our examination of the literature that children in the first eight or nine years of their schooling may be and are being involved in school situations in which there is a high possibility--even probability--of acts of collective violence.

The reasons behind what appears to be a remarkable blindness to a real potential for involvement in collective violence no doubt are manifold and complex. The most obvious, of course, is the absence of any widely published demonstration of collective violence in the grade school setting. Almost as obvious is the usual adult perception that the age, height, weight, strength, and stage of political development of children under the age of thirteen or fourteen are obstacles to their becoming effective leaders or followers in group violence. Publicized violent incidents among adolescents in the high schools have made the public aware of the high school potential. But most Americans still think of the young child as having a happy time. The American myth of a happy childhood dies hard. Few of our readers are aware that inner-city schools already have produced eleven to twelve year olds--fifth, sixth, or seventh graders, depending on the age at which they entered first grade and whether they have "skipped" grades--with remarkable talents in voicing and leading group protests.³

²Ellen Lurie, How to Change the Schools: A Parents' Action Handbook on How to Fight the System (New York: A Random House Vintage Book, 1970).

³It is grossly inaccurate, of course, to speak of the school system's "producing" dissident political consciousness and leadership. Rather, as studies of the political development of children point out, the influences on children's political behavior stem from home, school and community. The connection between school and home in encouraging dissident leadership which may but does not necessarily lead to group violence is illustrated in, for example, Joshua Maxis, "The Right to Petition at Eleven," in Marc Libarle and Tom Seligson (eds.), The High School Revolutionaries (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 153-160. Joshua Maxis

(Footnote continued, next page)

Psychologists, psychoanalysts, social workers, specialists on juvenile delinquency and educators all have made public convincing evidence that childhood, far from being a joyous carefree time, is full of stress and pain. The children themselves tell us so, in their drawing and painting, their writing, their aggressions and withdrawals, their resistances and their enthusiasms.⁴ Each of the

(Footnote 3, continued)

was an eleven year old pupil at one of New York City's "middle schools" (Intermediate School 44, Manhattan) in 1969 when he brought suit against the school principal for depriving him of a First Amendment right--the right to petition freely. Editors Libarle and Seligson point out that

...His whole family is involved in radical political activity, and Joshua is supported in his actions by his parents. (p. 153)

Similarly, Jim Gardiner, who recalls his consciousness of racism in the grade school as "full-blown" at age eight in fourth grade, and who also attended Intermediate School 44, is described by Libarle and Seligson as

... a thirteen-year-old Sophomore at New York City's prestigious Bronx High School of Science. A brilliant student, he went through a three-year junior high school in two years. [The reference to "junior high" is in error; I. S. 44 is a "middle school."] He lives in Morningside Heights, that part of New York's Upper West Side that borders on Harlem. His father is a Professor of Literature at a nearby women's college. Jim has been active in political demonstrations since he was eight. In October [1969] he was with the Weathermen in Chicago. (p. 161)

Jim Gardiner, "Growing Up Radical," in Marc Libarle and Tom Seligson (eds.), The High School Revolutionaries, op. cit., pp. 161-171.

⁴Children, adolescents and adults have vividly illustrated in their writings the validity of the thesis of their childhood experiences of stress, anxiety, fear and pain. Read, for examples, any or all of the following: Herbert Kohl, Thirty-Six Children (New York: New American Library, 1968), which includes materials written by inner-city grade schoolers of New York City; Charlotte Leon Mayerson, Two Blocks Apart: Juan Gonzales and Peter Quinn (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), which pictures, in the boys' own words, their childhood and adulthood experiences in the same New York City (Manhattan) neighborhood; Michael Marqusee, "Turn Left at Scarsdale," in Marc Libarle and Tom Seligson (eds.), The High School Revolutionaries, op. cit., pp. 13-23, for what this upper middle class high schooler has to say of his grade school experience; "Part Two: Education in the Streets" in Estelle Fuchs, Pickets at the Gates (New York: The Free Press, 1966, pp. 170-191, in particular) for a New York City ethnic minority view. See also Gerald E. Levy, Ghetto School: Class Warfare in an Elementary School (New York: Pegasus, 1970), particularly Chapters VIII and IX. For an

(Footnote continued, next page)

two grade schoolers whose drawings are reproduced here is eloquent in his comments on his teacher. The three drawings on pp. 145 through 147 convey both the unhappy and happy parts of school experience for the child. But for the black child, the drawing of the school (p. 147) and the drawings of the school bus and the child grown up later in the chapter (pp. 187-188) show the special intensity of unhappiness in the experience of the black child.⁵

The children's testimony, too, is valid and revealing. No child is immune to, or isolated from, stressful and hurtful experiences in growing up. But just as levels and sources of suffering differ, so do acceptable responses to frustration, to tension, to hurt differ among the poor, the middle class and the rich, and among ethnic groups. Children in the inner-city schools and neighborhoods have the greatest exposure to stress of any of our children--in an atmosphere in which physical aggression is accepted and encouraged.

In remembering things past, few adults and few adolescents describe school as a happy place. Yet the striking testimony of disenchantment with the classroom experience would not in itself be sufficient cause to draw the grade school potential for collective violence to the attention of law enforcement and criminal justice. Grade school children have rankling resentments: some trivial, some major, some warranted, some unreasonable. To their unrest is added not only the messages of the press, television and radio, but also the pressures of militants for whom school policies and school control are vital issues. Admittedly it is unlikely that grade schoolers will stage a walkout or a riot on their own. But it is not at all improbable that militants will stage a walkout or a boycott in which


(Footnote 4, continued)

adult's remembrances of childhood, see James Baldwin, The Fire Next Time (New York: The Dial Press, 1963). There is vivid descriptor material in Paul Bullock, Watts: The Aftermath. An Inside View of the Ghetto by the People of Watts (New York: Grove Press, 1969)--see particularly but not exclusively the chapter on The Schools. See also Natalie Robinson Cole, Children's Arts from Deep Down Inside (New York: The John Day Company, 1966); Robert Coles, Teachers and the Children of Poverty (Washington, D. C.: The Potomac Institute, Inc., 1970); and Bill Wertheim (ed.), Talkin' About Us. Writings by Students in the Upward Bound Program (New York: New Century, 1970).

⁵Robert Coles, Teachers and the Children of Poverty, op. cit.




A black child shows the teacher
with a pointer and on a stool.
"She's always over you and on you
to do something and she gets
annoyed too quick.
She's too nervous about us, I think."



A white child says
the same teacher is "friendly"
and "likes to hug us a lot."

A black child draws a fine school,
yet says he feels lonely there,
and is seen as lonely there
by his teacher.



the children may voluntarily or with encouragement be active.⁶ Walkouts and boycotts have a potential for turning into collective violence. Where grade schoolers are involved, there is a potential for their participation in such collective violence. Here, then, is the principal focus for law enforcement and criminal justice concern with possibilities for collective violence in the grade schools:

Grade schoolers--especially inner-city grade schoolers--are most vulnerable to that form of guided collective violence which results from the activities of outsiders who enter the school.

"Grade School" in this context. Many contemporary Americans think of the "grade schools" as serving children from kindergarten (age five or six, in most parts of the country) through completion of the sixth grade, at roughly the age of twelve. "Junior high schools," so called, established early in this century as a bridge between what was described as the relaxed atmosphere of the elementary school and the disciplined rigors of the high school, have for decades served seventh, eighth and ninth graders. Parents of youngsters currently in the public school system, and youngsters themselves, in many urban and suburban areas now talk knowledgeably of grade schools for the kindergarten through fourth grader and "middle schools" for fifth through eighth graders. Junior high schools are out of favor, and the four year high school program is back in fashion.⁷

The "middle school" idea reflects continuing efforts to organize the schools to meet the real needs of the developing child. Early teenagers or children just before their teens are a critical concern for law enforcement and criminal justice, for these ages are not only the times when children are having their positive commitments to citizenship shaped, but they are also the times when delinquent behaviors or their precursor traits are likely to have emerged. Therefore, it is vital for law enforcement and criminal justice officers to be aware of the reasons why "middle schools" for this general age group appear attractive to educators.

⁶ Doubters need only read, for example, Estelle Fuchs, Pickets at the Gates, op. cit., and the instructive handbook by Ellen Lurie, op. cit.

⁷ See for example William M. Alexander and Emmett L. Williams, "Schools for the Middle Years," in Harold Full (ed.), Controversy in American Education: An Anthology of Crucial Issues (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 116.

Margaret Mead argues that the junior high school system deprives seventh, eighth and ninth graders of the reassurance of association with "their own recent past selves" (the fifth and sixth graders), simultaneously cutting them off from contact with the high school adolescents who are what these same children are in the process of becoming.⁸ Psychiatrists, psychologists and educators tend to agree with Mead.⁹ Alexander and Williams argue the case for the "middle schools" in terms which also pinpoint some of the basic issues pupil and adult activists have been raising:

... Today's children in this age bracket need freedom of movement, opportunities for independence, a voice in the running of their own affairs, the intellectual experience of working with different groups and with different teacher specialists.¹⁰

Large city systems already have adopted the middle school, sometimes known as an "intermediate school." New York City, for example, has as of 1970-1971 forty "intermediate schools" and one hundred and seventeen "junior high schools," evidence that the changeover to the "middle school" is underway.¹¹

⁸Margaret Mead, "Early Adolescence in the United States," in Bulletin of the National Association of Secondary School Principals, 49 (April 1965), pp. 5-10.

⁹See as illustrations: Sidney Berman, "As a Psychiatrist Sees Pressures on Middle Class Teen Ageds," in National Education Association Journal, 54 (Feb. 1965), pp. 17-24; J.H. Hull, "The Jr. H. S. is a Poor Investment," in Nation's Schools, 65 (April 1960), 78-81; Robert J. Havighurst, "Lost Innocence: Modern Junior High School Youth" in Bulletin of the National Association of Secondary School Principals, 49 (April 1965), pp. 1-4; John Lounsbury and Jean Marani, The Junior High School We Saw: One Day in the Eighth Grade (Washington, D. C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1964).

¹⁰William M. Alexander and Emmett L. Williams, op. cit., p. 116. As Havighurst notes:

... the middle school offers a chance to get greater social or racial integration in areas where there is residential segregation in small areas, but Negro and white and other families live in an area that can be served by a middle school, an area perhaps of a one-mile radius. (Robert J. Havighurst, op. cit., p. 114.)

¹¹Official Directory of the Board of Education of the City of New York, 1970-1971.

In this report, the term "grade school" refers to:

"Elementary" or "grade" schools covering grades 1 through 6;

"Elementary" or "grade" schools covering grades 1 through 4;

"Junior high schools"--in which our interest is in pupils in grades 7 and 8;

"Middle" or "intermediate" schools covering grades 5 through 8.

Inner-city school systems in the United States usually have more than one type of grade school. Most large cities today have one or more grade schools for socially maladjusted children who are residing at home. New York City, for example, has what until recently have been called the "600 schools" to which are sent pupils considered too disturbed or disturbing to remain in an ordinary grade school classroom, but not sufficiently disturbed to warrant commitment to an institution. Chicago has two schools of this type for boys and one for girls. Almost all our cities have residential grade schools to which children are assigned either because they have no families or because the court has declared their families unfit to care for them.

Under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, many cities have followed New York's lead in establishing special services for some inner-city grade schools. In effect, these schools are "special" schools. New York in 1965-66 had twenty special service or "more effective" schools with classes smaller than is normal for the system (about twenty to a class) and special teachers, guidance counselors, teacher-aides, after-school classes and social workers.¹²

A framework for thinking about the public schools. It is helpful to distinguish four different types of public grade schools in the United States, since the particular form collective violence takes in grade school is likely to reflect the type of school in which it occurs. This is especially important for law enforcement tactical planners: if they know the type of school for which they must plan, they

¹²Robert J. Havighurst, op. cit., p. 113.

can anticipate the likely styles and emphases in the collective outbursts which they will encounter. It is useful to follow the sociologist Havighurst's¹³ four types of schools:

- "high status" grade schools;
- "conventional" grade schools;
- "common man" grade schools;
- "inner-city" grade schools.

An observer looking at these schools will find that each type has its characteristic

- curriculum and teaching materials;
- teaching emphases;
- "cultural experience" of its members;
- respect for teachers;
- attitudes of parents toward schools and teachers;
- degrees of student hostility;
- acceptable expressions of student hostility;
- school "climate" and mood;
- sources of student values.

Beginning with the "high status" schools--Havighurst found that students from "high status" schools came from what is widely recognized as the "best," most privileged backgrounds; they had the greatest curiosity and the most interest in learning for its own sake. The high income communities in which these schools were located were the most able and willing of all communities to give financial support to education. Parents felt and acted in a manner which supported

¹³Robert J. Havighurst, Education in Metropolitan Areas (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1966), Ch. 4, pp. 85-124. It must be noted that the words "high status," "conventional," and "common man" are convenient shorthand for both Havighurst and this Chapter. They are intended to carry no value implications.

academics. "Enriched" curricula were consistently followed in these schools. Most important from the point of view of law enforcement officer interest in collective violence:

- .1 A low level of hostility was found among children of "high status" schools.
- .2 Moreover, the children of "high status" schools tended to express their hostility in words and gestures rather than with their fists, feet or lethal weapons.¹⁴

"High status" schools are at one end of a scale, at the other end of which are the "inner-city" schools. Inner-city schools generally are located in a ghetto or slum area. Schools of this type serve families in which incomes are low, delinquency is high, and transiency is common. Resident ethnic minorities may be trapped in the ghetto by their poverty or their ethnic affiliation or their inability to think of other possibilities. Or they may be there as a matter of choice, "living among their own people."

In present-day America, educators--whether they are for or against this emphasis--tend to see the educational system as having a definite "middle class" academic orientation. In the ghetto and slum, however, student needs and student home backgrounds are usually not "middle class" in the customary sense. Accumulating research evidence demonstrates one important consequence of this: middle class ghetto teachers and their supervisors commonly see themselves as people who must "keep order" under difficult circumstances. Furthermore, ghetto students are unlikely to use the public libraries, visit the museums, travel with their parents, be taken to the theater and to concerts. In other words, the child of the slums lacks the "cultural experiences" that are considered vital to the academic curriculum--and little imagination or ingenuity is systematically applied by teachers to addressing the rich but unfamiliar "cultural experiences" these youngsters do have.

¹⁴Robert J. Havighurst, Education in Metropolitan Areas, op. cit., pp. 92-95.

Havighurst found that inner-city ghetto students and their parents do not necessarily respect the teacher; teachers must earn respect in this setting.¹⁵

Both parents and pupils may be apathetic toward school and learning--on the other hand, parents may strongly "push" education for their youngsters, and some pupil ambitions survive even the most discouraging school experiences. On the basis of the evidence, which is skimpy, these propositions appear to be valid:

- .1 Ghetto grade schoolers, who in home and school experience a great deal of frustration, are found to have a high level of hostility toward society and toward inner-city school personnel.
- .2 Inner-city (ghetto) grade school pupils tend to express their hostilities in roughhousing and rough fights, some of which are hard to break up. In their angry exchanges with each other, or with teachers and administrators, these pupils frequently use four letter words shocking to middle class adults.
- .3 Inner-city grade school pupils tend to feel different from, and hostile toward their middle class teachers and the middle class school administrators. These students tend also to look to others with similar feelings, of their own age or older, for their models of behavior.

In between these two types of American grade school Havighurst places the "conventional schools" and the "common man schools." "Conventional schools" generally are located in lower middle class sections of city or suburbs, but may also be found in upper middle and upper working class areas. By and large, their students are capable of working within the established curriculum, unlike the pupils of the common man and inner-city schools. Extra work assignments for curriculum enrichment are uncommon, although the emphasis in these schools, as in the "high status schools," is on academics. The so-called "cultural experiences" provided by the school are accepted by these students. Most families whose children attend the "conventional" schools respect teachers; parents therefore are likely to listen to the teacher--and these parents usually can follow

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 107-111.

through on teacher suggestions. Students behave well--and they conform to group standards of good behavior.¹⁶

Some change in student standards of "good behavior" appear to be emerging in the period from 1968 to date, under the tutelage of the more "advanced" and activist high schoolers. Havighurst suggested that students in the "conventional school" identified with their future adult role; this may be somewhat less true today.

"Common-man schools" are the schools to which the children of the stable working class go;¹⁷ like the stable working class, they are located in central city and working class suburban areas. The academic curriculum is not fully suited to the pupils in these elementary schools; teachers find that the children have difficulty in using the textbooks considered appropriate for their grade level. In these schools discipline is sufficiently a problem to require teacher time and effort in controlling disorder in the halls and around the buildings. "Cultural experiences" provided by the school are likely to be resisted by many of the children. Respect for the teacher is uncertain; some children and parents are highly respectful; some are highly disrespectful; some uncertain. Many parents want their children to "do well"--by which they mean to get good grades. A majority of the parents will accept the teacher as an authority in academic matters. Four letter words may be used by hostile and disorderly pupils. Fighting (wrestling-punching) is fairly common and on the rough side. Leadership may come from children who are discipline problems; under this leadership lessons may be disrupted but in the majority of instances the teacher and the school administrators can handle the discipline problems that arise. Conformity to the behavior and values of the group is to be expected here--the models the group adopts are apt to be patterned on what is seen in the movies or on TV.

¹⁶Robert J. Havighurst, Education in Metropolitan Areas, op. cit., pp. 100-102.

¹⁷In this context the term "stable working class" is a sociological term. It refers to steadily employed blue collar workers and white collar workers in clerical and other unskilled and semiskilled jobs. Small tradesmen also are included in this category. Rated by income, occupation and education, "stable working class people" tend to fall in either the lower middle class or the upper lower class.

Youngsters in the "common man" elementary schools frequently are found to have no identification with the middle class adult role for which U. S. schools have presumed to prepare them.¹⁸

For those who must anticipate and plan for collective violence, then, distinguishing these four types of school leads to these general findings:

- . 1 Pupils of the high-status elementary school usually fight with words and gestures and rarely resort to physical force.
- . 2 Students of conventional grade schools supplement the exchange of insults with "shoving matches"--but words and gestures are more usual than deeds.
- . 3 Profanity and the rough, wrestling-punching fight are somewhat likely among the children in the common-man grade schools.
- . 4 Profanity is frequent, and rough fighting most likely, in the inner-city grade schools. Breaking up these fights, in which lethal weapons may be used, can be very difficult.
- . 5 Research evidence clearly establishes that the level of hostility among inner-city grade schoolers is high, and that such hostility is frequently expressed in physical violence against individuals.

Havighurst's distinctions are useful in looking at the research and popular literature of recent years, and in pinpointing meaningful differences among grade school children that both the young officer in training and the senior tactical planner know but need to be reminded exist. But Havighurst was writing about the schools in a period of rapid change. The nature and direction of the ongoing changes in the schools have modified, and are continuing to change, the "mix" of pupils from given ethnic groups, income levels and residential areas attending any given grade school. Inner-city children are being bused to suburban or urban "non-inner-city" grade schools. New grade schools are being located in neighborhoods which serve an integrated rather than a segregated school age population. The "pairing" of schools brings a "mix" of children into "inner-city"

¹⁸ Robert J. Havighurst, Education in Metropolitan Areas, op. cit., pp. 102-107.

schools. Little material on the impact of these changes upon the children, or upon the level and frequency of violent incidents involving grade school children, is available. The growing body of commercially published autobiographical accounts by teachers is one source of impressions on this score. These materials are not scientific; their reliability may be questioned; they are, essentially, readable, entertaining accounts of individual experiences which may be exaggerated or unique. More systematic clues as to teacher reactions to the kinds of change the schools are undergoing are to be found in Robert Coles' report of his interviews with teachers and children, a recent study well worth reading.¹⁹

Relations Between Police and Grade School

Even recent literature on the grade school casts but little light on relations between law enforcement officers and grade school pupils, teachers, guidance personnel, assistant principals and principals, or school superintendents and boards of education. The tradition of a carefully cultivated, meticulously maintained distance between the police or other law enforcement officers and the schools is continuing in the 1970's for school administrators. The high school experience has been noted elsewhere.²⁰

Grade school administrators have strong reservations about calling in the police and thus, in their view, admitting their inability to handle problems on school premises. The "admission" has the dangers not only of reprimand from above and loss of promotion opportunity, but also the added perils of newspaper publicity about vulnerable children and parent protest, and perhaps even of a law suit brought by the parent against the school. Consequently, until comparatively recently neither educators or law enforcement officers have had much to say about police-grade school relations. Even now the comments tend to be muted.

Thus recent publications directed to grade school principals, guidance personnel, municipal police administrations, or law enforcement officers pay

¹⁹ Robert Coles, op. cit.

²⁰ Above, Chapter I, pp. 31-34 and pp. 37-48.

little heed to the desirability of improving communication between grade school pupils, teachers, administrators and law enforcement officers. The possibility of pupil involvement in situational or guided COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE²¹ is ignored. A sampling of recent materials on the grade school yielded the following quotations:

It is likely that a child who is a school behavior problem may also cause problems for the police. Close cooperation between police and schools will help in identifying potential delinquents, in meeting their needs and in solving their problems. In addition,

²¹ ... certain violent incidents may RESULT FROM THE STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF STUDENT LIFE IN THE SCHOOL, AS THIS LIFE IS SHAPED BY THE MUTUAL, DAILY INTERDEPENDENCE OF PEOPLE. These incidents may be called incidents of SITUATIONAL VIOLENCE, because they are products of the total situation in a school. In a sense, given the necessary combination of factors--overcrowding, understaffing, clashing racial minorities, rising aspirations thwarted by poverty conditions at home--violent incidents are inevitable. They would have come whether or not specific individuals consciously tried to provoke them. This does NOT mean individuals should not be held responsible for what happens. But it DOES mean that in working to control and eliminate incidents of this type, it is critically important to recognize how the total situation in a school can generate incidents.

On the other hand, certain incidents do RESULT FROM SOME CONSCIOUS ATTEMPT TO PRECIPITATE AND DIRECT VIOLENCE. These may be called incidents of GUIDED VIOLENCE. They may be deliberately provoked by students or by outsiders. In some instances, these provocations may play upon existing vulnerabilities of the high school to situational violence. This suggests one danger which should be avoided in the use of the term 'guided violence:' the danger of assuming that those guiding the violent incident have an altogether well worked out mental scenario of what it is they are trying to accomplish. A particularly difficult-to-control form of guided violence occurs when it is essentially not issue-oriented. In these instances, the adolescent agitator may simply be fishing in troubled waters, in the attempt to create conflict and crisis which will open a number of mutually reinforcing possibilities for destabilizing the school. Adults are likely to be overly reactive to this type of provocation, by trying to find logic and ideology where there is only a diffuse fantasy of anarchy and confusion in the mind of the student or adolescent agitator. A clever student or outside adolescent agent provocateur may sense that the authorities are indeed searching for these motives where there are none. He will then try to portray the authorities as engaging in 'paranoid persecution' of innocent youth. (*Ibid.*, p. 28.)

police and school authorities have other common problems in the areas of truancy, in-school interviews and apprehension, safety education, and crowd control at school social and sports events (p. 154).

... There are many intraschool problems, however, which may not involve police departments. A cardinal rule for the police and school administrators should be that all antisocial behavior by children on the school plant, not involving a violation of the law, would be handled by the school (p. 155).

... Working arrangements should be drawn up by the police and school officials, establishing guidelines for the inschool interviews of children by the police, in accordance with the law and court directives (p. 155).²²

James and Shepard, noting that "One current step taken by some departments to combat juvenile delinquency has been the creation of police-school resource or liaison programs," also note the opposition of critics to these police-school programs, and particularly to the police delinquency specialist's access to school records. In consequence, the recommendation that James and Shepard make is that "police administrators should seek other means to provide services to youths in school."²³ But their recommendation may best be seen as directed toward grade schools. There is simply too much contrary evidence that police-school liaison programs have valuable functions to perform at the later junior high and senior high levels.²⁴

Momboisse advocates and devotes considerable space to police and law enforcement officer liaison with the schools.²⁵ The greatest deficiency of his presentation is that it totally ignores the need for very specific assistance in overcoming the resistances to law enforcement officer presence--particularly in inner-city schools.

²² Jesse R. James and George H. Shepard, "Police Work with Children." In George D. Eastman and Esther M. Eastman (eds.), Municipal Police Administration (Washington: International City Management Association, 1969), pp. 154-155. See the discussion of the School Resource Officer above, Chapter I, pp. 39-42.

²³ James and Shepard, op. cit., p. 155.

²⁴ See Chapter I above, pp. 37-49.

²⁵ Raymond M. Momboisse, Community Relations and Riot Prevention (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1967), Chapter 11.

Writing on another, related subject, "School Boycott," Momboisse erroneously concludes that

The advantage of the boycott is that it involves children, while not involving them in a front-line confrontation with its accompanying dangers.²⁶

Obviously Momboisse has never read the story of the New York City school boycott of 1965 where youngsters were on the picket lines, and did confront the cops.²⁷

Even the most current and well regarded textbook for and about guidance in the grade school does not consider the possibility of grade schooler involvement in school-related collective violence. This is a curious omission in a text which stresses the point that

... Unless it be assumed that those with superior power will determine what the great masses of people may learn and what changes will be permitted, all children in our elementary schools require education in the ways of free people...²⁸

Authors Hill and Luckey recognize that, as they put it

It is both encouraging and disturbing that the search for freedom by many Americans has led in recent years to an overt struggle that for too long was suppressed. Human rights are no longer to be seen in many communities as an abstraction but as privileges being sought by all kinds of means, even by violent actions triggered by long denial...²⁹

To argue for creative work with grade schoolers in teaching them to recognize and assert their freedoms in and outside the grade school setting without any attempt to deal with the potential for involvement in collective violence of such creative work suggests either irresponsibility or ignorance of what might be

²⁶ Raymond M. Momboisse, Blueprint of Revolution: The Rebel, The Party, The Techniques of Revolt (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1970) p. 222.

²⁷ Estelle Fuchs, Pickets at the Gates, op. cit.

²⁸ George E. Hill and Eleanore Braun Luckey, Guidance for Children in Elementary Schools (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1960), p. 546.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 548.

referred to as the "natural history of a social movement." This is consistent with the general qualms and resistances educators have about any cooperation with the police, which they often see as a necessary evil, to be minimized wherever possible.

In summary, the traditional resistance of educators and of parents to police-school liaison continues strong--despite the presence of the police on school premises to preserve order and to protect property and pupils.

Inner-city grade school pupils' attitudes and behavior toward the police are of major importance in Police-School Relations and in the prediction, prevention and control of collective violence involving grade school age youngsters. Available accounts of grade schoolers or junior high school pupils--the latter ages thirteen and fourteen--reflect the wide variety of possible attitudes and behavior: fascination with the police, pity of them, hatred of them, contempt for them.³⁰ Hess and Torney have found that grade schoolers have positive but ambivalent images of the police:

There was much less personal liking for the policeman than for father, and somewhat less affection for him than for the President. Only the senator was less esteemed than the policeman. Mixed feelings concerning the policeman are illustrated by an increase with age in the number of children who saw the policeman's major function as helping people in trouble, accompanied by a decrease in the number of children who reported that they liked the policeman. Most responses to interview questions about the policeman were positive; however, there were some which showed ambivalent feelings. An interview with a fourth-grade, working-class girl illustrates this point:

'Do you like the policeman?'

'I don't know. They help, and they give you tickets. I don't like them. I like to obey my own rules. I listen to them, but I don't like them.'

³⁰ Estelle Fuchs, Pickets at the Gates, op. cit.; Charlotte Leon, op. cit.; are examples as is Pat Mitchell, "The Bar at 138 Street" in Bill Wertheim (ed.), op. cit., p. 10; or Linda Jacobs, "Proclaimed Ghettos of New York," in Bill Wertheim (ed.), op. cit., pp. 13-14.

Children have learned that policemen may help but also may punish them.

To children, the policeman represents the authoritative ruling order; more than 80 percent of the total group knew he worked for the government. The policeman is also a well-known figure; a second grader knows the postman and policeman better than other government figures. Children expect their behavior to be directly influenced by the policeman and anticipate suffering the consequences of disobedience. Although schools probably present a nurturant image of the policeman, children learn from an early age that one of the policeman's major responsibilities is to capture (and they believe also to punish) lawbreakers. Because children's first contacts with law are through observations of its enforcement, mixed feelings about its representatives are very important in determining perceptions of law.

Not all attitudes toward the system of law shift toward moderation with increased age. Norms concerning how the system should operate are distinguished from attitudes regarding the way it actually operates. The item, 'The policeman's job is to make the people obey laws,' is stable across the age range, although children's belief in the inevitability of punishment declines. Agreement with the statement that 'laws are to keep us safe' is stable, while agreement that 'all laws are fair' shows a marked decline with age. Ideal statements of how things ought to be tend to be more stable than perceptions of the way the system actually functions. This discrepancy may be the basis for cynicism.

The origin of orientations toward the compliance system is four-fold: first, the fund of positive feeling for government, particularly the President, which is extended to include laws made by governmental authorities; second, the core of respect for power wielded by authority figures, particularly the policeman; third, experience in subordinate, compliant roles, acquired by the child at home and school; fourth, the normative belief that all systems of rules are fair. These elements are central to a young child's induction into the compliance system.³¹

The study in question began in 1960 and was published in 1967.³² Is it valid today for inner-city grade schoolers? There is reason to ask the question. But we have no research data with which to respond to it.

³¹ Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Chicago: Aldine, 1967), pp. 58-59.

³² Ibid.

The grade school presents certain special problems in police operations.

In the grade school as in the high school, the law enforcement officer is subject to special tactical and legal requirements, some of which are rapidly evolving today. But resistance to recognizing the grade school as a potential setting for collective violence is an added complication in planning. A basic theme of this chapter is that the lack of adequate descriptions and analyses of incidents in which collective violence has involved grade schoolers, and of incidents of grade schooler involvement in incidents which might have but did not erupt into collective violence, intensifies and complicates the classic operational requirements of police work. The available literature does not permit the formulation of many specific tactical recommendations for law enforcement officers required to respond to possible or actual collective violence in the grade school setting.

An educated guess does, however, stress the probability that most inner-city grade schoolers today are hostile to police and law enforcement officers. But we stress here the lack of and the need for solid research materials on inner-city grade schoolers' views. And, available information on Police-School Relations suggests these summary findings and guidelines:

- . 1 A current need is for educators and law enforcement officers to think through the dimensions of the problem and to sponsor a program of research on attitudes, behavior and alternatives.
- . 2 Such a research program should collect and analyze (1) descriptions of incidents of collective violence in which grade schoolers have been involved; (2) descriptions of parent protests in which grade schoolers have participated in picketing the schools, Boards of Education, and other local government offices; (3) descriptions of incidents in which grade schoolers have participated in desegregation acts; (4) descriptions of acts of violence in the grade schools involving roving teen age "outsiders" and grade school pupils.
- . 3 Such a research program should use these analyses in the development of tactical recommendations for law enforcement officials.

Available Research Information:
How This Chapter is Organized

Deficiencies, biases, and problems in research information: the problem posed by outsiders. In working with grade schools even more particularly than in working with high schools, especially in communities where the grade school is being made, in effect, a laboratory for social changes under the leadership of militant parents and civil rights people, the police official or patrolman will find that his real job is becoming able to predict violence and to prevent or moderate it. Yet he may find it difficult to believe the possibility that grade schoolers--young children--can be involved in collective violence. In this respect, the grade school situation differs, for the police, from the high school situation in which they are dealing with essentially young adults, and in which collective violence now has a history.

Yet the law enforcement officer must come to see that the possibility of collective violence involving grade school age children exists. He must be made cognizant of the use of the grade school children as pawns in the battle for community control of the schools. It is important for him to know that there are school issues which "grab" grade schoolers as well as the early adolescents of the junior high school or high school young adults. A part of this necessary understanding of the grade school situation is an awareness of the role of OUTSIDERS in grade school violence.

Awareness of the parts outsiders play in grade school violence or the threat of grade school violence will remind law enforcement and criminal justice agencies that many interests will be at work to cast the police in the role of suppressors or repressors. There is always the possibility that interested groups may try to use the children to provoke a heavy-handed police response--a response which often serves the interest of those who would maintain and intensify social conflict in order to guide social changes in special directions, in pursuit of their private dreams and fantasies.

Ideally, what is needed for the basic police purpose of predicting and preventing or moderating and controlling grade school violence is a set of relatively explicit, tested, "how-to-do-it" procedures which derive directly from

systematic investigation of both the particular kinds of violence which are to be found in the American grade school setting today, and of the potential for violence in situations in which the children are being used as pawns by OUTSIDERS. The research data available is largely inappropriate for purposes of this sort. In general, systematic, data-based studies of the actual processes of different specific kinds of violence potentially or actually involving grade schoolers are NOT in evidence. For example, while racial integration is recognized as a critical factor in producing adult protests directed against grade school policies, there is very little systematically organized information about how the grade school children have been involved in specific events with specifically different kinds of histories and different tactical requirements for prevention and control. Yet racially related violence has received probably the most attention of social scientists and other systematic analysts. On such types as violence associated with ideological protests emanating from the high school New Left (largely a group of white students), it is possible, as noted elsewhere,³³ to find much fascinated reporting of what the students are saying and demanding. Some slight attention is being paid to junior high or middle school activists. But there appears to be little systematic knowledge of grade schooler demands and perceptions, or about the types of individuals who involve grade schoolers in violent or potentially violent disruptions, or about the kinds of things these individuals do to involve grade schoolers in school protests and school shutdowns.

The several parts of this chapter. Available systematic information presents only a small base from which to develop tactical recommendations for law enforcement personnel in dealing with violence or the threat of violence in the grade school setting. It does, however, pose the requirement of clarifying the problem of collective violence involving children of grade school age. Accordingly, this chapter is organized somewhat differently from the other chapters on violence in other types of educational institutions. Part I of Chapter I provided an overview of the difficulties in making high school violence a police concern,

³³ Above, Chapter I, pp. 8-9, p. 17, pp. 54-59.

grounded in a fairly substantial body of data, however uneven in quality. No similar body of literature and data exists in relation to grade school violence and the police. Part I of this chapter has presented, instead, the broad outlines of the conditions in school and society which argue for the need to consider carefully the likelihood of collective violence in the grade schools.

Part II of this chapter examines the potential for violence in the grade school setting. Liberal use has been made of quotations from the reports of observers and from the writings of the children, to describe the physical environment and the human beings who come together in that environment. Part III is concerned with the presentation of actors from the outside and issues over which the children are or may be used as pawns; the closing section of Part III suggests police tactical roles in the grade school setting, and how police can assist school officials responsible for controlling threats as well as acts of grade school collective violence.

Supplementing this chapter is a special Selected Annotated Bibliography, intended to meet at least a few of the immediate needs law enforcement and criminal justice personnel have for resource materials on collective violence in the grade schools.

CHAPTER II

Part II

THE INNER-CITY GRADE SCHOOL--A SETTING CONDUCTIVE TO SITUATIONAL AND GUIDED INCIDENTS OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE IN THE 1970's

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Why Give Special Attention to the
Inner-City School?

Although this chapter presents approaches to the problem of grade school violence which should be appropriate to all the different types of grade school, there is a special need for law enforcement officers to consider the problem of violence in what has been termed the "inner-city school." So, while Part III of this chapter presents a number of practical suggestions for dealing with threatened and actual violence across the full range of grade school types, there is need now for special attention to the special problems created by the inner-city school.

Why the need to pay special attention to the inner-city school? Because the evidence suggests that it is in these schools that

- . 1 children have the most intense feelings of hostility; and
- . 2 children are most likely to express their hostility in the form of physical violence.

At the same time, the struggle for community control of the schools is most intense in the inner-city, where, already, some grade school children have been on the picket lines during school boycotts. An emphasis on the inner-city does not mean, however, that officers whose responsibilities do not include inner-city schools are free to ignore their problems. Quite the opposite--it is the inner-city schools which present in their earliest, most vivid form problems of violence which are likely to be encountered later in all other types of grade school. For the urban police recruit as well as the big city police or criminal justice tactical planner, a generalized portrait of the inner-city school is fundamental intelligence background to all efforts at controlling the grade school-related violence in which he will be involved. For the officer whose concerns extend to other types

of schools, the inner-city grade school offers in one concentrated form a forecast of the problems that will eventually reach his schools.

Yet it is difficult to paint one valid portrait of inner-city grade schools. There are many different inner-city schools, whose differences go beyond the fact that in New York, kids are rooting for the Mets and Yankees, while in Chicago they go for the Cubs and White Sox, in Boston for the Red Sox, and in Baltimore for the Orioles. Between the worst and the best inner-city schools, there is a great distance. People--whether they are teachers, principals, administrators, school children, parents, or community residents--do more to make the school what it is than its physical plant or physical surroundings can ever do. People determine the use and expansion of school facilities, and the relations among children and educators, or among parents, children, educators, community leaders, teachers, administrators, and law enforcement officers.

The general sketch of the inner-city school given here is, therefore, a composite, drawn from the best available information, but one to which any particular real-life inner-city grade school may not completely correspond. Entering this general sketch are quite different sorts of research materials, which usually only indirectly raise issues and illustrations of grade school violence. Much available information suggests the inner-city grade schooler's potentialities for becoming involved in acts of collective violence. Good examples are Estelle Fuchs' Pickets at the Gates³⁴ and Robert Coles' Teachers and Children of Poverty.³⁵ Interviews conducted by members of the project team which prepared this chapter further support the notion of a potential for the involvement of grade school children in acts of collective violence. A wide variety of autobiographical accounts written by

³⁴ Estelle Fuchs, Pickets at the Gates (New York: The Free Press, 1966). The following also fit this category: Philip W. Jackson, Life in Classrooms (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968); Robert D. Strom (ed.), The Inner-City Classroom: Teacher Behaviors (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1966).

³⁵ Robert Coles, Teachers and Children of Poverty (Washington, D. C.: The Potomac Institute, 1970).

teachers and by grade school children,³⁶ and of journalists' reports,³⁷ describe conditions in the grade schools in terms such that they suggest, also, the grade schooler's increasing susceptibility to involvement in collective violence.

More than with any other major topic of collective violence treated in this volume, the informed law enforcement and criminal justice officer will need to judge this general portrait of the inner-city grade school and its possibilities for violence against his own experience. In the present state of publicly reported knowledge, his own "feel" for the grade schools he knows best--as professional problems affecting him--is often likely to be at least as good as those who have formally written on the subject.

The Physical Plant

Elliot Shapiro's famous--or infamous--description of old Public School 119 in Manhattan gives a grim picture of the physical plant of some of the nation's grade schools:

Shapiro was referring to "the incident of the rat" at P.S. 119, an event that briefly made the school famous and had more than a little to do with the construction of P.S. 92 as a replacement for it. "Five years ago," he explained, "the physical conditions here were awful. The plaster was falling down. When it rained, there were floods in the halls. And there was no way to get the building clean with all the vermin and cockroaches around. You could run into a rat on any floor. I sent letters and letters to the Board and to the assistant superintendent in charge of this district. No answers. I'd call and be told, 'It's not my department. I'll switch you.' I'd hold on and nothing would happen. Some of the parents went to City Hall to show pictures of water running in

³⁶ For a combined example, see Herbert Kohl, Thirty-Six Children (New York: New American Library, 1968). John Holt's published work falls in this general category: John Holt, The Underachieving School (New York: Dell, 1969). See also Jonathan Kozol, Death at an Early Age (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967).

³⁷ Schrag's work is a good example. Peter Schrag, Voices in the Classroom: Public Schools and Public Attitudes (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965). See also the account of the New York World Telegram and Sun reporter who taught in a Brooklyn junior high school on an "undercover" assignment for his paper: George N. Allen, Undercover Teacher (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1960).

the halls. Still nothing happened. We had a number of staff meetings, trying to figure out what to do. Finally, I suggested that we could always advertise in the newspaper. Everybody chipped in, and on May 22, 1961, an ad appeared on the school page of the World Telegram. He rummaged through his files and showed me the ad (reproduced as Figure II-1, page 173).³⁸

Anthropologist G. Alexander Moore has described three New York City inner-city grade schools as they were seen by the researcher-observers of the Hunter College Curriculum Center Project TRUE (Teachers and Resources for Urban Education).³⁹

THE SCHOOL

Since this is the first school, it will be called Public School No. 1 and will be given a mythical name, the Peter Pan School. In appearance it is by no means a never-never land, being a standard, unimaginative brick structure in current modern style. Since it is low and surrounded by spacious playgrounds, it has the advantage, for an urban school, of receiving abundant light and air. Teachers approaching it for the first time will be reassured by facing a building that, while not beautiful or stirring, at least is clean, bright, and recently built, in marked contrast to the grime and dinginess of all the other buildings nearby. High steel fences heighten the contrast with the neighborhood, and heavy padlocks on the many field gates insure that the public can enter only by the front entrance.

The public here is probably the least fortunate in the city, for they occupy one of the oldest and most crowded slums in the entire metropolitan area. Not all the area is unrelievedly miserable; but the usual route by public transportation to the school

³⁸ Quoted in Nat Hentoff, Our Children Are Dying (New York: Four Winds Press, 1966), pp. 57-58. Shapiro at that time was the principal of P.S. 119. The "incident of the rat" to which he was referring occurred after the appearance of the newspaper advertisement reproduced in the quotation from Hentoff. A mayor's investigating committee, in company with Board of Education representatives, made a visit to the school to check its condition. During that visit, a rat obligingly made a highly visible and convincing personal appearance.

³⁹ George Alexander Moore, Jr., Realities of the Urban Classroom: Observations in Elementary Schools (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1967). Project TRUE was conducted under a United States Office of Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Development Grant (Grant Number 62201) during 1962 to 1964.

Figure II-1

HELP!

HELP!

HELP!

HELP US TO GET A NEW SCHOOL TO
SAVE OUR CHILDREN
GIVE US A BUILDING WITHOUT

1. Rats and Roaches on Every Floor
2. A leaking Roof
3. Broken Door Frames
4. Split Sessions (1/2 an education)
5. Refrigerator Temperatures in the Winter and Ovenlike Sweltering During Spring
6. Irreparable Plumbing, Resulting in: Backups, Leaks, Flooded Yards and Corridors and Lunchrooms
7. Sagging, Dangerous Walls
8. Overcrowding in Lunchrooms and Classrooms
9. Unsanitary Children's Toilets
10. Wasteful Temporary Patching of Obsolete and Inherently Inadequate Scrap-Pile Facilities Without Shoving the Tax-payers' Money Down the Drain
11. Condemnation of Nine Classrooms of Our Old (1899) School Where Our Entire Building Is Wrought with Fire and Health Hazards

OUR CHILDREN DESERVE
A NEW SCHOOL
NOW!!

The teaching, clerical and administrative staff of
Public School #119--Manhattan

does take the visitor through squalid and dirty streets. He will notice an abundance of small retail establishments, however, and a lively street life if he passes by in warm weather.⁴⁰

Of the second school, Moore says:

As with all the schools in the urban system being considered, our second school has both a number and a name, the number being for administrative convenience, the name for symbolic purposes....

The school setting is interesting. The building occupies an entire city block between important downtown thoroughfares. Large and imposing, it is surrounded by wide playgrounds, visible to but separated from the street by high steel fences that completely enclose the block. Although there are many entrances to the building and grounds, all but one are kept locked during the school day. Inside, the building is a labyrinth of many rooms and long, disappearing corridors. At every staircase landing, steel casings enclose the windows. The school has seen many years of service, but has recently been renovated and changed from a smaller school to what is, for this city, a consolidated elementary school. For the teachers and staff of the school, it is a completely new assignment.

The neighborhood is a run-down, urban core residential area, housing mainly Negroes and Hispanics. Most of the streets are dingy arrays of crowded tenements with a sprinkling of small stores. However, as in many low-income areas, a large housing project has arrived on the scene. It has brought an increase of 20 percent to the total school population of the district, and its construction, with previous clearing, has contributed to a heavy turnover of pupils. There are two settlement house centers in the area; one sends volunteers to teach remedial reading in the school and the other aids children referred to it by the guidance office. The school itself reflects the mixed ethnic character of the neighborhood. Slightly over half of the students are Hispanics; most of the remaining students are American Negroes; and 2 percent are classified as "other." Altogether the school has an enrollment of 1400 students.⁴¹

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁴¹ George Alexander Moore, Jr., *op. cit.*, pp. 48-49.

Of the third New York City inner-city grade school, Moore remarks:

The building is large and rectangular; its sooty red brick facade is blackened with age. At the moment it stands majestic and alone in an area several blocks square, cleared of older buildings and pock-marked with craters of cellars and piles of rubble. A low-income housing project rises at the edge of this desolation, presaging what is to come all around the school itself. For the time being the school stands alone in its dusty field, the only object in the area spared by the city planners.

The three other sides of the field are bounded by old brick tenements, with rusty fire escapes on the fronts of the buildings, which are often festooned with laundry and laden with persons. In good weather the streets of this neighborhood, none of them being important thoroughfares, are turned into playgrounds by teeming children. It is the area of oldest Hispano settlement in this city; many Hispanos have been here for generations. However, since the war the Hispanic population has multiplied many times; the neighborhood has expanded greatly, and elsewhere in the city, areas have made room for the newcomers. Little English is heard on the streets in this area, and the numerous shops and commercial establishments are mainly owned and operated by Hispanos. A visitor here for the first time will be impressed by the noise and vitality of the streets. Radios blare, children play, everyone seems to be talking.⁴²

More varied, less colorful descriptions of grade schools across the United States, prepared by education specialists for teachers, can be found in William C. Wolf, Jr. and Bradley M. Loomer's textbook on the elementary school.⁴³ Children's perceptions of the ghetto or slum school plant would be an interesting addition here. (Coles'⁴⁴ reproductions of inner-city children's drawings of their schools, below, are eloquent testimony of the unhappy feelings grade school can inspire.) We have found many descriptions by grade schoolers

⁴²George Alexander Moore, Jr., *op. cit.*, pp. 95-96.

⁴³William C. Wolf, Jr. and Bradley M. Loomer, *The Elementary School: A Perspective* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), Chapter 5, pp. 83-125, complete with photographs.

⁴⁴Robert Coles, *op. cit.*, *passim*. See the black and white reproductions on pages 147, 188 of this report.

of the "climate" of the school, none of the buildings and playground and surrounding streets. The sketches offered, however, make the necessary point: that there are major differences in the quality of the physical plant of the nations' grade schools. They also point to the drabness and lack of imagination in the grim and cluttered quarters in which many inner-city grade school age youngsters spend their school days.

The Children

The most important revolutionary group in the advanced countries are the school children. Those aged around twelve are already kicking up a fuss, and it seems extremely likely the generations succeeding them will be even more militant.⁴⁵

An exaggeration? Perhaps. As Buckman goes on to say, "The demand for an effective say in the running of a school by its pupils may not sound revolutionary. But experience in New York and Paris seems to make it so."⁴⁶

The New York children of Ocean Hill-Brownsville of whom Buckman was thinking as he wrote were grade schoolers in an inner-city school. What is known about these children? These are the youngsters who have the most constant, direct exposure to the stresses, cares and frustrations of poverty of all children in our society, excepting only those who grow up in such areas of grim rural poverty as Appalachia. Poverty; dependence on the welfare check; chronic unemployment; the broken home; the heatless, rat infested overcrowded apartment in which the paint is peeling off the walls, the plaster cracked and falling and the plumbing out of order; alcoholism and drug addiction may be part of the direct

⁴⁵Peter Buckman, *The Limits of Protest* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), p. 178. Italics ours.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p. 179. The New York City experience he has in mind is that of Ocean Hill-Brownsville, in which the children "were at least as politically and physically militant as their protesting parents." (p. 180) The French experience of November 1968, was not immediately a success insofar as new modes of school governance were not attained--but it did get thousands of school children out on strike in Paris, Nantes, Marceilles and Toulouse, demanding an effective voice in the selection of their teachers, a vote on their dismissal, and the recruitment of working class children as their fellow students. (pp. 179, 183)

personal experience of the inner-city child in his home. Or he may have evidence of them as he walks the streets near his home, plays on the school playground, eats in the school lunchroom or sits in the same classroom with the children of dire poverty.

What the inner-city child experiences in his immediate neighborhood depends, of course, on the particular mixture of influences which his neighborhood presents to him. In many cases, inner-city neighborhoods will be quite varied from block to block or from sub-community to sub-community. Sometimes, planned low income or middle income housing introduces its own special pattern and problems into neighborhoods with quite different traditions. Thus, the huge, anonymous development can sit by a stable block of row houses in which families may have lived for generations. Uneven changes in population traits, in the willingness to keep up housing, and in the local economy shape the cost of a place to live, whether a home remains convenient to places of work, and whether low income people can find suitable housing at all. These changes may erode "old neighborhoods," which so many can remember with affection. They can destroy the distinctive unity and coherence of a child's neighborhood and present children attending the same school with quite different views of the neighborhood in which they live.

Thus, the inner-city public grade school pupil may or may not have direct, personal experience of poverty, chronic unemployment, and the broken home. For the same reasons, family aspirations for the grade schooler and the actions the family will take on his behalf will vary considerably within the same school district. But the desire for a sense of "community" and "home" appears to remain strong even in deteriorating inner-city neighborhoods. Even when the push is to desegregate neighborhoods and schools, the desire to be with the ethnic minority to which one belongs exerts a strong pull. Today, even where informed inner-city families can enroll their children in a grade school other than the neighborhood school, research findings suggest that the parents of young children prefer to use the school nearest home.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Estelle Fuchs, Pickets at the Gates, op. cit.

The children of the inner-city grade schools are, first and most importantly, children. Some of them are bright, some dull; some well adjusted, some disturbed. Most know when they are being "put down," when they are being "put on." Their teachers describe the children's awareness, their boredom, their self-doubts, their tentative approaches, their curiosity, their hostility.⁴⁸

The grimness of life in the inner-city grade school classroom is a constant theme in both autobiographical and specialist reports. Jackson, who stresses the importance of the grade school in the life of the young child, sees classroom life in the public school system as predominantly gray:

... The daily routine, ... may be brightened from time to time by happenings that add color to an otherwise drab existence, but the grayness of our daily lives has an abrasive potency of its own....⁴⁹

More concisely than most, Jackson has stated the importance of the grade school:

... it is during that period that the young child comes to grips with the facts of institutional life. Also during these formative years he develops adaptive strategies that will stay with him throughout the balance of his education and beyond.⁵⁰

The drabness, the cruelties, the handicaps of much of the inner-city grade school experience have been vividly described in the writings we have been citing--as has an occasional and, unhappily, often fleeting, success. The children themselves expressed the quality of their experience of the neighborhood and of the

⁴⁸ See for example such autobiographical descriptions as that of Herbert Kohl (op. cit.); or George N. Allen (op. cit.), an account by a New York World-Telegram reporter who taught in a Brooklyn junior high school on an "undercover" assignment for his paper; or George Dennison's descriptive analysis of a "free" school (outside the public school system, working on a voluntary basis with disturbed children and some referrals from the public schools of New York City): George Dennison, The Lives of Children (New York: Vintage Books, 1969). See also John Holt, op. cit.; James Herndon, The Way It Spozed to Be (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968); Jonathan Kozol, op. cit.

⁴⁹ Philip W. Jackson, op. cit.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. vii.

school. Young Maurice, sitting in Kohl's inner-city grade school classroom, wrote:

MY SCHOOL LIFE

After years passed by I got older and older and soon old enough to go to school. When my mother sign me up for first grade I was so happy to go but when I saw my teacher I was so scared of her that when my father ask is she a first grade teacher I said "NO." But she said yes the first day was easy but the next three day it was awful I had to righth read do arithmetic and even spelling. I was so young that I didn't even know how to write. So my teacher shoed me how to write. It was easy. I started with "A" and it wined up that I was the second best writer in the class I wasn't the best behaved boy but maybe the worse. I always got hit with the ruler and notes went home. And I got the beaten. All the rest of the year I was an angle.

When I got promoted I went too 2__my teacher was a nice lady until one week went passed we had arithmetic like: $4 \times 34 =$ and $6 \times 25 =$. We knew that she was leaving the school so she made it hard on us. One subject after another first: arithmetic, reading, penmanship, social studies, and some paper work. We had so much homework that it would take a hour are more. On holidays we had a party with enough loliepops for each person could get one the best time we had we when we were out of school. When we got in school the teacher hit me and I hit her back. That when I meet the principal we were boddy boddy. In her was to me I wanted to kill her. In time we got better aquatored. Near the end of the year I got notice that I was being transfore to P.S. __. When I got my reportcard it wasn't pleasant and when I got home I didn't fell pleasant either.

MY NEW SCHOOL LIFE

When I got transfore to P. S. __ I had a hard time getting in. First they had to get my recordcard then they got me a place to go that took a week by the second week I was in school my teacher was nice and sometimes a little bit wild. We got along okay but not the principal. He didn't like me and I didn't like him either. We got along. He never said anything to me and I didn't said anything to him. In the third grade nothing happened worth telling. In the forth grade I had the means teacher in the school so I was good at first but adventurally I got bad every time she hit somebody and somebody walk in she would act like she loved him she was luck she every got company she was worse than Miss Myaryer the means teacher in the school.

When I got in to the fith grade I had a man teacher he was the ulgyst teacher in the school you couldn't bend over to pick up a pencil without getting hit he hit boys but not girls. He was so strick that he had to leave at the end of the term. When I got into the sixth grade I had the best teach in the school. He was nice enough to show us how to do harder work than we suppose to do so we have better grades in junior high school when we go we should be thankful for him teaching us.⁵¹

The children in Kohl's class described the block on which they lived; here are some of their statements, with Kohl's explanation of the context in which they were written:

At eight o'clock on October 22, Alvin pushed Ralph up to my desk. Ralph handed me "The Rob-Killing of Liebowitz," and retreated.

Last night on 17 St. Liebowitz collected the rent. They told him not to come himself but he came for many years. The junkies got him last night. He wouldn't give them the money so they shot him and took it. They was cops and people runny all over roofs and the streets.

There were people from the news and an ambulance took Liebowitz.

I read Ralph's article to the class and asked them if it were true. There was an awkward silence, then Neomia said with bitterness:

"If you don't believe it you can look in the Daily News."

"Mr. Kohl, you don't know what it's like around here."

The others agreed, but when I pressed the class to tell me, silence returned. The more I tried to get the class to talk the dumber the children acted, until they finally denied that there was any truth in Robert's article whatever. The topic was too charged for public discussion; it somehow had to be made private, between each individual child and myself. After all, not everybody saw the same things, and worse perhaps, if things were so bad it would be natural for some of the children to be afraid. So I asked the class to write, as homework in the privacy of their apartments, and tell me what their block was like, what they felt about it. The papers

⁵¹Herbert Kohl, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-67. Here and later in this chapter, the original spelling and syntax have been retained, to preserve the flavor.

were not to be marked or shown to anybody else in the class. If anybody objected, he didn't have to do the assignment. This was probably the first time in their school lives that the children wrote to communicate, and the first sense they had of the possibilities of their own writing.

The next evening I read the responses.

Neomia

WHAT A BLOCK!

My block is the most terrible block I've ever seen. There are at least 25 or 30 narcotic people in my block. The cops come in around there and tries to act bad but I bet inside of them they are as scared as can be. They even had in the papers that this block is the worst block, not in Manhattan but in New York City. In the summer they don't do nothing except shooting, stabbing and fighting. They hang all over the stoops and when you say excuse me to them they hear you but they just don't feel like moving. Some times they make me so mad that I feel like slapping them and stuffing and bag of garbage down their throats. There's only one policeman who can handle these people and we all call him "Sunny." When he come around in his cop car the people run around the corners, and he won't let anyone sit on the stoops. If you don't believe this story come around some time and you'll find out.

Marie

My block is the worse block you ever saw people getting killed or stabbed men and women in building's taking dope. And when the police come around the block the block be so clean that nobody will get hurt. There's especially one police you even beat woman you can't even stand on your own stoop he'll chase you off. And sometimes the patrol wagon comes around and pick up all the dope addicts and one day they picked up this man and when his wife saw him and when she went to tell the police that that's her husband they just left so she went to the police station and they let him go. You can never trust anyone around my block you even get robbed when the children in my building ask me to come down stairs I say no because you don't know what would happen. Only sometimes I come down stairs not all the time.

Sonia

THE STORY ABOUT MY BLOCK

My block is dirty and it smell terrible

The children picks fights. And it hardly have room to play. its not a very long thing to write about, but if you were living

there you won't want to stay there no longer. It have doopedics and gabage pan is spill on the sidewalk and food is on the ground not everyday but sometimes children make fire in the backyard. on the stoop is dirty. I go out to play that the End about My block.

Phyllis

MY BLOCK

My block has a lot of kids who thing that the can beat everybody (like a lot of blocks) They pick on children that they know they can beat. There trouble makers and blabbers mouths.⁵²

These children are the same ones who, Kohl says, let him know they understood the school was not trying to teach them, but only to keep them quiet. These are the children who were pleased to be taught how to take tests, and who wrote to Kohl or came back to see him after they had gone from his sixth grade class to junior high school. These are children like the ones of whom Eisenberg says:

... They are children who are angry--angry perhaps for a good reason, but with an anger that takes it out on them and on us as well.⁵³

Many of these youngsters have imagination and courage and humor and a joy in living and loyalty, however little their classroom experience may bring it out. For many of the inner-city grade school classrooms are cruel to youngsters who in large numbers bear some heavy burdens in their home and neighborhood life.

The Teachers and the Administrators

With adolescent and adult leadership, inner-city grade schoolers may be turned into revolutionaries against the social order. In contrast, the teachers may be militants, in their attempts to reform the existing order. But just as some but not all children are potential revolutionaries, some but not all teachers are militants. The three main changes which have moved teachers and

⁵²Herbert Kohl, op. cit., pp. 45-47.

⁵³Leon Eisenberg, "Strengths of the Inner City Child." In A. Harry Passow, et al. (eds.), Education of the Disadvantaged: A Book of Readings (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1967, pp. 78-88), p. 78.

administrators to assert their rights and to redefine their obligations through protest, strike, and boycott are:

- .1 the impact of the "baby boom" on the schools, particularly as it swells the school census of low income, poverty stricken neighborhoods with broken family life;
- .2 the gradual upgrading of educational requirements for certification to teach in the schools, and an accompanying increased pride in teacher professionalism;
- .3 the significant increase in the number of men entering teaching, who bring new demands for status as well as security.

Between 1958 and 1964, the number of male teachers increased by 73.4 percent, in contrast to a 39 percent increase in the number of women teachers. (Even so, only 32 percent of all teachers were men in 1968.) The baby boom placed profound strains upon teachers, administrators and school facilities. The intensified "professionalization" of teaching and educational administration increased individual teacher's experiences of cumbersome, top-heavy bureaucracy. At the same time, professionalization contributed a cohesiveness among teachers that easily could support activist measures. Greater FRUSTRATION, lesser satisfaction in and out of the classroom was incidental to the changes in the system. And the men who plan to stay in teaching intend to control the power structure of the system.⁵⁴

Teacher militancy is a part of the "portrait of teacher" that the inner-city grade school pupil sees. This militancy, in most contexts perceived as against the child and his schooling, and selfishly oriented to the benefit of the teacher,

⁵⁴ Myron Brenton, What's Happened to Teacher? (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1970) seems to be the most easily accessible of the research commentaries on the contemporary teacher and teacher militancy. See Chapter 7, "The New Militancy," pp. 117-139. Brenton interviewed more than two hundred and fifty teachers and administrators in the United States, and discussed problems and policies with officials of the National Education Association, The American Federation of Teachers, and education agencies at local, state and federal levels. In the course of his research he also read over six hundred studies, articles and books.

has the more provocative potential because the teacher in the ghetto is one of "them"--not one of "us"--to ghetto parents and ghetto children.⁵⁵

Like many inner-city law enforcement officers, the inner-city middle class school teacher frequently feels himself to be, and is, an outsider--an alien in unknown territory. For years, analysts of this feeling of discomfort which goes with being an alien forced to live in strange surroundings have termed it culture shock:

a reaction of dismay, distress, disbelief, unhappiness in unfamiliar surroundings, among people who look, think, and act differently from the original group to whom one belongs.⁵⁶

It is less widely appreciated, however, that the inner-city grade schooler experiences culture shock in not only his classroom contact with the middle class teacher but in his contacts with the police.

Sometimes this shock is direct and abrupt: the result of intended or unintended cruelty by teachers or administrators. Overt cruelty is particularly damaging to the healthy development of grade schoolers, for

... Children of this age are approaching or undergoing physical and psychological changes which they are striving to understand. They are beginning to establish new roles for themselves which sometimes conflict with adult expectations. **THEY ARE INCREASINGLY AWARE OF DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN STATED IDEALS AND OBSERVED ACTIONS....**⁵⁷

⁵⁵ The inner-city ethnic minority reaction to some forms of teacher militancy is illustrated in the account of New York City's Ocean Hill-Brownsville disturbances of 1968. See Maurice R. Berube and Marilyn Gittell (eds.), Confrontation at Ocean Hill-Brownsville: The New York School Strikes of 1968 (New York: Praeger, 1969).

⁵⁶ George Alexander Moore, Jr., *op. cit.* One of the efforts at handling this which is worth examining is Sidney Trubowitz, A Handbook for Teaching in the Ghetto School (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968). See also: Gordon J. and Garda W. Bowman, Teacher Education in a Social Context (New York: Mental Health Materials Center, Inc., the Bank Street College of Education, 1966). The teachers' autobiographical accounts so constantly referred to in this chapter document these reactions vividly and unmistakably.

⁵⁷ William M. Alexander and Emmett L. Williams, "Schools for the Middle School Years," in Harold Full (ed.), Controversy in American Education: An Anthology of Crucial Issues (New York: Macmillan, 1967, pp. 114-120) p. 118.

Yet there is much cruelty in the grade schools. In some jurisdictions, corporal punishment of the grade schooler by teachers and/or principals continues to be legal--and encouraged by some high officials. Some educators apply corporal punishment with unnecessary severity. Others illegally apply it, and sometimes for minor infractions, particularly where the teacher sees himself as required to maintain discipline at all costs. Now, if this cruelty, performed by an adult who is a stranger to the neighborhood after hours, is combined with seemingly hypocritical professions of humane concerns, civil rights, and democratic practices, there is an obvious psychological blow to the child. It should not be surprising that children react with aggression, withdrawal, resignation, and feelings of having no place in the world outside their neighborhood.⁵⁸

Covert cruelty--the cruelty of the word, the gesture, the spoken and unspoken expectation--is equally traumatic for the children. The children recognize it, resent it, respond in ways consistent with their individual personalities and with the accepted behavior of their experience. This means, of course, that

⁵⁸ John Holt and Jonathan Kozol are among those who have stressed the existence and disastrous consequences of physical punishment of grade schoolers. Our illustrations are, it is true, anecdotal, but they can be validated by an examination of state laws and court cases. See, for example: John Holt, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-157, on physical punishment in the Roxbury, Massachusetts schools; he is reporting on Kozol's experience as a teacher in Roxbury. See also Elizabeth M. Eddy, *Walk the White Line: A Profile of Urban Education* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1967), particularly "The Place of the Pupil in the Urban School," and "Discipline Classes in the Urban School." For textbook comments on discipline in the grade school, see Luther E. Bradfield and Leonard E. Kraft (eds.) *The Elementary School Principal in Action* (Scranton, Pa.: International Textbook Co., 1970); "Discipline in the Classroom," *Today's Education: NEA Journal* (Washington, D. C.: National Education Association, 1969); Oscar T. Harvis (ed.), *Elementary School Administration: Readings* (Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown, 1969); Helen B. Shaffer, "Discipline in Public Schools," *Editorial Research Reports*, 11 (Aug. 27, 1969) pp. 635-652; Lawrence Stenhouse (ed.), *Discipline in Schools: A Symposium* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1967); Staten W. Webster, *Discipline in the Classroom* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1968); Asahel D., Woodruff, "Discipline." In *American Educational Research Assoc., Encyclopedia of Educational Research* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1960), pp. 381-385. See also Maurice's description of "My School Life," from Herbert Kohl, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-47, reproduced on pages 179-180, above.


since physical aggression is acceptable--even valued--in the slums, violence against the person is a predictable, but not inevitable, response of intentional or unintentional covert cruelty.

The teachers are as they are under the impact of a variety of converging influences. Their backgrounds and training and motivations for entering teaching may aid or hinder them in understanding and teaching the children. As primarily middle class individuals, they come to teaching with varying degrees of self-understanding, and varying ability to stand back and look at themselves with honesty and a sense of humor. They can be more or less easily trapped into unchanging, unconstructive definitions of the teaching situation in the inner-city schools. The situation they face pressures them to react as many do--to define their role as that of policeman-babysitter.

The two drawings reproduced on pages 187 and 188 convey the feelings of children who are trapped with teachers in this kind of teaching situation.⁵⁹ As in the drawings earlier in this chapter, the child-artists here are expressing what they could not directly express in most classrooms.

The young police officer first working with inner-city children would do well to look at these drawings, and ask what kinds might be drawn about him. Like the teacher in his first classroom encounter with these children, this young law enforcement officer is susceptible to shocks and disappointments. Like the teachers, these officers need specific preparation for their work with children, and understanding, informed support from their supervisors and commanders. One major problem in providing this support is that some older, experienced officers may find contemporary reports about inner-city schools to be not believable, or, if believable, to be exaggerated by "bleeding hearts." These older officers may not be fully sensitive to how inner-city schools, children, or teachers


⁵⁹ These were color drawings in Coles' collection; he has reproduced them in color and in black and white in *Teachers and the Children of Poverty*. If the black child in the bus sees the white driver as not only different from himself but part of white-owned properties, how must he see his white teacher and the school "belonging" to whites? The subtle commentary on the school as a meaningless experience for the child in the second drawing cannot be passed over lightly by those who are trying to understand violence in the grade schools.



A black child draws the school bus

[owned, he says, by "white people"] that takes him and others like him to school. His face can be seen amid the dabs of black. The white driver literally blends into the bus, which is the same color as the driver's face.

"Here I am when I'm grown up.
That's a cowboy hat.
I'm on top of a hill.
The school, it's way down there.
I could fly in that plane.
The kid, he still has to go to school,
but I thought I'd give him
a cowboy hat, too.
That's a crow. She's saying:
'Why don't you kids
fly away from school and
get yourself a deal someplace.'
That's what she's saying."



have changed from the "old neighborhood" they remember from their childhood. But as American society has changed, schools, teachers, and children have changed. Trainers of teachers and trainers of police officers and criminal justice specialists have a crucial, common job: to understand these changes and to interpret them to their trainees who, like it or not, will be thrust into the firing lines of social change.

Teaching in the inner-city schools is a demanding, painful job which needless to say also can be satisfying--even in the face of the frustrations compounded by a sluggish bureaucracy. All of the autobiographical materials to which we have referred confirm the demands, disappointments and satisfactions of this most difficult of teaching assignments. All of them also agree that many administrators--superintendents, principals, assistant principals--in the system regard the inner-city child as typically unteachable, and stress the MAINTENANCE OF DISCIPLINE as, not part of the job, but THE WHOLE JOB to be done with these children. The constraints and inadequacies of the bureaucracy are well documented in the readings we have suggested at the end of this chapter. TEACHERS OPT TO TEACH, TO POLICE OR TO BABYSIT--OR TO GET OUT OF THE SYSTEM, INTO A "FREE SCHOOL" OR A NONTEACHING JOB--DEPENDING ON THEIR PERSONAL STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES. THE CHILDREN KNOW THE OPTIONS AND CALCULATE THE ODDS IN THE CASE OF ANY GIVEN TEACHER. This, too, is a part of the portrait of "Teach" the grade schooler sees--and to which he reacts.

The children speak of the best and the worst among their mentors. Complaints of teacher prejudice and of the FAILURE TO TEACH are common:

Well, you know, the teachers are prejudiced....you're trying to tell her something and she tells you, ... "You niggers, you don't have no right on the street, you're not going to get... those white people owned you and you let yourself be enslaved and that's what you deserved.... The teachers put more emphasis on behavior than they do on teaching and that way you don't learn nothing.... I mean, a teacher going to stand up in front of the classroom a whole period while you could learn something useful for you in your future life and he's going to sit up there and tell

funny stories or tell you about one of his experiences--it doesn't make no sense. That isn't teaching so as the kids can learn.⁶⁰

The shocks and frustrations are felt on both sides of the teacher's desk. Neither teachers nor grade schoolers are exempt from persuasion to activism. And in militant activism lies the potential for collective violence.

In the final picture of the inner-city grade school which now emerges, there are strong indications that guidance personnel, assistant principals, and principals are insulated and isolated from what is going on in their grade schools and surrounding communities. Teachers are closer to the scene, of necessity, but they, too, can choose to insulate themselves. The children and many of their parents know this and can take advantage of it.

This isolation, this tendency toward polarization, between school staff on the one hand and the children, parents, and surrounding community on the other places specific burdens on law enforcement officers charged with monitoring, anticipating, and preventing grade school violence.

- .1 Police "cooperation" with school principals is not enough, although every police commander should establish both emergency liaison officials and contingency plans for the schools in his precinct, district, or division, prior to specific crises;
- .2 To maintain adequate intelligence about situations in which collective violence could threaten or erupt, it will be necessary for stable, mature, sensitive officers to cultivate children, parents, and teachers, so that there will be willingness to share timely information, and so that officers will have the sufficient, casual access to ongoing situations which will enable them to make their own appraisals of what is happening.
- .3 In neighborhoods where the grade schools are particularly "hot," there is likely to be no effective, available substitute for a direct street intelligence system which involves police with individual children, parents, and teachers.

⁶⁰ Estelle Fuchs, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

CHAPTER II

Part III

WHAT POLICE FACE IN THE
GRADE SCHOOLS

Part III

WHAT POLICE FACE IN THE GRADE SCHOOLS

The General Situation in the Grade School

Until very recently, analysts of collective violence in the grade school have given little attention to the problem of its control as a distinct, separate problem requiring the development of clear guidelines and doctrine. When treated at all, grade school collective violence is usually viewed as an interesting, dramatic part of larger problems afflicting particularly inner-city grade schools. By and large, professional analysts of grade school violence still focus on the individual--whether it is the pupil who "misbehaves," or the dramatic behavior of activists who seek to disrupt. This does not mean, however, that there is no basis for developing relevant procedures which law enforcement and criminal justice officers can use in addressing the problem of grade school collective violence. Yet, far more than in the case of the high school or college, police doctrine on grade school collective violence must rest in intelligent speculation, in the absence of carefully researched studies of the variety of ongoing situations in which collective violence is a problem in the grade school. Until there is more information of this type, for example, it is very difficult to define the the grade school as a general operational target, in the sense which could be done for the high school, in phases before, during, and after collective violence.⁶¹ At the moment, there is so much variation among grade schools, and the ways in which children can be used as pawns offers so many propaganda possibilities, that it is probably premature to think that there is even the beginning of a basis for prescribing one, coherent, generalized set of procedures which police should use in addressing grade school collective violence.

Certain lessons are clear, though, and it is from these that it is possible first, to describe the general situation which may confront law enforcement in the grade school. After this look is taken at the general tactical situation, it is

⁶¹ Above, Chapter I, pp. 30-77. See especially pp. 29-30.

possible to look, next, at the kinds of special requirements work in this situation imposes on police and criminal justice officials. Finally, there are some suggestions which can be made about police tactical response to a number of the most critical situations they are likely to encounter in the grade school. At the end of the last part of Chapter II, special attention is given to the problem of response to bomb threats, as not only a problem in its own right, but as a problem which sums up in various ways the difficulties of providing generally valid doctrine for threats as well as acts of collective violence in the grade school.

One organizing focus already used in this chapter has been an emphasis on the inner-city school. In the discussion that follows, however, it is important to remember that part of the value of emphasizing the inner-city school has been that the inner-city school offers a kind of forecast for what is likely to appear in other types of grade schools. Today in the inner-city school, the protests which lead to collective violence are often associated with attempts to gain community control over the schools or attempts to hasten school racial integration. Police may expect incidents of racially related collective violence to affect other types of grade schools in the future, particularly the "high status" and "common man" schools,⁶² where population changes are bringing changes in community racial composition. But there are problems other than race or community control which may provoke grade school incidents. One problem to which particularly high status schools are vulnerable is quite removed from the usual worries about race. This is the problem of sex education, which can bitterly divide even the most placid schools and communities. In fact, the viciousness of community controversies over sex education has become so extreme in some areas that the National Education Association, the major teachers' professional organization in the United States, has issued a special pamphlet on how to combat extremist troublemakers who exploit the sex education issue.⁶³

⁶²As defined above, pp. 150-156.

⁶³Commission on Professional Rights and Responsibilities of the National Education Association, Suggestions for Defense Against Extremist Attack: Sex Education in the Public Schools (Washington: National Education Association, Stock Number 161-05028, March 1970).

Outside agitators can do as much damage using sex education as the target, particularly with the emotionally charged issue of "protecting impressionable grade school children," as they can do on questions of racial integration or community control. For this reason, police should be equally attentive to them.

This only underscores the inherent dilemma many police will feel in combating school uproars triggered by skillful manipulators. As a middle class parent and citizen, the average law enforcement officer will be as vulnerable to shrill allegations about "sex education" as he will be to clever attempts to manipulate his reactions on "race." Only when he looks into these matters for himself will he discover, too often and too late, that these social issues are being used simply to divide and disrupt the community and its schools.

Crucial in any appraisal of the grade school situation must be, then, an estimate of the degree to which outsiders are overtly or covertly attempting to disrupt it. This may be very difficult, for unlike older children or young adults, grade schoolers can be made to react without giving clear clues about outside influence. On the other hand, older students may themselves be actively and coherently espousing the "cause" which the outsider brings in. At the same time, the extreme vulnerability of young children may cause police and criminal justice officials to overact--often exactly what is desired. So there is a critical general requirement that all officers involved in a situation of grade school collective violence be as aware as they can of what their own emotional reactions are to what is being presented to them as an "incident," and what, if any, attempts are being made to provoke them to react in terms of their instincts and emotions as parents and citizens.

Who are the outsiders? What general categories of people should be the subject of police concern, in police efforts to anticipate those outsiders and activities which may culminate in either situational or provoked and guided group violence in the elementary school?⁶⁴ Using accidents, misbehavior, or protests,

⁶⁴For definitions of the terms "situational" and "guided" violence, see Chapter I, above, pp. 83-91, and Footnote 21 in this chapter, above, p. 157.

CONTINUED

2 OF 5

the following general categories of outsiders or outside influences may be instigators of grade school collective violence:

- .1 Community militants and adults, who may or may not be acting in concert with militant teachers, administrative staff, or paraprofessional personnel, and who are concerned about community political issues.
- .2 Teenagers unconnected with the school, acting not only in small groups or as individuals (to engage in rapes, beatings, and thefts) within the school building but also as roving bands, who descend on grade schools from junior or senior high schools. These may sometimes be gangs which have their own organization independent of school; sometimes they may be recruited or encouraged by community militants, for the purpose of creating physical pandemonium in the school and terrorizing children and adult school personnel.
- .3 Protest movements within the grade school, as stimulated either by outside adults or by high school age students, the latter seeking to turn grade school attention to problems of school dress codes, discipline, or integration. There is unmistakable evidence that high school and junior high school activists have produced violent as well as non-violent protest, that they can create situations which can rapidly get out of their control, and that at least some of them see it as their moral duty to organize younger students to demand their rights.⁶⁵

Gerald Levy provides an explicit example from New York City of how outside community militants seek to organize grade schoolers:

The Organization of the Children

Toward the end of the spring term a youth group called "We March Together" rented a basement of a brownstone across the street from the school and started recruiting children from Midway and Porter Junior High. Run by a Black drop-out from Columbia University, "We March Together" was organized on a quasi-military basis. Loyalty to leaders, called lieutenants and captains, was stressed as well as "Black pride." Many of the

⁶⁵ Joshua Mamis, "The Right to Petition at Eleven," in Marc Libarle and Tom Seligson (eds.), The High School Revolutionaries (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 153-160, for example.

meetings were spent in learning fancy drill, which was displayed whenever possible in Midway's classrooms. Within a few weeks, "We March Together" had recruited about 100 children from Midway and about 300 from Porter Junior High. Before the end of the term, "We March Together" was in serious competition with the local "PAL" group (a youth group sponsored by the police department) and the WMT drill team had performed in a school assembly. The plan of WMT, according to its leaders, was to organize and discipline as many of Midway's children as possible, and at the proper time to take some sort of collective action such as a school boycott. Sensing this, teachers and administrators tried to discourage interested children from joining WMT and offered PAL as an alternative.⁶⁶

Likely organizers of protests. Community adults are the most likely sources of violence-prone activities centering on inner-city grade schools. In presenting demands, programs, and points of view, civil rights leaders have backed parents' organizations. An example of this interplay between civil rights leaders, a Parent-Teacher Association and the local grade school of the inner-city is given in Pickets at the Gates.⁶⁷ While in the instance in question the parent protest, supported by the civil rights leaders and reported in a newspaper with a high circulation in the Black community did not come to violence, it did involve some grade school children, and it did have a high collective violence potential. Given viable issues--as indeed exist in the inner-city grade schools--community militants may well find it in their political interest to stir things up. Less politically oriented groups of adults acting as parents have Ellen Lurie's handbook⁶⁸ to aid them in enterprises which can be expected to involve grade school students in the danger of collective violence.

⁶⁶ Gerald E. Levy, Ghetto School: Class Warfare in an Elementary School (New York: Pegasus, 1970), pp. 165-166.

⁶⁷ Estelle Fuchs, Pickets at the Gates, *op. cit.*, Part II. The Ocean Hill-Brownsville story is another example. See Maurice R. Berube and Marilyn Gittell (eds.), Confrontation at Ocean Hill-Brownsville: The New York School Strikes of 1968 (New York: Praeger, 1969).

⁶⁸ Ellen Lurie, How to Change the Schools: A Parents' Action Handbook on How to Fight the System (New York: A Random House Vintage Book, 1970).

Similar tactics and interplays among adult interest groups can be seen in campaigns to abolish sex education. In contrast with the usual inner-city protests, which are conducted by what police intelligence units customarily characterize as "leftist" organizations, the anti-sex education campaigns which have surfaced in a number of smaller city and suburban communities are often conducted by "right-wing" extremists, who also seek power over the schools. The following discussion of right-wing efforts to gain control of the schools through the sex education issue would need only a few words of change to make it directly applicable as a description of left-wing attempts to advance their own social policies through the schools:

Once the extremist elements within the community have fully activated their campaign, they must plan to peak it at the proper moment. This proper moment usually occurs before the school board election or before any other election that might influence the school board--perhaps the city council election if the money for the schools is controlled by that body. The hue and cry raised through the front group usually takes the line that the school board or other responsible agency will not heed the danger signals and abolish the sex education program. Therefore, the public will be told that the only alternative is to elect a new slate of school board or city council candidates. It is at this time that the real goals of the extremist are revealed: the front group will now change the direction of its main thrust and proceed to gear for an election while giving only lip service to its opposition to sex education. The extremist forces will then run a candidate or candidates for office who vow to support the abolition of sex education. If the front group is well-organized the candidates will probably be vocal members of the group; otherwise, the selected candidates, while in sympathy with the extremist's aims, may be individuals who are not easily identified with the front group.

... when, in attacking sex education, right-wingers utilize methods such as character assassination, intimidating and harassing telephone calls, gross distortions of truth, disruption of school board meetings, rallying opposition against school bond issues, and the tactics previously described, their actions undermine public confidence in the schools, subvert the honest criticism of parents, and threaten the academic freedom of students and teachers.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ Commission on Professional Rights and Responsibilities of the National Education Association, op. cit., p. 9.

The implication of this commentary for law enforcement and criminal justice is that officers throughout the country must be alert to the possibility of their grade schools being turned into arenas for collective violence by pressures from many types of adult activists. The resulting collective violence is no less dangerous if performed by White militant community adults forceably interrupting a sex education class or suburban school board meeting, than if performed by Black militant community adults intent upon seizing physical control of an inner-city school building in the name of the "people."

Militant teachers are, however, more likely to be an inner-city phenomenon, particularly when they are asserting their professional status and values in a big city which is facing pressures on its budget and is thus holding the line on salaries and services. New York City experience in teacher strikes demonstrates this.⁷⁰ In inner-city schools, where Black, Puerto Rican and Mexican-American parents tend to perceive the middle class teacher as prejudiced against, and failing to educate, their children, teacher militancy has provoked parent and pupil protest against the closing down of the school. Such protests generate a host of possibilities for collective violence.

One final category of inner-city adult who is involved in the school situation requires special notice: the paraprofessional. The paraprofessional is an adult working in the schools, as a supplement to the teacher in the classroom but without professional education or certification as a teacher. "Paras" perform many routine functions in working with the children, thus relieving the often heavily overburdened teacher professional, so that he can devote full time to formal instructional tasks. Although many paraprofessionals are, today, middle-aged women from the nearby community who find their work a meaningful, somewhat unexpected career, there are increasing signs that paraprofessionals in the future will come from younger people, many of whom will be recent college dropouts. These individuals frequently have aspirations for a status in life well above what they are qualified or able to attain. Such individuals entering the paraprofessional class of school worker are a likely source of protests in the near future

⁷⁰ See for example Maurice R. Berube and Marilyn Gittell (eds.), op. cit.

over the salary and status' of "paras." The vocal militants among this group of younger "paras" can be expected to have little hesitation about enlisting children in demonstrations or placing them in situations which will degenerate into collective violence. In New York City, informed confidential opinion suggests that the new program of open college admissions⁷¹ is likely to swell the ranks of grade school paraprofessionals with dropouts unable to do the work for which they enrolled in college. From this group may well come the skills and motivation required to intensify the already budding unionization of the "paras," so that their frustrated ambitions for status can come closer to realization.

For all cities where extensive use of paraprofessional personnel in the schools is contemplated, therefore, law enforcement planners should:

- . 1 Begin including materials on paraprofessional militancy within larger files on militant groups;
- . 2 Begin developing training materials which can sensitize patrolmen and commanders with any special operational problems which paraprofessionals may create because of their special access to the life and physical interiors of grade schools.

The requirement for police awareness of community factors influencing the grade school. Since grade schools may be special targets for outside interests, law enforcement officers at all levels of command must maintain an informed, continuing awareness of what is happening in their local grade schools which could possibly lend them to becoming targets for issue-oriented manipulation and penetration. A convenient checklist to determine whether this awareness does, in fact, exist in local law enforcement agencies would contain at least the following questions:

- . 1 Is there a neighborhood-by-neighborhood, precinct-by-precinct, district-by-district, division-by-division continuing, usable profile of the current political and social issues which might involve grade schools as targets or bargaining points?

⁷¹As of September, 1970, the New York City program of "open admissions" to the city university system guarantees admission to any holder of a New York City high school diploma--regardless of record or other qualification factors.

- . 2 Does the local police commander have an estimate of how aware principals and their assistants are of these issues, and how principals might respond to pressure tactics?
- . 3 Are there strong parent-teacher associations or other indications of adult organization which could be turned to supporting efforts to stabilize grade schools? Or, are these school-support organizations in danger of penetration, manipulation, or subversion to other ends?
- . 4 Who are the local militants and what do they want? How current and reliable is police intelligence on their activities? Are there systematic plans for building this intelligence on militant activities into operational planning?
- . 5 Are there current, updated operational plans which can guide police activities for the full range of violent incidents which activists of all political persuasions might incite? These incidents include, but are not limited to:
 - . a Harassment and threats leading to violence, or violent counteractions;
 - . b Boycotts;
 - . c Sit-ins and mill-ins;
 - . d Threats against property, including bomb threats;
 - . e Individual or collective assaults on other individuals;
 - . f Any actions in which children might be used as hostages.
- . 6 Are there separate channels for police communication with militants and with school officials, such that police can form independent estimates of the validity of the information being given to them by each of these two sides in school controversies? Or, are the views of both sides presented to police by only one side?
- . 7 Do programs exist for training both recruits and senior officers in the special vulnerabilities of grade schools to acts of individual and collective violence?

A special opportunity for building informed awareness exists in the young police officer, just out of the police academy, and the young teacher, just graduated from college. Both are young, and often they are both strangers or aliens to the localities in which they work--especially if it is the inner-city. Because they are young, their chances of forming relationships with the grade school children may be greater than is true for the school administrator, the older teacher, or the older law enforcement officer. This chance exists despite

the fact that one of these young men wears a uniform and both are alien middle class representatives. Because they are young and middle class and alien to the community in which they work, they may be able to transcend the barriers to effective communication between teachers and police officers. The experience of the ghetto is similar in important aspects for both the young police officer and the young teacher. If they successfully make common cause of their shared experience despite the obstacles to good police-teacher relations, the law enforcement officer's ability to predict the likelihood of outbursts of collective violence involving grade school children, and to act in a fashion which prevents or controls violent developments, will be enhanced.

This leads to a possibility which inner-city police officials responsible for training may wish to consider:

A Program for Co-Training the
Young Officer and the Young Teacher

In the later phases of their basic academy training (for police recruits) and their in-service school orientation (for elementary school teachers), it may be desirable to bring these two groups of young professionals together, on a selected basis, for carefully constructed training workshops, in which the two groups become aware of the special responsibilities and problems which each will encounter in protecting young children from violence centering on the elementary school setting. Using the idealism and enthusiasm which these two groups of young professionals may be likely to have, it may be possible through these workshops to build not only mutual appreciation of the job the other must do--but, much more important to police tactics, specific relationships in precincts and divisions, between similarly motivated young police officers and teachers.

As presently stated, this is less of a "program," and more of an "idea" which may merit further careful development before any attempt is made to apply it. The idea is presented now in rough form, however, in the thought that in spite of obvious differences in outlook and background, a working alliance of young police and young teachers may be a most important resource in anticipating violence involving the very young and in protecting them from it.

Political awareness of children as a factor in the grade school situation facing police. In spite of the fact that much more needs to be known about the political attitudes and awareness of young children, there appears today to be a level of interest and activity in political processes among preadolescent children and adolescents which is quite different from the political interest and activities of earlier generations of American children. Passage in 1971 of the Constitutional Amendment giving eighteen-year-olds the right to vote is indirect evidence of this trend. More direct evidence comes from the writings and behavior of student activists. The intense present interest and activity of the adolescent is illustrated in the writings of the high school activists for their underground newspapers⁷² and in the protest behavior which makes headlines and is the subject of a wide range of studies, some of which have been annotated in the first chapter. Interviews with preadolescents cited in Pickets at the Gates⁷³ are useful examples of the quality of thought and emotion of this group. In studying Black children in southern United States, Robert Coles has found that

Again and again in recent years, children have marched by their parents' side in racial demonstrations....

They have ranged from grammar school youngsters of eight or ten, walking hands clasped in those of their parents, to a large number of adolescent youths whose actions are very much their own.... I know of several towns in the upper South where libraries and drugstores were desegregated by junior high and high school children to the surprise of their own parents....⁷⁴

There is solid evidence of an increase in student participation in various aspects of political life. The increased participation is accompanied by a new interest in political issues. Incidents of collective violence among students are

⁷²Some of these writings are reproduced in Marc Libarale and Tom Seligson (eds.), op. cit. On protest behavior, see the bibliography in Chapter I, pp. 110-136.

⁷³Estelle Fuchs, Pickets at the Gates, op. cit., Part II.

⁷⁴Robert Coles, Children of Crisis: A Study of Courage and Fear (Boston: Little and Brown, 1967).

increasing. Activism has become a part of high school life, and appears to be becoming a part of junior high or middle school life, at least in the inner-city. Grade schoolers can be involved in protests which are political in nature, and which give rise to the possibility of grade schooler involvement in incidents of collective violence. Whatever this may imply about "maturity," or the lack of maturity, it is of keen interest to law enforcement officers, for it means that relatively young children are increasingly able to "explain" collective violence in terms of this violence being a simple extension of political action.

Mobilizing issues in which the children are pawns. Inner-city grade school conditions offer a host of real, easily popularized issues around which parent and broader community support can be mobilized by Parent-Teacher Associations, civil rights leadership and other community militants. In this age of confrontation, school confrontations are inevitable, for they afford useful political capital to their instigators and astute supporters. Once the issue is successfully joined, parents keep their children out of class and school. In recent history, middle school pupils and some grade schoolers have walked the picket lines with their parents or on their own.

The school boycott and any violence associated with it are of course marginal to the school. Incidents of this type are organized by outsiders to the grade school--not by the grade school pupils. The issues around which such incidents have been or may be organized are the issues we have in mind, and the passivity of the role of grade school children in such incidents makes them "pawns" of the adults concerned.⁷⁵

In maintaining an estimate of the current situation in inner-city grade schools, the police commander and tactical planner should pay special attention to the emergence and development of the following issues:

⁷⁵ Unlike high school students, and to a lesser extent, pupils in the last two years of the junior high, grade schoolers do not appear to organize followings capable of taking protest actions.

- . 1 Overcrowding in the school, usually as a result of successful efforts by the majority population to maintain the de facto segregation of the schools, but sometimes a consequence of families' desire to keep the younger children in the neighborhood school.
- . 2 Decrepit, aged school building and worn, out of date equipment, common in the inner-city schools whose financing has not kept pace with the depredations of the years and of vandalism.
- . 3 Inadequate school playground space or no school playground in heavily trafficked inner-city neighborhoods.
- . 4 "School lunch" issues: these revolve around the needs of lower income families, for some of whose children lunch is the only meal, and for whom any disruption of the lunch schedule is disastrous.
- . 5 Complaints against the school administration and/or individual teachers, which may run a gamut from charges of physical mistreatment of a child or children to charges of bias or incompetency.
- . 6 Demands for a parent voice in the recruitment and dismissal of teachers, paraprofessionals and administrators.
- . 7 Dissatisfaction with desegregation measures: a mixed bag, including opposition to busing, demands for busing, demonstrations in favor of segregation, etc.
- . 8 Demands for status as symbolized by higher salaries, tenure, and so on, coming from organized paraprofessionals in the school system.
- . 9 School disciplinary practices, including corporal punishment, suspension of the student, etc.: occasionally the issue raised is that of school bias against an ethnic minority. High school and junior high or middle school activists have protested against the dress codes and for a strong voice in newspaper policy, student government, and teacher rating. Some of these activists may seek to enlist grade schoolers.

In addition to these characteristically inner-city issues in which children may be made pawns in events which can ultimately lead them into protests and situations of collective violence, there are several issues which may be expected to make children pawns in other kinds of schools:

- . 1 Specific disapproved programs, such as "sex education," in which an emotionally charged issue is used to undercut the credibility of administrators and teachers and to disrupt the daily processes of school life. As in inner-city situations, children here may be asked to be informers. They may be asked to engage in walkouts and led to other more violent physical actions.
- . 2 Enforced racial integration in excess of what is approved in the local community at-large. Police should be alert to efforts by community adults to instigate child-to-child or group-against-group acts of violence in grade school, as "proof" that children of different races cannot get along together. Police should be alert to attempts to disrupt court-ordered busing of children out of their neighborhoods. In this disruption of busing, children may be physical pawns in the most direct sense.

Is one type of school more likely to produce collective violence on certain issues than other types?⁷⁶ For example, are the children of high status schools less likely to be involved in incidents of guided violence centering on race, but more likely than the others to be involved in incidents of guided violence centering on sex education? Research as yet provides no answers.

Personal Qualities Required of Law Enforcement Officers in the Grade School Setting

The importance of attitude. The previous section has considered the "general situation" in the elementary school, especially as outsiders and issues work to shape the events of inner-city grade school life. Before turning to some tactical suggestions, it is useful now to suggest how the tone of grade school life--again, with special emphasis on the inner-city--requires some special attitudes by law enforcement personnel assigned to deal with grade school life. Even much enhanced intelligence on grade schools and their surrounding communities can be of little value if officers react with shock and outrage in the presence of impressionable but sophisticated children.

⁷⁶ As these four types were defined above, pp. 150-156.

"Misbehavior" and current freedoms. Police officers are all familiar with the kinds of child "misbehavior" called defiance, profanity, fighting, truancy, stealing and vandalism. Truancy, or absence from the compulsory schools, is handled by the truant officer; defiance and profanity on school premises are behaviors the classroom teacher or the school administrative staff usually cope with as they occur. Fighting among grade schoolers ordinarily is broken up by the teachers; law enforcement officers are called in only under extraordinary circumstances. Theft on school grounds, and occasionally vandalism, may be handled either by the school alone or by police at the request of the school administration. Crimes against the grade schooler committed by adults or adolescent "outsiders" on grade school premises are a matter for the law enforcement officer.

It is obvious, but necessary to remark, that defiance, profanity, fighting and theft and/or vandalism are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The police officer called in to deal with grade school theft may be treated to a fine show of defiance and/or profanity by the youngster who is suspect--and his supporters. It is equally obvious, but necessary to state, that none of these misbehaviors is common to one social class alone. The nature of the delinquent act and the numbers and motives of the suspects vary, and the temptations to misbehave in certain ways differ. The likelihood that a law enforcement officer will be called in, and that if called in he may "throw the book" at the suspected thief, vandal or assailant has been demonstrated to be highest in the inner-city slums and lowest in the upper-class neighborhoods. Slum dwellers perceive the greater likelihood of their arrest and prosecution to be reality even where law enforcement officers are making every effort to treat all law violators equally. Inner-city children, too, react to their sense of being prejudged; the emotional atmosphere these feelings produce may trigger collective protest at any given police action, winding up in collective violence.

Today police are challenged to handle grade schoolers' defiance in the school and elsewhere. Defiance is universal. Grade schoolers at certain stages in their development are impelled to test out how far they can go with parents and other adults--and with the police and teachers in particular. There are no

cookbook recipes for law enforcement officer--or teacher--handling of defiance, although a handbook of ghetto teaching⁷⁷ offers some suggestions appropriate to classroom experience. A policeman, remembering that he is dealing with children, needs to use his good sense and intuition in guessing the probable reason for the act of defiance, and his self control and sense of humor in handling it "without making a federal case out of it." The officer who can do this may win not only his point but also the child's respect and liking--even if only temporarily.

Profanity--in and outside the school setting--appears to be becoming universal. Until the last decade, four letter words were most unlikely to be used within the confines of the "conventional" or the "high status" public grade schools. Every law enforcement officer knows that four letter words are now in fashion among activists, whether the activists are college students or dropouts, or pupils of the "high status," "conventional," "common man" or "inner-city" high schools.⁷⁸ It comes harder to American adults to recognize that there are junior high school activists, and that among them the fad of never missing an opportunity to use a four letter word also has caught on. It is probable that the more advanced grade schoolers age ten and over are now equally proficient in substituting a profane word wherever it will fit. The shock reaction is, of course, what the youngsters are after. The law enforcement officer who can keep them guessing as to his reaction has scored a point. Four letter words are a natural part of an inner-city slum child's vocabulary; the shock effect achieved by them sometimes surprises the children, who rapidly learn to capitalize on it.

Officers called in to the grade school, middle school or junior high to investigate a theft, an act (or acts) of vandalism or fighting with a lethal weapon are subject to the standard rules which protect the rights of the suspect in such inquiries. The developing and still uncertain "law of student conduct" is beginning to be reflected in the grade schoolers' claiming, and having recognized, adult

⁷⁷Sidney Trubowitz, A Handbook for Teaching in the Ghetto School (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968).

⁷⁸See above, pp. 150-156 for definitions of these terms.

constitutional rights, a complicating factor in dealing with children. Moreover, there is widely publicized evidence that inner-city residents, children included, are very sensitive because of their perception of the high probability that law enforcement officers will violate their rights. Of course there is no easy way to handle this. A precise and business-like approach may be as much an object of severe criticism and resentment as a more lenient and relaxed one. And there is always the danger that civil rights leaders or other outsiders may organize a mass protest--which could involve grade school children, in the school setting, and which could develop into a violent encounter--if the police give them the minutest excuse.

Grade schoolers and police in protest situations. The considerably greater likelihood of mass protest, and perhaps violence, following upon the performance of police duty in the inner-city, is new in the last decade. New, too, is the notion of the grade school age child's participation in school boycotts and school strikes. Some junior high or middle school pupils have "told it like it was" for them during the picketing of the Board of Education in New York City's Operation Shutdown, a 1965 school boycott:

GIRL:

...I have to tell you what happened--this story will amaze you. We're walking down the street, you know, opposite the Board of Education, and a truant officer, I think, no it was a cop arrested this boy that was walking along with me. And so I turn around and I say something to him, you know, and I seen the cop there and I said: "What's the matter, what'd you do? You didn't do nothing." So the truant officer comes up to me and says, "Do you want to go to jail?" I smiled at him because, you know, I really thought he was playing, you know, smiled and everything was pleasant and he say all right, get in the car. I says: "Look, I didn't do nothing. I'm walking down the street and I'm not getting in that car unless I did something." All these, I mean one little old me--all these cops and truant officers would grab me and drag me to the ground and threw me in the car and everything and then when they got down to court you should hear some of the lies that come out. I'm down there for a ... at first I thought I was being down there for walking the street. When you get down there, I'm for assault and battery, this all... of resisting arrest, trespassing, and a couple other thousand things thrown in. I says, "What's this?"

I do not... here I'm charged with all this jazz, you know, and you just should see the way those cops brought those grown-ups in. They lift kids by our clothes, you know, and they drag you and it's just disgusting. There's nothing glamorous in getting arrested, I'll tell you that much.⁷⁹

BOY:

And, you know, inside, you know, I was scared. You know, I said now if I was to go down here, I said, I never been on nothing like that before, you know. So after that everybody went home. We didn't go no places. That was the first couple days I was coming down here--about three days--and the fourth day is the time we went.

So I went home that night and I was thinking to myself. I said-- I want my kids to come up honest and clean and with a good education because I plan on getting a good one myself. I said they might start out like I do but I don't want them to wind up like I do, you know. I want them to have a good education and things. So, I was saying, thinking very hard. So I went home that night and I was just thinking, thinking to myself, you know... and I lay in the bed, you know, before I go to sleep and I think to myself, and I was thinking so hard that I had a dream about it. And I was thinking that--now if I go downtown--I was just, you know, just thinking, and I was saying to myself that I want my kids to grow up, you know, in a decent school and a decent neighborhood. So I was thinking... I was thinking about whether to say yes or no to--about going downtown or anyplace, So I said, "Oh, I'll go ahead and do it." I said, "It won't kill me and if I do die I'll die trying..."⁸⁰

GIRL:

Then, you know, we went down to the picket lines... oh, I hated it, down there. But, you know, when you're down on the picket lines you have to learn how to take everything from people--you have to listen to people talk about you. And most teen-agers... you know, when people say something about... they'll want to jump up and fight. But you'd be amazed that all of us around here are peaceful and everything and... Those white students from St. John's University had to say, "Niggers, go home."

⁷⁹ Estelle Fuchs, *op. cit.*, pp. 172-173.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

Now, all of us all riled up because they had arrested all the adults and some of the teen-agers that tried to take over when the grown-ups had gone... every time one of the kids tried to get order they'd arrest him or something like that. And when those St. John's University students, they said, "Niggers, go home," and everybody just exploded and it was disgusting.

And then, everytime, it seemed like when you want to get a little, a little room to do something, those cops would push you back. Now, they're telling you to keep moving but yet they're pushing you back and everything. I was trying to talk to some of these white people--they had just got on the picket line and this horse chased me up and down the street.⁸¹

One picket-line captain, a teen-ager himself, described his arrest:

BOY:

I kept them in a straight line and in order. Then when it was time to go home, I'd tell them to follow me and things like that. The police officers, they took me out from the line and said I was influencing kids to stay out of school.⁸²

GIRL:

And everytime we would go down town and demonstrate they would arrest all the adults and they would leave us, you know, without any adult supervision. Then they would run behind us with horses and nightsticks and whatnot. And the boys would become angry, then they would fight back like the time they knocked-out. A cop... they had, they had us inside a barricade and the kids were marching around and--got pushed into the barricade and one of the cops knocked him out. His heart beat twice and he fell down. And then the boys became mad and they started fighting, you know, fussing with the cops back and forth. There's some boys from St. John's University who came up to the edge of the parking lot and said, "Niggers, go home." And then the boys chased them and they started fighting.⁸³

⁸¹ Estelle Fuchs, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 175.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 175-176.

Law enforcement officers have tough problems to deal with here, in an atmosphere which, as Westley notes, makes it a good deal harder to manage an inherently difficult set of problems of officer role management. As Westley says:

The dynamics of the relationship between the police and their work described in this study are based on a very simple model of how men handle their occupational lives. If one assumes with Everett Hughes that today occupation is a major badge of identity, then one also assumes that men will act in such a way as to protect their identity and self-esteem. The major problem for the policeman is to deal with pressures and expectations of the public. When the public is hostile, the police will react with hostility and secrecy. When their activities are likely to lead to criticism from the public, they will hide or eliminate these activities.

... Today, with rising public violence and protest and its consequence of sharp criticism of the police, at the same time that the police are pressured to control this public violence, we should assume an increasing reliance on violence and secrecy by the police themselves.⁸⁴

Westley goes on to argue for a solution which might help the police but will not necessarily solve the larger problem:

Means must be found for integrating the police with the community and for deescalating their adversarial role. ... Paralleling this increased democratization and involvement with the community should be a decrease in the duties leading to violent confrontation with the public, for example, riot control. In these cases, it would be preferable that a broad citizen group like the National Guard (rather than the Army) be called in.⁸⁵

Even if some means is found to deescalate the adversarial role of the police, the inner-city police officer in the grade school setting will still have his problems in handling himself and the children, and will need to apply his best talent, imagination and understanding of children in whose world aggression is a value and physical violence an accepted fact of everyday life.

⁸⁴William A. Westley, Violence and the Police: A Sociological Study of Law, Custom and Morality (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1970), pp. xiv-xv, italics his.

⁸⁵Ibid., pp. xvii-xviii.

How should police behave? Some closing observations on police behavior in the inner-city grade school setting are in order:

- . 1 The police officer, like the teacher, is likely to be a middle class product, with middle class values and vulnerabilities. He is perhaps equally primed to leave his sense of humor out of what he learns and what he experiences in his occupation or profession.
- . 2 The police officer, like the teacher, needs to learn to handle his own reactions and responses to the behavior and values of the inner-city child and his parents.⁸⁶
- . 3 Particularly, he needs to keep in mind children's needs to defy authority, testing out the limits of how far they can go.
- . 4 The police officer needs to remember that, among grade schoolers, violence can spread like a contagion--or can in many instances be checked by the immediate removal of one or two active initiators.
- . 5 The police officer, like the teacher, needs to know that aggressiveness is valued in the inner-city, and thus to be better able to successfully distinguish "normal" aggressiveness in this setting from the abnormal and pathological.
- . 6 From his superiors, the inner-city policeman needs a special and unique kind of support. Support to be effective in this context must rely heavily on sensitivity to the situation and gentle, wry humor.
- . 7 The police officer needs to develop the ability to laugh at himself and to appreciate the humor in others' perceptions of him, if he is to avoid a world view which pits him and his fellow law enforcement officers against a hostile civilian world.

⁸⁶In a set of guidelines emphasizing the inner-city, there is a danger that an equally important though less frequently reported problem of values will be ignored. The other side of the problem discussed here is that the same middle class officer may be equally repelled by the freedoms and attitudes enjoyed by children of high status schools. The behavior-value problem here is for the officer to understand that his strict "middle class" attitudes toward social behavior may not be shared by either "upper class" children or their parents--as is evidenced when it is necessary to enforce anti-drug laws against "pot parties" taking place in affluent homes or schools.

.8 The police officer, and his superiors, like the educational administrator, needs to familiarize himself with a parents' handbook for changing the schools.⁸⁷ It can be used as a tool in the prediction of possible collective violence and the development of strategy and tactics to handle parent protests.

The law enforcement officer whose beat is the grade school interacts at a key point with the children, their parents and their teachers. The 1970's is the era of confrontation behavior--confrontation between parents and the school on community control of the schools, confrontation between militant teachers and the schools, with parents perhaps entering the fray, and confrontation between pupils and the school. Law enforcement officer behavior, especially in the setting of the inner-city grade school, influences (although it does not fully determine) the course of events in school confrontations and the atmosphere in which these events unfold. Moreover, because the inner-city grade school based law enforcement officer is potentially a role model for the grade school male child, successful response to the demands of his law enforcement role takes on added importance. Sometimes--although he may be unaware of it--a law enforcement officer is the first contact a child from a broken home has with a male authority figure whom he can potentially respect. But this respect has to be earned, and it can be easily thrown away.

Some Tactical Suggestions for Grade Schools where there are Threats of Collective Violence

In spite of the fact that available research and intelligence information about grade school collective violence is so spotty, it is still possible to advance now a few practical tactical suggestions about what to do in grade schools where collective violence threatens or occurs. These suggestions derive not only from the varieties of information which this chapter does contain, but also from the practical experiences of a number of seasoned officials for whom grade school

⁸⁷Ellen Lurie, op. cit.

violence is a daily operational responsibility.⁸⁸ These suggestions assume, however, that the law enforcement and criminal justice officers who apply them will first have carefully considered the earlier sections of this chapter on the general situation in the grade school and the desirable personal qualities which officers should express in grade school operations or assignments. No general suggestion or guideline can replace informed, mature, on-the-scene judgment in the grade school, given the quickly shifting, highly emotional tone of any situation involving the safety of young children. Thus, these suggestions should be read against the personal experiences of the user, applicable general police doctrines and rules, and in the light of this general requirement for effectiveness in grade schools, namely that

Seasoned officer personnel, with desirable qualities for working in situations involving children, be sent in equipped with careful estimates and understandings of not only the current situation in the particular school, but with accurate current intelligence on disruptive factors, especially outsiders who are seeking to stir up controversies.

Rumors. Many grade school principals and local police commanders are likely, at some time in their experience, to get the following rumor or its equivalent:

"There is a dead girl in the girls' bathroom at _____ School."

The informant may be a parent (who may have heard it from a child who somehow phoned home!), another child, or a newspaper tipster who is seeking either to stir up or to verify a story. What to do? A dead child on school premises is bad enough, but to have it in the "girls' room" stirs additional fears about the safety

⁸⁸Special thanks are due here as elsewhere in this chapter to Mr. George Lent of the Board of Education of the City of New York, who, in his role as Assistant Administrative Director for School Relations of the Office of Education Information Services and Public Relations, receives and processes all information on sensitive incidents which occur in the New York City public schools. In effect, Mr. Lent sits at the central intelligence collection and dissemination point for the City schools. His experience, vantage point, and the fact that his work is in New York City all combine to make him a unique source of practical advice on what to do about the many different kinds of threats and overt incidents which are routine in big city public schools.

of restrooms, and it creates problems about just how one quietly checks it out-- if the principal is a man. (If the principal is a woman, it can be expected that that the "dead child" will be a boy, found in the boys' lavatory.) In neighborhoods where the schools are already subjects of controversy, sometimes before the principal and police can act to check this rumor there will be a parents' delegation arriving on the scene.

Particularly in situations charged with other controversies and problems, sound tactics are for the principal and police commander, acting jointly under the principal's general guidance and after they have made their initial joint inspection for the "dead girl," to select a parents' committee of appropriate sex to inspect the lavatory and verify that there is indeed no dead child within. The parents' committee is then invited to inspect the remainder of the school premises. All this has been on condition that if the principal is telling the truth--that there is no dead girl in the girls' lavatory--the parents will collectively and singly spread this fact throughout the informal communications network of the neighborhood. In the meantime, the principal or higher-level school officials will inform the communications media--if necessary, witnessed at some point by a member of the parents' committee. The police commander and any criminal justice personnel on the scene stay in the background.

Informing the media under these circumstances is a particularly delicate matter, especially if there is evidence that outsiders have invited the media in, in order to use the situation to attack the "incompetence" of the schools. The semi-military chain of command among police limits the extent to which unauthorized members of the local police unit will disclose salient information, but the police commander on the scene may, in informal consultation with school officials charged with communicating to the press, reiterate the following simple principles:

- . 1 One and only one individual speaks officially for those representatives of the local government units charged with investigating the rumor;
- . 2 That individual, after appropriate consultation and clearance with higher policy officials, discloses only facts which he has personally verified;

- . 3 The official charged with communicating with press, radio, and television does not respond to hypothetical questions put by media representatives--such as, "What would you have done if you had found a dead girl...?" Answers to hypotheticals of this sort can be headlined, "PRINCIPAL SAYS THAT WHEN HE FINDS DEAD GIRL, HE WILL...".

The problem of controlling school-related rumors is, fundamentally, that in any school or community other than a small one, it takes time to establish the correct story. In large cities, where school strikes by students are now being experienced, one basic local unit of school administration or police jurisdiction may have tens of thousands of children in its schools. For example, on February 24, 1971, 16,000 children were out of school on strike in District 6 of the New York City public schools. Rumors, carried on respectable radio channels, asserted that in the nearby Districts 3 and 5, children were also walking out of school. Was this the beginning of a massive strike-conflagration, which would eventually spread to the whole city? What were the potentialities for collective violence, on and off school property, with thousands of children of all ages walking out in defiance of school authority?

This was an extremely grave rumor, and an extremely difficult one to check out. Unfortunately, in New York City as in many other cities or localities, there is at present no secure central telephone tieline among schools and school headquarters, nor are there other means, such as teletype, radio, and closed circuit television, for quickly, reliably and securely communicating among school units and between schools and the police. The principal vehicle for checking out this rumor had to be, therefore, ordinary telephone. Use of the common telephone was made more difficult by the absence of any firmly established local School District emergency operations center. The school official trying to verify or disconfirm this rumor therefore had to rummage through his memory for a reliable acquaintance in one of the Districts where the rumor had been reported, and when he could remember one, call him on the phone, ask him to "take a look around," and give his opinion on what was happening. Fortunately, he could recall an appropriate person, whom he called while school was in session. It turned out that all the kids were in school, and that there was some basis in fact for inferring that there was no general school strike.

The implications of such a situation for effective application of law enforcement in schools are sobering. Today, for many school systems, responsible police officials will find that their "opposite numbers" in school security planning and school security operations are using technical systems of command, communications, and control which are equivalent to using pre-Pearl Harbor weapons to fight the wars of the 1970's. Often, the police commander and police planner will find that the best a school official can do is to "get on the phone" and find out what is going on. This, in contrast to the radio- and tele-communications systems of the well equipped average police department, and the access to central data banks which criminal justice agencies increasingly can employ. One of the first and most vivid obstacles to effective rumor control by school officials will be, therefore, the primitive technology available to them for rapidly inventorying and analyzing complex data on complex events in complex school systems. Police agencies may find that they are better informed about dangerous incidents and dangerous rumors in the schools than are the responsible school officials themselves.

Under conditions where police do, indeed, have superior facilities for acquiring intelligence which can be used to control and suppress threatening rumors in the schools, it appears desirable that:

- . 1 Effective, continuing, secure communication systems be established between central police intelligence and dispatch facilities and a clearly defined crisis and rumor control center within school headquarters, so that rapid inputs of reasonably reliable and comprehensive information can be made to responsible school officials.
- . 2 Police specialists should assist school officials in establishing stand-by facilities within school headquarters which can be quickly activated to ensure rapid communication and coordination during crises affecting the schools. It should be noted that these crises include not only threats of violence but major natural disasters, for which many school systems are basically unprepared as school systems. It is probable that for many systems, it will be impossible to support a full-time continuing crisis management and rumor control center, in non-crisis conditions.

- . 3 Primary intelligence gathering on threatening situations remains a police function, but with provisions made for effective dissemination of timely information to required levels of the school system, through school headquarters.

Demonstrations. The possible use of parents to assist in controlling the rumor about the "dead girl" skirts one problem which must now be faced squarely: what happens when even a small number of parents in the local community are seeking, through words or acts, to disrupt the school where the rumor is rife? Inviting participation of parents in such a situation may only give a noisy minority the opportunity to extend the rumor's life, by adding other rumors or by using the rumor to "prove" the incompetence of the school system, the school principal, or the school staff to conduct adequate and safe daily instruction. Obviously, before using parents to deal with rumors, the principal and his police contact will need quick but careful evaluation of the community situation, and of the question of whether inviting the community in will create more problems than it solves. This assumes, in turn, that both principal and police have a realistic, detailed, sensitive appraisal of the mood of their neighborhoods.

Even if they do, however, it may still be impossible to avoid demonstrations and confrontations which can lead directly to physical violence. It may be the intention of certain parents and other groups to provoke problems no matter how adroit are school officials and police. Thus, a good working rule for school and police people charged with anticipating and controlling demonstrations which could lead to violence is for them to realize that it is not necessarily an indication of their failure if, in spite of best efforts, an incident occurs. In an open society, troublemakers bent on trouble can usually make it at least once. And a skillful troublemaker will try to turn the fact that an incident did occur into an additional pressure which will erode the self-confidence of officials trying to cope with it.

A useful example of the tactics that can await principal and police is found in the "action handbook" by Ellen Lurie, which throughout this chapter has been recommended to all law enforcement and criminal justice officers as

required reading on how the schools are viewed by those who wish to make them targets for actions which could lead to collective violence.⁸⁹ In her specific "Action Checklist for Parents" on "How to Get Rid of a Truly Terrible Principal," Mrs. Lurie details a campaign which at several points could produce collective violence in and around the school.⁹⁰ After listing "Your basic ingredients for success: You must be persistent; you must present your arguments persuasively and clearly; you must build an ever-increasing base of parent-community support,"⁹¹ she shows how to get started:

At first there are usually only five or ten parents who are really outraged at what is happening in the school. They form the nucleus for the initial committee; they must have plenty of determination and energy to keep going in the very tough months ahead. But they must work to get more and more parents interested, involved and indignant. Many wonderful groups fail at the outset because they spend too much time relating to the district superintendent, the local school board members, the officials downtown; they become engrossed in meetings with the "powerful," and neglect the community whose support they absolutely must have if they are to succeed.

This entire operation can take anywhere from four months to an entire school year. In the successful campaigns that I have seen around town, the parents usually start organizing in February or March, after the first semester has demonstrated for certain that the principal is not equipped to handle his job. Starting in the spring also provides good weather for meetings, and ample time to prevent the principal's return the following September.⁹²

This basic operational philosophy, especially with regard to timing, appears to correspond with the experiences of many school and police officials: that while football and basketball games offer many possibilities for collective

⁸⁹Ellen Lurie, How to Change the Schools: A Parents' Action Handbook on How to Fight the System (New York: A Random House Vintage Book, 1970).

⁹⁰Ibid., pp. 142-151.

⁹¹Ibid., p. 142.

⁹²Ibid., pp. 142-143.

violence among older students in Fall and Winter, the generally hot time is February, March and April where even in northern climates, the young children can be gotten out on the streets with increasing frequency. With a nice eye for presenting evidence with which to harry the principal, Mrs. Lurie keys actions for this "hot season" with the use of incriminating facts which have been gathered on the principal during the relatively quiet first half of the year.

To intensify the campaign, Mrs. Lurie then prescribes:

- .1 Call a meeting of the most concerned and angry parents;
- .2 Draw up a preliminary list of grievances;
- .3 Call a mass meeting to broaden support;
- .4 During the public meeting enlarge your list of grievances and develop an extensive list of demands;
- .5 Demand a meeting with the district superintendent and local school board to present your demands.⁹³

This first major meeting with school officials affords an opportunity for protest and confrontation which could lead to collective violence by the parents, especially as Mrs. Lurie describes the best situation for achieving the parents' objectives:

Take as large a group of parents and community representatives to this meeting as you can. The school system frequently tries to restrict unreasonably and artificially the size of a parent delegation. You must avoid this if you can, for it will weaken your group. Of course, a large committee of parents makes the discussion a bit noisier and harder to keep under control. But such a meeting is more than worth the trouble, since it permits all the interested parents to see the official in action and hear the responses directly.

Be alert to any attempt to break your group into factions, to isolate you from each other, to play you against one another.

⁹³Ibid., pp. 143-146. While the terms "district superintendent" and "local school board" refer to officials which exist at the community level under New York City's plan of school "decentralization," the general applicability of this strategy is clear.

When you appear at the meeting, another group of parents or community people may appear suddenly who have been called in to act as buffers between you and the superintendent. Don't fall into that trap. Always respect another parent or community group and never get into a fight with them in front of the school authorities if you can possibly avoid it. Ask for time to caucus with them before your meeting--or continue your meeting, but don't address your arguments to them. Don't let the superintendent or local board steer you away from the real target--the principal. "We respect these other parents, but we do not agree with them," you might point out.⁹⁴

A noisy, jammed meeting has many tactical advantages, including the probability that it will be so full of disruptive side events that even if school officials are attempting with all means in their power to appear reasonable, they can be deprived of any opportunity, simply because no one will let them make a coherent presentation. Note also that under these tactics, it is possible to characterize any opposing parent group, whether or not they are sincere in their defense of the principal and opposed to the power tactics of the attackers, as people "who have been called in to act as buffers"--a nice way of saying "stooges." But school officials and police commanders may expect that wherever possible, any pressure applied by dissidents against supportive parents will be done out of their view--so as to avoid attention being taken "away from the real target--the principal."

Clearly, school officials working in close tactical planning with police will need to exert every effort to keep the meeting orderly, in spite of whatever real merits may lie in the case presented by the dissident parents. Not only can a jammed, disorderly meeting lead to a direct incident of collective violence with dangers of physical injury to all; especially if the meeting is occurring on school premises, as frequently occurs in some large cities, an incident of collective violence at this meeting among adults can define the entire school atmosphere as one in which violence occurs. The kids will know about it by next day.

⁹⁴Ibid., pp. 146-147. Emphasis in original.

After the initial meeting with school officials the plan is to keep up the pressure. "...Don't waste any time: Keep the parents involved by making them get more support".⁹⁵

1. Mimeograph your demands into a petition and canvas as many parents and community residents as you can for their signatures.
2. Organize a grievance committee which collects more complaints and problems every day.
3. Organize a watch-dog committee which makes periodic, unannounced visits to the school to see how conditions are and if they have improved. Keep issuing public announcements of "no progress" or new grievances. Of course, if a miracle occurs and the principal improves greatly, acclaim it! But I am assuming that the person you have chosen as the target is far more unyielding than that.
4. If you have given your local board a specific time limit to investigate your demands and give their answers, announce a public meeting for that date, and invite everyone in the community. Don't let your superintendent or board members weasel out of coming to report to that meeting!
5. After you receive their reports, if the local board and the district superintendent still haven't agreed to remove the principal, intensify your campaign. (They still won't. They will probably only agree to give some additional services or repairs.) Go see your local elected officials, your borough president, the members of the Board of Education, the mayor, your community planning board, your antipoverty agency--everyone who is concerned about your community and any threat to its peaceful existence. Try not to go anywhere with fewer than fifteen parents and community residents.⁹⁶

Note that by recommendation 5. on keeping up the pressure, the phrase "any threat to its peaceful existence" has now been used. Implicit in these tactics of community activism is, if necessary, disruption of the entire local community,

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 148.

⁹⁶Ibid., pp. 148-149. Emphasis in original.

as other community institutions are involved in the strategy and tactics of the dissidents. Community violence is always available as a last resort. A striking aspect of Mrs. Lurie's general approach to action is that it reasserts the importance of stirring up community political processes--even in the largest city, a strategic strength of this approach is that it recognizes that the many little communities which form even large cities are all under various stresses, often for urgent reasons: low budgets for essential services (including police, fire, schools, and sanitation), deteriorating housing and transportation, and the general stink, ugliness, and crowdedness of inner-city life. What better, then, than to get other respected community agencies involved in the struggle against the principal?

6. Try to get a particularly respected agency to publicly announce their support. Once, in the South Bronx, when the parents had organized to demand the removal of a flagrantly unqualified principal, they found out that a local mental-health agency had had a special program in that school but had discontinued it after they found the principal to be destructive and unstable. When some community leaders heard the social workers talking about the principal, they were indignant: "If you really care about our children the way you say you do, put your comments in writing and give us a copy of your letter." The agency was very anxious to develop stronger ties with the neighborhood; it acknowledged the parents' criticisms, and a two-page letter on official letterhead was written to district headquarters, with copies circulated throughout the community. That letter played a key role in mobilizing the neighborhood against the principal, legitimatizing the grievance of the "less educated unprofessional" parents.⁹⁷

With the community now mobilized, and at least implicit threats of violence in the background, it is time for a direct assault on the school and the principal. Possibly the tactics will have achieved results before this direct action occurs--but the tone of not only Mrs. Lurie's writing but that of others suggests that only direct, physical confrontation and encounter will produce results against what is seen as an intransigent, defiant school system and larger authority

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 149.

structure. School and police "conflict management specialists" will have as one of their most difficult tasks establishing the credibility and good will of authorities' concerns. Mrs. Lurie well understands one cardinal rule of guerilla warfare: that where there are legitimate grievances to be mobilized, a much larger program can be mounted on them, all the way to collective violence. She also understands that the ability of authorities to engage in effective counter-action is undercut to the degree that they are unable to respond to legitimate grievances.

Eventually, then, the campaign against the principal comes to physical action. First, it is good to get the attention of the press:

7. Call a press conference or sponsor a press tour of the school. Make public a detailed report on each complaint and grievance, and how it is still unresolved. State clearly how you have tried to have the principal investigated through every possible channel, with no success. Spell out clearly the dangerous, unprofessional, unproductive, wasteful job he is doing. Announce your intention of blocking him personally if he is reassigned to the school in the fall.⁹⁸

Then, begin the demonstrations--the more spectacular the better:

8. Stage a series of demonstrations to prove you have the strength to support your threat. If you have organized effectively in the community, by now you should have enough parents, students and community people who are willing to physically demonstrate that they support the demand for his removal. Organize a picket line at the school, the district office or at Board of Education headquarters, whichever seems to make more sense to you. Or call a sit-in in the principal's or district office. The more local you can keep the demonstrations, the more support you are likely to build from your community. People will see you marching in front of the school and join you. This is less likely to happen downtown. On the other hand, you must do something to get attention. If you confine your demonstration to your local community, you will have to think up a particularly newsworthy twist--for example, at P.S. 175 in Harlem the fact that the demonstrators wore African garb got plenty of press attention. United Bronx Parents members washed diapers and cooked arroz con pollo at a memorably picturesque sleep-in. When

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 149.

the Lower East Side began to block a street with cement bricks, the cameramen appeared in force. Use your imagination and ingenuity, and you can turn a local demonstration into a real confrontation.⁹⁹

By step 7 of the pressure campaign, there is imminent danger of violence on the school premises. Who, after all, authorizes a "press tour" of the school? A vigorous principal may try to bar the "press tour," in which case the confrontation occurs on the street, in full view of cameras. A principal faced with a "press tour" must promptly and carefully obtain injunctive relief and support low profile, efficiently applied police tactics if he is to cope with it. But, it is likely that before mounting the overall campaign and the press tours and demonstrations which culminate it, the activists will have correctly diagnosed the principal as "weak." The weak principal is, in this situation, a focal point for real dangers of collective violence. Faced with an imminent "press tour" and further demonstrations, a principal known to be weak needs the following tactical aids (which are quite apart from whatever judgments may be made about his tenure at the school):

- .1 Planning support--in the form of procedural advice and tactical information--from school officials in a position to assist him in both immediate planning and immediate operations. Providing this support may be frequently hindered by:
 - .a Absence of an effective central resource office and crisis center in the school system;
 - .b The principal's fears that reporting impending trouble and seeking guidance will be interpreted as evidence of weakness or incompetence by school officials, or that it will be construed as an immediate request to bring police into the school, in violation of his own prerogatives.
- .2 Immediate, acceptable police liaison;
- .3 Legal resources from the schools, including advice on when and how to seek injunctions;

⁹⁹Ibid., pp. 149-150. Arroz con pollo, or "chicken with rice," is a staple of Spanish cuisine and a convenient food symbol for Hispano-American ethnic protest.

- .4 Tactical advice, sometimes in the form of higher-tier school officials on the scene, on how to isolate outside as well as student troublemakers, how to protect the safety of non-involved children, and how to assist police in whatever deployments are necessary.

Until formal injunctions have been obtained, orders to disperse read, and carefully controlled, low profile law enforcement actions set in motion against demonstrators, the tactical initiative can be easily retrieved by demonstrators seeking physical confrontation. In Mrs. Lurie's final step 8 in the "final pressure" to get rid of the principal, the desirable composition of the demonstrators includes "parents, students, and community people who are willing physically to demonstrate that they support the demand for his removal." By inference, this is the same group that would engage in direct physical blocking actions against the principal, if he were reassigned. In final steps 7 and 8 for maintaining the pressure of the campaign against the principal, there can be little doubt that confrontations between demonstrators and school authorities and between demonstrators and police will jeopardize the safety of whatever children have appeared in support of the adult demonstrators.

This creates a law enforcement situation of the greatest delicacy. If communications media are present, they will immediately pick up any incident involving children. Furthermore, the legal status of grade school children participating in demonstrations verging on collective violence or collective encounters with authorities is especially unclear. It is difficult to prescribe guidelines for dealing with such ambiguous situations, which can so easily be given notoriety by the press. The basic tactical decision to be made jointly by principal and police commander can come from answering this question:

Is visible leadership presently in control of the demonstration, or is the demonstration essentially leaderless?

Especially if the demonstration has adult leadership, it may be good sense for the principal and police to permit it to run its course throughout one full day--especially if the principal can present himself as basically in support of the goals of the demonstrators. (A campaign against the principal himself is, of course, very difficult to treat in this way, for one of the objectives of it is to isolate the

principal as an effective figure. Indeed, a general campaign on the schools, with the intention of disrupting them, can well begin with attacks on the principals, who are the individuals most likely to be able to control the schools.)

Letting the demonstration go for one full day, making it a "one shot deal with a police attitude which emphasizes the rights of citizens to demonstrate peacefully, can sometimes defuse and de-energize further protests. This is even more so if the communications media have then given full play to whatever legitimate grievances the demonstrators had to present. Later, whatever action must be taken against the demonstrators can be directed toward the leadership cadre first. On the other hand, to oppose categorically a well organized demonstration is to invite direct movement against those who do the opposing.

A leaderless demonstration is another matter. If a disorganized mob begins forming at or in the school, and if it refuses to attend to the instructions of authorities, there are few options left except immediate division and dispersal tactics by police, acting in command of the situation.

If the group is leaderless and requires warning before action, or if it is led into a sit-in which then blocks premises, it is useful for the school principal, supported by the police commander on the scene, to follow an explicit scenario of steps, in which the dissident group is warned, ordered to disperse, given time to comply, and then arrested with as little force as possible for failure to comply. Many jurisdictions have developed or are developing such regularized procedures under the advice of school or city attorneys. In applying these phase-stepped procedures, every effort should be made to remove young children before arrest procedures begin, and if any remain as arrests begin, all actions should be directed toward adults. In the event that an adult carries an extremely young child, a police matron should be available to take non-arrest, wardship custody of the child. The matron can, of course, expect real or feigned "hysteria" as the child taken from the adult--who will usually be a woman.

Outline of a model police-school sit-in procedure. A specific step-by-step procedure for dealing with a school sit-in demonstration which refuses to disperse begins in the recognition, in the words of recent Los Angeles, California Police Department policy, that

The stratagems employed by the dissidents in disruptive activities in the schools include efforts to draw the police and the school administrators into tactical responses which will produce violence and injury to students in the hope that such activity will enable the dissidents to garner support for their cause. From a strategic point of view, that position is accurate, and it is therefore incumbent upon the Police Department to cope with disruptive situations in a manner which will minimize to the greatest extent the potential for a violent confrontation¹⁰⁰

Using the policies of the Los Angeles, Washington, D. C., and other police departments as guides, the essential specific steps for handling a school sit-in with minimum risk include the following:

- .1 Tactical assessment. Where there is sufficient time, a supervisory officer enters the school, on request of appropriate school officials, to make a total assessment of required manpower and equipment. In crisis situations near flash, police reserves should be brought in close to but not on the school grounds, until a working assessment can be made by individual responsible officers.
- .2 Departmental concurrence in proposed action, in coordination with school officials. In addition to usual police chain-of-command clearances that may be required, proposed actions and applications of existing or new policies should be reviewed with school officials. If time permits, concurrence with the central school administration or Board of Education should be sought, since in many instances, the community school system is de facto and de jure a recognizable unit of local government.
- .3 Warning of violation and imminent arrest. Many jurisdictions have or contemplate statutes which authorize the school principal or his representative to initiate injunctive

¹⁰⁰ Los Angeles Police Department, "Policy of the Los Angeles Police Department for Handling Sit-Down Demonstrations in Schools," March 14, 1969 (mimeographed). Emphasis added.

and arrest procedures against those legally in trespass on school property. Typical of school trespass laws is the California law:

Any person who comes into any school building or upon any school ground or street, or sidewalk, or public way adjacent thereto, without lawful business thereon and whose presence or acts interferes with the peaceful conduct of such schools and disrupts the school or its pupils or school activities, and who remains there, after being asked to leave by the chief administrative official who possesses a standard supervision credential or a standard administration credential, or who carries out the same functions as a person who possesses such a credential in the absence of the chief administrative official, the person is guilty of a misdemeanor. The term "school" as used in this section means any elementary school, junior high school, senior high school, or junior college.

The term "lawful business" as used in this section means a reason for being present upon school property which is not otherwise prohibited by a statute, by ordinance, or by any regulation adopted pursuant to statute or ordinance.¹⁰¹

Typical of laws providing injunctive relief is the Maryland statute which prescribes remedies for the schools of Baltimore:

It shall be unlawful for any person, persons, organizations, or group to disturb any public school in session, or to interfere in any manner with the normal operation of a public school. In addition to the remedies provided for in Section 577a of Article 27 of the Annotated Code of Maryland, upon application by the School Board, the Circuit Court of the County or City of Baltimore in which the school in question is located shall have jurisdiction to issue an injunction restraining such specific activities which are

¹⁰¹ California Penal Code Section 602.9 as quoted in National School Public Relations Association, High School Student Unrest. Special Report: How to Anticipate Protest, Channel Activism and Protect Student Rights (Washington, D. C.: National School Public Relations Association, 1969), p. 45.

in contravention of this section. The issuance and enforcement of any such injunction shall be in accordance with the Maryland Rules of Procedure relating to injunctions.¹⁰²

Warning of trespass and other violations should:

- a. Include reading of the full law together with a legally correct interpretation in layman's language, by the principal or his representative.
 - b. Be provided with sufficient amplification to be clearly audible to all under any reasonable standard.
 - c. Be recorded electronically and photographically as it is given and as it is repeated to the subject crowd.
- .4 Provision for voluntary departure by those wishing to avoid arrest. A reasonable time should be permitted for those wishing to avoid arrest to depart in peace. A difficult problem arises if it is noted that members of the sit-in crowd are forcibly preventing the departure of those who wish to leave. Police are well advised to avoid being drawn into anything which gives the appearance of a "tug-of-war," in which they are assisting those who are attempting to leave while those who wish to stay behind are holding on to the person in between.
 - .5 Minimum force arrest, working at all times to avoid stirring the crowd. Working in teams from the edge in and without assaulting the crowd except in response to overt initiatives from the crowd, police carefully arrest individuals one at a time. Problems are created when the sit-in crowd links bodies together in resistance; careful disentanglement is required, sometimes under conditions during which officers will be verbally or physically assaulted. Police commanders will be required to exercise extreme discipline. A tactical advantage to the police will be knowledge which many demonstrators have that resisting arrest or assaulting an officer are additional charges which may be brought against them. Subordinates to the police commander should be reminded of this.
 - .6 Full field arrest procedures on site. Identification and recording procedures, using field arrest forms and photographic techniques, should be completed as arrest is made.

¹⁰² Maryland School Code, Article 77, Section 96 (1971).

.7 Control of media access. A school demonstration is likely to have been staged with an eye to media reportage. While there are legitimate First Amendment rights to press coverage, school principals and police commanders should have adequate powers to bar media from school premises. School trespass laws generally appear to restrict the right of schools to be defined as "public places," and newsmen appear to be legal trespassers when the principal for good cause denies access to the premises. In addition, the principal's and police commander's obligation to ensure the safety of minors is an important policy restriction on free access by the media to the premises. Streets and areas off school premises are another matter, and police should be aware that once they leave school premises with demonstrators, the media will be attentive to any element of a "good story" that can be adduced.

Situational factors in collective violence. Except for sudden, transitory group fracas which must be entered directly and forcefully by teachers, it appears that most incidents of situational violence in the grade school will be committed by individuals against individuals.¹⁰³ Only accidentally do they become incidents of collective violence. Thus the emphasis in the chapter has been on provoked, guided violence, especially that by outsiders who instigate collective violence in or around the grade school.

Yet it is important that officers planning tactical responses to grade school violence have adequate current intelligence on situational factors which may contribute to collective violence, for the community activist making grade schools an issue may be skillful in using situational factors to make it appear that guided grade school violence is actually "situational" and accidental. The most obvious situational condition which can be turned to violence is overcrowding. Overcrowding with young children can create a variety of accidents, including panic conditions. The emotional tautness of an overcrowded atmosphere makes an intuitively vivid issue, which outsiders can both directly exploit and to which they can draw attention of non-school community power groups.

¹⁰³ A further treatment of grade school violence by individuals is found below, in Chapter III by Peter Guardino, "Violence in the Large Urban School: A Teacher's View," especially p. 280 and pp. 288-291. And in the definition of situational and guided violence given in Footnote 21 above, p. 157.

In addition to overcrowding, there are a number of other situational conditions about which continuing current intelligence is needed by school and police conflict management specialists and tactical planners. A number of these are to be found by inference in the previously reproduced newspaper and by the staff of Manhattan's P.S. 119 (above, page 173). Sudden appearances of rodent and insect life, even for hardened inner-city children, can release anxiety, aggression, and panic responses from both the children and from adult staff. Split sessions, particularly when one large group is coming to school while another is departing, create traffic jams, accidental collisions of individuals and small groups, and intensify specific situations of chronic overcrowding: lunch rooms into which children are drifting or crowding from the new shift become even more dangerous "hot spots." Irreparable plumbing creates sudden flooding and narrows overcrowded passages even more; in addition, plumbing problems in school toilets make these already sensitive and difficult-to-manage locations places of greater uncertainty and anxiety.

These concrete, physical conditions need constant monitoring, but police can expect that school systems already burdened with resource limitations and political conflicts will have only limited abilities to maintain the kind of awareness-to-conditions which would contribute to effective anticipation and prevention of the specific incidents of violence which may be triggered by them. Sometimes, all the police can do is use their own "street intelligence" systems to keep abreast of shifting tactical conditions in the schools. Sometimes, the simplest kinds of remedies may be in order. For example, in overcrowded grade schools where outsiders are constantly rushing in to provoke guided violence or to intensify factors which could lead to situational violence, police and school security officers will wish to determine whether bar-press doors which open "outside-only" are feasible or, if installed, are functional. Doors which open outside-only allow not only instant access to the outside from within the school, and thus are not panic-producing in the sense that fully locked doors are, but they require outsiders to come in through that small number of two-way entrances which those in charge of the school choose to keep open. In the most volatile schools, however, inspecting officers will probably find that the outside-only doors are broken or can be jimmed.

The Bomb Threat: A Problem in School
and Police Judgment

Probably the most severe single threat of collective violence that can be made against a school is the bomb threat, with its implication that the building and its inhabitants will be "destroyed" at one blow. In dealing with bomb threats against schools, especially those against grade schools, law enforcement and criminal justice agencies must recognize that this threat creates a special difficulty for the harassed school official who has a responsibility for deciding what to do. In a number of senses, coping with bomb threats brings into one focus the tactical problems and difficulties inherent in responding to both threats and acts of collective violence in the grade school.

Bomb threats can be especially upsetting to school officials, who are usually already unpracticed in anticipating, managing, and suppressing collective violence. The reason they are so upsetting is inherent in the dilemma of choice posed by a bomb threat, if the "bomb" cannot be immediately found:

- .1 Evacuating the school means disrupting the routine of the day, with the immediate result of disrupting ongoing educational processes and the longer term result of unsettling the mood of the school, the latter often conducive to other kinds of violent incidents or threats. In addition, evacuation may indicate to the threatener that the principal is ready to respond to additional threats with disruptive evacuation; thus the way is open for continued and more frequent threats.
- .2 Leaving the school in session without evacuation may place lives and property in immediate jeopardy, even if a quiet bomb search has been conducted. There is always the chance that a bomb will go off. Especially if young children are at jeopardy, the explosion of a bomb after the principal refused to evacuate for cause may create not only horror and scandal, but irresistible pressures to evacuate all schools at all times future threats are received, thus guaranteeing pandemonium in the schools.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁴This point may be partially offset, however, by the possibilities of widespread revulsion against anyone who would actually bomb little children. As is noted in Chapter IV below, there appeared to be wide revulsion in the more moderate sector of the campus underground following the August, 1970 bombing of the Army Mathematics Center at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, in which a mathematics graduate student was killed.

Too many evacuations, and the school can be made subject to chronic disruption while the principal is perceived to be an easy mark for coercive tactics. Too few evacuations--or one wrong judgment--and a bomb goes off. In short, bomb threats confront those responsible with a classic problem in weighing competing uncertainties and ambiguities inherent in a life-or-death command decision made with too little information and a very short time line. Even when the threat turns out to be unfounded, if the decision-maker is not accustomed to making these kinds of decision, the result can be, at the least, inefficiently managed stress, and, at the worst, chaos, panic, and real danger.

Because of the vulnerability of young children, and the public uproar which can be triggered if any are hurt, bomb threats against elementary schools are especially ugly. And it is especially difficult to prescribe general procedures when so little is known about the kinds of individuals who make bomb threats, about variations in style and technique of making bomb threats, about variations of bomb threat incident rates among different types of schools and other types of institutions, and about the various sensitive, classified techniques, devices, and procedures which local officials may have for dealing with threats but about which they are understandably reluctant to permit public disclosure.

Add all these considerations to the general lack of experience grade school principals appear to have in managing conflict and sustained collective stress--and it can be clearly seen why the problem of bomb threats is a good symbol and a good summary of the difficulties in forging effective school-police responses to threats or acts of grade school violence.

But steps are now being taken to provide more effective responses to the mounting problem of bombs and bomb threats in the United States, and from these newly developing resources, plus additional research information, it is possible to suggest at least the beginnings of generalized tactical guidelines for meeting bomb threats. A new and important resource for guidance on the general problem of bombs is the National Bomb Data Center, supported by the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the Law Enforcement Assistance

Administration, U. S. Department of Justice.¹⁰⁵ This Center compiles records of bomb incidents from public media and participating law enforcement agencies and prepares procedural guidance for the variety of responses required by the variety of problems created by bombs and bomb threats. Several recent manuals published by the National Bomb Data Center will be of special interest to school security officers, and cognizant law enforcement personnel can recommend them to school officials charged with planning bomb threat procedure.¹⁰⁶

Some indication of the national magnitude of bombing incidents--apart from threats--is found in a recent Center compilation of the incidents reported to it for the last six months of 1970. Table II-1 gives these figures.

Table II-1¹⁰⁷

REPORTED BOMB INCIDENTS:
July 1, 1970-December 31, 1970
United States

	Explosive		Incendiary		Totals
	Detonation	No Detonation	Ignition	No Ignition	
Incidents	302	76	352	34	764
Bombs	352	92	471	76	991
Injuries	52		30		82
Deaths	7		3		10

¹⁰⁵ Address: Eleven Firstfield Road, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20760.

¹⁰⁶ These include: Thompson S. Crockett, Development of Bomb Incident Policy and Procedure; C. R. Newhouser, Bomb Scene Procedures: The Protective Response; and Thompson S. Crockett and George R. Goering, Bomb Security Guidelines: The Preventive Response.

¹⁰⁷ Source: National Bomb Data Center, Six Months Summary Report: July 1-December 31, 1970 (Gaithersburg, Md.; International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1971), p. 1.

Reported incidents in American educational institutions for this period totaled 102, which were distributed by type of institution as in Table II-2:

Table II-2¹⁰⁸

BOMBING INCIDENTS REPORTED IN
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
July 1, 1970-December 31, 1970

Type of Educational Institution	Total for that Institutional Category
College or University	22
High School	63
Public Grade School	12
Private Grade School	1
Other	4
TOTAL	102

The striking size of the problem posed by bomb threats can now be understood when actual bombings are compared with threats throughout the United States, for this same six months period. Table II-3 compares reported incident rates for actual bombings, attempted bombings, and bombing threats for the major geographic regions of the United States.

¹⁰⁸ Source: Ibid., Table F, "Summary of Target Location."

Table II-3¹⁰⁹

ACTUAL BOMBINGS, ATTEMPTED BOMBINGS, AND
BOMBING THREATS REPORTED FOR
MAJOR GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS OF THE UNITED STATES:
July 1, 1970-December 31, 1970

	West- ern	North Atlantic	South- west	South- east	Mid- west	Central	Mid- Atlantic	National Totals
ACTUAL BOMBINGS								
Explosive	235	178	113	93	164	124	68	975
Incendiary	550	383	157	437	887	572	369	3,355
Total	785	561	270	530	1,051	696	437	4,330
BOMBING ATTEMPTS	371	290	132	109	273	183	117	1,475
BOMBING THREATS	3,844	14,758	2,855	3,328	2,322	5,390	2,622	35,129

Even if it must be assumed that not all incidents have been recorded by the National Bomb Data Center, and that there are various tendencies within the Bomb Center's data toward under-reporting or over-reporting particular regions, the general trend of the data is startlingly clear and in conformity to off-the-record knowledgeable estimates:

That there are now between five and ten thousand bombing incidents in the United States every year, and between seven and fifteen times as many threats.

Table II-2 suggests, of course, that the really dangerous sector for education is the high school, and that grade schools are the least bombed of institutions in public education. Yet, grade schools are bombed. And the large

¹⁰⁹Source: Ibid., Table J, "Actual Bombings, Attempts, and Threats--
By Regions."

number of threats in relation to actual bombings appears to hold true for grade schools, thus presenting police and principals with difficult on-the-scene decisions. Unfortunately, there appear to be at present few detailed data on the incidence of grade school bomb threats, and on the decisions school officials made in meeting these threats. In the search for at least suggestive data which could partially fill this gap, a member of the research staff which prepared this chapter examined the exactly 150 available reports of bomb threats which had been turned in to New York City school headquarters for the period from the opening of schools in September 1970 to the reopening of schools after the Christmas holidays in January 1971. New York City requires its principals to report details of all bomb threats to central school security officials; in addition to descriptions of the threat itself, principals are asked to indicate what action they took. Thus it becomes possible to make a simple comparison of the numbers of threats received in the different major types of school (grade, junior high, and senior high) and of the actions school officials took in these same major types of schools.

Table II-4 presents the results of this simple tabulation.

Table II-4
REPORTED BOMB THREATS AND ACTIONS TAKEN BY
PRINCIPALS IN MAJOR TYPES OF NEW YORK CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS
September, 1970 to Reopening of School after Christmas, January, 1971

150 Threat Cases

Actions Taken	Type of School			Total of Actions
	Grade Schools	Junior High Schools	Senior High Schools	
Evacuated	21	10	0	31
Not Evacuated	9	53	57	119
Total Threats Each School Type	30	63	57	150

Great care must be taken in drawing conclusions from Table II-4. Clearly not all principals report bomb threats, and the reporting procedure--often by mail instead of telephone--means that reports come in at different intervals from time of threat. Thus, reports from the reporting period were straggling in through January, 1971. Also during January, 1971--but arriving too late for inclusion in this analysis--were several instances of senior high school evacuation because of bomb threats. In all, there is no real way of knowing how complete is bomb threat reportage under this system. Comparison with other data suggests that this reporting system gets half or fewer of all actual bomb threats.

Even so, the findings are so clear as to suggest that they would persist even under much more rigorously controlled reporting. While the grade schools get the least number of reported threats (30 out of 150), they report by far the greatest number of evacuations (21 out of 31), which is the principal immediate option available to the school official in charge. The tendency to evacuate the school falls off as the student age group gets older, with evacuation seldom if ever ordered in the senior high schools. Possibly evacuation is less disruptive for grade schools, where the children often remain under one teacher all day and where, when they return to school, they can settle down and resume work in the same room. In contrast, to evacuate a high school may mean losing the work of one full period of instruction, for when students return to school, it is likely to be too late to return to last period's teacher, or, if return is made to the old period, only a few minutes remain before class and teacher changes.

Yet these data also suggest that principals are responding to the special vulnerabilities of grade school children with caution. What the data seem to be saying is that while bomb threats are less likely in grade schools, when they are received, they are likely to be taken more seriously, given all factors in the judgment.

Some suggested procedures for handling grade school bomb threats.

Given this evidence about bomb threats, what ought to be done when one is received in a grade school? It may be of some comfort for principals to know that at least in New York City, no official can recall that a bomb has ever gone off in

a school after a bomb threat was received. Bombs have gone off in the schools, but they have exploded without warning. Even so--there is always the possibility of that first time. Recognizing this and the other factors that must affect the principal's decision and the advice police may wish to give him, the following procedures may be suggested by law enforcement officers to school officials charged with responding to grade school bomb threats:

- . 1 Approach all threats without fear, but with caution. Any threat to an elementary school should be taken seriously, but not so seriously as to impair effective judgment and action. This attitude is in contrast to that which can safely be taken in at least some high schools, where the principal can quickly recognize that the purpose is simply to get school dismissed for the day.
- . 2 Obtain, retain, and report an exact description of the threat. Not only are prompt, exact descriptions vital in order to supply police and school intelligence needs for accumulating information on threat patterns, but a full description of the message will sometimes provide the basis for the school official in charge to determine appropriate action, especially evacuation, even if he did not take the message himself. The threat should be immediately transmitted to the official in charge of the school. Message description should include the following characteristics:
 - a. Exact message content, especially degree of specificity by location and time. (Compare: "A bomb placed in the basement boys' bathroom will explode in exactly 60 seconds" with "A bomb is going to blow up the whole school today.")
 - b. Sex and age of threatener, if by phone. Was the voice male or female, youthful or old? In addition, were there any identifiable ethnic or physical noise background traits. (Compare a calm, adult male communicating a specific, short-time threat with a giggling, little girl, uttering generalities about bombs.)
 - c. Time message was received, and time given for appropriate response.
 - d. Who received the message, and the credibility of this individual.
 - e. An additional item of information is the frequency with which similar or different messages have been received. Part of the principal's judgment will be influenced by whether the present message is one of a recurring, apparently harmless series.
- . 3 If there is sufficient time, inform police of the threat and ask for police assistance while reserving judgment until a quiet inspection of the premises can be conducted.

- .4 Have always available a regularly designated search team from among the school staff who can quickly and quietly inspect the premises, and order them to conduct an appropriate search.
 - a. This inspection can aid the principal in deciding whether to institute evacuation procedures, by locating or failing to find a bomb device or suspicious object.
 - b. In the event a suspicious device or package of any nature is found, immediate evacuation should be ordered by the official in charge of the school. Only police should touch or remove the suspicious object.
 - c. In the event nothing suspicious is found, a judgment will be made by the school official in charge, based on his best appraisal of all factors, and with such police advice as he may request.
- .5 When the threat indicates an imminent explosion and there is no time to conduct search procedures, school officials are well advised to order immediate evacuation.
- .6 There will be strong disposition for police officials to desire to err on the side of safety and to order evacuation. Unless there is some clearly overriding reason for evacuating, however, principals will usually have final authority to decide the appropriate course. They will also thereby accept the final responsibility.

In assisting principals and other officials to discharge their responsibilities in the face of bomb threats, law enforcement officials can provide clear tactical suggestions and stand by to render specialized support. Especially when young children are threatened, law enforcement advisors to school officials can do much to preserve the integrity and independence of public school systems by showing school officials just what reasonable measures can be taken, short of constant disruption of school life. When done with a proper appreciation for the special independence of the schools, aiding grade school officials in dealing with bomb threats can therefore be one of the most direct ways of illustrating this general lesson: that rational, disciplined procedures can check the spread of not only acts but threats of collective violence against vulnerable grade schoolers.

A SELECTED ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON VIOLENCE
AND THE POSSIBILITY OF VIOLENCE IN THE
GRADE SCHOOL SETTING

A SELECTED ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON VIOLENCE
AND THE POSSIBILITY OF VIOLENCE IN THE
GRADE SCHOOL SETTING

The following references are meant to be only a sampling of the kinds of publications which now exist on the problem of violence in the grade schools. In no sense is this a complete bibliography. Rather, it is intended to point out a few of the more accessible items which are now available for police training programs and operations planning.

The nature of available materials calls for comment here. Most published research reports have dealt only indirectly, if at all, with violence in the grade school setting. The most useful of such materials included in the bibliography of this report is Pickets at the Gates,¹ one of several publications to come out of Hunter College's Project TRUE (Teachers and Resources for Urban Education). The Project TRUE publications, based on research undertaken early in the 1960's, are intended for use in teacher training. Their formating suggests that the publisher had an eye to a wider reading public than the teacher-in-training. Their concern--and this is true of Pickets at the Gates, as well--is with a variety of issues pertinent to the perceptions and performance of teachers in "inner-city" schools. Many of the same issues are pertinent to the perceptions and performance of policemen as well as teachers in the inner-city setting. A more recent study on elementary school violence, done in partial fulfillment of requirements for the Master of Arts degree, has been published under the title Ghetto School: Class Warfare in an Elementary School.² In its published form this participant-

¹Estelle Fuchs, Pickets at the Gates (New York: The Free Press, 1966). Other published reports from Project TRUE include: Estelle Fuchs, Teachers Talk: Views from Inside City Schools (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1969); Elizabeth M. Eddy, Walk the White Line: A Profile of Urban Education (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1967); George Alexander Moore, Jr., Realities of the Urban Classroom: Observations in Elementary Schools (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1967); and Joan I. Roberts (ed.), School Children in the Urban Slum: Readings in Social Science Research (New York: The Free Press; London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1967).

²Gerald E. Levy, Ghetto School: Class Warfare in an Elementary School (New York: Pegasus, 1970).

observer report has all the earmarks of a volume produced out of a thesis to get, simultaneously, the longest mileage in satisfying academic publication requirements and the greatest financial profit. The dubious neo-Marxian assumption of class warfare as an explanatory catch-all and the groping for catchy descriptors illustrated in a typology of "acute" and "chronic" teachers seriously diminish the utility of the published study. Levy's book, nonetheless, like the work of Haskins³ and Kohl⁴ which have been annotated here, and of Kozol,⁵ Holt⁶ and others who have not been included in this sampling of the available publications on the grade school, reflects the reactions of idealistic, if egotistical, young people to the realities of the inner-city schools. These books are important sources for those who need to understand the conditions and the issues and to think about the ways in which their behavior and the behavior of involved parents and political leaders may shape the grade school child's experience of collective violence.

The reader will note that this bibliography follows a standard format. No page contains more than one reference; few references have run over a page. Under each reference is an abstract of the work. The first paragraph of this abstract is a "Summary" of the essential content of the work. The second paragraph, headed "Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers," is an appraisal of the value of the work for various law enforcement and criminal justice purposes.

The decision to follow this standard format came from the desire of the authors of this report to provide readers with easy-to-use, readily accessible, detachable reference listings, which could be quickly turned to individual needs in different jurisdictions.

³Jim Haskins, Diary of a Harlem Schoolteacher (New York: Grove Press, 1969).

⁴Herbert Kohl, Thirty-Six Children (New York: New American Library, 1967).

⁵Jonathan Kozol, Death at an Early Age (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967).

⁶John Holt, The Underachieving School (New York: Dell, 1969).

BARTKY, JOHN A., Social Issues in Public Education (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company; Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1963). 340 pages + viii. Suggested readings at end of each chapter.

Summary. Social Issues in Public Education are discussed under three major headings: The Educational Institution; School Interaction with Social Institutions; and The School and Social Problems. Bartky initially explores the nature of public education and its relationship to social purposes. This leads in to a consideration of the political unit of educational organization and in sequence of financing and governing public education. The section on The Educational Institution closes with a summary of school organization types. Under the rubric of School Interaction with Social Institutions, Bartky comments on personalities, roles and culture; the schools and culture, the family, the church, the university, the community. City, suburban and rural community interaction with school systems is outlined. The closing note of this section is a fairly standard, politically oriented analysis of the school and society. In the final section, the social problems highlighted are those of moral and spiritual (and democratic) values. Inevitably the commentary turns to politics and pressure groups. School segregation receives attention, as do demographic and educational problems.

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. This volume is recommended because it poses questions which are central to student, educator, parent and law enforcement officer concerns. Examples are: What is the basic purpose of education--life adjustment? or preparation for a new society? (italics mine); Should schools be governed by direct democratic action? or as representative democracies? Should schooling stress community culture? or the teachers' own culture? What is the extent of the school "fit" to community needs? What is the school's responsibility for juvenile delinquency? (pp. 326-327.) These are among the issues on which protests turn; the grounds for raising them, the conditions which obtain, the potential for violence in their defense all are part of an informed law man's approach to educators and students.

BRENTON, MYRON, What's Happened to Teacher? (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1970). 280 pages, including index.

Summary. Brenton's report is "based on interviews with more than two hundred and fifty teachers and administrators in various sections of the country; on discussions with officials representing the National Education Association, the American Federation of Teachers, and education agencies on federal, state, and local levels; and on library research that included the reading of more than six hundred separate studies, articles and books dealing with teachers and education." (Acknowledgements, p. 7). He presents a well written, vivid and perhaps generally valid picture of the personal and professional life style of the teacher. Analyzing the "indignities" to which members of the teaching profession are submitted, he provides a thoughtful summation of "Why Beginners Tune Out," and detailed explanation of "the most distinguishing feature of today's teacher" as viewed by parents--the New Militancy. The third and final section of the book is concerned with relationships between the teachers and the politicians of the educational milieu; the teachers and the kids; the teachers and the alien cultures of the ghettos. Concluding notes are descriptive of the present school environment--"The School as Fortress," and "The Limits of Professionalism." Focus is on the public school system generally, rather than on the elementary school solely.

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. Granted, that an understanding of the school environment is an indispensable part of comprehending, and devising ways of coping constructively with, violence in the schools, What's Happened to Teacher is a book to be commended to law enforcement officers as professionals and as parents. Chapter 7, "The New Militancy" particularly warrants reading. Far from constituting special pleading, it poses a sophisticated analysis of the social changes impinging upon our teachers and their relationship to the "new militancy." Teacher-police relations, however, are not a focus of Brenton's work.

CAMPBELL, ROALD F., LUCY ANN MARX and RAPHAEL O. NYSTRAND (eds.), Education and Urban Renaissance. Based on papers presented at the National Conference on the Educational Dimension of the Model Cities Program, The University of Chicago, Center for Continuing Education, 1967. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1969). 148 pages + xii.

Summary. The editors of these conference papers use a city school superintendent's graphic description of contemporary school problems to introduce the Model Cities Program discussion:

We have built schools behind barbed wire fences with armed guards watching the buildings as they went up. We have used as many as 200 policemen to open a high school and keep it open. We have held school board meetings with armed guards in the audience. The superintendent has been escorted to meetings after the audience and the Board of Education is seated with one armed guard in front of him and one behind him. Last week, we had four schools bombed. Two weeks ago, we put 1,000 children on the street while an arsonist burned a school to the ground. This week, a bomb was thrown into a school during the school day and landed in a classroom. It exploded in front of a group of children. We have gone through pickets. We have had pray-ins. We have had our share of boycotts, riots, violence, sanctions, and strikes. And as superintendent of schools, I probably am the recipient of more advice than any other living American. (1)

Yet, these editors stress, city schools are CONFRONTED WITH BROADER MORE INTENSE DEMANDS UPON THE SCHOOLS FROM GHETTO PARENTS AND CHILDREN. The man in the street and the academician are as one in demanding earlier education, longer education and more teaching; these demands are undergirded by economic and social considerations. High level discussions follow, in papers organized around the topics of The Model Cities Program; Serving Urban Clients; Organizing Urban Schools; Governing Urban Schools; and Education and Urban Renaissance. The end piece, "Urban Education for the Future" makes some constructive recommendations.

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. Education and Urban Renaissance has no utility for law enforcement officers in dealing with violence. Instructors, however, and upper echelon personnel will find the editors' introduction to "Educational Problems in the Urban Setting" worthwhile, and "Urban Education for the Future" suggestive. Attention is called to recommendation 2. in the latter, a carefully developed statement of consensus among the conferees on the need for the urban school to develop closer working relationships with other human service agencies. Note the statement that

... We know too that home and neighborhood situations that concern health, law enforcement, and welfare often affect the performance

of children at school. If the school is to assume the broader community role that we would urge for it, it and these other agencies must cooperate in at least three ways:

- (a) they must develop certain instructional programs jointly with other agencies in such areas as sex education, narcotics education, civics, and traffic safety;
- (b) they must consult with one another about the handling of specific cases involving school pupils; and
- (c) they must develop policies that are consistent among the respective agencies and in the best educational interests of the community. (p. 137, italics ours)

Here is a springboard to successful planning for cooperative interaction between law enforcement personnel and educators.

FUCHS, ESTELLE, Teachers Talk: Views from Inside City Schools (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1969). 244 pages (including index) + xiv.

Summary. Teachers Talk, is, like G. Alexander Moore's Realities in the Urban Classroom (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1967) based on materials collected and interpreted at Hunter College of the City University of New York under the auspices of Project TRUE (Teachers and Resources for Urban Education) under grants from the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The volume is one of the better guides to the background of unrest in the New York City public school system. It zeros in, explicitly, on the impact upon lower class parents of the characteristics of the city's school system (in 1964), and on the inadequacies of teacher and supervisor information and understanding of the integration issue and other related problems.

In a well written, clear text, anthropologist Fuchs develops a discussion of the locked doors, guards and requirements for entry permits which lower class parents find shutting them out of the grade and high schools their children attend. The social dimension of this background of potential (and actual) conflict is summarized as the difference between the private world of these parents (who are black or Puerto Rican, in particular) and the private world of the teachers and their supervisors. (pp. 135-139) Teacher ignorance of the issues of the proposed boycott of February 1964 is documented, and a balanced, thoughtful statement stresses the importance of better information among teachers and supervisors of their organizations' potential role in school policy formulation.

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. While Teachers Talk is intended for teacher training, the information, to considerable extent characteristic of all inner-city grade schools rather than peculiar to the New York City system, is crucial for law enforcement officer preparation to work with the young students, their teachers and parents. In addition to qualifying as one of the soundest of the available background discussions of the problems of New York City's public school system in particular and of the U. S. urban ghetto school in general, Teachers Talk contributes a short (pp. 127-130) comment on one use of police in the city schools: to frisk children. The brief comment on teacher justifications, parent and child reactions opens up possibilities of insight and imagination in solving the problem of pupil safety more effectively and with an avoidance of a process which is "potentially an extremely degrading experience to the child"--particularly the innocent child.

HASKINS, JIM, Diary of a Harlem Schoolteacher (New York: Grove Press, 1969). 149 pages+ xviii. Introduction (xi-xiii) by Rhody McCoy.

Summary. Haskins' diary is a stark, unadorned record of "the events which happened during a typical Harlem school year (1967-1968) as observed by me, a black teacher." (Foreword, xviii) Just how stark and unadorned a record is illustrated in the following quote, a Tuesday, June 25 entry representative in its style but not its content:

Melvin came to school with his hand all bandaged up and a form from Harlem Hospital stating that he has a fracture. He said his little brother sat on his hand.

The math teacher had difficulty with a fifth-grade boy and took him to the Guidance office at two-thirty. When school was out he followed the teacher all the way to the subway, calling her names and throwing rocks at her.

The Afro-Arts Cultural Center presented an outdoor concert for the students and parents in the school yard this afternoon. The large audience, including many people in the tenement windows across the street, was very responsive. (116)

The volume is rounded out by Haskins with biographies of the nine children he "had worked hardest with during the term, in order to give the reader a more complete picture of their individual needs, their family situations, and the lives these children are condemned to live." (121) The "Foreword" by Rhody McCoy (Administrator, Ocean Hill-Brownsville Experimental School District) and the "Afterword" by Haskins are succinct statements of the black critique of racism and the educational system in the United States.

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. The understated style which characterizes Haskins' book and McCoy's "Foreword" to it gives both the picture of conditions in Public School 92 in Central Harlem in the year 1967-1968 and the ideological stance of the two men a ring of truth, fact and impact far beyond what might be anticipated of such a volume. "Truth" and "fact" of course have many faces--thus the considerable documentation in other published materials of conditions such as those described here is important to recognize. Even if all the book did were to present a credible running account of teacher, child and parent experience (with emphasis on child and teacher) in a Harlem grade school over a year, it would be a book to be read by law enforcement officers. The "Foreword" and "Afterword" are clear statements of the problem of public education as influential black leader-educators see it, and the direction in which they see the broad outline of solutions. While group violence in the grade school and its prevention or control is never discussed, and police action in cases of individual violence is not reported, there are in scattered diary entries clues to the absence of constructive relations between police and school, police and children. Diary of a Harlem Schoolteacher should be read and discussed by law enforcement officers.

JACKSON, PHILIP W., Life in Classrooms (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968). 177 pages + ix.

Summary. Jackson's focus is deliberately and "almost exclusively" on life in the elementary school classroom. He remarks that "... This emphasis on the early years of schooling is quite intentional, for it is during that period that the young child comes to grips with the facts of academic life. Also during these formative years he develops adaptive strategies that will stay with him throughout the balance of his education and beyond..." (vii). Chapter captions are graphic content descriptors: "The Daily Grind;" "Students' Feelings about School;" "Involvement and Withdrawal in the Classroom;" "Teachers' Views;" "The Need for New Perspectives." Whether he is calling attention to "the four unpublicized features of school life: delay, denial, interruption, and social distraction..." (17) or noting our unease in discussing "the oppressive use of power" as a "normal occurrence in the classroom," or summing up students' negative feelings about school life and teachers' perceptions of student reaction, Jackson draws upon a variety of materials, many of them technical. He reports some interesting findings; for example, that "... certain crude relationships between attitudes and achievement do exist and are visible to most teachers..." (81) Yet, he suggests:

But suppose the gradations of differences revealed by attitude questionnaires do not represent significant differences in the subjective feelings of the students. Suppose, that is, that a small number of students dislike school intensely and an equally small number are correspondingly positive in their opinion, but that most students have either mixed or very neutral feelings about their classroom experience. Perhaps for attitudes to interact with achievement they have to be extremes, and extreme attitudes, either positive or negative, may be much rarer than is commonly thought. (81)

"Involvement and Withdrawal in the Classroom" is a highly technical chapter. Here it is suggested that four conclusions seem warranted: First, inattention as an educational problem is "here to stay"--although its intensity may be stepped up or diminished by teacher action. Second, that "attention" and "involvement" are DIFFERENT; third, that "in the cultivation of human potential, involvement, like love, is not enough..." Fourth, INATTENTION MAY BE A PRODUCT OF THE EXPERIENCE CALLED "GOING TO SCHOOL..." (LIKENED BY SOME RECENT AUTHORS TO A PRISON EXPERIENCE) rather than only of lesson content or the psychological difficulties of students.

Usefulness for Law Enforcement Officers. While this is a well written, well researched book, Chapters 2 and 3 are too technical for general use in training law enforcement officers. Instructors will find the study a valuable contribution to understanding of the elementary school experience of the child, but a little on the heavy side. Nothing in the volume is explicitly concerned with violence in the elementary school or with its handling by law enforcement officers.

KOHL, HERBERT, 36 Children (New York: A Signet Book from New American Library, 1967). 224 pages.

Summary. This is one of a number of books detailing teaching experiences in the inner-city schools of New York City. The volume is well-written and sensitive. It includes a considerable variety of quotations from the writings of the 36 elementary school children of Harlem who were in Kohl's class. The not fully committed reader may find the length and quantity of these tedious; the law enforcement instructor may be grateful for the wealth of sampling of these children's thoughts.

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. 36 Children is primarily useful for its explicit detail on the conditions in the schools (and streets and homes) which have a bearing on these children's potential for violence as they reach the upper grades of the elementary school, or go on to junior high and high school. Instructors working with this readable and meaty volume might find some implicit clues to ways in which Kohl, and other teachers like him, may share their insights in cooperation with law enforcement personnel to "reach" these children. But such insights if extracted will need to be tested.

LEVENSON, WILLIAM B., The Urban School in Transition: The Spiral Pendulum. (New York: Rand McNally and Co., 1968). 304 pages, including notes, index, bibliography.

Summary. Levenson notes the following directions of change on viewpoints relevant to urban education: first, from a view of education and welfare as largely separate functions to a concept of the two as intertwined; second, from a taboo on school leader attention to politics to an acceptance of school leader involvement in politics as a requirement of the role; third, from a perception of the realities of education as being largely or purely local to a focus on national implications and impact; and fourth, from a mandate to educators to function as preservers of the status quo to an emphasis on education as an instrument of social change. While the main thrust of the book is in urban education, there is recognition of the growing congruence between inner-city school problems and school problems in at least some of the suburbs. Good descriptive materials on the inner-city child and the Negro sections of the city are provided, but the standard of evaluation is based in middle-class values. On the other hand, Levenson offers an explicit discussion of the cultural deprivation of the children of the affluent. Topics dealt with are population and educational change; inner-city children and teachers; "the realities of big city school operation;" "the impact of change;" race relations; compensatory education programs; communication skills; guidance; vocational education; the future. The analysis is reasonably good, the prose readable. But ethnic minorities may feel that the tone is racist; what is more, Levenson uses the concept of assimilation--that is, the "melting pot" of America--with no hint of contemporary social science questioning of the reality of the process or the validity of the concept.

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. The Urban School in Transition is of minimal usefulness to law enforcement personnel. Levenson's chapter on "The Realities of Big City School Operation" (Chapter V) does not discuss organized violence in the schools--nor even group verbal protest. His diary entries include only one mention of the possibility of violence--a bomb scare. (91) Similarly, "The Impact of Change" (Chapter VI), which deals largely with the financial impacts of change, refers only briefly to the intensification of "other difficult aspects of city-school finance ... by social tensions and strife." (101) "A Look Ahead" (Chapter XII), does summarize likely teacher union goals and strife, but again fails to mention violence in the schools or the police role in controlling or preventing violence.

LURIE, ELLEN. How to Change the Schools: A Parents' Action Handbook on How to Fight the System (New York: A Random House Vintage Book, 1970).

Summary. A parent activist who has become well known in New York City for her campaigns against what is alleged to be the entrenched educational bureaucracy there, Mrs. Lurie here draws upon her experience as Local School Board Member, organizer of United Bronx Parents, and participator in the unofficial and short-lived Peoples' Board of Education to tell what parents can do to "change" the public schools. The chapters are explicit and graphic. They deal with "How to Make a School Visit," "The Curriculum," "Compensatory Education and Curriculum Reform," "Hiring the Staff," "Improving the Staff," "Firing the Staff," "Reporting to Parents," "The Cumulative Record Card," "Student Suspensions and Student Rights," "Public Hearings," "Parents' Rights," and "Organizing Against the System." At the end of each chapter she provides "action checklists," so that parents can define, initiate, and follow through actions designed to result in attaining particular kinds of objectives. Throughout her book, Mrs. Lurie hammers at one uniting theme: parents, properly organized, can exercise not only the opportunity but their inherent "rights" to change the system.

Usefulness for Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Personnel. The significance of this book goes far beyond New York City concerns, although they provide the case study documentation for Mrs. Lurie's presentation. Not only does the book show in the most concrete possible way just how "outside" individuals can try to enforce changes on the schools; it also provides a list of the channels through which they can disrupt the functioning of both the total system and its member schools. Mrs. Lurie asserts, of course, that parents are not "outsiders," that they have inherent rights to affect many parts of the educational process. But the tone of the book is quite the opposite from that which would have been written by an individual who felt that she was not an "outsider." In fact, the book is permeated by barely controlled hostility to "the system"--which appears to be much more than just the New York City school system. Particularly as it is focused on the New York City school system, this hostility may in some real measure be justified, but the tone of hostility and anger has the effect of always bringing Mrs. Lurie on in the role of "attacker," and her book is written to train fellow attackers.

Attack for what purpose? As Mrs. Lurie says (page 9), "You do not have to read this book from start to finish. Find the section which discusses the things you want to change in your child's school. There is no 'best' way to start." Later, in telling parents "How to Organize... to Beat the System," she says (page 268), "Don't be abstract, vague or intellectual. Select nitty-gritty demands--the more specific the better." The importance of these statements for law and criminal justice officials is that these statements reflect no real point of view or coherent set of objectives for education as such. Instead, Mrs. Lurie has written a tactically oriented manual to guide parents in waging a form of guerrilla warfare on any school system, for the purpose of "shaking it up." All personnel working

with school officials to reduce the vulnerabilities of schools and school systems to this kind of warfare need to read and ponder every point Mrs. Lurie makes. They should ask themselves whether they have thought about the problem of controlling disruption with the same degree of precision that Mrs. Lurie has thought about how to make changes. They should also remember that wherever guerrilla warfare surfaces, it is founded in part on real or imagined grievances.

MAYERSON, CHARLOTTE LEON, Two Blocks Apart: Juan Gonzales and Peter Quinn (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965). 126 pages.

Summary. The editor has permitted two seventeen year old boys, Juan Gonzales and Peter Quinn, to tell their own stories. The boys live in the same New York City neighborhood, and at seventeen are high school seniors in the same school district. Both are Catholics in the same parish. Both are devoted to their immediate family; both express reluctance to intervene in any incidents in which there is the possibility of personal risk. Spiritual questions are matters of disinterest to both, and both manifest a full range of misconceptions and resentments of parts of society other than their own. While the editor explicitly acknowledges that her decision to present the life histories of these two youngsters has no scientific base, she does suggest that they are typical rather than atypical. As she also remarks, "... That they do not know each other is an urban commonplace; that they are utter strangers in the conditions of their lives, in their vision of what they themselves are, seems a personal illustration of the apparent failure of the American melting pot." (9)

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. These two autobiographical accounts do cast light on growing up in two different subcultures. They are readable, and they are thoughtprovoking. Yet their utility is marginal to law enforcement personnel in general. Instructors may make appreciative use of the boys' comments on their experiences with the police, and of Juan's discussion of his gang activities. It is Juan who says:

In that gang the kids felt like they had protection, but now I think that it's better fighting for yourself. Otherwise you need the gang like an addict who needs the drug. You never see one of those boys fight anybody alone. Like in the school I used to go to, the junior high. They used to have lots of gangs there and it was rough in the nighttime or even in the daytime. (41)

There is in this slender volume a wealth of material for imaginative instructor use.

MOORE, G. ALEXANDER, JR., Realities of the Urban Classroom: Observations in Elementary Schools (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books edition, 1967. Reprinted by permission of The Free Press, a Division of Macmillan Company). 188 pages + viii.

Summary. Realities of the Urban Classroom is one of several commercially published reports which came out of Project TRUE (Teachers and Resources for Urban Education), conducted at Hunter College Curriculum Center. This particular part of the project was financed under Grant Number 62201 of the U. S. Office of Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Development during the period 1962-1964. The published study presents a sound anthropological perspective on some selected observations of three elementary schools in lower-income areas of "a large American city." Most of the students in these schools are American Blacks or American citizens of Latin American background. Both the American Black students and the American students of Latin American descent are for the most part recent arrivals in the city. The data base consists in observations of researchers recorded under the direction of a sociologist; the published writeup here under consideration has been prepared by an anthropologist. While the project objective was the production of more realistic teacher training materials for urban teachers, the purpose of Moore's book is to introduce the newcomer, teacher or parent, to "what might be experienced in urban schools." (3) Thoughtful introductory and concluding sections add a valuable dimension to this readable exposition of realities and their roots. Moore's hope that this book will help the teacher to turn culture shock into a creative force may also be realized in the case of the open-minded urban law enforcement officer who reads with sympathetic care.

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. Among the recent books and articles on urban public schools which are appropriate reading for the establishment of a general understanding of students, teachers and issues, this one is highly rated. Instructor attention is called to the introductory and concluding discussion of culture shock--that is the anxiety, repugnance, tension or "uptightness" created in individuals by encounter with people whose values, customs and overt behavior differ radically from one's own. Implicit here are some issues of major importance in the creative handling of organized violence and potential for organized violence.

RESNIK, HENRY S. Turning on the System: War in the Philadelphia Public Schools (New York: Pantheon Books, a Division of Random House, Inc., 1970). 299 pages + xii.

Summary. Resnik calls this a "book about a year or so of civil war in the city of Philadelphia" in the mid-1960's. (3) It is a sober, chilling account of reform, attempted reform and counterreform. Considerable insight went into the narration and the analysis of Philadelphia's inner-city school problems and of the intertwining of the educational and the political systems of the city of brotherly love. Knowledgeable readers may be able to draw some tentative, hypothetical parallels with experiences in other cities.

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. This account of educational civil war in Philadelphia is only peripherally useful to law enforcement personnel in general, in that law enforcement responses to violence are not an explicit theme. For police academy instructors, however, it is a fine source of discussion of issues related to grade school student violence, parent militancy and teacher militancy. While the Philadelphia situation has features peculiar to that city's political organization and population, its inner-city education problems are in significant ways typical of inner-city problems across the country. A comparison of Resnik's book on Philadelphia with Rogers' on New York City's "110 Livingston Street" (see page 94, below) is useful in focusing on the problems of school administration, community relations, and student "futures" which are the sources of concern, militancy and potential or actual violence.

ROBERTS, JOAN I. (ed.), School Children in the Urban Slum: Readings in Social Science Research (New York: The Free Press; London: Collier-Macmillan, Ltd., 1967). 626 pages, including bibliography, index, + xiii.

Summary. This book is another of the products of Project TRUE (Teacher Resources for Urban Education) conducted under the auspices of Hunter College of the City University of New York. The papers by well-known authors collected here are technical in content and expression. The volume is organized under five general headings. Part I: General Introduction, introduces the purpose of the project and of this collection of readings; defines the social science concepts used; and describes the background environmental characteristics of the urban educational system studied. Part II: Cognitive Factors and Environment, presents highly technical reports of the intellectual functioning of school children in the urban slum area and of learning differences among school children. Part III reports on "Personal Attributes and Self Concept" and on "Motivational Characteristics" under the overall heading of Affective Factors and Environment. Parts IV and V, respectively, deal with Familial Factors and Environment and Educational Factors and Environment.

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. This set of readings is highly technical and only peripherally useful for law enforcement personnel, although instructors may want to browse through the papers on "Social Science Concepts" and "Background Environmental Characteristics" for materials they can put to use.

ROGERS, DAVID, 110 Livingston Street: Politics and Bureaucracy in the New York School System (New York: Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, April 1969. Copyright 1968). 584 pages including appendices, bibliography and index + xii.

Summary. "110 Livingston Street" is the traditional way for knowledgeable New Yorkers to refer to the headquarters of the New York City Board of Education. Until recent attempts to "decentralize" the New York City Schools (to date only partially successful), "110" was the real power center for this, the nation's largest single public school system. The size, problems, and diversity of the New York City Schools have always made them of crucial importance to those concerned with not only the present quality but the future direction of public school life. In this major work, Rogers suggests how the organization and informal politics of the City Board of Education reflect the broader problems of an immense city, and how the Board has created an organization which shapes school policy, runs a professional bureaucracy of teachers and supporting personnel, and conducts complex processes of decision-making, crisis management, and community relations. Rogers gives attention to different administrative "styles" within the system, to ways in which the Board has redirected pressures for change and thus created new problems, and to the various meanings "educational reform" can have within the system. He is continually concerned with the relations which exist between the Schools and other parts of the City Government, especially City Hall. Appendix A tells some "Stories out of School;" Appendix B is a sociologist's (Rogers') "Memo to Sociologists." While only Appendix B is written for sociologists, the book is hardly light reading. In detail and in broad range, 110 Livingston Street presents a large collection of case materials on the life and functioning of the New York City public schools.

Rogers' analysis is seriously flawed by not only his general lack of a clearly worked out view of how to describe organizations in their most general terms, but also by his taking the problem of "desegregation" as the principal organizing focus for the book. Desegregation becomes the "problem" which helps define broader issues of "what New York City Schools are really like;" it would have been sounder in many ways to have established a solid description of the schools and their continuing problems and processes first, then shown how "desegregation" is actually only an element of what a huge and entrenched educational bureaucracy faces today. In a number of ways, Rogers substitutes an analysis of the desegregation problem in New York City for the kind of hard general analysis upon which the book should have been founded.

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. New York City law enforcement and criminal justice personnel will, of course, want to look at this book if they have not already done so. For personnel in the country at large, the volume provides a fascinating body of "ideas to think about," as they wonder what are the factors which make school people so incapable of dealing with certain crises of collective violence in the schools. This book suggests how the school organization can sap the abilities of individual school people to function effectively in crisis. But be warned: Rogers' focus on desegregation leads him to sometimes dubious general interpretations, and there are times when his "facts" may be just plain wrong.

SCHRAG, PETER, Village School Downtown: Politics and Education--A Boston Report (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967). 191 pages, including index.

Summary. This is a journalist's detailed, readable account of an inner-city school system in trouble (as indeed all inner-city school systems are in these times). Chapter IV, Order in the Class, and Chapter V, There Must be Change, are particularly of interest.

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officers. Schrag's Village School Downtown is one of the more readable commentaries on inner-city school problems. Its utility to law enforcement personnel, however, is only on the level of understanding in depth of the inner-city school system's troubles.

SCHRAG, PETER, Voices in the Classroom: Public Schools and Public Attitudes (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965). 292 pages including index.

Summary. Voices in the Classroom is a journalist's report on his examination of "a variety of American Schools and communities, rich, poor, large, small, each with its own social and regional characteristics." (6) Except for the Newton, Massachusetts chapter, all accounts in this book are derived from Schrag's three month trip around the United States in the fall of 1964. As the author made his way from classroom to classroom, the questions he had in mind included the following: What explains what happens in a classroom, how to control it, how to improve it? (4) "... The Cold War, the Negro revolution, the various national pressure groups have all had an effect on the classroom, but what has the effect been, and how has it, in turn, influenced particular decisions and policies?" (5) "What is going on in the classroom, and why?" (5) Illustrative materials in weighing "answers" to these and other questions are drawn from Schrag's elementary and high school observations in Topeka, Chicago, Newton, Appalachia, Macon, Fullerton, San Francisco and Jeffco. The sum total is a readable account which gives a feel for the flavor of the variety of school systems in the United States and the variety of community views about school systems.

Usefulness to Law Enforcement Officials. This is one of many reports available for assignment as optional student reading to promote understanding of and provoke thought regarding the American child's experience of the classroom today and its consequence for the law enforcement officer's fulfillment of his responsibilities in preventing and controlling organized violence in the schools. While its usefulness is limited, this report is a good example of a rather large body of materials being produced today by those concerned with education.

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Chapter III

VIOLENCE IN THE LARGE URBAN
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL:
A TEACHER'S VIEW

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER III

There are few studies which directly treat the role of law enforcement and criminal justice agencies in controlling both individual and collective acts of violence in the elementary school. For this reason, it was decided to seek an original appraisal of the problem of elementary school violence, from an insider-- a teacher who is sensitive to the concerns of law enforcement.

Although he is still only in his twenties, Peter Guardino, author of the following chapter on violence in the large urban elementary school, has a lifetime of experience in surviving the highly political, highly risky, very violent environment of the big city school. His first sentence reflects this wisdom in characteristically direct language:

Violence in the elementary school has been treated largely in the abstract.

In place of "abstract" analysis, Mr. Guardino offers a practical but systematic guide to what it is like as a teacher to experience the routine incidents of individual or collective violence which color the lives of urban elementary school children. People such as Mr. Guardino would make ideal co-trainees with police who are to be assigned to elementary school problems. Later, they would make ideal school-police liaison officials.

While the author's school is in one of the most deprived areas of New York City--which may encourage the non-New Yorker to say, "It doesn't apply to me, it couldn't happen here"--the wise police academy director will recognize that this analysis of urban school violence is a valuable document for acquainting police cadets with what happens in the elementary school. Furthermore, the police commander and staff planner will want to attend to Mr. Guardino's suggestions about the kinds of information which police need to have about the schools in their jurisdiction (see his Table 3). As it happens, Mr. Guardino is finding time to complete a Ph.D. in administration at a major New York City university, while teaching full time and becoming increasingly active in the affairs of the big New York City teachers union, the United Federation of Teachers. Under other circumstances, he would have been studying and accumulating time to take his police Sergeant's exam.

Mr. Guardino is one who has had to cope with not only the "routine" problems of individual acts of ghetto violence, but with the collective violence which results from the attempts of city people to achieve what they feel is more effective political expression. As he wrote this paper, New York City schools experienced a major fiscal crisis, in which it had been determined at the central Board of Education that the school budget was \$40 million deficient. Mass rallies were organized, with the prospect of violence always present, in the attempt to force officials to find the money to keep schools running at their fully budgeted levels. As it turned out, accounting devices allowed the schools to get through the year. But the possibility of teacher layoffs was imminent throughout the writing of this chapter. Although he had tenure, Peter Guardino didn't have seniority. In a real pinch, he would have been one of those to go.

VIOLENCE IN THE LARGE URBAN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL: A TEACHER'S VIEW

Peter Guardino*

Introduction

Violence in the elementary school has been treated largely in the abstract. The need for research and the collection and analysis of data is pressing as the incidence of violence at the elementary school level increases.

There has been some research on violence in secondary schools and colleges but despite the upswing of such activities in the elementary school, pertinent studies have not surfaced.

Those groups who come together to pressure school and city administrations have at their disposal a manual on how to disrupt the system.¹ Those on the side of containment and prevention of violence must, for the most part, treat each incident as a phenomenon unrelated to any previous experiences. Accurate data is not centrally collected on the most frequent acts; no systematic analysis to determine trends, pre-existing conditions or recommendations for prevention is made available to those most directly on the firing line: teachers and administrators.

The present report is an attempt to summarize three years of experience in a large urban elementary school as a basis for recommendations which should be useful to teachers, administrators, and police, in order to contain and prevent violence.

*"Peter Guardino" is the pen name of a New York City school teacher, who, as Consultant, prepared this paper especially for this research project on collective violence. Although in no significant sense have they been altered, background details have been slightly disguised or changed in order to protect the identity of the writer.

¹Ellen Lurie, How to Change the Schools: A Parents' Action Handbook on How to Fight the System (New York: A Random House Vintage Book, 1970).

Types of collective and individual violence which are of concern to the teacher, administrator, police, and community will be identified and discussed. Those acts which require interaction of the school and police will be described, along with those acts which are self contained. A vital part of this report will be the description of those indicators which precede such acts of violence and both the short run and the long run implications for coping with the perpetrators of violence.

A limitation of this report is that it is the result of the author's specific experiences and observations; it is not intended to be wholly applicable in a universal sense.

Table III -1 (pp. 279-280) lists in outline form perpetrators, the victims, and the acts which this report will consider.

The School: A Capsule Portrait

The school where the writer teaches has several facets which make it extremely interesting as a sociological and educational entity, and it would be helpful if pertinent data were presented here in capsule form.

COMMUNITY

- Mood - Generally tense and suspicious. Formerly a Profaci Fiefdom, now Columbo Territory in organized crime.
- Ethnic breakdown - Years past it was solidly Italian. Over the past fifteen years Blacks and Puerto Ricans have moved in.
- Housing - On the average, it is solid and of the three- to five-story brick and brownstone variety. Most landlords are Italian or Jewish. Several blocks are strongly Italian, although they will rent to select Puerto Ricans. Puerto Ricans tend to return to Puerto Rico, whereas some Blacks will save and buy houses in transitional areas a short distance away.

Table III-1
Subject Categories of This Report

POTENTIAL PERPETRATORS

A. Individual

- Pupil.
- Intruder (Older adolescents).
- Recognized Intruder (Parents, Community Workers, Ex-Employees).
- Insider (Teacher, Administrator, Custodian, Paraprofessional, Guard).

B. Collective

1. Community Groups

Singular Goal

- Church - Catholic, Jewish, Black Ministers.
- Economic - Local Merchants.

Multiple Goals

- Fraternal - Muslims, Black Panthers, Italian American Civil Rights League.
- Political - Local clubs, Politicians, Poverty Groups.
- Social - Clubs.
- Supportive - PTA, Afro-American Teachers Groups.
- Voluntary - Block Associations.

2. Outside Groups

Agitators
Unions

- From above groups outside the community.

POTENTIAL VICTIMS

A. School

- Administrator
- Aide
- Custodian
- Guards
- Other Teaching Personnel--Guidance, Coordinators, Reading, Speech
- Paraprofessional
- Pupil
- Teacher

Continued, next page

B. Non-School

Parent
Police

ACTS OF VIOLENCE

A. Individual Acts of Violence

1. Assaults: Without Weapons

Choking
Destruction of Property
Punching
Pushing
Scratching
Sexual
Theft
Threats against person or property
Tripping

2. Assaults: With Weapons

Bomb
Burning
Shooting
Stabbing, slicing, cutting

B. Collective Violence

1. Threats

Fire } - Property
Bomb }
Personal/Group

2. Riots and Civil Disorders (Including group clashes)

3. Damage to Property

Fire
Bomb
Sabotage (heat, electricity, water, supplies, plant, food, sanitary)

4. Demonstrations and Political Pressures

Boycott
Picketting
Sit-Ins
Strikes
Direct Assaults } - Violence

Services

- The area is well served by public transportation and some minority civil servants live in the area. Fire, sanitation, and police service tend to be barely adequate. Lack of minority representation in these services is a frequent cause of friction and misunderstanding. There is shopping nearby but it is of the ghetto variety: expensive. The local Churches are very active in the community and are rallying points against the local carpetbag politicians.

SCHOOL BUILDING AND CENSUS

Physical Plant

- Dates from the turn of the century. A two million dollar renovation is being completed, but the work tends to be shoddy. The building is basically a four story rectangle with inadequate recreation and lunch facilities. Maintenance is minimal, with sanitary facilities in a putrid state.

Population

- Administrators (5)
Faculty (60)
Paraprofessionals (30)
Pupils (1000)

The ethnic breakdown of the school is approximately one-third Puerto Rican, two-thirds Black, and a handful of Italians on each grade level. Over sixty percent of the population is on welfare.

Faculty

- There are approximately sixty teachers, with five Puerto Ricans, eighteen Blacks, thirty Jews, and seven others. The Principal and one assistant are Puerto Rican, two assistants are Jewish, and one assistant is black. Faculty morale is low due to politically motivated leadership which, to accomplish goals, has divided the staff.

Programs

- On paper there are many programs and resources, but due to poor leadership there has been little coordination and effective learning.

1. Adult Education--Babysitting service is provided for parents learning English, Spanish, or taking equivalency diploma preparation.

2. Bilingual Classes--Puerto Rican pupils are segregated by parental choice into classes taught in Spanish with a Puerto Rican teacher.
3. Classroom Adjustment--A social worker and three paraprofessionals make some visits and work with mildly disturbed pupils.
4. Cluster Teacher--Teacher specialists in art, science, music, or social studies relieve each classroom teacher for a forty-five minute preparation period each day, as stipulated in the union contract.
5. Guidance--There are three guidance counselors (two are black), who counsel both disruptive and withdrawn pupils.
6. Health--A school nurse is on duty twice a week and a doctor gives immunizations and examinations twice a month.
7. Junior Guidance--Is a special class limited to 12 pupils who have a disruptive history. It is hoped that after a short stay they will be capable of returning to their original class.
8. Lunch--The frozen lunches are catered from a central kitchen and they are of a superior quality. During vacations lunch is served daily.
9. Multimedia--The school is wired for video tape and there are a studio and ample equipment in the school.
10. Paraprofessionals--There is a paraprofessional (local person without a college degree) to help the teachers in each class from kindergarten to second grade. They also help in the lunchroom and hallways.
11. Reading--There is a reading department with five full-time teachers who provide individualized instruction and consult with the teachers.

12. Tracking--At each grade level there is a top class and a bottom class, with the remainder being homogeneous in ability.

Potential Perpetrators of Violence

The term "perpetrator" has moved out of law enforcement vocabulary into common usage. It applies to both individuals and groups.

In the urban elementary school the school population can easily change almost 100% every two years; hence, it is not easy to recognize and know a majority of the school population. This includes the staff and the parents, as well as the children.

Who comes in? The writer's present school is easily entered without a pass or challenge. This is partially due to the fact that the school is sixty years old and has seven recently renovated entrances, six of which open only outwardly--when they are locked. It would take a well trained security staff to contain intruders. When early childhood classes end, older children, parents, and babysitters flock into the school and soon fall into the category of recognized intruders, since they are allowed to roam the building in search of missing children. Paraprofessionals are usually assigned to guard doors, but they are not trained for this task and for the most part are women who are not capable of deterring junior high school pupils or adults. Indeed, it is a rare paraprofessional (or teacher) who can command the respect of all pupils and intruders. In the author's school there is one male paraprofessional who can contain any individual due to his enormous physical appearance. The author has seen disturbed youngsters rapidly disappear when challenged by this individual. On the other hand, the writer has seen him disappear when challenged by a group of junior high students. The need for the male paraprofessional is self-evident due to the recurrence of violence caused by maturing students of secondary age.

Unfortunately violence statistics for the school are not accurate, nor are they tabulated in a scientific manner.

Recognized intruders and insiders, versus unrecognized and covert intruders. Recognized intruders and insiders pose the greatest threat to school property, whereas pupils and unrecognized and covert intruders are more of a threat to individual safety. Former employees, parents, community workers, teachers and paraprofessionals are more likely to participate in a theft than perform personal acts of violence. Hence, on a daily basis the individual pupil and adolescent intruder are the gravest short run concern because of their numbers and their ever-present opportunities. There is an uneasy churning in the teacher's stomach when he looks out the window and sees one of the primary indicators of potential violence milling into the street--that is to say, adolescent groups either from other schools or from the community at large who, being restless during the day, know that excitement awaits them in the unguarded hallways of the local school! Once a rampage by these adolescents is underway, it is near impossible to control; for pupil-teacher safety, classrooms are better off locked since they can be opened from the inside in case of extreme emergency.

Community groups and the orchestration of crises. What have been termed here "community groups" are in the long run the most volatile and dangerous. These community groups were listed according to the individuals' common bonds for membership in the group. Usually these groups have definite goals and objectives which are not readily apparent to the outsider. The tendency to violence as a direct result of these groups' goal-oriented activities is frightening. During a recent upheaval over control of the schools, the author witnessed the emergence of a coalition of several groups of quite different backgrounds. The goals of the groups were similar, hence they were able to plot their confrontation strategy as one. Politics makes strange bedfellows; it is often not easy to determine who is sleeping together. In this particular instance the coalition came into the open with their demands and were easy to identify. Demands and goals are not the same, but demands are often calculated to be the means to attaining the goal.

In this case, black ministers, priests, black politicians, minority administrators, Afro-American teacher groups, Puerto Rican student groups, and a smattering of idealistic professionals all forged together to fight the common

enemy--the much beleaguered Community School Board.² People had joined together before in common cause, but this time the author was terrified, because he knew of planned violence and heard it discussed by respected professionals and members of the clergy in a casual manner as the means to the desired goal. It was intriguing to observe how respected professional black militants could whip an auditorium of community people into a frenzy, while the real issues were hidden behind other demands.³

The auditorium of the Junior High School was packed with community groups, activist teachers, administrators, and agitators. The only whites present were young and inexperienced teachers who were enthralled by the excitement of the confrontation. Several of the local school administrators who were under fire from the (central) Board of Education made vague speeches alluding to the power structure and the bureaucracy of local government. Then the meeting was turned over to two professional agitators from outside the community and they proceeded to use "Soul language" and mannerisms to attack the invisible opponent, who was no match in the electrified setting.

Sniping at police cars, youth group rampages, and bomb threats were mentioned casually as strategy here. In fact, they did take place after the meeting.

Recently, a new crisis has formed a coalition of community groups, unions, parent groups, the Board of Education, and an ethnically oriented league. The central Board of Education had been pressured by local school boards to extend programs and hire more professionals and paraprofessionals. It became apparent that the Board of Education would be bankrupt before the fiscal year 1970-1971 was ended, so cuts were planned without consulting the local school boards. Chaos broke out in the school system; a mass demonstration was planned as tension mounted. Threats were enough, as a fiscal maneuver enabled the schools to

²In New York City, Community School Boards have direct operational jurisdiction over daily activities in their District, under the City's recently enacted policy of Decentralization.

³Editor's note: To safeguard the author, details of this incident cannot be amplified here. What is important is the basic tactic being described.

keep operating at maximum levels. It seems incomprehensible that different groups who coalesced during this fiscal crisis could have anything in common, but a financial crisis was all that was necessary to lead to a coalition which was planning demonstrations, with all their potentialities for collective violence.

Unfortunately children even down to the fourth grade level were to be used in demonstrating for funds to run the school. The author has attended other demonstrations similar to the one being planned, and it is inconceivable how any adult could guarantee the safety of a young child in such an activity. Outside groups can be a violent factor in the elementary schools if their needs partially rest in legitimate community needs. With the schools now utilized more fully by community groups, who often actually meet on school premises, goals with a much wider scope can be met by agitating or producing violence in them.

Potential Victims

Much is written concerning violent acts and the profile of the one who commits them, but little thought is directly given to the potential victim. In the author's experience hardly a day goes by wherein he has not been personally challenged or had some contact with violence, usually pupil to pupil. The attitude one takes towards his position and the position itself determines to a great degree the possibility or propensity for violence from pupil to the teacher.

In his current assignment as a "cluster teacher" who teaches three periods a day with a daily lunch duty and several "coverages"⁴ of other strange classes a month, the writer has experienced an extraordinary amount of violence contrasted to when he had his own class and was able to remain in his own room. Not having his own room and traveling from room to room has exposed the author to the hallways throughout much of the day. They can be fearsome at times, especially when the junior high school has been dismissed for exams or because

⁴"Cluster teachers" relieve classroom teachers for grade meetings.

junior high school authorities cannot maintain discipline. This can and does occur almost daily in the warm weather. In essence, the person who has to spend any time outside of a well structured or supervised activity stands a far greater chance of meeting violence.

The school lunchroom. Lunchroom duty is a horrendous and a thoroughly unsafe responsibility. The author volunteered for it and has learned much about group control and group tolerances as a result of his experiences. Most teachers approach this task with a negative attitude and think of it as duty unbecoming a professional. It is because of their attitude that much of the danger is present, and teacher attitudes will have to change before a safer lunch and recreation period can be had. The teacher in charge of such group activities must be perceptive enough to recognize those indicators which tell what the group tolerances and limits are. The teacher should set limits and commands and keep them meaningful. Routines should be set up so that the period flows in an expected manner. Weather and events have a great effect on the mood of groups, and the teacher in charge must sense these daily and change his timing and routines accordingly. For example, if he arranges it with the kitchen help, he can channel the pupils into the lunchroom more quickly, to give the children some activity and use up their energy. Administratively speaking, however, it is impossible to guarantee a safe lunch period, since the supervisor has to maintain order in both the school auditorium and the lunchroom at the same time; he cannot maintain simultaneous surveillance of both areas.

One of the most fascinating observations of Puerto Rican family structure can be made in the lunchroom. Puerto Rican mothers come to school to feed and observe their children at lunch, thus extending their family life from home to school. The children tend to be dominated by the school's black majority, and the mothers fight all the battles for their children. The teacher in this situation has to determine which parents are stable and sincere. It is a dangerous situation, because black families do not congregate in the school, and the only help the black child might expect is from an older brother or sister or perhaps a cousin after school. If friction lasts until after school, you can be assured that it will be blown up out of proportion to the facts. Many Puerto Rican parents treat the

lunch hour as a fiesta; others are downright dangerous. One Puerto Rican mother pulled a knife and slashed at a black pupil who supposedly bothered her son. It is hard to believe that she is still present most of the day in school, but she is. The Principal has encouraged the Puerto Rican parents to come to school because he is Puerto Rican and the parents are his power base in the school and the surrounding community. He will go to some lengths to please them, and it seems that he spends more time with them than with his faculty or pupils. Puerto Rican parental interference also could lead to collective violence, since as a group the parents could get enraged at a teacher restraining a child and take direct action.

The teacher's attitude. The attitude that a teacher takes toward his job has a lot to do with the overall security of the school and his personal safety as well. If the teacher stops each pupil for a pass in the hallway and also inquires whether he can be of help to any other stranger, he stands a much higher risk of personal violence than if he merely walks on by and ignores one and all; unfortunately, increasing teacher passivity in the face of potential violence is the case in many urban schools.

Security personnel. There are few elementary schools that have trained full-time security personnel. In the author's school there are two guards on duty around the clock, including weekends, but they are not trained and are not on patrol. They are stationary! They were hired to protect the school's "multi-media" audio-visual equipment, which was donated by a private foundation, and hence they are not Board of Education personnel. Their sole function is to keep the equipment from disappearing. Unfortunately one of the guards was apprehended while helping repairmen, who were renovating the school, carry a television to their dump truck.

Individual and Collective Acts of Violence

Individual acts. The previously listed individual personal acts of violence with bare hands or body action need no definition; however, when they are combined with those acts of violence which occur as a result of the use of a weapon,

the elementary school teacher has a heavy responsibility, since these are the primary acts which will be committed in the classroom.

"Personal" acts of violence are usually committed pupil-to-pupil and are generally of a normal pattern of behavior for the ghetto child. This pattern is called "instant gratification." Sociologists and psychologists use this term to identify behavior which the urban teacher has to understand and contend with daily. The term "instant gratification" refers back to the needs of the child and his frustration when he is unable to meet them. The child adapts to this frustration by never gaining the middle class value of thrift, or temporary self-denial, because he consumes or takes advantage of any gratification he can possibly get at the moment he can get it; it may not be available when he could make use of this gratification later. The teacher in an urban elementary school will be well acquainted with these acts of violence which result from immediate demands that needs be met. By observation of behavior patterns the teacher should be able to discern which pupils will be prone to acting out these needs, and will be able to plan for those children accordingly. The only personal act which cannot usually be handled in an unemotional manner is a sexual act, which can be of infinite variety and intensity depending on the participants. Any act of violence that can be construed to have sexual overtones has to be handled sensitively, with emphasis on the facts rather than the emotions and prejudices of all involved. Sexual aggression is a highly charged act of violence which triggers waves of almost uncontrollable reactions. Once a particular act between pupils or between teacher and pupil has been discovered, emotional outbursts and violent reactions are to be expected and considered the norm, not only in the school but in the community. The Principal has to be apprised of the situation and if necessary he can communicate with the police and parents. Generally speaking, the guidance department has a hand in deciding what course of action should be taken. With the exception of a sexual act, all individual personal acts should be contained in the classroom and should be adjudicated on the spot by the teacher, wherever possible.

Those individual acts of violence which occur in the classroom with the aid of a weapon such as a knife, gun, or match are of a much more serious nature and usually are harder to prevent, since the weapon is usually hidden and it takes

only a moment to finish the act. Once again the teacher can often observe and predict behavior beforehand, but unfortunately there are few second chances if a misjudgment is made. In the elementary school the knife and the pencil are the two most frequently observed weapons. In the ghetto, skill with a knife is taken for granted; they are readily available. From Project Headstart on up the author has observed the fascination of the ghetto child with the knife. In particular, the Spanish child will come to depend on the knife, since it is a real part of the Puerto Rican culture to work with one. The middle class teacher should not overreact to the presence of a knife, but rather should handle it in a matter of fact manner until the safety of all is assured and until he fully understands what is going on. The author found a knife with a six-inch blade stuck in his desk one morning. Since the kindergarten children have been observed only with much smaller knives, his first assumption was that the Adult Education Center used the kindergarten for a babysitting room and one of the youths employed by the Center forgot his weapon!

The remaining types of individual violent acts are of a serious nature and usually occur outside the classroom. Usually the school Office is the first to be notified in the event of a bomb threat or a false alarm. In the New York City schools there has never been an actual detonation if a bomb warning has been given; however, there have been unforwarned school bombings. This is not to say that any such event should be taken lightly, for it is the duty of the Principal to decide whether or not the building is to be evacuated. After consultation with the police he can choose his options. The problems of choosing the right option can sometimes be made very difficult for apparently simple, mechanical reasons. For example, in the writer's school renovation has been under way for three years and the bell system has been out of order for long periods of time. The teachers have been conditioned to hearing the bells go off sporadically, and most hesitate to move their pupils since it most probably is an electrical problem. There is no need to expound on the inherent danger in this situation. What happens the one time when the seeming school bell malfunction should have been heeded?

Fires are a daily concern. Most of them are of the trash basket variety; however, in recent years the firebomb has come into vogue and in the ghetto, schoolyards are a natural gathering spot at night. All of the firebombings in the author's school have occurred against outside doors and in the schoolyard and they appear to be the work of junior scientists with nothing better to do.

Collective acts. Over the past five years the phenomena of collective or group violence have become an integral part of political maneuvering in the schools. Seemingly it is acceptable to make demands and under threats of violence obtain concessions. This is not a new phenomenon but it may be a lasting one, since our elementary school pupils have observed and participated in these group actions and have learned the effectiveness of this method of negotiating with the "system." In the previously discussed fiscal crisis of 1970-1971, plans were made by the "Citywide Coalition" to make use of school children from the fourth grade up, in a major demonstration. It would be appropriate to duplicate here the flyer that was distributed to the children to show how organized and massive these demonstrations can be (Table III-2, page 292).

Group violence can be a fearsome force if you happen to be on the receiving end. A new twist seems to be the use of youth groups to put pressure on organizations and individuals. If an individual can get a poverty grant from either Federal, city or state agencies with few fiscal controls over job descriptions, time cards, and job site, he has a powerful force which can strike fear in the heart of any peace-loving administrator. Youths on payroll can be used as a rampaging force to extract more funds and job slots, with the resultant shift in political power in the community. The schools are affected when these poverty groups and community action groups turn their firepower on them. The teacher had best stay out of the way lest he become one of the targets of the group. Since youth programs are prevalent in the summer when the danger of collective violence is at its peak, governmental agencies should design programs with adequate amounts of supervision and fiscal accountability, so that controls can be imposed on the manpower available for mobilization to politically motivated collective violence.

Text of Flyer Distributed During New York City School Fiscal Crisis, 1971

BULLETIN BULLETIN BULLETIN BULLETIN BULLETIN BULLETIN

MARCH FOR A MILLION CHILDREN

Friday, March 12, 1971

12:30 p. m. --City Hall Area

WHY WE MARCH

- To save our schools for our children
- To restore the needed \$45 million to the school budget.

WHO IS SPONSORING THE MARCH?

- Coordinating Committee for a Citywide Coalition to Save Our Public Schools consisting of:
- Community school boards, teachers, paraprofessionals, supervisors, parents and parent organizations, civic and civil rights organizations, trade unions, and students.

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Only children in 4th grade and up should participate.
2. Only children whose parents have signed consent slips should attend--preferably with parents.
3. Schools must arrange for children to eat lunch by 11:00 a. m.
4. Leave from schools to arrive at CITY HALL AREA or designated destination at 12:30. You will be informed of your assigned destination within the week. Districts will be asked to assemble as districts at specified locations.
5. Toilet and health facilities will be available.
6. Make your own signs and banners identifying your school and district or organization.

Use ONLY the following slogans:

NO CUTS

SAVE EDUCATION IN OUR CITY

MARCH FOR A MILLION CHILDREN

KEEP OUR PUBLIC SCHOOLS

DON'T DESTROY OUR SCHOOLS

RESTORE 45 MILLION DOLLARS TO KEEP OUR SCHOOLS GOING

CIVICS LESSON FOR THE WEEK: GOVERNMENT MUST PROVIDE MONEY FOR SCHOOLS

OUR CHILDREN MUST NOT SUFFER

Do not use sticks for signs or banners.

7. EACH SCHOOL DISTRICT SHOULD ORGANIZE ITS SCHOOLS. Each school should make arrangements for captains and marshals for its group.
8. Every participating organization should have a captain and marshals for its group.
9. Coalition marshals will also be assigned throughout the march to regulate the demonstration. More detailed instructions will follow.

CITYWIDE COALITION TO SAVE OUR PUBLIC SCHOOLS

When the topic of collective violence is considered in relation to the writer's school area, there come to mind three incidents which had a decided effect on the outcome of a recent and extremely bitter teacher strike.

1. After a large community rally, a clergyman who was extremely active in community affairs happened to mention that "a lot more heat" would be put on the Mayor (of New York City) if he didn't capitulate to the group's demands that the present local power structure be allowed to remain intact. At the same time mention was made of shooting at police cars. Sure enough, the heat was on the Mayor, and the police were the ones who bore the brunt of the physical assaults.

2. The second incident concerned the support of the teachers' union by the custodial union. Before leaving school to honor the strike--because their job security was threatened--the custodians watered down the old coal furnace, pulled the circuit breakers, and padlocked the doors with chains. The community was frothing at the mouth, since they wanted to keep the schools open. It took a fourth grader to get the school open again, since he showed the principal how to get into the school through the coal chute!

3. The final incident in that violent strike was the disruption by the incumbents of a community election to elect a new Community School Board. The morning of the election, there was a bomb threat to the school; on the way up the steps that morning, the principal had warned some teachers that the bomb threat would occur. As the result of this tactic the election results were suspect and the incumbent's pressure group had an opportunity to call for a new election. Unfortunately, when power is at stake the dangerous aspects of these violent acts appear to some to be morally justifiable. Children make great shields, and everybody hides behind them. Control over these dangerous situations is out of the hands of the teacher. The politicians are the ones who have to balance the scales of justice, since their future hangs in the balance.

There is one final concern in the area of collective violence which the writer envisions to be a potential hotspot in the near future. The paraprofessionals

as a group are growing at an enormous rate.⁵ Teachers at first were afraid of them and viewed them as threats to their job security. That threat has not materialized and the paraprofessionals have proved to be worth their weight in gold. They have limitations because their background is generally not as broad as a teacher's, but at the same time their insights and understanding of the ghetto child have forestalled many a violent incident which could have been blamed on the middle class teacher's lack of understanding.

Much ballyhoo has been made over "career ladder programs" which will lead to a degree and other financial benefits for paraprofessionals. However, few paraprofessionals have the time to devote to school, since almost all of them are mothers and have family responsibilities. Other paraprofessionals who are younger and free of family ties have already washed out of college via Open Enrollment programs or work-study.⁶ Hence, there are a lot of underpaid and frustrated people with high status aspirations in our schools, and they are becoming aware of the power that they can have for the taking, given the political life of New York City. As a group, paraprofessionals are bound to become one of the most powerful in the urban school, because they are community residents, usually mothers of pupils in the school, active in parent associations, and frequently a wedge which the principal can use to keep the teachers off guard. There are few teachers that have as complete a picture of the school environment as the average paraprofessional, who lives in the immediate community. Absorption into the teacher's union may be one of the principal ways to control this new political dimension.

⁵"Paraprofessionals" are adult assistants to certified teachers, who perform many time-consuming routine functions in the classrooms and who often supply a special sensitivity to the needs of minority children because they themselves come from the community's minority groups.

⁶In 1970, the New York City University system opened its enrollment to all high school graduates, regardless of academic record and preparation. Thus the new term, "Open Enrollment."

Recommendations for Controlling School Violence

Teachers should:

1. Offer to participate in planning for school safety and security procedures with administrators and pupils.
2. Be aware of all emergency procedures and regulations. These include procedures for:
 - fire
 - bomb
 - rapid dismissalRegulations:
 - Take role book for names and addresses of the children.
 - Instantaneous evacuation at the sound of any signal.
3. Be aware of school and community tensions which could precipitate violence. If the teacher is active in the school and its community, he will be aware of any new activity and trends.
4. Be cognizant of conditions within the school, especially physical environment and interpersonal relationships.
5. Stress safety at all times, in:
 - Classroom
 - Building
 - Street
6. Be aware of police problems, particularly their role in the schools and their own changing perception of the job in the community.
7. Present a positive police image to children, in lessons and in attitude.
8. Have the time (supplies, equipment, help) to personalize his relationship with all pupils. If conditions warrant the teacher must improvise. Often, the teacher will have too few supplies, too little equipment, too little help.
9. Create a positive working and personal relationship with each member and the total class, balancing the need for harmony and social order against concern and respect for individuals and their rights.
10. Develop a sound professional attitude in regard to total student body, accepting responsibility outside as well as within his classroom. This can be risky. But if all teachers were to do so, there would be a part-time security staff of sixty professionals.

Administrators should:

1. Keep a high profile to provide visible leadership.
2. Not over-react.
3. Keep accurate violence statistics by using a centralized log kept by the guidance department. This may require new and difficult-to-implement procedures.
4. Develop methods of improving communication between all factions in the school and neighborhood including the police. This could best be coordinated with the local school superintendent and police captain, using a candid awareness of community political and social realities.
5. Be a "super administrator as defined" in the texts:⁷

A "person who occupies a position of leadership exceeds the average member of his group to some degree in the following respects: (1) sociability, (2) initiative, (3) persistence, (4) knowing how to get things done, (5) self-confidence, (6) alertness or an insight into situations, (7) cooperativeness, (8) popularity, (9) adaptability, and (10) verbal facility."
6. Keep the school and staff flexible. They should be capable of performing under all conditions.
7. Seek out talented professional staff which will meet the needs of the pupils. Constraints on hiring will make this difficult.
8. Alert staff to potential trouble areas in order to mobilize for prevention.
9. Encourage and employ those community people who can make a contribution as paraprofessionals and as security personnel.
10. Provide adequate in-service training to all employees regarding safety and security affairs.

Police should:

1. Contrary to current positions, they should maintain a positive high profile in the elementary school so that they can reinforce lessons

⁷Ralph M. Stogdill, "Personal Factors Associated with Leadership," Journal of Psychology, 25, First Half (Jan. 1948), p. 63.

CONTINUED

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on "community helpers." Current police doctrine emphasizes the need for a low police profile in the schools.

2. Have more minority group members on the job and visible in the community.
3. Not over-react, in complex school situations.
4. Reduce prejudices, through human relations courses and equity in assignment.
5. Have college trained personnel in ghetto areas since they should be better prepared to cope with the environment. Again, this may conflict with some police doctrine, which emphasizes that a policeman's task is essentially the same, wherever it is performed.
6. Coordinate with community organizations for sounder relationships.
7. Provide continuity on school patrols so that the men can be familiar to the staff and pupils.

Community, Parents and Local School Boards should:

1. Devote all energies to promoting sound educational experiences.
2. Keep the children out of potentially dangerous demonstrations.
3. Expect professionals to conduct themselves as such, even if they have to go against the political grain.
4. Encourage and support the worthwhile effort of the administrators and teachers to provide an atmosphere conducive to learning.
5. Seek professional advice from outside the community to guide them in formulating goals and strategies for improving the school. Use of outside consultants will modify the tendency of competition among local vested interests which explodes into incidents. These consultants can be recruited by advertisements or informal feelers. Public and private institutions are top heavy with talented people, as it is a buyer's market at present.

The preceding specific recommendations revolve around several general themes which suggest a long run solution to the problem of making our schools relevant to the needs of the pupils, thus preventing violence. The first of these themes concerns the desirable type of teacher and the role that he is to assume.

To be an effective teacher in an urban elementary school, there are certain qualities needed. As one observes the scene, certain teachers are noted to have a quietly serene look and attitude in their class; problems exist, but they are taken care of in a calm manner. In currently popular jargon the class would describe this type of teacher as "all together." The following is a:

DESIRED TEACHER PROFILE FOR THE URBAN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

1. Personal Type
 - A. Young and searching, sincere and hard working.
 - B. Mature and stable, well structured but loving.
 - C. Preferably male, to let the ghetto child, often denied a father, identify with the teacher.
2. Generalist with wide current interests and a searching intellect capable of involving students in relevant activities.
3. Emotionally secure.
4. Enough stamina for a running back.
5. Be well organized and prepared but flexible.
6. Not a cynic, who has been battered by the "realities" of the city.

The second general theme to be found in the previous recommendations is the problem of communication. The principal and teacher need to be acutely sensitive to community needs and pressures. There are several factors that could help the schools and police work more closely. The following is a list of these measures:

POLICE AND SCHOOL SENSITIVITY MEASURES TO HELP EACH OTHER ATTAIN AND UNDERSTAND THEIR GOALS

1. Understanding of roles played by each:
Administrators
Teachers
Patrolmen

2. College trained police in ghetto areas.
3. Develop profiles of typical desired patrolman and teacher, to be used in teacher and police training as well as in school lessons.
4. Police should have a positive high profile for acceptance.
5. More minorities in civil service.
6. Local police commander should have a school council, which would coordinate meetings with the local school district and share information and problem solving. This could best be done as part of the local school superintendent's regular meetings with principals.

To further help police-school communications and to help the local police commander formulate his contingency plans, the following questionnaire (Table III-3, page 300) should prove valuable. The questionnaire was kept short and specific so that it would be accepted positively by school administrators while still providing enough basic information to prove valuable to the police. It should be filled out on a semi-annual basis by the local precinct working with the school principal.

A Concluding Thought

Enough has been said and written about the problems and solutions for the elementary school. The time has come for our society to reorder its priorities and actively generate social brotherhood. As the educational structure now exists, it puts obstacles in the way of the professional teacher, and it is hard for him to rise above the status of zookeeper. The structure has to move and concern itself with positive educational experiences rather than placing the focus on containment and suppression. Contingency plans are necessary but they are not a long run solution to violence. The ultimate solution is not in the hands of the police. It must be the joint concern of educators and the school's community.

PROPOSED QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMMUNITY BASED
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY RESPONSIBLE
FOR SCHOOL SECURITY

1. Description of school building _____

Name, address and phone number of school custodian and engineer:

Custodian: _____ Address _____ Phone _____

Engineer: _____ Address _____ Phone _____

2. Boundaries of school local attendance area by streets and house numbers:

Total enrollment: _____

3. Student Profile:

Personal _____

Achievement _____

4. Program strengths and weaknesses: _____

5. Copy of principal's log.

Summarized violent acts and accidents, by date and tally.

Annexes:

- A. Map of school, including utilities and entrances;
- B. Map of local attendance area;
- C. List of staff and license plate numbers. (Include paraprofessional and custodial staff).

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Chapter IV

COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY

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PART I

COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY VIOLENCE
AS A CONCERN FOR
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

PART I

COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY VIOLENCE
AS A CONCERN FOR
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Conflict between College and Law Enforcement Is Not New

College students are natural irritants to authority. College students have always been a natural irritant to law enforcement personnel. They have been almost equally irritating over the years to criminal justice agencies.

To the officer of criminal justice--whether he be state's attorney, judge, probation official, or another officer of the court--the collegian is a likely source of skillfully applied pressures to extend the law in new and sometimes worrisome directions. These pressures may reach all the way from the Constitution itself, with the recently enacted Amendment giving eighteen-year-olds the right to vote, to municipal ordinances, which are readily challenged from the campus when the collegian deems them restrictive of his right to demonstrate for social changes.

For the law enforcement officer, the college student is often an intensely personal irritant. The majority of all law enforcement officers in the United States have little or no college background, and there is a real division of opinion among law enforcement professionals over whether much college background is of real use to the policeman. In many situations where police encounter college students, the "generation gap" is actually an education gap. On one side are students, still that privileged, articulate minority who are earning that priceless credential, the college degree, as the basis from which to safeguard their already high status in society. On the other side are the police, who have shouldered real-world responsibilities early in life, and who never had the time, the luck, the ability, or the interest to spend four years after high school still going to school. The policeman has legal force and professional skills; the collegian has the words and wit to make even casual encounters into celebrated cases. The results can be

dangerous conflict, which can easily become set into a pattern, and which can lead to collective violence.

Thus, unlike the high schools and grade schools, where the full dimensions of collective violence are only now becoming fully understood, the college and university have for centuries been perceived by knowledgeable law enforcement and criminal justice officers as breeders of trouble. Since the emergence of the modern university at Bologna, Italy in the Eleventh Century and the blooming of Oxford in Thirteenth Century England, "Town" versus "Gown" has been a fixture of life in college communities. At the University of Paris, major riots between students and police have come and gone for centuries. The legends which surround German university life note with barely suppressed pride the tradition of student dueling at Heidelberg University, where one was not "a man" until he had gotten a scar across the cheek. For a hundred years, the dueling tradition has bedeviled both local and national law enforcement in Germany, where repeated attempts have been made to stamp it out. In Latin America, universities have frequently been used as privileged refuges from which to mount political and social revolution. Frequently, "town-gown" conflict in these countries has become a question of whether the national army can enter the university precincts to suppress revolt. In this light, what is remarkable about the American experience is not that violence has come to the American campus, but that, except for a relatively small number of cases or historical periods, it has been of low intensity and frequency. In general, over the years, American student protest has taken relatively benign forms. Until very recently--and then in a small number of cases--American campus "violence" has been trivial by European or Latin American standards.

This does not mean that American campuses have been havens for the docile. The first American college, Harvard, experienced student unrest just two years after its founding in 1636. In 1638, students rose against President Nathaniel Eaton, who

had every qualification on paper for a successful president; but he used the rod more freely than college students were willing to put up with even in those rough days, and his wife, who

did the catering, served them mouldy bread, spoiled beef, and sour beer--when there was beer.¹

The Harvard tradition of food riots continued with the celebrated Butter Riot of 1766. By the first half of the Nineteenth Century, college unrest and violence had become widespread:

Nearly every college experienced student rebellion or riots, some more serious than others. In certain cases, they eventuated in broken windows or cracked furniture; in others, they resulted in deaths. All involved some kind of collective action either of a class or the whole student body. These outbursts could be found in all sections of the country, at state universities and denominational colleges, at "godless" Harvard and Virginia, and at pious Yale and Princeton. Everywhere the atmosphere was like that of a revolutionary brawl or a violent modern strike.²

What about college and university life brings collegians into conflict with authority and leads to situations conducive to collective violence? Oft-cited reasons in the 1960's and '70's--an unpopular war in which youth is forced to serve; slowness of social institutions to respond to urgent social problems such as racial segregation; discontent with "materialism" in the society outside the university--actually reflect much longer-term tensions between university and society. The university here and overseas grew up both in and outside the mainstream of daily social life. Taking students from the society to prepare them for professional roles in the society, the university has always had to be rooted in the society. In the currently fashionable word, the university has always had to be "relevant" in important ways. Yet the university has always been separated in important ways from momentary social problems and customary social disciplines.

In more recent centuries, this separation has been in the name of "academic freedom." Academic freedom means not only freedom to teach and do research

¹Frank L. Ellsworth and Martha A. Burns, Student Activism in American Higher Education (Washington: American College Personnel Association, Student Personnel Series No. 10, 1970), p. 9, quoting Samuel Eliot Morison's The Intellectual Life of Colonial New England (New York: N. Y. University Press, 1956).

²Ibid., quoting John Seiler Brubacher and W. Rudy, Higher Education in Transition (New York: Harper and Row, 1958).

according to one's academic discipline if one is on the faculty, but freedom to learn from the best available knowledge if one is a student. While in recent centuries these twin freedoms have served the purpose of keeping the university sufficiently isolated so that its members were truly free to pursue knowledge without the intrusion of irrelevant coercions, in earlier centuries, academic freedom directly defined one's place in society. That is to say, to be a student or a faculty member placed one in a reserved legal category, subject to the rules of the university rector and senate, under charters or other arrangements ratified by the king or local lord but based ultimately on the fact that the religious groups founding the university were not fully under the king's secular law. In the most direct sense, therefore, students were legally apart from other members of the local society.

As time passed, this led to several problems in maintaining orderly universities. One problem, which lay in the status of students compared to that of members of the immediate society around the university, was that students could, with relative ease, defy local political authorities. At ancient Oxford, for example, the local constables were severely limited in their legal ability to pursue rascally drunken undergraduates behind the walls of the college buildings. Another problem lay within the university itself. There, students and faculty could begin to adopt ideas at variance with those of the university officials who were elected by the faculties or religious orders in control. Thus, even when universities were under strong church control and apart from the outside political society, individuals could take the university's relative independence of society as part of the basis for asserting that they were free to pursue their own ideas regardless of the consequences to established beliefs.

Rather quickly, universities became arenas for contending opinions. In modern times, this came to be recognized as one of the great functions of the college and university--to pursue knowledge freely, through research, debate, and controversy. Yet universities were also to teach the younger adult, and here lies one of the great impulses to physical disorder on the campus. The college and university years are usually the end of rapid physical growth, when the young

adult is in full physical power. They are also the years of rapid intellectual development, when an emphasis in earlier years on acquiring the mechanical tools for learning is replaced by the learning of broad areas of knowledge and idea. As the student reaches out into these broad areas of knowledge, he finds that they are full of additional questions and problems, and that these supposedly secure areas of "knowledge" may contain many doubtful facts and ideas. But the college student also finds that with his broadened perspective, he is now able to look at society outside college from an analytic, critical point of view. In taking this look at knowledge, at himself, and society outside, the collegian can see much that is deeply dissatisfying. This rude awakening--which can be for the academically oriented person the mental equivalent of the physical hardening that goes on in Marine Corps Boot Camp--seems sometimes to demand expression in both words and acts.

The American college population. This learning turmoil can be both especially exciting and especially frustrating on the American college campus. The American collegian is a member of a population group rapidly increasing in both total size and as a proportional element in the total population. In 1870, the 56,000 students enrolled in institutions of higher education constituted 1.68% of the American population aged 18-21.³ By 1920, the 598,000 college-level students were slightly over 8% of this same age group.⁴ In 1950, the 2,659,000 in institutions of higher learning were 29.88% of the eighteen- through twenty-one year-olds.⁵ While final 1970 Census figures were not available when this chapter was prepared, the preliminary count of 14,141,539 eighteen-through twenty-one year-olds,⁶ viewed against the 7,852,000 students projected to be

³U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), Series H 316-326, p. 211.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., p. 210.

⁶Obtained directly from Census Bureau headquarters near Washington.

in public or private institutions of higher education in 1970,⁷ suggests that about one half of all Americans in age group 18-21 were doing college work as the 1970's began.⁸ In appraising the evolving American college scene of the 1970's, it is of additional importance to note the increasing importance of the publicly supported institution. While Federal projections forecast 5,623,000 students in public institutions and 2,229,000 students in private institutions in 1970, by 1977, the public enrollees are projected to have grown to 8,018,000, while the number of private college students will have increased slightly, to 2,650,000.⁹ But whether in public or private institutions, not only are an increasing number of late adolescents in college-level education, but they are a numerically big group today--with a social voice likely to be enhanced out of proportion to their numbers because of the lowering of the voting age to eighteen and the heightened political interests of collegians.

Very probably an impulse to college was, for the collegian, the dream of his parents. A "college education" certainly has been one of the most widely held dreams of middle-aged Americans--if not for themselves, then for their children. But when he gets to college, the collegian enters a special world--even if he commutes to it every day from his home. Even if his mind is only on getting ready for his future career, he can hardly avoid the bombardment of ideas and demands from others. And wherever he goes, he will find that American college students and college faculty are taking the outside world as their laboratory.

The American college and university have been under increasing pressures from outside and within to "get involved" in the affairs of the larger society. Students may denounce the fact that on the campuses, university faculty have engaged

⁷U.S. Office of Education, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Projections of Educational Statistics to 1977-78 (1968 Edition) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), Table 1, p. 9.

⁸There is, of course, a weakness of method in assuming that it is only the group 18-21 who are in college, and taking this group as the reference group against which to measure the proportional impact of college attendance on age groups. A number of individuals younger or older than this group are in college; in addition, college attendance statistics are often inflated by part-time attendees or attendees who are in non-degree programs.

⁹Office of Education, op. cit.

in defense research in the name of the larger society, yet they often show little hesitation in entering outside crusades for civil rights--also in the name of the larger society. But each of these and other pressures toward "involvement," even though quite different, breaks down the special separation of university from society. In the short run, this can mean that the student insists that the ideas and ideals of social life cultivated in the special setting of the university be instantly applied and affirmed in the larger society. When the larger society fails to respond, the collegian therefore experiences frustration, while those in charge of the university experience a difficult dilemma. Can the collegian be helped to think to the point a short time ahead, when, with the skills developed in the special freedom of the university, he can engage in practical, tough, daily actions to help society evolve? To the angry late adolescent, this wait may seem emotionally unendurable and morally unacceptable. But if the university administrator and faculty member condone direct action in the name of immediate change, and if this action becomes authoritarian and violent--are they prepared to withstand the counteraction of society against the university, which provided the base from which pressures toward violent change were launched?

Those who would provoke college students into violent actions in the name of instant change well appreciate this dilemma. They know many of the tactics for intensifying it, beginning often in driving social barriers among students, faculty, and administration on the college campus. In dealing with those who would use the special freedoms and problems of the university to produce violence, law enforcement and criminal justice officials need to know how deepset are the special tensions between university and society which activists seek to exploit, and how resistant universities are, because of their long and special history, to anything that looks like official repression. Using this history in their favor, activists will seek whenever possible to show that any action by police or criminal justice agencies against universities must be repressive. They will portray administrators and faculty who legitimately cooperate with outside authorities as "tools of repression" which should be driven from the campus. And they will seek wherever possible to use whatever opportunities may be handed to them by the differences between the average collegian and the average law enforcement officer.

Status disparities between college students and police. At present, the most significant single difference between the law enforcement officer and the collegian is in the years of education each has completed. Although 1970 Census figures were not available at the time this chapter was written, it appears that in the nation at-large, the law enforcement officer is most likely to be a high school graduate with less than a year of college. During the decade of the 1960's,

The median education level of police officers has risen slightly.... Figures released by the U.S. Department of Health Education, and Welfare set the median at 12.4 years of education in 1966, a slight rise from the 12.2 level reported by the Bureau of the Census in 1960. A recent national survey of 6,300 police officers indicated that approximately 24 percent of patrolmen and 31 percent of top-level department administrators had attended college.¹⁰

In contrast, the average collegian, merely by having been in college more than one semester, is likely to have more education than the average police officer, even though the officer may be older and have more experience in the workaday world.

This contrast in level of educational attainment is a critically sensitive issue in preparing law enforcement agencies to deal with collective violence on the college campus, but it is at the same time a very difficult issue to evaluate in terms of its implications for the law enforcement profession. In dealing with collective violence in the high school and grade school, the average law enforcement officer is not only significantly older than the student group, but his combination of formal and extra-curricular, practical education often puts him at least on a par with the kids with whom he must deal. In approaching collegians, however, these advantages diminish. While the college students may be younger and with less experience, they are likely to be more skilled at articulating issues, especially when authorities resist. And issues are at the heart of most campus protests. Beyond this, entrance into college and university studies marks, in American

¹⁰ President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 10.

society, an important transition in the social status of the student. Even though this transition is at the present moment denied by some upper-middle class youth who affect workers' overalls and used military clothing, it is very real: entry to college places the student on the definite road toward a place in the upper-status, white collar world, access to which is governed by the college degree. For the student from poor origins, college marks entrance into the middle class. For the middle- or upper-class student, college affirms that status. Although systematic survey research is urgently needed on this point, it is likely that whether or not they are willing to admit it, collegians view police as essentially blue-collar operatives--even though police may be perceived to be at the top of the blue collar trades. Not far below the surface of every encounter between collegians and cops is the intimation that status superiors are battling status inferiors.

The evident status disparity between law enforcement personnel and collegians or college degree holders obviously rankles the law enforcement profession, but the thrust to upgrade the educational background of law enforcement personnel is much more complex in its implications and problems than just a desire to raise the social standing of the profession. The increasing complexity of police work generates its own pressures toward lengthening the educational preparation of policemen, yet one important body of opinion argues:

... police work is not characterized by as high a level of educational expectations as characterize other occupations, although the recent trends strongly indicate the need of higher educational levels in all fields of employment. Police work involves specific training in a variety of skills which can be understood in relatively brief periods of time and more appropriately are considered job-related. College education, although desirable, is not necessary for all kinds of police work. For these reasons, the specialized educational needs of police are not usually associated with those of a profession.¹¹

One danger of such a position is that it takes police work as a given, from which argue future requirements. Furthermore, police professionals who are emotionally

¹¹ Clarence M. Kelley and David L. Norrgard, "The Emerging Police Service," in George D. Eastman and Esther M. Eastman (eds.), Municipal Police Administration (Washington: International City Management Association: Municipal Management Series, 1969), p. 323.

committed to upgrading the profession may sniff a certain condescension in this passage. But Kelley and Norrgard have an important implicit point to make: there are today and should be in the future job alternatives which are challenging but which are freed from artificial pressures to make them status-oriented professions with artificial educational requirements.

Others argue that while police work requires more education, this education should not be at the cost of imposing artificial social class orientations. After assessing evidence on the effects of the relatively low educational background of law enforcement officers and of the "lower-middle" and "working class" origins of many police,¹² Watson and Sterling, quoting Banton, comment:

For the present though, we should give more than passing consideration to the following middle-ground point of view of social class:

To do his job properly, the policeman, like the minister of religion, has to be to some extent a "classless" figure. He has to deal with subjects of different class and his relationships with them must be determined by his office, not by his class position.

To this view, we would hasten to add that the policeman should be an educated classless figure.¹³

In this view, while the policeman may have strong "lower status" background influences, these influences do not strictly determine how he will perform his role, and, in any case, should be made irrelevant, through experience and training, to the inherently classless public service which he must objectively perform.

Some commentators have, however, a vigorous faith in the inherent values of college education for police. Typical of these is Berkley, who, in writing on how to attain the "democratic policeman," asserts

¹² Nelson A. Watson and James W. Sterling, Police and Their Opinions (Washington: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1969), especially pp. 31-36, pp. 105-109.

¹³ Ibid., p. 124, emphasis in the original. The indented quote is from Michael Banton, The Policeman in the Community (London: Tavistock Publications, 1964), p. 181.

... democratic attitudes and patterns of behavior increase markedly with education. Thus, the educated policeman is more likely to be the democratic policeman.¹⁴

He laments, however, that "many, if not most, American police departments give little credit to, and take little advantage of, their college-trained men."¹⁵

The differences in the assumptions and tone of these comments about the need for college education in police work reflect the wide differences today in opinions about the direction in which the law enforcement profession should evolve. While there are clearly many status desires as well as desires for increased professional competence behind the drive to increase the number of college-educated men and women serving in law enforcement, there is a counter-impulse, based in part on a certain contemporary disenchantment with college and "overqualification for job," to keep law enforcement a more open career, into which vigorous people can effectively move without excessive academic inhibition. This institutional conflict within the law enforcement profession has special bite and irony for law enforcement personnel assigned to campus disorders. To some obvious but difficult-to-measure degree, police overreactions to college students engaged in protest, disorder and collective violence reveal barely concealed pleasure at "teaching those smart kids a lesson." In such situations, the status disparities weighted in favor of collegians make police vulnerable to temptations to engage in over-reactions which discharge the anger they feel at being placed in the position of status inferiors. Campus agitators will be especially alert for individual officers or police units who appear overly sensitive. Through insults based on the allegedly inferior status of police (for example, shouts of "Pig!"), these activists will deliberately seek to provoke these police into excessive behavior, in which police will visibly act out their anger toward their "status superiors"-- in full view of the communications media.

Should police detailed to campus disorders be persons with college background? It would seem that the answer is "Yes," but closer thought might suggest

¹⁴ George E. Berkeley, The Democratic Policeman (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 74.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 86.

serious reservations. If the only reason for sending college-trained police onto a campus is to equalize the status of the contenders, and if these college-trained police are individuals who "made it up the hard way," there will still be exploitable status considerations intruding into the confrontation, and the police may feel just as much anger at "soft, smart kids." Conceivably there could be additional anger, absent in the case of the non-college trained officer, because of the educated officer's more explicit awareness of how the kids "are throwing opportunities away." On the other hand, a college background for the law enforcement officer or commander charged with campus disorder may enable him to engage in the issue-oriented dialogues which are such a distinctive feature of college and university disorders. This ability, plus evidence of sharing the same assumptions about intellectual inquiry and evidence of a desire to show that rational values dominate police behavior, can be critical in directing the energy of college students back toward the verbal discourse so highly valued in the college setting, and away from obviously irrational acts of violence. But if collegians do not always reflect these values, is it fair to assume the college-trained police will always necessarily reflect them, just because of their college grounding? Maturity, self-control, and judgment do not necessarily flow from academic skills acquired alone.

The policeman employed by a campus security force is in an especially vulnerable position. Within the law enforcement profession, these officers have tended to be relatively low status, marginal individuals: often retirees or part-timers, with slender education. One of the few currently established authorities on campus policing comments on the extremely low level of some campus police personnel in these terms:

State universities have for the most part been very slow in bringing about badly needed professionalization of their campus security offices. Campus security officers are usually hired to meet low-level Civil Service job descriptions which were written for a completely different type of security operation. For example, one large state uses a job description written a number of years ago for guards in its mental institutions, and Civil Service cannot see any difference in their duties.¹⁶

¹⁶ John W. Powell, "The History and Proper Role of Campus Security, Part I," Security World, VIII, 3 (March, 1971), p. 22. One of the few available

Until relatively recently, such personnel were little more than custodial and janitorial persons; indeed, that these functions were perceived to be the campus policeman's role was reflected in the general practice of placing the campus police under the college maintenance department.¹⁷ And where campus police have been styled on more traditional police lines, the effectiveness of the officers is at best debatable:

... Officers in this type of department are usually trained at some municipal police training school along with local officers, and in addition to being trained in basic police procedures, duties, rules and regulations, also can acquire a "police philosophy." This type of officer reacts to situations involving students and others like a municipal officer--either he makes an arrest or lets the individual go and forgets about the incident. There is no "middle road," and there must be if a campus security operation is to be successful and contribute to maintaining a peaceful campus.

....

The strictly police approach can be found on some state university campuses where officers confront demonstrating students in full riot gear and follow a hard police line in their daily duties (arrests, traffic tickets, etc.). This type of operation quickly alienates a college community and results in cries of "Pig" and the security force becoming a minority group itself, removed from the flow of campus life and activity. Such an image can also foster dissent and violence and be used by hard-core extremists to enlist masses of students in violent confrontation.¹⁸

(Footnote 16, continued) data-based surveys of campus police units reports:

We found 81 of 94 [college or university security unit] respondents... stated that they required a high school diploma or less. Generally, as one progressed from junior college to university and with increased size of institution there was more of a requirement for some college education. We found that 14 of the total respondents required less than a high school education. This situation tended to exist in institutions 10,000 and below.

Gary Adams and Percy Rogers, "Campus Policing: State of the Art" (Los Angeles: University of Southern California Center for Justice Administration, 1971), pp. 27-28.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 18-19.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 20-21, emphasis added.

Considerations such as these have given great impetus to a national movement to "professionalize" campus security. For some security forces, this has meant direct encouragement for campus police to undertake or pursue college degrees. For example, a widely cited model campus security force, that of Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah, has the following regulation in its Operations Manual:

Promotions and salary adjustments will be recommended and determined in some degree by the job interest and initiative of each employee, reflected in part by his participation in continuing education offered to all employees of the university without cost. Each employee is urged to take advantage of the educational opportunities afforded him as a fringe benefit of employment with the university.¹⁹

It is likely this type of inducement will become widespread among campus security forces, not only because of the apparently widespread feeling among security professionals that some college experience is valuable for campus security officers,²⁰ but because of the general feeling in American society--which campus security professionals reflect--that a college education is a good thing.

There are obvious reasons why some exposure to and appreciation of college level academic work is desirable for campus security officers. The "middle road" to which Powell refers, the road between simple arrest and simply letting the individual go, must require the ability of campus security officials to engage in rational dialogue with students, and to conduct that dialogue from a basis in obviously shared values. But there may be some danger in too readily equating police professionalism, on or off campus, with college background. Total police

¹⁹Brigham Young University Security Force, Operations Manual (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University, 1967), Section 34/102/9. See also the laudatory article: Herbert E. McLean, "All Quiet on Campus," Law and Order, XIX, 5 (May, 1971), pp. 36-42.

²⁰This feeling appeared widespread in informal discussions among campus security directors at the First Annual National Symposium on Campus Unrest, sponsored by the American Academy of Criminal Justice, held in Newton, Massachusetts, April 1-2, 1971.

professionalism requires not only an ability to command various legal and procedural issues, but quick physical reflexes, well developed manual skills, mature judgment, humor, and stamina. These latter qualities of character are not simply additions to more "formal" qualifications; they are an integral part of the foundation upon which a law enforcement officer builds a career. On the basis of available evidence, it is difficult to say whether, in fact, college training does measurably enhance the performance and effectiveness of individuals assigned to campus security functions. The proposition that it does appears at present to rest more on faith than on test. It would be interesting, for example, to compare the performance of the college-grounded police recruit involved in campus security operations to the performance of the law enforcement recruit who has come directly into police work from a unit such as the U. S. Army Special Forces. The latter individual, although perhaps with little motivation for college, will be not only physically but intellectually robust. Because of rigorous prior selection, he will often have the ability required to undertake and complete a college degree--but his motivations and satisfactions may lie elsewhere. Are there any reasons to think that such strong and flexible individuals will necessarily be less effective in campus settings than college-grounded police?

The inadequate state of formal knowledge about police effectiveness on the campus makes it difficult to answer such questions. Such questions do, however, suggest several working guidelines from which law enforcement planners should approach the problem of status disparities between college students and police:

Some Guidelines for Considering Police-College Status Disparities

.1 Careful distinctions should be made between police professionalism and the benefits accruing from college background. If college background is desirable for campus law enforcement personnel sent to quell campus disorders or violence, in what measurable ways does such background enhance police effectiveness?

.2 To what degree is the pressure for educationally upgrading law enforcement personnel an implicit ratification of the fact that there are status disparities between cops and collegians? In the short run, do such pressures--by ratifying this status disparity--create more tensions and difficulties than they resolve?

.3 The bases for dealing with status disparities between cops and collegians may be grounds other than equipping police with college experience. Not only must police change their attitudes toward students, but students must be encouraged to value a social pluralism which genuinely respects individuals whether or not they have college backgrounds. Very recent trends on college campuses, with apparent increases in numbers of students "dropping out" for a time or working in manual occupations after receiving their degrees, suggest that a broadened basis for this respect is now being created. Ironically--although the evidence is entirely informal, there is some evidence that young collegians are entering police work in increasing numbers today because (a) they see it as a commitment to socially relevant action that is (b) free from stifling academic rigidities.

.4 The possible role conflicts which college-trained police may experience in dealing with campus problems need careful analysis and consideration. Role conflicts occur when individuals, in one situation, are required to act out what are essentially different roles. Thus, in college disorders, an activist tactic will be to suggest that an individual with college values and background cannot and should not act out a law enforcement role, which must be "inherently repressive." Such appeals are often based on an implicit Marxist theory of action which holds that individuals of the same class should express class solidarity in the same ways. It may well take college-level skills in dialectic for a law enforcement professional to refute activist assertions that "solidarity" with the students prohibits actions against them. But to only a limited degree can law enforcement personnel enter into debates--even with collegians. Because of this and because of appeals which can be made to them by clever propagandists, there may be need for attention to be given to the special tactical dilemmas into which college-oriented law enforcement personnel may be put on campus.

The Importance of Issues in Campus Disorder and Violence

A heightened sensitivity to the importance of issues in sustaining and intensifying protest may be one advantage a college-grounded law enforcement officer has in approaching situations which could lead to campus violence. Although issues are of increasing importance in mobilizing the high schools, and although even grade schools may now expect to be targets of issue-oriented activism,²¹

²¹In addition to evidence presented in this point in Chapters II and III above, it is noteworthy that at the July, 1971 meetings held by the National Peace

it is in the colleges and universities that issues appear to dominate all phases of protest. When disorder and violence occur on campus, issues remain dominant, although as violence occurs and law enforcement agencies move in to contain it, the issues may turn quickly from demands centered on university governance and national politics to demands centered on the uses and tactics of police personnel in the immediate situation. While collective violence can often result from situational, accidental events, the events which bring college students and law enforcement officers into confrontation will be seen, time and again, to be controlled by the unfolding of issues. At all phases of the law enforcement response--from

(Footnote 21, continued)

Action Coalition in New York City to plan protest activities for the Fall of 1971, a "High School, Junior High School, Elementary School Workshop Proposal" explicitly joined agitation for the right to organize politically to agitation for immediate withdrawal of United States forces from Southeast Asia. The following full text of this "Proposal," taken from the mimeographed statement distributed at the NPAC meetings, specifically includes elementary schools as targets for organization and demonstration:

I. Student Rights and the War

High school, junior high and elementary school students are overwhelmingly against the war and for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all U.S. forces from S.E. Asia. We also believe that we have the right to form political groups to express our views and to print, distribute and speak out on our political ideas in school and out.

To underscore and make clear these demands we propose that antiwar students in High Schools, Junior Highs, and Elementary schools throughout the nation hold referendums in their schools centering on:

- 1.) The right of students to organize politically, to form groups, to leaflet, etc.
- 2.) The question of Immediate Withdrawal from S. E. Asia.

Other local issues could be included, but the two major issues will be very important in strengthening our work in building the Fall Offensive against the war. The referenda would be carried out with the support of the local Peace Action Coalitions and every other interested organization.

II. Each PAC should form a High School, Junior High and Elementary School task forces (sic) to build a contingent for the fall antiwar actions.

in-depth intelligence about what is happening on a subject campus to tactical determinations of the likely responses to be made to likely incidents which activists will provoke around issues--it is therefore of critical importance that law enforcement and criminal justice agencies thoroughly understand what issues are exciting students. Furthermore, official agencies should have conducted analyses of the content and logic of particular substantive issues, so that they will have an increased awareness of how issues can convert into other issues, which can lead students in new directions and require new plans for official response.

The need for continuing scrutiny and analysis of campus issues is illustrated by the rapidity with which issues surfaced and declined in 1969 and 1970. A study of 292 "major student protests" on 232 college and university campuses during the period January through June, 1969, indicated that black recognition was the single most frequently occurring protest issue, where protest is defined as "an organized attempt by a student group to (1) stage a disruption of college activities or (2) make a formal set of demands of a college or university."²² The major protest issues revealed by this Urban Research Corporation study are given in Table IV-1 (page 325).²³ It is important to note that the URC study was not based on a sample survey of campuses, but on a reading of a very large but nevertheless selected number of local newspapers and periodicals, supplemented by other information. Thus, to be reported in the URC study, a campus protest had to be reported in one of the papers monitored daily by URC, or it had to be accessible to URC staff through other contacts. Because of this method, it is not possible to say that the URC study is necessarily a statistically valid survey of all campus protest which occurred during the first half of 1969. Depending on the adequacy of the sample of newspapers or sources monitored and upon the adequacy of the reportage in those newspapers or by those sources, URC's data may or

²²Urban Research Corporation, Student Protests, 1969: Summary (Chicago: Urban Research Corporation, 1970), pp. 1-2.

²³Ibid., pp. 1-11. Table IV-1 gives percentages for both major issues and issue-components. Those interested in method will note that the sum of percentages of issues or issue-components can be greater than 100%, because on any campus, more than one issue or issue-component could be raised.

Table IV-1
MAJOR CAMPUS PROTEST ISSUES, FIRST HALF OF 1969
292 Protests on 232 Campuses

MAJOR ISSUE AND ISSUE-COMPONENT (Note: More than one issue and issue-component could be raised on any campus)	Percent of all 292 protests in which these issues raised
. 1 BLACK RECOGNITION Provide more black courses or black studies centers: 32% Increase number of black students: 24% Hire more black faculty and staff: 23% End discrimination; honor blacks: 15% Provide more facilities for black students: 9% Increase black representation on committees: 8% Support off-campus black power: hire black employees: 4%	49%
. 2 STUDENT POWER Provide student role in faculty hiring, firing decisions: 22% Institute student participation on decision-making committees: 21% End restrictions on student publications, organizations: 7% Revise disciplinary procedures: 7% Prohibit police searches on campus: 6% Agree to student bill of rights: 3%	44%
. 3 QUALITY OF STUDENT LIFE Revise grading system and courses: 13% Lower tuition: 6% Provide more, better student facilities: 6% Revise dormitory rules and coed regulations: 6% Improve food services: 4% Offer more new left courses: 2% Revise dress regulations: 1% Change drinking regulations: 1% Change automobile regulations: 1% Change chapel regulations: 0.3%	28%
. 4 WAR-RELATED Abolish ROTC or make it non-credit course: 12% End on-campus military or war-related industry recruiting: 9% Stop war research: 7% End the war in Vietnam: 2% End the draft: 0.3%	22%
. 5 UNIVERSITY AND THE COMMUNITY Waive tuition for the poor: 6% Increase staff pay and improve conditions: 4% Stop campus expansion: 3% Use university-owned land for community parks, public services: 3% Open campus facilities to community: 3% Admit students from neighborhood schools: 3% Provide services to community: 2% Give community role or voice in university decisions: 2% Oppose local landlords: 1%	18%
. 6 OTHER Express sympathy with other protests: 3% Dissaffiliate police training or other "reactionary" programs: 3% Denounce "reactionary" legislation: 2%	8%

may not be statistically valid as a survey of all campus protest during a given time period. It is likely, however, that URC's list of major issues does cover almost all significant matters that were exciting collegians, since the issue categories used by URC do reduce a broad variety of campus protests to a few clearly recurrent issue-themes, and since media reportage appears especially sensitive to issues. Thus, law enforcement and criminal justice planners will find the list of issues in Table IV-1 a useful and comprehensive checklist of issues, to which they should be sensitive as they attempt to maintain a continuing understanding of the particular campus situation for which they have responsibilities.

The list of issues from the Urban Research Corporation is useful not only as a checklist for observing the campus situation at a given time but as a benchmark list for observing how issues change in importance over time. It is striking that "End the war in Vietnam" was a specific issue in only 2% of the 292 protests reported in the URC study. Of course, specific campus protest over Vietnam is only one vehicle for registering opinion; certainly more than 2% of the college population favored an immediate end to the Vietnam War by mid-1969. But college opinion appears to have hardened dramatically by mid-1970, which brought in a very short interval the Cambodian Intervention of April, the deaths at Kent State and Jackson State in May, and an immediate wave of campus strikes throughout the United States. A useful, judicious summary of this evolution of campus opinion is to be found in the Report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest, a report which should be on the desk of every law enforcement and criminal justice official who has responsibilities for campus disorders:

On the whole, American students are not as politically radical as some press reports might suggest. Only three years ago, in the spring of 1967, a Gallup poll of college students found that 49 per cent classified themselves as "hawks" on the war in Vietnam. Since that time, there has been a dramatic shift of students' attitudes toward the war. A Gallup poll published in December 1969 found that only 20 per cent of the students classified themselves as "hawks" while 69 per cent classified themselves as "doves." At the same time, 50 per cent--as compared to 64 per cent of the adult public--approved of the way President Nixon was handling the situation in Vietnam.

In 1965, one poll reported that only 6 per cent of American students favored immediate withdrawal from Vietnam. In May 1970, a special Harris survey, commissioned by the American Council on Education and conducted after the Cambodian incursion and the events at Kent State and Jackson State, found that 54 per cent favored an end to the fighting in Vietnam and bringing American troops home as soon as possible.²⁴

Additional findings from this special national survey of college student opinion by the Louis Harris organization are given in Table IV-2, page 328. They confirm that while there is a considerable body of college opinion which believes "basic changes" are needed in the American system, extremist tactics have little widespread appeal. Indeed, on specific issues such as the use of law enforcement agencies on campus and the proper role of the military on campus, "college opinion" is basically "middle of the road" or "conservative." The shift toward radicalism has been minor though vocal: "in 1968, the Harris organization found that 4 per cent of American students identified themselves as 'radical or far left'; by 1970, 11 per cent identified themselves in this way."²⁵

The Harris findings are supported by recent findings from the Gallup Poll. In a late December, 1970 survey, 1,063 students at 61 colleges and universities were interviewed on their opinions toward extremist groups. Of particular interest to the Gallup pollers was whether student opinion differed markedly from that of the "general public" toward these organizations. The basic finding

²⁴The President's Commission on Campus Unrest, Campus Unrest (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 47-48, emphasis added. Appointed by President Nixon in the aftermath of the student deaths at Kent State University, Ohio, and Jackson State College, Mississippi, in May, 1970, this Commission, under the chairmanship of former Governor William W. Scranton of Pennsylvania, closely examined the actions of law enforcement agencies which led to these killings. The report is especially useful for its appraisal of the interacting factors which produced the massive outbreak of disorders and violence on American campuses in mid-1970. If responsible officials have time for only one general treatment of campus disorder--this is the one they should read. For ease in citation later in this chapter, this report will be cited simply as the Scranton Report.

²⁵Ibid., p. 48.

Table IV-2

SOME SELECTED FINDINGS FROM THE SPECIAL HARRIS SURVEY
OF CAMPUS OPINION, CONDUCTED IN MAY, 1970

Source: Report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest
pp. 48-49.

- | |
|---|
| <p>. 1 ON THE USE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES TO DEAL WITH CAMPUS DISORDERS:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">. a 70% agree that "school authorities are right" to call in police when students occupy a building or threaten violence.. b 42% feel that "the National Guard has acted responsibly in most cases" when it has been called onto college campuses--THIS AFTER THE KENT STATE KILLINGS. |
| <p>. 2 ON THE PROPER ROLE OF THE MILITARY ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">. a Only 25% feel that ROTC should be completely removed from campus, while 37% feel that it should be permitted on campus or receive academic credit.. b 72% believe that companies doing defense business should be allowed to recruit on campus. |
| <p>. 3 ON CHANGING THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SYSTEM OR COLLEGE SYSTEM:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">. a 76% believe "basic changes in the system" will be necessary to improve the quality of life in America.. b 44% think social progress in America is more likely to come about through "radical pressure from outside the system" than the actions of established institutions.. c 80% of student respondents' schools experienced protests or demonstrations in May, 1970; at these schools, 75% of the students indicated they favored the goals of the protests and 58% actually protested in the protests.. d But, 68% do not accept violence as an effective means of change.. e Yet, to some extent, tactical extremism is becoming acceptable: 56% disagree with the statement that "since colleges and universities are intended as a place for serious intellectual study and learning, they are too important to our society to be continually disrupted by protests and demonstrations." |

is striking: students and general public are, in most cases, almost equal in holding "Highly Unfavorable" opinions toward extremists. Table IV-3 330, compares the ratings given by students to the ratings given by the "general public" to a number of well known extremist groups.²⁶ The only organization on which students differ markedly from the general public in their opinions is on the Black Panthers: while only 42% of students registered "Highly Unfavorable" opinions toward the Panthers, 75% of the general public was "Highly Unfavorable."

The Gallup survey also provides a striking finding on the self-sustaining appeals of extremism for its own sake among college radicals:

... [A]mong college radicals of both the left and right, there is an apparent appeal in extremism for its own sake, among other factors. For example, a significant proportion of students who describe their political philosophy as far left give a highly favorable rating to the John Birch Society and the KKK. Similarly, a sizeable percentage of students who classify themselves as far right give a highly favorable rating to the SDS, the Weathermen and the Black Panthers.²⁷

This finding suggests a caution to law enforcement and criminal personnel charged with countering extremists on campus: too much attention to the justice issues may be as counterproductive as too little ability to deal with issues. Ultimately, polarization and clash are strong extremist motivations regardless of side. When these lead to violence by extremists attempting to generate self-sustaining chaos, the time for rational discourse has past. Instead, the requirement is for carefully applied, precisely limited tactical force.

In general, the opinion survey findings cited here have enormous practical significance for law enforcement and criminal justice tacticians preparing for campus violence. Among the implications of these findings for law enforcement and criminal justice actions, two practical propositions especially stand out:

²⁶ George Gallup, "Extremist Groups Have Little Appeal among College Students" (Princeton, N. J.: American Institute of Public Opinion, Press Release for Sunday, February 7, 1971).

²⁷ Ibid.

Table IV-3

OPINIONS OF COLLEGE STUDENTS COMPARED WITH OPINIONS OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC, ABOUT A NUMBER OF WELL KNOWN EXTREMIST GROUPS

Source: Gallup Poll, February, 1971

"FAR RIGHT" ORGANIZATIONS		
	Highly Favorable	Highly Unfavorable
<u>John Birch Society</u>		
COLLEGE STUDENTS	2%	48%
GENERAL PUBLIC	4%	38%
<u>Ku Klux Klan</u>		
COLLEGE STUDENTS	2%	80%
GENERAL PUBLIC	3%	76%
"FAR LEFT" ORGANIZATIONS		
	Highly Favorable	Highly Unfavorable
<u>Students for a Democratic Society</u>		
COLLEGE STUDENTS	6%	37%
GENERAL PUBLIC	7%	42%
<u>Black Panthers</u>		
COLLEGE STUDENTS	8%	42%
GENERAL PUBLIC	2%	75%
<u>Weathermen</u>		
COLLEGE STUDENTS	8%	47%
GENERAL PUBLIC	(no data available for comparison)	

.1 While concerned about real grievances and susceptible to mobilization over real issues, collegians basically reject extremist tactics--especially violence--as appropriate vehicles for social change.

.2 Since extremists are a distinct minority and are basically disapproved by collegians (with the possible exception of certain organizations devoted to Black Pride), law enforcement and criminal justice personnel should:

.a Use carefully controlled, low profile responses which will isolate extremists from the large campus majority;

.b Emphasize, through a willingness to meet extremists in rational dialogue at the early stages of confrontation, that they represent the values of the majority of collegians;

.c Avoid any tactical response which can be characterized by moderates as repressive, but at the same time remember that extremists will attempt to characterize every law enforcement response as "repression."

With these practical guidelines about extremists and issues in mind, officials can more precisely gauge the kinds of responses which they should make to situations of campus protest where violence appears likely. How they can do this can be suggested by examining some additional data from the 1969 Urban Research Corporation study. In that study, college protests which were essentially New Left in emphasis were compared with college protests which were Non-New Left; the objective was to determine which issues were likely to surface in New Left protests, compared with Non-New Left protests. Table IV-4 shows this comparison.²⁸

²⁸ Urban Research Corporation, op. cit., p. 19.

Table IV-4

NEW LEFT COMPARED WITH NON-NEW LEFT PROTESTS ON CAMPUS,
BY PERCENTAGE INCIDENCE OF MAJOR ISSUES

Source: 1969 Urban Research Corporation study

Issue (see Table IV-1)	Protests	
	NEW LEFT (N=81)	NON-NEW LEFT* (N=109)
War-related	54%	13%
Student power	42%	52%
Black recognition	33%	25%
University and the community	31%	16%
Quality of student life	17%	30%
Other	17%	7%

*Excluding black-led protests

The most striking finding in Table IV-4 is that when a protest is white New Left controlled (by SDS, Weatherman, or a similar white radical left group), war-related issues are as likely as not to arise; in Non-New Left protests, war-related issues are seldom likely to arise. In contrast, in the Non-New Left protest, issues of student power and the quality of student life are somewhat more likely than in the New Left protest. While student power is important to the New Left, it is more likely for the New Left to be associated with the issue of the university's place in the community. As with the military issue, which looks beyond the campus, the New Left looks beyond the campus on the community issue. The New Left is, finally, slightly more likely to pick up the black recognition issue, although for both major categories of white led protests, black recognition is an issue in a minority of cases. Generally, the New Left is more likely to pick issues which bring the outside world into the university directly; the Non-New Left protests are somewhat more likely to address the university for its own sake.

Looking at Table IV-4 and the previous findings, the law enforcement planner can recognize, first, that when war-related or other "outside" issues are being used to stimulate campus protest and violence, and especially when this is being done by extremists, a majority of the campus is likely to be unfavorably disposed to both the issues and the tactics. Careful work by official agencies can enlist this predisposition, on the side of containing the extremists and limiting potentialities for violence. A necessary starting point is, however, initial recognition by official agencies that they do subscribe to values of reason and restraint. By carefully working to isolate and expose extremists who are using outside issues, police, criminal justice agencies, and college officials can show that the extremist definition of issues is not shared by the campus majority. On the other hand, where Non-New Left issues of student power and quality of student life are being raised, they may well stir a sizable group on campus, and authorities concerned to control the direction of the protest are well advised to respond directly to these issues, emphasizing that responses must be governed by due process for all. In responding to legitimate issues advanced by a significant group on campus, all responsible officials must be constantly alert for attempts to convert these issues into political issues which can be resolved only by making the university a revolutionary political weapon. New Left activists constantly seek to convert legitimate issues of university life into issues of foreign and domestic national policy which cannot be addressed exclusively on campus--thus the New Left emphasis on war-related and community-related issues. A dramatic illustration of near-successful use of this New Left tactic was in the highly destructive Columbia University protest of 1968. The Scranton Report summarizes the basic strategy of the Columbia radicals:

At Columbia, however, the demands of radicals suggested that they viewed the university largely as a political instrument. The goal of the SDS leaders was not to make Columbia more neutral politically and more open intellectually, but rather to transform it into a revolutionary political weapon with which they could attack the system... violence by students was greater at Columbia: considerable property damage was done, and some students forcibly resisted arrest. For their part, the

police reacted to the Columbia disturbances with excessive force and violence of their own.²⁹

Indeed, general signs for police intelligence units that the likelihood of collective violence has increased in a campus protest are:

.1 Sudden attempts to convert university-centered issues into "outside-focused" issues, particularly issues pertaining to war or social change in the community outside the university;

.2 The appearance of New Left activists, who seek to gain control of the channels of university communication preparatory to defining or redefining the salient issues;

.3 Pre-emptive attempts to define law enforcement responses as inherently repressive, before law enforcement agencies have been able to establish a presence;

.4 Claims that the pertinent issues can be resolved only by making the university a force for political change in the larger society;

.5 Multiplication of issues, especially when done by visible activist leaders, in the face of due-process attempts to resolve earlier issues.

The importance of reading the meaning of issues correctly can be demonstrated by a final table from the 1969 Urban Research Corporation study. While overt violence and destruction occurred in probably fewer than one quarter of the 292 protests considered there, there are important differences in the likely incidence of violence, depending on whether race was a factor and the New Left was a factor. Table IV-5, page 335, presents the percentage incidence of major types of violence and destruction in those campus protests during the first half of 1969 where violence occurred.³⁰ The data show that while black-led protests are an important special case with a relatively high likelihood of violence, the really dangerous situation occurs when New Left issues are injected into a protest

²⁹Scranton Report, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

³⁰Urban Research Corporation, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

Table IV-5.

PERCENTAGE INCIDENCE OF MAJOR TYPES OF VIOLENCE AND DESTRUCTION IN VIOLENT CAMPUS PROTESTS, BY GROUP AND ISSUES INVOLVED

Source: 1969 Urban Research Corporation study

Group and/or Issues	Serious injuries	Bombings, fires, other destruction	Police use of clubs or Mace	Percent of all protests in which violence occurred
Black schools	18%	35%	18%	41%
Blacks at other schools	4%	19%	6%	22%
Mixed - no New Left	8%	16%	20%	20%
Mixed - New Left	35%	52%	17%	61%
Whites - New Left	5%	16%	9%	24%
Whites - no New Left	1%	8%	4%	10%
Total - all protests	7%	19%	9%	23%

(The number in each of these categories is small)

situation mobilizing both whites and blacks. In that situation, violence occurred in 61% of the cases. In sharp contrast, violence occurred in only 10% of the protests which were exclusively white and in which there were no New Left issues.

Several summary conclusions can now be drawn for those responsible for police planning and police tactics in campus protests where violence is latent, imminent, or occurring:

.1 Issues are to be treated with the outmost seriousness. They will be the basis for many protests, and to contain the protest, officials must move to deal directly with them.

.2 Specific issues are likely to be associated with specific:

- .a Protest tactics;
- .b Probabilities of violence and risk;
- .c Degrees of support from the majority of the student body.

... 3 By working to support academic officials in their efforts to respond via due process to legitimate majority issues and to isolate activists who are using generally disapproved extremist tactics to advance minority issues, police and criminal justice officials can deflect attempts to characterize them as repressive forces which must be met with violence in a situation of polarized conflict.

.4 To accomplish this basic tactical objective, police must maintain comprehensive and sensitive awareness of:

- .a What issues are currently important on a particular campus;
- .b Who is identified with these issues;
- .c What themes in the issues lend the issues to redirection by minority elements working to create violent confrontation.

Types of College and University

The role of the good student in protest. A favorite theme among analysts of campus protest is that since issues are so important, it is the "better" colleges and universities that are more likely to be arenas for protest. It takes good, alert students on lively campuses--so the argument goes--to spark effective, sustained protests. By implication, then, the real trouble spots will be those "select private" colleges and universities, filled with high-quality liberal arts students who are engaged in pre-professional studies and who form a continuing constituency ready to seize and articulate issues.

The general theme that good students on the top campuses have been important inciters and sustainers of campus protest emerged clearly for the first time in studies of the Free Speech Movement protest at the University of California in Berkeley in 1964. The FSM protest at Berkeley marked the definitive beginning of the campus movement toward protests and violence which came to characterize the late 1960's, and even in 1964, sensitive observers of the college scene recognized the potential significance of the Berkeley events. To learn more about what was happening, therefore, social scientists from Berkeley studied what was happening right on their own campus. In early November, 1964, the Berkeley

sociologist Robert Somers directed an intensive interview study of 285 students drawn to represent the whole student body--whose Fall Semester enrollment was then 27,431. Somers found:

... [I]n our sample there is a strong relation between academic achievement and support for the demonstrators. Among those who reported to our interviewers a grade point average of B or better, nearly half (45 per cent) are militants, and only a tenth are conservatives. At the other end, over a third of those with an average of B- or less are conservatives, and only 15 per cent are militants. Thus, even if one disposes of the whole Free Speech Movement as representing only a minority of the campus, the group sloughed off is a minority vital to the excellence of this university.³¹

In a footnote, Somers also comments:

These results accord with a survey by several political science graduate students of the 800 students arrested in the Sproul Hall sit-in of December 3, [1964] which found that half of the arrested undergraduates had an academic average of B or above while the graduate students' records were even better. Twenty of the students were Phi Beta Kappa, eight Woodrow Wilson Fellows, and so on. Incidentally, this report also suggests that less than 5 per cent of the arrested students belong to radical political groups (Socialist clubs, etc.), and that the major common bond was membership (of about one fourth of them) in civil-rights organizations, a theme which receives strong support in our survey.³²

But it is activism as such which draws the better students; while leftwing activism may be currently fashionable, the better students may be either left-wing or right-wing (or, indeed, not political) in their activism because they tend to be more "involved." Involvement and activism, taken as impulses alone, do not necessarily dictate left-wing or right-wing tendencies. Lipset sums this up well:

³¹Robert H. Somers, "The Mainsprings of the Rebellion: A Survey of Berkeley Students in November, 1964," in Seymour Martin Lipset and Sheldon S. Wolin (eds.), The Berkeley Student Revolt: Facts and Interpretations (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company Anchor Books, 1965), p. 544.

³²Ibid.

In evaluating the growing body of research on the characteristics of leftist activists by psychologists, it is also important to note whether these activists are being compared with other activists or, as often is done, with data from the bulk of the student population, that is, the passive majority. Leftist activists should properly be compared with conservative activists, and with those involved in nonpolitical forms of campus activity. The limited efforts in these directions indicate that some of the characteristics which have been identified as those of leftist activists, such as greater intelligence, characterize the involved generally. Both leftist and conservative activists, as well as moderates involved in student government, are drawn from the ranks of the academically talented in the United States.³³

Law enforcement and criminal justice planners need to consider Lipset's summation carefully. On the tactical level--those legitimate student activists with whom law enforcement and criminal justice agencies come into contact on campus are likely to be intelligent, sophisticated individuals, who will be quick to spot signs of condescension or manipulation. It will be particularly important to avoid such intended or unintended signs toward moderate students or student government figures, who can quickly be driven into unwilling support of radical activists by official failures to approach them as intelligent adults who are intelligently concerned about real issues.

On the strategic and planning level--the general finding that the superior students are more likely to be activists has great importance in suggesting the proper focus of efforts to anticipate and limit the location of future outbursts of campus disorder or collective violence. Although leadership for the campus activism of the 1960's did come from a number of high prestige campuses, of which Berkeley, Columbia, Harvard, Chicago, and Brandeis are perhaps most noteworthy, it is misleading to say that the prestige campuses will be the center of activism, disorder, and violence in the future--though they may well be. The important point is that anywhere there are students of good quality who can become

³³Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Activists: A Profile," in Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol (eds.), Confrontation: The Student Rebellion and the Universities (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1969), pp. 56-57, emphasis in original.

involved in issues, either through their own impulses or under stimulation from outsiders, there are real possibilities of activism and disorder.

Unfortunately, the ability of students at the most select colleges and universities to express their own experiences for themselves has tended to define campus activism as distinctively a feature and a problem of certain elite campuses. Thus the confrontation and killing at relatively unprestigious Kent State University in Ohio came as a special shock and special tragedy. Almost before the Harvard Confrontation of April, 1969 was over, student authors were beginning books, in which they chronicled the events which ultimately sent a large tactical police force into University Hall to break the sit-in there. Within a relatively short time after peace had come back to Harvard, the book manuscripts had become hardbacks and paperbacks, distributed by major national publishers.³⁴ Yet no one had been killed at Harvard. In sharp contrast, it took outsiders in the form of a Presidential Commission³⁵ and a celebrated author³⁶ to chronicle the Kent State tragedy in which four died, a tragedy which accelerated protests and strikes on over seven hundred campuses. Little comparable to the Harvard books came out of Kent.

³⁴Two of the better ones are:

Steven Kelman, Push Comes to Shove: The Escalation of Student Protest (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970). Kelman was in his junior year during the great confrontation and finished the book during his senior year.

Lawrence E. Eichel, Kenneth W. Jost, Robert D. Luskin, and Richard M. Neustadt, The Harvard Strike (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970). All four were staffers of Harvard student radio station WHRB.

³⁵Scranton Report, op. cit.

³⁶James A. Michener, Kent State: What Happened and Why (New York: Random House, 1971). The book jacket aims to capture the special horror of Kent, what distinguished it from the "Ivy," the "prestige" campuses: "This could be your university. The students and National Guardsmen could be you, or young people of your neighborhood, or, if you are old enough, your sons and daughters. The city of Kent could be your community. That is why you need to know what happened to you, so that you can prevent it from happening again."

Of great interest to scientific analysts of campus violence would be a systematic study, over several years, of the styles and trends in campus disorders, according to whether these disorders hit "more prestigious" versus "less prestigious" campuses, "larger" versus "smaller" campuses, and "public" versus "private" campuses. Of even greater interest to law enforcement and criminal justice officials would be carefully compared case studies of ongoing incidents and their resolution, including each of these types of campus, so that more could be known about the actual processes which lead to self-sustaining disorders, and so that more could be systematically known about what tactics succeeded and failed in containing disruption. Unfortunately, there is much less of this information presently available than there is information about the various ideological and structural issues which campuses experienced. On the issues themselves, there has been a veritable avalanche of books--which is what might be expected from articulate academics writing about matters which affect them deeply. And these writings tend to emanate from the most distinguished schools--which may or may not have suffered most from campus violence.

It is necessary to assume, however, that in the future, law enforcement and criminal justice agencies will continue to be confronted with possibilities for disorder and violence on a broad range of campuses. In spite of the widely noted lull in campus activism during the 1970-1971 school year,³⁷ attention must still be directed to the variety of campus settings in which future problems can arise. Keeping in mind that capable, involved students appear indispensable to mounting a sustained campaign of protest, and that these students can exist on a variety of campuses, what are the basic types of colleges and universities to which official agencies should be attentive?

³⁷Many reports of this lull are impressionistic and informal, and tend to be about certain especially select schools. Typical of these reports is the feature story in the Wall Street Journal for February 10, 1971 (Vol. CXXXVII, No. 28), pp. 1 and 13, titled "Turning Inward: Campuses Calm Down as Apathy, Cynicism Replace the Activism; Establishment and Radicals Turn Off Oberlin Youths; But Crafts Center Blooms," and containing this appraisal:

"The radical movement is disorganized. The campus is almost somber. We've had only one bomb threat," Columbia's new

"College" versus "university." In everyday American usage, "college" or "college student" is often used to lump together students who attend quite different kinds of higher educational institution. In strict usage, "college" is a higher educational institution which usually offers only a Bachelor's degree--the "first degree" in "arts" or "sciences." Four years of college attendance are required to attain this degree, after which the student may continue his education toward the higher Master's or Doctor's degree. While some colleges offer Master's degree programs in departments where they are especially strong, and some may even have small graduate schools attached (as does, for example,

(Footnote 37, continued)

president, William J. McGill, said last month. A recent poll of 1,030 students at 43 campuses across the nation found 66% said their school was "more calm" than a year earlier, 23% said "about the same," and only 4% said "less calm." p. 1.

...

...[At Oberlin] [t]he decline of interest in group activism pains Tom Ricketts, the student senate president. The senate has led the movements for a number of major changes at Oberlin in recent years, and Tom thinks it still has a lot to do. This fall, one senator resigned, calling it "an irrelevant institution," and another followed suit when he couldn't fulfill his campaign pledge--to persuade the senate to abolish itself.

"No one wants to get involved with any organization where there's a possibility of being sold out," says Tom. "The student body won't work with you. It resolutely stays uninformed, so you are constantly suspected of selling out. It makes my job almost a mockery."

The apparent successor to politics at Oberlin is what's known as "the counter-culture," a loose assortment of individually oriented activities built around the themes of understanding one's inner emotions, rejecting society's standards and finding things to do outside the "establishment."

Thus, two dozen students spent January living on an Israeli kibbutz, while others visited U.S. communes. In Wilder Hall, the student union, a student-run "other placement office" is helping alienated undergraduates find alternatives to the usual range of job opportunities and living situations--communes for the dropouts, draft counseling jobs for the activists.

p. 13.

Dartmouth), the distinctive feature of the "college" is that most of its students are studying for the four-year Bachelor's degree, right after high school or some intervening break from education.

On the other hand, a "university" has both Bachelor's degree and higher degree programs in arts and sciences, has, in addition, major professional schools such as Law, Medicine, and Theology, each of which gives higher professional degrees equivalent to Master's or Doctoral attainment, and generally emphasizes graduate and professional instruction over undergraduate instruction for the Bachelor's degree. The size and variety of university offerings usually require a number of major divisions and schools or colleges, each of which has the status of a semi-independent college within the total university. In some very large state university systems, where there are many university-sized campuses within the total system, each campus may be in charge of a Chancellor or presidential official or equivalent title, who administers most affairs there.

Universities may provide for education of undergraduates in a number of ways, most generally by placing them in a separate college. In the older universities, the college may have been there first, before the university idea was imported from Germany in the Nineteenth Century. For example, Harvard College, which styles itself a "university college" was founded two centuries before the great graduate faculties of the University brought more graduate than undergraduate students to Cambridge, Massachusetts. A contrasting case is Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, which was modeled on the German university ideal and devoted from its founding largely to excellence in graduate and professional education, with relatively low priority placed on traditional "college" undergraduate instruction.

These differences in what colleges and universities do significantly influence the situations law enforcement personnel will find on the different campuses. In general, colleges will be smaller, physically more compact, with a younger, more homogeneous population. They may be quick to arouse, but quick to cool. The university will be larger, with a more varied population, with many older and highly sophisticated students, and with many special issues and grievances which

reflect the university's size. Physically often as large as small cities, universities can present physical tactical problems of intelligence, command-control, and logistics which are equivalent to a small military operation--but in an emotional atmosphere which makes overt military displays and styles immediately inflammatory. While the issues which stir a university can be abstract and intellectual, the very size of some universities provides activists with concrete issues which can arouse even normally placid, passive students. Heavy-handed allocation of parking spaces and enforcement of parking regulations can be one such issue in a big commuter university.

Private colleges and private universities. Although data presented earlier in this chapter show that the American college population is increasingly attending publicly supported colleges and universities, privately supported colleges and universities remain a distinctive force in American higher education. Indeed, "the small private college sitting on a hill" has been one of America's special contributions to education. Founded often by religious groups or through benefactions from a private mercantile estate, the private colleges followed America's Westward movement, to become local sources of professional men and of individuals who would continue to found the small private colleges. As endowments grew and circumstances changed, colleges originally founded under religious auspices--such as Harvard College, Yale College, Princeton College, and King's College (later Columbia University)--became the centers of great private universities, from which universities such as Stanford in California and Cornell in New York could draw their inspiration.

Independence from public funds, legislative charters granting relative independence from political controls, and traditions of church and secular academic values stimulated many of the private colleges and universities to view themselves as special reservoirs of excellence. The tradition of excellence and independence--even when unmerited in the case of some particular private colleges--did much to determine the responses private institutions of higher education would make to the possibilities for campus disorder and violence which opened in the 1960's. Looking at the whole pattern of campus disorder in the 1960's--it appears

that many private colleges and private universities were involved surprisingly late.

Part of the answer for this apparent lag is that many private schools already had strong traditions of dissent and controversy which effectively blunted the initial impulse toward nation-wide campus activism. Some colleges, notably institutions such as Antioch, Reed, and Swarthmore Colleges, have had long traditions of intense concern about matters on and off campus; indeed, what makes campuses such as these attractive to students is in part, that from the perspective of the late 1960's and early 1970's, these colleges appear to have devoted most of their institutional lives to supporting controversy, activism, and lively inquiry.³⁸ These traditions were of direct aid in meeting contemporary currents. While Swarthmore was not spared its black student protest,³⁹ substantially before larger universities such as Harvard had faced the unavoidable demands for student roles in university decision-making, little Swarthmore had produced a major self-study of all phases of its campus life.⁴⁰ The attitude of this self-study is reflected in the reasons given for examining "student rights":

We felt, further, that the current disputes about "social rules" and "student rights" on our campus and many others suffer because they are based on assumptions and premises that trustees, administrators, faculty members, and students have not examined together. Arguments focus on particulars of

³⁸ A useful analytic treatment of such private colleges is Burton R. Clark, The Distinctive College: Antioch, Reed, and Swarthmore (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1970). Everett L. Hunt, former Dean at Swarthmore, puts current uproars in the perspective of the forces which have always made Swarthmore lively, in The Revolt of the College Intellectual (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1963). Dean Hunt writes about matters which had surfaced at Swarthmore years before the fashionable activism of the late 1960's.

³⁹ Which, incidentally, partially backfired because at its height, President Courtney Smith died of heart attack in his office. It was widely interpreted that this death had been precipitated by overwork due to the protest crisis.

⁴⁰ Swarthmore College, Commission on Educational Policy, Special Committee on Library Policy, and Special Committee on Student Life, Critique of a College (Swarthmore, Pa.: Swarthmore College, November, 1967), 461 pp. +.

behavior, when what we all need is rather to consider and clarify our basic assumptions about the extent of a college's responsibility for student behavior, and our assumptions about the bases for standards of behavior.⁴¹

Publication of this study was an event which caused the college to take a number of days off, so that all could sit and engage in earnest dialogue on its meanings. Certainly, police departments in not only Swarthmore but in other towns and cities where such independently vigorous colleges exist have long since learned to anticipate and expect major controversial incidents which involve law enforcement and criminal justice agencies. But it should not be overlooked that on campuses where traditions of dissent and inquiry do exist, momentary pressures to respond violently to issues and activists come as less of a sudden shock demanding immediate, ill-considered response. On campuses such as those at Antioch, Oberlin, Reed, and Swarthmore, a typical reaction may be to look skeptically and critically at who is demanding what--and then to start an argument to find out more about what is happening. Admittedly, schools such as these small, intellectual private colleges are a minority, even in the private sector of higher education. Yet they embody, in intense form, the values which--other things being equal--appear to make the private institution relatively less vulnerable than certain public institutions to sudden pressures toward violent disorder.

Public colleges and universities. An increasing majority of American college students are in institutions supported from public funds which come from tax revenues, legislative grants and appropriations, and income from land or other interest-earning endowments. These publicly supported institutions include major state university systems (of which those in California and New York are most noteworthy), individual state universities or colleges of arts, sciences, and technology, and a rapidly increasing number of publicly supported "community" and "junior" colleges. In contrast with the private colleges and universities, the publicly supported institutions are increasingly devoted to the idea that all qualified individuals have the right to a college education at minimum expense. What

⁴¹ Ibid., p. vi, emphasis added.

this means in practical terms is that many state universities became gigantic in the 1960's. It has been noted earlier in this chapter that over 27,000 students were enrolled on the Berkeley campus of the University of California at the time of the Free Speech Movement in 1964. This was just on the Berkeley campus; at the time of the FSM, there were seven other major university campuses in the university component of the California system of public higher education. Taken together, the eight campuses enrolled nearly 100,000 university students. In the future, larger states may expect enrollments of between 100 and 200,000 students in their statewide systems.

By themselves, major state university campuses outside the most populous states can easily enroll in excess of 20,000 students. And "commuter campuses" such as California State College at Long Beach can expect to have 10,000 students come and go each day--many of them by car.

Size alone does not necessarily dictate that a campus will experience "violence." But size, particularly when it requires rapid processing of large numbers of quite different people with quite different backgrounds and aspirations, can intensify feelings of young adults that they are adrift in a massive, impersonal system. If, indeed, classes number in the hundreds, senior faculty are inaccessible, the administration is swamped in its attempt to govern, and students live in essentially ghetto communities which are viewed with suspicion by the average taxpayer--the classic conditions for a mass protest movement have been created.⁴²

The problem of student expectations. For most individuals not directly involved in college life, these and other factors which have been raised to "explain" incidents of campus unrest may appear to benefit from hindsight. After all, only a minority of campuses experienced major unrest and violence during the late 1960's.⁴³ Why didn't the various political, sociological, and psychological

⁴²An excellent summary overview of these and related problems is to be found in the Scranton Report, op. cit., Ch. II, "The Causes of Student Protest," pp. 51-89.

⁴³There is urgent need for much more accurate and comprehensive data on unfolding campus incidents than now appears to exist. But available data and

factors which are such favorites of interpreters of the American college scene work more generally, to produce more widespread difficulties? And even if such factors were operative, how can they help law enforcement and criminal justice agencies more precisely anticipate specific incidents, about which they should be planning now? Were the various serious outbursts which did occur basically tactical accidents, which more perceptive tactics would have more quickly contained?

Before looking in Part II of this chapter at some particular tactical considerations which might guide approaches to campus violence, it is useful to try to sum up just how relatively general factors can work to create particular situations which are inherently difficult for official agencies to address on campus. An appreciation of how these quite general factors can work must be based on an awareness of how colleges differ, and what these differences can do to individuals. This appreciation can, in turn, suggest how certain campuses are vulnerable to events which lead to violence, and what understandings officials need to have about how these vulnerabilities are created and enhanced.

From the perspective of hindsight--but using the studies which have been done in the aftermath of disorder and tragedy--one sharp fact appears to emerge

(Footnote 43, continued) interpretations support the statement that while protests and mild disorders did flourish briefly during May, 1970, major incidents of violence were in the minority.

Student protest in 1969 was not, in general, characterized by violence. There were two deaths (in different protests) and injuries occurred in 22 protests (7% of all protests).

In 19 percent of the protests, damage from bombings and fires occurred.

Urban Research Corporation, op. cit., p. 25.

[In May, 1970] overall, violence by protestors was limited. University opposition to the combined issues of Cambodia, Kent State, and Jackson State had become so widespread that moderate protestors far outnumbered extremists, and the vast majority of protests remained peaceful. While nearly 30 per cent of U.S. campuses were involved in some degree of strike activity, only 5 per cent experienced violence.

Scranton Report, op. cit., p. 45.

if attention is directed systematically to those campuses where critical events occurred to give shape to American college protest. Berkeley in 1964, San Francisco State in 1968, Columbia in 1968, and Kent State in 1970 all appear to be campuses where a majority image of "what the campus is like" was subject to sudden challenge and demonstrated quickly to be, in important ways, not true to the reality being asserted by activists or by events. Expressed in less rigorous language--what members of a college thought their college was or could be was not what the college revealed itself to be. The discovery of this immediately created a large number of people who were available for mobilization by activists, or who were at least unable to resist pressures toward activism, disorder, violence, or despair.

Of central importance is the way in which the college turned out to be not what the members of its community thought it to be. Looking back on the events at at least these four critical campuses, it appears that at least significant numbers on the campus of each school

had high expectations and optimistic assumptions about what was happening on their campus, and that these positive attitudes were sharply, meaningfully, and unavoidably disappointed by events surrounding the crucial protest.

In short, prior expectations and subsequent events were in such sharp and compelling conflict that individuals experienced clearcut disaffection, disorientation, and disillusionment which directly weakened the institutional solidarity of the university community.

Unfortunately, this is as much an interpretation based on the whole record as it is an interpretation based on recorded public opinion data systematically gathered in university communities. Yet there is evidence of various sorts to support this interpretation, which, if it is true, has important lessons for those who must officially plan to deal with campus disorders. In considering this interpretation, it is important to look, first, at Berkeley. On some campuses throughout the United States, it is difficult to conceive of anything which should shake students from their apathy. But Berkeley is and has been in that select

group of campuses where a great faculty, a varied yet selected student body of capable people, a physically beautiful campus, and a lively surrounding town come together to produce one of the most distinguished universities in the world. Berkeley's great quality is the heart of its problem. Although faculty and students at Berkeley identify themselves with the best private American universities, such as Harvard, Yale, and Stanford, Berkeley is a state university, supported in significant part by public monies from the people of California. With increasing numbers of volatile students, Berkeley experienced a major "free speech strike" in 1934--thirty years before the FSM outbreak of 1964.⁴⁴ Increasingly, Berkeley was becoming known as containing "reds"--a matter galling to at least some taxpayers. With a vigorous faculty ready to fight incursions of academic freedom, Berkeley could and did fight for complete academic freedom, but the tension between demands for campus freedom and requirements for sensitivity to the political climate in California always remained. Conflict was always just below the surface.

From this historical background, the 1964 Free Speech Movement protest erupted over a relatively minor issue: the Dean of Students' barring tables for distributing off-campus political literature from a twenty-six foot strip of university property near the most heavily used university entrance.⁴⁵ This event triggered the unfolding crisis, in which the administration was trapped between the political leaders and the citizenry of California on the one hand and the students and the faculty, in varying combinations, on the other. The gravity of the crisis is indicated by the fact that while 83% of the student body said they agreed with the goals of the FSM protest,⁴⁶ 55% of the California citizens polled at the time said

⁴⁴C. Michael Otten, University Authority and the Student: The Berkeley Experience (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 110-112. The subsequent discussion of this paragraph also draws upon this scholarly analysis of Berkeley's continuing problem with managing the demands of freedom and the demands of authority.

⁴⁵See the account given by Editors of California Monthly, "Chronology of Events: Three Months of Crisis," in Lipset and Wolin (eds.), op. cit., pp. 99-199.

⁴⁶Otten, op. cit., p. 179. See also his balanced discussion, pp. 59-188.

the "disapproved strongly" of the student protest movement, while an additional 19% indicated they "disapproved somewhat."⁴⁷ This sharp cleavage between students' perceptions and outside citizens' perceptions of what was happening was well known on the Berkeley campus. It was one of the inescapable signs that Berkeley was, after all, not only not free from public pressures, but in great danger of being restricted by the public and political leadership of California-- in sharp contrast to the proud assumption that Berkeley was the "Harvard of the West." In this atmosphere, the FSM activists sustained a major institutional attack on the university which lasted for over three months, in which the administration was unable to deal with the basic conflict between the university's professed ideals of freedom and the demands of outside society for authority and order. After initial resolution of months of protest had been achieved, University President Clark Kerr was fired by the Regents.

A similar basic situation existed at San Francisco State College, where student strikes and repeated allegations of police violence created national headlines during the Fall and Winter of 1968-1969. With 18,000 students at the time of its troubles, San Francisco State was hardly a college; it was, in reality, a university, with widely known programs in the creative arts, the first Black Student Union (BSU) in the country, and a sophisticated, ethnically diverse population.⁴⁸ Yet its mechanisms of authority were weak and vulnerable. The College had had seven Presidents in the eight-year period which ended in 1968. Committed to a rigid form of line-item budgeting, the campus had no flexibility for shifting funds to meet crash needs. This limitation on the positive initiatives which could be taken was reinforced by the weakness of the few negative sanctions that were available for dealing with increasingly sophisticated, aggressive students:

⁴⁷ From the reputable California Poll, as reported by Mervin C. Field, "The UC Student Protests: California Poll," in Lipset and Wolin (eds.), op. cit., p. 199.

⁴⁸ William H. Orrick, Jr., Shut It Down! A College in Crisis: San Francisco State College: October, 1968 - April, 1969 (Washington: National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Staff Report, June, 1969), pp. 2-4. The following brief account of the San Francisco State situation is drawn from this report.

systematic disciplinary procedures for dealing with student activists had to be evolved for the first time during the wave of strikes which began in late 1968. Thus, when well organized black students of the Black Student Union sought to disrupt classes, lead a wave of student strikes, and directly intervene in faculty and administration personnel matters, there was little institutional base for effectively dealing with them. S. I. Hayakawa, the famed scholar who, as Acting President, finally stopped the administrative rout and set up countervailing forces to both SDS and Black activists on campus, was virtually forced to build a power base outside the campus, through the media, before he could effectively deal with the situation on campus.

The chaotic situation at San Francisco State offered many opportunities for individual and collective acts of guerrilla warfare against college authorities. These acts ranged from sudden outbreaks of trashbasket fires and the ripping out of phone lines to invasion and assaults on classrooms and wild melees with the police who were periodically called to the campus. Typical of these melees in which classic police-student escalation occurred is the following:

At noon the Black Students Union held a press conference beside the BSU headquarters, a cramped area of the campus dotted with one-story huts used by the student government and student groups such as the BSU and the experimental college.

At the press conference, George Murray told his audience that the strike and its accompanying disruption marked a "very historic" moment. "It's the first time that barriers have been dissolved between classes--between black, brown, yellow and red people," Murray said.

"You can tell every racist pig in the world, including Richard Milhous Nixon, that we're not going to negotiate until the demands are met."

As the press conference was breaking up, a nine-man unit of the San Francisco Police Department tactical squad appeared at the other side of the BSU hut. To students, it appeared that the police were there to intimidate and harass strikers.

The police had come to the area because of a report of a beating of a television cameraman. The cameraman told police that he was photographing two Negroes, "one of them with a suspicious-looking lump in his pocket," when he was

jumped from behind by "a big black." The cameraman said he was knocked down and kicked in the back, then he rolled over and filmed the black man running away.

He mentioned the incident to a campus policeman who suggested that he make a report to one of the tactical-squad officers in a nearby building. The cameraman did so and said he thought he could identify his assailant. The police sent two plainclothesmen to accompany the cameraman to the student hut area. As they neared the area, the cameraman decided that he was unable to pick out the black who had attacked him.

At this point, explained tactical squad commander Lt. James Curran, his men lost radio contact with the plainclothesmen. Fearing the plainclothesmen were endangered, the uniformed squad marched to the area. The students knew nothing of this, and felt they were being attacked or at least harassed by police. And the melee was on.

The tactical squad and its reinforcements felt they were surrounded and under attack, and they fought back. It is impossible to re-create precisely how the battle began. To the students it seemed that the tactical squad suddenly appeared and seized and clubbed Nesbitt Crutchfield, a BSU member.⁴⁹

Needless to say, such an atmosphere on campus presented students daily with the most intensely felt disparity between what they felt the college should have been and claimed to be, and what it actually was. Black activists particularly exploited the seeming ineptitude and hypocrisy of campus authorities, in order to mount a sustained campaign of violence and disorder in support of increased black student admissions and an expanded program of black studies. The black strategy is instructive: blacks were successful in bringing more blacks to the campus and in enhancing black studies programs not because there were few blacks and minorities on campus, but, probably, because San Francisco State was already one of the most ethnically diverse campuses in the country. Because of this, the need for expanded educational opportunities for minorities was already understood and accepted. When the administration failed to move quickly enough to satisfy activists, and when it revealed itself unable to deal effectively and quickly with them, the way was open for an escalating campaign to demonstrate to all that the College was not living up to its obligations.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 42.

Although a private university, Columbia in New York City was caught in a trap somewhat like that at San Francisco State. Located in upper Manhattan in a deteriorating area next to Spanish Harlem, Columbia had been forced to look at its nearby properties for construction of a gymnasium. Although various arrangements could have been made for meeting the needs of low income residents in the neighborhoods which would have been affected by this expansion, radical student leadership at Columbia successfully defined the gymnasium issue as one which would deprive poor people of their rights. The way had been left open to do this partly because here as in other matters, a university administration already somewhat removed and aloof had largely controlled all aspects of the gymnasium planning. Now Students for a Democratic Society and other radical activists could portray the university as insensitive to the needs of its neighbors, and link this alleged insensitivity with the university's support of targets hated by the SDS, particularly the Institute for Defense Analyses, a multi-university organization primarily devoted to advanced research for the U.S. Department of Defense. As activists escalated their protests, President Kirk was personally abused with vulgar language--without response from an administration shown to be conservative on disciplinary matters--and during April, 1968, central university buildings were barricaded and occupied by student strikers for a number of days.

By the time police finally were called in to clear buildings and then the campus, the conflict situation, enhanced by uncertainties created by all participants, guaranteed the collective violence which ensued. The official Columbia report summarizes what happened.⁵⁰

There was great violence. Given the conditions on the campus, violence was unavoidable. The expectation that the campus would be relatively quiet, a hope shared by police and University officials, proved utterly false; since afternoon everyone had known that the "bust" was imminent. Outside the buildings were hundreds of strike sympathizers, many resentful of the presence of police upon any academic campus. In addition, AHFG [Ad Hoc Faculty Group] members of the faculty had

⁵⁰ Fact-finding Commission Appointed to Investigate the Disturbances at Columbia University, Crisis at Columbia (New York: Random House Vintage Books, 1968), pp. 140-142. This, the report of the "Cox Commission," is the best convenient source on what happened at Columbia.

pledged themselves, on Thursday, to "stand before the occupied buildings to prevent forcible entry by police" and, on Sunday, according to one interpretation, to "take all measures within our several consciences to prevent the use of force to vacate these buildings." It would be surprising if there were not also trouble-makers in the throng.

...

At each of the buildings a University representative directed the occupants to evacuate the premises. Everyone who wished was given ample opportunity to leave. Hamilton Hall was cleared without violence. One unit of police went through the tunnels about 2:20 A.M. while another shouldered aside some faculty members and forced open the main door. The black students inside made no resistance. They walked, as directed, in the presence of their legal counsel, through the tunnels under Hamilton Hall out to waiting police buses on Amsterdam Avenue. Eighty-six students were arrested in Hamilton Hall.

Low Library was the next building to be cleared. Police used more force here than at Hamilton Hall in breaking the faculty cordon. Inside, the students had decided to resist passively by linking arms and "going limp" when seized. After asking the group through a bullhorn to walk out willingly, the police began to drag individuals away. Some were clubbed.

At Avery Hall, the police again met resistance and responded with force. A combined force of plainclothesmen and uniformed patrolmen entered the building around three o'clock and dragged or carried out the occupants. There were 42 arrests inside Avery Hall.

About 3:15 A.M. the police approached Fayerweather Hall where students and faculty ringed the entrances. Again using force, the police gained access by the north entrance. Later they secured the south entrance as well. Occupants of Fayerweather had reached no collective decision on resistance. Some cooperated and left the buildings voluntarily. Some went limp; others linked arms. Two hundred and sixty-eight persons were arrested in Fayerweather Hall.

Mathematics was the last police objective. Helmeted officers began work on the barricade at about 3:40 A.M. and entered the building at 4:00 A.M. The students inside had wet the stairs with soap and water to make them hazardous for the police; as the barricade fell, some students also locked arms. Less violence seems to have occurred here than elsewhere. There were 203 arrests.

Neither the police activity nor the violence was limited to the occupied buildings, all of which are north of College Walk. The original plan had called for removing the arrested occupants from the campus through the side gates near each building, but when the police found the numbers much greater than anticipated they brought police vans onto College Walk. When the vans proved provocative, an order to clear South Field was given by unidentified police officers. Unknown to the police, the only exit gates south of College Walk were closed and locked, as had been the case all week in order to limit access to the troubled campus. It seems to have been in this part of the operation that the worst brutality occurred.

Our bare, conclusory account describes neither the violence, nor the emotional storm, nor the physical injuries. Yet the hospital records tell a good deal. Sixteen persons sought treatment at Knickerbocker Hospital; 15 were students and one a patrolman. Knickerbocker's ambulance made more than a dozen round trips. Eighty-seven persons, bringing the total to 103, obtained treatment at St. Luke's. Eight were faculty or staff; 62 were graduate or undergraduate students (including five from Barnard); and 13 were New York City Police. The character of injuries ranged from heavy bruises and scalp lacerations to sprains and severe fright. Two fractures are listed. One student was held at St. Luke's and three were admitted to the Columbia infirmary. The rest were discharged.

The arrest statistics go far to dispel the suggestion that the demonstration was the work of "outside agitators" or a small band of Columbia radicals bent upon revolution. There were 692 arrests in the five buildings. Five hundred and twenty-four, or 75 percent, were Columbia students. At least 25 more, or another 3.6 percent, were Columbia alumni. The others appear to have been mostly students from other universities, but there were a few residents of the neighborhood in buildings other than Hamilton Hall. The following figures give a rough idea of the proportion of the student body involved from different parts of the university.

School or Division	Number of Students	Percentage of its Enrollment
Architecture	250	9.73 percent
College	2750	8.79 "
Barnard	2740	6.01 "
General Studies	3000	2.32 "
Graduate Faculties	4000	1.92 "

The proportion of students arrested from other schools (such as the law school) was less than in the cases listed above.

Clearly, Columbia students had been successfully enlisted in a protest directed against a university administration which had been portrayed as departing in practice and procedure from what many believed the university ought to be. Shortly after the calming of the campus, President Grayson Kirk resigned.

In examining both Berkeley and Columbia as the critical outbursts they were, the Scranton Commission characterized Berkeley as the Invention, and Columbia as the Expansion. The Scranton Commission observed that the Berkeley Invention was a scenario "which contained the following elements":

The Berkeley Invention, 1964⁵¹

- .1 The protest was initiated by a small group of student activists. As the protest proceeded, the most radical students assumed leadership.
- .2 The issue was in fact a dual issue, combining on-campus and off-campus matters. At one level, it was a civil liberties issue, involving intense feelings and high moral values. But at a second level, it was a university issue, for it raised the question of what kinds of political activity would be permissible on campus. The FSM itself did not attack off-campus foes of civil liberties and free speech. Neither did it attack those who discriminated against blacks or prevented them from voting. Its target was instead a liberal university administration, which it cast--which had cast itself--in a repressive role.

This combination of major social and political issues with local university issues turned out to be extremely difficult for a university administration to deal with. For although administrators were faced with a specific, university-related demand--one which was within their power to grant--the demand was put forward with a fervor and moral intensity aroused by a transcendent social cause that was not within their jurisdiction. Yielding to the protestors' university-related demand--the right to organize on campus--could never entirely dispel their underlying fervor and discontent.

- .3 The activists introduced into campus protest new tactics that disrupted the university and denied others their fundamental civil liberties. These tactics included blocking of university

⁵¹Scranton Report, op. cit., pp. 25-28. For ease of reading, the major paragraphs have been numbered and certain emphases added.

officials carrying out their duties, harassing of university officials, and sit-ins in university buildings. The origin of these tactics, which had not been used by radical groups on campus before, was the civil rights movement, in which several FSM leaders had taken part. These tactics required some university response. At Berkeley, the administration chose to call in the police.

The administration's response to disruption was decisive in determining what would follow. At Berkeley, the police intervention was interpreted as a confirmation of the radicals' original claim that the university was unjust and repressive, especially toward those working for civil rights.

- .4 Police action produced a strong reaction. Previously, only a small minority had actually demonstrated; now vast numbers of indignant students and faculty joined the widening protest. Classes came to a halt, and a wave of politicking, protesting, and speech-making swept the campus. This response demonstrated the extraordinary power of the dual issue at Berkeley. It became clear that more students would demonstrate against and administration which punished students for on-campus infractions committed in the pursuit of valued social objectives than would join other sorts of political action. Strong feelings of generational loyalty were aroused as students watched their classmates being dragged off limp, resisting, and sometimes bloodied, to jail.
- .5 By these means, the Berkeley invention enlisted large numbers of liberals and tactical moderates, who contributed their own distinctive style to campus protest. At first, the concern of the liberals focused upon the university's stance toward political activities on campus, but soon it widened to encompass a new range of issues. The liberals now demanded participation in university governance and reform of curriculum. The radicals, who were primarily interested in political action on larger social issues, were for the most part indifferent to such campus reforms but aligned themselves with the liberals in return for support that helped legitimate the radicals' demands. New liberal and "moderate" leaders emerged.
- .6 The radical and liberal leaders were linked to the mass of demonstrators not by organizational ties or formal mechanisms but rather by common participation in a movement. Unlike traditional campus political organizations, but like the civil rights movement, the FSM emphasized reaching decisions by group consensus and mass meetings and avoided bureaucratic organization. At the same time, key tactical decisions were made at critical moments by a small group of leaders who directed the movement.

- .7 Few concrete changes resulted from all this effort.... A series of reports were issued; some reforms were instituted. But despite the time and energy that went into these efforts, the university's formal programs remained essentially unchanged. Four years after the FSM, the average Berkeley faculty member spend less time in the classroom than he had in 1964. Thus, although the Berkeley invention stimulated broad demands for university reform, its aftermath offered little hope that any such reform would be achieved....
- .8 Perhaps the most distinctive aspect of the Berkeley invention was its success in combining two impulses that previously had been separate in student disruption. The high spirits and defiance of authority that had characterized the traditional school riot were now joined to youthful idealism and to social objectives of the highest importance. This combination moved the participants to intense feeling and vigorous political activism and provoked from state or university officials reactions and over-reactions that promised to keep the whole movement alive.

In seeking to make Columbia University "a revolutionary political weapon," tactics and responses thus created what the Scranton Commission described as the Columbia Expansion, which rapidly spread to other campuses:

The Columbia Expansion and Aftermath, 1968⁵²

- .1 Destruction of property, papers and records. At Columbia, university officials estimated that the 1968 incidents resulted in hundreds of thousands of dollars of property damage. On a number of campuses, ROTC buildings became popular targets for arson. Threats were made to destroy other university facilities unless the radicals' demands were met. At Columbia, the notes of an historian, the result of years of work, were destroyed by a fire that some alleged was maliciously set by student protestors. The rifling and copying of files became a more common occurrence in student-occupied buildings.
- .2 Counterviolence against protesting students by law enforcement officers. There were charges of police brutality at Columbia, and many of them had a basis in fact. Both before and after Columbia, every police bust gave rise to brutality charges. Far too often, they were true.

⁵² Ibid., pp. 37-41. Paragraph numberings and emphases have been added.

- .3 University unpreparedness. In spite of the increase in the number and intensity of student protests since Berkeley, university administrators rarely had formulated plans to deal with them. Convinced that their own campuses were immune to disruptive or violent protests, administrators were unprepared to cope with them when they occurred. In the midst of a crisis, some administrators believed that their only options were to do nothing or to call in the police. If they did nothing, they would allow the extremists to take over the campus; if they called in the police, they could not be sure the police would act properly.
- .4 Threats against university officials. In April 1968, black students at Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut, held the school's trustees captive until their demands were accepted. In November 1968, students at San Fernando Valley State College in Los Angeles held officials at knife point. Anonymous threats against university officials and faculty members critical of student activities became more frequent.
- .5 Acts of terrorism. In February 1969, a secretary at Pomona College in California was severely injured by a bomb. In March 1969, a student at San Francisco State College was critically injured while attempting to place a bomb in a classroom building. On another occasion, a bomb was placed near the office of a liberal faculty member who opposed the "Third World" strike there. Later that year, a custodian at the University of California at Santa Barbara was killed by a bomb in the faculty club. The underground press proclaimed that the bombing in Madison, Wisconsin, on August 24, 1970, was part of a terrorist strategy. Earlier this summer [1970], Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Eugene T. Rossides reported that, between January 1, 1969, and April 15, 1970, almost 41,000 bombings, attempted bombings, and bomb threats were recorded in the nation as a whole. Most could not be attributed to any specific cause. Of those that could be attributed to some cause, more than half--over 8,200--were attributable to "campus disturbances and student unrest."
- .6 University disciplinary action. Faced with increasingly disruptive or violent demonstrations, university officials began to take stronger disciplinary actions against disruptive and violent students. In 1969, for example, one study of disciplinary measures at 28 campuses reported that more than 900 students had been expelled or suspended, while more than 850 others were given reprimands. In a statement to this Commission, J. Edgar Hoover reported that disruptive and violent protests resulted in over 4,000 arrests during the 1968-69 academic year and about 7,200 arrests during 1969-70. At the University of Chicago, Harvard, and elsewhere, students were expelled from the university because of their involvement in building occupations. Others were suspended or placed on probation.

- .7 The influence of a new youth culture. Student unrest was increasingly reinforced by a youthful "counter-culture" that expressed itself in new kinds of art and music, in the use of drugs, and in unorthodox dress and personal relations. Students were receptive to this culture's accent on authenticity and alienation. Many university communities began to attract nonstudents who also participated in the new youth culture. These "street people" in turn played a prominent part in some student demonstrations, violence, and riots, and complicated responses to campus unrest.
- .8 The growth of militancy and of political and cultural self-consciousness among minority group students other than Blacks, particularly among Puerto Ricans in the East and among Chicanos in the West and Southwest. Chicano and Puerto Rican student activists increasingly formed cohesive groups dedicated to asserting the claims of their communities upon the resources, curriculum, admissions policies, and concern of the university. While maintaining its separate identity, the movement of Spanish-speaking students sometimes made common cause with black and other minority students in a "Third World" coalition, as at San Francisco State and elsewhere.
- .9 Public backlash against campus unrest. The great majority of Americans were outraged by violence on American campuses. Such reactions against campus unrest were often intensified by a more general revulsion against the distinctive dress, life style, behavior, or speech adopted by some young people. Concerned over what they saw as an erosion of standards, a loss of morality, and a turn toward violence, many Americans came to believe that only harsh measures could quell campus disturbances. Many failed to distinguish between peaceful dissent and violent protest and called for the elimination of all campus unrest. Such public backlash made events on campus--in particular, protests, disruptions, and violence--a major political issue, both rationally discussed and irresponsibly exploited.
- .10 Legislative action. As a major political issue, campus unrest has been the subject of much legislation, most of it punitive. By mid-1970, over 30 states had enacted a total of nearly 80 laws dealing with campus unrest. Some laws require expulsion or withdrawal of financial aid from students committing crimes or violating campus rules; others require dismissal or suspension of faculty members for similar offenses. Criminal statutes passed in 12 states so far authorize jail sentences and fines for anyone who willfully denies free use of university property and facilities to members of the university community. The federal Higher Education Act of 1968 and a number of federal acts passed since 1968 bar federal financial aid to students who disrupt campus activities.

- .11 Indirect legislative reactions also became increasingly common. In some states, appropriations for higher education were delayed or denied; in others, funds were diverted from major universities and colleges to community colleges where there have been fewer protests. Public officials, regents, and trustees intervened far more actively in university decisions on curriculum and faculty appointments.

Time and again it will be seen that as campus disorder and violence expanded, a crucial factor was the disparity between what the college was and what students, faculty, and others could be mobilized to demand of it. At Kent State, this disparity was reflected less before the National Guard killing of four students on May 4, 1970, than afterwards, in the shocked reactions that it was at this relatively "ordinary," low-prestige campus that campus violence had reached its culmination--and that Kent's students cared as much about Kent as students did elsewhere about their own colleges.⁵³

The lesson for law enforcement and criminal justice agencies can be summarized by looking finally at a campus which was successful in avoiding violence in 1970. The Mayday Weekend before Kent State, Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut was the locale of a mass demonstration, called by activists but supported by much Yale sentiment, in support of a just trial for a number of Black Panther leaders who were to go on trial at the nearby County Court House across the central town park--New Haven Green. Located right on the Green, Yale was the natural staging point for demonstrators attending the rally, and the university faced major immediate decisions about how to keep any possible violence from invading the campus or from issuing forth from the campus into the town.

Not unsurprisingly, Yale's success in averting major violence has not been reported with the rich fascination major tragedies always get. After brief intensive play in the popular media and a number of in-depth student pamphlet and newspaper coverages, systematic interest declined, except for one distinguished and moving, though certainly biased, account written by a famous novelist who

⁵³This theme, which might be characterized as a kind of belated establishment of "expectations" about what Kent was before the violence and what it should be afterwards, underlies Michener's reconstruction, op. cit.

happened at the time to be Master of a Yale undergraduate college.⁵⁴ Taking what accounts do exist and combining them with the observations of the writer of this chapter, who was present on the scene, the following conclusions appear warranted:

.1 A popular President, widely supported by faculty and students, led an administration which was felt to be prudently and humanely preparing for the events of May Day. President Kingman Brewster had been helped in solidifying support around him by his celebrated comment:

So in spite of my insistence on the limits of my official capacity, I personally want to say that I am appalled and ashamed that things should have come to such a pass that I am skeptical of the ability of black revolutionaries to achieve a fair trial anywhere in the United States. In large part the atmosphere has been created by police actions and prosecutions against the Panthers in many parts of the country. It is one more inheritance from centuries of racial discrimination and conflict.⁵⁵

This statement was widely attacked in the country at large, by those who included Vice President Agnew, and served to identify the Yale President with the student body, as both under attack by a "mindless Establishment."

.2 There was close planning and tactical coordination between University and local police, with a command center accessible quickly to top officials of both chains. This coordination was enhanced by rapport between university officials and a widely known "new breed" type of Police Chief, James E. Ahern, who sympathized with university values. This coordination also included participation by leadership elements of the planned demonstration.⁵⁶

.3 While the campus was opened to outsiders, including activists, who were housed and fed on an emergency basis, student and administration officials maintained effective control,

⁵⁴ John Hersey, Letter to the Alumni (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970). Hersey well captures the intense feelings, including the desire to preserve the University, which dominated Yale Mayday Weekend, 1970.

⁵⁵ As quoted by Hersey, ibid., p. 88. Brewster was sincerely expressing a widely held campus feeling, that the police were out to get the Panthers, although it has since been recognized that allegations of such a police plot have little substance. See Edward Jay Epstein, "A Reporter at Large: The Panthers and the Police--A Pattern of Genocide?", New Yorker (February 13, 1971), pp. 45-77.

⁵⁶ Fred Germain, "Chiefly Chatter, James E. Ahern: One of the "New Breed," Law and Order, XIX, 5 (May, 1971), pp. 48-54.

a control enhanced since many of the Yale hosts were in obvious sympathy with the outsiders. This gave outsiders a definable and controllable "home." Much of the formal university activity was devoted to intensive "teach-in" discussions of a range of radical issues.

.4 Many students not in sympathy with this use of Yale appeared to have gone home or away; thus there were few ideological confrontations among contending groups of students.

.5 The on-campus strategy, reinforced by a low profile police response which did not impede the conduct of the scheduled rallies on behalf of Bobby Seale and the Black Panthers, isolated extremists from all major sectors of opinion. Extremist actions were met with minimum force, although National Guard companies were deployed to bar access to several sides of the Yale campus, as small crowds of extremists tried to stir trouble the first night.

.6 In addition, although these were not effectively reported in mass media, communications went out to the large New Haven black population, encouraging them to stay away from what was defined as essentially a white, college demonstration.

Law enforcement officials may find elements of this strategy unattractive, and they may, at the time, have strongly disagreed with President Brewster's comment on fair trials for black revolutionaries (a comment often not accurately reported in the media). The important lesson is, however, that this strategy to contain violence worked because it was genuine. In short, the college was, in crisis, what the majority of its community appeared to want it to be. There was little disparity between expectations and what was later revealed under pressure to be reality.

Thus there derive the following basic principles for law enforcement and criminal justice agencies faced with campus actions:

.1 The greater the disparity between expectations about the campus and realities on the campus, the more likely are situations conducive to disorder and violence to arise.

.2 Therefore, in every tactical estimate of campus situations, there must be a fundamental appraisal and understanding of the degree to which all members of the campus share common values, understandings, and commitments, and, contrastingly,

the degree to which there are exploitable, fundamental cleavages among individuals, groups, and major sub-organizations.

.3 This requires in-depth and continuing official awareness of all that is happening on the campus.

.4 Gaining this awareness will be hindered by the degree to which official agencies are fundamentally hostile to what is happening on campus.

The campuses which have suffered most from disorder and violence appear to be those where it could be rather quickly revealed that college was not what it appeared to be, and where issues could therefore quickly divide the campus into contending factions. By the same rule--Yale avoided violence because it really was, in the end, what its students, faculty, and administration all wanted it to be.

CHAPTER IV
PART II
TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN RESPONSES
TO CAMPUS VIOLENCE

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Police and Criminal Justice Agencies on Campus

Any officer of law enforcement or criminal justice who enters any educational institution is entering a domain reserved by law and custom. Officers do, of course, have jurisdiction over campuses when there has been a violation of law. Although some activists would like to claim that American campuses are privileged sanctuaries in the same sense enjoyed by some Latin American universities,⁵⁷ and thus immune bases from which to foment disorder, there is no impediment to officers performing their legal duties when there is cause to do so on an American campus. Yet it was pointed out elsewhere that the mere presence of police in high schools is likely to be inflammatory.⁵⁸ If that is true for high schools, it is true many times over for the college and university. Part I of this chapter has presented many of the background reasons for why this is so, and has detailed several graphic incidents of how quickly inept or imprecise police intervention has intensified campus turmoil. But when police must act on campus, what are they to do? This present shorter Part applies some of the lessons from Part I of Chapter IV to answering this practical question.

The present discussion is not meant to be a set of all-inclusive guidelines or a precise manual on how to deal with campus violence. Many of the classic problems of police operations are, for the campus, basically the same as in the non-campus civil society. And in spite of seemingly sudden mass shifts of student

⁵⁷ Michener, op. cit., pp. 490-497, provides lurid examples of what the concept of sanctuary has meant in Latin American and Japanese university settings. His discussion of how the Zengakuren ("Federation of All Japan Student Councils") used the privileged sanctuary of the Japanese university to mount escalating national political action and violence will be of special interest to American analysts of Students for a Democratic Society.

⁵⁸ Chapter I above, pp. 31-34 and pp. 60-63.

opinion against official agencies on some campuses, law enforcement personnel can still count on the support of most students, when they are carrying out what students can clearly perceive to be their duty. The purpose of the present discussion is, therefore, only to highlight certain general principles and problems which are distinctive of the potential law enforcement and criminal justice role on campus.

Police are vulnerable in campus situations. If police are provocative in high schools, they are vulnerable on the college campus. The physical strength and tactical skills of college activists make them formidable adversaries, particularly when students are able to portray the police as dumb interlopers, and when they are successful in provoking police into physical overreactions or District Attorneys into extravagant imputations about student motives. The status disparity⁵⁹ between police and students can be consciously manipulated through insults directed toward the "intellectual inferiority" of the police. And constantly, the assertion will be broadcast by voice, pamphlet, and billboard that police have no "right" to be on campus. In the heat of the moment, this can be a powerful argument to angry adolescents who are conscious of their "solidarity" as students. Especially when goaded to act out their "rights" by the presence of the mass media, these angry individuals can be incited to move on the police in small groups or larger mobs.

One general strategy for reducing this vulnerability of the police in campus situations is to insist on high standards of police professionalism. This means not only that police involved in campus disorders should be well grounded in the best available standard police knowledge and skills, but that they should:

- .1 Be sensitive to certain psychological disadvantages they may have in the presence of immature people with more formal education and greater verbal skills, and using this self-awareness as well as tactical awareness of how inciters work to goad them, learn to exercise complete emotional self-control in the campus situation.

⁵⁹ See Part I above, pp. 314-322.

- .2 Be thoroughly familiar with the small-unit and massed-unit tactics which are required to contain civil disorders and which differ fundamentally from the usual individual and patrol tactics on most forces. This requires particularly:
 - .a Skill in acting out concerted movements;
 - .b Ability to respond to the special command-control requirements of unit tactics;
 - .c Willingness to subordinate certain acquired habits to a semi-military situation.
- .3 Have sufficient familiarity with the college experience--without necessarily blindly equating "professionalism" with "college education"--to understand and be governed in part by the basic intellectual values of a well-ordered college community. This includes a minimum ability and desire to:
 - .a Talk and work with students as equals;
 - .b Engage in dialogue about issues;
 - .c Recognize--and be seen as recognizing--that young citizens have a Constitutional right to engage in peaceful dissent and demonstration.

These special requirements for professionalism in actions directed toward college situations will be especially difficult to meet in smaller cities and towns near large universities, where the local force may be insufficiently trained to deal with large student demonstrations. And because of their relatively small size and poor quality, campus security police forces are likely, in most instances, to be markedly deficient in these professional skills and attitudes.

In addition to upgrading the general quality of police professionalism which a force can bring to any campus situation, a local force and its supporting agencies can reduce their vulnerability on campus by understanding and developing appropriate general tactics. These tactics must be based on an appreciation of the need, on campus, for carefully planned, low profile tactics.

Need for carefully planned, precisely executed, quickly completed low profile tactics. Once committed to a campus disorder, police agencies should have a precise understanding of their tactical objectives, which will be defined and limited by pertinent advance plans which include all necessary information and estimates. Except for a few situations, determined by special factors weighed by the police commander and the appropriate college officials, a massive show of force should be avoided. Instead, police should maintain the lowest profile

consistent with precisely and rapidly attaining their tactical objectives. When those objectives have been attained, they should withdraw, leaving stay-behind forces in accordance with requests and agreements from the college officials charged with ensuring that the situation will not again deteriorate into disorder.

Intelligence Requirements

Even smaller colleges and universities will tend to have larger campuses than the average high school, although their student populations may be no larger in size. The physical size and intellectual sophistication of a college campus therefore dictate an appreciation of the special strategic and tactical problems inherent in these matters of scale. Where a high school could be conveniently defined as one unified strategic and tactical objective, the college and university campus presents several simultaneously occurring problems of strategic and tactical appraisal. These problems begin in acquiring the necessary strategic and tactical intelligence upon which both planning and operations can be conducted. Both types of intelligence will be affected in important ways by the ability of local law enforcement and criminal justice agencies to maintain working relationships with university officials, and by the degree to which these relationships are those of mutual trust and shared values, as contrasted with latent or manifest mutual hostility.

Strategic intelligence. Good, continuing strategic intelligence may be much more difficult to acquire than good tactical intelligence, simply because in non-crisis situations:

- . 1 Uniformed police operatives have no easily acceptable place on campus, except insofar as they are performing normal police functions;
- . 2 College and university authorities will be reluctant to do anything which, in their eyes, would compromise the freedom of their institutions or damage the reputation of any member of the campus community;

- . 3 Undercover operatives, except in clearcut urgent security cases, may create suspicion and tension, and, if "uncovered," suddenly increased tensions between campus and law enforcement agencies.⁶⁰
- . 4 Under most conditions, few police departments or other official agencies will have the physical resources or skilled manpower to maintain professional, sophisticated monitoring of campus conditions, using secondary sources such as campus and underground newspapers.

Nevertheless, if the conclusions of Part I of this chapter are to be accepted, the following kinds of strategic intelligence are needed by agencies legitimately concerned with safety and order on specific college and university campuses:

- . 1 A general and continuing appraisal of the principal tensions and cleavages on campus, as inferred from all available information, and with particular reference to those issues which can be exploited by activists of any type to create student-administration-faculty hostilities and confrontation.
- . 2 A file of all student media, particularly legitimate as well as "underground" press, from which the current state of all campus issues and problems can be followed, and from which timely situation estimates can be prepared.
- . 3 A specific list of critical ideological issues on campus, displayed and analyzed in such a way that new issues can be readily introduced and interpreted, and old issues can be carefully analyzed, to determine the new emphases and directions they can take. This may require the addition of one police intelligence specialist skilled in analysis of both secondary and primary information.
- . 4 A basic campus and map file, including building plans and locations of all communications and utilities lines. Contingency

⁶⁰The Scranton Report, op. cit., pp. 171-173, emphasizes the dangers of using undercover operatives in the college setting.

On the matter of "blowing cover" in order to intensify hostilities between campus and law enforcement agencies--it is possible to speculate that this was one basic purpose behind the March, 1971 raid on the Federal Bureau of Investigation Resident Agency in Media, Pennsylvania. Subsequent newspaper publication of alleged copies of documents taken during this raid suggested the identities of "informants" on a number of Philadelphia area campuses, and dramatized individuals allegedly of "security interest" because of their activities. The predictable reactions occurred.

plans for safeguarding campus communications and utility lines should be drawn up, to supplement whatever campus security resources may be available.

- .5 From all sources, a current list of recognized campus activists.
- .6 Periodically and regularly exchanged liaison reports, between campus and local official agencies, containing both general situation appraisals and particular reports of possible critical incidents.
- .7 After initial implementation of this strategic intelligence bank, secondary analysis, in order to abstract out of it those particular critical indicators which can be economically followed to maintain continuing strategic appraisal of the campus situation. These indicators will include incident counts and other quantifiable measures of campus behavior.

A good general rule to remember about acquiring strategic intelligence on the campus situation is that colleges and universities are essentially open places, where ideas and issues are freely argued and displayed. Although more tactically sophisticated extremist cells may operate semi-clandestinely, much information will be openly, simply displayed. Given the general openness of the campus, it is both counterproductive and silly in most situations for police agencies to mount elaborate secret intelligence operations, especially if their concerns are limited to the control of events which could lead to collective violence. Some national security and domestic security problems may require other forms of intelligence operation, as may certain specific plots against life and limb, but this present outline of tactical considerations is not intended primarily for use by agencies entrusted with those matters.

Tactical intelligence. Under conditions of impending crisis, the need for police intelligence may become more acceptable to university authorities. Such tactical intelligence, which is crucial for the low-level, precise response desired in most campus situations, must be in a form which permits momentary updating, amplification and correction. On issues, strategic intelligence becomes

tactical intelligence indicating increased likelihood of collective violence, when the following themes or conditions emerge:⁶¹

- .1 Sudden attempts to broaden the protest issue-base, from university-centered issues to "outside-focused" issues, using especially issues over which the university has little control but for which it is being held accountable, and thus made vulnerable;
- .2 The appearance of New Left radical activists, who seek to gain control of both specific encounter situations and general channels of university communication, preparatory to defining or re-defining what are the salient issues. These activists may:
 - .a Implicitly encourage official agencies or, even, opposite ideological groups to oppose them in a direct confrontation--on some campuses, for example, neo-Nazi political groups may be enticed into opposing the New Left.
 - .b Use the format of the mass meeting to engage in the appearances of "mass democracy," while reserving tactical decisions in the hands of a small cadre. A CRITICAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE CONCERN WILL BE TO IDENTIFY AND MAINTAIN TACTICAL OBSERVATION OF THIS CADRE.
- .3 Pre-emptive attempts to define law enforcement responses as inherently repressive, immediately before law enforcement agencies have entered the scene;
- .4 Claims that the pertinent issues can be resolved only by making the university an immediate force for immediate political change in the larger society;
- .5 Continuing multiplication of the issues into irresolvable confusion, especially when done in the face of due-process and good-faith attempts to resolve earlier issues;
- .6 Sit-ins or other direct action blockages, especially when they are:
 - .a Conducted in violation of the rights of other students;
 - .b Continued in spite of requests for dispersal by college authorities, using their own administrative rules or formal legal powers granted by a legislature;
 - .c Maintained in defiance of court injunction.

⁶¹This list is essentially that given above, p. 334.

- 7 Actual overt invasions of the teaching process or other regular college and university functions, in violation of the faculty member or guest's right to teach.

In conducting operations, satisfactory tactical intelligence will crucially depend on the quality of the prior planning which has been done between the educational institution and official agencies. Based on effective working relationships which center on a command post in which college and outside authorities can coordinate their planning and actions, a constant flow of validated and updated tactical intelligence should be maintained. During all operational and tactical crises and peak message load periods, there should be secure communications facilities among all key university, law enforcement, and criminal justice officials, so that sharing of critical current information and close coordination of operational planning can be assured. Outfitting of university authorities with simple hand-held Citizens' Band radios represents, for example, one kind of unacceptable expedient.

Planning and Coordination

As has been suggested immediately above, the quality of intelligence--as well as other critical elements in planning and executing operations to minimize campus violence--depends centrally on the ability of all concerned officials and agencies to develop advance contingency plans and to execute these plans with precise coordination. Without such planning and coordination, intelligence can be incomplete and irrelevant before action. During action, these intelligence inadequacies, when compounded by failures of planning and coordination, can lead to disastrous situations.

The evidence suggests that many public schools, whatever their grade level, simply have no contingency plans for disorderly situations which can lead to violence. This reflects not only a hesitation about involving police in school affairs, but the simple fact that key school officials are too overburdened to think too far in advance about disorders, when there are many seemingly more urgent matters pressing in upon them. On the college and university level, however, failures to engage in advance planning and coordination with law enforcement

agencies by appropriate educational administrators are sometimes the result of distrust or outright hostility. In 1969, for example, when assistance in contingency planning might have materially aided in coping more successfully with the incipient campus tragedies of the following year, many universities declined the invitation the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration extended to university and law enforcement officials, to come together to consider problems of campus disorder.⁶² Even with the experiences which have intervened since that time, the attitude of key academic officials toward practical contingency planning with law enforcement agencies is probably still uncertain. Police and criminal justice officials need to appreciate why these attitudes exist, even if such attitudes endanger the freedoms to which academic men say they are committed.

There can be little doubt, however, that extensive prior consultation and planning before disorder, and effective operational coordination during disorder, are fundamental requirements in increasing the probabilities that campus demonstrations will not lead to disorders, and that disorders will not lead to violence. The Scranton Report only reflects accepted professional opinion when it lays down these suggestions:⁶³

- 1 The police cannot prepare to deal with campus disorder without extensive consultation and joint planning with the university itself. In most cases, the relations between university officials and the police do not extend beyond what is needed to handle minor problems in normal times. This is not enough to meet the problems of a campus disruption. Developing a capacity to deal with disruption requires a continuing relationship between the university and the police.

⁶²Scranton Report, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-165.

⁶³*Ibid.*, pp. 160-164. These propositions have been edited, numbered from running narrative in the text, and given certain emphases. Many of the propositions here were affirmed in detail by campus security officials speaking formally and informally at the First Annual Symposium on Campus Unrest, sponsored by the American Academy of Criminal Justice, Newton, Massachusetts, April 1-2, 1971. See, for example, the presentation by Swen Nielsen, Chief Security Officer of Brigham Young University, at the April 1 session on "How to Develop a Campus Plan and What It Should Contain."

.2 The university and police must consult with one another at the first hint of a threatening situation. University officials have been reluctant to consult with the police until very late in the course of a crisis, while the police have often been willing to go into action without serious consultation with university officials. This lack of coordination has made dangerous situations more dangerous and has precipitated troubles that could have been avoided.

.3 Consultation before a crisis threatens is far better:

- .a Police officials can help administrators and campus police officers to control a disturbance with the university's internal resources before it escalates into violence. Where the assistance of outside policemen appears necessary, early consultation enables the police to respond promptly and effectively to the university's request.
- .b It gives police the opportunity to mobilize, to prepare a specific tactical plan, and to brief policemen on the roles they will play.
- .c Early consultation can familiarize campus administrators with the legal and operational constraints that govern the police response.
- .d It can give the university an opportunity to influence the shaping of police tactics.
- .e Learning the measures the police plan to use on the campus lessens surprise when those tactics are used.

.4 But even early consultation is not enough. Public agencies and universities must develop relations of a far more regular kind. Long before the threat of a crisis, the highest officials of the university and the city or town in which it is located should arrive at some understanding about law enforcement and protest on the campus: specifically, they should agree upon the circumstances in which the police are to be called onto the campus. Until the highest authorities agree about general principles, those at the operations level cannot begin drawing up specific plans. Through good planning, university officials and the police can develop a long-range strategy for handling protest on the campus that will avoid or minimize violent confrontations.

However difficult reaching such an agreement may be, the result is worth the time spent. It will provide a measure of assurance that, should trouble arise, the campus and the town will not work at cross-purposes. Most important, it may help create an atmosphere in which both university and town residents will respond reasonably rather than viscerally to each other. A policeman who knows that his chief and the mayor are dedicated to the protection of legitimate acts of protest and dissent is less likely to consider everyone with a tie-dye T-shirt and long hair

as a potentially violent criminal. It is useful as well for a protesting student to know in advance precisely when his activities will be halted and that illegal conduct will be dealt with as such.

.5 [T]here is much merit in creating a standing joint committee composed of designated representatives of concerned public agencies and of the university. Such a committee should include the university officials chiefly responsible for dealing with campus crisis; the local chief of police, the district attorney, and the mayor, or their special assistants; and, sometimes (where, for example, a large university is situated in a small town), representatives of the state police and National Guard, who in any event will be included in the contingency planning we discuss below.

The Committee should meet regularly even when no trouble appears to be imminent. It should set general guidelines for the use of law enforcement agencies in situations of campus disorder. In addition, it could serve as a channel through which the campus and off-campus communities keep each other informed and resolve mutual problems.

.6 Joint Contingency Plan. Beyond this, however, universities and law enforcement agencies need to engage in detailed and technical joint contingency planning in which the state police and the National Guard are also included. Although joint contingency plans must have sufficient flexibility to accommodate the unpredictable specifics of an actual disruption and will vary from campus to campus, we can discuss some of the problems and areas the plans should cover.

A joint contingency plan should identify a university official (and his deputy) responsible for maintaining liaison with the police. It should define the circumstances under which the university is likely to call in the police. It should describe the degree of force and types of weapons likely to be used under different contingencies. It should determine the circumstances in which university observers and student marshals will be used.

The plan should address itself to the question of command among all possible participating law enforcement agencies and the National Guard. In general, local police properly have assumed command of the outside forces on campus. Command relationships may vary, however, and--particularly where National Guard troops are committed--relationships sometimes have been confused. This is why they should be established in advance--by agreement, statute, or executive directive. This will minimize friction, misunderstanding, and loss of time and effectiveness.

Proper command and control requires that the participating law enforcement agencies be able to communicate effectively with one another.

[C]ooperating agencies often do not have compatible communications equipment. We found this to be the case in Jackson, Mississippi, and it is also true in many other areas of the country. In small communities, where the cost of new or modified radio equipment is not commensurate with the likely need, participants in the contingency plan should establish procedures whereby the command post can act as a relay for inter-agency communications.

As part of a joint plan, a notebook should be prepared for each university. The notebook should include detailed maps of the campus and the immediate vicinity, designating the location of critical on-campus areas, sites for the location of a command post, staging areas for personnel and equipment, and power and communications sources.

The joint contingency plan should include arrest policies and procedures, and it should provide for the presence of the district attorney or his assistant to give legal guidance. Mass arrests may require adjustments in traditional booking and arraignment procedures and may create a need for additional transportation and detention facilities. This in turn requires the making of advance arrangements with judges, prosecutors, public defenders, doctors, court administrators, and those who supply transportation, detention facilities, and medical facilities.

- .7 In addition to the joint contingency plan, each law enforcement agency should have its own, more detailed internal contingency plan.

The internal plan should provide for the organizational structure and chain of command necessary to meet a situation of campus disorder. In their day-to-day activity police officers generally work singly or in two-man teams. Many officers are not accustomed to squad-type operations under the continuous direction of supervisors.

Moreover, the organizational structure of the department and channels of communication are oriented toward usual police business. The contingency plan should establish lines of communication that will give a commander access to accurate campus information and enable him to convey orders to the campus clearly and directly.

The agency's internal plan should also provide for the rapid and efficient mobilization of sufficient manpower. An undermanned police effort is ineffective and is likely to be dangerous

to police and participants alike. If necessary, mutual assistance agreements and procedures with other law enforcement or supporting agencies should be established to insure that there will be enough manpower to respond adequately with only minimum curtailment of other essential police services. In addition, we should emphasize that contingency plans--no matter how carefully formulated--are practically useless unless they are periodically tested with the participation of all concerned agencies.

Since state police agencies and the National Guard may have critical supplemental roles in a campus emergency, it is vital they be included on all occasions when contingency plans are subjected to command exercises and field tests. It is critical that these exercises and tests be conducted, especially in non-crisis conditions. But while all emergency plans and organizations can grow flabby in "normal" times, the events of 1970 suggest that law enforcement agencies have little freedom left to fail on campus.

Low Profile Tactical Maneuver

With proper intelligence, planning, and coordination, the probabilities are increased that if law enforcement and support agencies must enter a campus disorder, they can maintain a low profile, minimum force, closely controlled, tactically precise response. Such a general response profile minimizes opportunities for activist attempts to stage major confrontations and to shift attention onto the police and away from their own disorderly, violent, and unlawful behavior. Certain specific conditions enhance the likelihood of successful low profile tactical maneuver:

- .1 Successful police-university cooperation and high student and faculty support for the campus administration will have served to cause most students to keep demonstrations and protests peaceful and orderly. The example of how this happened at Yale in 1970 has been considered in Part I of this Chapter.⁶⁴
- .2 By virtue of this general situation having been achieved, activists and troublemakers will have been isolated from the main

⁶⁴ Above, pp. 361-364.

body of student opinion, so that law enforcement agencies can make the requisite but low profile response toward this special group alone. Thus, any tactical movements or use of non-lethal weaponry can be presented as necessary to control this isolated, non-representative group. This becomes particularly important when chemical agents are used in such a manner that wind causes them to drift over a peaceful group of students on the campus grounds.

- .3 Careful continuing tactical distinction is made between containing relatively small numbers of activists and containing major civil disorder. In fact, law enforcement agencies have seldom if ever been faced with a true, sustained civil disorder on campus. Should one erupt around campus, response tactics toward this disorder should be distinguished from the tactics used to deal with collegians, whose basic support of law enforcement and basic condemnation of tactical extremism should be recognized and enlisted by law enforcement agencies. If it is necessary to establish campus perimeter control through use of police or troops, tactical commanders should be prepared to limit any responses made by the cordon to students. Except for verbal abuse from students, a trivial matter which should be emphasized as such in troop training, the real trouble will lie in the other direction. In presenting the need for cordoning the campus, its basically protective potentialities should be emphasized to students, faculty observers, and university officials.

Recent events have made numerous accounts of campus tactical problems and campus tactical failures available to law enforcement and criminal justice agencies. The present discussion of tactics examines a relatively successful application of low profile tactical maneuver to a dangerous situation where certain recurring problems in controlling campus violence were fully revealed.

New Haven, May Day, 1970. The widely publicized "Free Bobby Seale" and "Justice to the Black Panthers" rally set for Friday afternoon, May 1, 1970 on the New Haven Green--the central New Haven park immediately outside the focal point of Yale University, "Yale Old Campus"--drew between eight and twelve thousand demonstrators of all dispositions. Most quietly listened during the bright afternoon to several hours of rhetoric, some of it obscene and some just skirting legal incitement to disorder. There was intensive public media coverage, in addition to numerous semi-concealed moving picture stations in partially blacked rooms in the buildings lining Church Street opposite the Green. This camera


activity was taken, along with other evidences, as evidence of extensive "Pig" presence and interest.

The rally peacefully disbanded, most walking up across the slightly sloping Green to the Yale Old Campus, where cheap dinners of brown rice and fruit were being dispensed under tents. A small number of rowdies crossed Elm Street from the Green, to sit on the steps and statuary of the County Court House, in which the Panther Trial was to occur. This was a simple extension of the crowd, which had massed immediately across the street on the Green for its protest rally--"in the shadow of the Court House." Little happened on the Court House steps, however, and the people went away after scrawling a few slogans.

As night came, a rock music festival began inside the Old Campus, where a small crowd was forming. Around the Campus and elsewhere in Yale, intensive "teach-in" discussions were occurring. There had been extensive rumors of violence planned for the evening, as people would try to "take" the Court House and "free" Bobby Seale (who was incarcerated elsewhere). The Green made a potentially inviting arena for collective violence as Map IV-1, page 382, suggests. All the New Haven action was centered there. The Yale Old Campus, contained in a great dormitory quadrangle, was a natural staging area for a mass movement across the Green to the County Court House, located opposite on a gentle downhill diagonal of movement. The Green itself had few barriers, except for stretches of an old three-foot cast iron ornamental fence; Temple Street, which divided it into two unequal parts; and three historic old churches, memories of the days when the New England Town Green was the reserved site for churches all standing in a row.

Shortly after 9 in the evening, between seven hundred and one thousand college-age demonstrators streamed from Phelps Gateway.⁶⁵ The chants of "Free Bobby Seale" were organized, and some individuals carried military or

⁶⁵The writer of this chapter accompanied this crowd at all times during the action described.



MAP IV-1
 TACTICAL SITUATION ON THE NEW HAVEN (CONNECTICUT)
 GREEN OPPOSITE YALE UNIVERSITY, FRIDAY NIGHT, 1 MAY 1970
 2100-2215 hrs.

motor scooter helmets, gas masks, and improvised billies. This gave credence to the rumor that "Weatherman" was in town. In twenty minutes to half an hour, after some pausing and circling before the center church on the Green, the crowd continued on its basic march diagonal toward the intersection of Elm and Church Streets, across which was the Court House. Fewer than a hundred New Haven City Police had now appeared in a skirmish line on the Church Street sidewalk opposite the Green. They came from a sizable reserve pool held in city building facilities out of sight of but just behind Church Street, in less than a minute's march from the Green.

The crowd moving on the Court House paused briefly behind the cast iron ornamental fence bounding the Green at this point (dashed lines), while some began to move to cross the street. Police edged up into the intersection, along the center line of Church Street parallel to the Green, while one patrolman equipped with a "pepper-fogger" began to dispense chemical agents, just below the Elm-Church intersection, toward the main body of the crowd, now converging on this point. A brisk northerly breeze blowing off Long Island Sound a few blocks away rapidly swept the gas across the edge of the crowd, and up past the Court House, as indicated by the dotted large arrow in Figure IV-1. Some in the crowd, who were bent on making this a ritualistic, provocative, taunting encounter, saw this as a sign of police ineptitude in handling gas, for the gas was swept away from the crowd, off the Green and past the Court House into public buildings and private housing. But the effect of this limited application of gas was to turn the crowd immediately southward, along the Church Street boundary of the Green, and to begin a process of returning them to the Yale campus, along open withdrawal routes. As the crowd moved south along the Green boundary and began to turn southwesterly, the pepper fogger unit followed just behind, and then withdrew.

The crowd, still shouting and occasionally lobbing objects at any available policeman, now tried to turn off the Green at the intersection of Temple and Chapel Streets. Police echelons in depth stood here. In front of the police were patrolmen equipped with gas cannisters and one pepper-fogger. All wore gas masks.

The top leadership of the New Haven Police appeared at this point, in civilian clothes,⁶⁶ to take tactical charge. Gas was dispensed from the fogger; the wind drift was now unquestionably advantageous to the police, and the gas swept frontally into the crowd, most of whom withdrew behind the southmost church on the Green and began to disperse back toward the Yale Campus. Several obviously "high" individuals appeared from the crowd to rush the police. Gas was again dispensed, arrests were minimized,⁶⁷ and a high official of the New Haven Police was seen physically to restrict several patrolmen from pursuing the now fleeing taunters. Heavy gas application and tight top level tactical control at this point appeared to break most of the crowd's energy while avoiding any serious confrontation.

While many of the demonstrators began to drift back into the crowd now standing on the Yale sidewalks at the corner of College and Chapel Streets, a few made for this intersection in a final thrust. Here, however, a National Guard company carrying rifles and wearing masks had been deployed in a rough rectangle to seal the intersection. When taunted, the Guard threw gas cannisters northward up College Street and at individuals rushing at them and dancing before them. This successfully contained the final thrust, which now settled down into several hours of yelling and dancing before the guard by a small number of college-age persons.

But perhaps there was a premonition of things to come on another campus. One tear gas cannister, which had been thrown by a member of the Guard into the demonstrators north of the College-Chapel intersection was lobbed back behind the main body of Guard troops, who at that moment were facing north. A cleanly dressed, short-haired late teenage young man gently picked up this still streaming

⁶⁶While perhaps creating doubts in the crowd, the wearing of civilian clothes by top personnel in such a situation may enhance their visibility to men in uniform. Chiefs will, of course, vary in their styles and dispositions on this point.

⁶⁷Several arrests were made here. The City Police experienced some difficulty in applying the new "plastic handcuffs," and handling of arrestees was to some degree hampered by the jostling in of movie cameramen wearing press badges.

cannister and gently lobbed it to a National Guard Sergeant, who willingly caught it and threw it back into the demonstrating crowd. Catching sight of this, however, several Guard privates immediately began lobbing CN cannisters southward along College Street, toward the small crowd of "straight" observers and up along the walls of the Hotel Taft, which rises just south of this intersection. While the breeze blew much of this back onto the Guard and into the Yale Campus, some entered the Hotel and surrounding establishments.

As the evening progressed, the National Guard deployed several additional companies on several key streets by or near Yale, and maintained a ready reserve at several points within several blocks. In commenting on the use of the Guard in New Haven during this and subsequent minor demonstrations, the Scranton Report said:

There are times, moreover, when the very fact of the arrival of the Guard may avert disorder before any has begun. When reliable information indicates that a mass assembly or demonstration threatens to become violent, the presence of the Guard may serve a deterrent function. The Guard successfully played such a preventive role in New Haven in May 1970.⁶⁸

Media and Rumor

During and after tactical actions to contain campus disorder and incipient violence, it is likely that the mass media will have become intensely interested in the events. They will seek to witness the action, and they will attend closely to whatever critical incidents occur. Proper relations among law enforcement agencies, university officials, and the working press should accomplish these objectives:

- .1 Preserve First Amendment rights to press coverage of legitimate news events. Proper professional coverage can often, by disseminating factual accounts, do much to correct and dispel rumors cultivated by activists and provocateurs.

⁶⁸Scranton Report, op. cit., p. 179.

- .2 Permit officials to communicate a factual, verifiable clear account of events, without unduly limiting the rights of reporters to conduct their own investigations.
- .3 Enable law enforcement and criminal justice agencies to conduct necessary operations without excessive public information requirements being levied on them by the media.
- .4 Keep media reporters and participants in disorder and violence separated, to the degree required to keep media representatives from unwittingly intensifying or shaping the unfolding event.

It is seldom recognized that all on the scene of a disorder have rights with regard to the mass media--including law enforcement agencies trying to do a job. Recognizing and balancing these sometimes seemingly conflicting media rights is one of the most difficult jobs confronting the various official agencies in the 1970's.

Difficulties and problems created by incomplete or hurried mass media coverage are to be seen in some of the reporting of the Kent State tragedy. Figures IV-1 and IV-2, pages 387 and 388, illustrate what may be called "image conflict." Image conflict arises when different parts of the story are told at different times for different purposes and audiences. In Figure IV-1, one of the Kent State students who died a short time after the pictures were taken is shown engaged in what must be considered "provocative" acts: in one case, throwing a gas cannister back at the National Guard skirmish line; in the other, gesturing, as part of a larger crowd, in the classic stance of both center fingers upraised. It is at this point an easy truism to say that under no circumstances was the Guard justified in firing in response to such provocations. It wasn't, but that is not the point. The point is that in an effort to reconstruct what happened at Kent, recognition must be given to the two-sided nature of such encounters. That this recognition was certainly underplayed in immediate reporting of the death of Jeffrey Glenn Miller may have helped some manage the grief they felt at his death, but it also may have intensified the special uproar that the death of "martyrs" creates. At the same time, this underplay hindered the exercise of the larger public's right to know what had truly happened at Kent: that two-sided encounters can produce inexcusable tragedies.



Figure IV-1

THE PROBLEM OF IMAGE CONFLICT IN REPORTING A TRAGEDY - I

These photographs from the Scranton Commission Report depict, according to that report, Jeffrey Glenn Miller, a victim of the National Guard shooting at Kent State, engaged in provocative acts prior to the tragedy. In the top photo (Scranton Report, p. 340), Miller (white arrow added) is identified as throwing a tear gas cannister back at the Guard. In the lower photo (Scranton Report, p. 306), Miller (white arrow added) is shown gesturing with both middle fingers upraised. In reporting Miller's death, the New York Times (May 6, 1970, p. 19) said that although "If any of the victims looked like a radical," Miller did, "[m]any say the looks were deceiving. The youth was described by acquaintances as quiet, intelligent, studious--and not the rebellious type," although one acquaintance is reported as saying "when something was happening, he would be there."



Figure IV-2

THE PROBLEM OF IMAGE CONFLICT IN REPORTING A TRAGEDY - II

These photographs (top two from Life, May 15, 1970, p. 34; the lower one from Newsweek, May 18, 1970, p. 3 and Front Cover) show initial reportage of what became the most famous single symbol of college protest in 1970--the Kent State Girl, grieving over a body. Life describes this sequence in these words: "At first stunned and disbelieving... a coed kneels over the body of Jeffrey Glenn Miller, dead from a bullet wound in his head. Then, suddenly realizing the truth, she turns to other students in horror..." (Life, loc. cit.) Some time later, after the initial national impact of the image of the grieving girl, it became known that she had no formal connection with Kent State and was not, in fact, a student but a younger runaway who had gone to Kent State out of curiosity. (See main text.)

Figure IV-2 shows the creation of the famous Kent State Girl, the image that the novelist James Michener calls the "Girl with the Delacroix Face," after the kinds of powerful images evoked by the famous French painter of Nineteenth Century revolutionary turmoil. In the rush to get the story out, Life and other publications casually referred to her as a "coed," no doubt because of her size and apparent maturity. In fact, she was a fourteen-year-old runaway girl from a Florida junior high school, who after a series of drifting adventures and happenstances, had ended up in Kent, Ohio at the time of the tragedy, and who had been drawn to the campus out of momentary curiosity.⁶⁹

As a symbol of a particular set of feelings about what had happened, the Kent State Girl is perfect. But the symbol also acted to distort a reality about which the public needed to know. First, a point about which youth "alienated" with the "phoniness" of American life might reflect: the Kent State Girl is not herself what she was reported at the moment to be--except that she was, indeed, shocked and stunned. Those--young people, media representatives, others--who later conveniently and uncritically accepted her as a symbol participated in at least two important distortions. On the one hand, by focusing on Mary Vecchio as a symbol, the special and sensitive role of outside young people in campus demonstrations was further confused, for Kent and for the subsequent massive protests that followed elsewhere. Unattached young people clinging to a campus are one of the least understood components of major collective violence on and around campus. While "outsiders" are often a too convenient excuse for explaining what happened on campus,⁷⁰ there is urgent need to understand the role they have apparently had in escalating incidents, from Berkeley in 1964 to the Harvard Square "trashings" which still continue. The Kent State Girl confused this issue and drew attention away from it. On the other hand, by doing this the Kent State Girl did, in a sense, draw attention away from Mary Vecchio herself.

⁶⁹ James Michener, using the good reporter's eye and the novelist's skills, presents by far the best available portrait of this girl, Mary Vecchio. Michener, op. cit., pp. 543-555.

⁷⁰ See, for example, the account of what happened at Columbia University in 1968, above, pp. 353-356.

She was soon identified and returned home, but it would appear that her own problems are rapidly becoming submerged to her value as a symbol. By being romanticized and symbolized, numbers of disoriented, maladapted, drifting youngsters who need and who may want specific assistance are deprived of it, while they continue to search in hunt for the next diversion.

Obviously the problems illustrated in Figure IV-1 and IV-2 go far beyond the abilities and requirements of momentary campus tactics. But in the volatile, issue-oriented world of college and university protest, there is a special requirement for accurate public information: improper reportage can create myths which later make achievement of stability on a particular campus much more difficult.⁷¹ To enhance the likelihood of effective, factual dissemination of pertinent news, therefore, university and law enforcement officials should make sure that:

- . 1 An officially designated public information officer, with access to all facts but briefed on whatever special security requirements obtain, is available to the media at all times before, during, and after campus disorder and violence.
- . 2 The requirements of public information be specifically considered and built into all campus contingency planning and all after-action reporting.

The close contemporary connection between events on campus and events in the larger society almost guarantees that ad hoc public information arrangements will create particular problems in responding effectively to specific campus disorders, and at the same time, intensify the already severe social problems America faces.

The Rule of Law on Campus

Officials who appreciate the importance of issues in defining and guiding campus protest should be prepared to recognize that the motivations which make

⁷¹ Of course, this can work the other way, too. A student who has seen media distortions of what he "knows" is true may be moved to behave more rationally in the future, because he is more critical about what is presented to him as "fact."

issues important to collegians can and must be enlisted to restore tranquillity to the campus. The student who earnestly raises and debates issues and who insists through protest that they be heard can be asked to participate more directly in governing the campus, especially through the process of preparing and ratifying workable charters of rights and responsibilities which can govern the debate of issues there. The evidence that the majority of students reject extremist tactics,⁷² coupled to the obvious power issues and debate have on many campuses, suggests that there is a strong constituency waiting on most campuses to be properly involved in campus governance. Such involvement cuts the heart from the activist claim that students have no "power," that they are at the mercy of a repressive bureaucracy which denies them the "due process" they deserve as citizens.

Thus, in response especially to recent turmoils, many colleges and universities are now actively re-examining their disciplinary procedures, with an eye toward drawing up acceptable codes of rights and responsibilities to which students and all others on campus will then be held accountable. The doing of this is, in itself, an activity which requires considerable legal skill, and in which local criminal justice officials might well participate. There is a problem, of course, in that student codes of rights and responsibilities can be misunderstood as having full legal status in courts of law, and that disillusionment with them can occur when a student finds them seemingly disregarded or devalued by officers of law enforcement and criminal justice. Obviously, where a student-accepted code of rights and responsibilities does exist, local law enforcement and criminal justice agencies are well advised to give them maximum opportunity to govern behavior on campus, even during crisis.

Clearly, on a campus where individuals of citizenship age will not accept the practical responsibilities of citizenship, or where they are frozen out from meaningful participation in defining their roles as citizens, there is little hope of establishing the peace required for academic work, especially when activists

⁷²See above, pp. 327-330.

insist on pointing out these facts. Yet involving all members of the academic community in active campus citizenship is more than a procedural device useful in stabilizing a campus. This involvement is, fundamentally, a process of affirming the values for which the college and university were established. By affirming their values institutionally, persons are more likely to try to live them individually. And without a major group on campus which is willing to affirm the rational and moderating values which govern university life, there is little law enforcement and criminal justice officers can do to "save" a campus.

The importance of affirming values as an integral part of preserving a campus before, during, and after disorder and violence is illustrated by the events at George Washington University in Washington, D. C., during early May, 1971, when the central campus was subject to physical invasion by the "Mayday Tribes" which had come to "stop the Government."⁷³ George Washington is a private urban university located at its nearest approach only six blocks from the White House. Because of its proximity to the seat of government, GW had been targeted for some time by radical activists as a likely staging or retreat area for violent demonstrations. For several years, GW had been learning what this meant: Washington Metropolitan Police roadblocks and cordons, chemical agents to clear the streets, interference with student life and faculty functions. The absence of walls and gates around the campus buildings, the closeness of the buildings to the streets, and the large daily inflow and outflow of commuters had created a physically open campus, almost impossible to secure from outsiders. The question confronting George Washington officials prior to Mayday, 1971, was not whether outsiders as well as police would be in or around the university, but how to keep the university open in spite of the invasion. All responsible correctly understood this as one of several tests of GW's abilities to do its work while insiders and outsiders injected it into activism.

As events unfolded, GW did experience intrusion of outsiders and police in the narrow streets which cut through the campus. Gas hung in the air. Control

⁷³The Washington Mayday, 1971 experience is analyzed below in Chapter V, "Collective Violence in Actions by Extremist Groups."

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was exercised through careful scrutiny of student identification cards; those without them were likely to be arrested by the heavy contingent of police in the streets. Yet George Washington University did stay open, and although there was some reduction in class attendance, GW conducted many normal activities. While some argued cynically that this was largely because University officials were afraid of a law suit in the event they suspended classes and denied students the education for which tuition had been paid, it is probable that among the factors keeping the University open were affirmations by such campus groups as the Student-Faculty Union, which issued this letter printed in the student newspaper as the lead item two weeks before Mayday:

Everyone is aware that the demonstrations and other activities planned to occur in Washington this spring may threaten the integrity of the University. This spring could also be the occasion for a renewal of the University, in which the apathy, uncertainty, and repressed hostility which have been so much a part of the atmosphere on campus this year are dispelled, substantially, by a large-scale proof that members of the community can work together, in support of ideals held in common and in recognition of the fact that ideals must possess some reality if they are to command respect.

We in the Student-Faculty Union have declared that our purpose "shall be to bring together students and faculty who share a common concern for an open university, to create structures for communication on crucial issues which affect the freedom of the members of the University community, and to defend the rights of all against internal and external repression." By an "open university," we mean an institution which is, with respect to political issues, open to the world and committed to preserving for its members the freedom of inquiry, peaceful assembly, and advocacy. We believe that a consciousness of political issues and their impact upon the University is appropriate at this time; we also believe that specific concerns and positions should be forced upon no one, and that the normal operations of the University should not be disrupted by those who are concerned.

In preparation for the stresses which may develop on the campus in late April and the first week of May, the Union has begun to make plans for the following:

1. An Information Center to provide information about activities on and off campus during the period April 20 to May 8; a directory of persons and offices to be contacted for various kinds of information, decisions, and services; a board for bulletins

and messages; news, in case of trouble, of conditions and events on and around the campus; liaison with campus and city authorities, and news of decisions affecting the GW community.

2. A trained and organized group of Campus Marshals, working with the staff of the Information Center, to supply information and provide a moderating and mediating presence.
3. A program of classes, discussions and forums to coexist with the regular classes and other activities of the University, which would enable students and faculty together to focus on some of the issues created by the war and by protest against it.

We are a small group. We need the support and active participation of many members of the community--faculty, students and administrators--if we are to complete and carry out the plans outlined here. We call upon all who are interested to meet with us to discuss them. There exists everywhere in the University today an unpleasant uncertainty about what is going to happen and what is going to be done about it. There are things that can be known and things that can be done.

We hope you will come prepared to give some time to one or more of these efforts. Anyone who cannot attend the meeting, or who wishes further information should call...⁷⁴

Distinctive about this appeal was the direct linkage it made between general university ideals--"open to the world and committed to preserving for its members the freedom of inquiry, peaceful assembly, and advocacy"--and practical steps which members of the university community were about to take to guarantee this freedom. In the light of this fundamental affirmation of values, these practical steps were more than measures which would work to the benefit of law enforcement and criminal justice agencies. They were an assertion that the rules of law which govern a university community must, in the end, be preserved by the affirmative action of those on campus who believe in them.

⁷⁴"Open U. Group Prepares for Spring," George Washington University The Hatchet, April 15, 1971 (LXVII, 45), pp. 1 and 3.

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