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**ANTITERRORISM MEASURES: THE ADEQUACY
OF FOREIGN AIRPORT SECURITY**

STAFF REPORT

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES



AUGUST 8, 1986

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FOREWORD

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC, August 8, 1986.

This report has been submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs by the staff task force on international terrorism and diplomatic security study mission to Frankfurt, Rome, and London, from May 25 to June 4, 1986, and to Athens from July 7 to July 13, 1986. The findings in this report are those of the study mission and do not necessarily reflect the views of the membership of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

DANTE B. FASCELL, *Chairman.*

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC, August 8, 1986.

Hon. DANTE B. FASCELL,
*Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: During the period May 25-June 4, 1986, and the period July 7-13, 1986, the House Foreign Affairs Committee Staff Task Force on International Terrorism and Diplomatic Security visited Frankfurt, Rome, London, and Athens. The purpose of these trips was to review the implementation of the Foreign Airport Security Act and relevant security issues at each of the international airports visited. In addition, the staff task force met with host government officials to discuss policy issues with respect to international terrorism and reviewed the status of security projects at the U.S. Consulate General in Frankfurt, the U.S. Embassies in Rome, the Vatican, London, and Athens.

The staff task force also met with the German border guard special counterterrorism unit (GS-G9) located near Bonn, the special branch counterterrorism office of Scotland Yard and the Foreign Ministry in London, and the head of the Foreign Ministry's counterterrorism office in Rome. At all of the airports visited, the staff task force met with the representatives of the various airport authorities, local police, U.S. flag air carriers, and host government air carriers.

We would like to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to those officials in the Department of State, the Federal Aviation Administration, and at the U.S. diplomatic missions abroad who assisted the staff task force in their study.

Sincerely,

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Senior Staff Consultant.

TONI G. VERSTANDIG,
Staff Consultant.

ROBERT M. JENKINS,
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BETH A. FORD,
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THOMAS W. BRUCE,
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PREFACE: PRINCIPAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. *Travel and tourism.*—Due to the FAA extraordinary security requirements issued following enactment of the Foreign Airport Security Act and self-initiated actions, the U.S. carriers serving the international airports visited (Frankfurt, Rome, London/Heathrow, and Athens) maintain higher security standards and procedures than the other foreign air carriers (with the possible exception of El Al).

The foreign international airports surveyed have been assessed by the FAA and have been judged to be in compliance with the minimum safety and security standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). While certain deficiencies still exist at the four airports surveyed, each of the airports has taken steps to upgrade its security procedures this year and has, in varying degrees, cooperated with the U.S. Government and U.S. air carriers in the implementation of the Foreign Airport Security Act. Of the four airports, London/Heathrow maintains the highest overall level of security.

2. *Port and cruise ship security.*—The staff task force found that the privately owned Greek cruiseline industry has taken the lead in establishing security procedures on cruise ships operating out of the Port of Piraeus. Specifically, they have unilaterally imposed the security measures outlined in the draft International Maritime Organization (IMO) recommendations, which are to be finalized during the upcoming IMO meeting in September. The IMO draft measures were proposed by the United States following House passage of H.R. 4151, the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986.

3. *Reciprocity.*—The staff task force recommends that, in order to ensure a universally high level of security, foreign flag carriers should be required to institute equivalent security procedures to those required of U.S. carriers as envisioned by the Foreign Airport Security Act. For example, the staff task force noted that most foreign carriers are not required to implement equivalent security measures, despite the high volume of Americans they carry. The staff task force recommends reciprocity; that is, if foreign flag carriers do not implement equivalent security measures, they should be prohibited from flying directly to or from the United States. The staff task force notes that Federal Aviation regulation 129 now requires that foreign carriers maintain a security program for flights servicing the United States and submit a security plan for the last point of departure to the United States. In fact, the FAA has cited one of the foreign carriers observed by the staff task force for not meeting current minimum security standards. The staff task force urges the FAA to use this existing authority to require that those

programs and plans be strengthened to contain security procedures equivalent to those now required of U.S. carriers by the FAA following enactment of the Foreign Airport Security Act.

4. *Federal Aviation Administration.*—It is clear that the FAA has not made the transition from a nuts and bolts airline mechanical safety approach to a broader internationally oriented airline security program. The staff task force recommends that the FAA reorganize its relevant Washington headquarters and overseas offices in order to more adequately implement the spirit and the letter of the Foreign Airport Security Act. In this respect, it is recommended that the FAA should divide the security office in Washington into international and domestic security components. In order to provide the expertise in the international field and to address the criticism that the FAA remains too domestically oriented, the staff task force suggests that a Diplomatic Security Service officer (Department of State) with overseas experience be detailed to direct the FAA's international security program in this high-threat transition period as the FAA attempts to recruit and train its own corps of professional security experts with overseas experience.

In addition, the FAA must increase the security/policy component of its Brussels office in order to meet the requirements of the Foreign Airport Security Act.

5. *Air marshals.*—The staff task force recommends that the FAA consider modifying the role of the current Air Marshal Program. Further consideration should be given to expanding the ground role of the air marshals to more fully utilize them as onsite security coordinators to complement U.S. airline efforts and to provide U.S. Government representation in security activities in high-threat airports.

6. *U.S. Government responsibility and coordination.*—The staff task force recommends that the FAA and our embassies make the initial and necessary continuing demarches at the government level on requirements for enhanced airline security measures in order to avoid the current situation of having the airlines "fight it out" individually with host government and airport authorities.

7. *State-sponsored terrorism and the airlines.*—The staff task force found in all airports visited a great concern about the presence of national carriers of radical governments, and the possibility that state-supported terrorist organizations could use these informal presences to conduct or stage terrorist acts. The staff task force recommends that the U.S. Government place high on the agenda, in both bilateral and multilateral discussions of international terrorism, the question of state-sponsored terrorism, specifically the use of airlines and airport ticket offices by terrorist states. Specifically, the U.S. Government should raise this issue and broader security issues at the next meeting of the International Civil Aviation Organization in September and should call for the prompt convening of the Summit Seven Experts Group on International Terrorism.


8. *Host government/airport authority responsibility for security.*—Given the escalating threat of international terrorism against airports and aviation in general, concerned governments and/or airport authorities should provide the additional security required to combat this threat. In light of the fact that virtually all aircraft

hijackings have been committed by fare-paying passengers, the importance of passenger and carry-on baggage screening cannot be overemphasized. The recent attempted terrorist incidents in London and Madrid highlight the importance of redundant passenger security checks. The staff task force finds that there is no reason why any government or airport authority should not fully cooperate and participate with any carrier in conducting these redundant checks.



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INTRODUCTION

On August 8, 1985, the President signed into law the Foreign Airport Security Act which was contained in the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-83). This law was formulated by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, in coordination with the Public Works and Transportation Subcommittee on Aviation, in response to the growing number of terrorist acts directed against foreign international airports and the international aviation industry in general.

In brief the act does the following:

- Mandates that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) conduct periodic security assessments of foreign international airports used by American carriers;
- Specifies that these assessments be measured against the minimum airport security standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO);
- In carrying out these assessments, the Secretary of Transportation must consult with the Secretary of State regarding the terrorist threat which exists in each country and also to determine which foreign airports are not under the de facto control of the government of the country in which they are located;
- If an FAA assessment demonstrates that such an airport is substandard, the Secretary of Transportation, after advising the Secretary of State, must notify that foreign government and recommend the necessary steps to bring the security measures at that airport up to standard; and
- If after 90 days that government has not brought its airport up to the appropriate standards the following sanctions must be imposed:
 - (A) Issuance of a travel advisory by the Secretary of State;
 - (B) Publication in the Federal Register of the identity of that airport;
 - (C) Public advertisement of the determination against that airport; and
 - (D) Notification of travel advisory in all airline tickets sold.

Suspension of all assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or the Arms Export Control Act to any recipient country in which such an airport is located may also be imposed.

In addition to this 90-day process, the act provides for immediate notification, issuance of travel advisory, and suspension of air service to any airport if the Secretary of Transportation determines that a condition exists which threatens the safety and security of passengers, aircraft, or crew traveling to or from such an airport.

Beyond this legislation, H.R. 4151, the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act, which is currently pending in Congress contains a similar title relating to maritime security. This title does the following:

- Establishes international standards for seaport and shipboard security;
- Directs the Secretary of Transportation and the Secretary of State to seek agreements on security measures for seaport and shipboard security at the International Maritime Organization;
- Establishes international measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and crews on board ships;
- Establishes a regime for the assessment of security standards at foreign ports which pose a high risk of acts of international terrorism;
- Directs the Secretary of State to immediately issue a travel advisory with respect to any port where a condition exists that threatens the safety and security of passengers, passenger vessels, or crews; and
- Authorizes the President to suspend passenger services to any port in a foreign country which he determines in any way arms, aids, or abets any terrorist organization which knowingly uses the illegal seizure of passenger vessels as an instrument of policy.

Finally, the bill establishes a similar regime for domestic port security assessments and standards.

On April 22, 1986, during an oversight hearing on the implementation of the Foreign Airport Security Act conducted by the Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science, International Operations, and on Aviation (Public Works), the Department of Transportation testified that the FAA had conducted some 70 assessments of foreign airports pursuant to the requirements of the Foreign Airport Security Act. Subsequently, the committee was informed that the first 90-day notification on a foreign airport had been invoked. In addition to the April 22 hearing, the Foreign Affairs Committee also held oversight hearings on April 17 and May 16, 1986.

In addition to the committees' oversight and other activities in Washington, the chairman of the committee, the Honorable Dante B. Fascell, instructed the staff task force on international terrorism and diplomatic security to begin a series of oversight trips to selected foreign international airports to review and evaluate the implementation of the Foreign Airport Security Act and the extent of host government support for the implementation of the requirements of the act. The first of these trips covered the international airports in Frankfurt, Rome, and London. The second covered airport, seaport, and cruise ship security in Athens.

Specifically, the chairman requested that the staff task force examine the extent of U.S. Government support for U.S. carriers in fulfilling the requirements of the Foreign Airport Security Act and the U.S. Government's efforts to encourage host governments to cooperate in the implementation process.

In preparation for this trip, the staff task force consulted the Department of State's Office of Counter-Terrorism, Bureau of Diplo-

matic Security and Office of Aviation, the FAA, the Air Line Pilots' Association, the Air Transport Association, and representatives of several U.S. air carriers.

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA)

GENERAL

Following enactment of the Foreign Airport Security Act, the FAA issued extraordinary security procedures and categorized all international airports according to threat. These categories determine the number of assessments to be done at these airports each year. To date, the FAA has done 71 such assessments.

The staff task force found that the FAA representatives were by and large very professional and concerned about airport security. However, it is clear that the FAA in Washington has not successfully made the transition from its historic role of a nuts and bolts approach to domestic airline mechanical safety to a broader internationally oriented airline security program, in coordination with the Department of State, as mandated by the Foreign Airport Security Act. The act requires a heavy emphasis on the international component of airline security and antiterrorism measures.

Because of the FAA's traditional domestic orientation, all too often the U.S. airlines are required to add new security measures, told to implement them and then left to fight it out individually with host government and airport authorities. One airline representative asserted that "everything we have achieved . . . has been fought for tooth and nail." Given the recent increase in the terrorist threat to U.S. carriers overseas, it is recommended that the FAA's original mandate should be formally redefined to provide greater emphasis on the importance of providing security (i.e., an expanded role for air marshals, special agents, or other qualified FAA security personnel) for U.S. carriers overseas, as well as assisting these carriers in implementing the new extraordinary security requirements. In conjunction with this recommendation, the staff task force strongly recommends that the FAA and our embassies make the initial and necessary continuing demarches at the government level with respect to enhancing security measures. Such a strong U.S. Government role would ensure that host governments recognize that enhanced airline/airport security is a policy matter of the highest importance to the U.S. Government. In the current high-threat terrorist environment, security must be treated as a given as opposed to a factor affecting airline competitiveness.

This fight it out situation overseas is the result of a variety of problems. First, the enactment of the Foreign Airport Security Act occurred at a time when the FAA security component was seriously understaffed. Obtaining additional resources for the FAA and other government agencies has been particularly difficult during the period of fiscal austerity under the Gramm-Rudman balanced budget provisions. FAA sources told the staff that there was, and continues to be, a significant time lag in getting the bureaucratic

approval for additional slots. In fact, the judgment is that the FAA is some 20 positions short of their target and will probably need to add 50 to 100 more positions in order to fully staff a new international security division and a separate domestic division. In addition to this, the requirements for the expanded Air Marshal Program and threat analysis staff will undoubtedly require that more personnel be added. In order to provide the expertise in the international field and to address the criticism that the FAA remains too domestically oriented, the staff task force suggests that a Diplomatic Security Service officer (Department of State) with overseas experience be detailed to direct the FAA's international security program in this high-threat transition period as the FAA attempts to recruit and train its own corps of professional security experts with overseas experience.

Second, the limited number of personnel currently stationed in Europe and tasked with carrying out the implementation of the Foreign Airport Security Act are not only too few, but are also not graded at a sufficiently high level to adequately carry out their responsibilities and to interface with airport directors, police chiefs, and senior host government aviation authorities. Third, the lack of policy guidance and properly designed assessment forms and guidelines on foreign airport security requirements hinder the implementation of the act.

In addition, the staff task force learned that the FAA has not established an effective mechanism for regularly distributing the FAA's assessments and any followup recommendations or enforcement actions to the U.S. Embassy so as to insure effective followup with the host government. In fact, in one country visited, the embassy was unaware of a specific security issue between FAA and the host government airline. The staff task force recommends that, immediately following an FAA assessment or finding regarding airport security, such information should be provided to the American Embassy team responsible for aviation matters and security (the aviation attaché and security officer).

Because of the new security measures required of the U.S. air carriers pursuant to the Foreign Airport Security Act, representatives of U.S. air carriers and some U.S. Government officials stated that the added costs and time factors involved have placed the U.S. carriers in a competitive disadvantage with foreign air carriers on the same routes. The staff task force was informed that one U.S. carrier was spending approximately \$2 million a year on security at one European airport and \$1 million each at two other stations. The issue of the increasing cost of security becomes particularly relevant when considering the technological advances being made in the field of x-ray screening and bomb detection and the costs of these new state-of-the-art systems. For example, one member of the staff task force recently visited the FAA's technical center near Atlantic City. He was informed that one of the new devices being developed to detect explosives would cost approximately \$300,000-\$500,000 per unit. In light of the spiraling costs of security measures, the staff task force recommends that the FAA and Congress investigate the desirability of restoring government financial support to U.S. carriers flying abroad who are required by Federal law to implement extraordinary security measures.

In addition, the staff task force recommends that, in order to ensure a universally high level of security, as well as competitive fairness, foreign flag carriers should be required to institute security procedures equivalent to those required of U.S. carriers. For example, the staff task force noted that certain foreign flag carriers do not implement equivalent security measures, despite the high volume of Americans that they carry. Reciprocity with respect to security requirements can be achieved under existing law. For example, part 129 of the regulations established pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act requires foreign air carriers to maintain security programs for flights servicing the United States and to submit to the FAA a security plan for the last point of departure from the foreign airport to the United States. This regulation was used successfully in the 1970's to upgrade security during the peak of aircraft hijackings. The staff task force strongly recommends that the FAA utilize this existing authority to require that foreign air carriers adopt equivalent security measures. Failure to implement equivalent security measures should involve sanctions, such as suspension of direct flights to the United States on the part of such foreign carriers.

However, the staff task force was reminded repeatedly by host government security officials that the security at U.S. international airports was inadequate. In fact, some airport authorities consider some U.S. international airports to be substandard in security and therefore require additional security measures for flights originating in the United States. The staff task force believes that the U.S. Government may be in a weak position in demanding that foreign airports maintain higher levels of security than are maintained at international airports in the United States. This problem is not a new issue: A report was released in 1985 by the House Government Operations Committee on the status of security at U.S. international airports. In addition, the FAA testified at a recent hearing of the Subcommittee on Government Activities and Transportation that security at Dulles International Airport was rated as "marginal" in an official FAA assessment of that facility.

In brief, it is clear that the FAA's new role will require additional personnel and resources. As the lead U.S. Government Agency with respect to aviation security, the FAA must exercise a greater degree of leadership and initiative in demonstrating the U.S. Government's commitment to protecting U.S. citizens against acts of aviation-related terrorism.

AIR MARSHALS

During the oversight hearings on the Foreign Airport Security Act, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation received testimony that the Air Marshal Program has significantly improved with respect to the quality of the personnel and the degree of interface with the airlines and their crews. They appear to have a better understanding of their in-flight and ground coordination roles than was previously exhibited. Presently, the air marshals have a ground security responsibility component in their job description and have become the nucleus of the FAA's security apparatus. In addition, they are

more familiar with the international dimension of security and are often used to provide the foreign airport security training component of the Department of State's Anti-Terrorism Training Assistance Program.

The staff task force recommends that the FAA consider modifying the role of the current Air Marshal Program. Specifically, consideration should be given to expanding the Air Marshal Program to more fully utilize them as ground security coordinators to complement and provide U.S. Government representation at security screening points in high-threat airports. This would be similar, though not identical, to the El Al check-in procedure, which was observed at one of the airports visited. This recommendation is enthusiastically endorsed by all the U.S. carriers consulted, as well as the Air Transport Association, who feel that the air marshals would serve a far more useful role on the ground and would serve to reassure the American public of the U.S. Government's commitment to the enhanced security of U.S. carriers at high-threat airports. This change is seen as a way of complementing and enhancing the security which is currently being provided by U.S. air carriers.

It has alternatively been recommended that members of the U.S. Armed Forces be utilized for this purpose. Historically, the use of members of the military by the Air Marshal Program has been fraught with a multitude of problems. The staff task force engaged in extensive discussions on the current feasibility of using U.S. Armed Forces in this program and found that this alternative is less than desirable. Experts noted that it would be complex, create enormous problems with host governments, as well as raising problems within the U.S. Government with respect to command and control, and because they are a rotating work force, they would not provide needed continuity.

TRAINING

All U.S. carriers were highly critical of the first post-Foreign Airport Security Act antiterrorism training program designed by the FAA, which involved a one-time 8-hour course. They all felt that training was necessary, but that the initial FAA course was poorly designed, improperly presented and did not adequately represent the international dimension of the threat. Although the carriers could have developed their own course, they were under an FAA-imposed time constraint to implement the course. The staff task force recommends that the FAA upgrade this training course and give consideration to actually providing the training themselves in order to standardize, at the highest levels, the training received by the security and flight crews of American carriers.

The staff task force strongly recommends that the FAA take a more active role and provide leadership in the training component of airline security and, in this respect, significantly improve the recurrent training course for airline personnel and insure that it is a meaningful, valuable, and interesting course designed to accomplish an objective; that is, improving airline security.

It is equally important that the Antiterrorism Training Assistance Program (ATA) be utilized more effectively to upgrade and

enhance foreign airport security in cooperation with host government authorities. The ATA program has already made an impact on the Athens International Airport (10 Greek airport officials have already participated in the program). In fact, during the staff task force's survey of the Athens airport, the ATA program was often cited as being helpful and essential to the Greek Government's effort to continue to upgrade security there.

However, more needs to be done with respect to ATA in offering training and additional equipment to address some of the remaining problems at the airport. In fact, the Government of Greece has officially requested additional assistance and training under ATA, particularly to upgrade security at the Olympic Airlines terminal. The U.S. Government should accelerate its response to this request.

SECURITY PERSONNEL

The staff task force found that the personnel employed by the airlines to enforce the extraordinary security procedures are the essential link in the overall security program. The staff task force observed both U.S. carrier security personnel and foreign airport security personnel and found a "mixed bag." They ranged from highly trained and motivated professionals to "rent a cops." For example, some U.S. carriers have employed their own professional security personnel in selected high threat airports for some time as a way of developing a cadre of dependable people who have a commitment to that organization. Pan Am also recently launched a highly publicized corporate security program designed to create its own professional security force overseas.

However, other U.S. carriers and foreign carriers serving the United States depend on the airport security forces to provide security measures. These forces may range from highly trained host government police and military personnel to a more dubious mix of security personnel. The "rent a cop" criticism was also leveled at U.S. international airports by the Air Line Pilots' Association during the oversight hearings on the Foreign Airport Security Act. In light of this situation, the staff task force recommends that the U.S. Government raise the issue of uneven security personnel and training at the upcoming ICAO General Assembly in September. In addition, the staff task force strongly recommends that the FAA address this critical issue, both with respect to the domestic component and the need for greater standardization of security at foreign international airports.

FOREIGN AIRPORT SECURITY ACT: FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

In order to conduct the appropriate oversight of the Foreign Airport Security Act, it is necessary that the reports required by the act be made available on a timely basis. The staff task force notes that the semiannual report on airport assessments has not been transmitted to the Congress (due June 1, 1986), nor has the report on the Air Marshal Program, which was due in February 1986.

The staff task force strongly urges the Department of Transportation to exercise more vigorously the 90-day notification/consultation provision in the act. There appears to be a reluctance to exercise this authority. For example, in testimony during a public hearing, a Member of Congress read an illustrative list of security deficiencies at an unnamed airport. The Department of Transportation witness responded unequivocally that under the circumstances that existed at that airport, a 90-day notice would be issued. When confronted with the fact that all of these conditions actually existed at a high threat international airport, the Department of Transportation witness was unable to provide adequate justification as to why a notice was never issued at that airport. The Congress intended that the 90-day notification provision would be automatic, whereas the executive branch appears to have interpreted it to be discretionary. The staff task force suggests that this 90-day notice can be used more effectively as a nonpublicized tool to improve the overall security standards at high threat international airports.

The staff task force notes that on May 8, 1986, the FAA issued a 90-day notification to the Government of the Philippines citing security deficiencies at the Manila International Airport. Subsequently, the FAA determined that the deficiencies cited in its assessment were not fully corrected by the end of the 90-day period. In accordance with the requirements of the Foreign Airport Security Act, the Department of Transportation made public the existence of the Manila International Airport's remaining deficiencies. Pursuant to the law, a Department of State travel advisory will immediately be issued.

Finally, the staff task force recommends that the administration and the Congress address the ongoing problem of air carriers such as Middle East Airlines operating out of airports which are not controlled by any governmental authority. In conjunction with this problem, the current law does not provide any authority or sanction with respect to international airports which continue to allow access by the national airlines of states which support international terrorism. In the event that bilateral negotiations do not resolve these problems, it is recommended that the Foreign Airport Security Act be amended to address this issue.

MARITIME SECURITY: FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

In Athens, the staff task force met with the Minister of Merchant Marine and the Commander of the Greek Coast Guard, toured the Port of Piraeus and observed the cruise ship security measures. We were informed that immediately following the *Achille Lauro* incident, the Greek cruise line industry took the lead in establishing extraordinary security measures on passenger ships departing from Piraeus.

Specifically, they unilaterally imposed the security measures contained in the draft IMO recommendations which will be considered during the IMO meeting in September. We were extremely impressed by the measures which already have been implemented, including screening of baggage and passengers, security measures to restrict access to the passenger ships, and visible identification badges for passengers and crew.

In this regard, the Greek cruise line industry and the Greek Government have taken the initiative in the area of maritime security and should continue this effort at the upcoming IMO meeting. Since the Greek cruise line industry and the Greek Government have already implemented stringent maritime security measures, it is appropriate for them to take the lead in this area during the upcoming IMO meeting. In particular, the Greek Government would like to see agreement on the following issues: Time limitations on implementing the IMO security recommendations; IMO certification procedures to ensure implementation of these security measures; and universal security measures at all ports and onboard passenger ships.

Based on our discussions with Greek maritime officials, the staff task force recommends that the United States, the Government of Greece, and other likeminded governments should initiate discussions at the IMO on the establishment of enforcement regime certification process. With respect to enforcement, the members of the IMO should agree that any government whose ports and passenger ships do not comply with IMO security standards should not be allowed to embark and disembark passengers. IMO should establish a certification mechanism to ensure compliance with the IMO security standards. Information on such certification should then be made available to the public. Barring the establishment by IMO of such a procedure, individual member-nations should consider establishing unilateral certification procedures as those contained in H.R. 4151. These procedures would be applicable to all passenger ship lines doing business in the United States.

EL AL

The staff task force met with the security directors of El Al in Rome, London, and Athens. In Rome, the staff task force had an opportunity to observe El Al's security procedures and engaged in extensive discussions on this subject with the chief of El Al security in Rome. He observed that the measures taken in the Rome airport check-in area after the December 27 terrorist attack greatly improved the security of the airport in that area. He did, however, support a U.S. air carrier request to structurally reinforce their ticket counters, and felt that the profile questions being asked by American carriers of departing passengers were good.

The chief of security shared with the staff task force El Al's security procedures, which were developed pursuant to ICAO Assembly Resolution A17/10 and Annex 9—Specifications, for clearing passengers, unaccompanied baggage, and cargo. The staff task force notes that some of these procedures, such as searching aircraft before departure at intermediate stops, are already being performed by U.S. carriers, and some other measures could be emulated by U.S. carriers. However, it must be noted that some specific security procedures of El Al are not necessarily appropriate for U.S. carriers.

It should also be noted that while the El Al profile screening is very extensive, their security representative acknowledged that it is impossible to rely solely on the profile screening, particularly on El Al flights to the United States, where there are so many more valid reasons for traveling, as opposed to traveling to Israel.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS

In May, members of the staff task force visited the FAA's technical center near Atlantic City, including the aviation security research and development program. Recently, the FAA has undertaken the development of new equipment to detect plastic explosives. In 1985, the Committee on Foreign Affairs authorized \$5 million under the Foreign Airport Security Act from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund for research and development of airport security devices or techniques for detecting explosives. For fiscal year 1986, about \$12 million is being made available for this accelerated program.

The FAA is now developing a prototype thermal-activation system for screening checked baggage and cargo. These prototypes will be available in mid-1987. This equipment will screen baggage at the rate of one bag every 6 seconds and will cost approximately \$300,000-\$500,000 per unit.

The FAA is also developing a prototype vapor detection portal for screening passengers. This device will sense the presence of vapors emitted from chemical explosives. The unit will be available in mid-1988 and will cost approximately \$30,000-\$40,000, about the same cost of current x-ray screening.

In addition, the FAA, in conjunction with the explosives industry, is studying the feasibility of adding certain chemicals to blasting caps to make them detectible by these screening devices currently being developed. The FAA is also contracting with the private sector to improve the effectiveness of walk-through x-ray units. They have contracted with Oak Ridge Laboratories to develop a system for detecting gasoline and other flammable liquids.

TRAVEL/TOURISM EFFECT ON U.S. CARRIERS

At each airport visited, particularly Athens International, Rome-Fiumicino, and Heathrow, the staff task force noted a significant drop in American tourism. In Rome, the airlines reported flights operating at 30-40 percent capacity, with slightly higher figures in London. In Athens the dropoff in American tourism has been approximately 40-70 percent. The de facto economic sanction imposed by the American traveler is having an enormous impact in Europe. Part of the reason for improvements in security at the Rome airport is a direct result of the December 27 terrorist attack, the Italian concern about their image in the United States, and the dramatic drop in tourism.

The dramatic decline in American tourism is even more noticeable in Athens, as a result of the combined effect of the travel advisory issued by the United States following the TWA 847 hijacking and the TWA 840 bombing, which happened to occur over Greece. Although the travel advisory was lifted and the Greek Government has made significant progress in improving security at the Athens International Airport and in unilaterally implementing security measures at the Port of Piraeus and on board cruise ships, the residual effects of these terrorist acts and the sustained negative media coverage are still severely impacting on the Greek tourism industry.

In contrast to the practical steps taken by the authorities in each of the countries visited, in some cases political ambivalence toward radical Arab States tends to overshadow the progress that has already been made.

A number of representatives of U.S. carriers in the four countries visited advised that about 90 percent of American travelers supported the idea of additional security checks as part of an effort to improve airport and airline security. One representative of a U.S. carrier advised that a number of American passengers complained when they failed to receive the detailed screening that other passengers received.

The staff task force observed U.S. passengers departing for the United States on American carriers at all of the airports visited. None of the passengers interviewed expressed opposition to the extra security procedures. In fact, some of the passengers complained when they were not subjected to physical searches.

Despite the continuing level of threat in Europe now, the staff task force sees no compelling reason not to travel through the airports visited, and recommends traveling on American carriers because of the high level of security and the commitment to security exhibited by the individual U.S. carriers.

In order to restore confidence to the traveling American public, the progress made to date needs to be highlighted by the White House, Department of State, and the FAA. During our visit, the

staff task force was repeatedly reminded of President Reagan's statement in a January press conference where he seemed to discourage Americans from traveling to Europe. Although in a recent press conference he noted that our Ambassador to Great Britain believed London was one of the safest cities in the world, President Reagan again seemed to vacillate on the issue of traveling to Europe. This view ignores the substantial progress that has been made by U.S. carriers, host governments, and airport authorities in improving security and in seeking to insure the safety of the traveling public in the airports visited by the staff task force.

STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM AND AIRLINES

As the U.S. Government and host governments have become more sensitized to the use of diplomatic privileges to support terrorist organizations, the issue of the use of airlines and airports by radical governments for this purpose has yet to be addressed.

While the airports visited are taking some informal steps by pay special attention to airlines such as Syrian Airlines, Libyan Arab Airlines, Iran Air, Iraq Air, and Middle Eastern Airlines, these flights and their respective offices in the airports visited continue to pose a potential threat to the airports and passengers.

The threat posed by these unofficial presences is being recognized by host governments and the U.S. Government. For example, while in Rome, the Italian Government was in the process of deporting the president of LAFICO, a major Libyan trading company as part of their review of the nonofficial presence of Libyans in Italy. However, since the staff's return press reports have indicated that the president of LAFICO would not be deported, in part due to the fear that the Libyans would withdraw significant investments from Italy.

These unofficial presences deserve closer scrutiny. For example, the staff task force was informed that an international terrorist organization utilized a national carrier of a recognized terrorist state to stage a planned terrorist incident. In addition, it was reported in the media that one of the Libyans charged with attempting to bomb a U.S. officers club in Turkey is the station chief of Libyan Airlines in Istanbul.

