

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
CALIFORNIA

INMATE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM STUDY: FINAL REPORT

JANUARY 1986

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In recent years nationwide interest in prison classification has stemmed from two primary sources: 1) increasing pressure by courts demanding that decisions affecting inmates be made in an objective and consistent manner; and 2) the search by correctional administrators for more effective placement mechanisms to deal with overcrowding and the need to allocate physical, program, and financial resources in a manner which best protects staff and inmates while meeting the primary goal of public protection.

In response to these pressures, California assumed a leadership role in the field of inmate classification in 1980 by being one of the first states to implement an objective inmate classification system to determine inmate placement. This system, considered by most experts to be one of the best and most innovative in the nation, has become the cornerstone for decision-making throughout California's entire correctional process.

The current classification system is an additive points-based system involving 38 items. Each item is weighted with points given for the inmate's pre-incarceration behavior, prior incarceration, or current in-prison behavior. The system can be described as both actuarial and consensus-based in that some items were included because research indicates that these items identify inmates who are likely to engage in misconduct, while other items were included based on a consensus of California correctional professionals.

Point brackets were established to convert an inmate's classification score into one of four classification designations, Level I through IV, which correspond to the levels of security required for different inmates. Inmates with the lowest scores are Level I while inmates with the highest scores are Level IV. Level I

is the least secure facility with the lowest risk inmates. Level IV is the most secure with the highest risk inmates.

The California Department of Corrections recently conducted a thorough evaluation of its classification system in response to a court order arising, in part, from Wilson v. Deukmejian, as well as, from growing concerns within the Department that the system "overclassified" inmates which resulted in a large number of placements that required "overrides" to the system. At the same time, the Governor's and Legislature's interest in the classification process increased as plans for new prison construction unfolded.

In April 1984 the Department issued two reports relating to inmate classification:

- Final Plan to Implement the Findings of the Court, Wilson v. Deukmejian, Phase II Report, which reviewed several specific areas of the classification system.

- Preliminary Report: Review and Analysis of Departmental Inmate Classification System, which resulted in some immediate short-term changes, as well as a recommendation for a long-term evaluation beginning in the Fall of 1984.

In May 1985 the Department issued a report entitled Inmate Classification System, Policy Report which developed a number of important policy issues, findings, and recommendations. The Policy Report is the precursor to the final findings and recommendations presented in this report.

This report makes several observations about California's current classification system based on a review of other state and federal systems and the system used in California prior to 1980 which argue against changing the basic structure of the current system:

° California's current system is a significant improvement over the previous clinical judgment based system because it provides for consistent placement based on documented policy, is generally well accepted by both staff and inmates, and provides for well documented decisions which are more easily defended if questioned.

- California's current system is in line with the current national movement toward objective classification systems.

- California's current system distributes inmates in approximately the same manner as other major state and federal systems.

However, there are several major concerns or problem areas in California's Inmate Classification System which are dealt with in this report. These are as follows:

- There are a number of indications that the classification system "overclassifies" inmates, in that it may be housing inmates in higher security levels than necessary. Much confusion exists over what this means and how to correct the problem. As a basis for resolving this confusion, "overclassification" should be defined as follows: Overclassification occurs when something is known that would place an inmate in a lower risk category (such as demonstrated "good" behavior) and the Department fails to adjust his score level and placement appropriately.

- The current score system is driven primarily by the term item, which is based on the length of an inmate's sentence. As a result, in-prison behavior appears to be given little weight. Prior research indicates that recent institutional behavior is the best predictor of future behavior in prison. In addition, analysis of the system indicates that inmates do not have sufficient opportunity to reduce their classification scores by demonstrating "good" behavior in prison. Therefore, in-prison behavior items should be given more significance.

- There are a number of legitimate policy and casework concerns which require placement of inmates in institution levels which do not coincide with that dictated solely by their classification score. Currently these legitimate placements create the perception that the classification system has failed because they are commonly called "overrides" of the inmate's score level. These policy and casework concerns, termed in this report, "Administrative Determinants", are a legitimate part of the classification process and should be formalized to insure that they are applied consistently and fairly, and to dispel the misconception that they constitute a failure of the system.

- The current system is designed to deal with the security aspects of an inmate's confinement. Matters of internal custody are dealt with by individual institutions. As a result there is no centralized custody classification policy and procedure to provide for consistent custody placements within institutions. Further study is needed to develop a custody model to be used in conjunction with the current score system.

Subsequent to the Policy Report the concept of a "Second Tier" was developed and is currently being added to the classification system to account for the policy and case work concerns. Issues relating to custody classification will be dealt

with in a long term study. Overclassification, the term item, and the importance of in-prison behavior was addressed by research and analysis which followed the policy report and is included in this report.

Validation research conducted by the Department provides strong evidence that the score system is doing a good job of sorting high-risk inmates into higher institution levels. However, due to limitations associated with the statistical techniques used and available data, the validation study was not able to provide specific guidance as to which individual factors to weight more or less heavily. Additionally, the validation study provides empirical evidence that the security and custody aspects of California's higher level institutions do a good job of reducing misconduct among the inmates who pose the highest risk to the prison system.

The Department has made extensive efforts since late 1983 to deal with the severe overcrowding problems in higher level institutions by housing significant numbers of inmates in institution levels lower than that dictated by their score alone. These efforts have been complicated by limitations placed on those institutions by various court orders. In looking back upon this experience the evidence shows that these efforts, which we now refer to as "Natural Experiments", were generally successful. Therefore, a large measure of overclassification can be eliminated if a way can be found to modify the score system in order to reflect the Department's actual placement practices.

Based on the analysis of these "Natural Experiments" and the policy issues summarized previously, the following recommendations for changes in the score system are presented:

1. Change the weight of the term item on the CDC 839 and the item on the CDC 840 which is used to correct the term item on the CDC 840 from four to three points per year.

2. Place a cap on term points at eight points above the cutoff between Level III and Level IV.

3. Drop the holds and detainers item on the CDC 839 and the item on the CDC 840 which is used to add or remove holds and detainers.

4. Modify the prior incarceration items on the CDC 839 so that points are assessed only if prior incarceration behavior points are not assessed; combine the three items into one item with a weight of four points per incarceration of more than 30 days with a limit of three incarcerations total.

In addition to the recommendation for basic score system changes, this report analyzes three options for adjusting the score level brackets. Adjusting the brackets would reduce overclassification by starting inmates at lower levels immediately after admission, and permit inmates to reduce their score levels sooner once they are placed.

The three options explore different amounts of reductions in inmate score levels. Option 2 would approximate the Department's current placement practices which override many inmates to lower institution levels because of population pressures. Option 1 would result in slightly less movement, and Option 3 would result in substantially more.

Options 1 and 2 improve on the score system's ability to sort inmates with disciplinary problems into higher institutions. All three options would provide greater opportunities than under the current system for inmates to earn their way to lower institution levels based on in-prison behavior.

It is recommended that Option 1 be implemented. Option 1 would shift a substantial number of inmates to lower levels, resulting in fewer Level IV and more Level II and III inmates. Overall, Option 1 would result in a 30 percent reduction in Score Level IV inmates compared to their classification level after score system changes and the Second Tier are implemented. Excluding special housing and medical/psychiatric inmates, the reduction in Score Level IV inmates would be approximately 38 percent.

Other recommendations contained within the report include: 1) establishment of an ongoing evaluation/monitoring process; 2) an examination of the classification of the institutions; 3) the establishment of an ongoing classification research capability, and; 4) the refinement of the Inmate Classification data base.

I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years there has been an unprecedented increase both in the nation's correctional population and the judicial scrutiny of correctional systems, institutions, policies, and practices. Correctional agencies have faced state and federal litigation dealing with the totality of conditions imposed on incarcerated individuals. Courts have questioned the basis for decisions that affect the placement of inmates and demanded that criteria utilized in determining facility, housing, job, and program assignments be clearly identified and uniformly applied to all prisoners. Due to the growing recognition of the importance of inmate classification, one can predict that the current preoccupation by both the courts and correctional agencies may only be the beginning. The development of more dynamic inmate classification systems will undoubtedly continue to be one of the most significant issues facing correctional administrators for the foreseeable future.

As a result, most states are evaluating their approaches to classification. California is no exception. A heightened awareness of the necessity for an effective classification system has grown in direct proportion to the overcrowding of California's prisons and increasing pressure by the courts demanding that decisions affecting inmates be made in an objective and consistent manner. At the same time, competition from equally sensitive areas have increased the California Department of Corrections' (CDC) recognition of the need to allocate physical, program, and financial resources in a manner which best protects staff and inmates while meeting the primary correctional goal of public protection.

In response to these pressures, California assumed a leadership role in the field of inmate classification and since 1980 has used an objective, points-based classification system to determine inmate placement. This system, considered by most experts to be one of the best, as well as one of the most innovative, was developed with the assistance of a grant from the National Institute of Corrections (NIC), and represented a major departure from the previous clinical judgment model. Since implementation, it has become a cornerstone for decision-making throughout California's entire correctional process, playing a major role in planning the CDC's future construction program, as well as, an important part in developing the Department's annual budget.

Not only has California been one of the first states to implement an objective inmate classification system, it also was one of the first to recognize the need to evaluate it. This is an obvious step if the classification process is to continue meeting the changing needs of a complex correctional structure. As with any system, the classification system, albeit a very sophisticated one, is in reality only a tool which must be periodically revised and refined to meet the needs of those it serves. Because of the importance of decisions resulting from its use, it cannot be viewed as a static, unchanging device which arbitrarily controls events. The dynamics of how it operates and its effectiveness in accomplishing its stated goals must be clearly understood so that the system can be continually improved.

With this in mind CDC has recently completed a thorough evaluation of the current system. The timing of this evaluation effort was particularly appropriate in light of increasing inmate populations which makes appropriate placement even more important. There was also a growing perception that perhaps

the system "overclassified" inmates. In other words, it placed inmates in higher security level institutions than necessary. The question was: "Could some of these inmates be safely housed in lower levels without risk of escape or misconduct"? In addition to the question of overclassification, other concerns involved the increasing number of overrides of the classification system, as well as, the number and validity of factors currently contained in the score system.

Additionally, there was a great deal of interest in validating the system design now that sufficient data was available to examine the results of inmate placement over a multi-year period. By testing or validating the predictive capability of the system and determining the contribution of each individual factor, refinements might be developed to improve the process while objectively dealing with the various criticisms of the system.

Coincidentally, the Governor's and the Legislature's interest in the Department's classification process increased as plans for new prison construction unfolded. These officials began raising questions concerning the planned levels of institutions and the costs associated with building new prisons.

During this same period, a court order arising from Wilson v. Deukmejian required the Department to review specific areas of the inmate classification system and report back to the court. In preparing the response, it became evident that the limited examination required by the court would not totally satisfy departmental or legislative concerns. A more extensive preliminary evaluation (Phase I) was therefore instituted in 1983.

In 1984 a report entitled Preliminary Report: Review and Analysis of Departmental Inmate Classification System was issued presenting the results of this evaluation. It recommended implementation of a series of immediate short-term changes to the California Inmate Classification System and provided the foundation for a second phase long-term evaluation and validation of the system. The short-term changes were subsequently implemented and the longer term review scheduled for the Fall of 1984.

As scheduled, the second phase evaluation began in the Fall of 1984, however, because of unanticipated problems in the validation component of the study, a report entitled Inmate Classification System Study Policy Report was issued on May 31, 1985 in anticipation of the completion of the study by January 1986. A summary of the policy issues, important findings, and recommendations resulting from the Policy Report can be found in Chapter III.

Since the Policy Report was published the validation efforts have been completed. This report presents the summation of what has been learned about the California Inmate Classification System since the evaluation began. It is self-contained and provides the reader sufficient background information to develop a basic understanding of classification systems as well as information on the current evaluation, findings, and needed revisions to the system.

II. BACKGROUND AND SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

A. BACKGROUND

Historically, correctional systems were called upon simply to maintain the offender in a setting which precluded interaction with the community. This philosophy resulted in correctional practices which established prisons far from population centers and away from public view. Little attention was paid to prison conditions, and the concepts of prison reform and program opportunities for inmates gained very limited public support. During these years, only the most rudimentary forms of inmate classification, such as fundamental separations of men from women, adults from juveniles, and occasionally, the nuisance offender from the dangerous were used.

Prison labor was central to institutional functioning and provided the typical activity of inmates. Little in the way of classification was needed since virtually all inmates were similarly housed and their time was occupied in essentially the same manner.

The late nineteenth century brought experiments in educational and rehabilitative programming. These flourished in the twentieth century as the psychological and sociological roots of crime, and treatment efforts required to achieve correction were developed. Enthusiasm for the rehabilitation of offenders peaked in the 1960's and early 1970's and then changed quickly as the public became increasingly frustrated with rising crime rates, violence, and the perceived failure of many correctional programs.

At the same time, new legislation was passed in many states increasing both the number of individuals sentenced to prison and the length of sentences for many offenses. As a result, prison populations already rising increased dramatically, putting tremendous strain on existing facilities.

Presently the status of corrections in the United States includes increasingly overcrowded and dangerous institutions, a perceived public demand for harsh sentences, and the opinion of many courts that prison conditions are often so inadequate that they violate basic constitutional rights to just and humane punishment.

Consequently, there is a clear recognition nationwide of the need to examine our historical approaches to classification in order to develop more efficient and effective systems. Classification is now viewed as both a major management tool for corrections and a means for enhancing consistency and equity in decision-making.

Recent Federal Court involvement in corrections has caused many agencies to "rethink" the relationship between classification and management issues. The Court's recognition of the importance of classification to corrections' management was best expressed in Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 965 (DRI 1977):

> "Classification is essential to the operation of an orderly and safe prison. It is a prerequisite for the rational allocation of whatever program opportunities exist within the institution. It enables the institution to gauge the proper custody level of an inmate, to identify the inmate's educational, vocational, and psychological needs, and to separate non-violent inmates from the more predatory... Classification is also indispensible for any coherent future planning."

In short, inmates must be assigned to facilities which provide the security and necessary programming appropriate to the degree of risk and need presented by each inmate. To accomplish this, well developed methods of inmate assessment consistently applied throughout the system are required. In response, objective systems of inmate classification have been developed in recent years by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, National Institute of Corrections, and approximately 30 individual states including California.

B. METHODS USED TO DEVELOP OBJECTIVE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

1. Subjective Versus Objective Models

Prior to the development of objective instruments, most classification decisions were based on the subjective judgment of correctional professionals, who relied on experience and intuition in determining inmate placement. Even though agencies sometimes specified criteria to be considered by classification staff, the relative importance of each factor was often left to the subjective judgment of the individual counselor and/or committee. Furthermore, such criteria generally had little or no relationship to actual prison behavior, and often served to perpetuate myths concerning offender conduct.

The most prominent objections to subjective classification systems include the following issues:

- Constitutionality. Courts have found that entirely subjective methods of placement at initial classification or reclassification are not likely to result in the proper assignments to prevent harm to or by any individual inmate (Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir., 1971).

- Arbitrariness. Although a loosely structured system theoretically has the capability to respond to needs on a case-by-case basis, it has the inherent danger of arbitrariness. Because there is little guidance for classification personnel, it may be difficult to explain the basis for many placements as other than "gut feelings". Inmates are very likely to perceive the decisions as unfair, and this can lead to frustration (and its potential consequences), or to "caseworker shopping" (to acquire the most favorable placement recommendations.) Further, arbitrary placement decisions are less likely to result in inmates receiving supervision consistent with their needs.

- Inconsistency. A completely subjective method of placement is especially susceptible to inconsistent decisions. That is, even with the best of intentions, two classification committees may independently arrive at very different decisions in any given case. Although some variation is acceptable, such a system necessarily impedes meeting the basic objectives of classification and good management.

° Validity. The validity of an instrument is its capacity to measure or predict what it claims to measure or predict. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to test the validity of a subjective classification system. One would not be able to identify the actual decision-making components, thus one could not investigate the effectiveness and accuracy of the classification method (e.g., what factors influenced the classification decision).

In summary, placement decisions based on subjective systems are less defensible in light of court and public demands for accountability in corrections. They also rarely require much in the way of documentation and are, therefore, difficult to monitor or evaluate.

2. Types of Objective Models

Structured classification systems are generally developed either through consensus of key decision makers within an agency or through a research effort designed to identify valid indicators of prison adjustment. The latter approach results in actuarial tables similar in intent and format to those used in other disciplines. Each of these approaches to scale development is described below.

a. Consensus-Based Models - A number of states have been called upon to develop classification systems without the benefit of an existing data base. Lacking reliable descriptive and outcome data on which to test the validity of predictive factors, developers have utilized consensus as a basis for establishing decision-making criteria. Using this method, experienced staff members work in committee to achieve consensus on factors to be included in the criteria for making classification decisions. Through discussion, persuasion, and finally vote, the group agrees on a criteria which will govern the classification process. However, unless prior research is used as the foundation for considering potential classification factors, the validity of items selected remains questionable.

In most instances, items are selected based on staff perceptions, not according to any demonstrated ability to differentiate among offender groups. Thus many consensus-based systems contain a "hodge podge" of factors--some valid indicators of behavior, and some that have not demonstrated a relationship to conduct. Despite this, such systems do offer standardization and at a minimum, greatly enhance consistency in the classification decision process.

Recently, computer techniques (Interpretive Structure Modeling) have been introduced to assist in reaching consensus and in formatting classification instruments. Florida was the first state to devise a classification system using Interpretive Structure Modeling (ISM) (Fouty and Jones, 1982) and since then it has been used by both Kansas and Iowa.

b. Actuarial Models - Actuarial systems are based on the ability of a combination of factors to "predict" future events. These models are statistically derived often through the use of various types of multi-variate analyses. Linear regression, discriminant analysis, and multidimensional contingency analysis are the most common techniques encountered. Used extensively in business and economic research, actuarial techniques have also been used to develop predictive instruments for probation, parole agencies, and prison classification offices.

Many types of data such as clinical test results, social and criminal history factors can be used in actuarial prediction. Valid indicators of outcome, however, cannot be isolated without the availability of a sufficiently large, representative, and reliable

data base. The lack of such data bases in many correctional jurisdictions, represents one of the major drawbacks to the development of actuarial systems. If constructed on a small or unreliable data base, the resultant relationships may not be valid for the entire prison population.

Another weakness of actuarial prediction is that the techniques result in group statistics which have a very limited ability to predict the behavior of any given individual. Actuarial tables can indicate, for example, that an individual belongs to a group, 30% of which will adjust poorly to prison while 70% will adjust reasonably well. The instrument, however, is unable to determine which individuals will fall into the 30% or the 70% categories.

The main strength of an actuarial system is that it uses accepted statistical techniques to select variables based on their relationships to actual outcomes. If carefully constructed, actuarial systems are often able to simplify the classification process by reducing the number and complexity of the various factors considered in security and custody decisions.

Whether developed by consensus or statistical analysis, three axioms should govern the development of systems. Classification systems function best when they:

° Minimize the complexity of the classification decision process.

° Rely on variables having validated relationships with prison behavior.

° Are objective and demonstrate reliability.

3. Classification Scale Formats

Two types of classification scales are most commonly encountered: the decision tree and the additive scale.

The term "decision tree" aptly describes the branch-like format of these instruments. In such scales, the response to each question determines the next question to be asked. Decision trees can be developed using either consensus-building techniques or through statistical analysis. The following simplified example best illustrates how these scales operate:



The decision tree offers several advantages. First, these scales are relatively easy to complete in most instances, and since no computations are required, the rater reliability is usually quite high. More significantly, different levels of custody or security can be based on entirely different criteria. This allows higher level assignments to be based on potential for violence while other criteria (e.g., escape potential, management problems, etc.) can be used to differentiate between medium and lower level placements.

Two significant disadvantages of the decision-tree should also be noted. First, if incorrect information is obtained at any stage, then subsequent responses to questions may be incorrect as well. For example, if the response to a question regarding a diagnosed psychological/psychiatric problem is positive, then the inmate may receive a high security level placement. However, if there was a misdiagnosis of the problem, then the high security placement might not be warranted. Thus, a chain of incorrect decisions might begin. Second, and perhaps more importantly, these models have the potential for giving tremendous discriminatory power to a single variable. In the above illustration for example, only offenders convicted of rape, armed robbery, or murder can be placed in close or maximum custody.

On additive scales, the scores given for each item are summed and a classification level is assigned based on the total. Like the decision-tree format, additive scales can be developed through a variety of means including statistical analysis and consensus-building techniques. Additive scales overcome the basic flaw of decision-tree schemes since discriminating power is spread among many variables; often various combinations of factors can result in identical overall scores. This strength is, at the same time, the primary drawback to additive scales. All decisions are based on cutoff scores along one continuum. Unlike the decision-tree, additive models generally do not base different custody or security level decisions on different criteria. Looking back at the above diagram, for example, it is seen that maximum custody is used only for very serious repeat offenders; while completely different criteria are used to decide between medium and minimum custody.

C. DESCRIPTION OF CALIFORNIA INMATE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

In examining California's Inmate Classification System in light of the previous discussion it should be noted that both the clinical judgment model and now the objective points-based model have been utilized for inmate placement.

1. Clinical Judgment Model

Prior to implementation of the current objective classification system, the Department relied on a clinical judgment model to determine inmate placement. Under this process all decisions regarding initial placement from one of the reception centers, as well as any subsequent inter-institutional transfers were based on recommendations developed by a correctional counselor and presented in a classification report. In preparing the report the counselor relied on any information available concerning the inmate such as commitment offense, sentence, criminal record, prior institutional conduct, military record, family history, and test scores. In addition, as a part of the consideration for placement, counselors reviewed the inmate's educational and vocational needs, and specific job skills in trying to match the inmate's program needs and experience with those of a specific institution.

Utilizing this information and relying heavily on personal judgment, the counselor developed a recommendation which included a custody level of minimum, medium, or maximum and a specific institution which could meet both inmate security and program needs. The recommendation was then reviewed by either a supervisor and/or classification committee and approved by central office in an attempt to maintain consistency in the decision-making process. Central office review also insured that each institution received the number and type of prisoners it could accommodate.

Inter-institutional transfers involved much the same process, however, they relied even more heavily on the personal judgment of the correctional counselors. In addition, the institutions had developed an informal system under which, by agreement, wardens and superintendents could transfer an inmate for the good of the institution.

In 1979, because of growing criticism from both external and internal sources, the Department undertook a major study of its existing classification system. Results of the study pointed out several major problem areas associated with the clinical judgment model.

One of the primary criticisms was directed at inconsistent placement decisions resulting from the exclusive reliance on professional judgment and the absence of any specific or objective criteria for the counselor to use in determining placement. Although departmental policy provided guidelines and a general criteria for how these decisions were to be reached, they were primarily subjective in nature. As a result, each counselor had a great deal of flexibility in judging the inmate's placement needs and personal opinion and experience played a major role in each determination.

Consistency implies that like recommendations be made for inmates possessing similar histories and case characteristics. Under the clinical judgment model, however, the lack of specific criteria impacted the final judgment and decisions were made by correctional counselors who had different views of the relative importance of casework factors such as age or prior institution conduct. It was not uncommon to find significant discrepancies between decisions involving inmates with similar backgrounds or, in fact, different recommendations for the same inmate.

In addition to this inherent weakness in the system, the problems were often compounded because of the ambiguity of the criteria defining inmate placement. This resulted in it being possible to justify placement of almost any inmate in any one of the eleven male institutions given either the need of the institution or the system. An article published concerning the California system stated, "Although centralized reception is administratively convenient, the process itself was fraught with problems from the beginning. Program resources failed to materialize, receiving institutions often ignored the program prescription, and in the final analysis available bed space became the overriding consideration" (N. Holt, G. Ducat and G. Eakles, "California's New Inmate Classification System", Corrections Today, May/June 1981).

In summary, the study pointed out that in reality no system existed. Over the years, each of the 11 male prisons had in fact developed an autonomy and independence that impaired any real efforts at consistent and centrally controlled inmate placement.

Based on the initial study begun in 1979, the Department began extensive efforts to replace the clinical judgment model with an objective points-based model. A grant from NIC was received in 1979 to assist in the development of the new system which was installed in early 1980.

The above discussion draws heavily from an article written by Normam Holt and Daniel Glaser entitled "Statistical Guidelines for Custodial Classification Decisions", contained in Correctional Institution (Third Edition, M. Carter, D. Glaser and L. Wilkins, eds.). The following section provides a brief description of the current points-based system.

2. Objective Points-Based Model

The current California Inmate Classification System is an additive points-based system involving 38 separately weighted variables. Points are given for the inmate's pre-incarceration, prior incarceration, or current in-prison behavior. The system includes both positive and negative variables resulting in either a decrease or increase in the inmate's score. Both actuarial and consensus-based methods were used in arriving at the final selection of variables.

Initially, the system was designed to predict both potential for misconduct and escape based on the variables and the final score. It is, however, one dimensional in that the points are accumulated into a final score without any distinction as to whether the score represents either a higher potential for misconduct or escape.

Two instruments are used for capturing data on each inmate. The CDC 839 (see Attachment A) which is completed at the reception center and determines initial placement and the CDC 840 (see Attachment B) which is used for reclassification. Reclassification occurs at least once a year after initial placement or earlier if the inmate misbehaves.

Once the inmate classification score has been computed it is used to determine the appropriate security level to which the inmate should be assigned. The following represents the current security levels to which inmates can be assigned based upon their classification score:

Level I.....0 to 23
Level II.....24 to 33
Level III.....34 to 55
Level IV.....56 or more

Given the inmate's computed level, they are assigned to a prison with a like level designation. Level I is the least secure facility with the lowest risk inmate. Level IV is the most secure facility with the highest risk inmate. The following describes Level I through IV institutions:

Level I institutions have open dormitories with no armed perimeter;

Level II institutions have open dormitories with secure perimeter fences and armed coverage;

Level III institutions have outside cell construction, fenced perimeter, and armed coverage;

Level IV* institutions have walled perimeters, armed coverage (both inside and outside the institution), and inside cell construction.

The representative characteristics which are considered when assigning inmates to each level are:

Level I inmates generally have less than a 30-month sentence, a minor history of criminality, limited prior incarcerations, and some history of social stability;

Level II inmates generally have a sentence over 30 months, minimal history of state incarceration, criminality, escape, or institution violence background, and a lack of social stability;

*Note: Under the new prison construction program, prototype Level IV institutions have outside cell construction, fenced perimeters, armed coverage and electronic detection systems.

Level III inmates generally have a somewhat longer sentence, significant history of prior incarceration, walk-aways, escapes, disciplinaries in past incarcerations, and no social stability; and

Level IV inmates generally have long-terms, histories of extensive criminal behavior, serious disciplinaries in past incarcerations, a history of serious escapes, or terms of such long lengths that an escape attempt is highly possible. Very few Level IV inmates have histories of social stability.

III. FINDINGS OF POLICY REPORT - MAY 1985

The previous sections were included to provide the reader unfamiliar with classification systems a basis for understanding the remainder of this report. The focus now changes to deal more directly with the evaluation of California's Inmate Classification System.

Initially, the study was broken into three components. The first was designed to provide a statistical validation of the score system, while the other two included the evaluation of associated operational issues, and a review of current research literature and other state and federal systems by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD).

The validation efforts were aimed at statistically verifying the items contained on the two instruments (CDC 839 and CDC 840). It was anticipated that the results from this evaluation would indicate which items should be maintained, which could be eliminated, and how the weighting of items might be changed to improve the overall predictive capability of the system.

In addition, several major policy issues developed which had to be resolved before the study could be concluded. As a result, this portion of the study was not as successful as originally anticipated. Although a great deal was learned about the overall system, very little conclusive data was developed as to how the system should be modified.

Because of this, it was decided the validation efforts would be expanded and a final report with specific recommendations would be published in early 1986. These additional validation efforts developed within the context of overclassification discussed in the latter portion of this chapter are presented in detail in Chapter IV.

The other two components were more successful and the findings developed from them and presented in the Policy Report are summarized in this chapter.

A. ADVANTAGES OF CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

In reviewing the study findings of the May 31, 1985 Policy Report, several observations can be made in support of the basic structure of California's Inmate Classification System.

1. California's Objective Inmate Classification System is a significant improvement over the previous clinical-based system. Its basic strength lies in several important attributes it has in comparison to clinical-based systems. Simply stated it: 1) provides for consistent placement decisions based on documented policy, thus eliminating the perceived arbitrariness of the clinical approach; 2) is generally well accepted by both staff and inmates; and 3) provides for well documented decisions which are more easily defended if questioned.

2. CDC's Inmate Classification System is in line with the current national movement toward objective classification systems. This is supported by a recent survey completed by the Correctional Services Group which reports over 30 states now claiming to have implemented an objective classification model. Despite the increasing trend toward objective models, however, there still remains a certain degree of uncertainty in the field in terms of system design, proven validity, and acceptability to correctional administrators.

   Most of the models are relatively new and only in their early development stages. It will be several years and only after a series of validation studies have been completed before we will know what form

of classification system operates best and under which conditions.

Despite the relatively recent use of objective systems, however, several states now have had sufficient experience to produce a number of important trends as summarized below:

- States adopting objective-based models have experienced reductions in the proportion of inmates assigned to maximum security levels and associated population increases in minimum and medium levels of security.
- Despite the shifts in the inmate population security levels, there have been no associated system-wide increases in rates of major disciplinary incidents or escapes that can be directly attributable to objective classification systems. Some states/institutions have reported decreases in disciplinary rates.
- Acceptance of these models have generally been favorable. It appears that involving correctional staff in the development of each state's model increases the likelihood of staff acceptability.
- Little validation research has been completed on these models. The greatest amount of published information has been done on the Federal Bureau of Prisons model and most recently the California model.

Table 1 on the following page presents a brief comparison of several of the more important systems which are currently operational.

TABLE 1

SUMMARY OF MAJOR CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS

	STATES					
	CALIFORNIA	NEW YORK	ILLINOIS	FLORIDA	NIC*	FEDERAL
Implemented	1980	1981	1982	1979	1982	1979
Population	40,000	30,000	16,000	26,000	N/A	32,000
Format	Additive	Additive	Additive	Decision Tree	Additive	Additive
How Developed	Actuarial/ Consensus	Consensus	Actuarial	Consensus	Actuarial/ Consensus	Consensus***
Design Philosophy	Security	Security	Security	Security	Security/ Custody	Security/ Custody
Override	30%**	15-20%	15%	20%	Varies	14.5%
Reduced Security Levels	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Increased Disciplinary Rates	No	?	?	No	?	No
Validation	Completed (1986)	None to Date	In Process (1985)	Partial	In Process (1985)	In Process (1985)
Staff Acceptance	Good	Good	Good	Good	Mixed	Good

*National Institute of Corrections developed a model objective classification system in 1982. This model has subsequently been implemented in Vermont, Colorado, Tennessee, Wisconsin, Kentucky, Virginia, and Nevada.

**10% Overcrowding/20% Administrative

***The Federal System also used prior research studies to build consensus on the final model.

3. All in all California's system fares very well when compared to other systems. Notwithstanding some differences between the systems in terms of structure, a recent study by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD) indicated that California's model distributes inmates in approximately the same manner as both the National Institute of Corrections' (NIC) and Federal Bureau of Prisons' models. Using computer simulation techniques NCCD applied the NIC, Federal Bureau of Prisons, and California's initial classification criteria to an identical sample of inmates admitted to the Nevada Department of Prisons. As shown below in Table 2, there are few differences in security level distributions regardless of the instrument used.

TABLE 2

NCCD STUDY

FEDERAL		CALIFORNIA		NIC	
Level 6	0.0%	Level IV	3.5%	Maximum	8.1%
Level 5	2.1%				
Level 4	18.5%	Level III	15.2%	Medium	35.3%
Level 3	23.3%	Level II	28.6%		
Level 2	24.5%	Level I	52.7%	Minimum	56.6%
Level 1	32.7%				

Simulated Nevada inmate initial security level using each model's original Classification Designation (n=1,026 prison admissions).

4. A recent CDC survey of California and ten other states with large male inmate populations (Memo to Deputy Director, Evaluation and Compliance Division, March 6, 1983) shows that California's Inmate Classification System is one of the least restrictive systems in terms of housing inmates. Table 3 indicates that California housed only about 14 percent of its inmates in Level IV institutions; the equivalent to maximum

security facilities in the other states. This places California in the bottom third of the states surveyed in terms of the proportion of inmates housed in maximum institutions. The relatively small proportion housed in California Level IV institutions is due to overcrowding and population pressures which many Level IV inmates in Level III medium security institutions. However, after the implementation of Option 1 or 2 as recommended by this report the 14 percent shown in Table 3 for California would only increase to 17 percent for Option 1 and actually decrease to about 13.5 percent for Option 2.

TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE OF MALE INMATE POPULATION*
BY SECURITY OF INSTITUTIONS

STATE	TOTAL ADULT MALE POPULATION	MAXIMUM	MEDIUM	MINIMUM
California	47,122	14.2	61.6	24.2
Texas	36,077	38.4	28.6	33.0
New York**	34,779	48.0	40.0	7.0
Florida**	28,967	44.0	23.0	34.0
Illinois	17,781	45.9	39.2	14.9
N. Carolina	17,458	.9	52.1	47.0
Georgia	15,700	24.3	74.2	1.5
Pennsylvania**	13,764	44.4	44.1	9.4
Ohio**	13,620	7.6	78.9	13.4
Maryland	11,926	15.8	72.1	12.1
Louisiana	10,605	47.1	50.3	2.6

*Excluding community based.
**Percentages do not equal 100 percent due to rounding or incomplete information.

5. After subsequent evaluation it appears that several concerns about the system are, in fact, not problems in light of information developed during the recently completed study. These questions involve a perceived difficulty in completing the CDC 839 and CDC 840 because of the number of factors included on the forms, as well as, anticipation of a high error rate due to the computations required to complete the documents.

In comparing the California model to other systems (Illinois, New York, NIC and Federal Bureau of Prisons) the NCCD study found CDC's initial classification scale contains two or three times the number of factors contained in any other system and recommended the number of factors be significantly reduced. This was also in line with a general feeling in the Department that there may be too many factors and a reduction in number would simplify the form.

Validation results, however, tended to support the current structure of both documents and general indications were that the great majority of the variables had some validity. Although it could not be established that the contribution each factor made was significant, there were also no sound reasons found for eliminating any factors. A more thorough discussion of this aspect of the study is contained in Chapter IV.

In addition, the California forms are self-contained which provides for ease of completion. In other systems one factor is used to cover several items on the form and the rater is required to flip through several pages of instructions and charts to retrieve the appropriate score for individual items.

Another criticism of the forms focused on the need to multiply factors during the completion of the form. It was felt this might be contributing to a higher error rate than a more simple form without any computations would produce. Surprisingly, a recent audit of error rates showed a relatively low (5.1 percent) overall error rate. As the following table illustrates, of the 5.1 percent only 1.1 percent is attributable to computation errors on the actual score. In fact, in reviewing Table 4 only 2.3 percent (out-of-level and computation errors) of the errors actually affect the inmate's score. The remainder are primarily procedural in nature.

TABLE 4

ERROR RATE

REASON FOR ERROR	PERCENT OF ERROR
Out-of-Level, No CSR* Action	1.2
Computation Error	1.1
Date of Action or Review Missing or Not Legible	1.0
Miscellaneous	0.9
Incorrect Name or Invalid CDC No.	0.5
Auditor Signature Missing	0.3
Unused Box Not Blank	0.0

Error rates CDC 839 and CDC 840 based on 1983 data.

B. PROBLEM AREAS IN CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

In addition to the findings in support of the basic structure of the score system, there were also several major problem areas identified for which specific recommendations were presented in the Policy Report.

1. Overclassification

A major controversy surrounding the classification system stems from a common perception that the score system overclassifies inmates. Preliminary data suggest indirectly that some overclassifying is occurring; however, disagreement arises over what, if anything, should be done to correct this problem.

In the Preliminary Report released in April 1984 general observations were made which shed some light on the overclassification issue:

*CSR refers to Classification Services Representative. These are central office staff who travel to each institution and are responsible for final review and approval of all classification actions.

- Classification scores have increased in recent years resulting in more inmates being classified at higher levels, while the number of beds in higher levels has not substantially increased. Thus, the classification score system overclassifies in the sense that it produces more higher-level inmates than the Department can house appropriately. Part of this problem is attributable to the sheer increase in total inmate population (Chapter III).

- The length of an inmate's (term) sentence is the largest single determinant of an inmate's score (accounting for about 50 percent of the variation in scores - Chapter IV). The overwhelming weight given to the term factor combined with increasing sentences imposed by the courts has driven up classification scores in recent years (Chapter III). This creates a potential for overclassification since inmate scores are being inflated in a manner which is not controlled directly by the Department.

- If factors relating to positive behavior in prison are given slightly greater weight, large numbers of inmates would be reclassified to a lower level (Chapter VII). This indicates that there is a potential for housing inmates in lower levels based solely on recent behavior.

- Because of population pressures many inmates are currently being housed in institutions lower than the level indicated by their score. These inmates are no more likely to cause serious disciplinary problems than those housed in accordance with their score. It may be inappropriate, however, to conclude from this information alone that overclassification is in fact occurring since the lack of increase in serious disciplinary problems associated with housing inmates below level may, in part, be attributable to additional security measures taken at these institutions.

- The Validation Study described earlier in this report shows that the large majority of Level III and IV inmates were not involved in any disciplinary problems during the study period (65 to 95 percent depending on the criteria used). This information also suggests that overclassification may be occurring. On the other hand, the proportion of Level I and II inmates who did not get involved in behavior problems is even larger (90 to 99 percent, depending on the criteria used). It could be argued that the relatively low number of problem inmates at all levels is due to the fact that the classification system is working correctly by placing inmates where they are least likely to cause problems.

Despite all these indicators of possible overclassification it is still not clear to what extent and in what context overclassification is occurring, if at all, since the measurement of overclassification is complicated by an imprecise understanding of the problem of classifying

inmates. Often a judgment is made about the presence or absence of overclassification based solely on evidence which compares inmate scores and behavior retrospectively.

At the time of initial classification, correctional staff lack the wealth of information about how the inmate behaves in prison which will be available later at reclassification. Inmates may appear to be in a high risk group, based on all the information provided at reception such as their term length and incarceration history, but later prove to be "ideal" inmates in terms of prison behavior. It would be a mistake to label these inmates as overclassified unless, and until, we observe their "good" behavior and fail to reduce their classification score.

Thus it is better to define overclassification as follows:

> Overclassification occurs when something is known that places an inmate in a lower risk category (such as demonstrated "good" behavior) and the Department fails to adjust his score level and placement appropriately.

If the goal is to reduce or eliminate possible overclassification then the objective should be to refine the score system so that every inmate is assigned an appropriate classification level given the information available at the time the decision is made. Since the information at reception is sketchy at best, it is likely that many "good" inmates, in terms of behavior in prison, will be grouped with others who turn out to be "bad". This in itself is not indicative of overclassification unless we fail to adjust their scores when we discover the difference.

This points to several possible approaches to reducing or eliminating possible overclassification:

- Stress Initial Classification. Further study would focus on refining the admission classification score sheet (CDC 839) which would increase the predictive ability of the CDC 839 so it does a better job of identifying those inmates who will become management problems or escape. This would provide more appropriate initial placement. The primary issue would be the weight given to the term factor.

- Stress Reclassification. Further study would focus on refining the reclassification score sheet (CDC 840) to do a better job of identifying those inmates who demonstrate they are "good" or "bad", based on their in-prison behavior, and thereby insure that they are reclassified appropriately. The primary issue would be the weight given to positive factors.

- Combination of Initial and Reclassification. By examining the problems of initial classification and reclassification together the advantages of both approaches could be combined. The primary issues would be the weights given to the term factor and positive behavior factors on the CDC 840, and the dynamic relationship between the CDC 839 and CDC 840.

2. In-Prison Behavior

CDC's initial classification process results in an inmate's score being driven primarily by the term factor or sentence which is based on the inmate's crime. This becomes the foundation for determining the initial classification score. As a result, past behavior is the major factor in determining not only initial but continuing placement, whereas in-prison behavior appears to be given little positive weight during the reclassification process and has little impact on altering an inmate's placement.

Kane and Saylor (1982) found that the recency of prior institutional violence and escapes were superior predictors of future behavior compared to simple post history measures. Moss and Hosford (1982) concluded that current and accurate ratings of inmate behavior within an institution are the most important measures upon which to base classification decisions.

Both of these studies and other research tested against the Federal Bureau of Prisons model suggest initial classification items are of limited utility in predicting institutional behavior and point to recent institutional behavior as being the most important or best factors. Accurate monitoring and documentation of the inmate's behavior via reclassification instruments are critical to accurate classification decisions. In California this would mean more emphasis should be placed on current behavior via the CDC 840 reclassification form.

An associated finding was that the CDC 840 appeared to appropriately increase an inmate's score when they demonstrate negative behavior, however, it does not seem to adequately lower the score when they demonstrate positive behavior. The primary problem is in the higher level institutions where inmates with high scores receive little opportunity to reduce their scores. It takes these inmates an extremely long time to work themselves down to lower levels even when they have begun to demonstrate continued good behavior.

This observation was initially made in the preliminary evaluation of the system and confirmed to some extent through interviews with staff. It was hoped the validation of the CDC 840, primarily responsible for this movement, would cast more light on the problem. However, since the validation tests were inconclusive in regard to the CDC 840, there is no empirical data to bear out this criticism. Upon reviewing the system, however, it seems logical that this is a valid complaint.

3. Overrides

A second major criticism concerning the score system stems from the large number of inmates whose classification level designation does not reflect the level of institution where they are housed. Normally inmates are placed in an institution commensurate with their classification score. On occasion, however, inmates with special placement needs which cannot be reflected in their score are "overridden" to a different level of institution than dictated by their score. These are referred to as "exceptional placements" and can result in moving an inmate in either an upward or downward direction.

Exceptional placements can be divided into three distinct categories: 1) policy; 2) casework; and 3) those dictated by population pressures. The first category consists of those inmates who by Department policy cannot be housed below a certain level or must be excluded from being placed in a specific institution for security reasons. These include: medical/psychiatric, flamboyant homosexuals, arsonists, sex offenders, lifers, and long-term determinate sentence cases. The second group, which are referred to as casework placements, require housing an inmate in a particular institution because of a condition unique to that inmate. For example these may include: enemies, individual institution or inmate program needs, and/or gang problems. Collectively, the first two categories can be referred to as "administrative determinants" since they are the result of administrative concerns rather than the classification score itself. These differ significantly from the factors that are included in the score system because they have nothing to do with prediction, i.e., they do not identify inmates who will become a management problem.

As an illustration we can use the example of an inmate who has documented enemies within all the institutions at his score level. Given only the inmate's score on which to base a decision, it is possible that the inmate would be placed in an institution where he had enemies and would, therefore, be in danger. Since the score system has no way of developing an inmate's score based on these individual casework factors, the only reasonable decision is to override the inmate to a facility where he can be safely housed even though the level of the facility may not match his score.

The third category includes those inmates who are placed in an institution because there are insufficient beds to house them in a facility whose level matches their scores. In effect this last group are not considered valid placements in the context of the classification system since the decision is based on factors outside the scope of the classification system. In other words the placement would not have been considered were sufficient numbers of beds available in institutions of the right level.

The classification score system currently operates with about 30 percent overrides, which is approximately 10-15 percentage points above the national average. This is not as out-of-line as it looks, however, since about 10 percent of the inmates are overridden because of population pressures resulting from overcrowding, and 20 percent are related to the inmate's custody or special program needs.

In understanding the override problem it is important to note that in reality it is basically a perceptual one rather than a flaw in system design. This is primarily because many people have developed the notion that the only legitimate placement criteria is the inmate's classification score. As a result, whenever an inmate is encountered whose score does not match the institution level where he is housed, it is often considered a failure of the score system to have properly placed the inmate. In fact this is not the case since there are a number of legitimate policy based administrative determinants such as those previously defined which dictate placement over and above the inmate's score. The classification score is only one factor for deciding proper inmate placement.

It is important to recognize that the classification system utilizes these legitimate policy and casework factors in combination with an inmate's score in determining appropriate placement. Therefore, in order to minimize this perceptual problem it is necessary to combine or overlay these qualifiers or administrative determinants with the score developed by the score system in order to have a complete picture of the decision criteria utilized in each placement.

In further defining this problem it should be noted that the current classification system has a relatively clear and consistent set of procedures and practices which govern the score system. However, policies and procedures on administrative determinants are generally vague, incomplete, or totally absent.

Because administrative determinants are not formally incorporated into the classification process, the system has a certain measure of arbitrariness and confusion. As a result, there is no method of assuring that those inmates who cannot be housed according to their scores will be treated consistently. Philosophically this runs contrary to one of the primary goals of modern correctional classification which is to insure that similar inmates are dealt with in a similar fashion. This goal is desirable not only because of concerns for fairness and legal compliance, but also out of concern for administrative efficiency.

Any modification to the system that deals with administrative determinants and overrides should be embodied in clear and concise written policy. Furthermore, it should contain provisions for central authorities to audit and endorse such placements to avoid a potential for abuse. This is particularly true for casework placements since specific policies cannot be written governing these cases. In addition, any system which formalizes administrative determinants should keep these concerns separate from the score system.

Conceptually the process which has been developed to resolve this problem has been referred to as the "Second Tier". This is principally because it envisions a system whereby an inmate's score would continue to be calculated as it is currently in the score system. The score would then be overlaid or modified by specifically defined adminstrative determinants to establish the appropriate classification level.

This approach requires that all policy and procedure dealing with administrative determinants be brought together into one organized system with clearly defined instruction for reaching decisions. It also requires that the Second Tier be established as a complementary system to the existing score system so that in the future all inmate placements would be viewed as a result of the combination of score and administrative determinants (classification score + administrative determinants = classification level).

In the past there has been some confusion over the term "score level" and "placement level"; however, with the implementation of the Second Tier a new set of terminology is provided which should avoid this confusion in the future.

- "Classification score" is the score computed on the CDC 839 and CDC 840.
- "Score level" is the actual level dictated by the raw score developed for each inmate by the score system utilizing the CDC 839 and CDC 840.
- "Administrative determinants" is the body of policy and casework processes which are utilized in concert with "score level" to arrive at the appropriate "classification level".
- "Classification level" is the actual legitimate placement decision resulting from the combination of "score level" and "administrative determinants".
- "Institution level" is the actual security level of the institution in which the inmate is housed, not the level of the inmate himself.
- "Overrides" would now refer to only those placement decisions which fall outside the defined administrative determinants such as population pressure.

Figure 1 presents an example of how classification policy could be organized into a comprehensive set of administrative determinants. This is only a hypothetical representation, however, and should not be viewed as a final product. During the actual implementation of the Second Tier the reality of the classification process as related to the various institutions will dictate the final form of the administrative determinants.

Figure 2 graphically illustrates how the Second Tier would act in conjunction with the current score system. As shown, the left hand side of the figure represents the typical process flow, the right demonstrates several hypothetical examples. In the first example an inmate is processed through the reception center with a Burglary 1st conviction. Utilizing the CDC 839 his score is calculated at 16. Because there are no other circumstances which require application of the Second Tier, his score will dictate his actual placement in a Level I facility. The other two examples demonstrate how the administrative determinants included in the Second Tier could move an inmate's placement level either up or down.

In addition to the obvious benefit of effectively communicating many of the placement decisions that have, in the past, been referred to as overrides, there are several other very real advantages to implementation of the Second Tier concept:

- Removes a certain measure of confusion which is created by the current process of overriding inmates within the classification system.
- Insures that all inmates in similar situations will be dealt with similarly.
- Gives better control over classification and placement of inmates.

FIGURE 1

SECOND TIER - ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINANTS

SAFETY NET (Lowest Possible Level Placement)	ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINANT	DEPARTMENTAL POLICY
I	[A]	Camp
II	[B]	Sex offenders, arson, long determinate sentence lengths/dates, lifers, escape, holds, notoriety, pre-release
III	[C]	Medical, psychiatric, Protective Housing Unit (PHU)
IV	[D]	Security Housing Unit (SHU), condemned
Casework Specific	[E]	Enemy, gang, x-gang, program needs
Overrides*		Department Review Board, Administrative Bulletins, population pressures, miscellaneous

*Excluded from Second Tier.

Note: Administrative factors would be divided into categories A through E, reflecting the lowest level where inmates in that category can be placed. Inmates in category E could be placed in any level justified by casework factors. The organization of policies included in this example are just examples and do not necessarily reflect a policy recommendation. The actual organization of policies into administrative determinants will be made upon actual implementation of the Second Tier concept.

F I G U R E 2

Classification Score Process Including Second Tier



EXAMPLES OF INMATE PLACEMENT UTILIZING SCORE SYSTEM AND ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINANT

	EXAMPLE 1	EXAMPLE 2	EXAMPLE 3
1.	Inmate convicted of Burglary 1st. Score calculated = 16	Inmate arrested for sale of narcotics with prior for rape. Score calculated = 18	Inmate convicted Murder 2nd. Long history of mental hygiene placement Atascadero. Score calculated = 68
2.	No	Yes	Yes
3.	Administrative Determinant = ~~0~~*	Administrative Determinant = B*	Administrative Determinant = C*
4.	Score Level = I Admin. Det. = ~~0~~ Classification Level = I	Score Level = I Admin. Det. = B Classification Level = II	Score Level = IV Admin. Det. = C Classification Level = III

*These Administrative Determinants are only hypothetical and are drawn from Figure 1. They should <u>not</u> be construed as the final form into which Administrative Determinants will be organized.

- Reduces the vulnerability of the classification system to criticisms for being unfair, arbitrary, and unconstitutional.
- Will reduce overrides from 30 percent to as little as 10 percent of the population.
- Separates administrative factors and certain individual casework factors which are essentially unquantifiable, from the score system, preserving the predictive nature of the score system.
- Creates a "safety net" which would prevent certain types of inmates from dropping below the security level where they can be housed safely according to policy.
- Provides a formal mechanism for expressing department policy governing the application of administrative factors in placement decisions.

4. Custody Classification Issues

The current classification score system is basically designed to deal with the security aspects of an inmate's confinement and as a result, only gets an inmate to the "front door" of the institution. Once the inmate is delivered to the institution, matters of internal custody are dealt with by the individual institution.

For purposes of this discussion, "security" refers to physical design constraints (architectural or environmental) and perimeter staffing capabilities that contribute to the perimeter security of an institution. "Custody", on the other hand, refers to the degree and type of staff supervision provided, inmate privileges, and other program elements that relate to controlling inmates within the prison. Security could be viewed as the things that are done to prevent an inmate from escaping, while custody represents the things that are done to control an inmate's behavior within his environment.

Because the classification score system is limited to decisions relating to security, institutional custody decisions may or may not take into account the inmate's classification score. The score system, however, includes factors that relate conceptually to both custody and security concerns. For example, several factors including current and prior incarceration behavior attempt to measure the likelihood of an inmate becoming a disciplinary problem. Also, there are several factors including the term length and prior escapes, which attempt to measure the likelihood of escape. Consequently, the score system currently confuses these two concepts. It is designed to do two things, guide custody and security decisions, but generally is just used for the latter.

Furthermore, custody procedures and terminology differ widely between institutions. Thus, there is no central mechanism for controlling and setting department-wide custody policies. Consequently, the Department lacks a formal policy context by which it articulates departmental concerns for intra-prison custody decisions.

Given the levels of overcrowding and other problems which are disrupting institutions, it may be desirable for the Department to seek additional methods by which to deal with such problems. The severity of the problems in association with increased legal intervention and concerns for consistency may justify expanding the scope of departmental control over certain institutional procedures in this area.

A centralized custody classification policy and procedure would provide one such tool. The appropriate security level could be derived from the custody determination and a separate assessment of the inmate's escape potential. This suggests a need for separate custody and security

scales. The Federal Bureau of Prisons and several states which have adopted the NIC classification model have already successfully incorporated this distinction between custody and security concerns into their classification procedures.

C. CONCLUSIONS

After careful consideration it can be said that many of the criticisms directed at the California Inmate Classification System are not borne out. In fact, the system seems to work fairly well. Therefore, the Policy Report recommended that no changes be made in the basic underlying philosophy and direction of the system. There were, however, three general recommendations made for refining and improving the system:

1. Overclassification/In-Prison Behavior

   Revise the score system to deal with perceived overclassification, while placing greater emphasis on current in-prison behavior. This includes examining both initial classification and reclassification documents. Further study should focus on refining the CDC 839 and CDC 840 so that CDC staff are able to do a better job of initially classifying inmates and later identifying those inmates who demonstrate they are "good" or "bad" based on their in-prison behavior. The primary issues should include the term factor, positive behavior factors, and the dynamics of classification scores.

2. Overrides

   Incorporate an objective, policy-based system of administrative determinants (Second Tier) into the current score system in order to deal with overrides.

3. Custody Model

   Develop a custody model to be used in conjunction with the current score system which deals primarily with security.

As can be seen, the first recommendation deals with both overclassification and in-prison behavior and as previously mentioned provides the basic point of reference for the continued item validation efforts. A detailed discussion of the results of the further validation study efforts can be found in Chapter IV.

In response to the second recommendation, since the issuance of the Policy Report in May of 1985, the Department of Corrections' Institutions Division has been working on development of the policies and procedures necessary to implement the administrative determinants. At this point the procedures have been written and disseminated throughout the Department for review and comment (see Attachment C). Actual implementation should be accomplished by June or July of 1986.

As to the third recommendation, the interaction between custody and security is the key to the NIC and Federal systems and permits greater flexibility in institutional housing, work, and program decisions. In order for California to implement a similar system, it would require that definitions of each custody level be developed to augment security parameters already in place. This concept was put forward in the Policy Report and was intended as a long term conceptual proposal for consideration by Department management. It is still considered a valid concept and although no work has been done to date it is recommended that the development of a custody model as an element of the Department's Inmate Classification System be the subject of further research.

IV. FINAL RESEARCH AND FINDINGS

This chapter presents a summary of the results of the item validation efforts presented in the Policy Report and reports on the expanded validation efforts completed since that report was published. It should be noted that a detailed, technical discussion of all the validation research which has been conducted will be contained in the Technical Supplement to be published later in 1986.

A. BACKGROUND - PREVIOUS RESEARCH ITEM VALIDATION

The May 1985 Policy Report defined overclassification as follows:

> Overclassification occurs when something is known that would place an inmate in a lower risk category (such as demonstrated "good" behavior) and the Department fails to adjust his score level and placement appropriately.

The purpose of defining overclassification in this manner is to focus attention on making the best use of information available at the time a classification decision must be made and avoiding the temptation to "second-guess" these decisions at a later date based on information that was not available until after the decision has been made. In other words, the goal of the classification system should be to assign every inmate to the lowest level of custody consistent with an assessment of that inmate's "risk", given what is known about the inmate at the time the decision must be made.

By design the classification score system is intended to be a risk assessment tool that attempts to predict which inmates are more likely to become escape risks or "management problems"; e.g., assault other inmates or staff, traffic in drugs, and other behavior that is indicative of an inmate's

inability to conform to expectations of prison management. The four classification score levels constitute risk categories and in order to reduce overclassification, ways must be found of refining the system to do a better job of sorting inmates into these categories.

The validation study portion of the Inmate Classification System Study was designed to accomplish this task by answering two key questions: 1) How good of a job does the score system do in sorting inmates into high- and low-risk categories? and 2) How much does each item in the score system contribute to the ability of the score system to properly sort out inmates? The answer to the first question would provide a way of judging how well the system works as a whole. This would give some indication about the need for basic structural change in the system. The answer to the second question would provide information concerning how to improve the system by modifying individual items. This could include placing more emphasis on certain factors, less emphasis on others, and perhaps dropping still other factors.

To answer the first question, the initial validation study examined a sample of 16,000 inmates admitted in FY 1981-82. Six criterion were identified to determine whether inmates with higher classification levels are more likely to become management problems.

- Whether or not the inmate was involved as an aggressor or participant in an incident, excluding nonviolent sex and suicides.
- Whether or not the inmate was involved as an aggressor or participant in an assault incident, excluding nonviolent sex and suicides.
- Whether or not the inmate received additional points from a subsequent reclassification due to a disciplinary action.
- Whether or not the inmate received additional points from a subsequent reclassification due to a disciplinary action (the most serious offenses) commonly known as "Big 6" offenses.

- Whether or not points were subtracted from an inmate's score at a subsequent reclassification due to participation in work, school, or vocational programs.
- Whether or not points were subtracted from an inmate's score at a subsequent reclassification due to not receiving any disciplinary actions for a six-month period.

The last two criterion are actually the reverse of the first four, in the sense that they measure which inmates demonstrate they are not management problems by adjusting positively to prison life. Reporting problems made these two criterion difficult to interpret and they have subsequently been dropped. The remaining four criterion, as applied to the inmate sample, are described in Charts 1 and 2 and Tables 5-8.

In response to the first validation question, the data presented in the charts show that the score system generally does a good job of identifying which inmates will become involved in incidents and disciplinary problems. For example, Chart 1 indicates that approximately 33 percent of the inmates classified Level IV at admission received some serious disciplinary action during their first institution level placement. By way of comparison, less than 7 percent of those initially classified as Level I received a serious disciplinary action during their first institution level placement. The conclusion, therefore, can be drawn that inmates initially classified as Level IV are nearly five times more likely to have a disciplinary action than those classified as Level I inmates.

Chart 2 shows a similar picture for incidents which were considered sufficiently serious to be reported to headquarters.

PERCENT INMATES WITH SERIOUS DISCIPLINARIES BY CLASSIFICATION LEVEL AT ADMISSION



NOTE: BASED ON FY 1981-82 ADMISSION COHORT WITH TWO YEAR FOLLOWUP PERIOD. "BIG 6" INCLUDES ASSAULT ON OFFICER, ASSAULT ON INMATE, DRUG OFFENSE, WEAPONS OFFENSE, CAUSING DISTURBANCE, AND ESCAPE.

* Mean Cost Rating

CHART 2

MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS & EVALUATION BRANCH

INMATE CLASSIFICATION STUDY

PERCENT INMATES INVOLVED IN INCIDENTS BY CLASSIFICATION LEVEL AT ADMISSION



NOTE: BASED ON FY 1981-82 ADMISSION COHORT WITH TWO YEAR FOLLOWUP PERIOD. INCIDENTS EXCLUDE SUICIDE AND NON-VIOLENT SEX.

*Mean Cost Rating

TABLE 5

CRITERION

RECEIVED SERIOUS DISCIPLINARY POINTS ON CDC840

INMATE CLASSIFICATION LEVEL	NO POINTS		POINTS		TOTAL	
	NUMBER	PERCENT	NUMBER	PERCENT	NUMBER	PERCENT
IV	938	67.43%	453	32.57%	1391	100.00%
III	2630	79.10%	695	20.90%	3325	100.00%
II	4041	89.01%	499	10.99%	4540	100.00%
I	6378	93.20%	465	6.80%	6843	100.00%
TOTAL	13987	86.88%	2112	13.12%	16099	100.00%

MCR - MEAN COST RATING = 0.35

TABLE 6

CRITERION

RECEIVED "BIG 6" DISCIPLINARY POINTS ON CDC840

INMATE CLASSIFICATION LEVEL	NO POINTS		POINTS		TOTAL	
	NUMBER	PERCENT	NUMBER	PERCENT	NUMBER	PERCENT
IV	1246	89.58%	145	10.42%	1391	100.00%
III	3168	95.28%	157	4.72%	3325	100.00%
II	4476	98.59%	64	1.41%	4540	100.00%
I	6791	99.24%	52	0.76%	6843	100.00%
TOTAL	15681	97.40%	418	2.60%	16099	100.00%

MCR - MEAN COST RATING = 0.51

TABLE 7

CRITERION

AGGRESSOR OR PARTICIPANT IN INCIDENT

INMATE CLASSIFICATION LEVEL	NO INCIDENTS		INCIDENTS		TOTAL	
	NUMBER	PERCENT	NUMBER	PERCENT	NUMBER	PERCENT
IV	1099	79.01%	292	20.99%	1391	100.00%
III	2948	88.66%	377	11.34%	3325	100.00%
II	4329	95.35%	211	4.65%	4540	100.00%
I	6654	97.24%	189	2.76%	6843	100.00%
TOTAL	15030	93.36%	1069	6.64%	16099	100.00%

MCR - MEAN COST RATING = 0.42

TABLE 8

CRITERION

AGGRESSOR OR PARTICIPANT IN ASSAULT INCIDENT

INMATE CLASSIFICATION LEVEL	NO INCIDENTS		INCIDENTS		TOTAL	
	NUMBER	PERCENT	NUMBER	PERCENT	NUMBER	PERCENT
IV	1238	89.00%	153	11.00%	1391	100.00%
III	3149	94.71%	176	5.29%	3325	100.00%
II	4473	98.52%	67	1.48%	4540	100.00%
I	6792	99.25%	51	0.75%	6843	100.00%
TOTAL	15652	97.22%	447	2.78%	16099	100.00%

MCR - MEAN COST RATING = 0.53

Almost 21 percent of inmates scored initially as Level IV became involved in incidents during their first institution level placement, while less than 3 percent of Level I inmates became involved in incidents. This indicates that inmates scored at admission as Level IV are 7 times more likely to become involved in an incident than those scored as Level I.

These charts also illustrate a special statistic which is frequently calculated on this kind of data to measure the strength of the relationship. It is called the Mean Cost Rating (MCR), and reflects a general accuracy rating or the percentage increase in accuracy of prediction over pure chance. A score of 0.0 indicates that the score system does absolutely nothing to identify problem inmates; in other words, Level IV inmates are no more likely to get into trouble than lower level inmates. A score of 1.0 is a perfect score, which would mean that all inmates who get into trouble are classified as Level IV. A score of .30 is generally considered good for classification systems. The MCR's for the criterion illustrated in Charts 1 and 2 range from .35 to .53, providing another indication that the score system does a fairly good job of sorting out inmates at initial classification who become "management problems". In summary, inmates with higher scores at admission are more likely to get involved in incidents and disciplinary actions.

In response to the second validation question concerning the contribution each item made to the system's ability to properly sort out inmates, a number of tests were run using the same data base used in examining the first validation question (see page 39). More detailed results of these examinations were presented in the Policy Report.

Following the issuance of the Policy Report, however, a number of significant problem areas were identified in these earlier tests (a more detailed discussion of these problem areas is contained in the next section of this report). In response to these problems and based on a new analysis of the data utilizing modified statistical techniques, it has been determined that, in fact, the initial tests are unreliable and cannot be used in any way to determine the contribution of individual score items.

Research conducted subsequent to the Policy Report has focused on resolving the problems in the preliminary validation research. In line with the recommendations presented in Chapter III of that report, primary emphasis was placed on developing information that would assist in finding ways to reduce overclassification, address the policy concerns surrounding the term factor, and place greater emphasis on current in-prison behavior.

The research was divided into two general areas: 1) refinement of the item validation techniques; and 2) examination of a series of "Natural Experiments" resulting from the Department's recent experience with "overriding" inmates to lower institution levels because of population pressures. The latter was intended to provide information on whether these "override experiments" have worked, and if so, how the classification score system could be revised to make it reflect these placement practices.

B. REFINEMENT OF THE ITEM VALIDATION TECHNIQUES

As previously mentioned, validation efforts since the Policy Report was issued focused in part on resolving several problems identified in earlier item validation techniques. These problems were identified because the relationships attributed to some of the score items in the preliminary research were contrary to the way the items were scored or were inconsistent between criteria. At first it was believed the confusing relationships could be explained by systematic biases due to reporting problems or were caused by spurious relationships with other variables for which no control was provided. However, efforts to explain the inconsistent and contrary relationships were frustrated and most resulted in more confusing answers and further questions about relationships with the criterion. Some clear conclusions were reached, however, as to problems with the statistical techniques:

- Higher level institutions may tend to suppress the misconduct that the score system was intended to predict, making it very difficult to show any statistical relationship between the score system items and the misconduct criterion.
- RTC (Return to Custody) inmates were included in the study sample, although most RTC inmates are not in prison long enough to accumulate the records from which the criteria were collected. This weakened the statistical tests and possibly resulted in systematic biases in the results.
- There are serious reporting problems associated with two of the criteria used: points awarded on CDC 840's for not receiving disciplinaries, and points for participation in inmate programs. The reporting problems render these criteria useless for the statistical analysis.
- As used in the preliminary item validation, the criteria confounded two apparently distinct concepts: the presence or absence of negative or positive behavior, and the amount of that behavior. As a result, the preliminary validation was trying to predict two different things, with the result being very poor predictions.
- The behavior measured by all of the criteria is relative rare, at least in a statistical sense. In the preliminary sample less than 7 percent of all inmates were involved in an incident during their first institution level placement and only about 13 percent received a disciplinary action. This

is partly due to the fact that in the past inmates have been moved fairly frequently from one facility to another to accommodate the increasing prison population. As a result, inmates spending long periods of time in the same institution level are relatively rare. Since it is essential to take the level of institution into account in the statistical procedures, and because inmates do not stay very long at a particular institution level, the chances of an inmate getting into trouble during the time they were observed are fairly small. The effect is to reduce the chances of finding statistically significant results.

Several of these problems were resolved by eliminating about 2,000 RTC's from the original cohort of 16,000 inmates examined, and using only the serious disciplinary criteria in further validation research. Eliminating RTC's increased the percent of the study cohort with disciplinaries from 13 percent to 14.5 percent.

In consultation with two methodology experts, Drs. John Berecochea, Consulting Criminologist, and Richard Berk, Professor and Director of the Social Process Research Institute, University of California, Santa Barbara, a number of different nonlinear regression techniques were explored. Based on advice from the experts and analysis of the results it was concluded that logistic regression techniques give the most convincing and useful results. A model using these techniques was designed to measure the relationship of each one of the items on the CDC 839 (independent of each other, the level of institution, and the period of time spent in a particular level) with the presence or absence of disciplinary action. Each institution level was treated as a separate item in the regression model making it possible to determine whether the levels had different effects on disciplinary rates. The inmate cohort developed for the preliminary validation study, excluding RTC's, was used.

The following is a summary of findings of the new item validation efforts based on the changes made to the data base and the utilization of the new statistical techniques.

1. Findings - Current Item Validation

As discussed previously, the item validation efforts were intended to establish which items in the score system are valid predictors of inmate misconduct. If the new techniques worked as anticipated they would show that those items which are valid predictors of inmate behavior have a statistically significant relationship with the disciplinary criterion. Table 8 contains the data summarizing the results of these tests.

The statistic presented in Table 9 is called the "Odds Multiplier" and has a fairly simple interpretation. In understanding the statistics it should be noted that all of the items contained on the CDC 839 can be separated into two distinct groups. The first are those factors for which an inmate can either receive points or not. For example, inmates either receive points for being under 26 or no points if they are 26 or older. The other group contains those factors for which inmates can receive a variety of points such as term length.

For the first group of score items, the odds multiplier represents the change in the odds of receiving a disciplinary if the inmate falls into the category that receives points on that item, apart from the effect of all other items on the CDC 839 and the level of institution where the inmate was housed. As an example, this statistic would indicate the odds of receiving a disciplinary for an inmate who is under 26 at admission compared to an inmate who is 26 or older at admission, when all other factors including institution level have been taken into account.

As the name suggests, this statistic is a multiplier. This means that the change in odds of receiving a disciplinary associated with receiving points on a particular CDC 839 item is expressed as a multiple of the

TABLE 9

VALIDATION OF ITEMS IN INMATE SCORE SYSTEM
PREDICTIVE ABILITY WITH RESPECT TO DISCIPLINARY HISTORY
FY 1981-82 ADMISSION COHORT WITH A
MAXIMUM TWO-YEAR FOLLOW-UP

PREDICTOR ITEMS	ODDS MULTIPLIER[a] ODDS
Classification Score Items:	
1. TERM	1.067
2. STABILITY	
a. Under age 26 at admission	2.442
b. Never married	
c. Not high school graduate	
d. Not employed 6 months	1.284
e. No honorable military discharge	1.372
3. PRIOR ESCAPES	
a. Number of walkaways	
b. Number of breached perimeter	[b]
c. Number of escapes	
4. HOLDS AND DETAINERS	
5. PRIOR SENTENCES SERVED	
a. Number of jail or county juvenile	
b. Number of state level juvenile	1.196
c. Number of adult state or federal	
6. UNFAVORABLE PRIOR INCARCERATION BEHAVIOR	
a. Number of serious disciplinaries	[b]
b. Escape in last incarceration	
c. Number of assaults on staff	
d. Number of assaults on inmates	
e. Number of drug related offenses	
f. Number of weapons offenses	[b]
g. Number of inciting disturbances	
h. Number of assaults in which injury was caused	
7. FAVORABLE PRIOR INCARCERATION BEHAVIOR	
a. Minimum custody or dorm living	0.781
b. No serious disciplinaries	
c. Participation in work, school, or vocational program	
Other Predictor Items:	
Length of time in prison during follow-up period (months)	
Housed in Institution Level II	
Housed in Institution Level III	0.731
Housed in Institution Level IV	0.369

[a] Odds multiplier based on statistically significant logistic regression coefficients ($p<=.01$)

[b] The item has a statistically significant relationship with the criterion but is not a good candidate for statistical prediction because the item applies to very few inmates.

odds if no points are received on that item. For example, an odds multiplier of one indicates that there is no difference in the odds for inmates with points on the item compared with those that did not receive points (any number multiplied by one results in the same number) and, therefore, it could be concluded that there is no relationship between the item and the likelihood of receiving a disciplinary. Multipliers greater than one indicate that inmates with points on the item are more likely to receive a disciplinary. A multiplier of two would indicate that inmates with points on the item are twice as likely to receive a disciplinary as those without points, which amounts to a 100 percent increase in the odds. Multipliers less than one indicate that inmates with points on the item are less likely to receive a disciplinary. A multiplier of .5, for instance, indicates that the odds of receiving a disciplinary for inmates with points are half of that for inmates with no points, which amounts for a 50 percent reduction in the odds. The multiplier can range from 0 to infinity. The multiplier has the same interpretation for the effect of institution levels, except that it represents the change in odds associated with being housed in institution Level II, III or IV, compared to Level I.

For the second group where the predictor item has more than two categories, such as the inmate's term length in years, the odds multiplier reflects the change in the odds of receiving a disciplinary associated with a unit change in the CDC 839 item, independent from other score items and institution level.

2. Analysis - Current Item Validation

In analyzing the results reported in Table 9 relating to the score items only it was determined that they are unreliable and, therefore, inconclusive. This is primarily due to a finding that higher level institutions have a significant suppressive effect on inmate misconduct. Although this finding means that no conclusions can be made about the validity of individual score items, the finding is significant in its own right and served to redirect the focus of attention from the predictive capability of individual score items to the overall suppressive effect higher level institutions have on inmate misconduct.

The evidence supporting this conclusion can be found in Table 9. When the relationship between institution level and disciplinaries is measured, independent from inmates' classification scores, inmates with the same score in Level III and IV institutions are less likely to receive disciplinaries than similar inmates in Level I institutions. Specifically, the odds of an inmate in a Level III institution receiving a disciplinary are 73 percent of that of an inmate housed in Level I with the same classification score (see Table 9). In other words, the odds of an inmate in a Level III institution receiving a disciplinary are 27 percent less (i.e., 100 percent minus 73 percent) than that of an inmate in a Level I institution with the same score. The odds of an inmate housed in a Level IV institution receiving a disciplinary are 63 percent (100 percent minus 37 percent) less than that of an inmate housed in Level I with the same classification score. The odds of an inmate in a Level II institution receiving a disciplinary are not significantly different from those of an inmate in a Level I institution.

Although this conclusion may seem to contradict the earlier finding illustrated in Chart 1, that a higher proportion of Score Level IV inmates receive disciplinary actions, it actually supports and strengthens these earlier findings.

To comprehend the importance of this conclusion one must understand precisely what is meant by the statement that higher level institutions tend to suppress inmate misconduct. To begin the explanation, assume that there is no difference between the effects of high- and low-level institutions on inmate misconduct. Suppose that all institutions have identical security and custody capabilities and practices. Assume also that the score system does not sort out high-risk inmates from low-risk inmates. The score system would, in effect, assign inmates to different institutions on an entirely random basis, without respect to level of risk. In other words, the score system would not do any better at sorting out high- and low-risk inmates than would flipping a coin. Under these circumstances, one would expect the disciplinary rates to be essentially identical in all institution levels, because the overall risk-level of inmates and the security and custody measures would be identical at all institutions.

The previous example is a theoretical model which illustrates what would happen if the classification system did not work at all. In research this model is sometimes known as the "null hypothesis" because it hypothesizes that there is no relationship between disciplinary rates and levels of inmates or institutions. The purpose is to compare the "null hypothesis" with the real classification system. If it can be shown that the null hypothesis is incorrect then it might be concluded that the classification score system is working. Since it has already

been shown that Level IV inmates are five times as likely to receive a disciplinary action as Level I inmates, it could be concluded that the score system is working.

In fact, this information was used earlier to support the reasonable conclusion that the score system is correctly sorting high-risk inmates into higher classification levels. A sophisticated reader, however, would not necessarily accept this conclusion based solely on the evidence discussed so far. Such a person may well ask whether Level IV inmates have a higher disciplinary rate because they are more prone to violence and other misconduct or, alternately, because the Level III and IV institutions where most Level IV inmates are housed breed violence and misconduct.

Therefore, it is clear that the critical question is what kind of effect institutions have on inmate misconduct. The statistical test used to develop Table 9 (discussed earlier in this Chapter) is able to answer this question by determining how the odds of receiving a disciplinary for inmates housed in Levels III and IV institutions compare with the odds for inmates housed in Level I institutions, after differences in classification scores are taken into account.

The findings in Table 9 indicate that inmates in Level III and IV institutions are less likely to get into trouble than inmates in Level I institutions, after classification scores are taken into account. This means that if one placed a Score Level IV inmate in a Level IV institution he would be less likely to get into trouble than if he were placed in a Level I institution.

This is a very important finding because it clearly shows that the higher disciplinary rates among Score Level III and IV inmates are not caused by the institutions, as a critic of the system might argue. Instead, it indicates that the disciplinary rates observed in Chart 1 for Level III and IV inmates would probably be much higher if the score system were not being used and, as a result, many of these inmates were placed in lower level institutions.

In summary, disciplinary rates are higher in Level III and IV institutions because the system concentrates the most problematic inmates in the higher level institutions, but disciplinary rates in those institutions are considerably lower than they would be if security and custody methods in Level III and IV institutions were not successfully suppressing misconduct. In addition, the overall disciplinary rate is lower than it would be if the classification score system were not doing a good job of sorting high-risk inmates into higher level institutions.

This is an extremely important finding because it gives a factual and theoretical support for the earlier conclusion that the score system is working well and as a whole, is a valid predictor of inmate behavior. Unfortunately, the suppressive effect of higher level institutions makes it very difficult to validate the predictive ability of individual score items as originally intended. To understand this paradox requires more specific explanation.

By placing the highest risk inmates in the institutions where they are least able to cause problems, the classification system suppresses the behavior the validation effort is trying to predict. This creates a paradox which makes it impossible under normal operating conditions to validate the predictive ability of the particular score items. The

following analogy, borrowing from Dr. Berk's analysis (see Attachment D), explains why this is true.

> Imagine that one is trying to predict who will die from cancer and who will not. We have a new drug, designed to cure cancer, which we give to those who we think are most likely to die. Those who we think will not die do not get the drug. Suppose we find that no one dies of cancer in either group. It becomes impossible to determine whether it is possible to predict who will die because no one died. At a lesser extreme, suppose we find that some people died, but that the treatment reduced dramatically the chances of dying for those in the high-risk group. To the extent that the treatment saved lives it becomes harder to show that your method of predicting who will die is valid, except indirectly from the fact that you have reduced the chance of dying for those that you predicted were high-risk.

If one thinks of higher security institution levels as a kind of "treatment" designed to reduce misbehavior, the analogy illustrates why we cannot determine which individual score items are valid predictors of disciplinaries. Lack of a significant statistical relationship for a particular item in the regression model does not necessarily indicate that the item is not a valid predictor, and the statistically significant relationships might actually be false. The only way to truly validate the score system would be to create an experiment where inmates were randomly assigned to different institutions. Of course the implications for security and the safety of staff, inmates, and the public weigh heavily against such an experiment.

3. Conclusion - Current Item Validation

In summary the results of the current item validation provide strong evidence which supports the general conclusion made in the Policy Report and summarized again earlier in this report that the score system is doing a good job of sorting high-risk inmates into higher institution levels. However, no conclusions regarding the validity of individual score items can be made since all of the tests which have been run,

including those reported in the Policy Report, produce unreliable results with respect to score items. As previously discussed this was due to problems associated with the data base and the suppressive effect of higher level institutions. Additionally, the item validation study provides empirical evidence that the security and custody aspects of California's higher level institutions do a good job of reducing misconduct among the inmates who pose the highest risk to the prison system. As a result, the validation study offers no information as to how to refine the system through adjustment to individual items. It does argue against deleting any items unless there are very strong theoretical reasons to believe that they do not contribute to the validity of the system.

C. EXAMINATION OF "NATURAL EXPERIMENTS"

In recent years the continuing growth of California's prison population has been a major factor in the Department's prison classification policies. Although overcrowding has become a fact of life at all levels, it has become particularly critical in housing maximum security inmates. This is primarily because the number of beds available in Level IV institutions have been reduced by court orders affecting San Quentin and Folsom Prisons while the number and proportion of high-risk inmates has steadily increased. New prison construction will alleviate this problem over time, but is of no assistance in the short term.

Since late 1983 the Department has gone through several periods during which bed shortages became critical at higher level institutions. As a result, to make room in San Quentin and Folsom Prisons for the most dangerous, newly admitted inmates, it became necessary to review their Level IV inmates for those who might be housed safely in the less secure Level III facilities at

Deuel Vocational Institution (DVI) and California Training Facility (CTF). Later, Level IV population pressures became so great that the Department began sending selected Level IV inmates directly from the reception centers to DVI and CTF without a trial period of time at San Quentin or Folsom. There was concern, however, that these inmates, particularly the latter group, might cause problems since the Department had not been able to observe them first in a Level IV setting before making a decision to house them in a lower level institution. Collectively these Level IV inmates overridden to CTF and DVI due to population pressures became known as "population overrides".

To avoid the need to transfer significantly large numbers of Level III inmates to lower level institutions because of the population overrides, some better Level III inmates from DVI and CTF were transferred to other Level III institutions. Additional beds were also made available in DVI and CTF by increased utilization of double-celling in those and other Level III institutions. In addition, security and staffing capabilities were strengthened at DVI and CTF in order to minimize the potential for violence and management problems which could result from concentrating the worst, Level III inmates and Level IV population overrides at those institutions.

This was not the first instance of higher level inmates being overridden to lower institution levels. Since the inception of the classification score system the Department has found it necessary to house inmates in institution levels different from that dictated by their score level. The reasons for overriding these inmates have included inmate program needs, medical or psychiatric treatment, protective custody and special security housing for inmates who have committed certain crimes, and a variety of other administrative and security concerns. The population overrides, however,

constitute a significant and distinct group of inmates who are housed in lower level institutions solely because of population pressures. They can be clearly separated from all other inmates who have been overridden for a variety of reasons that make them exceptional types.

The criteria initially used to select inmates for population overrides changed over time as the Department sought to increase the number of potentially acceptable inmates by including those with less indication of disciplinary problems and no escape history. Within these parameters, the selections were made on an individual basis by correctional counselors and classification representatives based on their personal assessments of an inmate's record.

At the same time a similar but smaller problem was occurring in Level I and II institutions. Increased use of community-based facilities helped mitigate this problem; however, they soon began competing with conservation camps for the better Level I inmates. This was complicated by the fact that many inmates with Level I scores are not eligible for camp placement because they: 1) do not meet physical fitness criteria; 2) they will be paroled too soon to make it worth training them; or 3) they have arson or sex crime convictions that, by Department policy, prevent them from being housed in a camp. Consequently, in order to fill the camp program needs the Department was forced to start overriding Level II inmates who could be safely placed in camps. These inmates became known as "camp overrides".

At first the criteria used to select camp overrides included inmates with the lowest scores who met the basic camp criteria, since many of them would become Level I inmates fairly soon anyway. This criteria was soon dropped, however, permitting virtually any Level II inmate who met the basic camp

criteria to be overridden to the camp program, since concern for potential disciplinary problems among those camp overrides was not as great as for the Level IV population overrides.

The population and camp overrides provide unique possibilities for natural experiments since they allow a comparison to be made between the behavior of inmates who share the same security and custody arrangements but differ in their initial score level. From these comparisons it is possible that information can be developed as to the success or failure of the experiment and, if successful, indications of how to adjust the score system to recognize that these groups are in a lower risk category than reflected by their score level. This is particularly important in light of the failure of item validation efforts to provide any conclusive data on how to adjust the score system to deal with overclassification.

To evaluate the natural experiments three separate analyses were developed using the inmates that were overridden for population reasons or camp placement between November 1983 and September 1985. It should be noted that Level III inmate overrides to Level II institutions were not examined because the Department has insufficient experience to constitute an experiment. Following is a description of the three experiments:

Experimental Group	Number of Inmates
Experiment #1: (San Quentin and Folsom Overrides)	
° Level IV inmates endorsed to DVI and CTF for population "overrides" from San Quentin or Folsom.	1,550
° Level III inmates endorsed to DVI and CTF from reception centers.	3,930
° Level III inmates endorsed to DVI and CTF from other institutions.	2,319

Experiment #2: (Reception Center Overrides)

- Level IV inmates endorsed to DVI and CTF for population "override" direct from reception centers. 1,424
- Level III inmates endorsed to DVI and CTF direct from reception centers. 3,936
- Level III inmates endorsed to CIM-E (California Institution for Men-East), CMC (California Mens Colony), and CMF-S (California Medical Facility - South) direct from reception centers. 2,172

Experiment #3: (Camp Overrides)

- Level II inmates endorsed to SCC (Sierra Conservation Center) and CCC (California Conservation Center) for camp placement direct from reception centers. 786
- Level I inmates endorsed to SCC and CCC for camp placement direct from reception centers. 5,177

An endorsement refers to a transfer order given by a Classification Services Representative based on a placement recommendation made by the counselors in the reception centers or other institutions.

Data for the analysis was obtained from the classification score system, and included information describing the inmate's behavior after being endorsed. Initially three criteria were developed for comparing inmate behavior: 1) presence of a disciplinary record; 2) credit given at reclassification for being disciplinary free; and 3) credit given at reclassification for participating in inmate programs. The last two criteria suffered from the same reporting problems discovered in the validation study and were eventually dropped. As a result, inmates were only compared using the first criteria.

1. Findings - Natural Experiments

Charts 3-5 describe disciplinary rates, adjusted for a period of exposure to represent an annualized rate, for inmates in each of the three experiments. As shown in Chart 3, Level IV population overrides from San Quentin and Folsom did as well as Level III inmates endorsed to DVI and CTF from reception centers. Both groups had a disciplinary rate of about 32 percent. The same Level IV inmates did better, however, than the Level III inmates endorsed from other institutions to DVI and CTF. By comparison this group had a disciplinary rate of about 37 percent. This is probably due to the fact that Level III inmates endorsed from other institutions to CTF and DVI are typically inmates who have had problems and tend to be working their way toward higher level institutions. The worst of the Level III inmates are sent to DVI and CTF because these institutions are the best equipped among Level III institutions to deal with problem inmates. It can be concluded, therefore, that the first phase of population overrides was successful since these inmates did as well or better than the worst of the Level III inmates. Note, however, that this success is due in part to the fact that the security and staffing capabilities at CTF and DVI were strengthened.

As shown in Chart 4, the Level IV population overrides direct from reception centers to DVI and CTF also had a disciplinary rate of about 32 percent. By comparison, then, they did about as well as the Level IV population overrides from San Quentin and Folsom and Level III inmates endorsed from reception centers to DVI and CTF, but not as well as Level III inmates endorsed from reception centers to CIM-E, CMC and CMF-S who had a disciplinary rate of about 19 percent. Generally the better Level III inmates are sent to CIM-E, CMC, and CMF-S.

CHART 3

PERCENT OF INMATES WITH SERIOUS DISCIPLINARIES

LEVEL IV "POPULATION OVERRIDES" FROM SQ & FOL AND LEVEL III INMATES ENDORSED TO DVI AND CTF-C/N



NOTE: PERCENTS ADJUSTED FOR PERIOD OF EXPOSURE TO REPRESENT THE PERCENT PER INMATE YEAR.

CHART 4

PERCENT OF INMATES WITH SERIOUS DISCIPLINARES

LEVEL IV "POPULATION OVERRIDES" FROM RECEPTION CENTERS AND LEVEL III INMATES ENDORSED TO LEVEL III INSTITUTIONS FROM RECEPTION CENTERS



NOTE: PERCENTS ADJUSTED FOR PERIOD OF EXPOSURE TO REPRESENT THE PERCENT PER INMATE YEAR.

It can also be concluded that the population overrides of Level IV inmates direct from reception centers was successful since they did as well as the population overrides who had a trial period at San Quentin and Folsom. However, it would be incorrect to assume that the population override IV's could be housed in any other Level III institution since they do substantially worse than the better Level III inmates and could significantly disrupt the institutions where these inmates are housed. In addition, the success is attributable in part to the increased security and staffing capabilities at CTF and DVI. It should be noted the changes made at CTF and DVI to support this shift are not desirable long term Level III arrangements.

On the other hand, Level II inmates overridden to camp had a disciplinary rate of 18 percent, as shown in Chart 5, and did substantially worse than Level I camp placements. It should be noted that, it is likely the disciplinary rate among Level I camp placements suffers from underreporting since Level I inmates generally serve shorter terms and would be paroled before receiving their annual reclassification review.

If only inmates who remained in prison for at least one full year after endorsement are examined, Level II camp placements still do worse than Level I camp placements, but the difference is much smaller - Level II inmates had a 40 percent disciplinary rate while Level I inmates had a 29 percent disciplinary rate.

CHART 5

PERCENT OF INMATES WITH SERIOUS DISCIPLINARIES

LEVEL II CAMP OVERRIDES FROM RECEPTION CENTERS AND LEVEL I INMATES ENDORSED TO CAMP CENTERS FROM RECEPTION CENTERS



NOTE: PERCENTS ADJUSTED FOR PERIOD OF EXPOSURE TO REPRESENT THE PERCENT PER INMATE YEAR.

As a result the Level II camp overrides may be considered a qualified success, even though they did somewhat worse than their Level I counterparts, since their disciplinary rate was within an acceptable range.

2. Analysis - Natural Experiments

The data from these experiments was analyzed further to determine if there are any score items which could be associated with the decision to override the inmates in the three experiments. Since it has been concluded that these inmates can be safely housed in lower level institutions, data which points to these factors will help provide a basis for refining the score system to recognize the inmates who are in a lower risk category, thus providing guidance in reducing overclassification.

The analysis consisted of comparing the inmates who were overridden with a similar group of inmates who were not overridden. Using a construction sample, the independent relationship of each of the score items with the decision to override or not override was examined. The factors that appeared to be statistically significant were then tested on a validation sample to measure the actual relationship. A similar analysis was done for only those inmates who were overridden to determine which factors are associated with whether or not they received disciplinary actions.

In general, there were no significant findings pointing to any of the factors in the score system which could be used in identifying the Level IV overrides from San Quentin and Folsom. This probably can be attributed to the fact that the criterion for selection has changed numerous times and it is hard to identify this group statistically because it consists of a number of different types of inmates.

On the other hand, the Department is able to do a good job of identifying the Level IV population overrides from reception centers. This is probably due to the fact that these overrides were made more recently and the criteria did not change. Fortunately, if the Level IV population overrides can be identified at reception there is no need to give them a trial run at San Quentin or Folsom. Since the earlier findings indicate they do as well in Level III institutions as those who are first placed at San Quentin and Folsom and then transferred.

There were also no indications found that any of the factors in the score system could be utilized to identify the Level II camp placements. This stems from the fact that, more recently, the Department has sent to camp virtually any Level II inmate who meets the physical and other general camp placement criteria. The inability to identify Level II camp placements accurately means that there cannot be any reasonable hope of altering the classification score system in a way that captures the same types of inmates that are currently being overridden.

Table 10 gives the results of the analysis for Level IV population overrides from reception centers. The Odds Multiplier can be interpreted in the same manner as in the analysis of the validation study (see page 54 for a more detailed explanation).

TABLE 10

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH LEVEL IV POPULATION OVERRIDES FROM RECEPTION CENTERS TO DVI AND CTF

PREDICTOR ITEMS	ODDS MULTIPLIER[a] DECISION TO OVERRIDE	ODDS MULTIPLIER[a] RECEIVE DISCIPLINARY AFTER OVERRIDE
Classification Score Items:		
1. TERM	0.871	
2. STABILITY		
a. Under age 26 at admission		2.199
b. Never married		
c. Not high school graduate		
d. Not employed 6 months		
e. No honorable military discharge		
3. PRIOR ESCAPES		
a. Number of walkaways	0.745	
b. Number of breached perimeter		
c. Number of escapes		
4. HOLDS AND DETAINERS		
5. PRIOR SENTENCES SERVED		
a. Number of jail or county juvenile		
b. Number of state level juvenile		
c. Number of adult state or federal		
6. UNFAVORABLE PRIOR INCARCERATION BEHAVIOR		
a. Number of serious disciplinaries	0.801	
b. Escape in last incarceration		
c. Number of assaults on staff		
d. Number of assaults on inmates		
e. Number of drug related offenses		
f. Number of weapons offenses		
g. Number of inciting disturbances		
h. Number of assaults in which injury was caused		
7. FAVORABLE PRIOR INCARCERATION BEHAVIOR		
a. Minimum custody or dorm living		
b. No serious disciplinaries		
c. Participation in work, school, or vocational program		
Length of time in prison during follow-up (days)		1.181

[a] Odds multiplier based on statistically significant logistic regression coefficients ($p<=.05$)

It can be predicted correctly 71 percent of the time (using a logistic regression model) which inmates in our sample will be overridden and which ones will not, based on just three items: term length, number of walkaways in previous terms, and number of serious disciplinaries in previous terms.

For each year an inmate's term increases, the odds of being overridden decline by 13 percent (100 percent minus 87 percent). In other words, the odds of not being overridden for a Level IV inmate with a term of 25 years are two times the odds for a Level IV inmate with a term of 17 years.

For each additional walkaway in a previous incarceration the odds of being overridden decreases by about 25 percent (100 percent minus 75 percent). For each additional disciplinary from a prior incarceration the odds of being overridden decreases by about 20 percent.

Based on Table 10 it can be seen that among Level IV population overrides, the only factor associated with whether or not they get subsequent disciplinaries is their age at admission. The odds of receiving a disciplinary, for Level IV population override inmates under the age of 26 at admission, is more than twice that of older Level IV inmates.

3. Conclusion - Natural Experiments

In summary it was found that three items in the score system can be successfully utilized in identifying the Level IV population overrides from the reception centers: term length, number of walkaways in previous terms, and number of serious disciplinaries in previous terms. The only factor associated with whether or not they get subsequent

disciplinaries is their age at admission. In other words, Level IV population overrides tend to be very similar in that they have relatively short terms, little or no history of walkaways or disciplinaries in a prior incarceration, and the only factor which distinguishes between those who succeed and those who do not is the inmate's age.

In contrast, nothing conclusive can be stated concerning the ability of the score system to identify either the Level IV overrides from San Quentin and Folsom or the Level II camp placements.

V. REFINING THE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

This chapter presents the findings and analysis regarding suggested refinements to the Inmate Classification System. Initially individual changes to the score system and the rationale for making them are discussed. Based on this analysis three system options are developed utilizing these changes as constants and combining them with three different sets of point brackets to form separate system models. In the final analysis each new system model is evaluated against its probable impact on population distribution, ability to manage disciplinary problems, and ability to successfully identify inmates who should be overridden to lower custody.

A. INTRODUCTION

A major issue raised in the Policy Report is overclassification and how to deal with it through changes in the score system. The conclusions of the Policy Report and subsequent analysis are summarized in Chapter IV.

Generally, it was concluded that the score system as a whole is a valid predictor of which inmates will become management problems. Furthermore, the conclusions argue against changing the basic design of the score system or deleting any individual items since it was proven the system is doing a good overall job of sorting the most problematic inmates into higher institution levels.

It was also pointed out that, overclassification can be reduced if specific categories of inmates can be identified based on information available at the time the classification decisions are made (i.e., admission or annual reviews) who have a lower level of risk with respect to institutional misconduct than is currently recognized by their score. With this in mind

the original intent of the validation study was, therefore, to identify those score system items which are the best predictors of inmate misconduct and determine how to adjust the weights of the factors in order to reduce the scores of the best inmates.

The validation research, however, did not provide the results necessary to determine the exact weights which should be assigned to individual items within the score system. As a result the natural experiments provided the only guidance for changing the score system to better identify groups of lower risk inmates who could be placed at lower institution levels with little associated increase in risk.

Although, due in part to the increased security and staffing arrangements at CTF and DVI, analysis of the natural experiments, described in Chapter IV, indicates that the Department's recent experience in overriding inmates to lower institution levels has been a success. It also found that the Level IV population overrides have the following characteristics which distinguish them from other inmates, therefore, allowing for them to be readily identified statistically at reception.

- Shorter terms
- Few or no walkaway escapes in prior incarcerations
- Little or no disciplinary actions in prior incarcerations

In addition, the Level IV population overrides least likely to receive disciplinaries were those who were age 26 or older at admission.

One way of insuring that as many of the Level IV population overrides as possible receive a Level III score is to emphasize the score items that relate to these characteristics and de-emphasize others. This would reduce

the scores of most of the population overrides while holding scores constant for inmates who do not have the identified characteristics.

Based on this information in combination with prior research, institutional experience, and policy concerns, the following specific changes to individual score items have been developed.

B. SCORE ITEM MODIFICATION

1. Term Factor

General agreement within the Department, as well as among many observers, is that the term item on the CDC 839, which is derived from the inmate's length of sentence should be modified. This is based on a consensus that the item was given too much weight originally and has too much impact on an inmate's score. In addition, changes in sentencing laws and practices since the score system was implemented have tended to drive up sentence lengths making the term item even more important than orginally intended. Also, increased opportunity to earn a greater sentence reduction under current law has not been reflected by a decrease in the importance of term relative to the other factors.

As reported in the Preliminary Report the term item accounts for about 62 percent of the variation in inmates' scores at admission and 41 percent of the variation in inmates' current scores.

Several possibilities were explored for reducing the significance of the term item: 1) reducing the point multiplier (currently four points for each year of term); 2) placing a cap on the total number of term points an inmate can earn; 3) reducing the term by a time-to-serve factor (i.e., inmates' term scores would be reduced automatically in proportion

to the amount of their term that has been served); and 4) replacing the term item with a "seriousness of offense" item which is based on the type of offense for which the inmate was convicted.

A consensus of institutions staff interviewed during data gathering for the Policy Report indicated they would prefer leaving the term factor the way it is, with perhaps a modification in its weight. By comparison, it was felt the alternatives to the term factor, "time-left-to-serve" and "seriousness of offense", would add considerable complexity to the CDC 839 with no promise of improvement in the score system.

Automatically reducing the term points as time is served runs contrary to the basic nature of the current score system. Rather than require inmates to earn points based on in-prison behavior in order to decrease their score, the "time-left-to-serve" concept would reward inmates for serving time regardless of how they behaved and thus, distort the existing incentive structure built into the CDC 840.

The "seriousness of offense" concept would unnecessarily complicate the score system. The term factor already reflects the seriousness of the inmate's offense as judged by the legislature and the courts. Furthermore, it is flexible in that the method of applying it does not have to be changed whenever crimes are legislatively redefined, new crimes are created statutorily, or society's evaluation of the

seriousness of a particular crime changes. All these things are accounted for in the length of an inmate's term. To adopt a definition of "seriousness" independent of sentence length would require categorizing the many different offense types and assigning some weight to each category. Institution staff would then have to make a determination of the appropriate category in filling out a CDC 839 on every inmate.

The remaining two possibilities, a decrease in the point multiplier and an upper limit (cap) on term points, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Some preliminary analysis was done on changing the multiplier to three or two points, placing a cap on term points, and a combination of both.

It should be noted that the concept of placing a cap on term length not only addresses the problem of reducing the significance of term length, but also deals with problems associated with extreme sentence length and the inability of inmates with high sentences to reduce their score in any reasonable time. In fact there does not seem to be any other modification which can compensate for extreme sentence under the current structure of the score system.

It was concluded that if a cap were placed on term points it should be placed at eight points above the point that divides Level III and Level IV. The rationale being that inmates who are Level IV primarily because of long terms, such as lifers, should have the opportunity to work their scores down to Level III within a reasonable period of time if they remain disciplinary free.

Under the current system a first degree murderer carrying a term of 25 years to life with no other enhancements would receive an admission score of 96 points based on term points alone. Therefore, with no other points on his CDC 839 and earning a maximum of eight points per year, he would not be able to decrease his score to Level III (currently 34 to 55 points) in less than five years. If the term cap were placed at 63 points, however, this ideal inmate could earn a Level III score after just one year. A 63 point cap would also insure that no inmate with a sentence over 24 years could become a Level III inmate in less than one year. In that regard current departmental policy permits first degree murderers to be placed in Level III institutions after serving one year without disciplinary problems.

Of course, few inmates are "ideal" so such cases would take longer than one year to work their way to Level III, even if they remain disciplinary free. A cap at eight points above the top of the Level III bracket would insure that inmates with such long terms would have a reasonable opportunity to reduce their score level, but not sooner than one year.

When different term point multipliers and a term point cap at eight points above the top of the Level III range were analyzed independently and in combination, it was concluded that a combination of reducing the multiplier from the current four points per year to three points per year and the cap gave the most satisfactory results. This reduced the importance of the term item by about 1/3 at time of admission and by more than 1/2 for the inmate's current score, or from 62 percent of the variance to about 40 percent of admission score and from 41 percent of the variance of total score for continuing inmates to about 20 percent. This combination also did a better job of identifying the Level IV

inmates with the lowest disciplinary rates than a reduction in the point multiplier or a cap alone.

2. Detainers, Warrants, and Holds

The item on the CDC 839 which currently adds points to an inmate's score for any holds or detainers by another jurisdiction should be eliminated from the CDC 839. This item has now been built into the Second Tier since it is primarily an administrative concern and there is no theoretical or empirical evidence that the presence of holds or detainers is predictive of misconduct. Its deletion would result in a reduction in the complexity of the CDC 839 and greater emphasis on the CDC 840 through reducing CDC 839 scores.

3. Prior Incarceration

An issue not addressed in the Policy Report, but raised by the Technical Advisory Committee which advised research staff during the initial policy phase of the study, relates to the three prior incarceration items on the CDC 839. These items are partially duplicated by the favorable and unfavorable prior incarceration behavior items on the right side of the CDC 839.

For example, an inmate who has served prior terms without getting into trouble is credited for his favorable prior incarceration behavior on one hand, but penalized for having a prior incarceration record on the other. Essentially he is rewarded, but then his reward is taken away. He is no better off than the inmate whose behavior is unknown because he is in prison for the first time. By comparison an inmate who got into trouble in a prior incarceration is penalized twice - once for being in prison previously and once for getting into trouble when he was in prison.

The problem with the prior incarceration factors, therefore, is that they penalize an inmate whether or not anything is known about how he adjusted to prison during his incarceration. If an inmate's in-prison behavior record is known then that should be the driving factor in assessing his potential for misconduct. However, the fact that an inmate has been incarcerated previously cannot be totally ignored since the Department often lacks complete records of how an inmate behaved while incarcerated.

This suggests that if it is known that an inmate adjusted well to prison during a prior incarceration, he should not be penalized for the prior incarceration. On the other hand, if the inmate's prior incarceration behavior is known to be bad he should be assessed only for his behavior while in prison. In addition, if an inmate has a prior incarceration and there is no information available on how he behaved he should be assessed points for the prior incarceration because the best information available indicates that he is a repeat offender which places him in a higher risk category.

In order to simplify the CDC 839, the three prior incarceration items could be combined into one item and given a single weight. It would be appropriate under this approach to give four points for each prior incarceration, the same number of points as an inmate would receive for serving a prior incarceration where he received one serious disciplinary other than a "Big Six" item. This is equivalent to assuming that the inmate with an unknown record has at least one serious disciplinary and results in reducing the weight given to prior incarceration while increasing the significance of prior incarceration behavior.

4. Current In-Prison Behavior

This issue, raised in the Policy Report, stems from a consensus of institution staff and the Technical Advisory Committee that not enough emphasis is being placed on inmates' demonstrated behavior in prison. The first problem is that Level IV, and to a lesser extent Level III inmates, often receive scores at admission so high relative to the CDC 840 point reductions they can earn for good behavior at a Level III or IV institution, that it takes too long for a disciplinary free inmate to earn his way to a lower level institution. Thus, for such cases the CDC 839 score remains the determining factor in placement even after the Department has had several years to observe the inmate.

The second problem is that the heavy emphasis placed on the admission score makes it more difficult to transfer disciplinary cases from lower to higher custody levels.

Previous research in corrections supports these concerns and indicates that past behavior in prison is a better predictor of future misconduct in prison than many of the general background characteristics on the CDC 839. In fact, the more recent the behavior the more important it is for predicting behavior.

There are two ways of dealing with the problem, increase the weights of items on the CDC 840 pertaining to positive behavior or decrease admission scores by reducing the weights on selected CDC 839 factors.

Increasing the weight of the positive behavior items on CDC 840 would permit inmates to reduce their admission scores more quickly. On the other hand, if the total score on the CDC 839 is reduced, inmates would have fewer points to reduce from the outset and the CDC 840 points would gain greater weight in comparison automatically.

For example, if the only change made to the score system was to reduce the weight of the term factor from four points to three, as previously discussed, total admission scores would decline significantly - by as much as one-quarter for inmates with no other CDC 839 points. This would automatically make the CDC 840 more important since it would then account for a greater proportion of an inmate's total score. As a result, the system would become more dynamic allowing inmates who remain disciplinary free to reduce their score more quickly. Thus, simply reducing the weight of the term item will give greater emphasis to in-prison behavior. If other CDC 839 item weights are reduced the emphasis on the CDC 840 would be even greater. As an aside, a cap on term points would also give greater weight to in-prison behavior for inmates with longer terms because it would give them the opportunity to reduce their scores more quickly if they stay out of trouble.

It should be noted that reductions in item weights on the CDC 839 or increasing the positive item weights on the CDC 840 would allow inmates at all levels to reduce their scores more quickly and, therefore, does not permit a system design which would intentionally create more movement at one level than another. This presents a problem since more movement is needed from Level IV to III because overclassification is most critical in Level IV institutions and the Natural Experiments indicate that there are a significant number of Level IV population overrides who could be safely housed in certain Level III institutions.

In addition, the Department has had little experience with movement between Levels III and II; consequently, a less aggressive approach at Level III is advisable until the Department gains more experience. There is also less concern for increasing movement from Level II to I.

One way of compensating for this is by changing the score level brackets. The score level brackets can be placed in a way that precisely controls how quickly an inmate can reduce his score from Level IV to Level III, as compared to movement from Level III to II and II to I. By making a bracket broader one can make it more difficult to move downward. On the other hand, by making the bracket more narrow the reverse is accomplished. These issues are dealt with in Section C, page 88.

5. Conclusion - Modification of Score Items

In summary, based on an analysis of policy issues and research results, the following basic changes in the score system are recommended:

- Change the weight of the term item on the CDC 839 and the term correction item on the CDC 840 from four to three points per year.
- Place a cap on term points at eight points above the cutoff between Level III and Level IV.
- Drop the holds and detainers item on the CDC 839 and the change in holds and detainers item on the CDC 840.
- Modify the prior incarceration items so that points are assessed only if prior incarceration behavior points are not assessed; combine the three items into one item with a weight of four points per incarceration of more than 30 days with a limit of three incarcerations.

C. INTRODUCTION OF POINT BRACKET CHANGES

Exploration of the final system options build on the recommended changes to the CDC 839 items as discussed in the last section. This section examines options developed by making the changes recommended in the previous section, then holding them constant while changing the score level brackets and term point cap. When changes in the point brackets are combined with a reduction of the term item and the other recommended changes to the CDC 839, the results would be lower initial placement, opportunity to reduce score level sooner after admission, and more emphasis on in-prison behavior to determine subsequent placement.

The Natural Experiments can provide some assistance in making the decision as to where to place the top of the Level III point bracket. Information about existing override patterns for all levels can also provide some guidance. However, these pieces of information can only provide guidance for policy-makers. The exact placement of the point ranges must be a policy decision based on how much additional risk the Department is willing to accept by housing inmates with higher scores at lower levels.

Initially, several options were examined which attempted to duplicate the existing distribution of inmates by their current score level and the institution level where they are actually housed. Another option was also examined which placed the score level brackets at points where there were natural separations in the disciplinary rates (disciplinary data was taken from the admission cohort used in the validation study described in Chapter IV). In developing this option disciplinary rates were arranged by score and it was found that as the scores increased so did the rates. On further examination it was discovered that a number of natural separations in the

disciplinary rates occurred at points which might be utilized to establish point brackets for the score system. Therefore, on the low end of the score distribution the bracket for Score Level I was placed where a natural group occurred with a very low disciplinary rate. The Score Level II bracket was placed where a natural group occurred which had a slightly higher disciplinary rate than the Level I group, but significantly lower than inmates with higher scores. The Score Level III and IV brackets were placed where similar natural groups with progressively higher disciplinary rates occurred. In effect this latter option chooses the brackets that do the best job of sorting the inmates with higher disciplinary rates into Score Level III and IV and those with lower rates into Score Level I and II.

As it turned out, the option based on disciplinary rates not only did the best job of sorting out inmates who have disciplinaries but also resulted in the biggest shift of inmates to lower score levels. This option (Option 1) became the base option utilized in developing the final options. Option 2 and 3 are variations of Option 1 and were designed to create even larger shifts toward lower score levels. Each variation involved different point ranges and term point caps.

TABLE 11

THREE OPTIONS FOR SCORE LEVEL RANGES AND TERM CAPS

Score Level	Option 1	Option 2	Option 3
I	0-18	0-18	0-18
II	19-27	19-27	19-27
III	28-51	28-65	28-79
IV	52-Up	66-Up	80-Up
Cap on Term Points	59	73	87

In examining Table 11 it can be seen that all three options produce different degrees of downward shift of Level IV inmates to Level III. The focus is on this shift because the Department has the most experience with and need for housing Level IV inmates in Level III institutions as discussed in the Natural Experiments section in Chapter IV.

Different degrees of shift from Level III to II were not included in the options examined, because the Department has almost no experience housing Level III inmates in Level II institutions and, therefore, had no basis upon which to make such an examination. In addition, different degrees of shift from Level II to Level I are not included in the options because the Natural Experiments concluded that no factors in the score system can do a good job of identifying the Level II overrides.

The Levels I and II point brackets which were established by research methods described earlier for Option 1, result in significant shifts from Level II to I and provide the best information about where to set the lower score level brackets for the other two options. In addition, the basic changes recommended earlier will result in greater opportunity for Levels II and III inmates to earn their way downward more rapidly through good behavior. Therefore, the score level brackets for Levels I and II are the same in all three options.

The cap on term points in all three options was placed at eight points above the top of the Score Level III bracket because that is the point that maximizes the opportunity for Level IV inmates with long terms to reduce their score while insuring that no lifer will become a Score Level III in less than one year from admission.

It should be noted that the changes discussed previously coincide with the findings of the Natural Experiments that Level IV population override inmates have shorter terms, no walkaways, and little or no disciplinaries from a previous incarceration. By increasing the top of the Level III bracket, Score Level IV inmates with shorter terms will become legitimate Score Level III inmates, unless they have sufficient points on escape or prior incarceration behavior items to prevent them from becoming a Level III. In addition, by reducing the weight for the term and prior incarceration items on the CDC 839 and eliminating the holds and detainers item as recommended earlier, escapes (including walkaways) and prior disciplinary behavior items will automatically be given more weight.

In the following sections each of the three options is separately analyzed with respect to five areas:

° Impact on the score system

° Impact of the Second Tier when overlaid on the option

° Impact on disciplinary rates by score level

° Ability to duplicate the Level IV population override decisions

° Impact on dynamics of the score system

1. Analysis of Option 1

Score Level	Point Range
I	0-18
II	19-27
III	28-51
IV	52-Up

Term Point Cap = 59

° Score System

Chart 6 illustrates the overall impact of all three options on the distribution of inmates among score levels. It was prepared by modeling each of the three options and then determining the impact of the changes to the score system. The models were applied to the total October 31, 1985 male felon prison population, excluding inmates in reception centers. It should be noted that this chart reflects the level dictated by their score only. The impact of the Second Tier will be discussed later in this section.

As shown in Chart 6, Option 1 would increase the proportion of inmates who fall into Score Level I from 33 percent to about 37 percent. In addition the proportion of inmates in Score Level II would decline slightly from about 21 percent to about 20 percent; Score Level III would increase from about 20 percent to 24 percent; and Level IV would decrease from about 26 percent to 19 percent.

Although Chart 6 shows the overall distribution, it does not give a clear picture of how the shifts would occur. Chart 7 illustrates the shifts for Option 1. Over 84 percent of Score Level I inmates would remain Score Level I and less than 16 percent would become Score Level II inmates.

CHART 6

PERCENT OF INMATES BY CURRENT SCORE LEVEL

INMATES IN PRISON ON OCTOBER 31, 1985



CHART 7

PERCENT OF INMATES BY CURRENT SCORE LEVEL BY NEW LEVEL

INMATES IN PRISON ON OCTOBER 31, 1985

OPTION 1



About 36 percent of Score Level II inmates would become Score Level I inmates, another 48 percent would remain Score Level II and the remaining 16 percent of Score Level II inmates would become Score Level III inmates. Thus, Option 1 shifts more current Level II inmates downward and fewer upward than are currently being housed at those levels.

Of current Score Level III inmates, only a little more than 1 percent would become Score Level IV inmates. About 69 percent would remain Score Level III, about 23 percent would become Score Level II, and about 7 percent would become Score Level I inmates. Thus, a greater number of current Level III inmates are shifted downward under Option 1 than are currently housed below level.

Under Option 1 about 27 percent of Score Level IV inmates would become Score Level III and the balance would remain Score Level IV. Thus, Option 1 shifts a smaller number of current score Level IV inmates than are currently being housed below level. Note, however, that this is only a rough analysis of the impact on the Level IV population. Since this is a major issue a more detailed analysis is presented separately at the end of this chapter.

In summary, some inmates' score levels will increase while others will decrease; however, overall many more inmates will see their score levels decrease than increase.

To understand the real impact on classification decisions, however, one must look at the impact on classification levels after the Second Tier is overlaid in Option 1.

° Second Tier

Table 12 illustrates the impact of the Second Tier if overlaid on Option 1. For purposes of comparison, Table 13 illustrates the impact of the Second Tier if overlaid on the current score system. These tables reflect the new definitions of administrative determinants discussed in Chapter III. These tables were developed as the base for classification projections presented later in this chapter. Since the Department's projections are based on fiscal years the base for the projections, and data in Tables 12 and 13 reflect the June 30, 1985 male felon institution population. (Tables presented earlier in this chapter are based on more recent data as of October 31, 1985.)

In examining the tables, Column (A) represents the inmates who can be placed according to their pure score level. Columns (B) and (C) together represent the Second Tier, and reflect inmates who must be placed according to an administrative determinant which requires them to be housed in a level other than the one dictated by their score. Column (B) includes those inmates placed by one of the seven administrative determinants defined in Attachment C. Note that over 4,000 inmates, under both the current system and Option 1, fall under Level III in this column because they are predominantly medical/psychiatric patients who must be housed in Level III institutions regardless of their score levels because of Department policy. Column (C) represents those inmates placed by an administrative determinant that is based on casework determinants as defined in Attachment C as "Exceptional Placements", "Temporary Exceptional Placements", or "Special/Public Interest Cases". Note that there are over 1,600

TABLE 12

Offender Information Services Branch
Administrative Services Division
Department of Corrections

Youth and Adult Correctional Agency
State of California
March 11, 1986

MALE FELON INSTITUTION POPULATION

DETERMINATION OF CLASSIFICATION LEVEL

JUNE 30, 1985

UNDER OPTION 1

CLASSIFICATION LEVEL	(A) TOTAL SCORE PLACEMENTS	SECOND TIER ADMINISTRATIVE PLACEMENTS (B) POLICY	(C) CASEWORK	(D) OUT-OF-LEVEL PLACEMENTS	(E) FINAL CLASSIFICATION LEVEL NUMBER	PERCENT
I	10,041	22	875	441	11,379	28.52
II	5,165	1,826	245	176	7,412	18.58
III	8,763	4,029	1,250	186	14,228	35.67
IV	2,165	2,725	88	1,897	6,875	17.23
TOTAL PLACEMENT	26,134	8,602	2,458	2,700	39,894	
PERCENT	65.51	21.56	6.16	6.77		100.00
RECEPTION CENTERS					3,052	
TOTAL MALE FELON POPULATION					42,946	

(E) Total of (A), (B), (C), and (D)

TABLE 13

Offender Information Services Branch
Administrative Services Division
Department of Corrections

Youth and Adult Correctional Agency
State of California
December 16, 1985

MALE FELON INSTITUTION POPULATION

DETERMINATION OF CLASSIFICATION LEVEL

JUNE 30, 1985

CURRENT SCORE SYSTEM (WITH SECOND TIER)

CLASSIFICATION LEVEL	(A) TOTAL SCORE PLACEMENTS	SECOND TIER ADMINISTRATIVE PLACEMENTS (B) POLICY	(C) CASEWORK	(D) OUT-OF-LEVEL PLACEMENTS	(E) FINAL CLASSIFICATION LEVEL NUMBER	PERCENT
I	9,508	100	1,309	634	11,551	28.95
II	3,722	1,600	233	681	6,236	15.63
III	7,274	4,048	1,666	260	13,248	33.21
IV	2,543	3,001	126	3,189	8,859	22.21
TOTAL PLACEMENT	23,047	8,749	3,334	4,764	39,894	
PERCENT	57.77	21.93	8.36	11.94		100.00
RECEPTION CENTERS					3,052	
TOTAL MALE FELON POPULATION					42,946	

(E) Total of (A), (B), (C), and (D)

inmates under the current system and over 1,200 inmates under Option 1 who fall under Level III in this column primarily because they were identified, based on casework, as security risks at lower level institutions and, therefore, must be housed in Level III institutions regardless of their score level.

Column (D) represents the number of inmates who are housed out-of-level because of population pressures and, therefore, fall outside of the administrative determinants. For these out-of-level inmates, classification level is dictated by their score level not where they are actually housed. For example, about 3,000 Level IV inmates are shown as out-of-level under the current system, and almost 1,900 under Option 1, because of population pressures, even though they are actually housed in Level III institutions. Column (E) is derived by summing across the columns and represents the inmate's final classification level when both score system and Second Tier considerations are taken into account.

The inmate's final classification level is the most important concern here since it represents the final classification decision; therefore, the impact of each option on classification level is summarized in Chart 8.

Under Option 1 the Classification Level I population would remain at slightly less than 29 percent which is approximately the same under the current system. However, the Classification Level II population would increase from less than 16 percent under the current score system to almost 19 percent of total population. The Classification

CHART 8

PERCENT OF INMATES BY CLASSIFICATION LEVEL IF SECOND TIER IMPLEMENTED

MALE FELON POPULATION AS OF JUNE 30, 1985

CURRENT SCORE SYSTEM



OPTION 1



OPTION 2



OPTION 3



Level III population would increase from about 33 percent to almost 36 percent and the Classification Level IV population would decline from about 22 percent to 17 percent. It can be anticipated that there would be about a 2 percent shift in population from cells to dormitories. This is due to the fact that under the current system approximately 45 percent of the population is housed in Levels I and II, while under Option 1 approximately 47 percent would be housed in those levels.

As can be seen here, the shifts in classification level are not as great as in score level. This is due to the fact that the tables assume that a certain portion of inmates whose score level is reduced would not be able to be housed in the lower level because of behavior problems and escape risks. These inmates are counted under casework placements at the level where they are currently housed.

Another way of looking at the impact on classification level is to compare Option 1 to the way inmates are actually housed under the current system, including out-of-level placements. Table 14 shows the average daily male felon population for the first ten months of 1985 by the level of institution where they are actually housed, as opposed to their score level. About 29 percent of the population was housed in Level I institutions; 14 percent in Level II; 40 percent in Level III; and 17 percent in Level IV. Therefore, Option 1 would place about the same proportion of inmates in Level I as are actually placed in that level under the current system, a larger proportion in Level II, less in Level III, and about the same in Level IV.

TABLE 14

CDC CLASSIFICATION
AVERAGE DAILY MALE FELON POPULATION - JANUARY - OCTOBER 1985[a]
EXCLUDING RECEPTION CENTER PROCESS CASES
SCORE LEVEL BY LEVEL OF INSTITUTION WHERE ACTUALLY PLACED

SCORE LEVEL		INSTITUTION LEVEL PLACEMENT I	II	III	IV	TOTAL
I -	NUMBER	7900	1722	1522	386	11530
	PERCENT	68.51%	14.93%	13.20%	3.35%	100.00%
II -	NUMBER	1854	2873	1696	355	6778
	PERCENT	27.35%	42.39%	25.02%	5.24%	100.00%
III -	NUMBER	149	303	5462	436	6351
	PERCENT	2.34%	4.77%	86.01%	6.87%	100.00%
IV -	NUMBER	14	13	4811	4559	9396
	PERCENT	0.14%	0.14%	51.20%	48.52%	100.00%
TOTAL -	NUMBER	9916	4911	13492	5737	34055
	PERCENT	29.12%	14.42%	39.62%	16.84%	100.00%

[a] Average monthly data was used rather than data for October 31, 1985, as in previous charts in this report, because the pattern of out-of-level placements by level of institution tends to fluctuate from month to month due to changes in the availability of beds at different institutions and increasing population pressures.

Overall, Option 1 brings the score levels closer to classification levels by reducing the percent who are out-of-level for population reasons. Under the current system almost 12 percent of the population is housed out-of-level due to population pressures. Option 1 reduces the number of out-of-level population pressures from almost 12 percent to less than 7 percent. This is because the score level of many of the inmates who are counted as out-of-level under the current system would be reduced to the level where they are currently housed.

° Disciplinaries

This section analyzes the ability of Option 1 to sort the inmates with higher disciplinary rates into higher score levels. As previously indicated, the system already does a good job of sorting out high-risk inmates, the goal is to find an option that at least does not decrease the ability of the system to sort out high-risk inmates. Chart 9 illustrates the potential impact of the three options on the disciplinary rate by score level. A comparison can be made with the disciplinary rate by score level under the current system.

Option 1 results in a small reduction in the disciplinary rate among Score Level I and II inmates and a small increase among Score Level III and IV inmates. This is because the score system, under Option 1, would do a better job of sorting the problematic inmates out of Levels I and II and into Levels III and IV.

CHART 9
PERCENT OF INMATES WITH DISCIPLINARIES AT FIRST INSTITUTION LEVEL PLACEMENT
INMATES ADMITTED DURING FY 1981-82



° Level IV "Population Overrides"

This section analyzes how good a job Option 1 does in duplicating the decisions to override Score Level IV inmates from reception centers direct to CTF and DVI. The analysis is based on the sample of 1,424 Level IV inmates used in Experiment 2 (page 66). Because it has been determined that these inmates did as well as Score Level III inmates at CTF and DVI they constitute a category of inmates who could probably be safely housed in Level III institutions with the additional security CTF and DVI have been using. Chart 10 illustrates how well the three options fared at identifying the inmates who were overridden, while not reclassifying those who were not overridden.

Under Option 1 about 900 of the 1,424 overrides are reclassified to Score Level III. However, Option 1 also results in reclassifying an additional 260 of the 1,241 inmates who were not overridden originally. It also failed to reclassify about 530 of the override inmates. If placements were unaffected by the changes in Option 1, a total of 790 inmates would have to be housed in a level different from their new score level (530 overrides who were not identified and 260 non-overrides who were incorrectly reclassified). This is almost a 50 percent improvement over the current system because all 1,424 of the overrides are currently counted as out-of-level.

The MCR statistic, introduced in the discussion of the validation study, is a good indicator of how good the option is at identifying the population overrides. Because the current system captures none of the population overrides, the MCR statistic indicates that Option 1 does 42 percent better than the current system.

CHART 10

LEVEL IV INMATES FROM RECEPTION

"POPULATION" OVERRIDE DECISION BY IMPACT OF OPTION



° Dynamics of Score System

This section analyzes the impact of Option 1 on the ability of an inmate to decrease his score if he remains disciplinary free. It also looks at the ability of the score system to move an inmate to a higher level if the inmate causes problems.

It should be noted that there have been major concerns expressed in the past relating to the ability of inmates to reduce their scores too rapidly and the possibility of problematic inmates moving to lesser security levels than appropriate as a result. This concern is not as great as it would be, however, if the Second Tier were not implemented at the same time as changes to the score system. By design the safety net aspect of the Second Tier is intended to complement the score system by catching inmates whose initial score levels do not place them at a high enough level due to the inexactness of the science of prediction.

It would also be unwise to intentionally design a score system which would fail to move these inmates' score levels upward to reflect their disciplinary behavior. If this were the case, the Second Tier would soon grow to encompass many inmates and, as a result, the purpose of the score system would be undermined.

As a result, it is important to examine the responsiveness of the score system to extreme disciplinary behavior in order to seek an option that balances an inmate's opportunity to reduce his score level with the ability to increase his score level if he exhibits severe misconduct. To simplify this analysis, two "case histories" are presented that typify the more critical classification decisions:

° An average inmate admitted as a Score Level IV trying to work his way down to a Level I institution.

° A Score Level III inmate who gets into trouble and is headed for a Level IV institution.

The first case history depicted in Table 15 analyzes the time required under the current system, and each option, for the average Score Level IV inmate at admission to work his way down to a lower level institution if he remains disciplinary free.

Under the current system the average Score Level IV inmate has an admission score of 83.5 points. It takes him four years to become eligible for Level III placement if he remains disciplinary free and participates in inmate programs. In another three years he is eligible for Level II and in one more year he is eligible for Level I. Therefore, a total of eight years is required before he reaches Level I.

Under Option 1, the average admission score for Score Level IV inmates drops to 69.55 because of the changes in the score system. As a result the time required for the average Score Level IV inmate to make it to Level III is only 2.5 years. Another 3 years is required for Level II, and another half year for Level I. A total of only six years is required before he reaches Level I.

Thus Option 1 provides a significantly greater opportunity for Level IV inmates to earn their way to lower levels. The time required to move from Level IV to Level III, and II to I, decreases dramatically. However, the time to move from Level III to II remains the same. This is appropriate since the movement from Level III celled facilities to Level II dormitory facilities entails a much more significant reduction in custody and security measures.

TABLE 15

TIME REQUIRED FOR AVERAGE LEVEL IV INMATES AT RECEPTION TO WORK SCORE LEVEL DOWN IF DISCIPLINARY FREE

AVERAGE SCORE AT ADMISSION	CURRENT SYSTEM	OPTION 1	OPTION 2	OPTION 3
TERM POINTS	51.98	42.09	57.75	63.98
(TERM YEARS)	(14)	(15)	(20)	(22)
OTHER THAN TERM	31.52	27.46	27.74	28.29
TOTAL CDC 839	83.50	69.55	85.49	92.27
(Number of Inmates)	(1,068)	(688)	(412)	(249)
IF INMATE REMAINS DISCIPLINARY FREE:				
Years to Level III[a]	4	2.5	3	2
(Top of Range)	(55)	(51)	(65)	(79)
Additional Years to Level II[a]	3	3	5	6.5
(Top of Range)	(33)	(27)	(27)	(27)
Additional Years to Level I[b]	1	½	½	½
(Top of Range)	(23)	(18)	(18)	(18)

[a] Level IV and III inmates can earn up to 8 points off their scores per year.

[b] Level II inmates can earn up to 20 points off their scores per year.

Note: This table represents the time required for an inmate to reduce his score only. Actual placement decision would take into account the Second Tier which because of security reasons could prevent the inmate from being placed in a lower level even though his score has been reduced.

The second case history examines the type of disciplinary behavior that would result in an inmate's score level being increased from III to IV. The system should be dynamic enough to reclassify an inmate to a higher level after a significant pattern of disciplinary behavior can be recognized. Table 16 illustrates the number and types of serious disciplinaries that would be required to move a Score Level III inmate who is working his way from lower institution levels to Level IV. This inmate would start at the bottom of the Level III range. Table 16 also illustrates the number and type of disciplinaries that would be required to move the average Level III inmate to Level IV. This inmate would start with the average score.

Under the current system the lowest Score Level III inmates would have a score of 34 points, requiring at least 22 more points to make him a Score Level IV. This would amount to four serious disciplinaries if none of the "Big Six" offenses were not involved. However, a "Big Six" offense would not necessarily make him a Score Level IV. In other words, the inmate could assault an officer once (14 points) without becoming a Score Level IV but if he used a weapon in the assault (26 points) he would become a Score Level IV.

On the otherhand, the average Level III inmate under the current system has a total score of only about 44 points. Therefore, it would take only three serious disciplinaries to make him a Score Level IV if none were "Big Six" offenses. In addition a single disciplinary which involved an assault on a staff member alone would be sufficient to move the average Score Level III inmate to Score Level IV.

TABLE 16

DISCIPLINARIES REQUIRED FOR SCORE LEVEL III INMATE
TO BECOME A SCORE LEVEL IV

	CURRENT SYSTEM	OPTION 1	OPTION 2	OPTION 3
(BOTTOM OF LEVEL IV BRACKET)	(56)	(52)	(66)	(80)
LOWEST LEVEL III				
Total Score	34	28	28	28
Points to Become IV	22	24	38	52
Number of Serious Disciplinaries on CDC 840 to Become IV	4	4	7	9
What "Big 6" Would Result in Level IV				
Assault on Inmate (10 points)	No	No	No	No
Assault on Staff (14 points)	No	No	No	No
Assault on Inmate with Weapon (26 points)	Yes	Yes	No	No
Assault on Inmate with Weapon Causing Serious Injury (42 points)	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
AVERAGE LEVEL III				
Average Score	43.66	38.36	39.86	41.58
Points to Become IV	12.34	13.64	26.14	38.42
Number of Serious Disciplinaries on CDC 840 to Become IV	3	3	5	7
What "Big 6" Would Result in Level IV				
Assault on Inmate (10 points)	No	No	No	No
Assault on Staff (14 points)	Yes	Yes	No	No
Assault on Inmate with Weapon (26 points)	Yes	Yes	No	No
Assault on Inmate with Weapon Causing Serious Injury (42 points)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: This table represents the affect various types of disciplinaries would have in a typical inmate's score and do not reflect placement decisions. Placement decisions as a result of serious offense which require placement in a Security Housing Unit remain a part of the Department's disciplinary process.

Under Option 1 the bottom of the Score Level III range would drop to 28 points but the number of additional disciplinary points required to increase to a Score Level IV would increase only to 24 because the bottom of the Score Level IV range would drop also. As a result, the number of serious disciplinaries or types of "Big Six" offenses that would result in reclassification to Score Level IV would remain the same under Option 1 for the lowest and the average Score Level III inmate. Thus, Option 1 does not make it any harder for the system to move a disciplinary problem to a higher level.

2. Analysis of Option 2

Score Level	Point Range
I	0-18
II	19-27
III	28-65
IV	66-Up

Term Point Cap = 73

° Score System

Under Option 2 (see Chart 6, page 93) the impact on Score Levels I and II is the same as for Option 1 because the level brackets are the same. The significant difference between Option 1 and 2 is in the shift from Score Levels IV to III. Option 2 results in an increase in Score Level III inmates from 24 percent under Option 1 to 30 percent under Option 2. Conversely, the Score Level IV population drops from 19 percent to 13 percent.

Again, although Chart 6 shows the overall distribution, it does not give a clear picture of how the shifts would occur. Chart 11 illustrates the shifts for Option 2.

CHART 11

PERCENT OF INMATES BY CURRENT SCORE LEVEL BY NEW LEVEL

INMATES IN PRISON ON OCTOBER 31, 1985

OPTION 2



As previously stated, since level brackets are the same for Options 1 and 2, Level I and II shifts would remain the same. The Level III shifts would also remain the same, however, under Option 2 approximate-ly 50 percent of the Score Level IV inmates would become Score Level III as compared to 30 percent under Option 1. Note, however, that this is only a rough analysis of the impact of the Level IV population. Since this is a major issue a more detailed analysis is presented separately at the end of this chapter.

° Second Tier

The impact of the Second Tier, when overlaid on Option 2, is illustrated in Table 17. The impact on the Classification Level I and II populations is the same as under Option 1 because the score level brackets are the same under both options.

Like score level, the significant difference in the Second Tier between Option 1 and 2 is the shift from Level IV to III that results from changes in the score level brackets. The Level III population would increase from 36 percent under Option 1 to 39 percent under Option 2, while the Level IV population would decline from 17 percent to less than 14 percent. In addition the number of inmates who would be out-of-level because of population pressures would drop from about 7 percent to about 4 percent.

Option 2 would place about the same proportion of inmates in Level III as are placed under the current system and less in Level IV (see Table 14, page 102).

TABLE 17

Offender Information Services Branch
Administrative Services Division
Department of Corrections

Youth and Adult Correctional Agency
State of California
March 11, 1986

MALE FELON INSTITUTION POPULATION

DETERMINATION OF CLASSIFICATION LEVEL

JUNE 30, 1985

UNDER OPTION 2

CLASSIFICATION LEVEL	(A) TOTAL SCORE PLACEMENTS	ADMINISTRATIVE PLACEMENTS (B) POLICY	ADMINISTRATIVE PLACEMENTS (C) CASEWORK	(D) OUT-OF-LEVEL PLACEMENTS	(E) FINAL CLASSIFICATION LEVEL NUMBER	(E) FINAL CLASSIFICATION LEVEL PERCENT
I	10,021	22	876	441	11,360	28.48
II	5,168	1,827	245	168	7,408	18.57
III	10,582	3,931	1,017	194	15,724	39.41
IV	1,643	2,736	91	932	5,402	13.54
TOTAL PLACEMENT	27,414	8,516	2,229	1,735	39,894	
PERCENT	68.72	21.34	5.59	4.35		100.00
RECEPTION CENTERS					3,052	
TOTAL MALE FELON POPULATION					42,946	

(E) Total of (A), (B), (C), and (D)

° Disciplinaries

The disciplinary rates by score level is virtually unchanged from Option 1 (see Chart 9, page 104) which means that Option 2 also improves slightly on the current system's ability to sort out inmates with disciplinary problems.

° Level IV Population "Overrides"

Under Option 2 about 1,260 of the 1,424 overrides would be reclassified to Score Level III, but at the cost of reclassifying an additional 500 of the 1,241 inmates who were not overridden originally (see Chart 10, page 106). Option 2 also failed to reclassify about 170 of the override inmates. If placements were unaffected by the changes in Option 2, a total of 670 inmates would have to be housed in a level different from their new score level (170 overrides who were not identified and 500 who were incorrectly reclassified). This is an improvement over the 790 inmates who would be housed out-of-level under Option 1.

The MCR statistic reported in Chart 10 (page 106) indicates that Option 2 improves the system by 48 percent, as compared with 42 percent for Option 1.

° Dynamics of the Score System

Using the case history illustrated in Table 15 (page 109) it would require three years before the average Score Level IV inmate could qualify for Level III placement if he remained disciplinary free and participated in inmate programs. This is one year less than under the current system and one-half year more than under Option 1. Another

five years would be required to reach Level II or two more years than under the current system and Option 1. Another half year would be required to reach Level I or two and one-half more years than under Option 1 and one-half year more than under the current system.

The reason why it would take longer for the average Score Level IV inmate under Option 2 is because his score is considerably higher than under Option 1. In fact, despite all the CDC 839 changes that reduce inmates scores, the average Score Level IV inmate under Option 2 has a higher admission score than the average Score Level IV inmate under Option 1 and the current system. This is because under Option 2 the number of Score Level IV inmates is cut in half. Those that remain are the worst of the former Score Level IV inmates in that they have longer terms (20 years under Option 2 compared with 14 years under the current system) and more unfavorable prior incarceration behavior.

In other words, despite the fact that the average Score Level IV inmate under Option 2 is substantially worse than under Option 1, his opportunity to work his way to lower institution levels is only a little worse. The increased time required to reduce his score compared to Option 1 is warranted by the fact that he is a much higher risk inmate and should not be permitted to move down too quickly.

The case history illustrated in Table 16 (page 111), indicates that under Option 2 the lowest Score Level III inmate would require seven serious disciplinaries, if none were "Big Six" offenses, before his score made him a Level IV, compared to four disciplinaries under Option 1. A single disciplinary involving an assault on an inmate with a weapon would not be sufficient alone to make him a Score Level IV, but if he also caused serious injury he would become a Score Level IV.

3. Analysis of Option 3

Score Level	Point Range
I	0-18
II	19-27
III	28-79
IV	80-Up

Term Point Cap = 87

° Score System

Again, the impact on Score Levels I and II is identical to Options 1 and 2. The significant difference between Option 3 and the other options is in the shift between Score Levels III and IV. The Score Level III population increases from 30 percent under Option 2 to 34 percent under Option 3 (see Chart 6, page 90). On the other hand, the Score Level IV population decreases from 13 percent to 8 percent (see Chart 6).

About 70 percent of current Score Level IV inmates would become Level III (see Chart 12), as compared to 50 percent under Option 2.

° Second Tier

The impact on Classification Levels I and II under Option 3 is identical to those under Options 1 and 2. The Classification Level III population, however, increases from over 39 percent under Option 2 to over 42 percent under Option 3 (see Table 18). On the other hand, Classification Level IV decreases from 13.5 percent to just under 11 percent. These shifts are due to the change in score level due to recommended changes in the score system. Also, the proportion of inmates who must be housed out-of-level due to population pressures declines from 4 percent under Option 2 to slightly over 3 percent under Option 3.

CHART 12

PERCENT OF INMATES BY CURRENT SCORE LEVEL BY NEW LEVEL

INMATES IN PRISON ON OCTOBER 31, 1985

OPTION 3



TABLE 18

Offender Information Services Branch
Administrative Services Division
Department of Corrections

Youth and Adult Correctional Agency
State of California
March 11, 1986

MALE FELON INSTITUTION POPULATION

DETERMINATION OF CLASSIFICATION LEVEL

JUNE 30, 1985

UNDER OPTION 3

CLASSIFICATION LEVEL	(A) TOTAL SCORE PLACEMENTS	ADMINISTRATIVE PLACEMENTS (B) POLICY	ADMINISTRATIVE PLACEMENTS (C) CASEWORK	(D) OUT-OF-LEVEL PLACEMENTS	(E) FINAL CLASSIFICATION LEVEL NUMBER	(E) FINAL CLASSIFICATION LEVEL PERCENT
I	10,022	22	877	440	11,361	28.48
II	5,166	1,826	245	168	7,405	18.56
III	11,895	3,911	810	197	16,813	42.14
IV	1,048	2,776	90	401	4,315	10.82
TOTAL PLACEMENT	28,131	8,535	2,022	1,206	39,894	
PERCENT	70.52	21.39	5.07	3.02		100.00
RECEPTION CENTERS					3,052	
TOTAL MALE FELON POPULATION					42,946	

(E) Total of (A), (B), (C), and (D)

Option 3 would place a significantly larger proportion of inmates in Level III than are placed under the current system and significantly less in Level IV (see Table 14, page 102).

° Disciplinaries

Under Option 3 the disciplinary rate among all score level inmates would probably stay the same as under Option 2 (see Chart 9, page 104) which means that it improves on the current system's ability to sort out problem inmates.

° Level IV Population "Overrides"

Under Option 3 all but 60 of the 1,424 overrides would be reclassified to Score Level III. However, an additional 770 of the 1,241 inmates who were not overridden originally (see Chart 10, page 106) would also be reclassified. If placements were unaffected by the changes in Option 3, a total of 830 inmates would have to be housed in a level different from their new score level (60 overrides who were not identified and 770 who were incorrectly reclassified). This is worse than either Options 1 or 2.

The MCR statistic reported in Chart 10 indicates that Option 3 improves the current system by 34 percent.

° Dynamics of the Score System

Using the case history illustrated in Table 15 (page 109) Option 3 would require two years before the average Score Level IV inmate could qualify for Level III placement if he remained disciplinary free and participated in inmate programs. This is two years less than under

the current system and one year less than under Option 2. Another six and one-half years would be required to reach Level II, or three and one-half more years than under the current system and one and one-half more than under Option 2. Another half year would be required to reach Level I, the same as under Option 1 and half of that under the current system. A total of nine years would be required to reach Level I, or one-half year more than under Option 2 and one year more than under the current system and Option 1.

As under Option 2 the average Score Level IV inmate would take longer to reach Level I because his score is considerably higher to start with than under Option 1. In fact, despite all the changes in the CDC 839 that reduce inmates' scores, the average Score Level IV inmate under Option 3 has a higher admission score than the average Score Level IV inmate under the current system or Option 2. The remaining Score Level IV are the worst of the former Score Level IV inmates because they have much longer terms (22 years under Option 3 compared 14 years under the current system) and more unfavorable prior incarceration behavior.

In other words, despite the fact that the average Score Level IV inmate under Option 3 is substantially worse than under Options 1 or 2, his opportunity to work his way to lower institution levels is only a little worse. The increased time required to reduce his score is warranted by the fact that he is a much higher risk inmate and should not be permitted to move down too quickly.

The case history illustrated in Table 16 (page 111) indicates that under Option 3 the lowest Score Level III inmate would require nine serious disciplinaries, if none were "Big Six" offenses, before his score made him a Level IV, compared to seven disciplinaries under Options 2 and 1. A single disciplinary involving an assault on an inmate with a weapon where serious injury was caused would not be sufficient to make him a Score Level IV.

The average Level III inmate under Option 3 would require seven serious disciplinaries to become a Score Level IV, compared with five under Option 2 and 1. An assault on an inmate with a weapon alone would not make him a Score Level IV, but if he also causes serious injury it would make him a Score Level IV.

Thus, under Option 3 the score system fails to move Score Level III inmates with serious patterns of misconduct to higher levels and, as a result, many Level III inmates would end up in the Second Tier due to a casework determination that these inmates must be housed in Level IV institutions.

4. Summary of Options

Table 19 summarizes the impact of the options on the Inmate Classification System. As shown, all three options would result in substantial reductions in score levels and classification levels. In comparing the options, however, it can be seen that Option 1 provides the least amount of change at the upper end of the system, resulting in about 30 percent of current Score Level IV inmates being reclassified to Level III. Option 2 would reclassify about 50 percent of current Score Level IV inmates to Level III. This is the approximate proportion of

Level IV inmates who are currently housed in Level III institutions. Option 3 provides the most changes resulting in about 70 percent of the Score Level IV's becoming Level III's. See Section D of this chapter for a more detailed analysis of the impact on current Score Level IV inmates.

When the Second Tier is overlaid on any of the options the number of inmates who are out-of-level because of population pressures decreases, as compared to the current system. It is the lowest under Option 3 and the highest under Option 1.

All of the options do slightly better than the current system at sorting higher risk inmates into higher level institutions at admission based on an analysis of resulting disciplinary rates.

Option 2 does the best job of identifying the Level IV population overrides, although Options 1 and 3 do a reasonable job.

The opportunity for inmates to work their scores down is good under all three options, a definite improvement over the existing system. The ability of the classification system to respond to disciplinary problems and insure that repetitive or severe misconduct results in increased score levels is good under Option 1 as well as the current system, poor under Option 2, and bad under Option 3. Although the Second Tier would catch these problematic inmates it is desirable that their score should reflect their disciplinary behavior.

In comparing the three options it would appear that Option 3 is too extreme to receive serious consideration. It would shift far more Score Level IV inmates to Level III than are currently housed in Level III institutions including many who have long terms or histories of serious

TABLE 19

SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF IMPACT OF FINAL OPTIONS

	CURRENT SYSTEM	OPTION 1	OPTION 2	OPTION 3
1. Score Level IVs reclassed to Level III	--	30%	50%	70%
2. Current Score Level to New Actual Classification Level[a]	--	38%	58%	N/A
3. Second Tier				
Classification Level	Actual Placements Under Current System			
I	29%	29%	28%	28%
II	14%	19%	19%	19%
III	40%	36%	39%	42%
IV	17%	17%	14%	11%
Out-of-Level	12%[b]	7%	4%	3%
4. Disciplinaries				
All options do a slightly better job of sorting disciplinary cases into higher levels than the current system.				
5. Level IV Population				
"Overrides"				
Ability to identify Level IV Population "Overrides"	--	Good	Best	Moderate
6. Dynamics of Score System				
Opportunites to Work Score Down	Bad	Excellent	Good	Acceptable
Responsiveness to[c] Problems	Good	Good	Bad	Bad

[a] A more detailed analysis of the impact on the Level IV population is presented at the end of this chapter.

[b] This figure comes from Table 12 and assumes that the Second Tier is overlaid on the current score system. As a result, many inmates who are currently considered out-of-level for policy or casework reasons are not considered out-of-level in this figure. The 30 percent out-of-level figure cited elsewhere in this report for the current system includes policy and casework placements.

[c] Although the Second Tier would capture inmates whose score level does not reflect the need for higher level custody because of serious disciplinary problems, it is still desirable for the score system to achieve a balance between responsiveness to disciplinary problems and opportunities to reduce one's score through good behavior.

misconduct, thereby creating a potential threat to the security of Level III institutions. Furthermore, Option 3 would not be responsive enough to inmates with patterns of repetitive or severe disciplinary problems to insure that their scores would be increased to Level IV. In summary, if Option 3 were adopted it could cause serious disruption of Level III institutions, as well as causing large numbers of inmates to fall into the Second Tier due to disciplinary problems which are not adequately accounted for in the score system. Therefore, further consideration will be given only to Options 1 and 2.

D. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS 1 AND 2

In order to provide a better understanding of the impact of implementing either Option 1 or 2 these options were further examined with respect to 4 additional criterion:

- Impact on classification population projections
- Impact on projected bed surplus/deficit
- Impact on Level IV population
- Safety and Security concerns

1. Impact on Classification Population Projections

Chart 13 compares projected classification level populations under the current score system to Options 1 and 2. These projections assume that the Second Tier has been implemented under the current score system as well as the options. The current system projections with the Second Tier in place is equivalent to previous CDC planning projections because

CHART 13

PROJECTED CLASSIFICATION OF MALE FELON INSTITUTION POPULATION

FISCAL YEARS 1985-86 THROUGH 1989-90



NOTE: These projections taken from tables prepared by Offender Information Services. Medical/Psychiatric and PHU included in Level III; SHU included in Level IV. Assumes implementation by June 30, 1986.

they take into account inmates' score levels as well as the policy and casework decisions which currently result in overrides (called administrative determinants under the Second Tier). Therefore, Chart 13 provides a picture of the impact on classification projections for planning purposes.

Chart 13 is derived from tables contained in Attachments E-1, E-2, and E-3. Medical/psychiatric and special housing inmates are folded into Levels III and IV in Chart 13 and Attachments E-1 through E-3. (These categories are broken out in Attachments E-4 through E-9 in order to provide projections which are comparable to past classification projections.) Medical/psychiatric and Protective Housing Unit (PHU) inmates are included in Level III and Security Housing Unit (SHU) inmates in Level IV. The projections assume that the score system changes proposed in Options 1 and 2 and the Second Tier would be implemented as proposed.

It should be noted that these are projections based on computer simulations and are not meant to be a prediction of what will actually occur. In addition, these projections were prepared for purposes of comparing options and will not necessarily coincide exactly with official projections released after this report. However, the relative impact of the options should be consistent with future projections.

As Chart 13 illustrates, the impact of either Option 1 or 2 on the Level I and II population would be nearly identical. Initially, the number of Level I inmates would not change significantly; however, over time the number of Level I inmates would increase due to greater opportunities for higher level inmates to reduce their classification scores.

By June 30, 1990, the Level I population would grow by about 1,350 more than under the current score system (with the Second Tier) if Option 1 were implemented and 1,650 if Option 2 were implemented.

The Level II population would increase initially by about 1,200 under either Option 1 or Option 2. Over time, the Level II population would tend to increase even more due to greater opportunities for higher level inmates to reduce their scores, but this increase would be mostly offset by additional Level II inmates working their way down to Level I. By June 30, 1990, the Level II population would increase by only 1,450 inmates over the current score system (with the Second Tier) if Option 1 were implemented and 1,600 if Option 2 were implemented.

The impact on the Level III and IV populations is different for Options 1 and 2. Initially, Option 1 results in a net reduction of about 2,000 Level IV inmates and Option 2 a net reduction of about 3,450 Level IV inmates to Level III. Under Option 1 this initial shift of Level IV inmates to Level III is mostly offset entirely by a large shift of Level III inmates to lower levels, resulting in an increase of only 1,000 Level III inmates. Under Option 2, however, the shift is not offset to the same degree resulting in an initial increase of about 2,500 Level III inmates. Over time, the drop in Level IV inmates becomes even greater relative to the current score system (with the Second Tier) because Level IV inmates will have greater opportunities to reduce their scores under Option 1 and Option 2.

By June 30, 1990, Option 1 would result in about 3,100 fewer Level IV inmates, and Option 2 would result in about 5,500 fewer Level IV inmates than under the current system (with the Second Tier). Under Option 1 the shift from Level IV to III over time would also be offset by

increased opportunity for Level III inmates to work their way down. By June 30, 1990, there would be only about 300 more Level III inmates than under the current system. Under Option 2 the initial increase of 2,300 Level III inmates is reduced to only 2,200 more than under the current system by June 30, 1990, due to greater opportunities for Level III inmates to work their way to lower levels.

In terms of raw numbers it appears as though Level I would increase dramatically under both options. However, in terms of the percent distribution of inmates (see Attachments E-1 through E-3) Level I would actually stay fairly stable at about 29 percent of the population over the entire period of the projections. The larger numerical increases in Level I under all of the options translates into relatively stable proportions because it counteracts the current trend toward relatively fewer Level I inmates. Under the current system, the proportion of Level I inmates drops over the projection period from 29 percent to under 26 percent.

In terms of percent distribution of inmates across levels, both of the options result in a much more stable system. Level II stays at a little over 18 percent under both options. Level III stays at about 35 percent under Option 1 and 38 percent under Option 2. Level IV shows a very slight increase under Option 1 (from 17 percent to almost 19 percent) and Option 2 (from 13.5 percent to almost 15 percent) because Level IV has a very small base to begin with and minute shifts from other levels translate into a noticeable, but still small increase in Level IV.

In summary, both options would result in large initial reductions in classification levels. The current trend toward relatively more Level IV and relatively less Level I inmates would be moderated by both options. A more-or-less stable system would result.

2. Impact on Projected Bed Surplus/Deficit

Chart 14 and Table 20 present Options 1 and 2 projections compared to the current systems population and planned new construction for now and 1990. As can be seen both Options 1 and 2 have the effect of reducing both the Level IV design bed and acceptable overcrowding bed deficit, as well as reducing the Level III surplus and increasing the deficits for both Levels II and I.

Implementation of Option 1 would result in a deficit of about 3,100 design beds and 2,400 acceptable overcrowding beds remain at Level IV, and a deficit of about 2,200 design beds and a surplus of about 3,000 acceptable overcrowding beds remain at Level III by June 30, 1990. In addition, a deficit of over 4,200 design beds and nearly 7,500 acceptable overcrowding beds would occur at Level I by June 30, 1990.

Under Option 2 a large shift of Level IV inmates to Level III nearly eliminates the Level IV design bed deficit under the current system and leaves the Level IV population at about the acceptable overcrowding limit. It also eliminates the surplus in Level III design limits. In general, Option 2 would result in inmate populations at Levels II, III, and IV which are essentially within acceptable overcrowding limits--substantially within limits at Level III; barely within limits at Level II; and at the limit for Level IV.

However, a deficit of almost 7,800 design beds and over 4,500 acceptable overcrowding beds would occur at Level I by June 30, 1990. In addition, there would still be a surplus of about 1,100 Level III acceptable overcrowding beds by June 30, 1990.

CHART 14

PROJECTED BED SURPLUS/DEFICIT AS OF JUNE 30, 1990

CURRENT SYSTEM COMPARED WITH OPTIONS 1 AND 2



TABLE 20

PROJECTED BED CAPACITY AND MALE FELON POPULATION BY LEVEL: JUNE 30, 1986 AND 1990
CURRENT SYSTEM COMPARED WITH OPTIONS 1 AND 2

	I	II	III	IV	RECEPTION	MED/PSYCH	TOTAL
**********	CURRENT SYSTEM				**********		
1986							
Design Bed Capacity (DBC)	7545	6318	7992	5210	1730	1486	30280
Population	12648	6988	12078	9778	3888	2478	47810
Deficit/Surplus (DBC)	-5100	-667	-4083	-4568	-2128	-990	-17530
% Occupied	168%	111%	151%	188%	223%	167%	158%
Accept. Overcrowding (ADC)	10471	7582	9890	5410	2076	1738	36864
Deficit/Surplus (ADC)	-2174	597	-2488	-4368	-1779	-740	-10946
1990							
Design Bed Capacity (DBC)	9107	6892	16392	7746	2630	1486	46452
Population	15238	8900	16348	13978	4500	3300	62288
Deficit/Surplus (DBC)	-6128	-8	47	-6229	-1670	-1815	-15803
% Occupied	167%	100%	100%	180%	159%	222%	134%
Accept. Overcrowding (ADC)	12348	10670	19670	8453	3396	1738	56269
Deficit/Surplus (ADC)	-2890	1770	3325	-6822	-1104	-1565	-8986
**********	OPTION 1				**********		
1986							
Design Bed Capacity (DBC)	7545	6318	7992	5210	1730	1486	30280
Population	12675	8240	12815	7688	3888	2640	47810
Deficit/Surplus (DBC)	-5130	-1922	-4823	-2478	-2128	-1068	-17530
% Occupied	168%	130%	160%	148%	223%	171%	158%
Accept. Overcrowding (ADC)	10471	7582	9890	5410	2076	1738	36864
Deficit/Surplus (ADC)	-2204	-658	-3225	-2278	-1779	-808	-10946
1990							
Design Bed Capacity (DBC)	9107	6892	16392	7746	2630	1486	46452
Population	16575	10355	16638	10880	4500	3310	62258
Deficit/Surplus (DBC)	-7468	-1463	-243	-3134	-1670	-1825	-15803
% Occupied	182%	116%	101%	140%	159%	223%	134%
Accept. Overcrowding (ADC)	12348	10670	19670	8453	3396	1738	56269
Deficit/Surplus (ADC)	-4230	315	3035	-2427	-1104	-1578	-8986
**********	OPTION 2				**********		
1986							
Design Bed Capacity (DBC)	7545	6318	7992	5210	1730	1486	30280
Population	12738	8280	14378	6038	3888	2630	47810
Deficit/Surplus (DBC)	-5190	-1962	-6383	-828	-2128	-1048	-17530
% Occupied	169%	131%	180%	116%	223%	170%	158%
Accept. Overcrowding (ADC)	10471	7582	9890	5410	2076	1738	36864
Deficit/Surplus (ADC)	-2264	-698	-4788	-628	-1779	-798	-10946
1990							
Design Bed Capacity (DBC)	9107	6892	16392	7746	2630	1486	46452
Population	16890	10506	18680	8498	4500	3288	62258
Deficit/Surplus (DBC)	-7783	-1613	-2188	-749	-1670	-1800	-15803
% Occupied	186%	116%	113%	110%	159%	221%	134%
Accept. Overcrowding (ADC)	12348	10670	19670	8453	3396	1738	56269
Deficit/Surplus (ADC)	-4545	168	1090	-42	-1104	-1550	-8986

Notes:

- Inmates requiring Protective Housing are included in Level III.
- Inmates requiring Security Housing are included in Level IV.
- Design Capacity and Acceptable Overcrowding based on November 6, 1985 report from Kitchell CEM.
- See Attachment B for the assumptions used for changes in design capacity.

TABLE 21

ESTIMATED IMPACT OF OPTION 1
ON LEVEL IV INMATE POPULATION

June 30, 1986

	NEW LEVEL		
	III	IV	TOTAL
CURRENT SCORE LEVEL IV INMATES: a/			
New Score Level	3,036	8,097	11,133
	27.27%	72.73%	100.00%
Impact of Second Tier:			
SHU	-123	123	
Med/Psych	596	-596	
PHU	111	-111	
Other:			
In Processing	211	-211	
Work Crew	22	-22	
Enemies	382	-382	
Dep. Dir. Review	26	-26	
Behavior OK	75	-75	
Miscellaneous	173	-173	
Classification Level	4,509	6,624	11,133
	40.50%	59.50%	100.00%

CURRENT SCORE LEVEL I-III INMATES WHO BECOME LEVEL IV BECAUSE OF SECOND TIER UNDER OPTION 1:	
SHU	458
In Processing	291
Work Crew	31
Disciplinary	109
Escape	22
Gang	16
Lifer/Death Row	19
III's Reclassed to IV	62
Miscellaneous	53
CLASSIFICATION LEVEL IV POPULATION:	7,685

Note: Table developed from data provided by Offender Information Services

a/ Includes 7,840 mailine inmates, 2,286 in SHU, 156 in PHU, and 851 in Med/Psych.

TABLE 22

ESTIMATED IMPACT OF OPTION 2
ON LEVEL IV INMATE POPULATION

June 30, 1986

	NEW LEVEL		
	III	IV	TOTAL
CURRENT SCORE LEVEL IV INMATES: a/			
New Score Level	5,501	5,632	11,133
	49.41%	50.59%	100.00%
Second Tier:			
SHU/MCU	-509	509	
Med/Psych	412	-412	
PHU	88	-88	
Other:			
In Processing	92	-92	
Work Crew	13	-13	
Enemies	233	-233	
Dep. Dir. Review	15	-15	
Behavior OK	38	-38	
Miscellaneous	96	-96	
Classification Level	5,979	5,154	11,133
	53.71%	46.29%	100.00%
CURRENT SCORE LEVEL I-III INMATES WHO BECOME LEVEL IV BECAUSE OF SECOND TIER UNDER OPTION 2:			
SHU			
In Processing		404	
Work Crew		257	
Disciplinary		27	
Escape		96	
Gang		19	
Lifer/Death Row		14	
III's Reclassed to IV		17	
Miscellaneous		47	
CLASSIFICATION LEVEL IV POPULATION:		6,035	

Note: Table developed from data provided by Offender Information Services Branch.

a/ Includes 7,840 mailine inmates, 2,286 in SHU, 156 in PHU, and 851 in Med/Psych.

3. Impact on Level IV Population

A more detailed analysis of the impact of Options 1 and 2 on the Level IV populations is presented here because the current practice of placing 50 percent of Score Level IV inmates in Level III institutions (see Table 14) has made this a major issue. Tables 21 and 22 illustrate the impact of Options 1 and 2 on the Level IV population. These tables are based on the June 30, 1986 projected population contained in Attachment E. Therefore, the figures contained in Tables 21 and 22 will not reconcile exactly to tables presented in earlier sections of this chapter.

The top part of these tables describes the impact on current Score Level IV inmates (before the Second Tier). Under Option 1 (see Table 21) a little less than 30 percent of current Score Level IV inmates (before the Second Tier) would be reclassified to Score Level III, but certain adjustments are made to account for the new Score Level III inmates who are housed in a Security Housing Unit (SHU) and Score Level IV inmates that must be housed in Level III because of medical/psychiatric treatment, housing in a Protective Housing Unit, and various other problems which require Level III housing. As a result of these Second Tier adjustments to classification level, about 40 percent of current Score Level IV inmates would become Level III under Option 1 with the Second Tier implemented. Similar adjustments for Option 2 (see Table 22) translates a 50 percent shift to a 54 percent shift when the Second Tier is taken into account.

In order to provide the complete picture of the impact on the Level IV population and reconcile Tables 21 and 22 to the Level IV projections in Chart 13, and Attachments E-2 and E-3, however, one must account for

current Score Levels I, II and III inmates who become Level IV as the result of the Second Tier because they are housed in a SHU, have disciplinary problems, are escape risks, and various other reasons. These adjustments are illustrated on the bottom part of Tables 21 and 22. For Option 1 these adjustments result in a total Classification Level IV population on June 30, 1986 of 7,685 (which is the same as the projected Level IV population in Table 20 and Attachment E-2 for the same date). For Option 2 these adjustments result in a total Classification Level IV population on June 30, 1986 of 6,035 (which is the same as the projected Level IV population in Attachment E-3 for that date).

Table 23 summarizes the overall impact of the options on the projected June 30, 1986 Level IV population and is based on the tables in Attachment E. Under the current system 11,333 inmates, including special housing and medical/psychiatric, will have a Level IV score on June 30, 1986. After the score system changes and the Second Tier are implemented, Option 1 would result in 7,685 Level IV inmates (as described in Table 21) as of June 30, 1986, including special housing and medical/psychiatric. This amounts to a 31 percent reduction from current Score Level IV inmates. Option 2 would result in 6,035 Level IV inmates including special and medical/psychiatric (as described in Table 22), a 46 percent reduction from current Score Level IV inmates.

Table 22 also provides another way of looking at the Level IV population excluding special housing and medical/psychiatric inmates. Under the current system 7,840 mainline inmates will have a Level IV score on June 30, 1986. After score system changes and the Second Tier are implemented Option 1 would result in 4,880 mainline Level IV inmates.

TABLE 23

LEVEL IV INMATE POPULATION UNDER OPTIONS
COMPARED TO CURRENT SYSTEM

June 30, 1986

CURRENT SYSTEM:	ALL INMATES	EXCLUDING SPECIAL HOUSING AND MED/PSYCH
Score Level IV (before Second Tier)	11,133[a/]	7,840
OPTION 1:		
Classification Level IV (after Second Tier)	7,685	4,880
Decrease	3,448	2,960
Percent Decrease	30.97%	37.76%
OPTION 2:		
Classification Level IV (after Second Tier)	6,035	3,260
Decrease	5,098	4,580
Percent Decrease	45.79%	58.42%

Note: Table developed from data provided by Offender Information Services Branch.

[a/] Includes 2,286 in SHU; 156 in PHU; and 851 in medical/psychiatric.

This amounts to approximately a 38 percent reduction from current Score Level IV inmates excluding special housing and medical/psychiatric. Option 2 would result in 4,580 mainline Level IV inmates or approximately a 58 percent reduction from current mainline Score Level IV inmates.

In summary, Option 1 results in a 30 percent shift of Score Level IV inmates to Score Level III, but this translates to about a 40 percent shift after the Second Tier is implemented. In terms of the total Level IV population (including lower score level inmates who are caught in the Second Tier) Option 1 would result in a 32 percent overall reduction. Option 2 results in a 50 percent shift of Score Level IV inmates to Score Level III, which translates to a 54 percent shift after the Second Tier. Option 2 would result in a 46 percent reduction in the overall Level IV population.

4. Safety and Security Concerns

Implementation of the Inmate Classification System in 1980 put into practice an administrative policy designed to concentrate CDC's most disruptive and violent inmates in Level IV institutions (San Quentin and Folsom Prison). The policy anticipated a leveling out, or even a reduction, in violence rates at lower level institutions as the more violent inmates were moved to Level IV institutions.

Conceptually this policy has worked. However, more recently the situation has been exacerbated by overcrowding at the higher level institutions, forcing the Department in late 1983 to start housing most of the better Level IV inmates in Level III facilities. As illustrated in Chart 15, violent incident rates at San Quentin and Folsom Prisons

increased to unprecedented levels following implementation of the classification system in 1980 and then increased again following the compression of Level IV inmate starting in 1983.

Although this course of action appears to have the desired affect in relation to violence at lower institution levels, if continued it will have certain implications with regard to current state law requiring the Department to build all Level IV institutions as 100 percent programming prisons. Experience at San Quentin and Folsom has shown that as violence increases in an institution the ability to continue effective work programs is seriously impaired. This can be attributed in part to the fact that there is an increased percentage of lockup inmates housed in these facilities while there is a continuing decline in the number of mainline Level IV inmates who provide the basic work force for the work programs. In addition, the increased security measures, such as prolonged institution lockdowns, required to manage these more violent Level IV mainline inmates also dramatically affects the ability of the institution to continue their established work programs. Although the new generation of Level IV institutions being constructed will allow the Department to better manage institution violence in the future, policies which concentrate violence-prone inmates in Level IV institutions will continue to make it more difficult to operate effective work programs in spite of the advanced design of the new facilities.

The compression of Level IV inmates, starting in 1983, also has had an effect on the Level III institutions where these inmates are housed. A number of security enhancements were necessary in order to safely manage the increasing numbers of Level IV inmates in Level III institutions, including addition of guns inside the institutions and additional

custody staff. A new set of classification policies which perpetuate the current compression of large numbers of inmates from Level IV to Level III would require continued presence of these enhanced security measures in certain Level III institutions.

Therefore, the selection of a final option should depend in part on the kind of Level III and IV institutions the Department would prefer to have in the future. In that regard, Option 1 is more conservative in terms of reducing inmate classification levels. It would, however, do a better job of providing the Department with sufficient numbers of Level IV workers to achieve goals for programming Level IV institutions and diffuse levels of violence and misconduct in those prisons. Under Option 1, Level IV institutions would retain some element of the Level IV mainline inmates capable of functioning in a partially restricted environment and participating in normal work or industry programs. By design it would permit the Department to spread the most violent inmates among a larger Level IV population, reducing the concentration of violence and misconduct at any prison and increasing the numbers of inmates who will contribute to the manageability of these institutions. Lower concentrations of these types of inmates would reduce the chances that programs at Level IV institutions would continue to be disrupted by violence or misconduct. In addition, Option 1 would permit Level III institutions to return to the less restrictive environment that existed prior to the compression.

Option 2, on the other hand is more aggressive in terms of reducing inmate classification levels. It would, however, perpetuate the current placement practice which has concentrated the most violent and disruptive inmates in Level IV institutions by reclassifying almost all the

Level IV inmates currently housed in Level III prisons, thereby making them legitimate Level III inmates. The inmates remaining in Level IV would therefore be the highest risk inmates presently housed in Level IV. Many of these inmates currently pose serious threats to the safety of staff and other inmates, as well as institution security, particularly if placed in Level IV school or industry programs as these are now organized.

Under Option 2, if new Level IV programming facilities are built it may not be possible to find sufficient numbers of Level IV inmates to fully use the program space in these facilities. In fact, at least 2,500 of the 5,400 Level IV inmates under Option 2 would require housing in SHU based on present populations and, as a result, could not be placed in work programs in the new prototype Level IV facilities.

Furthermore, the high levels of violence and misconduct currently occurring in Level IV institutions could be expected to continue if the Department continues the practice of concentrating the most violent inmates in Level IV institutions under Option 2. As a result Level IV could become a "super-maximum" designation reserved for the most violent and disruptive inmates in the system who are, for the most part, incapable of participating in normal programs and must be housed under extremely restricted conditions to protect staff and other inmates. In addition, Level III institutions would become more like current Level IV institutions with enhanced security measures and a more restrictive environment.

CHART 15

RATE OF ASSAULT INCIDENTS PER 100 AVERAGE DAILY INSTITUTION POPULATION

1970 - 1985



Note : Data based on incident reports submitted by institutions to the Offender Information Services Branch.

A variation on Option 2 could resolve the problems created by the compression by dividing the new Level III population into two new levels, creating five levels instead of four. The high end of Level III could then become the equivalent of a programming IV classification, while the Level IVs would become a "super" maximum security classification or Level V.

The Department concludes that Option 1 should be implemented because it would result in substantial reductions in inmate classification levels without compromising the safety of inmates and staff or the security of institutions. Of paramount concern to the Department is the ability to manage Level IV prisons in the face of increasing violence systemwide and the ability to comply with statutory requirements regarding 100 percent progamming Level IV institutions. Option 1 meets these concerns as well as the goal of reducing overclassification and refining the Inmate Classification System.

E. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings and analysis contained in this and the Policy Report the following recommendations are made in order to improve the Inmate Classification System:

1. Change the weight of the term item from four to three points per year on the CDC 839 and the item on the CDC 840 which is used to correct the term item.
2. Place a cap on term points at eight points above the cutoff between Level III and IV.
3. Drop the holds and detainers item on the CDC 839 and the item on the CDC 840 which is used to add or remove holds and detainers.
4. Modify the prior incarceration items so that points are assessed only if prior incarceration behavior points are not assessed; combine the three items into one item with a weight of four points for incarceration of more than 30 days, with a limit of three incarcerations total.
5. Implement Option 1 classification level brackets.

In addition to the above recommendations there are several other recommendations which are being presented as a result of ancillary findings made during the course of the study. Although these ancillary findings are not specifically discussed within the text of this report, they are sufficiently important to the Department's future classification efforts to warrant inclusion here.

6. Develop and implement a continuous evaluation component as an integral part of the classification system in order to monitor the impact of prospective changes in the classification system and continue the process of improving and refining the system.

   Both Options 1 or 2 would result in unprecedented movement of inmates to lower institution levels, particularly from Level III celled institutions to Level II dormitories. The potential custody risk involved in shifting numbers of inmates to lower levels warrants close monitoring and evaluation. Critical questions will undoubtedly be raised during implementation concerning the success of these changes, which the Department must be prepared to answer in a timely fashion. Therefore, it is recommended that a monitoring and evaluation component be built into the implementation phase.

7. Establish an ongoing classification research capability.

   There is a need for continuing research to validate and refine the score system. The score system is an important tool for making decisions about housing inmates, design and construction of prisons, and staffing and programming of institutions. It is critical that this tool be properly maintained and improved. Recent CDC validation research is a part of a pioneering effort in classification methods today. This research will place California's score system among the most advanced in the nation in terms of having a firm research foundation. If California is to remain in the forefront of inmate classification it must continue to invest resources in validation research and refining classification methods. Therefore, it is recommended that the Department establish an ongoing classification research capability. This capability should include assistance from research and classification experts outside the Department.

8. A study should be initiated immediately to analyze and possibly reclassify existing and planned institution custody and security capabilities.

   While the focus of this study has been on inmate classification, there is a need to look at the classification of institutions. Recent physical and custodial changes in existing institutions designed to accommodate overcrowding and compression of higher level inmates into lower level institutions has altered the original concepts which resulted in assignment of particular classification level designations

10. Another thorough evaluation and validation study of the Inmate Classification System be undertaken by 1991. In another five years reverberations from implementing these changes should have settled down and current construction efforts will be completed. It is recommended that, at that time, another thorough evaluation take place to re-examine policy questions raised in this report.

ATTACHMENTS

ATTACHMENT A

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

CDC CLASSIFICATION SCORE SHEET

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

RACE/ETHNIC STATUS (code one)
1-White, 2-Mexican descent, 3-Black, 4-Indian, 5-Chinese, 6-Japanese, 7-Filipino, 8-Hawaiian, 9-Other [ ] 23

DATE LAST RECEIVED CDC: mo [ ][ ] 24 25 day [ ][ ] 26 27 year [ ][ ] 28 29

COUNTY: [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ] 30 31 32 33 34

BASE OFFENSE: _____ (name)

BASE OFFENSE CODE: NUMBER: [ ] [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ] [ ] 35 36 37 38 39 40 41

MINIMUM RELEASE DATE: mo [ ][ ] 42 43 day [ ][ ] 44 45 year [ ][ ] 46 47

STATUS (code one): 1-New Commitment, 2-PV-WNT, 3-PV-RTC [ ] 48

RECEPTION CENTER: RCC, NRC, RCW, SQ, CIW [ ][ ][ ] 49 50 51

CALCULATION OF SCORE

BACKGROUND FACTORS

1. Total DSL Term
a) Sentence length ( )
b) Minus 1 year =___ x 4= [ ][ ] 52

2. Stability
a) Under 26 yrs. at reception + 2= [ ] 54
b) Never married/common law or marriage not intact + 2= [ ] 55
c) Not high school graduate or GED + 2= [ ] 56
d) Not more than 6 months with one employer + 2= [ ] 57
e) No military or not honorable discharge + 2= [ ] 58

3. Prior Escapes
a) No. of walkaways/escapes =___ x 4= [ ][ ] 59
b) No. of breached perimeter or escape is committing crime =___ x 8= [ ][ ] 61
c) No. of escapes with force =___ x 16= [ ][ ] 63

4. Holds and Detainers
a) No. of holds where new prison sentence, deportation likely =___ x 6= [ ][ ] 65

5. Prior Sentences Served
a) No. of jail or county juvenile of 31+ days (limit to 3) =___ x 2= [ ][ ] 67
b) No. of CYA, state level juvenile (limit to 3) =___ x 2= [ ][ ] 69
c) No. of CDC, CRC, adult state-federal level (limit to 3) ___ x 4= [ ][ ] 71
i) Total Background Factors Score +_____

Work Skills [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ] 73

PRIOR INCARCERATION BEHAVIOR

6. Unfavorable Prior Behavior
a) No. of serious or major disciplinaries last incarcerated year =___ x 4= [ ][ ] 7
b) Escape in last incarceration =___ x 8= [ ][ ] 9
c) No. of physical assaults on staff =___ x 8= [ ][ ] 11
d) No. of physical assaults on inmates =___ x 4= [ ][ ] 13
e) No. of smuggling/trafficking drugs =___ x 4= [ ][ ] 15
f) No. of possessing deadly weapons =___ x 4= [ ][ ] 17
g) No. of inciting disturbance =___ x 4= [ ][ ] 19
h) No. of assaults that caused serious injury =___ x 16= [ ][ ] 21
Total Unfavorable Points =+_____

7. Favorable Prior Behavior
a) Successfully completed last four months in any minimum custody or successful dorm living last incarceration −4 or successful minimum custody last year of incarceration or= −8 [ ] 23
b) No serious or major 115's last year of incarceration −4= [ ] 24
c) Full time work/school/voc., average or above program last incarcerated year −4= [ ] 25
Total Favorable Credits =−_____
h) Net Incarceration Behavior Score Unfavorable minus Favorable =+or−_____

TOTAL COMBINED BACKGROUND FACTORS AND PRIOR INCARCERATION SCORE [ ][ ][ ] 26

Counselor's Signature: _____ Supervisor's Signature: _____ Date: _____

CLASSIFICATION STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ACTION

Institution Approved: [ ][ ][ ] [ ][ ][ ] Cat: [ ] 20 30 31 32 33 34 35

CSR Last Name: [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ] 36 37 38 39 40 41

F.I. [ ] 42

Exceptional Placement* [ ][ ][ ] 43 44 45

Date of Action: mo [ ][ ] 46 47 day [ ][ ] 48 49 year [ ][ ] 50 51

* Explain Exceptional Placement; _____

CDC NUMBER: (end in Col. 6) [ ] [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ] 1 2 3 4 5 6

INMATE'S LAST NAME (start in Col. 7) [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ] 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

[ ][ ] 19 20

19 [ ][ ] 21 22

As amended for CAC Title 15 § 3375 on 7-23-84

CDC 839 (6 85)

Notice:

The inmate is to be advised that the central goal and responsibility of the Department is to maintain institutional security and preserve internal order and discipline (§3270 "General Policy," Article 2, Subchapter 4, Rules and Regulations of the Director, Title 15, California Administrative Code).

Classification and reclassification of inmates will normally be made pursuant to the CDC Classification Scoring System *except* when in the exercise of the discretion and judgment of departmental officials it is deemed necessary to depart therefrom in individual cases. Such departures from the system shall be made for the purpose of insuring the safety of inmates, correctional personnel and that of the general public as well as for special institutional and/or programming needs.

Inmates are to be advised of the "Fairness Procedures" established by the Department.

ATTACHMENT B

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

CDC Reclassification Score Sheet

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

	mo day yr	mo day yr	mo day yr
DATE OF CURRENT REVIEW:	21	21	21
8. Unfavorable Behavior Since Last Review			
a) No. of serious CDC 115's	___ x 6 = 27	___ x 6 = 27	___ x 6 = 27
b) No. of escapes during current period	___ x 8 = 29	___ x 8 = 29	___ x 8 = 29
c) No. of physical assaults on staff	___ x 8 = 31	___ x 8 = 31	___ x 8 = 31
d) No. of physical assaults on inmates	___ x 4 = 33	___ x 4 = 33	___ x 4 = 33
e) No. of smuggling/trafficking in drugs	___ x 4 = 35	___ x 4 = 35	___ x 4 = 35
f) No. of possessing deadly weapons	___ x 16 = 37	___ x 16 = 37	___ x 16 = 37
g) No. of inciting disturbance	___ x 4 = 39	___ x 4 = 39	___ x 4 = 39
h) No. of assualts that caused serious injury	___ x 16 = 41	___ x 16 = 41	___ x 16 = 41
i) Total Unfavorable Points	=+___	=+___	=+___
	No. of 6 mo. periods	No. of 6 mo. periods	No. of 6 mo. periods
9. Favorable Behavior Since Last Review			
a) Continuous minimum custody	___ x 4 = 43	___ x 4 = 43	___ x 4 = 43
b) Continuous dorm living	___ x 2 = 45	___ x 2 = 45	___ x 2 = 45
c) No serious 115's	___ x 2 = 47	___ x 2 = 47	___ x 2 = 47
d) Average or above full time work/vocational school program	___ x 2 = 49	___ x 2 = 49	___ x 2 = 49
ii) Total Favorable Credits	=-___	=-___	=-___
10. Computation of Classification Score			
a) Net Change = Unfavorable less Favorable =	___	= ___	= ___
b) Any change for holds or detainers (6 points)	=+or- 51	=+or- 51	=+or- 51
c) Any change of sentence points (4 points per year)	=+or- 54	=+or- 54	=+or- 54
d) Prior Classification Score	= 57	= 57	= 57
e) Adjusted Classification Score	= 60	= 60	= 60
11. Current Placement			
a) Current institution/camp	63	63	63
b) Assigned custody: (e.g. MIN-A-RS)	69	69	69
c) Special custody housing: (SHU/MCU/PHU)	75	75	75
d) Special case factors:	7	7	7
e) Any change in Minimum Release Date:	10	10	10
12. Staff Signature:			
13. Auditor Signature:			
14. CSR Action:			
a) Institution approved:	16	16	16
b) CSR's last name/first initial:	23	23	23
c) Exceptional placement:	30	30	30
Reasons:		Reasons	Reasons

CDC NUMBER (end in Col. 6) 1 2 3 4 5 6

INMATES LAST NAME 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

INITIALS 19 20

As amended for CAC Title 15, § 3375 on 7-23-84

CDC 840 (6 85)

Notice:

The inmate is to be advised that the central goal and responsibility of the Department is to maintain institutional security and preserve internal order and discipline (§3270 "General Policy," Article 2, Subchapter 4, Rules and Regulations of the Director, Title 15, California Administrative Code).

Classification and reclassification of inmates will normally be made pursuant to the CDC Classification Scoring System *except* when in the exercise of the discretion and judgment of departmental officials it is deemed necessary to depart therefrom in individual cases. Such departures from the system shall be made for the purpose of insuring the safety of inmates, correctional personnel and that of the general public as well as for special institutional and/or programming needs.

Inmates are to be advised of the "Fairness Procedures" established by the Department.

(b) Inmates within the following range of Classification Scores shall be placed in an institution which is designated at the level indicated:

Score	Level
0-23	I
24-33	II
34-55	III
56+	IV

753. **Administrative Determinants.**

Notwithstanding and apart from the inmate's Classification Score, the following policy shall take precedence in determining the placement of inmates. The letters in parentheses will be used to identify and record such determinants.

(a) Medical Psychiatric Cases ("I, J, H, B, K, V, N, or O"). Inmates who require medical or psychiatric care at an outpatient level or higher shall be housed at CMF, CMC-E, San Quentin or CIM.

(b) History of Sex Offenses ("R"). Inmates with a history of sex crimes ("R" custody suffix) shall not be housed in a Level I facility except CMC-W, CCI-I, CTF-S, SCC-I, or CCC-I, and shall receive direct and constant supervision if assigned outside a secure perimeter.

(c) History of Arson ("A"). Inmates with a history of arson shall not be housed in facilities constructed primarily of wood. These include all conservation camps, CMC-W I and II, CCI-I, CRC, CMF I and II, DVI-I, San Quentin I and II, and Folsom I.

(d) Active Felony Holds ("D"). Inmates with any felony hold, warrant, detainer or the equivalent thereof, which is judged likely to result in a significant period of subsequent consecutive incarceration or unfavorable deportation, shall not be housed in a Level I facility except CMC-W, CCI-I, CTF-S, SCC-I or CCI-I.

(e) Protective Custody Needs ("P"). Inmates for whom it has been documented that placement in a general population is likely to result in a serious injury shall be placed in a departmentally designated Protective Housing Unit.

(f) Security Housing Needs ("S"). Inmates who have demonstrated by their conduct that their continued presence in a general population threatens the safety of others or the security of the institution shall be placed in a Security Housing Unit.

(g) Life Sentence ("L"). Inmates serving a life sentence must have an established parole date of 36 months or less to be placed in a Level I facility. In addition, no inmate shall be housed at a facility lower than Level III if:

(1) Sentenced to Life Without Possibility of Parole.

(2) His/her commitment offense is for multiple murders, or he/she was involved in unusually high notoriety.

(3) He/she has a history of multiple escapes, escape from a secure perimeter, or escape with force or threat of force.

754. Exceptional Placements.

(a) In addition to Administrative Determinant placements, inmates will occasionally require housing in a facility with a level designation different from their Classification Score because of special security concerns, departmental requirements or inmate program needs. Such cases shall be referred to a Classification Staff Representative for exceptional placement.

(b) The Chief of Classification Services may also raise the maximum Classification Score as necessary to facilitate camp manpower needs.

(c) Specific institutions have been appropriated a quota of out-of-level inmates to maintain institutional manpower needs.

755. Temporary Exceptional Placement.

Institutions with different level facilities may retain or transfer inmates from one level facility to another which does not match the Classification Score or endorsement, pending disciplinary action or as an enroute (to another institution) for a period not to exceed 30 days without a Classification Staff Representative review.

756. Special/Public Interest Cases.

A special/public interest case is one which has received excessive media coverage, beyond local coverage, and public attention. When endorsing such a case for transfer, the CSR shall designate it as notorious on the CDC 128-G Transfer Chrono. A copy of this chrono will be given to the Classification and Parole Representative, who will notify the sending and receiving institution administrators. Additionally, the CSR endorsing the case for transfer will contact the Chief, Classification Services, at the time the action is taken and provide the Chief, Classification Services, with a copy of the 128-G Transfer Chrono and the CSR Endorsement Chrono.

757-769. (Reserved).

* * *

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA BARBARA

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SOCIAL PROCESS RESEARCH INSTITUTE

SANTA BARBARA, CALIFORNIA 93106

December 9, 1985

Mr. Robert Anderson
Chief, Management Services
Department of Corrections
P.O. Box 714
Sacramento, CA 95803

Dear Bob,

I am writing as you requested to summarize my views on your efforts to validate your inmate classification system. These views derive from three sources: the written materials you sent to me, the meeting we had in Sacramento, and some analyses of a sample of approximately 1000 prisoner cases taken from the larger files you have been using.

First and most important, it is almost certain that you do not have the data to formally validate your inmate classification system. Perhaps an analogy will show why this is the case.

Imagine that one is trying to predict who is likely to get bad headaches and who is not. Those individuals who are predicted to have bad headaches will be given a new wonder drug, and those who are not predicted to have bad headaches will not be given the drug. As a validation of the prediction system, statistical relationships will be examined between the predictors of headaches (e.g., levels of stress) and who ultimately gets headaches.

One can easily imagine several kinds of empirical outcomes. At one extreme expecially relevant to your situation, however, no one gets any headaches, this means that there is no variability in the validation measure and, therefore, there are no relationships between predictors and the validation measure. Unfortunately, the failure to find any relationships could lead to two very different conclusions. On the one hand, the wonder drug is so effective that all headaches are prevented. That is, the treatment is a smashing success with the prediction system designating the high risk group as hoped. On the other hand, one could conclude that the system used to place people in the high risk group was very badly flawed. In fact, the high risk group was at virtually no risk, and the wonder drug was irrelevant.

Your situation is rather similar. In addition to some real questions about quality of the outcome measures available to you (including serious outliers), it is apparent that there is very little variation. Most of the inmates score "0" across the board. As a result, when you find very small relationships between your predictors and your outcome measures, it could be because your prediction system is badly flawed or because your inmate placement system dramatically reduces undesirable outcomes. However, to the degree that you find even modest effects for the placement level on your outcome measures (in sensible directions), there is some evidence that the system is working.

In summary, a failure to find powerful predictors of behavioral problems could indicate that your classification system works very well or very poorly. The only way a proper empirical validation could be implemented is with a randomized experiment or a very strong quasi-experiment. The basic idea would be to place some prisoners with your current classification system and place other prisoners at random. The first collection of prisoners would serve as the treatment group and the second collection would serve as the control group. Ideally, prisoners would be assigned to the treatment or control condition on a random basis. I should add, however, that there are also some serious data quality problems that would have to be remedied. One cannot assume that data collected for administrative purposes are necessarily adequate for research purposes.

Second, while in my judgement the statistical procedures you have used to date have not been state of the art, it is very unlikely that superior approaches would have made much of a difference. I did a number of more appropriate statistical analyses with the sample of cases you sent. For example, I employed Tobit techniques to directly address the fact that "0" was the most common outcome. I too found few predictors that worked, although I was a bit more successful than you were. In short, I think your "null" results are probably correct.

Finally, since CDC designed the current classification system, CDC certainly can alter it. Thus, the idea of examining what may account for classification "overrides" is a good one. In effect, your people in the field may be inventing improvements. If these improvements can be summarized in a proper statistical analysis, you may well find ways to reweight your current list of placement variables, or even add new placement variables.

I hope that this letter addresses the key points. If I can be of more assistance, let me know.

Sincerely,

Richard A. Berk
Director, SPRI

CURRENT SCORE SYSTEM

PROJECTED[1] CLASSIFICATION OF MALE FELON INSTITUTION POPULATION
FISCAL YEARS 1984-85 THROUGH 1989-90
(WITH SECOND TIER IMPLEMENTED)

	NUMBER							PERCENT (EXCLUDING RECEPTION CENTER)				
FISCAL YEAR	RECEPTION CENTER	LEVEL 1	LEVEL 2	LEVEL[2] 3	LEVEL[3] 4	TOTAL	GRAND TOTAL	LEVEL 1	LEVEL 2	LEVEL[2] 3	LEVEL[3] 4	TOTAL
1984-85 JUNE 30	3,052	11,551	6,236	13,248	8,859	39,894	42,946	28.95	15.63	33.21	22.21	100.00
1985-86 JUNE 30	3,855	12,645	6,985	14,550	9,775	43,955	47,810	28.77	15.89	33.10	22.24	100.00
1986-87 JUNE 30	4,140	13,860	7,750	16,110	10,865	48,585	52,725	28.53	15.95	33.16	22.36	100.00
1987-88 JUNE 30	4,195	14,655	8,275	17,430	11,930	52,290	56,485	28.03	15.83	33.33	22.81	100.00
1988-89 JUNE 30	4,375	15,105	8,655	18,625	12,970	55,355	59,730	27.29	15.63	33.65	23.43	100.00
1989-90 JUNE 30	4,500	15,235	8,900	19,645	13,975	57,755	62,255	26.38	15.41	34.01	24.20	100.00

[1] These projections include the revised Classification System which was completed in June 1985 and assume the male felon reception center population will increase proportionately with the increase in male felon inmate. These projections assume that Chapter 42, statutes of 1980 (SB 1236, Beverly), will not sunset pursuant to Chapter 1388, statutes of 1985 (SB 72, Beverly).

[2] Level 3 includes inmates in Medical/Psychiatric and Protective Housing Units.

[3] Level 4 includes inmates in Security Housing Units.

Source: Projections prepared by Offender Information Services Branch, August 31, 1985.

C-CSS1

ATTACHMENT E-1

CLASSIFICATION STUDY OPTION 1

PROJECTED[1/] CLASSIFICATION OF MALE FELON INSTITUTION POPULATION
FISCAL YEARS 1984-85 THROUGH 1989-90

	NUMBER							PERCENT (EXCLUDING RECEPTION CENTER)				
FISCAL YEAR	RECEPTION CENTER	LEVEL 1	LEVEL 2	LEVEL[2/] 3	LEVEL[3/] 4	TOTAL	GRAND TOTAL	LEVEL 1	LEVEL 2	LEVEL[2/] 3	LEVEL[3/] 4	TOTAL
1984-85 JUNE 30	3,052	11,379	7,412	14,228	6,875	39,894	42,946	28.52	18.58	35.67	17.23	100.00
1985-86 JUNE 30	3,855	12,675	8,240	15,355	7,685	43,955	47,810	28.84	18.75	34.93	17.48	100.00
1986-87 JUNE 30	4,140	14,170	9,100	16,790	8,525	48,585	52,725	29.16	18.73	34.56	17.55	100.00
1987-88 JUNE 30	4,195	15,245	9,680	18,020	9,345	52,290	56,485	29.15	18.51	34.46	17.87	100.00
1988-89 JUNE 30	4,375	16,055	10,085	19,080	10,135	55,355	59,730	29.00	18.22	34.47	18.31	100.00
1989-90 JUNE 30	4,500	16,575	10,355	19,945	10,880	57,755	62,255	28.70	17.93	34.53	18.84	100.00

[1/] These projections include the revised Classification System which was completed in June 1985 and assume the male felon reception center population will increase proportionately with the increase in male felon inmate. These projections assume that Chapter 42, statutes of 1980 (SB 1236, Beverly), will not sunset pursuant to Chapter 1388, statutes of 1985 (SB 72, Beverly).

[2/] Level 3 includes inmates in Medical/Psychiatric and Protective Housing Units.

[3/] Level 4 includes inmates in Security Housing Units.

Source: Projections prepared by Offender Information Services Branch, January 22, 1986.

C-CSS2

ATTACHMENT E-2

CLASSIFICATION STUDY OPTION 2

PROJECTED[1/] CLASSIFICATION OF MALE FELON INSTITUTION POPULATION
FISCAL YEARS 1984-85 THROUGH 1989-90

	NUMBER							PERCENT (EXCLUDING RECEPTION CENTER)				
FISCAL YEAR	RECEPTION CENTER	LEVEL 1	LEVEL 2	LEVEL 3[2/]	LEVEL 4[3/]	TOTAL	GRAND TOTAL	LEVEL 1	LEVEL 2	LEVEL 3[2/]	LEVEL 4[3/]	TOTAL
1984-85 JUNE 30	3,052	11,360	7,408	15,724	5,402	39,894	42,946	28.48	18.57	39.41	13.54	100.00
1985-86 JUNE 30	3,855	12,735	8,280	16,905	6,035	43,955	47,810	28.97	18.84	38.46	13.73	100.00
1986-87 JUNE 30	4,140	14,285	9,155	18,470	6,675	48,585	52,725	29.40	18.84	38.02	13.74	100.00
1987-88 JUNE 30	4,195	15,455	9,785	19,710	7,340	52,290	56,485	29.56	18.71	37.69	14.04	100.00
1988-89 JUNE 30	4,375	16,330	10,220	20,890	7,915	55,355	59,730	29.50	18.46	37.74	14.30	100.00
1989-90 JUNE 30	4,500	16,890	10,505	21,865	8,495	57,755	62,255	29.24	18.19	37.86	14.71	100.00

[1/] These projections include the revised Classification System which was completed in June 1985 and assume the male felon reception center population will increase proportionately with the increase in male felon inmate. These projections assume that Chapter 42, statutes of 1980 (SB 1236, Beverly), will not sunset pursuant to Chapter 1388, statutes of 1985 (SB 72, Beverly).

[2/] Level 3 includes inmates in Medical/Psychiatric and Protective Housing Units.

[3/] Level 4 includes inmates in Security Housing Units.

Source: Projections prepared by Offender Information Services Branch, January 22, 1986.

C-CSS3

ATTACHMENT E-3

ESTIMATES AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SECTION
OFFENDER INFORMATION SERVICES BRANCH
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

YOUTH AND ADULT CORRECTIONAL AGENCY
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
AUGUST 31, 1985

CURRENT SCORE SYSTEM

PROJECTED[2] CLASSIFICATION OF MALE FELON INSTITUTION POPULATION
FISCAL YEARS 1985-86 THROUGH 1989-90
(WITH SECOND TIER IMPLEMENTED)

NUMBER

FISCAL YEAR	RECEPTION CENTER	LEVEL 1	LEVEL 2	LEVEL 3	LEVEL 4	MEDICAL/ PSYCHIATRIC	SPECIAL HOUSING PHU	SHU	TOTAL	GRAND TOTAL
1985-86										
SEPTEMBER 30	3,555	11,945	6,480	11,030	6,535	2,305	245	2,510	2,755	44,605
DECEMBER 31	3,750	12,205	6,655	11,305	6,710	2,360	255	2,575	2,830	45,815
MARCH 31	3,850	12,435	6,825	11,575	6,895	2,425	255	2,635	2,890	46,895
JUNE 30	3,855	12,645	6,985	11,815	7,070	2,475	260	2,705	2,965	47,810
1986-87										
SEPTEMBER 30	3,865	12,945	7,175	12,120	7,265	2,535	270	2,780	3,050	48,955
DECEMBER 31	3,935	13,150	7,320	12,400	7,445	2,590	275	2,845	3,120	49,960
MARCH 31	4,020	13,490	7,525	12,730	7,650	2,665	280	2,925	3,205	51,285
JUNE 30	4,140	13,860	7,750	13,085	7,865	2,740	285	3,000	3,285	52,725
1987-88										
JUNE 30	4,195	14,655	8,275	14,160	8,635	2,955	315	3,295	3,610	56,485
1988-89										
JUNE 30	4,375	15,105	8,655	15,135	9,385	3,150	340	3,585	3,925	59,730
1989-90										
JUNE 30	4,500	15,235	8,900	15,985	10,115	3,300	360	3,860	4,220	62,255

[1]THESE PROJECTIONS INCLUDE THE REVISED CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM WHICH WAS COMPLETED IN JUNE 1985 AND ASSUME THE MALE FELON RECEPTION CENTER POPULATION WILL INCREASE PROPORTIONATELY WITH THE INCREASE IN MALE FELON INTAKE.

[2]THESE PROJECTIONS ASSUME THAT CHAPTER 42, STATUTES OF 1980 (SB 1236, BEVERLY), WILL NOT SUNSET PURSUANT TO CHAPTER 1388, STATUTES OF 1985 (SB 72, BEVERLY).

ATTACHMENT E-4

ESTIMATES AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SECTION
OFFENDER INFORMATION SERVICES BRANCH
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

YOUTH AND ADULT CORRECTIONAL AGENCY
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
AUGUST 31, 1985

CURRENT SCORE SYSTEM
PROJECTED[2] SCORE LEVEL OF MALE FELON INSTITUTION POPULATION
FISCAL YEARS 1985-86 THROUGH 1989-90

NUMBER

FISCAL YEAR	RECEPTION CENTER	LEVEL 1	LEVEL 2	LEVEL 3	LEVEL 4	MEDICAL/ PSYCHIATRIC	SPECIAL HOUSING PHU	SHU	TOTAL	GRAND TOTAL
1985-86										
SEPTEMBER 30	3,555	13,320	7,215	8,215	7,240	2,305	245	2,510	2,755	44,605
DECEMBER 31	3,750	13,590	7,435	8,415	7,435	2,360	255	2,575	2,830	45,815
MARCH 31	3,850	13,840	7,645	8,605	7,640	2,425	255	2,635	2,890	46,895
JUNE 30	3,855	14,050	7,845	8,780	7,840	2,475	260	2,705	2,965	47,810
1986-87										
SEPTEMBER 30	3,865	14,380	8,070	9,000	8,055	2,535	270	2,780	3,050	48,955
DECEMBER 31	3,935	14,590	8,250	9,215	8,260	2,590	275	2,845	3,120	49,960
MARCH 31	4,020	14,965	8,495	9,455	8,480	2,665	280	2,925	3,205	51,285
JUNE 30	4,140	15,375	8,755	9,715	8,715	2,740	285	3,000	3,285	52,725
1987-88										
JUNE 30	4,195	16,210	9,390	10,525	9,600	2,955	315	3,295	3,610	56,485
1988-89										
JUNE 30	4,375	16,645	9,875	11,285	10,475	3,150	340	3,585	3,925	59,730
1989-90										
JUNE 30	4,500	16,685	10,240	11,970	11,340	3,300	360	3,860	4,220	62,255

[1]THESE PROJECTIONS INCLUDE THE REVISED CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM WHICH WAS COMPLETED IN JUNE 1985 AND ASSUME THE MALE FELON RECEPTION CENTER POPULATION WILL INCREASE PROPORTIONATELY WITH THE INCREASE IN MALE FELON INTAKE.

[2]THESE PROJECTIONS ASSUME THAT CHAPTER 42, STATUTES OF 1980 (SB 1236, BEVERLY), WILL NOT SUNSET PURSUANT TO CHAPTER 1388, STATUTES OF 1985 (SB 72, BEVERLY).

ATTACHMENT E-5

ESTIMATES AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SECTION
OFFENDER INFORMATION SERVICES BRANCH
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

YOUTH AND ADULT CORRECTIONAL AGENCY
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
JANUARY 22, 1986

CLASSIFICATION STUDY OPTION 1

PROJECTED[2] CLASSIFICATION OF MALE FELON INSTITUTION POPULATION
FISCAL YEARS 1985-86 THROUGH 1989-90

NUMBER

FISCAL YEAR	RECEPTION CENTER	LEVEL 1	LEVEL 2	LEVEL 3	LEVEL 4	MEDICAL/ PSYCHIATRIC	SPECIAL HOUSING PHU	SHU	TOTAL	GRAND TOTAL
1985-86										
JUNE 30	3,855	12,675	8,240	12,540	4,880	2,540	275	2,805	3,080	47,810
1986-87										
JUNE 30	4,140	14,170	9,100	13,695	5,435	2,800	295	3,090	3,385	52,725
1987-88										
JUNE 30	4,195	15,245	9,680	14,695	5,970	3,005	320	3,375	3,695	56,485
1988-89										
JUNE 30	4,375	16,055	10,085	15,560	6,490	3,180	340	3,645	3,985	59,730
1989-90										
JUNE 30	4,500	16,575	10,355	16,275	6,985	3,310	360	3,895	4,255	62,255

[1]THESE PROJECTIONS INCLUDE THE REVISED CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM WHICH WAS COMPLETED IN JUNE 1985 AND ASSUME THE MALE FELON RECEPTION CENTER POPULATION WILL INCREASE PROPORTIONATELY WITH THE INCREASE IN MALE FELON INTAKE.

[2]THESE PROJECTIONS ASSUME THAT CHAPTER 42, STATUTES OF 1980 (SB 1236, BEVERLY), WILL NOT SUNSET PURSUANT TO CHAPTER 1388, STATUTES OF 1985 (SB 72, BEVERLY).

ATTACHMENT E-6

ESTIMATES AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SECTION
OFFENDER INFORMATION SERVICES BRANCH
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

YOUTH AND ADULT CORRECTIONAL AGENCY
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
JANUARY 22, 1986

CLASSIFICATION STUDY OPTION 1

PROJECTED[2] CLASSIFICATION OF MALE FELON INSTITUTION POPULATION
FISCAL YEARS 1985-86 THROUGH 1989-90

PERCENT

FISCAL YEAR	RECEPTION CENTER	LEVEL 1	LEVEL 2	LEVEL 3	LEVEL 4	MEDICAL/ PSYCHIATRIC	SPECIAL HOUSING PHU	SPECIAL HOUSING SHU	SPECIAL HOUSING TOTAL	GRAND TOTAL
1985-86										
JUNE 30	8.06	26.51	17.23	26.23	10.21	5.31	0.58	5.87	6.44	100
1986-87										
JUNE 30	7.85	26.88	17.26	25.97	10.31	5.31	0.56	5.86	6.42	100
1987-88										
JUNE 30	7.43	26.99	17.14	26.02	10.57	5.32	0.57	5.98	6.54	100
1988-89										
JUNE 30	7.32	26.88	16.88	26.05	10.87	5.32	0.57	6.10	6.67	100
1989-90										
JUNE 30	7.23	26.62	16.63	26.14	11.22	5.32	0.58	6.26	6.83	100

[1]THESE PROJECTIONS INCLUDE THE REVISED CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM WHICH WAS COMPLETED IN JUNE 1985 AND ASSUME THE MALE FELON RECEPTION CENTER POPULATION WILL INCREASE PROPORTIONATELY WITH THE INCREASE IN MALE FELON INTAKE.

[2]THESE PROJECTIONS ASSUME THAT CHAPTER 42, STATUTES OF 1980 (SB 1236, BEVERLY), WILL NOT SUNSET PURSUANT TO CHAPTER 1388, STATUTES OF 1985 (SB 72, BEVERLY).

ATTACHMENT E-7

ESTIMATES AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SECTION
OFFENDER INFORMATION SERVICES BRANCH
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

YOUTH AND ADULT CORRECTIONAL AGENCY
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
JANUARY 22, 1986

CLASSIFICATION STUDY OPTION 2

PROJECTED[2] CLASSIFICATION OF MALE FELON INSTITUTION POPULATION
FISCAL YEARS 1985-86 THROUGH 1989-90

NUMBER

FISCAL YEAR	RECEPTION CENTER	LEVEL 1	LEVEL 2	LEVEL 3	LEVEL 4	MEDICAL/ PSYCHIATRIC	SPECIAL HOUSING PHU	SPECIAL HOUSING SHU	SPECIAL HOUSING TOTAL	GRAND TOTAL
1985-86										
JUNE 30	3,855	12,735	8,280	14,105	3,260	2,530	270	2,775	3,045	47,810
1986-87										
JUNE 30	4,140	14,285	9,155	15,400	3,625	2,780	290	3,050	3,340	52,725
1987-88										
JUNE 30	4,195	15,455	9,785	16,400	4,000	2,995	315	3,340	3,655	56,485
1988-89										
JUNE 30	4,375	16,330	10,220	17,405	4,340	3,150	335	3,575	3,910	59,730
1989-90										
JUNE 30	4,500	16,890	10,505	18,225	4,680	3,285	355	3,815	4,170	62,255

[1]THESE PROJECTIONS INCLUDE THE REVISED CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM WHICH WAS COMPLETED IN JUNE 1985 AND ASSUME THE MALE FELON RECEPTION CENTER POPULATION WILL INCREASE PROPORTIONATELY WITH THE INCREASE IN MALE FELON INTAKE.

[2]THESE PROJECTIONS ASSUME THAT CHAPTER 42, STATUTES OF 1980 (SB 1236, BEVERLY), WILL NOT SUNSET PURSUANT TO CHAPTER 1388, STATUTES OF 1985 (SB 72, BEVERLY).

ATTACHMENT E-8

ESTIMATES AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SECTION
OFFENDER INFORMATION SERVICES BRANCH
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

YOUTH AND ADULT CORRECTIONAL AGENCY
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
JANUARY 22, 1986

CLASSIFICATION STUDY OPTION 2

PROJECTED[2] CLASSIFICATION OF MALE FELON INSTITUTION POPULATION
FISCAL YEARS 1985-86 THROUGH 1989-90

PERCENT

FISCAL YEAR	RECEPTION CENTER	LEVEL 1	LEVEL 2	LEVEL 3	LEVEL 4	MEDICAL/ PSYCHIATRIC	SPECIAL HOUSING PHU	SHU	TOTAL	GRAND TOTAL
1985-86										
JUNE 30	8.06	26.64	17.32	29.50	6.82	5.29	0.56	5.80	6.37	100
1986-87										
JUNE 30	7.85	27.09	17.36	29.21	6.88	5.27	0.55	5.78	6.33	100
1987-88										
JUNE 30	7.43	27.36	17.32	29.03	7.08	5.30	0.56	5.91	6.47	100
1988-89										
JUNE 30	7.32	27.34	17.11	29.14	7.27	5.27	0.56	5.99	6.55	100
1989-90										
JUNE 30	7.23	27.13	16.87	29.27	7.52	5.28	0.57	6.13	6.70	100

[1]THESE PROJECTIONS INCLUDE THE REVISED CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM WHICH WAS COMPLETED IN JUNE 1985 AND ASSUME THE MALE FELON RECEPTION CENTER POPULATION WILL INCREASE PROPORTIONATELY WITH THE INCREASE IN MALE FELON INTAKE.

[2]THESE PROJECTIONS ASSUME THAT CHAPTER 42, STATUTES OF 1980 (SB 1236, BEVERLY), WILL NOT SUNSET PURSUANT TO CHAPTER 1388, STATUTES OF 1985 (SB 72, BEVERLY).

ATTACHMENT E-9

ATTACHMENT F

ADVISORY COMMITTEES

POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Paul Morris, Chairperson
Deputy Director, Institutions Division (retired)

Gregory W. Harding, Deputy Director
Evaluation and Compliance Division

Otis Loggins, New Prison Manager
California State Prison - Kings County at Avenal

Joe Campoy, Warden (retired)
Folsom State Prison

Eddie Ylst, Superintendent
California Medical Facility

TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Gregory W. Harding, Chairperson
Deputy Director, Evaluation and Compliance Division

Rick Burrows
Special Assistant to Chief Deputy Director

Robert Dickover, Chief
Research Unit

Dick Welch/Jerry Beckett
Chief, Offender Information Services

Norman Holt, Assistant Chief
Classification Services

Hugh Haines, Chief
Data Processing Services Branch

Curt Leitaker, Associate Superintendent
California Conservation Center

Dave Escoto, Program Administrator
California Correctional Institution

John Ryan, Correctional Counselor III
Deuel Vocational Institution

Diana Smith, Correctional Counselor III
California Institution for Men-East

Bert Rice, Correctional Counselor III
California Medical Facility

Karon Larson, Correctional Counselor II
Folsom State Prison

ATTACHMENT G

MALE FELON DESIGN BED CAPACITY ASSUMPTIONS

New Facilities to be completed by June 30, 1990:

Facility	Level	Design Beds
CSP-Solano	II	1,204 (additional)
SMSC	IV	1,000
Camps *	I	760
Conservation Camps	I	150
Corcoran	III	1,500
	IV	1,000
	I	400
Amador	III	1,500
	I	200
CSP-San Diego	I	200
	III	2,000
CSP-Kings (Avenal)	II	3,024
CSP-Sacramento	I	192
	IV	1,536
CCC-Susanville	III	500
CCC-Jamestown	III	500
SMSC-Tehachapi	III	500
CSP-Riverside	I	200
	III	1,500
CSP-Los Angeles	I	300
	III	400
	R.C.	1,100

* Camps: Ishi, Alder, Salt Creek, Bautista, Gabilin, Sugar Pine, Trinity and Delta