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DOWNTOWN SAFETY, SECURITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

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A Joint Report  
by  
The Citizens Crime Commission of New York City  
and  
Regional Plan Association

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ABSTRACT

The Downtown Safety Project involved a national solution search to develop strategies that would combat the crime problems identified in three outlying commercial centers in New York City.

The findings of the site visits fell into three categories--design and development strategies, police and private security programs and downtown leadership and organization.

In order to increase pedestrian flow and minimize the fear of crime, urban design and development should emphasize such features as dense and compact development, increased housing and mixed use development and stimulate downtown special events and activities.

Police and private security play major roles in safeguarding downtowns. The findings indicate that quality of life enforcement using permanently assigned beat officers is a common and effective police strategy in New York City and elsewhere. While private security forces are widely used, there appears to be a lack of consensus on their effectiveness and appropriate deployment.

Organization and cooperation of downtown businessmen is an important element of downtown crime reduction programs. This partnership should not be limited to business interests but extend to the community and public entities. In this way, mobilization of all area resources can be focused against crime and disorder.



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Citizens Crime Commission and Regional Plan Association have jointly undertaken the Downtown Safety, Security and Economic Development Program to address the problem of crime as a barrier to the economic health of three outlying commercial centers of New York City: Jamaica Center in Queens, Fordham Road in the Bronx and Downtown Brooklyn.

While recognizing that a whole range of improvements--from better transportation to more attractive stores--are necessary for these downtowns to become economically vibrant, this program was initiated with the belief that these areas must be secure so that potential downtown users are not afraid to take advantage of them. In the past, shopping and office activity have both been impeded by safety and security problems. Greater use will attract both retailers and office locators. For example, many corporations feel that by locating in these downtowns, they will be less able to compete for vital personnel who do not want to work in what is perceived to be a high-crime environment. This is especially important in light of New York City's effort to attract "back offices" (administrative, computer and clerical sections of corporations) to these areas rather than lose such jobs to suburban areas or to other states.

An increase in the number of back-office jobs could provide a major source of employment for low-income minority groups in these areas. By improving these downtown areas and attracting corporations, jobs would not only be saved, but new ones created that would provide employment for people in the surrounding neighborhoods.

The goal of this program is to assess the security needs in three outlying downtowns (Phase I) and search locally and nationwide for possible solutions that can be implemented in these areas (Phase II). This information will then be utilized to design effective anti-crime programs that can be implemented by a coalition of business, residents and government. The ultimate goal of the project is to make the three downtowns safer and thus more commercially viable and to pass the accumulated experience along to downtowns in the tri-state area and the nation.

The Phase I study involved a telephone survey of 610 trade area residents, interviews with local businessmen and officials and detailed analysis of police crime data in the precincts for the three downtowns.

During the course of Phase II, information on downtown programs was gathered from many cities across the country, and field visits were conducted in Newark, N.J.; Hartford, Conn.; Cleveland, Ohio; Atlanta, Ga.; Charlotte, N.C.; Oakland, Ca.; Philadelphia, Pa; Paterson, N.J.; and Washington, D.C. Phone interviews were also conducted with officials and businessmen in Tulsa, Okla.; Miami, Fla.; Buffalo, N.Y.; Chicago, Ill.; New Orleans, La.; Danbury, Conn.; Seattle, Wash.; San Francisco, Ca.; Los Angeles, Ca.; Portland, Ore.; Cincinnati, Ohio; Houston, Texas; Orlando, Fla.; and Minneapolis, Minn.

#### The Healthy Downtown

An economically vibrant downtown concentrates in a geographically compact area a wide spectrum of business, social and leisure activities. When a large number of people can walk quickly and safely from one activity to another, a downtown assumes its two unique characteristics: the capability for visitors to engage in multi-purpose visits, known as the multiplier effect, and a high level of interpersonal communication.

### Fear Of Crime

The fear of crime disrupts a downtown's economy primarily by altering the way people behave when they get there. Although the project findings indicate that the fear of crime may not significantly deter people from coming downtown, this fear can alter the behavior of pedestrians once they reach the area:

- it depresses the multiplier effect by reducing the level of pedestrian activity and the distances people are willing to walk on the streets.
- it encourages insulated activity, in which self-contained complexes and indoor walkways are preferred to outside sidewalks.
- it decreases the level of face-to-face communication between downtown users.
- it promotes the desertion of the downtown area after five o'clock.
- it increases auto use and demand for close-by parking. When demand for this parking exceeds existing capacity, people will park in peripheral downtown areas, thereby dispersing pedestrian activity and increasing vulnerability to crime.

### Feelings Of Safety In The Three Outlying Downtowns

The survey results showed that respondents feel safer in areas that are generally attractive and likely to have a high density of "their kind of people" on the streets. This suggests that

the overall revitalization of a downtown area can bring substantial changes in general feelings of safety.

Specific signs of physical disorder, such as broken windows and vacant buildings, have little impact on respondents' visitation rates, general feelings of safety or expectations about the occurrence of specific crimes. This may be unique to New York City, where such signs are commonplace for an inured citizenry. Specific signs of behavioral disorder, on the other hand, such as drug use and sale, public drinking and loitering do appear to have a substantial impact on the expectations of the occurrence of specific crimes.

#### Overcoming Fear Of Crime

The prime mechanism for establishing a downtown's general image is the network of downtown businessmen and workers and their friends and relatives. If negative messages about downtown safety are being sent into the community, no public relations campaign will be able to improve the downtown's high-crime reputation.

Office development is the key strategy to start the revitalization of a downtown. To attract this development employers must ensure that their workers will be safe on the street during the day and on the way home after work. While there may be few late-working or night employees, their safety may be critical in locational decisions.

The key to making downtown users feel safe is increasing the density of orderly, law abiding people on the street during the day and peak traveling hours. A high level of lawful street activity helps inhibit anti-social behavior and increases the multiplier effect and economic vibrancy of the business community.

In the absence of this self-policing critical mass of respectable people, increased private and security efforts are needed to ensure safety. Thus, daytime security is generally easier to maintain than round-the-clock protection or safety in downtowns with little office worker activity; in these cases, greater numbers of police and security personnel are needed to substitute for the daytime pedestrian flow.

### Design And Development Solutions

1) Dense and Compact Development will increase the concentration of orderly pedestrian activity, create a more attractive core area, and thereby minimize fear of crime.

Specialized activity enclaves (isolated areas dominated by government, retail, office or cultural facilities) and linear development along one side of the street help impede compact development.

Downtown limited-access structures (self-contained buildings) and off-street networks (hotels, office and apartment buildings, garages and other structures linked together by over-street walkways and building connections) impede outside pedestrian activity, yet may be the only way to attract new businesses to downtowns with high-crime images. Indeed, some off-street networks, if they are multi-functional, can stimulate a multiplier effect and accelerate a downtown's revitalization process. A goal for both types of facilities should be to open them up to the street as the downtown safety image improves.

2) Housing and Mixed-Use Development improve downtown security by, again, increasing pedestrian traffic, making the area more attractive and well-maintained, and by supporting evening restaurant, cultural and retail activity that would not be economically viable on lunchtime office traffic alone.

3) Promoting Evening Activity by encouraging after-office hours retailing, restaurant and cultural/entertainment activity is an important strategy for downtowns well along in their revitalization process, but unrealistic in more decayed urban centers. Daytime safety must be achieved before nighttime security can be effective.

4) Major Downtown Events are held in many cities to attract suburban residents or encourage office workers to stay after five o'clock or use the streets during lunchtime. Despite the enthusiasm among many development officials for this strategy, more active tactics for improving feelings of safety among daily employees and businessmen--who then pass on their perceptions to their networks of friends, relatives and neighbors--appear to have the greatest impact on changing the general public's image of a downtown.

5) Safe Parking Facilities are important to reduce employee and visitor fears of traveling downtown. Attached parking areas and garages are preferable in many areas, but the potential space available for such parking is limited. Well-lit open lots are generally safer than garages, but designing garages with open stairwells, glass elevators and few hiding places can substantially improve safety conditions. Although television surveillance can be effective, uniformed patrols on foot and by vehicle are the best ways to monitor garages and lots.

#### Police And Private Security Solutions

1) Public Policing plays a major role in safeguarding downtowns. The Phase II research indicates that there was a consensus in New York City and around the country on effective

police strategies. The key ones are:

- Special downtown patrols, particularly by permanently assigned foot officers. Foot patrols appear to make office workers feel safer during the day, particularly in downtowns without large number of employees; foot patrol presence is felt less in areas with a high concentration of office workers and during the evening when the area is sparsely populated.
- Strong emphasis on enforcement of quality-of-life crime and control of special populations such as the homeless and teenagers.
- Close liaison between the police and the community from the beat officer level to that of ranking commander.

In respect to these criteria, the New York City Police programs appear soundly conceived and are now in the process of institutionalization. Among possible recommendations that could be made for the three outlying New York City downtowns are:

- The downtown community should support the police to ensure that the judicial system recognizes the need to deal effectively with quality-of-life arrests made by the police department.
- Safe public transportation supports dense and compact development and a high concentration of pedestrian street traffic, and is especially critical to the revitalization of the three outlying downtowns, which are major transit centers. Subway crime in particular, is an important topic that warrants further study, since the subways are the main transit service in the three downtowns.

--Because there is a tendency for citizens to overestimate the extent of the crime problem in their neighborhoods, it might be useful to consider some vehicle, such as a newsletter, for police or other public officials to communicate crime and safety information to community leaders.

2) In contrast to the police findings, there appears to be no general consensus around the country about the effectiveness of private security forces on the streets. Nevertheless, patrolled safety corridors for office employees, and escort, van and convoy programs to take workers to remote parking and public transit areas during commuting hours can be effective in reducing crime, despite their high costs.

#### Downtown Organization and Leadership

Cooperative efforts between the public and private sectors have resulted in campaigns to address crime and other revitalization problems in downtown areas. The most successful--and comprehensive--programs have managed to galvanize leaders in the municipal, business and residential communities.

1) Downtown Councils and Associations draw membership primarily from the business community, and are usually associated with the city's chamber of commerce. These groups have become increasingly involved in promoting downtown safety through seminars, agenda-setting for city-run security programs, and even fund-raising for added foot patrol strength in downtown areas.

2) By establishing geographically-defined special assessment districts and levying special tax assessments for additional police and security services, many cities have raised



considerable money to launch and maintain anti-crime programs. This type of cooperative venture may be an effective way to concentrate and mobilize downtown resources.

3) Cooperation between private security contingents in efforts such as employee escort services is a potentially cost-effective strategy for increased downtown safety. Cooperative programs linking public police and private security strength is another area with promise.

4) Good working relationships between the public and private sectors--from the level of beat officers and merchants to that of top political and business leaders--can have a positive impact on the success of all the programs outlined in this report.

5) Interaction with the residential community is another area where cooperation pays off for the business community. By providing residents in and around the downtown area with a stake in the viability of the business district--through employment, good relations and safe shopping facilities--stores as well as restaurants, theatres and others can increase the pedestrian flow necessary to build both day and evening activity. Joint security programs between residents and businesses have been developed in some areas in Queens and Brooklyn.

6) Many organizations are attempting to improve their downtown's safety and public image by devising ways to cope with special populations, such as street people and teenagers. Truancy control programs, as well as other educational and employment projects directed toward teenagers, are particularly effective and popular in some communities.

I INTRODUCTION

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While recognizing that a whole range of improvements-- from better transportation to more attractive stores--are necessary for these downtowns to become economically vibrant, this program was initiated with the belief that these areas must be secure so that potential downtown users are not afraid to take advantage of them.

Greater use will attract both retailers and office locators. In the past, both shopping and office activity have been impeded by safety and security problems. Many corporations, for example, feel that by locating in these downtowns, they will be less able to compete for vital personnel who do not want to work in what is perceived to be a high-crime environment. This is especially important in light of New York City's effort to attract "back offices" (administrative, computer and clerical sections of corporations) to these areas rather than lose such jobs to suburban areas or to other states.

An increase in the number of back-office jobs could provide a major source of employment for low-income minority groups in these regions. By improving these downtown areas and attracting corporations, jobs would not only be saved, but new ones created that would provide employment for people in the surrounding neighborhoods.

Program Goal

The goal of this program is to assess the security needs in Jamaica Center, Fordham Road and Downtown Brooklyn, and search locally and nationwide for possible solutions that can be implemented in these areas. This information will then be utilized to design effective anti-crime programs that can be implemented by a coalition of business, residents and government. The ultimate goal of the project is to make the three downtowns safer and thus more commercially viable.

The entire program consists of four phases:

- Phase I was a needs assessment study to examine the specific crime problems in the three downtowns. This study was completed in September 1984 and the major findings are included in this report.
- The second phase focused on a nationwide search for solutions to the problems targeted in Phase I. This report presents these findings.
- The third phase will present the results from the first two phases to people in New York City, the New York Urban Region, and elsewhere.
- The fourth phase will include technical assistance to help downtowns develop their own safety and security programs.

It is anticipated that this program will produce training materials that can be used to help set up programs to increase downtown security throughout the country. The information will be disseminated locally through the networks of Regional Plan Association and the Citizens Crime Commission of New York City,

and nationally through the Downtown Idea Exchange and other economic development professional organization, including the National Association of Citizens Crime Commissions. The findings from this project will also be made available to local business associations, development corporations and other groups involved in downtown revitalization efforts.

### Phase I Study Results

The Phase I study involved telephone surveys of 610 trade area residents, numerous interviews with local businessmen and officials and detailed analysis of police crime data in the precincts for the three downtowns. The findings confirmed that crime is a serious problem in the outer-borough downtowns, in terms of both actual crime rates and citizen perceptions. Although some of the Phase I survey findings proved inconclusive, it is reasonable to assert that fear of crime among trade area residents and downtown workers impedes economic development by altering the behavior of users once they arrive and depressing the "multiplier effect," which is the willingness of people to take advantage of more than one downtown activity--such as banking, shopping or working--during their visits.

While one of the newer criminological theories contends that fear of crime is stimulated by physical signs of disorder, such as graffiti and broken windows, the Phase I findings indicated that these specific signs were not as important as others for trade area respondents. Feelings of safety appeared to be more affected by behavioral factors, such as public drinking, drug dealing and disorderly youths. Ultimately, the major determinants of feeling safe downtown during the day were whether or not respondents felt comfortable with the kind of people they expected to find there and the overall attractiveness of the area.

## The Phase II Study

Because of these findings, special attention was given in the Phase II solutions search to programs targeted to behavioral types of disorder--known as "quality of life" offenses--such as drug use and sale, public drinking, disorderly conduct, loitering and street gangs. In respect to youths, it should be noted that in the Phase I study males under 25 years old were determined to be the predominant criminal group in the three downtowns.

Other areas concentrated on in Phase II were:

1. Design considerations for new construction and redevelopment policies relevant to crime-control.
2. Police and security strategies to control crime and increase feelings of safety.
3. Downtown leadership and organization.

During the course of Phase II, information on downtown programs was gathered from many cities across the country, and field visits were conducted in Newark, N.J.; Hartford, Conn.; Cleveland, Ohio; Atlanta, Ga.; Charlotte, N.C.; Oakland, Ca.; Philadelphia, Pa.; Paterson, N.J.; and Washington, D.C. Phone interviews were conducted with officials and businessmen in Tulsa, Okla.; Miami, Fla.; Buffalo, N.Y.; Chicago, Ill.; New Orleans, La.; Danbury, Conn.; Seattle, Wash.; San Francisco, Ca.; Los Angeles, Ca.; Portland, Ore.; Cincinnati, Ohio; Houston, Texas; Orlando, Fla.; and Minneapolis, Minn.

The results of the nationwide search for solutions to the crime problems isolated in the three outlying downtowns are detailed in Section IV of this report.

Sections II and III set the stage by describing the elements of a healthy operating downtown economy and the impact of crime on such an economy.

II ELEMENTS OF A HEALTHY DOWNTOWN ECONOMY

A city downtown concentrates in one fairly dense and compact geographic area a wide spectrum of business, social and leisure activities. A downtown is typically a major merchandising center with retail outlets ranging from small merchants to large department stores. Because it is usually a major transportation center with rail, bus and highway access, and is located in the heart of a densely populated residential area, the downtown is in a unique position to tap large retail markets.

In addition, downtowns are frequently the location for municipal, state and federal government offices, as well as court facilities. Government activity can be a major source of employment opportunities; it also serves to draw area residents into the downtown community.

Successful downtowns can also be substantial centers of private-sector office employment when the following elements are in place: 1) a large office labor pool, 2) proximity to business support services, and 3) the opportunity for direct contact and interaction with other businesses.

Other activity facilities often associated with a successful downtown are museums, theaters, hospitals, educational institutions, major churches, medical and dental offices, restaurants, residential housing, bus and rail stations, convention centers, hotels, and indoor and outdoor sports facilities. Table 1, showing the results of a survey of visitors to downtown Cleveland in 1981, illustrates the relative drawing power of some of these activities.

Table 1  
Three Main Reasons For Visitors Coming to  
Downtown Cleveland in 1981\*

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Percent</u>		
	<u>1st Reason</u>	<u>2nd Reason</u>	<u>3rd Reason</u>
Shopping	24.1	20.5	7.1
Medical	4.9	4.4	2.8
School	3.2	1.2	1.5
Recreation	20.6	16.9	9.7
Personal Business	20.2	20.3	8.9
Work	22.9	4.7	3.4
Other	3.8	2.4	6.4
Not available	<u>0.3</u>	<u>29.6</u>	<u>60.2</u>
TOTAL	100	100	100

\*Source: The Greater Cleveland Growth Association

### Basic Components of a Vibrant Downtown

The first is the ability to draw shoppers from its potential trade area and attract workers from its labor pool. In part, this entails providing the right jobs, retail mix and amenities, such as restaurants, theaters, and parks. But workers and shoppers must also have the means to travel safely to and from downtown--by car, bus, rail or foot--within acceptable travel times and at acceptable costs.

Successful downtowns typically have heavy pedestrian traffic. In Manhattan, for example, there are flows as high as 12,000 pedestrians per hour on the west side of Fifth Avenue near 47th Street, while portions of Lexington, Madison and Third Avenues can reach sidewalk flows of about 6,000 per hour.<sup>1</sup>

High pedestrian flow not only generates the traffic needed for merchants, restaurants and theaters to thrive, but also plays a role in discouraging street crime and increasing feelings of safety among pedestrians. As Wilson and Kelling have stated:

"A busy, bustling shopping center and a well-tended suburb may need almost no visible police presence (to maintain order). In both cases, the ratio of respectable to disreputable people is ordinarily so high as to make informal social control effective."

<sup>1</sup>Smaller downtowns exhibited lower though still impressive levels of pedestrian traffic: up to 5,000 per hour in Chicago and Toronto; 3,000 in San Francisco; and 1,500 (comparable to some Manhattan crosstown streets) in Seattle (Pushkarev & Zupan, Urban Space for Pedestrians, 1975).



The results of the trade area telephone survey conducted during Phase I of this project support the contention that a high ratio of lawful, orderly pedestrians (Wilson and Kelling's "respectable" people) can engender feelings of personal safety. A significant correlation was found between how safe respondents felt their downtown was during the day (compared to other commercial centers) and the perceived likelihood they felt of finding people they were comfortable with shopping there. This result is very consistent with prior research showing that fear of crime is strongly influenced by how well we can predict the behavior of people we meet. Such predictability is greater when we interact with lawful, orderly or "our kind" of people.

A high concentration of pedestrian activity is fundamental to the operation of the other two components of a healthy downtown. The second important characteristic is the downtown's viability as a concentrated, self-contained business community where people can easily engage in face-to-face communication. For office occupants downtown rents buy not only leasable space but easy access to a range of needed skills, supplies, market information and investment sources. Because of the compactness of the successful downtown, much of this access can be achieved through direct personal contact.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup>In Manhattan, for example, the nine-square-mile Central Business District has reached a density level of land use, business transactions and personal interaction far beyond any other business district in the nation, with some two million employees housed in 600 million square feet of floor space in the area from the Battery to Central Park South. In its densest area, more than 500,000 jobs are compressed in one square mile, where on an average weekday there are 100,000 opportunities for face-to-face contact between workers within a ten-minute walking radius. The fact that commercial land values in the area have reached \$1,400 per square foot reflects the economic benefits associated with this degree of concentration (Armstrong and Milder, 1985).

The third and final element of an economically viable downtown is known as the "multiplier effect"--the tendency of visitors who come downtown for one particular activity to engage in a number of others during the course of their stay. A shopper, for example, will also decide to dine and see a show while downtown, or an office worker may lunch and shop at the noon hour. This phenomenon is particularly important for downtown retailing, as illustrated in Table 2, which shows that 52% of the shoppers surveyed in downtown Denver in 1972 had come downtown initially to engage in other activities.

Table 2  
PRIMARY REASONS SHOPPERS IN DOWNTOWN DENVER  
GIVE FOR BEING DOWNTOWN (1972)\*

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Work	31.3
Shop	48.0
Business, financial, and legal matters	7.5
Medical/dental visits	3.3
Meet friends or business associates	0.9
Attend meetings/conventions	0.4
Vacation visit	0.1
Recreation, amusement, eating	3.0
Visit government office	0.1
Seek employment	0.8
Education/cultural affairs	0.7
Other	3.9

\*A. Smith, "The Future of Downtown Retailing," Urban Land 1972, pp. 3-10.

The impact of office workers on the downtown retail economy can be very substantial. It was recently estimated, for example, that federal office workers who will soon be moving to Jamaica Center will each spend about \$1,700 per year in retail stores during their lunch hours. During the Phase II site visits, downtown officials across the nation invariably reported that middle-income shoppers, now usually residing in the suburbs, had for the most part left for the outlying shopping malls, and that the existing vitality of their middle-income retailing was attributable primarily to daytime purchases by downtown office workers. A 1984 survey of downtown workers in Cleveland shows that about 93% had shopped there during normal weekday working hours in the past year.<sup>3</sup>

Another example of the importance of office workers to downtown retailing is the widespread complaint encountered during the site visits of "five o'clock flight", the term given to the daily exodus of employees rushing home directly after work. This flight, caused in part by fear of crime, results in the desertion of downtown streets and forces retail stores, restaurants and cultural facilities to close at night.

Office development by itself can help improve the physical appearance of an area as well as provide employment opportunities for suitably trained nearby residents, but it is largely because of its ability to stimulate a multiplier effect that office development has become generally recognized as an

<sup>3</sup> Greater Cleveland Growth Association. Retail Market Research Survey of Downtown Cleveland's Workforce. Cleveland, 1984. In addition, a 1983 Regional Plan Association study found that on an average day about 25% of office employees in Manhattan make daytime trips to eat lunch or shop, compared to 20% of those working in regional sub-centers and 14% of those in campus-style office complexes.

important downtown revitalization strategy. And the multiplier effect can stimulate far more than the retailing industry: in Cleveland, the 1984 worker survey cited above showed that 22% of the respondents would be willing to live downtown if suitable housing could be provided, while 45% attended an Indians baseball game and 32% attended live theater at Playhouse Square.

If a downtown has a multiplier effect, facilitates business concentration and interpersonal communication, and can get workers and shoppers to and from the area in a safe and efficient manner, then it has an environment in which private investment will flow. It is an old and accepted axiom that retailers follow the customers, so if shoppers are going downtown, retailers will want to follow. In turn, if retailers want to locate in a downtown, then developers will have prospective tenants for existing or new retail space. Offices will also want to locate downtown and developers will again have a strong demand for existing or new office space. And the strength of the demand for commercial space as well as the overall level of economic activity will make long-term lenders willing to invest in future downtown projects.

While the three outlying downtowns in this project do not precisely fit the classic definition of a metropolitan downtown, they are the principal--or one of the principal--commercial centers of their respective boroughs. Indeed, Brooklyn constitutes the fourth largest city in the United States, and its downtown is comparable in size to that of some major cities studied during this program.

### III THE EFFECTS OF CRIME ON A DOWNTOWN ECONOMY

The widespread decline of urban downtowns in this country following World War II was not initiated by crime. Instead it was the result of numerous factors, including the increased use of the automobile, the shift of middle-class residents and shoppers to the suburbs, the aging of downtown buildings and infrastructures and the development of competitive suburban shopping malls and campus-style office complexes.

These same forces resulted in a loss of commercial businesses to outlying areas, an increase in vacant and abandoned buildings, a shift towards businesses positioned for low-income and transient populations, and nearby residential populations increasingly comprised largely of lower-income and minority groups. Disinvestment rather than investment in buildings and property became the rule in many central business districts.

During the 60's and 70's, the deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill and the development of methadone clinics and halfway houses for released offenders further altered the character of many downtown populations.

As the composition of downtown user populations changed there was a commensurate rise in crime rates against people and property.<sup>4</sup> Fear of crime increased among the remaining workers, businessmen and residents. The high-crime image associated with downtowns was perpetuated by the network of downtown workers and businessmen who passed on their perceptions to fellow workers, relatives and friends residing outside of the core area. The fear of crime was further

<sup>4</sup>An intensive discussion of the foregoing is found in Policing a City's Central District: The Oakland Story (Reiss, 1984 forthcoming)

stimulated by the burgeoning of low-level "quality of life" offenses, such as illegal drug sales, teenage loitering, littering and harrassment.<sup>5</sup>

Thus began a cycle of fear and flight to the suburbs that accelerated the economic decline of many central business districts. This cycle must be broken before substantial progress can be made toward the economic revitalization of America's urban centers.

<sup>5</sup>The Citizens Crime Commission of New York City reported in 1983 that: "Thousands of crimes involving low-level drug abuse, turnstile jumping and general street disorder are committed every day in New York City. Considered individually, these offenses seem insignificant, but taken as a whole they constitute a tidal wave of disorder that affects virtually every New Yorker every day. These 'minor' crimes, as well as more serious offenses, help determine the quality of life in an urban environment." (Crime and Criminal Justice in New York City, 1983 p.17)

A) FEAR OF CRIME

The Phase I telephone survey illustrates the extent of fear of crime among trade area residents.<sup>6</sup> The results showed that 58% of the respondents felt a visitor to their local downtowns would be likely to be attacked, beaten or raped, and 75% felt a visitor would be likely to have his money, wallet or purse stolen (Table 3).

TABLE 3  
RESPONDENTS FEELING A VISITOR  
TO THEIR DOWNTOWN WOULD BE LIKELY TO ENCOUNTER  
SPECIFIC CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR\*

	<u>Percent</u>			
	<u>Downtown Brooklyn</u>	<u>Fordham Road</u>	<u>Jamaica Center</u>	<u>All</u>
Have their car stolen or broken into	53.4	55.8	65.6	58.2
Be attacked, beaten or raped	37.8	38.8	51.1	40.3
Have their money, wallets or purses stolen	72.3	76.7	77.8	75.5

\*Source: CCC/RPA Phase I Report

The fear of crime robs a downtown of those features that make it uniquely advantageous as a business location. Evidence gathered during the initial phase of this project suggests that fear of crime impedes downtown business activity by inhibiting people from taking certain pedestrian trips, keeping them out of certain areas or pedestrian routes and inducing them to make shorter and more single-purpose trips. Ultimately, the perception of crime among the two primary user populations--the daily office workers and employees, and the intermittent group of shoppers and visitors--depresses the multiplier effect and strangles the downtown economy.

<sup>6</sup>The Phase I findings discussed in this report are based on research in three outer-borough downtowns in the New York urban region and may not be as applicable to other parts of the country.

1--Daily Population

As noted earlier, "five o'clock flight" is a widely reported phenomenon among downtown workers. Executives and development officials in the three outer-borough downtowns, as well as in Atlanta, Charlotte, Hartford, Newark, Cleveland and Oakland, all report workers rushing to leave the downtown area immediately after work.

Little shopping is done after dark. Stores close, streets become deserted, and employees working late often walk together in groups or are escorted to their destinations.

This desertion of downtowns and the avoidance behavior of those who remain reflects the dangerous image of downtowns at night. The Phase I trade area telephone survey showed that 66% of the respondents felt their downtown was less safe for nighttime shopping than other commercial centers. (Table 4).

TABLE 4

GENERAL FEELINGS OF COMPARATIVE SAFETY SHOPPING DURING  
THE EVENING IN THE THREE DOWNTOWNS\*

	<u>Downtowns</u>			Total Sample
	Downtown Brooklyn	Fordham Road	Jamaica Center	
How safe trade residents feel in the evening in their downtown compared to other shopping centers:				
-- safer	2.9	1.5	0.5	1.6
-- about as safe	10.7	12.3	8.1	10.4
-- less safe	62.6	64.7	70.2	65.8
-- don't know or no answer	<u>23.8</u>	<u>21.6</u>	<u>21.2</u>	<u>22.2</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Source: CCC/RPA Phase I Report



During the day, in downtowns or those parts of downtowns that have few law-abiding, orderly pedestrians, office workers may choose to lunch at their desks or in the company's cafeteria rather than venture out on to the streets. A recent survey of office workers in Jamaica Center, for example, showed that 60% left their buildings at lunchtime no more than once a week.<sup>7</sup>

The same survey illustrates the pervasiveness of fear of crime among downtown workers. The local park in Jamaica Center has a reputation for crime, drug use, and public drinking. The survey showed that more than 54% of office workers avoided going through the park during the day, even though it would be more convenient to do so. Yet an analysis of actual crime statistics showed that the park and its peripheral streets have fewer street robberies than main portions of the retail strip where a higher proportion of orderly people are found. This avoidance behavior is probably stimulated by the drinking and other incivilities that people observe in the park.

Merchants interviewed in Phase I in the three downtowns also perceive a high threat of crime; as many as 89% felt that pickpocketing and purse snatching were serious problems in their areas, while up to 72% saw street robbery and mugging of shoppers as serious concerns.

The prime mechanism for establishing a downtown's general image is the network of daily businessmen and workers and their friends and relatives. If negative messages about downtown safety are being sent into the community, the downtown's economy is likely to suffer from its high-crime reputation.

## 2--Intermittent Population

Downtowns can still get a substantial number of visitors during the day. The Phase I trade area telephone survey found that

<sup>7</sup>Vernon Boggs, King Park and Manner Users Study (Cooperative Research Unit, CUNY Graduate School, 1984), p. 23.

about 37% of the respondents visited their downtowns at least once a month and another 37% visited at least once in a while.<sup>8</sup> These visitors are not necessarily poor: the survey found that wealthier trade area residents are about as likely to visit their downtowns as poorer residents.<sup>9</sup>

While it is difficult to ascertain specifically why these people came downtown, the Phase I report concluded they did not come primarily to shop.

Much of the evidence suggests that other unique activities are responsible for drawing them downtown. Jamaica Center, for example, has 50,000 people entering its subway stations each day, with 3,000 coming daily to the motor vehicle office and countless others coming to courts, hospitals, York College, the public library and other facilities.

### 3--Fear of Crime and Downtown Visitation Rates

The Phase I trade area survey revealed that nearly 63% of the residents visit their downtown less than once a month. In addition, a substantial percentage of people felt visitors were likely to be victimized by crime while downtown (Table 3), and would encounter specific signs of disorder, such as graffiti, public drinking, drug sale, loitering and harrassment. Thus,

<sup>8</sup>A recent survey in Charlotte showed that 18% of the respondents visit the downtown area (known as the "uptown" among residents) daily while 44% visit it at least occasionally. (Central Charlotte Assn., Greater Cleveland Growth Assn.) In Cleveland, a 1982 trade area survey conducted by the Greater Cleveland Growth Association found that 37.8% of the respondents had been downtown within the past month and 60.6% had visited within the last year.

<sup>9</sup>The 1982 Cleveland survey showed no relationship between income and downtown visitation rates: more than 60% of those visiting at least once a month had household incomes of over \$15,000, and 37.7% had incomes above \$25,000.

while it would seem reasonable to infer that there is a general fear of crime in the three outer-borough downtowns, and that this fear may affect visitation rates among the 63% of respondents who rarely come downtown, the Phase I analysis summarized in Table 5 found no substantial correlation between respondents' fear of specific crimes and downtown visitation rates and feelings of comparative safety during the day.

#### 4--Physical and Behavioral Signs of Disorder

During the survey, respondents were asked about their reactions to physical signs of disorder, such as broken windows and graffiti, and behavioral signs of disorder, such as drug dealing, loitering and prostitution. As noted, little correlation was found between specific physical and behavioral signs of disorder and feelings of comparative safety during the day (Table 5). However, the two most strongly associated variables in respect to general feelings of safety were the likelihood of finding their type of people shopping there and the attractiveness of the downtown area.

The overall attractiveness variable may be interpreted as a measure of general physical disorder, and the variable of the likelihood of finding their type of people shopping downtown can be interpreted as a measure of behavioral disorder. These correlations suggest that general perceptions of public order, while not significantly affecting visitation rates, may have a substantial impact on depressing the multiplier effect.

TABLE 5

Strength of Association Between General Attitudes Toward Downtowns, Physical Signs of Disorder, Behavioral Signs of Disorder, Specific Crimes and A) How Often Downtowns are Visited and B) How Safe Survey Respondents Feel Downtown is During the Day Compared to other Shopping Areas.\*

	A)	B)
<u>1. General Attitudes Towards Downtown</u>	<u>How Often They Visit Downtown</u>	<u>Feeling Safe During the Day</u>
-- Likelihood of finding merchandise they want	.17	.15
-- How attractive they feel their downtown is	.24	.38
-- Ease of visiting downtown	.26	.18
-- Likelihood of finding their type of people shopping downtown	.24	.36
<u>2. Physical Signs of Disorder</u>		
-- Clean Streets	.12	.26
-- Abandoned Stores and Buildings	-.09	-.22
-- Well-lit streets	-.00+	-.07
-- Broken windows	-.12	-.13
-- Graffiti	-.09	-.21
<u>3. Behavioral Signs of Disorder</u>		
-- Groups hanging out**	-.11	-.13
-- Beggars and Bag People	.04+	-.12
-- Drinking in Public Places	-.11	-.20
-- Gangs on the Street**	-.12	-.26
-- Drugs being used/sold	-.18	-.23
-- Prostitutes on Street	-.15	-.17

+ not significant below 0.05

Table 5 continued

	A)	B)
	<u>How Often</u> <u>They Visit Downtown</u>	<u>Feeling Safe</u> <u>During the Day</u>
4. <u>Specific Crimes</u>		
-- Cars stolen/broken into	-.15	-.25
-- Attacks, beatings rapes	-.20	-.28
-- Street robberies	-.10	-.28
5. <u>General Feeling of Safety</u>		
-- Day	.30	----
-- Evening	.23	.37
6. <u>Other</u>		
-- Race	.27	.26
-- Income	.12	.14
-- Sex	.13	.14

\*Source: CCC/RPA Phase I Report. Pearson correlation coefficients measure the strength of association between two variables and range in value from plus one to minus one, with plus one being the highest positive correlation. A correlation of plus or minus .3 or more is considered to be of analytical import.

\*\*"Groups hanging out" differs from "Gangs on the street" in that the former are informal groupings while the latter are organized such as street or motorcycle gangs.

In specific terms, individual physical signs of disorder do not contribute as strongly as might be expected to the fear of crime. Wilson and Kelling have maintained that signs of physical disorder, such as broken windows, graffiti, dirty streets and abandoned buildings, in addition to disorderly people, signal that public authority can no longer maintain order in the area and increase the perception of crime.<sup>10</sup> Research in Cleveland, for example, found that dirty streets make people feel unsafe.<sup>11</sup> Yet the findings from the Phase I trade area survey summarized in Table 6 indicate that of all physical signs of disorder only graffiti displayed even a modest correlation with fear of specific crimes.<sup>12</sup>

Stronger correlations were found between expectations of specific violent crimes and behavioral signs of disorder, such as drug use and sale, public drinking, street gangs and loitering teenagers.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>10</sup>James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, "Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety", Atlantic Monthly, (3/82, pp. 28-38).

<sup>11</sup>Greater Cleveland Growth Association

<sup>12</sup>Though the Phase I data does not confirm the physical signs of disorder theory, this may be due to the pervasiveness of such signs in the New York City area. New York City residents may, in fact, have become inured to graffiti and abandoned buildings, confronting these signs so frequently that they have become a part of their daily experience.

<sup>13</sup>These findings are corroborated by the results of the Crime, Fear and Control In Neighborhood Commercial Centers study completed in 1983 by the Minnesota Crime Prevention Center. This study found that "...where residents perceived problems representing potential threats to their well-being--in particular, people harassing other, drunks, noisy or unruly teenagers, strangers and "outsiders", purse-snatching and street crimes--a significantly greater proportion of the respondents engaged in more avoidance behavior...Alternatively, avoidance was not highly related to physical conditions in the centers, such as litter, trash, upkeep, appearance of businesses, and evidence of vandalism. These...are apparently not dangerous by themselves, and do not lead to residents' avoidance or use of precautions while in the center to as great an extent."

TABLE 6 Strength of Association Between Physical and Behavioral Signs Of Disorder and A) Expectations About Specific Crimes and B) Feelings of Safety Downtown Compared to other Shopping Centers\*

<u>Signs of Disorder</u>	<u>A) Specific Crimes</u>			<u>B) Feeling Safe Downtown</u>	
	<u>Auto</u>	<u>Assaults</u>	<u>Street Robberies</u>	<u>Day</u>	<u>Evening</u>
<u>A. Physical</u>					
Street Cleanliness	-.13	-.13	-.16	.26	.15
Abandoned Stores and Buildings	.26	.23	.20	-.22	-.20
Street Lighting	-.20	-.19	-.23	.07	.09
Broken Windows	.26	.26	.18	-.13	-.19
Graffiti	.26	.30	.25	-.21	-.17
<u>B. Behavioral</u>					
Groups Hanging Out	.26	.23	.31	-.13	-.19
Beggars & Bag People	.21	.25	.29	-.12	-.12
Public Drinking	.33	.32	.35	-.20	-.27
Gangs on Streets	.22	.35	.26	-.26	-.25
Drug Use & Sale	.42	.46	.41	-.23	-.21
Prostitution	.22	.29	.24	-.17	-.23

\* Source: CCC/RPA Phase I Report. Pearson correlation coefficients measure the strength of association between two variables and range in value from plus one to minus one, with plus one being the highest positive correlation. A correlation of plus or minus .3 or above is considered to be of analytical import.

The foregoing suggests that programs aimed at dealing with behavioral signs of disorder (quality-of-life offenses) would do more to decrease fear in the New York City area than would programs aimed at improving specific signs of physical neglect; however, a general improvement in downtown appearance might well increase general feelings of safety.

## 5--Responses to Fear of Crime

Although the daily and visiting user populations have different purposes for coming downtown, they share several key responses to the fear of crime once they arrive:

### a. Limited Street Activity

Fear of crime keeps many downtown users off the streets. Generally, these visitors won't travel far on foot to reach secondary destinations such as shops and restaurants. And they will avoid downtown areas that lack a suitable density of orderly pedestrians or have visible signs of disorder.

In addition, fear of crime encourages use of self-contained or off-street activity areas. Shoppers, for example, can pull into the downtown Brooklyn A&S garage, use the over-street bridge into the main store, conduct their shopping, and reverse the trip without having to go out on the street--in fact, many people do precisely that. In Charlotte, a visitor can park in a garage and walk the equivalent of seven city blocks through a series of over-street bridges and building connections to reach nearly all the major office buildings, the two main department stores, the two major hotels, and 80 shops and restaurants.

### b. Fewer Multi-Purpose Visits

Fear of crime tends to make downtown visits more single-purposed: "Quick in and quick out" becomes the rule. This substantially impedes the ability of businessmen-- especially retailers--to benefit from pedestrian traffic.

### c. Limited use of public transit and increased demand for auto parking

Fear of crime is reputed to affect the commuting habits of workers and visitation habits of others who travel to reach downtown. Public



transit is usually an important asset of downtowns, as it is capable of bringing large numbers of people into the heart of the area while using a minimum of valuable land. Yet the perception is that the fear of crime on public transit reduces potential ridership or restricts it to rush hours. Consequently, those who can afford to will be likely to travel downtown by car; those who can't may be inclined not to shop or work there at all. The relationship between concern for crime and use of transit, subways in particular, warrants further study.

The reluctance to use public transit exacerbates an already difficult situation by generating more auto users than necessary. The automobile is the primary means for workers and visitors to get downtown in many cities. In Cleveland, for example, 70% of downtown visitors come by car.<sup>14</sup> The fear of crime increases the demand in most downtowns for close-in parking; companies located downtown often have long waiting lists of employees waiting to get access to these facilities. One company contacted during this study claims that employees typically have to wait more than two years.<sup>15</sup>

In addition, heavy auto use causes its own security problems. Large areas of closely-situated parking can provide long stretches of lightly used sidewalks. Affordable parking for the lowest paid--and often female--clerical help is often located in more remote downtown areas. Personal security in parking structures is a prime concern for many employees; car theft and auto larceny also contribute to fear of crime.

<sup>14</sup>Greater Cleveland Growth Assn. Retail Market Research Survey of Cleveland Standard Consolidated Statistical Area. Cleveland, 1982.

<sup>15</sup> The demand for close-by parking means that prime land must be used. This inevitably results in higher building costs, making it more difficult for downtown development sites to compete financially with those in the suburbs. In addition, the demand for close-by parking facilities by office workers can conflict with the needs of the downtown retail community. In Hartford, for example, workers occupy 16,000 of the 18,000 available parking places by 10 AM, thus leaving comparatively few places for shoppers and other visitors.

For potential workers and shoppers alike, concern about safety in getting to and from downtown (whether by car, bus, or rail), high parking costs, and fears about walking safely on downtown streets can all become factors in keeping them from taking jobs or shopping in the area.

#### B) CRIME AND OFFICE DEVELOPMENT

Office development is a key strategy to begin the revitalization of a downtown. Most companies are genuinely concerned about security in the areas surrounding potential office sites, as well as the safety of employees, especially women, during their commutation to and from work.<sup>16</sup> In a 1983 survey of 47 large corporations headquartered in Manhattan (see Table 7), Regional Plan Association found that safety and security ranked third in importance among 19 criteria used in making decisions regarding back office locations. Companies are worried about employees looking for new jobs in safer areas; obviously, this could be very costly.

The price of providing employee security can also be costly. Table 7 shows that operating costs (criteria I and II) are considered more important in office location decisions than safety and security. If the cost of making downtown employees feel safe and secure is too high, then firms will locate their offices elsewhere.

<sup>16</sup> In the outer-borough downtowns, those higher up on the corporate ladder are more likely to travel to work by car, but the clerical worker is likely to come by public transportation. Employees using public transit are most vulnerable to crime from the time they leave their office buildings to the time they get to their bus or subway stations, and while waiting for their buses or subway trains to come. Auto users, on the other hand, face greatest exposure from the time they leave their office buildings to the time they reach their garages, and from the time they enter their garages to the time they are in their cars. Enhanced security is therefore most often needed during these periods of time.

Table 7 How 19 Back Office Location Criteria Ranked In Importance Among 47 Firms That Have Moved Back Offices Out Of Manhattan\*

<u>Criteria</u>	<u>Rank</u>
Cost per square foot	1
Cost of electricity-	4+
40,000 square feet plus floors	14
Secure & proximate parking	11
Mass transit access	4+
Proximity to headquarters	12
Proximity to restaurants & shops	16
Safety & security in surrounding area	3
Access to fiber optics cable to communicate with headquarters	10
Access to satelite communications systems	15
Direct micro-wave link to headquarters	17
Proximity to attractive neighborhoods where workers can live	13
Quality of labor pool with 30 minutes of site	6
Physical attractiveness of area surrounding site	8

+ Same ranking

Table 7 continued

<u>Criteria</u>	<u>Rank</u>
Income of residents in surrounding area	18
Reliability of electric power	2
Residential locations of back office work force	9
Regulations on business	7
Waterfront access	19

\*Source: Regional Plan Association

Some employees need to work past the normal quitting time and the evening rush hour traffic. A recent survey of government office workers in Queens shows that about 20% work past 5:00 PM on an average workday. Research indicates that most employees working late are gone by 7:00 or 7:30 PM and only a very few remain past 9:00 PM. Extra security is therefore frequently needed between 6-9 PM for these evening office workers, many of whom use public transit.

Other corporate operations, especially those that are computerized, now run on a round-the-clock basis, and a pressing concern of these employers is with those workers (again, very often women) who work on the evening and early-morning shifts. Since the evening shift is likely to be arriving during the normal evening rush hour, and the late shift will leave during the morning rush hour, the main period of concern for employee security is between 11:00 PM and 1:00 AM, when the evening and late shifts are likely to change. Most of these workers are likely to come by car, primarily because traffic will be lighter and parking easier to find, but also because of worries about safety.

Relocating firms also want their office employees to be able to walk safely in the downtown during the day. Being able to shop and eat out at lunchtime is frequently considered an important worker amenity needed to keep employees happy with the company. So providing adequate daytime security may be yet another cost center for prospective office developers.

### C) CRIME AND RETAIL DEVELOPMENT

The fear of crime impedes the ability of retailers to tap both existing and potential customer traffic. An ideal downtown retail area attracts a mix of customers in all income

categories, but downtowns in decline usually attract primarily lower-income and ethnic shoppers.<sup>17</sup> In these downtowns, office workers have little inclination to go out to shop or lunch during the day. More successful downtowns, on the other hand, such as Hartford, Cleveland, Atlanta and Charlotte, maintain a healthier retail mix by drawing sufficient concentrations of office workers onto the streets during the day.

In nearly all the downtowns visited during Phase II of this project, retailers felt they had a large potential market of middle-income shoppers (usually residing in a geographic ring beyond the closer-in, more modest residential areas) who they were unable to attract because of the city's high crime image--an image which downtown development officials generally felt was unwarranted.

As the profile of the downtown shopper becomes increasingly low-income and ethnic, the retail and merchandise mixes follow suit.<sup>18</sup>

Crime, by helping deter potential middle-income customers from shopping downtown, contributes to the pressure felt by retailers aiming at this market segment.

<sup>17</sup> Analysis of Phase I survey results and research on retailing in Jamaica Center indicates that higher-income citizens may visit downtown, but they will be far less likely to shop. Initially, this may result from limited pedestrian activity due to the fear of crime; in its later stages, this trend is worsened because the overall retail mix has weakened.

<sup>18</sup>A good example is Jamaica Center, which just 30 years ago was a strong middle-income-oriented commercial area. But times changed, and although the average household income in its trade area was about \$20,000 in 1979, 80% of its shoppers in a survey two years later had incomes below \$17,000. Not surprisingly, middle-income stores such as Macy's, Gertz, B&B Long, Ethan Allen, and Wallachs have moved from the area in recent years.

Compounding this problem is the higher operating costs suffered by downtown retailers as a result of crime. The results from the Phase I retail survey (Table 8) demonstrate the extent to which retailers are concerned with crime in their downtowns: approximately 70%, for example, felt that mugging is a serious problem in their trade areas.

Table 8 Responses To Retail Survey: Percent of Retailers Considering Specific Crimes To Be Serious Problems\*

	Downtown Brooklyn	Fordham Road	Jamaica Center
	<u>% Serious</u>	<u>% Serious</u>	<u>% Serious</u>
Shoplifting	96.9	93.6	97.5
Pick Pocketing/Purse Snatching	89.0	87.3	87.5
Crime in Downtown Subway Stations	76.6	70.2	62.5
Shoppers Being Mugged/Held Up	71.9	63.8	70.0
Autos Being Broken Into Or Vandalized	59.3	72.3	70.0
Vandalism	56.2	59.6	42.5
Stores Being Burglar- ized At Night	56.3	68.1	75.0
Stores Being Held Up	54.7	61.7	50.0
Employee Theft	43.8	40.5	47.5
Average	67.2	68.6	66.9
Total Number of Respondents	64	47	40

\*Source: CCC/RPA Phase I Report

While security costs are a common problem wherever retailers locate, reports from the outer-borough downtowns and other cities visited during Phase II generally indicate these costs are more severe in downtown areas. Retailers may also fear for their personal safety during operating hours, while making late-night bank deposits or while going home after work. All of these are incentives for retailers to relocate.

For downtowns to achieve retail revitalization they must first attract office development of sufficient size and concentration to produce the purchasing power needed to stimulate an upgrade in the retail mix.<sup>19</sup> Yet before such an upgrade can be felt in the downtown retail community, it is essential that targeted customers not be afraid to shop. Some of these potential customers will already be downtown, so the problem becomes one of making them feel safer as they move about the area.

<sup>19</sup> Usually this is initiated by pulling in office employee noontime expenditures. Pushkarev and Zupan, for example, found that one Manhattan department store did "almost 50% of its business during two and a half hours at lunchtime and only 6% during its late open hours (p.38). Strategically placed, these new retail stores should increasingly draw trade from current middle-income shoppers, who eventually begin to come downtown just to shop. Further retail upgrading would occur as current workers and shoppers stay later after 5:00 PM and through word-of-mouth by other shoppers induced to come by the downtowns new facilities and safer image of the downtown.



IV) NATIONWIDE SOLUTIONS TO DOWNTOWN CRIME PROBLEMS

In examining solutions to downtown crime problems, it is necessary first to specify the type of central business district and economic development goals set by community and business leadership. These factors will determine the nature and extent of the security problems to be confronted. If, for example, the primary emphasis is on retaining and attracting new office development, then daytime safety and making late-working employees secure as they go home is of paramount importance, since the area will be otherwise largely deserted at night. But if a downtown already has a substantial office population and is attempting to promote more nighttime activity, then general evening security becomes a major concern.

Throughout the Phase II site visits, businessmen, development officials and police were unanimous in affirming that a key to making downtown pedestrians feel safe during the day and evening is increasing the flow of orderly, law-abiding people on downtown streets. A higher density of such pedestrian traffic helps inhibit anti-social behavior and results in more street activity, thereby increasing the downtown multiplier effect and economic vibrancy of the business community.

Although the precise "critical mass" needed to decrease fear of victimization is not known, evidence collected during this project indicates that pedestrians definitely feel safer in areas where they are likely to find similar types of people on the streets. In the absence of a critical mass of respectable people and the resulting level of self-policing it affords, increased private and public security efforts are needed to ensure safety. Thus, daytime security is generally easier to maintain than 24-hour protection, because greater numbers of police are needed after office hours to substitute for the daytime pedestrian flow.

In this section, three categories of strategies for enhancing downtown safety are identified:

- A) Downtown Design and Development
- B) Police and Private Security
- C) Civic and Business Organization

A) DOWNTOWN DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT

No downtown can be completely rebuilt as if it were one gigantic piece of vacant land, but when opportunities to construct new or rehabilitated office, retail, entertainment, cultural, residential and transportation facilities arise, consideration should be paid to methods for, as one city official puts it, "people-izing" the area.

The following design and development strategies are aimed at increasing pedestrian flow and minimizing fear of crime among downtown users.

1--Dense and Compact Development

The success of downtown business is, of course, greatly affected by proximity to potential customers.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> An analysis of walking habits of Manhattan office workers shows that the average distance for pedestrian trips is about 1,100 feet, or roughly twice the length as in other downtowns. The average distance traveled to eat lunch is about 810 feet, while daytime shopping trips have a median length of 1,250 feet (Pushkarev and Zupan, Urban Space for Pedestrians). According to sources in the retail industry, stores must be located within four city blocks, or about 800-900 feet of a concentration of at least 4,000 office workers to benefit from lunchtime shopping.

Dense and compact development will foster pedestrian activity, office worker retail sales and lessen the period of exposure on the streets. Moreover, by leading to the emergence of an attractive core development area, it can also lower the fear of crime; the trade area telephone survey found that there was a meaningful correlation (Table 5) between how generally attractive respondents considered their downtown to be and how safe they felt it was to shop there compared with other shopping centers.

#### a. Obstacles to Dense and Compact Development

Although commercial centers are often relatively dense and compact, the overall downtown area can be rather large from security and pedestrian perspectives. There are several important ways that downtowns impede dense and compact development and concentration of pedestrian activity:

##### --Linear Development

In many downtowns, including those in the outer-boroughs, it is not unusual to see development concentrated along linear corridors that may be a mile or more in length. In some cities, this tends to occur on one side of the street. The failure to develop both sides of the street diminishes the ability of development on that block to generate pedestrian activity.

Developing both sides of the street may also help dislodge facilities (such as bars and "head" shops) that generate the wrong kind of pedestrian traffic. Judging from the cities studied during Phase II, one-sided linear development on major streets also seems to siphon off pedestrian traffic by encouraging the use of over-street walkways and other building connections.

--Specialized Activity Enclaves

Many downtowns have areas dominated by government, retail, private office or entertainment/cultural facilities, all separated from each other by considerable walking distance. This situation is intentional in cities where planners have tried to "clean up" individual portions of downtowns, with the hope that this would stimulate further development in the remaining areas. This strategy has been most successful in cities with safe and reliable public and para-transit systems to help link these downtown enclaves.<sup>21</sup> If they can't be linked, however, such areas--particularly single buildings or developments--tend to assume a fortress-type image with users viewing them as outposts surrounded by hostile territory.

<sup>21</sup> In Denver, for example, there is a free shuttle bus with 70-second headways that services the 16th Street Mall, and its use is considerably higher than had initially been projected. Cleveland has a loop bus for the downtown area. In Newark, Prudential runs a van shuttle every 20 minutes between its headquarters complex, the Gateway Center and the two major railroad stations. While the Prudential shuttle is deemed safe by over 92% of its users, it is costly. And in many downtowns, people are afraid to use downtown buses and subways.

--Limited-Access Structures and Off-Street Pedestrian Networks

A limited-access structure is typically a single-tenant office building with an attached garage, few entrances, a security force that strictly controls floor-to-floor access, blank walls on street level, and a work force that commutes by car, eats lunch at their desks or in the company cafeteria, and resorts to five o'clock flight.

Another type of limited-access structure is a retail mall entirely surrounded by a parking structure or fenced-in parking lot. Foot traffic from the street is restricted by the limited number of entrances, and these malls usually have a large security force and television surveillance. The chief objection to these structures is that, by keeping people from using normal sidewalk routes, they diminish a downtown's street life and keep visitors from engaging in more than one activity. Says one retailer: "They rob from the street".<sup>22</sup>

Off-street networks link together hotels, office buildings, apartment buildings, garages and convention centers by means of self-contained over-street walkways and understreet tunnels. Some examples are the Overstreet Mall in Charlotte, Peachtree Center in Atlanta and Gateway Center in Newark. In Montreal, Dallas and Houston substantial portions of the pedestrian

<sup>22</sup>The Vermont/Slausson Shopping Mall in Los Angeles is an interesting example of a limited-access structure, though it was built in a neighborhood business district. Crime in this low-income area, especially that committed by teenage groups, was making local residents afraid to shop in the area, and retailers were leaving. The creation of a limited-access shopping center was a key condition for the city to interest a developer and recruit his two major tenants. The completion of the mall and the security it provides has stimulated a wave of shopping activity from local residents, while the on-street merchants are, at best, doing about as well as they had done before.


networks are underground. In this type of development there are usually numerous restaurants and boutiques, most of which can be entered only from within the network. These (usually privately-owned) complexes have the advantage of strong private security contingents which help monitor the flow of orderly people throughout the network. Reports from Charlotte, Atlanta and Newark all indicate that middle-income users feel very safe in these areas.<sup>23</sup>

While a limited-access structure that has a single function helps depress the downtown multiplier effect, this is not necessarily the case with off-street networks. These are generally multi-functional and can link numerous activities together in a rather compact area, stimulate middle-income pedestrian activity and foster the multiplier effect. Although a considerable portion of the downtown pedestrian traffic will be contained inside, there is a concentration of traffic nonetheless. As one developer puts it: "the Overstreet Mall is Main Street in Charlotte." Indeed, Charlotte's mall (Map 1) has substantially improved the area, triggering demand for middle-income housing and upgrading on-street stores on Tryon Street.

Although the construction of limited-access structures and off-street networks may seem at odds with the classic definition of a downtown, there is reason to believe that under certain circumstances

<sup>23</sup>By siphoning off middle-income shoppers, off-street networks may increase the percentage of lower-income pedestrians on the outside sidewalks. This leads to a functional separation of downtown users by income. But this phenomenon is neither complete nor a matter of public or corporate policy. And in most urban areas, such a separation usually occurs in retail and residential areas.

MAP 1 --THE OVERSTREET MALL NETWORK (38) IN CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA



downtown development may be unable to proceed without them. Providing space in these facilities may in fact be the only way to induce businesses to locate in a troubled urban area; care should be taken, however, to build them with the capability to open up access to the street as the downtown progresses toward revitalization.

## 2--Housing and Mixed-Use Development

Development officials interviewed during the Phase II site visits generally felt that office development, while essential in the early stages of a downtown's revitalization, can take the process just so far and that more residential development for middle- and upper-middle-income families is the key to taking it the rest of the way. Such residential development is seen as directly improving a downtown's security situation by increasing the number of orderly people on the street and improving the appearance and maintenance of downtown buildings. Indirectly, residential development can also help support restaurants and shops that would not be economically viable on lunchtime office traffic alone.

The feasibility of the downtown residential development strategy rests on the ability to provide affordable housing in attractive and safe downtown locations. The demand for housing is there, as the Cleveland survey mentioned on page 11 attests. Jamaica Center and Fordham Road already have substantial residential populations, although both lack sizable numbers of middle-income residents, and downtown Brooklyn has middle-income residents living on its western edge and in surrounding neighborhoods. But all of the outer borough downtowns also have "crimeogenic" residential areas in or around their downtowns.



Providing affordable middle-income housing is now a problem practically everywhere in the country, but some is being built in the three downtowns and special programs such as that of the NY Partnership are being developed to deliver more. And residential development is the surest strategy for most downtowns to generate restaurant and boutique-type retail development needed to attract people downtown for cultural, entertainment and other evening events.

### 3--Promoting Evening Activity

It is widely accepted among downtown retailers and development officials across the country that complete economic rejuvenation cannot be achieved without significant numbers of people going to restaurants, shows, movies, concerts and retail stores after the workday is through. This activity makes the downtown more attractive to potential users, its businesses more profitable, and its users safer since it increases the flow of orderly, law-abiding pedestrians. A crucial problem in making a downtown "alive after five" is fear of crime.

It must be reemphasized that in terms of economic development goals, the issue of evening crime shrinks in importance if making the downtown alive after five is of less concern. For downtowns in the early stages of the revitalization process, it can be argued that increasing after-five o'clock activity is an impractical goal--daytime security must be achieved before evening safety can be attempted (the safety of late-working employees and residents will always be a concern but there need not be too much emphasis on protecting other potential evening visitors).

For downtowns with a significant amount of office development, increasing after-five o'clock activity may be a more reasonable goal. Yet even here the Phase II interviews with downtown officials and businessmen--including those in the outer boroughs--revealed certain unrealistic expectations that might generate needless security concerns. For example, many of those interviewed believe that because suburban malls stay open until 9:00 PM downtown department stores and retail shops can attract a similar business.<sup>24</sup> But suburban malls can stay open primarily because they draw shoppers from middle-income areas; in many downtowns, potential middle-income shoppers live beyond a ring of lower-income neighborhoods and it is often easier for them to shop at a mall.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Many businessmen also think that retailing in Manhattan flourishes during these evening hours and is further proof of the potential for their downtowns. In Manhattan, though, most department stores only stay open until 9:00 PM on Monday and Thursday evenings, and as noted earlier, get only a very small percentage of their customer traffic during the evening hours. On other evenings, the retail strips on Fifth Avenue, 34th Street and 57th Street, for example, are closed tight by 7:00 PM or 7:30 PM. It is true that some boutiques do stay open, but these are usually located in strips in Manhattan's residential areas, such as Columbus Avenue and East 86th Street.

<sup>25</sup> To draw these people downtown a unique shopping opportunity must be offered. In Manhattan, off-price retailing on Orchard Street and discount lighting stores on the Bowery offer such opportunities and succeed in drawing numerous middle-income shoppers to highly urbanized areas with strong high-crime images. But the Bowery does this during the weekdays and Orchard Street mostly on Sundays, not during the evenings.

A new type of downtown retail complex is the "festival center," epitomized by the Faneuil Hall project in Boston, Harborside in Baltimore and South Street Seaport in Manhattan. These have proven themselves to be capable of drawing middle-income users. (footnote continued on next page)

(footnote 25 continued)

However, data compiled on some sample festival centers by the Downtown Research and Development Center show that retailing may only account for 32%-60% of the center's space (See Table 9), while restaurants, fast food operation and food markets can account for 42% to 62% of the area. Festival centers, as the name implies, have a strong recreational draw and are quite different in nature to traditional department store or chain store retailing.

Table 9. Space Utilizations in Three Sample Downtown Festival Centers

	Festival Centers Downtown			
	A	B	C	Average
Total Retail Space (S.F.)	95,000	140,000	220,000	151,700
Average Unit Size (S.F.)	1,120	900	1,250	1,090
Sales/Customer (\$)	5.95	4.00	6.87	5.61
Retail Stores (%)	60	32	46	46
Restaurants/Cafes/Pubs (%)	31	41	52	41
Fast Food (%)	6	14	5	8
Food Markets (%)	3	7	5	5

Source: 1985 Alexander Research & Communications, Inc.

Moreover, as Table 10 shows, these centers draw primarily on normal trade area residents with tourists the next largest group. This suggests that the facilities are most feasible in downtowns that have a substantial number of middle-income residents nearby and a significant tourist and convention business.

Table 10. Analysis of the Components of Traffic Flow at One Downtown Festival Center

<u>Source of customers/visitors</u>	<u>Share of total (%)</u>
People working onsite	8.2
People living onsite	2.7
Hotel occupants onsite	1.1
Convention Center visitors	6.5
Tourists	19.6
Basic Trade Area Residents	62.1

Source: Downtown Research & Development Center, 1985.

Yet it is possible to generate sizable middle-income activity during the evening: many downtowns are trying to attract new users by rehabilitating or constructing cultural and entertainment facilities, such as Playhouse Square in Cleveland, Spiral Square in Charlotte, and BAM in Downtown Brooklyn. These facilities can provide services that suburban areas might find hard to compete with, especially legitimate theatre and concerts<sup>26</sup>. The Playhouse Square Theatres, for example, attracted about 110,000 theatergoers to downtown Cleveland in 1983.<sup>27</sup>

However, the problems associated with strategies to increase nighttime activity are substantial. Entertainment and cultural events may not generate enough traffic to stimulate the opening of new restaurants and small retail stores.<sup>28</sup> Without them, visitors may come away feeling that the downtown at night is still dead and deserted. Moreover, while the costs of providing police and private security to cover evening

<sup>26</sup>An important note here: care must be taken to hold family-oriented entertainment events. Rock concerts, for example, can attract boisterous, drunk or drugged teenagers and may do more to reinforce a downtown's negative image than improve it, as some cities have learned to their dismay.

<sup>27</sup>The manager of a large retail complex in downtown Hartford commented that his real anchors, especially in the evening, were his quality restaurants; the other stores, basically boutiques, fed off the traffic brought in by these tenants. It seems likely, however, that these restaurants were primarily magnets for those coming downtown for other reasons, such as attending events at the nearby Coliseum.

<sup>28</sup> Sporting events may generate higher numbers of people and on a more frequent basis. Riverfront Stadium in Cincinnati, for example, has had a very positive effect on the downtown hotel and restaurant business.

activities may be significant, there is no substantial multiplier effect to be gained from these visitors.

It is important to note that residential, cultural, entertainment, dining and boutique retail facilities will have a greater propensity to reinforce each other if they are located close enough to each other to stimulate pedestrian activity. This suggests that the development of evening activities that link residential development with cultural, entertainment, dining and boutique retail facilities is a much more viable strategy than simply concentrating on attracting outsiders downtown.

#### 4--Downtown Events

Many cities, including Cincinnati, Hartford, Cleveland and Denver periodically promote major downtown events to attract suburban residents (such as Oktoberfest Cincinnati), or bring out downtown office workers (such as outdoor lunchtime and evening concerts). The objectives are to draw enough orderly people to establish a positive downtown image among everyday workers and suburban residents who otherwise would stay away. In Cincinnati, these events can attract as many as 250,000 people, according to local police. In Cleveland, a downtown All Nations Festival drew about 125,000 participants in 1983.

Despite the enthusiasm of downtown development officials, the overall effectiveness of this strategy as a public-relations tool is debatable. In decayed downtowns, premature use of major events simply confirms the negative impressions of infrequent visitors. In slightly healthier downtowns, people may decide it is safe to go downtown only for events with large

concentrations of people. Furthermore, noontime events in some public spaces may dilute, but not relocate the disorderly proportion of users, who move back into the area once the events are finished.

As noted earlier, the prime mechanism for establishing a downtown's general image is the network of daily employees and businessmen, and their friends and relatives. Thus, more active tactics for improving feelings of safety among daily users appear to have the greatest impact on changing the general public's image of a downtown.<sup>29</sup> If negative messages about safety are being sent into the community, no public relations campaign will ever be able to improve the downtown's high-crime reputation.

#### 5--Parking Facilities

All of the cities reviewed during Phase II had a high level of auto use among downtown visitors. A car affords a greater sense of mobility and convenience and in some cases gives added protection against crime.

<sup>29</sup>The Downtown Councils in Cleveland and Cincinnati are taking important steps in this direction. The council in Cincinnati, for example, has a popular auxiliary group called the UpDowntowners, whose 400-person membership consists primarily of young, single professionals. The social life is one inducement to join, but companies encourage their employees to belong to the organization; by actively working to better the downtown and its image, the members improve their status in the group and the community at large.

Although auto use in the three outer-borough study areas is not currently as high as in other downtowns, this is expected to change in the near future. Three projects now being planned or constructed in the outlying downtowns (the Mack building, Fordham Plaza and Atlantic Terminal), for instance, call for between 400 and 1,000 spaces of on-site parking.

By bringing large numbers of people in and out of the downtown area conveniently, safe public transportation can encourage dense and compact development and a high concentration of pedestrian activity. Heavy auto use, on the other hand, can make these goals more difficult to achieve, due to the limited amount of parking space in a downtown core area.

Inadequate parking facilities causes auto users to park farther away in peripheral parts of the downtown. This dispersion lessens the density of pedestrian traffic and makes it more difficult for policing because the area involved may be too large to patrol adequately. This situation may discourage evening activity in the downtown area because of the fear of crime.

The demand by office workers for nearby parking can conflict with the parking needs of the retail community. This competition can result in office development in peripheral areas--often in the form of limited-access structures--and further disperse pedestrian traffic.

Drivers want to park as close to their destination as possible: a 1982 Hartford survey found that the maximum distance people were willing to park from their destination was three blocks.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Source: Rideshare Corporation, 1982

Thus, it is not surprising to find that in most downtowns recent development projects have attached or underground parking facilities. Some examples are the Gateway Center in Newark, the Embarcadero in San Francisco, Peachtree Center in Atlanta, and the Convention Center in Constitution Plaza in Hartford. In some downtowns, retail complexes are almost fully enclosed by parking facilities; in others, over-street bridges link department stores to their garages. Underground parking is often expensive to build and seldom accomodates all of a building's auto users.

According to interviews conducted during Phase II, attached parking is widely regarded as the best method for promoting a sense of safety among late-working office employees. In Charlotte, N.C., for instance, one corporation has a seven-story attached garage that is well-lit and patrolled, with designated parking areas for late-night and overtime workers.

Well-lit, attended open lots are generally considered more secure than garages. Within garages, good visibility and an absence of blind spots are considered important for security; pillars and enclosed stairwells and elevators should be avoided. Some consultants feel that TV surveillance combined with an audio system can improve safety. While corporate security personnel agree that such equipment can be valuable, some argue that they are at best cost-effective eyes and ears. After hours, there seems to be agreement that there is no substitute for security presence, either on foot or a scooter-type vehicle.

Appendix A provides more detail on security and transportation facilities.



B. POLICE AND PRIVATE SECURITY

1--Public Policing

A crucial and highly visible component of downtown security is police presence. In recent years, the New York City Police Department has initiated major programs for:

- \* increasing total police patrol, particularly foot officers, in local neighborhoods. One example is the community patrol officer project begun in the Sunset Park district of Brooklyn in 1984 as part of the Total Patrol Concept (TOPAC). This project employs foot officers on regular beats who not only enforce laws but become an active part of the community by interacting with residents and working on other neighborhood problems, such as inadequate street lighting. These foot patrols are designed to be "proactive", in the sense that officers are trained to deal with low-level street offenses instead of simply reacting to citizen complaints.
  
- \* increasing the level of law enforcement against quality-of-life crime, such as drug use and sale, prostitution, and loitering. The NYPD believes that such activity will also help reduce the incidence of serious crimes. An example of this enforcement is the Operation Pressure Point program being conducted in various New York City neighborhoods. It began in 1984 when a police task force saturated the Lower East Side drug market area of the city. This resulted in nearly 3,000 arrests and a considerable reduction in the local crime rate. Robbery,

for example, fell by 50 percent, according to police department statistics.

The Phase II research found that downtowns in other locales have similar programs emphasizing foot patrol and enforcement of quality-of-life regulations. Such patrols are now being used in Atlanta, Charlotte, Hartford and Oakland and will soon be deployed in Cleveland. A variant of the program (currently being used in Denver) involves motorcycle officers parking their vehicles and engaging in foot patrol for substantial parts of their shifts. Refer to Appendix B for more background on the history and theory of police patrol in urban America.

a. Foot Patrol

National interest in foot patrols originated from the findings of two systematic evaluations of neighborhood programs in Flint Michigan and Newark, N.J.. These studies showed that while foot patrols did not actually lower crime rates, they did have a number of other favorable results:

\*local residents believed that crime rates had been reduced, felt more secure and had a more favorable opinion of police performance.

\*local merchants felt more secure and were almost invariably strong supporters of the patrols.

\*They greatly reduced the perceptual disparity between blacks and whites regarding the quality of police performance.

Kelling and Wilson argue that foot patrols work because they "elevate the level of public order" and address two of the

primary fears of pedestrians in urban public spaces: the fear of being suddenly and violently attacked by a stranger, and the fear of being bothered by panhandlers, drunks, addicts, rowdy teenagers, loiterers, the mentally disturbed and other disorderly people. The foot patrolman keeps an eye on these types of individuals and makes sure they obey public standards.

The Flint evaluation also emphasized other roles that foot patrolman can play: they can be service brokers linking the community and local service agencies, and also dispute mediators informally resolving neighborhood conflicts. Both roles are strongly emphasized in the NYPD programs.

One of the keys to the success of foot patrol programs is the permanency of the patrol and of the patrolmen's presence. This permits patrol officers to become familiar with residents, local merchants and minor offenders.

The objectives of downtown foot patrol programs vary in specificity and scope in different cities. In Hartford, the primary purpose is helping downtown retail growth by making shoppers from the suburbs and local merchants more secure during the day, as well as encouraging visitors to attend downtown events during the evening. The patrolman is expected to be a visible "downtown mayor," giving information and generally helping downtown users. Although he is not charged with a particularly strong quality-of-life enforcement role (perhaps because problems with drunks, drug users and loiterers are not particularly acute in the area), the foot officer has been used successfully to discourage teens from congregating in front of entrances to major retail stores.

In Charlotte, Atlanta and Cleveland, the primary goal is for foot patrollers to be visible among local merchants and make all downtown users feel more secure. But police and businessmen in all three cities report that by the very nature of their job, foot patrol officers deal with drunks, derelicts, verbal harassment, and other low-level disorder problems.

The foot patrol in Oakland is one component of a carefully designed downtown security program jointly undertaken by local developers and police to deal with those crime problems that most impinge on the area's economic development potential. The program utilizes five types of police patrol, each deployed to deal with specific downtown crime problems: foot, mounted, scooter, motorcycle and car. Each is deployed to deal with specific downtown crime problems. The Oakland Project emphasizes aggressive enforcement against quality-of-life crime, including liaison with prosecutors and courts to insure that violations are taken seriously by the other segments of the criminal justice system. The police also maintain contact with community groups to deal with special populations such as the homeless and youth.<sup>31</sup>

An interesting feature of the Oakland Project is that the business community provides some \$300,000 annually for the services of five patrolmen, four horses and three scooters (See discussion in Section C).

<sup>31</sup> Such "street people" not only appear menacing but there is evidence to suggest that when they cluster together in an area crime rates may increase. Police officials in Charlotte, for example, claim that over 70% of the street robberies, muggings and assaults in the downtown area are committed by or against street people.

Street crime in downtown Charlotte has decreased since the start of their patrols in 1982.<sup>32</sup> Surveys for two years in a row showed that over 70% of the area merchants felt that foot patrols were the best way to deal with crime.<sup>33</sup> In Hartford and Oakland, interviews with local retailers revealed that foot patrols made them feel more secure, have helped to increase lunchtime traffic and kept some retailers from moving to seemingly safer areas. As one Oakland merchant put it:

"I can honestly say that if we didn't have the foot patrol and increased police presence downtown, I wouldn't be in business in Oakland. And I don't make these statements lightly".

An analysis of the Oakland Project by Reiss found an impressive number of "soft" crime (quality-of-life) arrests, indicating that the downtown foot officers were indeed carrying out their mission. Crime statistics show that since the implementation of the foot, mounted and scooter patrols, certain offenses, including strongarm robberies, purse snatches and property crimes, have dropped significantly.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>32</sup>In this and other references to crime reduction, we rely on the statements of those cited; we have no independent verification of such claims. As in all crime-reduction programs, questions must be asked about possible displacement of crime to other areas, times, targets, etc. (See T. Reppetto, "Crime Control and the Displacement Phenomenon," Crime and Delinquency, April 1976.) One must also note the general trend of crime in the larger area. It is possible, for example, that crime reductions may well be a result of general trends rather than a specific local program. In addition, experimental projects often display the "Hawthorne Effect," wherein the very fact of a program's being new and unique causes participants to operate at higher levels of efficiency.

<sup>33</sup>Central Charlotte Assn.

<sup>34</sup>See footnote 32.

Oakland police also claim that since the inception of the program prostitutes have moved elsewhere, there are cleaner streets, fewer broken windows, panhandlers, and some "SRO" hotels have closed down. The reactions of local businessmen acknowledged these changes: "There are fewer weirdos on the street with foot patrol," or "I don't hear about muggings anymore," are typical responses.

Reports in Oakland indicate that foot patrols substantially increased office employee pedestrian activity. Businessmen report office workers being more secure and going out at lunchtime. One bank manager claimed that use of the bank's cafeteria has dropped significantly since the inception of the program, a good sign that workers are going out more frequently. The retailing community also reports more shopping by lunchtime office employees.

Downtowns in Atlanta, Charlotte, Cleveland, Denver and Hartford all have larger concentrations of office workers than Oakland; interviews with businessmen, police and development officials in these cities indicate that even before the institution of foot patrols, workers felt safe going out at lunchtime to eat and shop. In light of this project's findings it is reasonable to assume they felt safe because of the density of office employee pedestrian traffic. The fact the the number of office workers in Oakland is well below the 60,000 to 120,000 employees found in other downtowns suggests that foot patrols can be effective in making office workers feel safer during the day in those downtowns that lack the density of pedestrian traffic needed to generate feelings of street safety.

Yet evidence regarding the impact of foot patrols on the perceptions of other types of shoppers and visitors is less conclusive. In downtowns with a high concentration of office workers where the foot patrol role does not heavily emphasize

proactive control of quality-of-life crime, infrequent visitors--particularly those coming for the first time--may or may not encounter a foot patrolman; for them, the number of orderly pedestrians may be more effective in making them feel safer on the streets.

In downtowns with fewer office workers and highly proactive foot patrol, however, visitors may see fewer signs of disorders and notice more police on the streets. Foot patrolmen in these areas seem more likely to increase feelings of safety.

#### b. Mounted Patrol

To increase the visibility of downtown police officers and the sense among pedestrians that they can be observed by the police, cities are increasingly using mounted horse patrols: Atlanta, Cleveland, Oakland, and New York City all use this tactic. As one New York City Police Commander put it: "It is the equivalent of a ten-foot cop."

During site visits in Oakland, Atlanta and Cleveland businessmen and merchants expressed positive reactions to horse patrol, maintaining that in addition to increasing feelings of safety it helps improve relations between the police and downtown users.

#### c. Night Safety

In respect to downtown economic development strategies, it appears that police patrol is less effective in improving perceptions of safety at night.

All of the foot patrols in the cities surveyed during Phase II are operative in the evenings, but they do not appear to have much influence on reducing five o'clock flight. Nor is there evidence that those venturing downtown after dark feel any

safer. The key problem in increasing evening security is that while the number of pedestrians downtown often may be reduced by as much as 99% of daytime levels, the patrols must provide the same degree of protection for people engaging in activities and walking to their garage, bus or rail stop.

In Cleveland, for example, emphasis is being placed on providing security on Terminal Square (a major office, hotel, retail and transportation activity center), Playhouse Square with its many theaters and restaurants, and the mile-long corridor that links the two. Foot officers patrol the squares while auxilliary police monitor the corridor. Similarly, in Atlanta, conventioners are advised to use Independence Boulevard as the main pedestrian corridor between the Omni and Peachtree Centers, where extra security personnel are assigned. These tactics are intended to concentrate pedestrian as well as police activity into a single self-contained area. Parking lots, bus stops and subway stops, however, are often dispersed throughout a downtown and evening pedestrians do not always use common sense in their walking habits. Police in Hartford, for example, claim that people going to remote parking lots in deserted public parks at night are most likely to become crime victims.

Table 11 summarizes the overall effect of foot patrols on feelings of safety among downtown users. Patrol is most effective in reassuring downtown merchants and residents during both the day and night. It is also very reassuring to daytime office workers and frequent visitors in areas without a high concentration of orderly people on the streets.<sup>35</sup> In

<sup>35</sup>That foot patrols can stimulate office development is reflected in reports from Oakland that developers consider it a major asset in recruiting tenants. The downtown's comprehensive security program was a key factor in convincing IBM to locate offices there.



TABLE 11

Ability of Foot Patrols to Diminish  
Fears of Crime Among Downtown Users

<u>Type of Downtown User</u>	<u>Type of Downtown/ Time of Day</u>			
	<u>Hi Office/ Day</u>	<u>Hi Office/ Evening</u>	<u>Lo Office/ Day</u>	<u>Lo Office/ Evening</u>
Office Workers	Marginal	Marginal	Significant	Marginal
Merchants	Significant	Significant	Significant	Significant
Residents	Significant	Significant	Significant	Significant
Frequent Visitors/ Regular Shoppers	Marginal	Marginal	Significant	Marginal
Infrequent Visitors/ Irregular Shoppers	Marginal	Marginal	Marginal	Marginal

contrast, foot patrol has only a marginal impact on nighttime and infrequent visitors, as well as late-working employees going to remote parking.

d. New York City Police Programs

There are a number of specific programs to enhance safety in the three outlying downtowns of New York City. The NYPD uses foot posts, scooter patrol, special enforcement against peddlers, anti-crime teams and, in the Bronx and Queens, mounted patrols. Downtown Brooklyn is patrolled by a team of 21 officers, and there is special attention given to truants and teen loiterers. Similar programs are in effect in Jamaica Center and Fordham Road.

Based on the Phase II site visits, it would appear that the NYPD programs are soundly conceived, and are now in the process of institutionalization. It is clear that the city emphasizes many--if not all--of the same police programs found elsewhere in the country:

- 1) Special downtown patrols, particularly those using permanently assigned foot officers.
- 2) Strong efforts to deal with quality-of-life crime and special population groups, including teenagers and the homeless.
- 3) Close liaison with the community, from the beat officer level to that of senior commander.

There are three problem areas, however, that need to be considered in discussing police policy for the three outer-borough downtowns:

1) Judicial Treatment of Quality of Life Offenses

Many arrests in New York City's Operation Pressure Point as

well as other quality-of-life arrests have been summarily handled by the New York City criminal courts.<sup>36</sup>

Community groups--in conjunction with the police--must make local prosecutors and courts aware of the necessity of supporting police efforts to control quality-of-life offenses.

### 2) Public Misconceptions of Crime Statistics

The Phase I study noted that both trade-area residents and merchants overestimated the crime rates in the three outlying downtowns.

In Newark, police issue a newsletter presenting crime statistics and discussing local crime problems. A similar newsletter might be considered for use in the three downtowns.

### 3) Public Transportation Security

An important element in downtown safety is getting people in and out on public transportation. The Newark police department has undertaken a special program called BUS'T Crime, in which officers board city buses to enforce quality of life-type regulations. The New Jersey Transit Authority claims the program has resulted in a 40% reduction in bus crime.<sup>37</sup>

Although the New York City Police Department has employed BUS'T Crime tactics in some of their precincts, the basic

<sup>36</sup>The Citizens Crime Commission noted in 1984 that: "The courts are primarily geared to handle only the most serious cases. For example, in 1983 there were 28,000 felony cases filed in State Supreme Court and an average of 165 judges to dispose of them. In the lower criminal court, 240,600 cases were filed but only 76 judges were assigned to hear them. Some criminal court judges routinely dispose of 200 cases at one sitting. Frequently, individuals are either dismissed or pay a small fine. This is turnstile justice at its worse. Thus, all but the most egregious offenses are simply swept out the door in a court system that lacks the resources to handle them." (Crime and Criminal Justice in New York City, 1983 p.18)

<sup>37</sup> See footnote 32, page 52.

transportation system of the city is the subway, which is policed by a separate Transit Authority Police department. Subway crime problems frequently make headlines in NYC and it is generally conceded that people are afraid while using the system. Yet there is no direct evidence regarding the impact of crime on ridership. At present, two major studies of subway safety are in progress. This is an important topic that warrants further study, since the subways are the main transit service to the three downtowns.

During Phase II, the subway systems in Atlanta, Philadelphia and Washington were examined. In each, there was the familiar emphasis on control of quality-of-life crime and proactive enforcement. In addition, great emphasis was placed on improving the physical conditions by upgrading trains, station renovations, better lighting, and open areas.

The New York City subways provide another example of the notion that security is provided by a high density of orderly people. Suburban railroads report far less crime than in the subways.<sup>38</sup> Their passengers are generally persons who have purchased tickets which are collected by conductors. In the subways, it is simple for gangs of youths to jump turnstiles and roam through the system during non-rush hours.

In Brooklyn, the Pfizer Chemical Company installed a TV surveillance system in the Flushing Avenue subway station, which adjoins its 17-acre plant. The station also faces the Marcy Avenue Housing Projects, a rather dangerous area. Crime statistics supplied by the Transit Authority Police indicates

<sup>38</sup>In 1984, for example, there were 97 robberies reported on Metro-North trains, compared with 5,999 in the New York City subways; Metro-North also recorded 49 assaults during the year, while the subway claimed 901. Sources: NYPD; Transit Police; Metro-North Police Department.

that there has been no decrease in the number of crimes at the station since the introduction of the system, but plant officials claim that workers feel more secure when they use the station, and a number of local residents have voiced similar feelings.

In January, the Mayor announced that he would assign police officers to each train and high-crime platforms during the hours between 8 PM and 6 AM. Refer to Appendix C for more information on security and public transportation.

## 2--Privately-Financed Police Patrols

Businessmen are becoming increasingly aware that security on downtown streets beyond the boundaries of their properties is essential to their economic viability, and thus many are willing to defray some or all police foot patrol costs. Reiss' Oakland study noted that considerable money had been spent in the past on improving private security in downtown office buildings but that this had little impact on the surrounding streets. As a result, Oakland businesses began in 1981 to provide more than \$300,000 a year for public policing.

A number of techniques are being used to finance added police strength. In Oakland, voluntary contributions from local developers and major office tenants are used to support the downtown security program. The Downtown Council in Hartford used \$250,000 of its funds to contract with the city for extra

foot patrol officers. Foot patrol costs in Charlotte and Cleveland are being covered by the city governments, although in Cleveland the general assumption among downtown leaders is that if the program is a success, the business community will assume its costs, perhaps through a new downtown special assessment district.

Funds raised by special assessment districts in Denver and New Orleans are used to support extra police presence in their downtown areas; the intent is to assure long-term financing for foot patrol programs. Refer to section C for more detail on special assessment districts.

Yet there are problems associated with the funding of police programs by the downtown business community. Voluntary support from the Oakland business community for the downtown police enhancement program has not grown substantially since the effort began, and the bulk of the funds have been supplied by two large developers. It should also be noted that there was reluctance to support the concept when it was presented at a recent meeting of the National Association of Citizens Crime Commissions, whose membership includes groups with operating heads representing both the law enforcement and business communities. In addition, there may be charges from minorities and neighborhood residents that the city has adopted a "rent-a-cop" policy in which greater police protection will go to those who can afford to pay for it. This problem might be ameliorated through good relations between businessmen and local residents, who generally recognize the importance to them and to the whole community of their downtown revitalization.

### 3--Private Security

As mentioned earlier, downtown businesses are concerned about safety on the streets abutting their properties and on

heavily-used pedestrian walkways within them. Among private security directors interviewed during Phase II, there was overwhelming agreement that normal private security personnel cannot adequately patrol adjacent streets and sidewalks because they lack sufficient authority, training and motivation.

Businesses in Charlotte, Cleveland, Atlanta, Hartford and Newark are allowed to hire off-duty city police officers as security personnel, and many are actively doing so. In Peachtree Center in Atlanta, for example, off-duty city policemen patrol on foot the streets surrounding the nine square blocks of the Center that include several hotels and office buildings, a sizeable retail area, a Trade Mart, and several garages. While many of these are connected by over-street walkways, there is much street-level pedestrian activity. These off-duty officers provide about 140 man-hours of foot patrol each week in the Peachtree Center area. Georgia Power also uses off-duty Atlanta officers for the same purpose.

Almost every major corporation in Newark, including Prudential, Western Union, and AT&T, has an off-duty policeman patrolling the sidewalks on the perimeter of its building.

In Cleveland and Charlotte, off-duty policemen are used to patrol enclosed pedestrian walkways. Their use in Cleveland, in conjunction with improved safety design, was instrumental in controlling crime and increasing business activity in the Terminal Tower Complex.

In Charlotte, off-duty officers patrol portions of the privately-owned Overstreet Mall network in conjunction with private security personnel.

Most private security is still provided by non-police sources. The quality of security organizations varies widely. One development employed an "elite" private security team outfitted in orange jumpsuits patrolling on motorbikes. In other developments, the security personnel were less impressive. In similar fashion, the level of cooperation between public and private agencies varies greatly. In the judgment of those interviewed during the Phase II study, security officers should at the very least present a non-threatening appearance in keeping with their responsibilities. While an assessment of security practices in general is beyond the scope of this report, it is an area for each development district to study carefully. Among questions that should be addressed are:

- 1) What is the appropriate mix of public police and private security?
- 2) What authority should be invested in private officers? Should they be armed and given power of arrest? What standards of training, discipline and appearance should be maintained?
- 3) Are extensive private security efforts fully effective if public street safety is not well maintained?
- 4) If street safety is deemed inadequate, should private interests contribute funds to public policing as in Oakland, New Orleans and Denver?
- 5) Should off-duty regular police be employed as private security guards?

While there seems to be a general nationwide consensus in respect to effective downtown public policing strategies, the Phase II findings suggests that appropriate private security measures will vary in different cities.



#### 4--Security Escorts, Convoys and Vans

Escort programs are the most frequent response to the problem of getting workers to their parked cars during the evening. These services are most likely to be initiated by large corporate employers or large developments, such as Atlanta's Peachtree Center or Newark's Gateway Center, all of which have their own security personnel.

Escorts can vary in operation from an informal arrangement where late-working employees ask the downstairs security guard to watch as they cross the street to the parking lot to more formally planned and operated programs.<sup>39</sup>

While the problem of security within parking facilities can never be totally ameliorated, much can be done to mitigate it. According to operators and designers of parking facilities, valet parking is one of the best ways to insure security, but it is expensive. A computerized identification system is used.

<sup>39</sup>American Airlines has instituted a formal escort program for its employees in Hartford, some of whom park in an area that is a five minute walk away on the other side of an interstate highway and near a housing project. The program was instituted after a number of incidents involving evening workers going to their cars resulted in increased employee apprehension. A security officer, linked to the office by walkie-talkie, walks groups of three to five workers to their cars; one of the workers normally gives the officer a ride back to the base. The program operates from 5:30 PM to 1:30 AM, and on an average evening 40 to 50 employees are escorted. There have been no incidents since the escort program was instituted.

The Travelers Insurance Company, also in downtown Hartford, has a program in the evening where in response to telephone calls, security personnel drive employees to their parked space in a marked car with a flashing light. The escort then waits until the driver has entered the street before returning to base. In a typical month, about 130 escort rides are given, many of them carrying more than one person.

in a number of recently constructed garages in Houston, but this system is also expensive and not suited for facilities open to the general public.

Private firms are also using a variety of escort and "convoy" programs for employees going to subway and commuter rail stations. Firms in Downtown Brooklyn and Jamaica, have security officers, after the evening shift, walk a convoy of workers to the subway station.

A number of other firms in Newark operate van shuttles to take employees to the railroad stations. In addition to being expensive, one firm's experience showed that employee use of the shuttle drops off unless service is frequent enough, since they could walk to the station in less time than that needed to wait for the van.

Since shuttle service can be expensive, an attempt was made in Newark to develop a single shuttle for a number of firms. The attempt stalled, in part because of insurance problems, but also because employees had become so used to their existing shuttles that they resisted the new one. Perhaps the idea of an overall shuttle could work in downtowns where firms have not already developed their own program.

According to a number of corporate office managers common sense can do much to make workers feel more secure even if they do not have access to attached parking. One widespread practice is to arrange the work schedule so that people arrive early and leave work before dark. Other tactics include having late-working employees move their cars to an attached garage, having supervisors drive late-working clerical help to their cars, and firms sending employees home by cab when they work past an appointed hour.

C) DOWNTOWN LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION

Downtowns are by nature fragmented in a way that makes cooperation and unified problem-solving difficult undertakings. Although they may be distinct geographic areas, Central Business Districts are rarely autonomous jurisdictions. This means that the provision of municipal services--including those of the police department-- may entail a number of often uncoordinated administrative entities. Downtowns may, for example, be divided between two or more police precincts as is the case in Fordham Road and Downtown Brooklyn.

The fragmentation in the public sector is often mirrored in the private sector. Getting sizable groups of retailers, property owners, community organizations, and corporate and civic executives to work together on a voluntary basis is typically a daunting task, made even more difficult by the lack of an authoritative downtown decision-making structure. Encouraging cooperation between private sector groups is often a cost-effective means for increasing safety and reducing operating and security costs. (One example is the joining of separate private security contingents to operate Newark's safety corridor; see page 71).

Because it limits the amount and scope of resources that can be mobilized, fragmentation reduces a downtown's ability to mount comprehensive programs to solve its revitalization problems. The downtowns will be unable to significantly ameliorate their security situations unless they can first surmount the barriers produced by fragmentation.

The following strategies address these barriers by emphasizing leadership and cooperation among members of municipal, business and community sectors:

1--Downtown Councils and Associations

One response to fragmentation is the downtown council or association. Such an organization typically draws its membership from downtown businessmen and is usually associated with the city's Chamber of Commerce. Most important, it is the business organization having the designated mission of dealing with the downtown area. Activities can range from lobbying city agencies for cleaner streets and more parking to well-planned financial efforts to manage the downtown area, though they may lack any formal authority for such a task. Some of these organizations, such as the Downtown Councils in Cleveland and Hartford and the Central Charlotte Association, have been already referred to earlier in this report.

The stronger and most successful of these organizations use as a model the unified management structure characteristic of many of their competitors in suburban shopping malls; it results in better up-keep of the area, better sanitation, better tenant control and mix, better retail promotion and better security. Downtown Councils often try to replicate this type of management as much as possible, given that downtowns do not have unitary property ownership. They raise their funds from voluntary dues and contributions and their programs use these funds or the voluntary coordination of their members' services.

Typical programs include supplementary street cleaning services (in Hartford and Cleveland), downtown sales promotions, or special events to bring new people downtown. Increasingly, these councils have been entering the area of downtown security, initiating programs of varied complexity, cost and goals.

Some projects focus on security audits and safety seminars. The Downtown Council in Cleveland, for example, has been running a seminar program for downtown employees since 1977, and the Central City Association in Los Angeles recently instituted a Downtown Watch Program, a main component of which involves seminars to teach crime-prevention techniques to downtown employees.

Bringing downtown people together to discuss common security problems can help create a consensus on the type of security programs needed in a downtown as a whole or in particular areas. In Cleveland, this has been essential to the effectiveness of campaigns to increase security in the Terminal Tower area and to get the city to implement a downtown foot patrol program. A special downtown business committee of this sort in Newark led to the creation of a safety corridor involving a good deal of cooperation between numerous public and private security agencies.

The Downtown Council in Hartford has used its funds to pay for extra downtown foot patrols; a smaller group of businesses in Oakland worked together to pay for the police augmentation program in their downtown.

## 2--Special Assessment Districts

An increasingly popular strategy for improving downtown management and increasing police strength is the creation of special downtown districts. These are geographically-defined areas which usually encompass a large portion of the downtown, and certainly its commercial core, in which special tax

assessments are levied to pay for augmented or additional services in the downtown area. Cities of all sizes are using such districts, including New Orleans, Tulsa, Charlotte, Denver, Raleigh and 11 other municipalities in North Carolina--some with populations as small as 7,800.

The Special Assessment Districts and business improvement districts found in parts of New York City -- including the outer-borough downtowns -- are similar in nature, though elsewhere it is unusual to find two or more special districts in one downtown, as is the case in Downtown Brooklyn and Jamaica Center, or for them to cover such a comparatively small area.

In Denver, Tulsa and New Orleans, revenues derived from these districts are used in part to pay for additional police officers. In Denver, the district's managing body contracts with the city to provide 10 extra officers and a sergeant for its "Mall Patrol". In New Orleans, part of the revenues is used to provide 13 additional officers and a sergeant.

The amount of money that a district can raise is a function of its size, wealth and the rate of the extra assessment. Some districts use an assessment formula based on "frontage," but most use some variant of assessed value of the property. In North Carolina's 13 districts, assessed value was used as the basis for the assessment, and the rates in 1979 ranged from \$0.025 to \$0.45 per \$100 of assessed value. The smallest district raised only \$12,000 in 1979. In contrast, New Orleans expects to raise \$3.2 million in 1985.

These districts are not easy to create. Sensitive issues include determining which properties should be taxed and the fairness of the load assumed by larger property owners, and the concern that normal service levels might be lowered if additional city services are contracted for. Because many

downtown businessmen are reluctant to pay twice for municipal services, a number of districts have refused to contract with their cities for augmented security. But other district officials claim these problems can be overcome through effective monitoring of added services and contact with appropriate administrative officials.

Funds raised by special assessment districts have been used for other security-related capital projects, including parking lots, and, in Tulsa and Denver, downtown shuttle service.

A prominent concern of downtown businessmen in the outer boroughs and elsewhere in the country is the consistency of police service. They want to ensure that they will get the type of policing they need and that if a problem flares up in another area, the level of police service will not be altered. Using contracts with the city to buy additional police patrols --as one police chief confirmed--is a good way to achieve this end. By paying for extra police protection, downtown businessmen also defuse the issue of whether they are getting an unfair share of a scarce community resource. Yet there are some drawbacks to such efforts, as noted earlier in the section on Privately-Financed Police Patrols.

### 3--Cooperation Between Private Security Forces and Public Police

Almost every downtown business of any size has its own security force, usually confined to patrolling the periphery of their own property. Greater cooperation between private security contingents might help make downtown safety efforts all the more effective. For example, many security forces provide similar services, such as escorting workers to subway stations at night, and it might prove cost-effective to develop a common program.

Increased cooperation between private and public police personnel is another strategy that can result in better downtown safety and reduced private-sector security costs.

One of the most successful programs involving cooperation between private security forces and city and transit police is the Safety Corridor developed by the Business and Employee Safety Committee of the Newark Chamber of Commerce. The corridor runs about 1 1/4 miles along the primary routes used by people going to the two railroad stations in the downtown. During the evening rush hours, about 50 security people stand on static posts outside their buildings; the contingent includes on-duty officers from the city and Transit Police Departments, off-duty cops hired by private firms, private security personnel and officers from Rutgers University. The objective is to make downtown employees feel more secure in the area through the visible presence of this security force. While data on crime levels is not currently available, security directors and employees are very enthusiastic about the program.

In Dayton, Cleveland and soon in Hartford, CB radios and walkie-talkies are used to link downtown merchants and security forces with local police. But the results of some of these programs have been disappointing. Merchants and security people often lose interest in listening to their "scanners", and concern about possible lawsuits for false arrests makes private security officers hesitant to attempt to have suspects arrested on the basis of radio description. Many police departments also resist the concept of private security people becoming involved in such arrests. This suggests that the tactic of coordinating downtown private security efforts with police is difficult at best, and may have limited potential.



#### 4--Public-Private Sector Partnership

In the urban development field, it has become almost axiomatic that revitalization demands the forging of a partnership between the public and private sectors. This is equally true in the area of downtown security.

Both the Oakland and Hartford security programs show the benefit of on-going communication between police and businessmen. On the daily level, the foot officer and the merchant became well-acquainted with each other. While the benefits to merchants have been cited elsewhere, this collaboration has also helped the police departments target strategies and patrol tactics for their downtown program.

On a more general level, the ability of business leaders and city political leaders to communicate and develop a concensus can dramatically affect downtown security programs. In some cities, animosity between the business community and City halls has severely hampered the progress of downtown security efforts. In others, such as Charlotte, the working relationship that exists between business and political leaders have allowed the city to deal effectively with a number of difficult issues, of which downtown safety is one.

#### 5--Business-Community Partnership

Some businessmen and development officials also feel there is a need to forge good relations with residents in and around their downtown.

In some downtowns, animosity can develop between some businessmen, especially retailers and local residents. Often of differing ethnic and income groups, some residents may view

merchants as outsiders and exploiters, and thus legitimate targets for shoplifters and other criminals. In other instances, local residents may themselves be intimidated and refrain from exercising the informal constraints necessary for social control in the neighborhood.

A growing number of businesses, however, have begun to respond. Zayre's, a major retail chain, for example, has found it very profitable to operate in the kind of ethnic, relatively poor urban areas that other retail chains normally avoid. As part of a careful planning effort to determine how best to penetrate such markets, improving security became a major objective. The program they developed combines diligent implementation of internal security techniques with a community-relations program. A spokesperson claims that their shoplifting rates are significantly lower than existed before the program.

There is nothing new in the security used by Zayre--the real key to their success lies in their attitude to the local community. The management insists on providing a clean, attractive store; graffiti is quickly removed and vandalism repaired. The merchandise is carefully selected to meet local tastes, and they are scrupulous in maintaining fair pricing and returns policies. Employees are hired from the local area, and the store managers know how to relate to their customers. They also participate in and support local community fairs and festivals.

The objective is to make local residents see Zayre's stores as a part of their community, one that provides good merchandise at a fair price and takes pride in itself and the neighborhood. Joint security programs between residents and businesses have been developed in some areas in Brooklyn, Queens, Chicago and Portland.

The Edgewater Community Council, a neighborhood group located in northeast Chicago, has actively developed "block watchers" programs to assist police in fighting quality-of-life crime. The Council believes that the residential and commercial communities are inter-dependent, each needing the other to be healthy. And both are contributing to the program.

The Pratt Area Community Council in Brooklyn has a citizens patrol with about 100 volunteers, of which an estimated 15-20% are drawn from the neighborhood's business community. Local retailers and banks also make donations to buy equipment for the patrol.

In East New York, the business workers and residents located in an "in-place" industrial park pay fees to the local development corporation, which manages a uniformed security patrol during the evenings. Using vans, the patrol not only deters burglaries but also escorts residents from the subway station to their homes.

Similar partnerships between downtown business organizations and local residential organizations benefit from their grass-roots origin and are worthy of pursuit in many downtown areas.

#### 6--Special Populations

As noted in Section III, fear of crime among trade area respondents in the three outer-borough downtowns was substantially affected by behavioral signs of disorder, such as drug abuse and sale, loitering and public drinking. Downtown organizations have frequently undertaken programs to confront those groups whose behavior can signal public disorder to downtown visitors. Of particular interest to this study are

efforts aimed at dealing with two special population groups: street people and teenagers. The following are brief reviews of some current programs; Appendix D provides more detail on these and other projects across the country.

#### a. Street People

A major problem facing downtowns across the country is the growing number of homeless, drug-addicted, mentally disabled and unemployed citizens. While it is beyond the scope of this study to address fully the issue of these "street people", many cities--including New York--have attempted to meet some of the basic needs of this population. For instance, New Orleans supports the city's alcoholic detoxification center with \$30,000 per year from the funds raised by the downtown special assessment district. The HOW Foundation, sponsored by the city of Tulsa, Oklahoma in cooperation with the Chamber of Commerce and others, receives contracts for work projects for alcoholics, drug abusers and unemployed. The participants in this voluntary program are provided with housing, food, clothing, medical care and stipends; local officials claim it has reduced the number of street people by 70 percent.

In New York, a similar project sponsored by the Manhattan Bowery Group and Project Renewal gives street people downtown cleaning jobs. This program, however, differs from the HOW program in several key respects: first, it is publicly funded and run on a non-profit basis; second, it does not have a service contract with a downtown business organization.

#### b. Teenagers

Many cities have recognized the need to control the number of loitering teenagers on the street by reducing truancy,

providing employment and offering entertainment and leisure opportunities.

Project Pride in Newark, N.J., was originally intended to reduce juvenile vandalism and mischief. Initiated by New Jersey Bell, the project brought together other organizations suffering from vandalism, including the Board of Education and the Bus Company. The program attempts to instill in young people a sense of pride and responsibility for their neighborhoods through educational and recreational activities, and anti-vandalism groups to patrol housing sites and report vandalism to security personnel.

Two other programs in Newark seem particularly promising. The Self Esteem Enhancement Program (SEE) links the Police Department with the Board of Education to give youths an opportunity for growth and learning by keeping the schools open after hours for sports activities, counseling, and classes in photography, crafts and design. Many of the classes are taught by Newark police officers.

In the second project, the Neighborhood Clean Up Program, first-time minor juvenile offenders perform community work, such as cleaning streets and removing graffiti.

Truancy is one of the prime contributors to loitering and rowdiness among teenagers--behavior that often affects shoppers, businessmen, office workers and other downtown users. In addressing this problem a multi-pronged effort is needed, such as in Cincinnati, Ohio, where the Police Department and the Citizens Committee on Youth worked with the downtown business community for:

--stricter enforcement of existing ordinances to discourage loud music and loitering.

(77)

--reduction, through bus passes, of the time students are permitted to stay downtown

--the holding of graffiti art contests

The New York City Police Department has established special truancy units to deal with this problem in many areas, including the three study areas. However, the future cooperation of other municipal departments and agencies is required to enhance this program.

## V. CONCLUSIONS

A basic premise of this report is that crime and the fear of crime are impeding the economic development of the three outlying downtown study areas. Both physical signs of urban decay, of which graffiti is a prime example, and behavioral signs of disorder, which include quality of life offenses such as public drinking and loitering, appear to be related to limited use of downtown activities. The program findings, however, suggest that behavioral elements were stronger than physical signs in stimulating the fears of workers and visitors.

Site visits and analysis of progress made in other cities supports the Phase I finding that the key element in a healthy downtown is the presence of a high density of law-abiding, orderly citizens on the streets. This critical mass of pedestrian flow results in greater feelings of safety and a substantial measure of self-policing. Where this concentration does not occur naturally, increased police and security presence is the most effective substitute.

The Phase II study examined possible solutions to the crime problems faced by the three outlying downtowns; the findings fell into three categories--design and development strategies; police and private security programs; and downtown leadership and organization.

### A) DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT

The following are potentially effective methods for increasing pedestrian flow and minimizing fear of crime among downtown users.

restaurants, movies, concerts and evening retailing. However, this may be an unrealistic goal for some downtown areas; it appears to be most effective in downtowns that have achieved a high level of daytime security.

#### 4--Downtown Events

Many of the cities studied hold major downtown events to attract suburban residents or encourage downtown workers to remain in the evening. The long-term objective is to draw crowds of orderly people and foster a positive image. Despite the enthusiasm of some officials, the overall effectiveness of the strategy is debatable. In decayed downtowns, premature use of major events simply confirms negative impressions.



### 1--Dense and Compact Development

Dense and compact development fosters pedestrian activity, office worker retail sales and lessens the period of exposure on the street. In general, it can assist in controlling the physical signs of disorder and improve the overall appearance of the area.

Specialized activity enclaves are areas dominated by government, retail, office or entertainment facilities, all separated from each other by considerable walking distance. These areas can be successful if linked by reliable public transit systems, but if not such areas tend to assume a fortress-like image with users viewing them as outposts surrounded by hostile territory.

Limited-access structures such as single tenant office buildings or malls deter visitors from walking on streets and participating in more than one activity while downtown. Off-street networks are self-contained multi-functional complexes that occasionally can generate enough internal pedestrian activity for a healthy multiplier effect.

### 2--Housing and Mixed-Use Development

Although commercial activity is essential in the early stages of downtown revitalization, it is necessary for middle- and upper-middle income residential development to grow as well. This improves the downtown security situation by increasing the number of orderly people and improving the appearance and maintenance of the area.

### 3--Promoting Evening Activity

In order to minimize "five o'clock flight", it is necessary to encourage the growth of after-work activities, such as

B) POLICE AND SECURITY SOLUTIONS

Police and private security play a major role in safeguarding downtowns:

1--Public Policing

The Phase II research revealed a consensus in New York City and around the country on effective police strategies. The key ones are:

- a) Special downtown patrols, particularly those using permanently assigned foot officers.
- b) Strong enforcement of quality-of-life laws, and control of special populations, including teenagers and the homeless.
- c) Close liaison with the community, from the beat officer level to that of ranking commander.

In respect to these criteria, the New York City Police Department programs appear soundly conceived. The fact that the city plans to add several thousand additional officers over the next few years lends considerable hope that such programs will in fact be greatly expanded. Indeed, the police department is committed to providing the necessary resources to help facilitate economic development in the commercial areas of the city.

Among possible recommendations that could be made for the three outer-borough downtowns are:

- The downtown community should support the police to ensure that the judicial system recognizes the need to deal effectively with arrests for quality-of-life crimes.

--Because there is a tendency for citizens to overestimate the extent of the crime problem in their neighborhoods, it might be useful to consider some vehicle, such as a newsletter, for police or other public officials to communicate crime and safety information to community leaders.

--Safe public transportation supports dense and compact development and a high concentration of pedestrian street traffic, and is especially critical to the revitalization of the three outlying downtowns, which are major transit centers. Subway crime in particular, is an important topic that warrants further study, since the subways are the main transit service in the three downtowns. At present, several major studies of subway crime-fighting tactics have been undertaken by the transit authority and the city government. These should be monitored closely.

As relates specifically to economic development, foot patrol has been shown to reassure merchants and residents and may, in areas of low pedestrian density, increase feelings of street safety among downtown users. However, patrols appear less effective in diminishing fear of crime during the evening hours when there are relatively few orderly people on the streets.

## 2--Private Security

In contrast to the findings on police, there appears to be a lack of consensus around the country about the effectiveness of private security forces. This suggests that each community should address a number of questions regarding the appropriate mix between public police and private security, the authority of the security officers, and the possible use of regular police officers as security guards. In a number of cities, private security efforts do not address public protection on the street and therefore fail to promote economic development. Some

communities have sought to remedy this by providing private funds for augmented police services. However, there are considerable problems with this practice and its use varies according to local considerations.

### 3--Security Escorts, Convoys and Vans

Private firms are using a variety of escort, convoy and shuttle services for employees going to subway and commuter rail stations after work. Escort programs appear to be the most frequent response to the problem of getting workers to their parked cars in the evening.

## C) DOWNTOWN LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION

Cooperative efforts between the public and private sectors have resulted in some impressive campaigns to address crime and other revitalization problems in downtown areas. The most successful--and comprehensive--programs have managed to galvanize leaders in the municipal, business and residential communities. Some prime examples of these partnerships follow:

### 1--Downtown Councils and Associations

These organizations draw membership primarily from the business community, and are usually associated with a city's chamber of commerce. Increasingly these groups have become involved in promoting downtown safety through seminars, agenda-setting for city-run security programs, and even fund-raising for added foot patrol strength in downtown areas.

## 2--Special Assessment Districts

By establishing geographically-defined downtown districts and levying special tax assessments for additional police and security services, many cities have raised considerable money to launch and maintain anti-crime programs. This type of cooperative venture appears to be one of the most effective ways to concentrate and mobilize downtown resources.

## 3--Cooperation Between Private Security Forces and Public Police

Cooperation between private security contingents in efforts such as employee escort services is a potentially cost-effective strategy for increased downtown safety. Cooperative programs linking police and private security strength also seem to have promise.

## 4--Public-Private Sector Partnership

Good working relationships between the business community and police and city officials--from the level of beat officer and merchant to that of top political and business leaders--can have a tremendous impact on the success of all the programs outlined in this report. The Oakland and Hartford security programs, in particular, demonstrate the value of ongoing communication between police, city officials and businessmen.

## 5--Business-Community Partnership

Interaction with the residential community is another area where cooperation can pay off for the business community. By providing residents in and around the downtown area with a stake in the viability of the business district--through employment, good relations and safe shopping facilities--

merchants, restaurants, theatres and others can increase the pedestrian flow necessary to build both day and evening activity. Joint security programs between residents and businesses have been developed in some areas in Queens, Brooklyn and Chicago.

6--Special Population Programs

Many organizations are attempting to improve their downtown's safety and public image by devising ways to cope with special populations, such as street people, and teenagers. Truancy control programs, as well as other educational and employment projects directed toward teenagers seem particularly effective and popular in some communities.

VI. APPENDICES

- A) Transportation and Downtown Security
- B) Police Patrol Strategies
- C) Subway Safety
- D) Special Populations
- E) PHASE II Site Visits/Interviews

## APPENDIX A

### TRANSPORTATION AND DOWNTOWN SECURITY

Because of its ability to bring large numbers of travelers in and out of the core activity area, safe public transportation can reinforce a downtown's ability to concentrate facilities and pedestrian activity. This means that pedestrian trips can be shorter and pass through an area where there is likely to be more people and which will be of a size amenable to foot and mounted police patrols. High auto use, on the other hand, has a much greater potential to conflict with the desire to concentrate downtown facilities and activities.

Downtown users, like their counterparts in campus office sites and shoppers in suburban malls, want to park their cars as close to their destinations as possible. A 1982 survey of trade area shoppers in Hartford found that most came by car and that although most were willing to park a maximum of three blocks away, they preferred to park in a facility at their destination (Source: Rideshare Corp. 1982). Thus, it is not surprising to find in downtown after downtown that recent development projects have attached or underground parking facilities. In some downtowns, such as Stamford and White Plains, retail complexes are sometimes almost encased by



parking facilities. In others, over-street bridges span across streets from department stores to their garages; Macy's in White Plains, Pogue's in Cincinnati and Davisons in Atlanta are two examples of this type of structure.

The automobile is the primary means for most people to go to and from the downtown in most cities, and although this is not now the case in the outer-boroughs, their new projects indicate they will have more automobile users in the near future. In Cleveland about 66% of the downtown user population reports traveling there by car; in Charlotte, the personnel department of one large corporation estimates that over 80% of their downtown workers get there by car.

In the core downtown area the demand for parking can quickly become a factor serving to disperse facilities and pedestrian activities. Underground parking is often expensive to build and seldom accomodates all of a building's auto users. Surface garages and lots must compete with other users in the core downtown area. In some downtowns there may not be available sites on which "next door" parking can be easily provided for either new or older buildings. In other instances surface garages and lots in the core area may mean that key buildings must be spaced further apart and create "dead space" for pedestrians on the sidewalks abutting the garages.

This, in turn, can cause developers to locate new buildings in those parts of the downtown where they can construct appropriate parking. These sites may be beyond the periphery of the core area, creating a tendency for the development of limited-access structures or rival activity nodes.

Moreover, there may be competition between different downtown users for available parking places. In Hartford, for example, retail growth is being impeded by the fact that by 10 AM 16,000 of the available 18,000 parking places are occupied by downtown workers. In Jamaica Center, 1,500 of the 3,000 federal office workers soon to locate there might be expected to travel by car, thus creating new competition for spaces in the vicinity. Unless the core area can provide sufficient spaces for all auto users, there will be a tendency for a significant number of downtown users to park in peripheral parts of the downtown. Cost factors will induce less wealthy shoppers and office workers to use these more distant parking places since parking fees usually vary inversely with distance from the core downtown area. The consequent dispersion of shoppers and especially office workers after working hours creates a low-density pedestrian situation conducive to crime and fear. The dispersing of these auto users also makes it more difficult for police patrols to be an effective remedy, because the area involved may be rather large and the number of officers

(4)

required disproportionately large to the number of people to be protected.

Subway and rail stations tend to make downtown users converge as they go home. Located in the core downtown area and perhaps in peripheral activity enclaves as well, these transportation facilities tend to increase pedestrian traffic in what may already be a fairly concentrated area and therefore may be more amenable to police patrol.

Because of the downtown parking situation, Hartford is developing a system whereby workers are shuttled in vans to and from four large parking lots on the periphery of the downtown. If the parking facilities themselves are safe, this could provide a potential solution to the problem of getting employees who do not have attached spaces safely to their cars. American Airlines explored the possibility of establishing their own peripheral parking lot, or sharing one that would provide the 300 spaces they require at lower rates than those to be found downtown. But the cost of the shuttle service, when combined with parking and the fact that many employees wanted to continue using closer parking facilities and would still need an escort service, made the overall costs too high. This approach, however, may be more viable in other

situations, and we believe it deserves consideration because of its ability to deal with both downtown land use and security problems.

In the private sector, among corporate executives and security directors, parking facility operators and designers, as well as among police officials interviewed during Phase II, attached parking was considered by far to be the best way of reducing the fears of people as they walk to and from their downtown parking lot or garage.

This is viewed to be especially true for late-working or evening-shift employees. For evening-shift workers such parking often can be very easy to obtain since their firm uses such facilities for their day workers and the number of evening workers is often considerably less than that during the day. A fairly typical example is a corporation in Charlotte with 17,000 employees, about 20% of whom work the second and third shifts. Attached to their two connected office buildings is a seven-story garage which is exceedingly well-lit and patrolled; late-working employees are told to park in specially designated spaces clustered close together near the entrance to the building. Workers are reported to feel very secure, even late working secretaries.

While the problem of security within parking facilities can never be totally ameliorated, much can be done to mitigate it. Valet parking is one of the best ways to insure the security of persons, according to operators and designers of parking facilities, but it is expensive. To keep people "who don't belong there" out, a computerized "anti-passback" and identification system is being used in a number of recently constructed garages in Houston, such as the Texas Bank of Commerce garage. This system, too, however, is very expensive and not suited for facilities open to the general public.

Well-lit, attended open lots are generally considered less fearful than garages. Within garages, good visibility and an absence of blind spots are considered important for security. Pillars and enclosed stairwells and elevators should also be avoided. Some consultants feel that TV surveillance combined with an audio system can help make people feel more secure and deter criminals. While corporate security personnel agree that such equipment can be valuable, some argue that they are best treated simply as cost-effective additional "eyes and ears". After hours, there seems to be agreement that there is no substitute for having a security person on hand, either "walking the decks" or patrolling on a scooter, as is done in Hartford. Nevertheless, care should be taken to assure that these security people are readily identifiable as such, or they may end up scaring the very people they are meant to reassure.

## APPENDIX B

### POLICE PATROL STRATEGIES

Until the second World War, American municipal police departments deployed as much as 70% of their personnel on uniformed (primarily foot) patrol. The primary task of these beat officers was to maintain public order against drunks, vagrants, disorderly youths and other low-level offenders.<sup>1</sup> The volume of major crime was far less than at present and it was primarily dealt with by the relatively few officers (10%) assigned to specialized units such as detective bureaus. Beat officers were well known by local businessmen and residents, and police districts or precincts were comparatively small and part of the neighborhood's social fabric.

After World War II, as crime increased, there were efforts to make the uniformed patrol force more effective against major crimes. One trend was to put officers into cars so they could cover a wider area and respond more quickly to crime scenes. This was sometimes accompanied by policies stressing "aggressive preventive patrol," i.e. field interrogations or the stopping and frisking of criminal suspects.

Another trend was to reduce the number of neighborhood police stations, because they wasted manpower on administrative duties

that could be combined more efficiently in a centralized system, and because they were centers of parochial, even corrupt interests. In 1961, for example, O.W. Wilson, the greatest police reformer of the post World War II era, reduced the number of police stations in Chicago from 38 to 21 and virtually eliminated foot patrol.<sup>2</sup> One unintended result of these efforts was that police officers became anonymous impersonal figures to local residents.

This type of policing has been referred to as the "crime attack" model.<sup>3</sup> It assumes that the police force rather than the public at large has the primary responsibility for crime prevention and control, and that this is best achieved by aggressive patrol and the arrest of offenders, whether in the act of committing a crime or through follow-up investigation. The goal is to fight crime through 1) maximum effectiveness in apprehending actual criminals and 2) the resulting deterrence of potential offenders. The method involves the deployment of police personnel when and where major crimes are most likely to occur. For example, a special anti-robbery unit may be assigned to set up decoys in high-crime areas during the evening hours. While such units are often successful in apprehending muggers, they do not provide visible police presence, nor do they alter the milieu of street disorder in which mugging flourishes.

In a crime attack model the uniformed patrol force is motorized and strong emphasis is placed on rapid response to radio calls, particularly ones involving crimes in progress.

Recent research has questioned the wisdom of these policies. Some studies have shown that patrolling police officers rarely encounter crimes in progress. For example, it has been calculated that a Los Angeles police officer on motor patrol will encounter a robbery in progress an average of once every 14 years.<sup>4</sup> Another study found that 87% of arrests result not from police observation but from citizen-initiated calls or apprehension of offenders by security guards and private citizens.<sup>5</sup> Similarly, it has been found that most crime victims do not call the police immediately after the event. Reasons for delay may include unavailability of a phone, need to obtain first aid, desire to seek counsel of family and friends, etc.<sup>6</sup>

An alternative to the crime attack model is the "community service" model.<sup>7</sup> The rationale for this is that a sense of territorial identity and greater understanding between police and citizens will reduce the amount of crime while enabling the police to provide other services more effectively. In essence it is a return to the old style of police work. This model is often carried out through a neighborhood police



team. The basic elements of a neighborhood team are:

1) patrol officers are assigned permanently to a specific neighborhood rather than shifted periodically from one area to another. Efforts are made to dispatch all calls in a particular area to the neighborhood team even though its members might not be as readily available as police units outside the neighborhood. The reasoning is that speed of response is less important than familiarity with the neighborhood.

2) emphasis on close ties between the police team and the neighborhood through a systematic effort by team members to get to know the people of the neighborhood.

3) administrative decentralization, whereby major decisions on such issues as personnel deployment and operational tactics are made by the team rather than police headquarters.

Many aspects of team policing negate hierarchical centralized control by senior officers. Because of the emphasis on geographically dispersed personnel, the community service model generally requires a level of resources far greater than the crime attack model. A national assessment of team policing published in 1977 indicated there was no firm proof

that team policing had reduced crime, increased citizen satisfaction with the police, or improved the job satisfaction of police officers.<sup>8</sup> Given the various problems connected with team policing, many departments that had instituted it chose to cut back or abolish their teams.

In some instances, resource limitations have dictated the mode of policing. Between 1975 and 1980, due to a financial crisis, the New York City Police Department was reduced from 31,700 officers to 22,600. As a result, the department lacked the resources for extensive beat patrol and stressed instead crime attack policies such as anti-robbery and career criminal programs. As the department begins to regain its strength (present plans call for 30,600 officers by 1987) it has revived foot patrol programs, known today as the Total Patrol Concept (TOPAC).

Community service versus crime attack is not an either/or proposition. In a police department with extensive beat patrol, it would still be necessary to focus on major offenders such as career criminals, those people who commit robberies and burglaries on a regular basis. As noted, the division between a uniformed patrol force that emphasizes order maintenance and a detective force that operates against professional criminals was a hallmark of traditional American municipal policing.

One unintended consequence of the crime attack efforts of the post-World War II era was the withdrawal of police from the streets. As a result, general street disorder multiplied and created an environment in which more serious crime could take place. The reemphasis on beat patrol has placed renewed stress on order maintenance. In New York City, for example, the police have instituted Operation Pressure Point to combat street-level drug dealing in areas where it has flourished in the past.

Observers such as Kelling have pointed out, however, that police officers have essentially forgotten how to routinely patrol a beat.\* Effective beat patrol requires more than the mere visible presence of officers or periodic anti-crime sweeps. Police must take regular action against low-level "quality of life" crime. This involves law enforcement against peddlers, minor drug dealers, loud radios, disorderly teens, etc. This type of patrol seeks to alter the milieu of street disorder in which major crime flourishes. As a result, it may be a more effective means of reducing the incidence of serious crime than the crime attack model.

Even where police departments have the necessary level of resources to provide beat officers and instruct them to

\*See Footnote #10, main text

enforce the law vigorously against quality of life crime, it is difficult for the rest of the criminal justice system to accomodate their efforts. In an era where the rate of major crime is five or six times higher than a generation ago, many prosecutors and judges are reluctant to pay adequate attention to disorderly conduct or loitering arrests when they are spending half their time arraigning murders, rapists and robbers. Also, court decisions have narrowed the scope of laws against loitering, vagrancy and other low-level offenses and lessened the authority of police to deal with them. The deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill has led to the release onto the streets of thousands of people who in a past era might have been in an institution. This often contributes to the ongoing urban problem of the homeless population.

A generation ago, the streets of America's cities-- particularly in the central business districts--were fairly orderly, at least in the daytime. Today they present a casbah-like appearance, with large numbers of vendors and disorderly people. The trend in dealing with these problems seems to be a return to basics, including beat patrol, vigorous order maintenance, and a realization that the criminal justice system must impose meaningful sanctions against all levels of offenders.

## FOOTNOTES

- 1) Bruce Smith, Police Systems in the United States (New York: Harper & Row, 1960).
- 2) O.W. Wilson, Police Administration (New York: McGraw Hill, 1963).
- 3) James Q. Wilson, Thinking About Crime (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1975) pp. 91-93.
- 4) President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Science and Technology (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967, p.12)
- 5) Albert J. Reiss, Jr., The Police and the Public (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).
- 6) Calling The Police: Citizen Reporting of Crime, Police Executive Research Forum, Washington, D.C., 1981.
- 7) James Q. Wilson, Op. Cit. pp. 90-91.
- 8) Thomas White et al, Evaluation of LEAA's Full Service Neighborhood Team Policing Demonstration (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1977).

## APPENDIX C

### SUBWAY SAFETY

Subway systems are trying a number of methods to improve passenger safety. Since the spring of 1984, the New York City Transit Police have been experimenting with a program in which they eject passengers who smoke, drink alcoholic beverages, blast radios, put their feet on seats or commit other minor offenses in the subway. Ejection, it is hoped, will be a more effective tactic than the previous practice of issuing summonses, most of which were not responded to by their recipients.

Atlanta is also stressing the maintenance of order as the prime security strategy in its new subway system. The system is physically attractive, and graffiti is quickly removed. The subway police make it their policy to make a prompt and tough response to any infraction, no matter how small. "We are hard-nosed about crime," claimed one official, "and the community knows it."

This proactive attitude is shared by the Metro Security personnel in Washington, D.C. Several years ago, the transit police in Washington invited to their headquarters 16 judges who were resisting the clogging of their courts with minor offenses. After seeing slides of graffiti in New York

stations, 15 judges agreed to go along with the Metro's tougher enforcement policies.

Washington, D.C.'s Metro system is generally regarded by transportation safety experts as one of the nation's most secure subway systems. Management's policy is to remove graffiti before it signals that such disorderly behavior will be accepted in the Metro. The same strategy is followed in Philadelphia.

Some subway systems are designing new stations similar to those in Washington's Metro, ones that have no visual obstructions and no places for hiding or lurking. Thus, attendants can observe the whole station either visually or on TV monitors, and passengers can easily see other riders.

Most of the newer systems have TV surveillance as a standard feature in every station. While a number of subway officials interviewed during Phase II felt that electronic surveillance can increase feelings of security among riders and deter crime, only modest claims can be made for its overall efficiency. Aside from being inadequate in stopping crimes already in progress, TV surveillance is often hampered by the fact that attendants are drawn away by other chores. In addition, there are physical limits to how many monitors can be watched and for how long, and the cameras themselves may be vandalized.

## APPENDIX D

### SPECIAL POPULATIONS

Downtown organizations often undertake programs that can reduce fear of crime levels by ameliorating the impacts of special populations whose behavior can often signal public disorder.

#### 1) Street People

Downtowns have long been magnets for homeless and disoriented people, and their Skid Rows are usually well-known locally. Now it appears that shelters too are likely to be located in depressed downtowns, giving the areas a disproportionate share of an already heavy burden.

To deal with this problem in New Orleans, \$30,000 per year from funds raised by the downtown special assessment district is used to support the city's detoxification center in order to improve its services to Skid Row alcoholics; the district is also trying to develop a longer term solution to the problem.

The main "disorder" problem in Tulsa, Oklahoma's downtown mall and special assessment district is street people, most of whom are alcoholics and drug users.



The program is a detoxification and rehabilitation program run by the HOW Foundation in cooperation with the Chamber of Commerce and Downtown Tulsa Unlimited, which helped bring the HOW Foundation to Tulsa. Local officials claim that it has been successful in reducing the number of street people in the downtown by 70%.

Two panel trucks, referred to as "booze cruisers", pick up winos and derelicts on the streets. The vehicles are staffed by graduates of the program, who can relate to the derelicts; the program operates in coordination with the Tulsa Police, who generally turns over to HOW anyone they pick up who seems suited to the project and has not actually broken the law. They are happy to do this, as each time a person joins HOW instead of going into police custody the police department saves \$25.00. Participation in the program, however, is voluntary.

The program even helps pay for itself. Last year the HOW program had earned income of \$452,000 from its cleaning projects and operating expenses of \$428,000. The program has a contract with Downtown Tulsa Unlimited for a variety of clean-up services in the downtown area. No federal, state or county money is involved; everyone in the assessment district pays into the program in return for the clean-up work. Every evening, for example, HOW participants sweep the sidewalks.

A secondary benefit is increased security and public order. The sweepers are in uniform, use pick-up trucks equipped with flashing lights, and give the public a perception of increased security in the downtown in the evening. They are on the streets from 8:00 PM to 2:00 AM, and, ironically, they help remove derelicts as well: whenever a problem with winos or street people surfaces, the cleaners are instructed to aggressively clean up "right under" the offenders, to get them moving and off the sidewalks.

The program has been in effect for three years. In a typical year, they deal with nearly 1,000 people. Only 10% graduate --that is, complete the recommended six-month period--, but annual follow-ups (by letter or phone) indicate that 75-80% of program participants are still sober and holding jobs after a year or longer--a high recovery rate for this population.

## 2) Teenagers

The Phase I Report suggested that: "Programs are needed to get teenagers off the street by reducing truancy, providing employment and offering entertainment and leisure opportunities other than hanging out downtown." (p.40) One such program is Project Pride in Newark, New Jersey, which was originally intended to reduce juvenile vandalism and mischief. Started

by New Jersey Bell and then operated by the Chamber of Commerce, the program involved a broad public education campaign and group anti-vandalism patrols.

Very quickly, many schools reported considerable progress toward reducing vandalism. The program involved young people in the planning and carrying out of city-wide activities, including:

- Wholesome after-school activities like debate teams and basketball tournaments.
- Ten \$500 scholarships.
- A weekly radio program by and about students.
- An annual college football game to raise money for Project Pride, drawing 13,000 viewers.
- Tutoring by college students for public school students.

In recent years, the program has turned increasingly towards the goal of encouraging the growth and development of better-educated and more employable youngsters.

Two other programs now being tested in neighborhoods in Newark as part of the Police Department's experimental Fear Reduction Program might be transferred into other downtown settings. The Self-Esteem Enhancement Program gives youths an opportunity for constructive growth and learning by keeping the schools open after hours for sports activities, counseling, and classes

like photography, crafts and design. Many of the classes are taught by Newark police officers. In addition, weekly discos are held in target area schools.

The Neighborhood Cleanup Program links the Newark Police Department, the court system and the city's community development agency. A Juvenile Conference Committee, staffed by thirteen community members, hears cases involving juveniles accused of first or minor offenses. After hearing each case and determining the needs of each youth, the Committee offers selected youths the option of performing community service activities. Focused upon physical signs of disorder, community work service duties include clearing debris-strewn lots, removing graffiti from buildings and similar activities.

One of the prime reasons that youths litter, loiter and congregate in ways threatening to other daytime downtown users is that they are often truants. The Police Department in Oakland in conjunction with the Oakland Public Unified School District created a truancy reduction program called Operation Stay-In-School, that is reportedly very successful in controlling youth behavior downtown and very popular with the local community. According to public officials the truancy program has been the biggest reason--next to foot patrol--for the reduction of quality-of-life crime in the downtown area.

When a youth is observed in the area during school hours he is escorted by an Oakland police officer or school system official to an Operation Stay-In-School Reception Center. There the youth is counseled and the parents contacted before he is returned to school.

Cincinnati dealt in an innovative and multi-faceted way with a potentially serious problem involving teenagers on the outdoor, privately-owned over-street skywalk system. The skywalks had become the "in" place for teenagers to hang out on their way home after school. Brought there by buses, the students' bus passes allowed them to stay downtown while making connections to other lines. Although about 98% of the students behaved in an acceptable manner, the other 2% were causing problems such as harassment, graffiti and--after one fireworks event--gang violence.

The Police Department and the Citizens Committee on Youth worked closely with the downtown business community and other city agencies to put together a multi-pronged effort to deal with the youth problem. While the police used stricter enforcement of existing ordinances, a very simple tactic was also employed to reduce the amount of time high school students could stay downtown--the use of bus passes was altered so that students could not stay downtown for more than 30 minutes.

The Youth Services Bureau, a unit of the Citizens Committee on Youth, also developed a program in which former local sports stars (who can deal with the kids) approach them in a friendly manner, but still get across the point that they can't hang out and have to keep moving.

In Cleveland a similar problem with teenagers loitering downtown was successfully ameliorated by staggering bus schedules so that fewer students would be in the area at the same time.

APPENDIX E

ON SITE VISITS AND INTERVIEWS:

Oakland, California

Bill Bodrug  
Vice President  
Bramale  
January 10, 1985

Charles and Bud DeLauer  
Owners of bookstore  
January 11, 1985

Erich Gehring  
Manager  
Wells Fargo Bank  
January 11, 1985

Jerry Grenley  
Head of Oakland Merchant Ass.  
January 11, 1985

Tony Hare  
Oakland Police Department  
January 10, 1985

David Ralph  
Project Director  
Office of Economic Development  
and Employment  
January 10, 1985

Hank Rauch  
Security Director  
Oakland Center Development Co.  
January 10, 1985

Captain Peter Sarna  
Commander  
Downtown Unit-Oakland P.D.  
January 11, 1985

George Williams  
Director  
Office of Economic  
Development and Employment  
January 10, 1985

Clyde Woolridge  
Owner  
Camera Corner  
January 10, 1985

Atlanta, Georgia

Barry Marler  
Director of Security  
Peachtree Center  
December 10, 1984

Gene Slade  
Atlanta Crime Commission  
100 Edgewood Avenue  
December 10, 1984

Dan E. Sweat, Jr.  
Central Atlanta Progress, Inc.  
2 Peachtree Street, NW  
December 10, 1984

Charlotte, N.C.

Doug Cunningham  
Personnel Department  
NCNB  
One NCNB Plaza  
December 11, 1984

Charles Duncan  
President  
Jack Woods, Ltd.  
300 S. Tryon  
December 11, 1984

Charlotte, N.C. (con't.)

Major Jones  
Charlotte Police Department  
Law Enforcement Center  
December 12, 1984

Randy Jones  
Transportation Department  
City of Charlotte  
City Hall Annex  
December 12, 1984

Krisann Keisler  
Manager  
Central Charlotte Association  
129 W. Trade Street  
December 11, 1984

Commander Sam Killman  
Charlotte Police Department  
December 12, 1984

Fred Kline  
Partner  
Trammell Crow Company  
Charlotte Plaza  
December 11, 1984

Carol Loveless  
Asst. City Manager  
City Hall  
December 11th & 12th, 1984

H.R. McCroskey  
Operations Manager  
Belk Brosders, Co.  
115 East Trade Street  
December 11, 1984

James L. Patterson  
Property Manager  
Trammell Crow Company  
Charlotte Plaza  
December 11, 1984

Cleveland, Ohio

Bruce Campbell  
President  
Higbee's  
December 18, 1984

Barbara Hajes  
Downtown Council  
Greater Cleveland Growth Ass.  
December 17th & 18th, 1984

Captain Michael Janero  
Cleveland Police Dept.  
3rd District  
December 18, 1984

Captain Jerome Joyce  
Cleveland Police Dept.  
Special Operations Unit  
December 17, 1984

Sergeant W. Manocchio  
Cleveland Police Dept.  
3rd District  
December 18, 1984

Marty McCann  
Director of Security  
LTV Corporation  
December 18, 1984

Bob Zion  
Downtown Council  
Greater Cleveland Growth Ass.  
December 17, 1984



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Hartford, CT

Lois Barr  
Downtown Council  
December 5th & 6th, 1984

Roy Bangham  
Hartford Police Dept.  
50 Jennings Road  
November 30, 1984

Rudy Brooks  
Hartford Institute of Criminal  
and Social Justice  
November 20, 1984

Fred Burton  
Director of Security  
Travelers Insurance Co.  
1 Tower Square  
December 6, 1984

Tony Caruso  
Executive Director  
Downtown Council  
250 Constitution Plaza  
203-728-3089  
December 5, 1984

John Chapin  
Owner  
Shenanigans Restaurant  
Bushnell Towers  
Gold Street  
December 5, 1984

John Coleman  
Rideshare Corporation  
December 5, 1984

Don DeWard  
Director of Employment  
Travelers Insurance  
1 Tower Square  
December 6, 1984

George Garrity  
Manager of Civic Center Mall  
December 5, 1984

Lt. Jim Luby  
Hartford Police Department  
50 Jennings Road  
December 5, 1984

Phil Pizzanello  
Owner  
The Paper Chase  
55 Pratt Street  
December 5, 1984

Bernie Sullivan  
Chief  
Hartford Police Department  
50 Jennings Road  
December 5, 1984

Neil Sullivan  
Manager, Security-Safety  
Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co.  
140 Garden Street  
November 20, 1984

Bob Wiles  
Hartford Institute of Criminal  
and Social Justice  
November 20, 1984

Dan Ward  
Hartford Police Department  
50 Jennings Road  
November 30, 1984

(4)

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Ben Blair  
Program Manager  
Passenger Facilities Department  
Southeastern Pennsylvania  
Transportation Authority  
130 South 9th Street  
December 12, 1984

Thomas P. Smith  
Chief,  
SEPTA Police  
200 West Wyoming Avenue  
December 12, 1984

Harry Zucker  
Director - Communications and  
Engineering Services  
Room 630 - City Hall  
December 12, 1984

Newark, N.J.

Lou Dell'Ermo  
Safety Security Director  
Gateway Center  
November 28, 1984

E. Carroll Gerathy  
Project Director  
Third Gateway Urban Renewal  
Association  
Gateway One  
Newark, N.J. 07102

Norman Green  
Manager of Security  
Prudential Ins. Co. of America  
November 28, 1984

Hubert Williams  
Police Director  
Newark, N.J.  
November 1, 1984

Bronx, New York

Captain Andrew Dillon  
Commander  
46th Precinct  
January 30, 1985

Kevin Malley  
46th Precinct  
January 30, 1985

Geraldine McGowen  
52nd Precinct  
January 30, 1985

John O'Boyle  
52nd Precinct  
January 30, 1985

Captain Dan Sheeler  
Commander  
52nd Precinct  
January 30, 1985

Inspector Charles Sibon  
Zone Commander  
January 30, 1985

Jerome Williams  
46th Precinct  
January 30, 1985

Brooklyn, N.Y.

Captain Robert Frankel  
Commanding Officer  
84th Precinct  
January 24, 1985

Joseph Glettfelder  
Police Officer  
84th Precinct  
January 24, 1985

Sergeant Joseph Iannuzzi  
84th Precinct  
January 24, 1985

John Russo  
Police Officer  
84th Precinct  
January 24, 1985

Inspector Kenneth Strange  
84th Precinct  
January 24, 1985

Richard Recny  
Executive Director  
Local Development Corporation  
of East New York  
Brooklyn, N.Y.  
November 26, 1984

Tom Riley  
Director of Security  
Pfizer Corporation  
630 Flushing Avenue  
Brooklyn, New York  
November 17, 1984

Queens, New York

Deputy Inspector Curran  
103rd Precinct  
January 4, 1985

Assistant Chief Inspector  
William Fitzpatrick  
103rd Precinct  
January 4, 1985

Hank Forberg  
103rd Crime Prevention Unit  
January 4, 1985

Deputy Inspector Bill Iverson  
103rd Precinct  
January 4, 1985

Washington, D.C.

Angus Boyd MacLean  
Chief  
Washington Metro Transit Police  
Police  
600 Fifth Avenue  
December 11, 1984

Burton Morrow  
Inspector  
Washington Metro Transit  
600 Fifth Avenue  
December 11, 1984

PERSONAL INTERVIEWS IN RPA OFFICE

David Nutter  
Manager  
16th Street Mall  
Denver Partnership  
Denver, Colorado

Bob Reynolds  
New Jersey Bell  
Newark, N.J.

Fred I. Kent, III  
President  
Project for Public Spaces  
153 Waverly Place  
New York, N.Y. 10014

Lawrence A. Alexander  
Director  
Downtown Research and  
Development Center  
1133 Broadway  
New York, N.Y. 10010

Anthony Luizzo  
Director of Security  
Public Development Corporation  
New York, N.Y.

Leonard Singer  
Executive Director  
Project Renewal  
Brooklyn, N.Y.

Richard Bradley  
Executive Director  
International Downtown Executive Association  
915 Fifteenth St., N.W.  
Washington, D.C.

TELEPHONE INTERVIEWS

California

Forrest Franklin  
Director of Security  
Embarcadero Center  
San Francisco, CA

Warren T. Isaacs  
Manager, Central Business  
District Ass. of Oakland  
1419 Broadway  
Oakland, CA 94612

Connecticut

Anna Dressel  
President  
Danbury Downtown Council  
Danbury, CT

Ken Kummer  
Supervisor of Administration  
American Airlines  
Hartford, CT

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(7)

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Roy Woods  
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AT&T Technologies  
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New York

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Buffalo Transit Police  
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(9)

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Lt. Bruce Knox  
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