


National Criminal Justice Reference Service



This microfiche was produced from documents received for inclusion in the NCJRS data base. Since NCJRS cannot exercise control over the physical condition of the documents submitted, the individual frame quality will vary. The resolution chart on this frame may be used to evaluate the document quality.



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART  
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

Microfilming procedures used to create this fiche comply with the standards set forth in 41CFR 101-11.504.

Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the author(s) and do not represent the official position or policies of the U. S. Department of Justice.

National Institute of Justice  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C. 20531

11/05/86

101005

U.S. Department of Justice  
National Institute of Justice

101005

This document has been reproduced exactly as received from the person or organization originating it. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the National Institute of Justice.

Permission to reproduce this copyrighted material has been granted by

Public Domain/NIJ/OJJDP  
US Department of Justice  
to the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS).

Further reproduction outside of the NCJRS system requires permission of the copyright owner.

NATIONAL EVALUATION OF  
THE NEW PRIDE REPLICATION PROGRAM

FINAL REPORT

SUPPLEMENT: CASE STUDIES OF REPLICATION

January 12, 1985

Institute  
for Research  
and Evaluation

1777 N. California Walnut Creek, CA 94595 (415) 939-6666

Prepared under Grant Number 82-JS-AX-0035 from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Office of Justice Assistance, Research and Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice.

Points of view or opinions in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

**SUPPLEMENT:**

**CASE STUDIES OF REPLICATION**

## PREFACE

The supplement presents a distillation of the qualitative materials gathered over the four years of the New Pride Replication Program by field investigators from the National Evaluation research team. Site visits, interviews, and the acquisition of archival materials were the primary responsibility of Susan Laurence (for the Boston, Camden, and Fresno sites), Charmian Knowles (for the Georgetown, Providence, and San Francisco sites), and Barbara West (for the Chicago, Kansas City, Los Angeles, and Pensacola sites). Dr. West was assisted regularly in Pensacola by a five-year advisor to the evaluation, Dr. Terence Thornberry.

The Supplement begins with a conceptual discussion of project development in which a general model of organizational change is applied to the implementation of social programs as organizations. The model employed here is that of Dr. Ichak Adizes of the Graduate School of Management Studies at UCLA. It is followed by a discussion of how the analytic backdrop of the Adizes model was applied to the New Pride data.

The chapter on project development provides an overall conceptual organization for the qualitative materials presented in the case studies. The report outline lists the substantive issues covered by the individual site analyses, although the areas of emphasis and the order of their presentation differs depending upon the combination of factors unique to each site.

The case studies were compiled for presentation by Susan Laurence and Dr. Paula Gordon. They were assisted in Fresno by Teresa Roth, and in Chicago by Dr. John Holton, local evaluators of their respective projects during the full period of the Federal grants. Writing of the ethnographies and their abstracts were the responsibility of Susan Laurence and Barbara West, both five-year members of the National Evaluation Research team at Pacific Institute.

We wish to thank all of the project directors, local evaluators, and program staff who provided assistance, understanding, and keen insight into program issues. It is hoped that some of their vast contribution of knowledge has been reflected in these reports.

Barbara West  
Principal Investigator

## Site Process Reports

### A. Acquisition of the New Pride Grant

1. The Decision to Bid
2. Key Actors
3. The Proposal Process

### B. The Juvenile Justice System

### C. The Parent Organization

1. History, Purpose
2. Previous Involvement with Youth, Offenders

### D. Local Program Design

1. Administration
2. Advisory Board
3. Components
4. Staff
5. Facilities

### E. Model Components

1. Educational Alternative School
2. Intensive Supervision Component
3. Vocational Component
4. Volunteer Component
5. Diagnostic Component
6. Data Collection and Project Evaluation

### F. Program Implementation

1. Component Strengths and Weaknesses
2. Impact of Eligibility Criteria
3. Facilities
4. Discipline

### G. Program Linkages

1. With JJS
2. Other Youth Serving Agencies
3. Schools
4. Other Agencies

5. Staff Morale - Communications
6. Other Service/Client Issues

### H. Program Impact

1. On JJS
2. On Schools
3. On Other Local Agencies
4. Spin-offs

### I. Institutionalization

### J. Summary

1. Constraints
2. Strengths and Weaknesses

THE NATIONAL EVALUATION OF THE NEW PRIDE REPLICATION PROGRAM

CONTENTS OF THE FINAL REPORT

SUPPLEMENT: CASE STUDIES OF REPLICATION

Preface	i
Outline – Site Process Reports	iii
Project Development	1
Boston New Pride	22
Camden New Pride	57
Chicago New Pride	88
Fresno New Pride	116
Georgetown New Pride	145
Kansas City New Pride	167
Los Angeles New Pride	188
Pensacola New Pride	211
Providence New Pride	235
San Francisco New Pride	268

PROJECT DEVELOPMENT

Most social programs initiated at the state or Federal level do not involve establishing whole new organizations. Rather, they usually support the development of new activities within existing organizations, and use previously established structures of agency management, boards of directors, accountability, and community support. Ordinarily, such programs augment and encourage the diversification of existing resources. This was not the case in the New Pride Replication Program.

In this initiative, ten new highly complex and multifaceted organizations were started from scratch. Each was required to develop its own management structure, community board, evaluation, and network of community support. Because replicating New Pride meant founding new organizations, and not merely adding different tasks or activities to existing ones, an opportunity was afforded to observe the processes of organizational development first hand.

The projects went through periods of rapid growth and development that could be characterized in certain ways because they were similar from site to site. That is, they all began an organizational life cycle at the same time and with approximately the same dollar amount of resources. They were all to replicate the same comprehensive and holistic treatment model of services to the same target population or chronic juvenile offenders. This means that the conditions of observation were ideal.

Researchers from the National Evaluation of the New Pride Replication Program observed the processes of project implementation over the course of four years. In that time, we noted that certain management structures seemed to work out well, while others failed to work at all; that some parent agencies succeeded in launching new projects, while others seemed to inhibit the effort at every turn. Most important to both effective implementation and institutionalization were the capabilities and interface of two sets of managers, those from the parent agency and those from the project. Whenever they pulled together in an effective working relationship, and had the best interest of the

project as a primary goal of their concerted action, the projects were more likely to succeed. Furthermore, problems that could not be solved were much less likely to arise.

Tracing project history, three phases were easily distinguishable: Start-up, Implementation, and Stabilization. At each passage from one stage to another, particular challenges had to be met, and typical patterns of behavior emerged. Since the tasks were different as projects moved from one phase to the next, the management functions necessary to implement them shifted accordingly. Parent agencies, or grantees, were also in their own phases of development at the time they attempted to replicate New Pride. The type of parent agency as defined by its specialization or expertise, and its own stage at the time of implementation often affected the way the new projects were supported.

Management roles and their relationship to the phases of organizational life have been identified by Dr. Ichak Adizes of the Graduate School of Management, UCLA. Adizes worked with over fifty organizations in various efforts to help them define and solve management crises, including the governments of Sweden, Brazil, Ghana, Israel, and Los Angeles County Welfare Department. His schema of organizational passage and its interface with the different roles of management provided a useful framework from which to view the history of the New Pride Replication Program. His research confirmed that as organizations pass from one phase of life to the next, different management "roles are emphasized and the different role combinations that result produce different organizational behavior (Adizes, 1979:4)."

This paper presents a brief background discussion and Adizes' theory of organizational development, which is based on a more global perspective of organizations generally. This theory provided insight into the process findings from the New Pride Replication Programs as well as a sense of understanding about why certain managers seemed to be less successful than others in implementing their projects. It also formed the bases for our discussion of the findings and future recommendations at the organizational level.

### The Life Cycle Concept

The major proponents of a life-cycle orientation in the study of history were grand theorists, such as Max Weber, Oswald Spengler, Arnold Toynbee, and Pitrim Sorokin, who examined whole societies or cultures and extremely long-lived organizations such as churches. Modern sociologists have observed the processes described by life-cycle theorists in many types of social organizations, but have not ventured detailed explanations of them. March and Simon (1959) described organizational management, innovation, and change using concepts that were similar to those of Adizes, but without developing fully the life-cycle idea. For example, they noted, "it is often claimed that the personality traits required of top executives during such an innovating phase are different from the traits required during the subsequent program-execution stage. The differences are in the obvious direction--'idea man' versus orderly bureaucrat. (1959:190)."

Sinchcombe (1965) intriguingly described the advent of groups of major industries in certain historical periods, after which no new ones of that type emerged. His portrayal was suggestive of an element of historical determinism in the kinds of organizations and organizational structures that emerged. For instance, the industries that had been formed earliest and that were still operating in 1950--agriculture, wholesale and retail trades, had many unpaid family employees and family members acting as managers at that time, and very few clerks and professionals. Industries formed later--in the early nineteenth century, by contrast, had nearly no unpaid family members in 1950. Relatives remained managers, and the clerical component was substantial: about half of the administrative employees. The woodworking, apparel, textile, and banking industries were included in this group:

"Late nineteenth-century organizations--railroads, mining, and metals firms--clearly separated ownership from managerial responsibility; that is, the proportion of family members acting as managers was very small. Again, the clerical component was quite large in these industries. Finally, industries established in this century are similar to their nineteenth-century counterparts except that they employ many professionals. With only one exception (automobile repairs), industries in this category require

professional qualifications of more than half of their managers (Blau and Meyer, 1971:33-4)."

By studying a cross-section of industry types, Blau and Meyer concluded that the conditions conducive to rationalization or bureaucratization do not necessarily give rise to it in already established organizations. They documented that many of the organizations founded earlier resisted change, even though older industries were generally less profitable than newer ones. Efficiency seemed to have suffered from a lack of innovation. For Blau and Meyer, overcoming inertia appeared to require new organizations or new managers that were unencumbered by traditions and personal loyalties.

Findings on the more global level of these analyses, while suggestive, are still too broad to be useful in defining changes that may occur in a single organization. Certainly, the most predominant type of analysis in the study of social organization is one which examines the characteristics of enterprises within one or another phase. Specifically, bureaucracy has received an enormous amount of attention in the literature, stemming perhaps from Max Weber's earlier interest in the phenomenon and fear of its increasing predominance in modern life (e.g., the "iron cage").

Modern organizational theorists have tended to be structuralists (Merton, Parsons, Blau) or conflict theorists (Dahrendorf, Domhoff). Both of these orientations see the impetus for change as originating outside of the organizations themselves. In these perspectives, organizations react to essentially external pressures and constraints by accommodating successfully to them or rising in conflict to change them (Coser, 1956). Such conflict may result in supremacy or defeat, bargaining, trade-offs, and sometimes new laws which appease neither side (Chambliss, 1969). But, social change from both perspectives still has as its main focus interorganizational rather than intraorganizational dynamics. The idea that organizations might develop much as people do and that steps toward growth and survival must be taken in a stepwise sequential fashion so that no stage can be skipped, is essentially new in modern sociology. Developmental psychology (Kohlberg, Turiel, Piaget) defined

this process in human learning and proposed two further principles that could also apply to the study of social organizations: that there is a natural developmental progression through stages, and that any given stage is not learned, but is actively constructed by the individuals involved. The application of these principles to the study of organizational development suggests that at times the conflicts and contingencies that generate change can come from within the organizations themselves.

#### Management Roles

Adizes observed that for any organization to be able to perform its tasks well, four key managerial functions must be addressed. For short run success, there has to be someone who understands the purposes of the organization, a knowledgeable achiever who desires to see the finalization of activity (results). This individual, designated the Producer, emphasizes getting things done and is most often a hard worker. Producers frequently arrive earlier and stay later than others. The second necessary managerial role for short-term success is an Organizer, someone who knows how to make the system produce results - with the right intensity, in the right sequence. The Administrator provides a systemization of the effort. Producers and Administrators together assure an effective and efficient operation.

However, long-term adaptation to a changing environment requires planning and deciding what to do. For this, the role of the Entrepreneur is essential. The function of this type of manager is to focus on adaptive changes that require creativity, "...to see through the fog," and risk-taking capability, "...to walk into the fog."

Finally, to insure that the organization has a lifespan longer than the tenure of its key managers, a fourth role, called the Integrator, is necessary to build a team. Since every organization has "a religion, a climate, a system of values," the Integrator's function is to promote the organizational mission from within. He or she has the means to change people from mechanistic

consciousness to an organic way of thinking; from, "Everyone for himself," to, "Everyone for the greater good of us all."

While all four of these roles are seen as essential to an organization's effectiveness, emphasis on one or another of them automatically occurs as phase-related demands are faced. Retaining the entrepreneurial role is believed to be most essential to continuing organizational health, because it retards the later periods of decline.

The following list, derived from the Adizes model, depicts the most important managerial functions in each stage. Capital letters indicate that the function is very important, while small letters denote less important, though necessary functions (P = Producer, A = Administrator, E = Entrepreneur, I = Integrator). In the very late phases of organizational history, missing letters suggest functions which are not present at all.

<u>Stage</u>	<u>Function</u>
Courtship	paEi
Infancy	Paei
Go-Go	PaEi
Adolescence	pAEi
Prime	PAEi
Maturity	PAeI
Aristocracy	pAeI
Early Bureau- cracy	a i
Bureaucracy	A
Death	

#### A Theory of Organizational Lifecycles

People, organizations, and even societies have life-cycles -- including birth, growth, maturity, old age, and death. At every life-cycle passage a typical

pattern of behavior emerges as different challenges and problems are met. If phase-related challenges are not met in a reasonably successful manner at each stage, premature inefficiency and even dissolution can occur. Since these processes were distinctly observable in the New Pride Replication Programs, this presentation of the theory is phrased in terms of project development.<sup>1</sup>

#### Start-Up

Within the start-up phase, two stages are identifiable: Courtship and Infancy.

**Courtship Stage:** In this stage, there is as yet no organization. "At this passage the most pronounced role is E, Entrepreneurship. Founders are basically dreaming about 'what we might do.' There is excitement. Promises are made that later, in retrospect, might appear to have been made irresponsibly, without sufficient regard for the facts and for reality...." In the contexts of social programs, large numbers of clients meeting stringent criteria for eligibility may be promised. Random assignment may be proposed by researchers. The excitement is often accompanied by frantic activity. "One gets a sense that the founders are in love with their idea. They behave like missionaries searching for an audience to convert. It appears as if this process of selling the idea to others is actually a process of reinforcing their own commitment. Solidifying a commitment to the idea is indispensable if the founders are to succeed in building an organization from scratch (Adizes, 1979:4)."

**Infancy:** One important sign that an organization is about to be born is that there are significant expenses to be paid, symbolizing risk. The introduction

<sup>1</sup> It should be noted that each organization goes through the same phases in the same order, but they take different time intervals to do so, some shorter and some longer. Agencies responsible for implementing new tasks, rather than new organizations, begin activities at the phase they are already in and do not necessarily go through future ones just because of new activities. That is, this model, while applying to all organizations, does not apply to every activity classified as a Federal, state, or local program.



of task-generated risk leads to a behavioral shift. "The frenzy of creating ideas is discouraged. The entrepreneurial role declines rapidly and is replaced by the producer role. The Entrepreneur has created the risk and, now that there is a commitment to deliver something, the Producer must cover the risk. (Adizes, 1979:4)." This is a painful process of doing, of working terribly hard. Lots of working capital, or "front money," is needed.

At this stage, it is the love affair between the infant organization and the founder (E) that keeps the project alive. For this reason, Adizes sees the active and sometimes almost single-handed participation of the founder as being critical to the survival of an infant organization. Nearly always in a state of crisis, a condition of "management by crisis" best characterizes the situation. Infant organizations are very demanding. They are always short of resources. If the cost of development is too high, and the state of infancy too long, there is a danger that the founder may become exhausted and give up. Since there is no managerial depth, it is impossible to delegate. Even if there was, a danger exists that forced delegation of the founder's functions might cause his or her alienation and reduce the essential high level of commitment. What keeps founders going is an unlimited dedication to the organization created by his or her labor. Therefore, the delegation of functions at this stage can be seen as dangerous to the health of organizations and can have fatal repercussions.

### Implementation

Two stages are distinguishable as organizations are implemented: Go-Go and Adolescence.

**Go-Go Stage:** An organization which has survived infancy and arrived at a phase parallel to human toddlers is in this stage. Managers can see at last what it is they are trying to do. A Go-Go organization has the same results orientation (P) that an Infant organization has, but with a vision and a horrendous appetite (E). It moves very quickly, often making decisions intuitively since it lacks experience. For a Go-Go organization, almost every opportunity seems to

become a priority. "Its interest span is short (Adizes, 1979:5)." The survival of infancy provides a feeling of success, of being able to handle it all. Management becomes joyful and arrogant. Instead of management by crisis that characterized infancy, there is now crisis by management. A Go-Go organization usually gets into trouble by getting into too much. As Adizes explains, "They can lose overnight what they earned all year." The desire to add more or to diversify is very compelling. For an organization in this phase, everything is a priority. Thus it has none.

The mother-like commitment of the founder (E), which was indispensable for the survival of the organization in earlier stages, starts to become dysfunctional after the Go-Go stage. As it enters adolescence, the Administrative role becomes more important. Since managers with an "E" orientation are often in conflict with those having an "A" orientation, there are difficult problems to be faced at this point. The loving embrace of the founder can become a stranglehold if he or she refuses to depersonalize policies and institutionalize leadership; that is, to establish workable systems, procedures, and policies that do not require his or her personal judgment (Adizes, 1979:6). The Administrative role becomes more important because the organization needs to be put on a footing so that it will be able to operate without running to the founder to handle every little decision. If the Administrative function does not become emphasized at this point, the organization faces a new danger, that of falling into what Adizes has termed a "Founder's Trap." If this happens, it cannot continue to grow or develop until the founder leaves. According to Adizes, capitalism made its greatest contribution historically by the employment of professional managers at this point in the life-cycle.

**Adolescent Organization:** A switch occurs as the organization enters adolescence. In the Go-Go stage, more was better. In Adolescence, better becomes more important. At this point, E (the founder) must grow up. His or her project is moving toward independence. There is a necessary transition from the absolute monarchy of earlier times to a constitutional monarchy. Policies must be written to which the monarchs themselves are bound. This signals a change from entrepreneurial management to professional management. In the

Go-Go organization, everything centered around people, not around tasks. The organizational chart looked, "like a chicken walked all over a piece of paper." Everybody depended on and had developed an addiction to the founder. Now a restructuring must occur around tasks, but it must be done in such a way that the entrepreneurial role is not lost. If Entrepreneurship goes down or out at this stage, there is a danger that a premature aging process might ensue in which the organization loses its heart and its vision for the long range future.

Therefore, a healthy adolescence for an organization is one in which the growth in administrative effort is at the expense of producing results (P). Management must consciously decide to invest the time necessary for getting organized. Part of the time that was formerly spent on doing must now be spent on organizing, on planning and coordinating meetings, on developing training programs and labor policies. Yet this conscious decision to "cool off the growth rate for awhile to permit new growth over the long run," is not easily achieved. The transition "requires behavior that is intrinsically in conflict. Administrative behavior seeks stability, while Entrepreneurship is change oriented. The conflict between the two orientations exhibits itself in clique formation (Adizes, 1979:7)."

If the organization was a partnership, there is a danger that the partners might get divorced at this stage. If their original commitment which was built during courtship has been consumed by day-to-day fighting, their psychological contract may be broken. One partner or a group of people then continues in the Production-Administration mode, that is, "in the conservative, less ambitious route;" the Entrepreneur, who had the vision that founded the organization initially, looks around for other opportunities to start all over again.

In adolescence, what is done is frequently endangered by how it is done. At this phase, a strong Integrator (I) can forstall the need for the administrative emphasis, and can sometimes patch up the wounds. The Integrator can assist in a process of redefining leadership roles, getting the warring factions to define their mission and articulate organizational goals, and team-building to free the organization from the "Go to founder. Ask him. Come back." problem.

Teamwork is needed, as well as a mission and a structure that protects the Entrepreneur by moving him or her upstairs for a logical specialization in corporate development or planning. The Entrepreneur is best moved out of operations and into a new position as Chairman of the Board. But the (E) must remain in-house and working on behalf of the enterprise for the long term health of the organization. If he or she leaves altogether, premature aging takes place.

### Stabilization

Two additional phases can be distinguished within the general process of project stabilization: Prime and Maturity.

**Prime Organization:** If an organization gets safely through adolescence, it enters the Prime state of its life-cycle. As observed by Adizes, "The prime organization has a results orientation (P). Furthermore, it has plans and procedures to achieve efficiency (A), and at the same time, it has not lost its awareness of what is happening 'out there' (E). While in the Go-Go organization..." achievement is helter-skelter, it is stable and predictable for the Prime. Projections of activity are not only possible, but they can be met and performance frequently "sets standards for the industry (Adizes, 1979:7)." An organization in the prime stage has structure, a system, and a plan. Form and function are equally important.

"Staying in Prime is not assured, however. With time, aspirations of top management change. Aspirations are a function of the disparity between the desired and the expected. If what management desires is higher than what it expects to achieve, there will be energy and aspirations for change (Adizes, 1979:7)." If not, there is a tendency to let things remain as they are.

Remaining in the prime stage is possible by taking proactive and preventive measures not to lose coalesced authority, power, and influence that the organization has already gained. This is done by implementing steps that help to maintain a high entrepreneurial (E) orientation. It ideally consists of

reorganizing for decentralization. When an organization is decentralized, managers at lower organizational levels are expected to show leadership, which involves taking initiatives (E) and motivating subordinates to follow those initiatives (I). Decentralization develops essential entrepreneurial and integrating functions experientially. New spinoff organizations or projects are ideally started at this point. Divergent thinking becomes necessary, whereas convergent thinking was necessary earlier.

**Mature Organization:** A mature organization is characterized by a results orientation (P) and institutionalized systems (A) such as procedures, policies, and a system for getting things done. A climate of friendship emerges (I) along with the beginning of a period of decline. No real eagerness exists to challenge new tasks or each other. (Entrepreneurial functions are not emphasized at all). People spend more time interacting with each other than producing results. There are many more meetings, while any sense of urgency is lost. Formality ensues. "New ideas are received without excitement, criticism, or enthusiastic acceptance." Eventually, the results orientation is affected as well, and the eagerness to excel declines. Form slowly becomes more important than function. Up to the Prime stage, an organization succeeded by a willingness to take risks. Thereafter, it succeeds by the amount of risk that is avoided.

None of the New Pride projects had reached these later stages in the organizational life-cycle by the conclusion of the study. However, descriptions of later stages are provided so that the context of projects initiated within older parent agencies may be put into a broader perspective.

#### Decline

Organizational decline is characterized by the crystallization of activity in prescribed and customary ways. Maintaining the status quo eventually becomes the most desirable state of affairs and even the thought of change or of new ventures can become troublesome. In late maturity, three phases are described; Aristocracy, Early Bureaucracy, and Bureaucracy.

**Aristocratic Organization:** The climate in this phase is relatively stale. Managers have an unconscious fear about the future of the organization, but everyone is afraid to say anything about it. In meetings, which have become very formal, they rely on the past to carry them through the future. A paralysis ensues through their admiration for the past, and no one dares to make the first wave. Being neither results oriented (P), nor entrepreneurial (E), the organization begins to lose contracts and revenues. If it is reasonably cash heavy, budgetary allocations primarily go into administrative systems (A) and integrative efforts (I): "more into control systems, bigger and better computers, and more training programs rather than development programs (Adizes, 1979:11)." If it is a business, the organization is inclined to raise prices, rather than generate new products or penetrate new markets. Form becomes much more important than function, and it is possible to be promoted within such an organization solely on the basis of style, as opposed to what one has produced or contributed.

**Early Bureaucracy:** "In the Aristocratic situation there is the silence before the storm. People smile, are friendly, and handle each other with kid gloves. When in the Early Bureaucracy the bad results are finally evident, instead of fighting competition as they should, the organization's executives start fighting each other - and there are no gloves anymore, just bare knuckles. A ritual of human sacrifice ensues (Adizes, 1979:12)." The level of paranoia rises and with it, the need to place the blame on someone. It is usually any remaining entrepreneur who gets fired at this point, leaving only "deadwood." Personal survival becomes the primary motivation, as managers eliminate and discredit each other.

"Performance then declines further, making everyone even more paranoid. The better people, since they are feared, either are fired or leave. This process can continue as a vicious circle. The end result is bankruptcy. But if the organization can secure external sources of supporting funds despite its objective achievements (like tax-money supported government agencies), the result is full bureaucracy (Adizes, 1979:12-13)."

**Bureaucracy:** In a bureaucracy the "why" is forgotten entirely. "A Policy" is the explanation. In Early Bureaucracy it was still possible to get something done if one knew the right person. In a full-blown bureaucracy very little gets done, even though managers agree a lot. "There is no results orientation, no inclination to change, no teamwork - only systems, rules, procedures, forms." There is no flexibility. Outside interference is not welcomed. What the left hand does, the right hand doesn't know. An organization in this stage exists almost entirely through artificial life-support systems, having built layers of isolation around itself (i.e., one telephone line, one window open to clients only a very few hours a day, form letters in response to specific requests).


Organizations that have to work with bureaucracies provide an artificial bypass system by setting up special departments whose full-time task is called government relations, or public relations. "These departments get to know the inner workings of the bureaucracy and attempt to manipulate it to produce the results desired by the client. The monopoly that bureaucracies have on certain activities, the captive audience that is forced by law to 'buy' their services, provide the hospital-like, nonthreatening environment. The synergy of such a protected environment and the external bypass systems provided by the clients of the organizations keep them functioning (Adizes, 1979:13)."

**Death:** The organization stops all action and is dissolved.

#### Analysis of New Pride Sites

It is clear that any project has to be responsive to the needs of its purchasers or public, i.e., the community which it serves and to which it must sell itself and its services, its goals and aspirations. In reviewing the statements made about the role of the Project Director in the replication materials, every specified duty but one was of an Entrepreneurial type. The Project Director role required developing the goals, the objectives, the broad ambitions of the project and selling them to others in the Juvenile Justice System, the Parent Agency, and to the staff. It necessitated continuous public relations activities, as well as

interfacing with OJJDP. It involved doing everything necessary to get the project launched. In a way the developmental process, emphasizing these functions, must be characterized as continuing until the project becomes completely independent of Federal subsidy. Institutionalization complete, the project may then be considered a clear presence in the community serving the needs of that community.



Because of the complexities and challenges involved in founding new organizations, the most effective project directors were Entrepreneurial types with strong commitments to establishing New Pride in their own communities. The project's need for an Entrepreneur was initially little appreciated. Since the model, its components, staffing patterns, and so forth had already been defined, many felt that the most essential role was that of a Producer; or simply a manager who could execute a previously defined plan. What was less well understood, at least in the beginning, was that strategies for implementation and for institutionalization had to be developed from scratch in each jurisdiction. These tasks required vision, a sense of deeply engrained commitment to the project, an awareness of both internal and external sources of support, and an ability to mobilize them effectively on the project's behalf.

Proposals for the replication sites were initiated and generally written by individuals whose skills are entrepreneurial in nature because the task involved giving birth to a new endeavor for the parent agency. In two cases it also entailed founding new parent agencies that would be responsible for overseeing their respective New Pride projects. However, grantees were not supposed to exercise the kind of entrepreneurship that might have involved changing the model to suit local circumstances. Rather, the awards were provided to

establish replications of an ongoing LEAA exemplary project that was originally founded in Denver, Colorado.

Because they were replications, New Pride grantees were expected to execute business as mature organizations shortly after they were funded. There was little tolerance of the experimentation associated with young organizations. Instead, these early periods were compressed, and the projects had to go from birth to maturity very quickly. The necessary speed due to the special conditions of funding and its anticipated termination after a brief period of time produced stage transitions in rapid succession.

The life-cycle theory that we have been describing suggests that each new phase requires an emphasis on different kinds of management functions (PAEI - Production, Administration, Entrepreneurship, Integration) and that these frequently do not overlap successfully. Whenever they do not, there is likely to be an organizational crisis. Several New Pride projects ended up on the shoals, while others navigated successfully through the challenges of rapid growth and transition.

By studying the development of New Pride Replication projects, PIRE found that a management orientation or structure that was inappropriate to phase-related tasks became a key problem in several instances. The necessity to change from informal to formal procedures and policies marked the transition most fraught with difficulty in those projects that were established by entrepreneurial types. It threatened the environment of autonomy which Entrepreneurs love, and to a certain extent, the sense of creativity enjoyed by founders and other early administrators. Yet this change was essential to provide a comprehensible, expectable, and stable environment for the staff and clients, as well as systematic procedures of accountability to the courts.

On the other hand, several projects experienced problems from the beginning because they were never headed by entrepreneurs. In some cases, professional administrators hired to direct the projects tried to fix policy too early, fostering a rather cold environment in which creativity was stifled under

rules that had no basis in the project's experience. Such administrators had little vision of the future and could not inspire hope of institutionalization. Lacking a sense of direction about the future, they could not effectively sell the project nor raise the necessary funds. Most critical in the early stages, but very important throughout, was the key role of the Entrepreneur.

As expected from the theory of organizational life-cycles, the efficacy of new projects seemed almost contingent on the continuing active participation of the person who put each proposal together. In nine out of ten cases, this was the individual imbued with commitment to establishing New Pride in his or her city. The ideal place for these "founders" was in the Project Director role. Solicitations of many government agencies ask potential grantees to specify whether or not the conceptualizers or writers of proposals will be the ones directing the projects. (The mother-like commitment of the founder-director to the implementation of his or her vision is necessary to organizational health.) Such a managerial set-up was clearly optimal for effective implementation.

The most effective directors had these qualifications of involvement from the beginning, as well as experience directing youth programs in the communities in which the New Pride projects were founded. That is, their experience was local and specific to the New Pride city. This previously established credibility yielded an easy interface with the area's Juvenile Courts.

Judging from all the organizations with which it was necessary to forge an effective and rapid interface, it was important that the Project Director bring to the job some coalesced authority, power, and influence with these other organizations that had been built up through prior experience. It was especially critical that working relationships and influential bonds had already been established between the project directors and the parent organizations that sponsored the new projects. These relationships assured the necessary

administrative support and provided a smoothly functioning working environment.<sup>1</sup>

Yet the need for a committed entrepreneurial Founder-Project Director coming from a pre-existing position within the parent agency restricted the types of grantees that could supply this combination. As expected, the parent organizations which were themselves in the Prime phase of the life-cycle were most likely to be successful in founding new organizations and in providing adequate support to them. A special case that worked well involved a parent agency in its own early stage of development whose director also assumed the role of directing New Pride. In this case, the new project did not report to a parent agency in a different and perhaps incompatible stage, so that no premature decentralization of entrepreneurial functions occurred.

The following table suggests the salience of the factors we have been discussing to project longevity and institutionalization. The presence or absence of four key organizational variables are noted for each replication of Project New Pride. In seven out of ten cases, simply adding one point for each element provides a total score which is the same as complete years of Federal support.

OJJDP decisions about the continuation of projects were made on the basis of how well the projects were implementing the model and in the final year, on whether or not they had succeeded in generating money from another source. Since these decisions were made on the basis of substantive considerations alone, the four key factors identified here clearly had a bearing on the degree and adequacy of implementation.

In only three sites the structural features of project organization did not add up to the years of Federal support. In these cases the project continued beyond the years predicted from the model. The only element that emerged as a

---

<sup>1</sup> This need has been historically recognized by many government agencies whose solicitations ask that the persons who write proposals be current employees of applicant organizations and not outside consultants.

**Table I**  
**Organizational Variables and Their Relationship To Successful  
 Implementation and Institutionalization**

Site	Founder Employed by Parent Agency <sup>1</sup>	Founder Has Active Project Role <sup>2</sup>	Project Supported by Parent Agency <sup>3</sup>	Founder Directs New Pride <sup>4</sup>	Total Score	Whole Years Federal Support	Project Continued With Other Support
Boston	No 0	Yes 1	No 0	No 0	1	1	No
Camden	Yes 1	Yes 1	Yes 1	Yes 1	4	4	Yes
Chicago	Yes 1	No 0	No 0	No 0	1	3	No
Fresno	Yes 1	Yes 1	No 0	No 0	2	4	Yes
Georgetown	Yes 1	Yes 1	No 0	No 0	2	2	No
Kansas City	Yes 1	Yes 1	Yes 1	No 0	3	3	No
Los Angeles	No 0	Yes 1	No 0	No 0	1	1	No
Pensacola	Yes 1	Yes 1	Yes 1	Yes 1	4	4	No
Providence	Yes 1	Yes 1	Yes 1	Yes 1	4	4	Yes
San Francisco	Yes 1	No 0	Yes 1	No 0	2	3	No

S-19

- 1 Employed by parent agency
- 2 Any position on the staff for any length of time
- 3 Active and continuous support for the project effort
- 4 Officially or effectively the Director

similarity between these three sites is that they were each directed by women during the period of Federal support extending beyond the years estimated from by the four factor total score.<sup>1</sup>

As one can see from the following site descriptions, in four out of six instances the Entrepreneur that was the key figure in the earliest stage either never had a project role or left the project during its early months. One project never had an Entrepreneur. In two others the Entrepreneur's project role was one technically subordinate to a director hired from outside the parent agency. In one of these situations, the founder had the power to hire or fire the director as the executive vice president of the parent agency. This occasioned some managerial conflicts that rebounded negatively on the project.

The most successful replications of Project New Pride were implemented in agencies known in their communities for providing good programs to troubled youth. These agencies had been around long enough to have established local credibility, but had not entered late stages of the organizational life-cycle. The two projects that were established in much older agencies, having essentially different organizational missions, did not succeed. The bureaucratic character of their management structures (Administrative orientation) created an inappropriate or isolated working environment for the projects.

---

<sup>1</sup> While originally there were only two women project directors, eventually, there were four. Two of the projects headed by women were institutionalized with non-Federal dollars. The two remaining ones closed after three years.

## References

- Adizes, Ichak  
1979 How to Solve the Mismanagement Crisis: Diagnosis and Treatment of Management Problems (MDOR Institute, Los Angeles, California).
- Adizes, Ichak  
1979 "Organizational Passages - Diagnosing and Treating Lifecycle Problems of Organizations," (Organizational Dynamics, summer).
- Blau, P., and M. Meyer  
1971 Bureaucracy in Modern Society (Random House, New York) pp. 33-34.
- March, J., and H. Simon  
1969 "Planning and Innovation in Organizations," in Organizations - Vol. II: Systems, Control, and Adaptation (John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York, New York).



## BOSTON NEW PRIDE

Effective March 1, 1980, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention awarded Project Concern, a community-based, not-for-profit agency, a two-year grant of \$820,125 to create and operate a New Pride project in the City of Boston. Project Concern had made arrangements with the juvenile judges of the Roxbury Court and the Dorchester Court for the Boston New Pride to serve eligible youths from the two judicial jurisdictions.

### The Juvenile Justice System

The State of Massachusetts has played a unique role in the field of juvenile justice in this country. In early 1970, Massachusetts closed its state institutions which housed juvenile delinquents and status offenders and gave the Department of Youth Services (DYS) the mandate to develop a system of community-based care for these youths. In the mid-1970s the jurisdiction of DHS was further defined, and the scope of its services were limited to the following categories of youth: (1) youths in detention between arrest and adjudication; (2) youths who are adjudicated delinquent and committed to DHS; and (3) youths whom the courts believe to be in need of DHS services but who are referred to the DHS in lieu of commitment. This latter category may be accepted or rejected by DHS, depending upon the funds they have available. DHS is obliged to accept all youths committed to it and has sole authority over their placement.

Closing the state institutions was a bold step away from "locking-up," or incarcerating youth, and toward the development of alternative programs for delinquents. As one court official noted, "There are very strong lobbying groups against any kind of lock-up (for youths)."

As noted above, once a youth is committed by the judge to DHS, responsibility for placing that youth rests solely with DHS. Because the philosophy of DHS is based on using the least restrictive kind of placement possible, many judges have been dismayed by seeing youths they have committed

being placed in settings with less structure or with less intensive services than they felt were warranted. Sometimes they have committed a youth to DHS, judging him to be in need of more supervision than their resources could provide, only to find the youth paroled within a day. One court official said of this, "Subsequently what happens is that the youngster finds out that a commitment of DHS is less serious than being on probation."

The result of this has been a growing tendency on the part of judges to use commitment to DHS as a "last resort" and to use adjudication alternatives which allow them to hold cases open, so they can retain control over youths' placements and supervision. At present it is common for judges to continue a case without a finding or to commit youths to DHS with a suspended sentence or even a delayed execution. In this way the judge maintains control over the youth's treatment. By retaining this control the judge can keep his own pressure on the youth. The judge can have the youth report regularly to the bench, with the leverage that he can adjudicate or actually commit the youth at any time. This also allows the judge to keep pressure on treatment programs so the services they are providing are up to the standards deemed appropriate by the judge. As one court official observed, the use of a suspended sentence or delayed execution gives judges more "control over DHS, because the judge will hold the case open until DHS comes in with a service plan that's acceptable." Several officials report that judges' control over youths vis a vis DHS control increases at times when there is a "lame-duck" commissioner of DHS.

This was the situation in Boston when the New Pride project was being planned and executed. Judges were using a variety of adjudication alternatives to hold cases open and under their jurisdiction. Thus, the courts were assuming responsibility for finding alternative placements for serious juvenile offenders and were themselves putting together multifaceted treatment programs for these youths.

Until 1979 the Boston Juvenile Court, as one of four juvenile courts in the state, had exclusive jurisdiction over juveniles in the city of Boston (coextensive with Suffolk County). This court has itself been operating a multiservice

treatment program for serious offenders for close to 20 years, and many have considered this project to be a model treatment program. In 1979 the state legislature, responding to a long-standing black lobbying effort, created the position for a juvenile judge in the Roxbury District Court. This position is unique in the local court system, for the Roxbury juvenile judge reports through the district court system rather than to the juvenile judge at the Boston Juvenile Court, which has administrative jurisdiction over all other juvenile judges in Boston.

The new juvenile judge, when he came to the bench at Roxbury early in 1979, had the task of creating, from the ground up, a juvenile section and a new probation department. His goal was to create a model urban juvenile court. With a great deal of enthusiastic community support, he secured several grants from private foundations, hired a resource developer, and began the process of securing a range of alternative placement programs in which he could place youths. As one of his staff explained:

"We try to get a package and then the court tries to monitor (it) on a continuing basis. This court does that much more than most courts. Our judge schedules regular reviews for all kids, even kids that are committed to DYS, which is a way of 'riding herd' on DYS. We bring every kid back to court at least every three months for the length of time they may be on probation, which could be 18 months. It's a process for keeping tabs not just on the kid, to see how the kid is performing, but for the service provider to see if they are providing the type of services they say they are."

The Dorchester Court was the other court involved in referring youths to New Pride. It does not have a separate quasi-autonomous juvenile court like the Boston Juvenile and the Roxbury Courts, but comes under the administrative direction of the Boston Juvenile Court. Because it is less independent, it has less authority vis a vis other juvenile justice agencies and has fewer resources available for placement purposes. However, like the Roxbury Court, the Dorchester court has a policy of monitoring all juveniles and the bench reviews all cases every three months.

#### Acquisition of the Grant to Replicate Project New Pride

When the announcement of the Request for Proposal for the Replication of Project New Pride was published in the Federal Register, both the Roxbury Court Judge and a person working with him took notice of it simultaneously. The judge was extremely enthusiastic about trying the project in Boston and having its holistic, multiservice approach available to him as a dispositional option. His court was not eligible to apply for the grant since the RFP specified that only private, not-for-profit agencies could apply. Having just come to the bench a few months before, the Judge had only worked with the local service agencies for a short time. He wanted to find a local non-profit agency which had a record of working with serious juvenile offenders, primarily minority youth. Only a few agencies fit these criteria, one of which was Project Concern. He suggested that his associate approach Project Concern as a possible agency to parent the program and, if that agency was interested, to help the court put together a proposal for the grant.

Project Concern was very interested in sponsoring a New Pride Replication Project. It had started in 1968 as a grassroots drug rehabilitation program, serving minority young adults. It incorporated in 1970 and extended its focus to youth and its range of services to include residential group homes and diagnostic services. By 1979 Project Concern was operating two group homes, Perrin House and Andromeda House, which together served 100 youths per year. Andromeda House offered a short-term residential treatment program for DYS-referred, "hard-to-handle" offenders. Project Concern also operated Discovery House, a six-week residential diagnostic program. This program was initially funded by LEAA as a demonstration project and was providing diagnostic, treatment, educational, vocational, and recreational services. A Project Concern administrator described this program thus: "To tell the truth, if you took the residential part out of Discovery House, what you would really have is New Pride."

Project Concern held contracts with the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services (DYS), the Department of Mental Health, and the Department of Public Welfare. They received referrals primarily from these agencies, as well as from the courts and legal advocacy groups.

Project Concern saw New Pride as a program which could provide supplementary services to the youths already participating in their other programs. If the eligibility criteria were to relax in time, they hoped that it would serve as an after-care program for the DYS-committed youths in their group homes. They also felt that there were youths "...who don't need residential placement but need support systems to help." As one Project Concern administrator said, New Pride "...would give us a chance to work with kids before they entered the DYS system and enable us to get paid for it, because, frankly, if we had ever worked with kids before they were in DYS, then we had to eat the cost."

Project Concern, the Roxbury Court Judge, and his liaison person began the task of putting together the proposal for Project New Pride. They approached the Boston Juvenile Court as a possible referral source. The director of Project Concern reported that the judge there "...said that New Pride was a copy of their program" and refused to participate. Actually, the director agreed with this assessment, saying the Boston Juvenile Court's program was "...the exact, identical thing, except that it doesn't have any computer system."

The Roxbury Court, of course, was most supportive. The grant proposal states, "The Judge of the Roxbury Juvenile Court has been a leading advocate for implementation of the New Pride model by Project Concern." It also says, "The Judge...developed the supportive relationships documented elsewhere with the Dorchester Court judges and probation officers." However, the letter of support and agreement to refer from the Dorchester judge was quite cautious. It said, "The Dorchester Court will avail itself of services presently planned by Project Concern. These referrals, however, will only be made after the program has established itself according to guidelines, and only so long as it keeps a high standard of service to clients." A Dorchester Court official later explained that

they had been wary of Project Concern as the implementing agency from the start. That court had referred youth to other Project Concern programs in the past and felt that Project Concern had not been responsive or accountable to them. Even before New Pride started, the Dorchester Court "...thought it was the wrong agency to handle it...(and) didn't have much faith in them."

The proposal included other letters indicating there was a high degree of support for New Pride from a number of local institutions. The Commissioner of DYS wrote a strong letter of support and the City of Boston announced its support of Project Concern as the agency best suited to operate New Pride in that city. The Department of Mental Health pledged a matching grant of \$41,000 for the project, secured primarily by the efforts and credibility of the liaison person.

The liaison person between Project Concern and the Roxbury Judge, who coordinated the proposal writing process, recruited most of the members of a 24-person New Pride Advisory board. The judges and the Project Concern Director each selected a few members as well. The people chosen to serve on the board represented a range of expertise in areas relevant to the planning, administration and operation of the New Pride project, and were a prestigious and capable group of individuals. They accepted their new office with enthusiasm, meeting for the first time in November, 1979, four months before the grant was awarded. The board was to have responsibility for some personnel functions, such as monitoring the hiring process and performance evaluations and serving as an arbitrator in case of personnel differences. It was to play a major role in the institutionalization of New Pride, in fund-raising, long-term planning, and educating and informing the public about the project. Another function, as stated in the proposal, was this: "Any obstacles which involve resources, especially the juvenile justice system or areas of major impact, will be taken to the Advisory Board."

Just prior to the actual grant award, there was a confrontation between the Roxbury Juvenile Court Judge and the Director of Project Concern. Reportedly, this confrontation was catalyzed by the way that Project Concern's

director was handling the funding match from the Department of Mental Health. The Judge feared that New Pride was about to lose the match because of the Director's actions. A confrontation between the two resulted, which centered on the issue of control of New Pride. The Judge, who had committed his time, energy, and support to creating a New Pride project in Boston from the time he learned of the project and who was to be a main referral source for its clients, wanted to insure that he had an ongoing input into the program's management. He was concerned that the project be accountable for maintaining high quality, dependable services. He also wanted to do whatever might be required for the project to be institutionalized in Boston, so it would not be a two-year experiment, but a continuing placement alternative for serious offenders.

From Project Concern's perspective, the Judge was trying "...to take over the program" and was threatening the very existence of Project Concern in an attempt to be "...an unpaid executive director." A Project Concern administrator said, "He went so far as to ask Washington if he could put together a separate corporation and take over the grant," but Washington told him he could not. In a later interview, a Project Concern manager explained that the Judge had wanted to incorporate the Advisory Board. Whatever the specifics, Project Concern perceived this as such a threat that the Executive Director considered withdrawing the application for the New Pride grant.

The two finally reached an understanding which involved neither pulling the grant application nor separately incorporating or changing corporate structures. They agreed to make the Advisory Board "...a true, guiding, policy-making, active board." It was to share some degree of control over New Pride along with the parent agency and the program's own administrative staff. While the immediate crisis was resolved, the issue of control continued to be a major theme throughout the short life of Boston New Pride.

#### **New Pride's Target Population**

The grant proposal established Boston as a city with a relatively high crime

rate, citing FBI statistics which rank it as having the seventh highest crime rate in the nation and the sixth largest total number of crimes. The proposal went on to discuss the large number of juvenile offenders in Boston. What it did not mention was the fact that, in the State of Massachusetts, the juvenile court's jurisdiction extends to youths only through the age of 16. Youths committing offenses at the age of 17 and above are tried in adult court. While the New Pride model targets youths 14 through 17, the Boston project was limited by the state's legal definition of juvenile offenders as youths 14 through 16. The project was able to accept a few 17 year olds who had committed a presenting offense prior to their 17th birthday, so that the juvenile court still had jurisdiction over them. But the state's age restriction on juveniles did put the Boston project at a disadvantage in finding enough eligible youth.

In selecting the districts of Roxbury and Dorchester as its target areas, New Pride was focusing on two of the three highest crime areas in Boston. (The third was under the jurisdiction of the Boston Juvenile Court which did not feel it needed New Pride as a referral agency.) The grant proposal included 1978 statistics for the number of offenders and offenses per district, which substantiated the designation of these areas as high crime areas.

The New Pride model was designed for serving a clientele of serious multiple juvenile offenders. In the RFP, the eligibility criteria were defined thus:

"The target for this program is adjudicated youth from 14 to 17 years of age residing in jurisdictions with high levels of serious juvenile crime, under court supervision for a serious offense, with records of at least two prior adjudications/convictions for serious misdemeanors and/or felonies (preferably robbery, burglary, or assault) within the past 24 months who would otherwise be confined in correctional institutions or placed on probation."

Unfortunately the wording of these criteria was ambiguous enough to allow some people to misinterpret them, thinking youths were eligible with just two priors, rather than being "adjudicated youth...under court supervision for a

serious offense" in addition to having two prior convictions. Several places in the Boston proposal, the criteria were misinterpreted in this way. This statement is made several times: "All clients will be repeat offenders currently under court supervision with at least two convictions for serious crimes within the past 24 months." The letter of agreement with the Roxbury Court also defines eligible youth as having "...at least two prior convictions" without mentioning a third presenting offense. One place in the proposal, where the selection process is described, the RFP definition of eligible youth is stated, but there is nothing in the proposal to lead one to believe that this definition was interpreted to require three, rather than two adjudications.

There was a significant difference in the number of youth in the target area with two prior adjudications and those with three. The Boston proposal included statistics for juvenile offenses (committed by youths under 17) in 1978 which indicate that 63 youths in the Roxbury jurisdiction and 60 in Dorchester were arrested at least twice in 1978. While some of these 123 youths undoubtedly had additional convictions in prior years, only 69.4 percent of the offenses in 1978 were serious, and no figures were presented as to the proportion of arrests that were adjudicated. If one looks at the number of youths arrested three or more times in the preceding 12 months, there were a total of 37 for the entire target area. Again, to actually determine the potential pool of New Pride eligibles one would have to figure in how many of these offenses were serious, how many led to adjudication, and also know the youths' record for prior years. However, despite the incompleteness of these data, they did raise a question as to whether the target area in Boston could provide an adequate pool of eligible youth. In fact, given the reluctance on the part of the judges to adjudicate, choosing instead to "continue" a large proportion of cases without finding so as to keep them open and under the jurisdiction of the court, the target area did not have a sufficient number of youths eligible for New Pride.

There was not only a problem finding enough youths who would be eligible for the Boston project, but those who did meet the criteria were extremely serious offenders. Because judges are so reticent to adjudicate, youths often have a number of offenses, even serious ones, before they are adjudicated.

Those who were eligible were youths with a long history of offenses and quite often past the point of being amenable to treatment in a non-residential setting. At the point of three adjudications, judges often felt that commitment to DYS and subsequent placement in residential treatment or, in a few cases, waiver to the adult court, were the only viable dispositions.

The problem of the New Pride eligibility criteria being too rigid in light of judicial practices in Massachusetts is a theme which recurred throughout the life of the project. This issue was noted by Project Concern administrators even before the program started to accept referrals. As one said, "I don't think that the way the criteria are specifically laid out across the board is going to be the most advantageous, in the best interest of the type of population that we have here in Massachusetts."

Because Boston was not alone in having difficulty with the eligibility criteria, OJJDP revised them in January, 1981, to provide more flexibility within differing judicial contexts. The revised criteria changed the requirement for two prior convictions/adjudications to "judicial determinations of involvement (guilt) in two prior criminal events, regardless of whether they may have been the entry of an adjudication or finding of delinquency." This did not resolve the problem in Boston, however, for the judges continued to state, until right before the project closed, that they didn't have enough eligible youths to refer. After the program's closure, every respondent from the courts, Project Concern, and the New Pride staff who were interviewed cited a rigid eligibility criteria as being a major obstacle for the project.

#### The Boston New Pride Program Design

Project Concern managed the finances for New Pride, handling the project's bookkeeping at the Project Concern facility. Administrative management of the project was the responsibility of the Deputy Director of Project Concern. As contract manager for New Pride, she was to supervise the

Project Director, meeting with him at least weekly in the initial phase of the project to develop program policies and plans.

The Personnel Committee of the Advisory Board hired the New Pride Project Director. He had a background of working with youth-serving agencies in the Boston area, having formed and managed for several years an alliance of such agencies. Just prior to coming to New Pride, the project director had coordinated a large vocational training program for youth.

Both the court personnel and Project Concern administrators admit to being unhappy with the selection of New Pride's Project Director from the start. In his previous position he had some serious conflicts with other service delivery professionals. In addition, he had no actual experience managing a direct service program for offenders. Despite these misgivings, neither the court nor Project Concern interfered with the Advisory Board's decision, deferring to its judgment in the matter.

Although the proposal indicated that New Pride would be housed in the Project Concern facility, the project chose to lease space in the Harriet Tubman House. This local settlement house is a relatively new, cheerfully decorated building, situated in an ethnically mixed neighborhood. Several programs for the elderly are operated there, as well as programs for preschool children. While this facility was particularly good for New Pride because of its location, it did not provide enough space for the Alternative School classrooms. When the project started up there, the Project Director was planning to operate the school out of another separate facility. However, with the many pressures of starting a project of the complexity of New Pride, there was no time to find other classroom space, so the school fit itself into two rooms in the Tubman House along with the other New Pride components.

As indicated in the grant proposal, the target population for Boston New Pride's services was primarily black males. In keeping with the New Pride model, they intended to accept clients on a cohort basis twice yearly, in conjunction with the school schedule. The project planned to admit 50 youths

during the first year, 20 in July and 30 in January, during two 2-week intake periods. In subsequent years they expected to serve 60 clients per year. There was some room in their plans to accept a few clients outside of the intake periods and "put them on hold" in the intensive counseling component until they could join the Alternative School at the beginning of the new semester.

The program design called for a four-month intensive phase and an eight-month follow-up phase, which was a variation of the model's six-month timeframe for each of these phases. They did expect, however, to continue to provide some intensive services to youth during the follow-up phase, specifically by keeping some clients in the school for longer periods.

As well as hiring the Project Director, the Advisory Board hired the diagnostician, who was to supervise the diagnostic component and do most of the testing, as well as supervise the Alternative School. The Project Director hired the supervisors of the other components and the supervisors, in turn, selected their staff people. The person who had initially functioned as a liaison between Project Concern and the court and who had coordinated the proposal writing effort was hired by Project Concern as Resource Specialist. As one supervisor explained, this position included responsibilities which "...involved every aspect of New Pride's relationship to the outside world." These responsibilities were to form and maintain linkages with other agencies which might provide resources or services to clients, to supervise the volunteer component, to have responsibility for reintegrating New Pride students into other school settings, and even to make lists of recreational activities for groups of clients.

The diagnostic component was managed by the diagnostician, who did most of the testing except for some specialized hearing and speech testing which was done on a referral basis at Northeastern University. The teachers and counselors who were involved in the intake process also provided input into the diagnostic assessment. Intake services and the diagnostic assessment were supposed to be completed within a month after a referral was accepted.

From the beginning there were reservations in Boston about the appropriateness of the model's diagnostic package, which was to be replicated. At issue were some of the tests selected and the timing, or level, at which they were to be administered. The project was told that it was to start using the testing battery as Denver had developed it, but that some accommodations would be worked out among all the replication sites.

As mentioned above, the diagnostician was simultaneously responsible for supervising the Alternative School, which provided clients with remedial education classes and treatment for those with identified learning disabilities. The Alternative School had four teachers, two designated as remedial specialists and two as learning disability specialists. All four came with the same credentials, having been certified by the state to teach youths with special needs. Students identified by the diagnostic process as learning disabled were in the classroom along with the non-LD students, but were provided additional instruction designed to fit their individual treatment needs.

Boston New Pride began with the premise that all clients would be in some kind of educational setting while participating in the project. The Project Director expected the majority of clients to be attending New Pride's Alternative School. Of the first cohort, 19 out of 23 clients were enrolled in the New Pride school.

The Alternative School had two sessions: half of the students attended a three-hour morning session and half a three-hour afternoon session. They met four days a week, for Friday was designated a no-school, no-work recreational day for all clients, when they would go on field trips. Teachers only taught during the regular school year, closing the school and taking off during the summer months and regular school holidays.

The intensive supervision component was staffed by a counselor supervisor and three counselors. The counselors were to conduct intake visits and interviews with referred youths and their families. Each of the three counselors was to have a maximum caseload of 12 clients in the intensive phase. Counselors

were to engage in a minimum of one counseling session per week with each client. They were also responsible for supervising the Friday recreational sessions and other recreational activities which might occur. In addition, they were called upon to supervise some work activities where clients worked together in crews.

Rather than creating a separate employment component as suggested by the replication model, there was one employment counselor who was supervised by the counselor supervisor. All clients were to receive vocational training during their first two weeks at the project and all were to have part-time jobs as soon as they were prepared to handle them. During the intensive phase these jobs were usually subsidized by the project. New Pride did not plan to subsidize jobs held during follow-up but did plan to work toward placing clients in private sector employment.

Each client was to be engaged in either vocational training workshops or an actual work situation during the half day he was not attending school. Thus, the project was set up to be an all-day, five days a week involvement with some special evening and weekend recreational activities.

The research component had a staff of two: a research analyst and a coder. They had use of a leased Texas Instrument Silent 765 computer terminal which linked them to the Michigan Terminal System where they created data files and participated in the conferences sponsored by the national evaluator. Their task was to implement the management information system (MIS) in Boston and to create an ongoing, integrated self-evaluation of the project.

The program's resource specialist was, among other tasks, charged with forming linkages between New Pride and other agencies and with the coordination of volunteers. Through entrepreneurship and by utilizing the relationships already formed between Project Concern and other agencies, New Pride was able to negotiate a number of written agreements with other agencies for free services and a volunteer involvement with the program. None of the linkages formed involved a purchase of service contract or fees for services.

The Boston New Pride project had a special advantage in this, for there are innumerable service agencies, many of which serve youth, in the Boston area. In the original proposal agencies pledged many services to New Pride clients: optometric evaluations; hearing, language, and speech assessments and treatment; vocational assessments and training; unsubsidized job slots; medical services; and legal representation. Five local universities agreed to provide graduate student interns and two volunteer organizations offered a range of services. In addition, New Pride clients had the use of a local swimming pool and gymnasium, were to be provided with hot meals, psychological testing as needed, and an onsite social worker. The list of potential resources was staggering.

Even before the project started admitting clients, there was tension between what the New Pride model dictated and what the Boston administrators felt was best, given their own setting, staff, and clients. They felt somewhat constrained by the model. As one manager said, "Replication is being interpreted much too strictly. We should have used Denver as a model, not a template."

A major dissatisfaction with the model was that a year of services was too short for this population of youth. An administrator explained:

"One thing I would have done if I could change the model right now would be to keep the kids for more than a year. I don't think a year is adequate to deal with it. I also don't accept the argument that we are creating dependency, (for) dependency can be weaned. And I think the kids are really going to need some dependency for a longer period of time."

Other timeframes were perceived as rigid, such as the six-month intensive phase/six-month follow-up phase dichotomy. It was also felt that clients should attend the Alternative School for longer than the six months that was recommended.

While one program administrator viewed the case management design and the IISP as excellent, he was critical of the employment component. He also felt

that, given the many placement programs in Boston, it would be unnecessary to subsidize clients' jobs. He was particularly sceptical about the learning disabilities component.

Despite these reservations, the program's administrators expressed a willingness to conform to the model and to wait until later to make modifications. One reassured this evaluator, saying, "We're following the replication fairly closely."

#### Program Implementation

Boston New Pride started to get referrals from the Roxbury Court late in June, 1980, and in July they started accepting and serving clients. Dorchester Court took a "wait and see" attitude and did not begin to refer youths until late August. While New Pride had proposed to take 20 clients as a first cohort, by the end of September they had accepted 23 clients, one of whom was terminated almost immediately. All clients were black males from 14 to 17 years of age. At intake 5 of the 22 who remained were on probation, 11 committed to DYS with a suspended sentence, one continued without a finding, and 5 had been adjudicated but were pending dispositions.

Under the original eligibility criteria, the clients who had been continued without a finding would not have been eligible. Also, a few of the others had weak presenting offenses, such as violation of probation. However, respondents agreed that these clients were indeed serious offenders. As one court employee said, "They were our toughest kids. I know those kids now..(and) many of them are committed now."

As the New Pride staff was hired and the project geared up to intake clients, the staff met frequently and was engaged in many training sessions. Policy and program issues were discussed by the whole group, and there was a high degree of involvement in this process on everyone's part. After clients



began to be accepted and services started, the project director formed a management team of himself, the diagnostician, resource specialist, counseling supervisor, and research analyst. This team met weekly to make the major program decisions, while full staff meetings diminished to one every three weeks.

From the beginning, Boston New Pride experienced some serious programmatic and administrative problems. These involved staff dissension and inadequate training, clients not attending school or scheduled events and "acting-out" at the project, and a lack of administrative direction and follow-through in resolving these issues. This was exacerbated by a lack of sufficient space in the facility which housed the program. As a result, each component had a great deal of difficulty functioning adequately.

In the Fall of 1980 the counseling staff completed intake procedures for the first cohort and diagnostic testing began. However, many clients would not appear for their testing at the appointed time, so that testing was slow and incomplete and only partial diagnostic results were available for use in designing treatment plans. Too, even when test results were available they were not necessarily used. The diagnostician reported in the second quarterly report that some staff were "reluctant to accept the test results." This reflected a difference in treatment approaches and levels of training among staff members.

While the diagnostic testing was going on, the employment counselor began to place clients in part-time jobs. Through the efforts of the resource specialist, the project secured a \$12,800 grant from a local job program, the Corporation for a Cleaner Commonwealth (CCC). This grant provided partial salaries and some onsite supervision for the youths to work 25 hours a week, cleaning up rundown park areas in the city. CETA funds paid the remainder of the salaries and New Pride counselors also supervised the work crews. Sixteen clients were involved in this work until the grant ended in October of 1980. Several of the other clients were placed in other jobs, so that the project came quite close to its goal of finding work for all clients.

Although New Pride tried to negotiate with CCC for an extended grant period to keep clients working, they were unable to do so. Looking for other employment opportunities, the employment counselor made contact with 12 local employment programs. She reported, "Only (one) program could meet the needs of our clients." This program placed four youths in month-long positions, with their salaries subsidized by New Pride.

MIS employment data show that, between October and December of 1980, four clients had jobs with private firms, two paid by the employer and two by New Pride. Simultaneously, two clients worked at the state hospital, three in "non-profit" community programs, one at the Tubman House, the New Pride facility, and two were placed by another city youth employment program. Of these eight positions, five were supported by New Pride stipends, one by the employer, one by CETA, and one by some "other" source. Thus, even after the CCC grant ended, 12, or over half of the clients were employed at least part of the time for the remainder of 1980.

The employment situation changed at the start of 1981 when the employment counselor left the program. At the same time, project funds for subsidizing jobs ran out so that job development had to focus on finding jobs in the private sector. A new vocational specialist was finally hired in February, but only a few clients had jobs during the first half of 1981. During this time, employment services primarily consisted of vocational training activities, most of which were vocational workshops conducted by volunteers.

The counseling component was plagued by a number of difficulties. The three counselors had responsibility for intake interviews, supervising recreational activities and work crews, and conducting individual and group counseling sessions. None of the three had a car, so that transportation was an ongoing problem. There was criticism by other staff members that the counselors were not reliable supervisors of the clients, and in particular, that they sometimes left clients alone at the work sites. Although each client was supposed to have individual and group counseling twice a week, it was reported that many clients only met with their case worker one hour a week.

The friction between the counselors and other staff was partially the result of their having different attitudes toward the youth. The counselors had "street-worker" backgrounds but little actual training in counseling. Other staff felt that their expectations for attendance and behavior were too lenient and that their "laid-back" attitude had a negative effect upon the program.

The problems with this component were heightened when the counseling supervisor left at the end of September and was replaced a month later by one of the counselors who was promoted. Neither the counselors nor the other staff members found the new counseling supervisor easy to work with. Several reported her manner "dictatorial" and "abrasive," with the result that the staff was further divided and disharmonious.

The Alternative School, although it was crowded into two small classrooms, was a more structured and cohesive component. Eighteen of the first cohort were admitted into the Alternative School, four of whom were identified as leaning disabled. (Two other youths were diagnosed to be learning disabled, but attended other schools.) A point system was instituted to deal with behavior, with rewards for good behavior, attendance, and work.

As mentioned above, attendance was a problem from the start. The project reported in the second quarterly report, "Overall only about half the full complement of clients is present at school each day." Just getting clients to come to school remained an ongoing problem. With the confined quarters and behavioral problems from these serious offenders, low attendance was a mixed blessing. When clients weren't in school, the project didn't know where they were. Yet, as the school's supervisor noted, "The more students in attendance, the more difficult the classroom environments."

The research component was somewhat separated from the program difficulties in that it did not have direct service responsibilities. The two researchers began their work with enthusiasm, gathering local statistics for the Project Director and becoming conversant with the computer. They were

frustrated by a poor connection and frequent "down-time" with the Michigan Terminal System, and by what they felt was a serious time-lag in receiving final MIS forms and computer files from the national evaluator. However, they were highly motivated and designed some forms to serve their immediate needs. They wrote a data manual for the staff and trained them to fill out the MIS forms. They were conscientious about the quality of their data, working hard to clarify the variables used by the national evaluation in light of Massachusetts juvenile justice terminology and practices. They were eager to try new procedures on the computer and met PIRE's requests for data within a reasonable timeframe.

Because they weren't bogged down with the same service problems as the other components, the research team was assigned some additional tasks. After the turnover of the counseling supervisor, they had the task of going to the court to solicit referrals. They were to go through the records of all youths coming before the bench to find those who met the New Pride eligibility criteria. In addition, they did some staff training. They conducted three inservice training sessions for counselors, addressing procedures for conducting needs assessment, interviews, court history reviews, and writing measurable objectives. They worked with both counselors and teachers around filling out the individualized service plans, or IISPs. Because of staff problems, they were occasionally conscripted to do other nonrelated duties such as helping to supervise recreational activities and taking clients for physical examinations or hearing tests.

In September there was a turnover in staff of the data coder. This did not seem to be disruptive, however, for the new coder quickly learned to gather, code, and input data so that the Boston data base remained up-to-date.

A real blow to the project came in September, when the resource specialist left. Rather than hiring another person for this position, the Director decided to redistribute the responsibilities among the remaining staff. The task of school reintegration was assigned to the teachers and the coordination of the volunteers was thrown back on the Project Director. Counselors assumed responsibility for organizing recreational activities. The critical and irreplaceable function of

this staff position was that of liaison with other agencies and organizations, assuming an entrepreneurial role. The resource specialist had made arrangements to refer clients to a number of local programs for services that New Pride itself could not provide. When she left, these referrals stopped and were never initiated again. The linkages with most other agencies began to dissolve. From September on, few outside resources were available to New Pride. The project became more and more isolated and it became more dependent upon its own internal resources to meet all the needs of the clients. As communications with other agencies diminished, misunderstandings and tensions increased.

From the start, the Project Director had relied heavily on the resource specialist to link New Pride to its environment. He had concentrated on developing administrative policies for the project and he had the staff write handbooks of procedures, rules, and regulations for all internal aspects of the program. Several staff members described those organizational tasks as agonizing and endless, producing few results or actions at a time when the program was overrun with clients needing services. The Project Director kept a distance from the pressing staff and client issues. Many days he did not come to the project at all. He put off dealing with problems and conflicts, hoping the staff could resolve them on their own and somehow "get along." This didn't happen, though, and as staff morale diminished and the frustration level grew, staff members became more vocal about their complaints. Unable to cope with the problems, the Project Director did not want others to know that the situation was disintegrating. He tried to deal with his staff by fiat, instructing them all not to talk with involved parties outside of the project such as Project Concern staff, the Advisory Board members, or court personnel. This only made the staff feel more frustrated and angry.

After many months of searching for a new facility, the project finally found one. They moved on January 1, 1981. At last there was adequate space for the school as well as for the other components. The new location was in a predominately black area of Boston. The Director did not perceive this as a problem, however, for there was only one white client in the program and he

attended only sporadically. Also, the Director was certain that this would not prevent other white youth from participating, for while they might not want to walk in the area, public transportation was close by.

By this time, 10 months after the project had begun, the Advisory Board had lost its original enthusiasm and many of its members. Several members reported that they had joined the Board with the understanding that it would have the authority to make policy decisions toward the eventual goal of making New Pride a non-profit corporation. One member said that control of the project should have come from "...a tight link between the Advisory Board and the administration of New Pride. That was the way it was defined and that's the way it should have run." However, it did not. The Board repeatedly asked for, but did not receive, information about client flow and other program matters. They prepared new personnel policies, suggested certain staffing changes, such as placing a staff liaison in the courts, and made other suggestions to deal with problems the project was facing. Not only was this input not used, but the Board often got no form of response at all. In one member's opinion, "The Director was not interested in any input from the Advisory Board." One by one the members quit, and most of those who remained attended the monthly meetings only sporadically. One explained, "The Advisory Board had absolutely no authority, no power, couldn't do anything, couldn't hold anybody accountable. I thought that was ludicrous. That's why I quit."

The relationship between the project and the court also deteriorated rapidly. The issue which catalyzed a confrontation between the judges and the Project Director was the low attendance at the Alternative School. Although the quarterly reports acknowledged this as a problem from the start, the two referring judges were never fully informed of the scope of the problem. Both New Pride staff members and court officials reported that, when clients appeared before the court either for regular case reviews or as a result of new offenses, their poor attendance records were obfuscated. One staff member said that the project was reporting to the court "interpretatively;" if a client was in school one-third of the time, the attendance would be reported as "fair." A chief probation officer said, "They (the New Pride administrators) never reported to

us that the attendance was horrible. It was only after our digging into it and putting people on the spot that we found out that 'so-and-so' didn't go to class 27 days in a row. That is absurd."

When the judges learned the extent of the truancy at New Pride, they called a meeting with the Project Director. They reviewed program attendance and behavior, discussing clients' progress and problems at New Pride. Seriously disturbed about the project's lack of accountability and straightforward communication, the judges asked to receive a regular report of client activities. They also stipulated that clients with two consecutive days of unexcused absence be sent back to court.

At this time the judges made it very clear that they wanted to be more closely involved with the project in the sense of lending their authority to make it more functional. They offered their support, saying, "we can be the clout for you. And if the kids aren't coming to the program, let us know and we will deal with it."

Although one judge underlined the seriousness of his position by actually committing a youth to DYS for poor school attendance, the situation at New Pride did not improve significantly over the next two months. Judges did not receive regular reports on clients, nor did they see those youths who had been truant two consecutive days. In some cases, the project did report those incidents to clients' probation officers, but the judges were still not being directly involved in what was going on at New Pride. The general consensus of the project staff and court officials was that the Director was unable or unwilling to take advantage of the cooperation offered by the judges. On their part, the judges lost all trust in the Director; they felt that what information they were getting was less than honest.

On January 20, 1981, the two judges met with the administrators of Project Concern. They asked that the Project Director be fired. As reasons they cited his failure "...to use the power of the courts...and to bring back uncooperative clients." In addition, they listed programmatic problems such as the poor school

attendance, the falling off of job placements, and the lack of supervised recreational activities. They also expressed concern about the low staff morale.

Naturally the Project Concern administrators took the judges' position quite seriously, for they realized that New Pride could not continue to exist without referrals from the two courts. At the same time, they felt that the judges had unrealistic expectations of the project in dealing with such serious delinquents. Regarding the expectation that every client with two consecutive days of unexcused absence from the school be sent back to court, a Project Concern manager said, "The standards that the Roxbury judge was setting up were almost impossible to meet except by revoking almost your whole population. (Only) a few kids in a day program could possibly meet that level." This manager perceived other expectations as unrealistic as well: "The Judge expected every kid to be employed. He expected us to provide supervision for kids over an 18-hour day period, I think, and weekends. His expectations grossly exceeded the program design."

In response to the judges' request for the Project Director's dismissal, Project Concern replied that they would have to evaluate the situation before taking such action. They agreed to begin an evaluation immediately.

The meeting with the judges took place at the very time when the majority of the staff had united to draft a memorandum to Project Concern expressing their frustrations with the management of the project. Their chief complaint was with the Counseling Supervisor and her abrasive manner. They had given up hope that the Director would take any action to improve the situation. They wished to inform his supervisor at Project Concern of his inability to provide any direction to the project.

Project Concern immediately conducted a week-long evaluation of New Pride, with the result that both the Project Director and the Counselor Supervisor were dismissed. Two reasons were given for the Director's dismissal:

1. Failure to develop an attendance policy and procedure which incorporated the policies requested by the referring judges and which were agreed to by the Project Concern, Inc., Executive Director.
2. Failure to manage staff and make appropriate and timely personnel decisions which resulted in serious demoralization of staff, confusion, and stagnation within the program.

A director of another Project Concern program was appointed "temporary Acting Director" of New Pride and a search began for a new counseling supervisor.

The issue of the Director's termination was not over. The Advisory Board was angry when they found out about it and about the appointment of a new Acting Director. Project Concern had not involved them in this process and did not even inform them of it until some time after the fact. One of the Board's functions was to handle just such personnel matters and they had been excluded entirely from the process. On top of this, the former director sent an appeal of his termination to the Board, claiming that Project Concern had not followed its own personnel policies. He also claimed that the two reasons given for his termination were "...inaccurate, misleading, and, in some areas, false."

The Advisory Board investigated these claims and made four findings. One was that the Director had been terminated without the benefit of due process as specified in the personnel policies. As another finding, the board expressed disapproval of their own exclusion from the process:

"The New Pride Advisory Committee was never officially notified of the termination of the Program Director nor, to date, notified officially as to who is currently performing the Director's duties."

They recommended that the Director be allowed to resign and be given an additional six weeks of pay to compensate for the lack of due process. They also recommended that Project Concern inform the Board "...in writing within 24 hours of the termination of any employee whose hiring process included participation by the Advisory Committee." In addition, they recommended that

the positions vacated be filled only after the applicants had been screened by the Board. This latter recommendation was ignored, for those positions had already been filled and Project Concern had no immediate plans to search for a permanent director. After some delay and the threat of a lawsuit by the former director, the first recommendation was acted upon.

The courts were also angry about the way in which Project Concern had gone about this process, for they were not informed of the Director's firing or of his replacement until they had learned of it indirectly. As one court representative said, "Those are the type of changes that lead me to believe we were not dealing with honorable people."

The first priority for the new director was to institute changes that would satisfy, as much as possible, the requests of the judges. The evaluation staff began to submit monthly attendance and participation reports to the judges, probation officers, and Project Concern. A new attendance policy was designed which included bringing truant clients back to court. Counselors were to prepare monthly schedules for each client's activities. A new vocational specialist was hired who was to concentrate on placing clients in jobs. Weekly staff meetings were held involving all staff members. As there was more structure and better communications within the program, staff morale improved dramatically.

The second cohort was scheduled to be admitted during two weeks in January. Almost no referrals were made during this time, so the period was extended to a six week timeframe. However, during this period New Pride was in upheaval with its major staff changes and the program received only four referrals.

During the intake period the Acting Director and the evaluators spent a good deal of time at the courts, encouraging referrals to New Pride. The evaluators went through the offense records of all clients with pending court appearances, searching for eligible youth. From their record searches they thought there were enough youths to fill the thirty client places. However, the

courts were saying they did not have enough youth who could meet the eligibility criteria.

Both referring judges attended the New Pride Project Directors' Conference held in Denver in later January. There they pressed OJJDP to modify the eligibility criteria to accept "probation violation" as a presenting offense. The Roxbury Judge said, "New Pride should be seen and used as an alternative to commitment. As such, probation violators should be eligible. After probation is violated we now have to send them to DYS. Why can't we send them to New Pride instead?"

The program began searching for new referral sources. Again they asked the Boston Juvenile Court to refer youth and again the court refused, saying its own program provided the same services as New Pride. They negotiated to get some youths referred directly from DYS, and with OJJDP's approval they accepted three new clients from DYS. They did have some trepidation about this step, however, for these youth were even more serious offenders than their other clients.

Because so few referrals were coming in, the referral period had to be extended several times and finally a decision was made to abandon the cohort intake system for a continuous intake process. Gradually, between January and May, the program received 39 referrals, 20 of whom were accepted as clients. Due to many early terminations, there were only 12 clients left in the intensive phase by May 1. During this time, most of the clients in the follow-up phase were also terminated. May statistics reported five follow-up clients in the program.

As the Acting Director retained administrative responsibilities for another program, he was only at New Pride on a part-time basis. Much of the actual program management was handled by the new counseling supervisor. In April the position of Acting Director was transferred to another program director from Project Concern, also on a part-time basis. This change seemed to have little

impact, however, for the Counseling Supervisor continued to deal with most of the program issues.

While there had been a new burst of enthusiasm and program activity after the original director left, the program's initial problems were not really resolved. Attendance in all areas, and the school in particular, was soon as low as it had been before the staff changes. As one of the component supervisors reported, "We may have had kids on the books, but they weren't coming to the program. We had no way of holding them there. Absolutely no way of making them come. There was no structure to the program and no reason for them to come."

There were behavior problems at the program, and the staff disagreed on how these should be dealt with. One issue concerned weapons. While all staff agreed that a weapon should be confiscated when found on a client at the program, some insisted it be kept permanently while others thought it should be returned to the client at the end of the day. The reason given for this was that the neighborhood around New Pride was unsafe and the youths needed to be able to protect themselves on their way home. Only when a client repeatedly brought weapons to the program was there additional punishment or a report to a probation officer.

The addition of the DYS-referred clients exacerbated those behavior problems. Two of the three had to be terminated almost immediately.

In May the court stopped referring youth to New Pride. One court official reports that they had lost all faith in the project. The court "...didn't know what the future would be and we didn't want to send any more kids over there into the situation."

This came as a surprise to Project Concern, for they had a very different perception of how the project was going. According to a Project Concern manager, "It was a total shock to us when they stopped the referrals. I, frankly, have no specific reason; it has never been communicated to us. The only thing I can attribute it to is the ongoing jurisdictional power struggle about who was to

operate the program. There was no specific problem with the program as it was constituted that would cause him to stop referrals." This person went on to say, "...it was just starting to get some cohesiveness when the Roxbury Judge pulled out of it completely."

After stopping their referrals the judges tried one final tactic to change the situation. They asked OJJDP to take the grant away from Project Concern and find another parent agency to manage New Pride. Reportedly OJJDP refused, telling them that they would have to work out their problems with Project Concern.

In July the two judges announced to OJJDP that they would make no further referrals to New Pride and recommended that the project's funding be terminated. A Project Concern manager said that when that agency learned of this, "...there was no point in continuing to operate the program, so we notified Washington that we were closing." The official closing date for Boston New Pride was set for October 30. However, the project activities were minimal after July and only administrative staff remained after mid-September.

#### **Institutionalization**

The institutionalization of the New Pride project in Boston after Federal funding ceased was originally designated as a function both of the project staff and of the Executive Subcommittee of the Advisory Board. The institutionalization process never began, however, for New Pride never reached a point of stability where anything but immediate crises could be addressed. As it evolved, New Pride was unable to operate successfully even with its funding guaranteed by the Federal government. The issue of continuing it under other funding was never faced.

As to whether or not New Pride could have found the support required for institutionalization in Boston, two different opinions were expressed. One person who had experience working with both the project and the courts, and who had

also successfully raised funds from the state legislature for service programs, said about the institutionalization of New Pride, "I am positive we could have done that! I knew we could have done that!"

Several other people involved with New Pride expressed a different point of view. One Advisory Board member who also directs several programs serving serious offenders said, "When the money ended, (New Pride) would never have been absorbed locally. It was way too expensive. We were running the same kind of services other places a lot cheaper." Staff salaries at New Pride were substantially higher than elsewhere for comparable positions, and the actual number of youths served was extremely low considering the number of staff members. Given the many service resources already available in Boston, New Pride was seen by many as operating on a budget that was "outlandish."

#### **Program Impact**

Without follow-up recidivism data on clients and comparison subjects, nothing definitive can be said about Boston New Pride's impact on the youths it served. Of the 47 clients admitted into New Pride, only five completed the year program. The data that were collected up to July, 1981 on the first cohort of 23 youths show that 9 of the 23, or 39 percent, were arrested for new offenses.

This does not mean, however, that those youths who participated in the program did not benefit from it. Even a very disenchanted ex-staff member stated that some youths had been helped by New Pride. Of the six youths who completed exit surveys at termination, all six indicated they were glad they had come to the New Pride program, and five indicated they would have recommended the New Pride program to a friend in trouble.

As for New Pride's impact on Project Concern, one administrator involved with the project said, "It had a hell of an impact on us." This person explained, "It was pure hell, because of the judge (from Roxbury). Because literally, he tried to wipe out our agency in an effort to take over the grant."

Project Concern found the program model unsuitable to the population it targeted. "We would have preferred to (serve) a less chronic delinquent population, at least as it shows up in Massachusetts. We found that many of the kids, by the time they were eligible for New Pride were, in fact, in need of residential care."

The experience with New Pride did move Project Concern to redefine some of its own service priorities. They became more aware of the importance of reintegrating youth back into public schools and now invest a great deal of effort in this. It also made them focus on follow-up services: "We weren't doing that before. We now do a minimum of six months of follow-up after the residential care." This administrator continued, "What can I say (that is) positive that we got from New Pride? Computers. Essentially I would like to computerize our records."

Many people who were involved with New Pride indicated that the program had little impact on the Boston community or on other youth-serving agencies there. They viewed the program as cut-off from its environment. One Advisory Board member and the director of a youth program said, "I don't think the community was aware of the program." Another said, "I don't think it made any attempt, ever...to utilize the experience of other existing services and programs. It just didn't try."

New Pride's impact on the juvenile justice system is somewhat more complex and difficult to assess. A probation official from the Dorchester Court, one of the project's two referral sources, indicated that New Pride had had no impact on that court. The situation with the Roxbury Court, however, was different. This court had a policy of being more actively involved with the youth, with the explicit goal of becoming a model urban juvenile court. From Project Concern's perspective, this court tried to take control of New Pride for, as one administrator said, "The Roxbury Judge was going to get a program one way or another, because Boston Juvenile Court had a program and he wanted the Roxbury Court to be equal in stature with Boston."

From the court's perspective, New Pride initially promised to serve as a placement alternative which could provide a number of needed services to youth within one program setting. Yet the New Pride program never succeeded in meeting the expectations of the court. As this became evident the Roxbury Court began to set up its own system of brokering services to youth. They arranged for their probation department to have access to DYS funds to use for direct referral services for some youths before these youths were actually committed to DYS. Two people were hired, one of whom was the former New Pride resources specialist, to organize this system of brokering services. They raised money from several local foundations and the state legislature and soon had a substantial program operating. In 1982 they incorporated into a private, non-profit agency called the Roxbury Youth Works. Since then, this agency has evolved into a combination of a networking and a direct service organization, and one of its initiators explained, "What we are doing here are essentially New Pride things using, however, combinations of existing programs in the community," along with operating inhouse service components.

Neither of the two people who developed the Roxbury Youth Works views it as a spin-off from Project New Pride. One of them explained, "It wasn't that...New Pride introduced a new philosophy, because that we already had. A lot of New Pride experience certainly went into my design of the Roxbury Youth Works program." The other, when asked if New Pride had an impact on the program's design and programming, replied, "Not really. My approach to working with these kids comes from my experience...A lot of the things that I tried to get New Pride to do, in terms of regular reporting and accessing private resources are things that I have brought into this program..."

In the course of interviewing a number of key actors involved with Boston New Pride, several people made the same point: Massachusetts was not an appropriate setting for the replication of New Pride. Some years ago the state juvenile justice system made a bold move to reduce the incarceration of youth, to keep as many as possible in the community and provide them with a range of alternative treatment programs. Thus, the concept of offering alternatives to incarceration, which is at the core of the New Pride model, was already widely



accepted and practiced in Massachusetts. The state already had many treatment programs for these youth, some of which had been operating successfully for years. New Pride did include a wider range of services within one program than did most other local programs, but each of its services was also being offered by a number of other agencies in the area. The general consensus of the respondents was that New Pride was not needed in Boston and had little, if any, impact on the juvenile justice system. As one person said, "I never quite understood why Massachusetts got the grant because there was nothing that could be proven here anyway."

#### Summary

In reviewing the experience of Boston New Pride, one is struck with the fact that the project never really got going. It actually offered services to youth for only one year: July, 1980 to July, 1981. The project spent its entire year trying to get clients and then, once they had them, trying to get them to come to the program.

In follow-up interviews with people who were directly involved with New Pride, this question was posed: Why did Boston New Pride fail? The answers were remarkably similar; in fact all respondents but one cited the same four factors. These are:

The original Project Director: This person proved to be an ineffective administrator, unable to provide the direction required to move the project forward and to resolve the staff conflicts. Several people commented that he did not take advantage of opportunities and support available to him, such as the other service resources in the community, the Advisory Board, and the cooperation offered by the judges.

Project Concern, the parent agency: They did not provide enough direction or supervision to New Pride. Some respondents expressed a lack of confidence and trust in their motivations regarding New Pride. Several comments were made that their primary interest in New Pride was in the overhead they received from the project.

Some viewed their attitude toward the judges as an unwarranted "paranoia."

The Advisory Board: Although the board members were capable and experienced people who could make a real difference in how New Pride functioned, they had almost no input into the project's policy making and operations. Neither Project Concern nor the Director used their expertise or allowed them to play any meaningful role in the project. It was suggested that this might have been different had the board members been more assertive; instead of fighting for more direct involvement, they lost interest and dropped out.

Eligibility Criteria: It was generally agreed that the requirement of the New Pride model that clients have three findings of delinquency was too restrictive given the Massachusetts judicial practices. Rather than adjudicate, Massachusetts judges frequently handle juvenile cases by continuing them without a finding. Because of this practice, by the time a youth has three findings of guilt he may have had many times that number of offenses. At this point it is often reckoned too late for any alternative treatment, and the judge will commit such a youth to DYS even though DYS may do little or nothing. Thus, there were not enough youths who met the criteria and who judges thought amenable to the program to fill the available client slots.

Follow-up interviews with Project Concern, while including several of these factors, revealed a somewhat different perception of why the project failed. While they cited an ineffective director, an uninvolved Advisory Board, and too restrictive eligibility criteria as reasons, they saw the judges as the major cause of New Pride's demise. They felt the other problems could have been resolved had it not been for the unrealistic expectations of the judges and the continual attempts of the Roxbury Judge to take over the control of New Pride.

Despite all the difficulties the project had to contend with, only two people interviewed negatively viewed New Pride's chances for success in Boston. One said the model design was too expensive ever to have been institutionalized and another said that the restrictive eligibility criteria could never have allowed the

program enough clients. All the other respondents thought that the program's problems could have been resolved and that the program failed because of its inability to get its own "house in order." Another essentially summed it up saying that the failure of the program was a tragedy because there were no external forces working against it which would have kept them from succeeding.

#### CAMDEN NEW PRIDE

On March 1, 1980, the Juvenile Resource Center, Inc. (JRC) of Haddonfield, New Jersey, was awarded a grant from OJJDP to replicate Project New Pride. The grant was for two years, in the amount of \$908,567. To this award JRC was to add a 10 percent match, bringing the two-year budget to \$1,009,519. Funding from OJJDP continued beyond the two years; the agency received \$383,601 in the third year and \$225,000 in the fourth. The New Pride monies ended as of March 1, 1984.

#### The Parent Organization and Its Acquisition of the New Pride Grant

JRC had been created by a joint planning effort of the State Law Enforcement Planning Agency, CETA, and the Camden County Court, in particular, the juvenile judge and the juvenile Chief Probation Officer (CPO). The agency began operations in September, 1977 as a special unit of Camden County CETA. It was directed to provide services to juvenile offenders. The Assistant Director of the county CETA acted as the Director of JRC.

JRC served youth between the ages of 16 and a half and 20 who had some history of involvement with the court. The program was divided in two levels. Track I served the more serious offenders in the morning, while Track II served the less serious delinquents, most of whom were status offenders, in the afternoon hours. The services were of three types: counseling, educational, and employment. Counseling, offered to all youth, was required for Track I clients. Educational services included GED preparation, living skills, and driver's education. Employment services included "Mission Employable," an intensive, five-day introduction to the world of work, and some vocational training. The thrust of JRC's employment services was not to get jobs for youth, but to equip youth with the skills to get their own jobs.

JRC had a great deal of active support from the community. Its most enthusiastic advocates, other than the county government (of which it was a part), were from the juvenile justice system. Chief among these was a highly dedicated Juvenile Court Judge. Considering institutionalization of youth to be an absolute last resort measure, he was supportive of alternative programs and encouraged their development locally. As he had been involved with JRC from its inception, the judge was committed to helping the agency succeed. He assured them he would refer all the clients they could handle. JRC could also count on referrals from both Juvenile Probation and the Family Intake Unit, which was responsible for screening all complaints against juveniles.

Camden officials were enthusiastic about JRC because they knew their community had a great need for the services it offered. In the New Pride proposal, Camden is described thus: "It is a city of more than 85,000 people that has no movie theater, no major restaurant other than fast-food outlets, and one supermarket. More than half the population is on some form of public assistance; a third is on welfare." The proposal included the following quote from the Philadelphia Inquirer:

"By every measure - school test scores, poverty level, housing abandonment, population decline - its quality of life is among the most dismal in the nation."

This was a city that desperately needed a multi-service treatment program like JRC.

In 1979 the New Pride request-for-proposal was released, and it came to the attention of the New Jersey State Law Enforcement Planning Office and the Camden County Juvenile Court. The juvenile judge and the local LEAA office were very interested in getting a New Pride grant for Camden County. These same officials had been involved in the creation of JRC, had worked with it for the past two years, and watched it develop into a semi-autonomous agency with a facility and staff separate from CETA's and supplementary funding from

several different sources. They had seen JRC work with many of the system's more serious offenders.

As an appendage of CETA, JRC was not eligible to apply for a New Pride grant. They could only be eligible as a private not-for-profit agency. Recently, JRC administrators had considered incorporating separately, but had not developed the idea or taken steps to do so. Now the court was pushing them to incorporate and finally, the Director reported, they "talked us into it... The impetus for it (incorporation) really was the grant."

This was a risky venture for the staff, who had been enjoying the relative security of being civil servants. They were leaving county employment on the hope of getting a large, though temporary, Federal grant. As one court official explained, "The staff had to resign their positions and were flying by the seat of their pants. Then the problem was how to sell the Feds when this corporation had no track record."

The Law Enforcement Planning Office coordinated the effort and the proposal was submitted in September, 1979. JRC became an independent corporation in that same month.

The local officials, all working together, did all they could to lend credibility to JRC, submitting strong letters of support to OJJDP and lobbying for legislative assistance to secure the grant. Camden County pledged a grant match of \$100,952. A Juvenile Court Judge made special assurances that he would refer a full quota of clients to JRC. The Director of CETA became the president of the JRC Board of Directors. The juvenile CPO became vice-president of the Board. As one of the court officials said, "We were all in this together, so perhaps this helped us to transcend the system jurisdictions."

#### **New Pride Program Design**

In accepting the OJJDP grant to operate a New Pride program, JRC

administrators did not anticipate making any significant changes in their existing program. They saw the New Pride monies as allowing the agency to expand in size, offer some new services, and extend the age range of its clientele to include younger children. They intended to continue to serve non-New Pride youth along with the New Pride clients. The Director explained, "We're different from the other (New Pride replication programs)...in that we're not setting up a whole new thing for 100 kids. We already operate in a way very similar to the way Denver operates." He went on to say, "I think we resemble them most in terms of what we do and the way we are set up, in size and client flow and the whole thing."

Since the JRC administration perceived the agency as already being like New Pride, they never saw themselves as a replication project, but insisted on retaining their own identity as JRC. From the start of the grant, they discouraged the use of the name "New Pride." "New Pride is in Colorado; the JRC is in New Jersey," said one administrator.

Despite the rhetoric that the JRC was already just like New Pride, it had to make substantial additions to its staff, facility, programming, and target population in order to satisfy the New Pride grant requirements. The most significant addition to JRC was the Alternative School. It was designed for the younger clients, those between 14 and 17 years old. The original JRC program, with its emphasis on a GED and employment, was unsuitable for these younger clients. All clients under 16 were legally required to attend an accredited school. Thus the school had to be accredited by the state of New Jersey and had to have a credentialed principal. As such, the school would initiate a new type of service for JRC - traditional educational classes.

The learning disability (LD) component of the New Pride model presented quite a challenge to JRC. It called for highly trained professional staff to administer a sophisticated battery of diagnostic tests to all New Pride clients, and then provide specific kinds of treatments for those youth who were diagnosed as learning disabled. Both this type of staff and service were new to

JRC, for the agency had evolved out of the "street-worker" tradition and still operated in that mode.

In the New Pride program design, the LD component was to share a facility with the Alternative School, yet maintain its own separate programming, classrooms, and teachers. The LD component was to serve the same age range of clients as the school.

It was anticipated that, after an initial start-up period, the Alternative School would serve a total of 100 LD and non-LD students. About 40 of these were to be New Pride clients and about 60 to be less serious offenders who did not meet the New Pride eligibility criteria. All students at the Alternative School were to receive intensive supervision and counseling services. Few vocational services were planned, however, as they were considered inappropriate for the younger client who was still in school.

The original JRC program was to continue to operate much as it had been, making few changes to accommodate the New Pride model. As the agency had expanded to include a second facility, the old JRC now referred to itself as the base program. At the base, they expected to serve about 100 to 150 youth a year, 60 of whom would be New Pride clients. They would continue to serve the older clients, accepting almost no one younger than 16 and a half years old. As all of their clients proved to be school drop-outs, no traditional educational classes were to be offered. Clients could attend GED preparation classes, or if they were unprepared for these, Adult Basic Education (ABE) classes. No LD component was planned for the base program, but some LD services were to be offered.

The base program planned to offer clients a range of employment services geared towards preparing youth to find their own jobs. As in the Alternative School, intensive supervision and counseling services were to be a fundamental part of the program.

In setting up the New Pride program, some programmatic elements were left to be resolved after the program got underway. While the Alternative School was planning to take two cohorts of clients each year (one group at the start of each semester), the base program was unsure whether it would intake clients in six month cohorts or on a monthly basis. The six month follow-up period was not defined for either place. JRC administrators expected to formalize the follow-up after the program got off the ground.

#### Where is New Pride?

Trying to distinguish what is New Pride at JRC from what is not is a hopeless task, as can be seen from the program's design. When the national evaluators reviewed the proposals of finalists for the grant, they made these comments about the JRC submission:

"This proposal is very confusing. It is hard to tell if what is being funded is the exact JRC, a New Pride component, a continuation of both, or what. They are so intermixed one cannot tell them apart."

After JRC started its new program at the Alternative School, it usually referred to the original program as the base program. Often, however, it was simply called "JRC" and the Alternative School was referred to as "New Pride." In the publicity brochure which the agency developed after getting the New Pride grant, New Pride was only mentioned in this context: "New Pride - An Alternative School."

When the Director of JRC assumed the position of Project Director of New Pride, he planned to keep the position only for a year and then turn it over to someone else who would take responsibility for New Pride. Since New Pride never became anything distinctly separate from JRC, this switch never occurred. He remained both Agency and Project Director until the New Pride grant ended.

For the same reason, there was never a New Pride Advisory Board. As one administrator explained, "There's really no purpose to having an additional New Pride board. It didn't make much sense to us to have a separate board doing the same thing (as the Board of Directors)."

As late as 1983, New Pride remained an elusive, undefinable entity at Camden. When the Director was asked, "Do you have a New Pride project within JRC?" he replied, "It's not separate enough...In a sense, the whole agency is New Pride."

#### Program Linkages

Being a spin-off from the Camden County bureaucracy, JRC began with solid relationships with a number of local agencies. It maintained an excellent relationship with the County CETA, of which it was once a part, and until mid-1983 the CETA Director served as president of the JRC Board of Directors. CETA continued to be a principal funding source for JRC, making any CETA service which was appropriate to the JRC clients available to them. The Camden City CETA also provided some funds for JRC and job slots for their clients.

From time to time there were minor rifts in JRC's relationship with CETA. Several times JRC's CETA funds were threatened because their paperwork documenting CETA-sponsored services was incomplete. These crises prompted periods of better record keeping on the part of JRC.

From its beginning, JRC had worked with the Juvenile Court Judge. He had been an ardent supporter of the agency in its bid for the New Pride grant. The Judge assured OJJDP that he would refer all the clients necessary to fill the New Pride program - 100 per year. Later, however, he balked at the strict eligibility criteria and was a vocal opponent of it. He attended several New Pride Project Director Conferences, and helped to bring about the modification of the official eligibility criteria.

The Probation Department, following the lead of the Judge, was also supportive of JRC. The juvenile CPO sat on the JRC Board of Directors and took an active role on that Board. He also attended several New Pride Project Director Conferences. The CPO encouraged the PO's under his supervision to refer youth to New Pride.

JRC maintained a staff position of liaison with the court, probation, and schools. The person who filled this position had the responsibility for keeping the relationship between the project and the probation officers on a positive footing. He would spend some time each day at the court, attending the trials of clients and meeting informally with probation officers, sharing information about their probationers who were JRC clients.

In mid-1981, the person who acted as the court/school liaison was moved to another position and then left the agency under protest. This proved to be disruptive to project/probation relations. A number of probation officers were angry at the way this person had been treated by JRC, and referrals to the project fell off noticeably. Several months later a new person was put in the liaison position, and in time the relationship with probation improved. A few probation officers, however, never referred clients to JRC after that incident.

JRC faced a challenging period in 1983 when personnel changes affected its relationship with three vital agencies. Two new judges began hearing the majority of juvenile court cases, and both of them were more punitive and less inclined to order alternative dispositions than the previous judge had been. In addition, the juvenile CPO was transferred to another position and two people, neither of whom had a close relationship with JRC, took over as acting CPO. Finally, the Director of Camden County CETA was promoted from his position with CETA to another post in the county government. His successor was antagonistic toward JRC, so much so that one agency manager said, "We do battle with him every day." Coming all at once, these changes required a real expenditure of time and energy on the part of JRC administrators to form new, positive working relationships within these critical agencies.

The relationship between JRC and the local schools was also an important one and was facilitated by the Alternative School Principal serving on the local Board of Education. There were some ongoing difficulties, however, in reintegrating clients back into public schools. Many of the principals did not want these "troublemakers" back. This attitude of local educators was perceived by the Alternative School Principal as one of the school's greatest obstacles.

JRC was able to maintain positive relationships with many other agencies at the local, state, and even Federal level because of the entrepreneurial skills of its Director. The Director lobbied for his agency with any organization he thought might prove helpful. He frequently lobbied at the state legislature for legislative changes that might bring new funding to JRC.

When the agency opened its Lunchbox Cafe in downtown Camden, it gained a new, positive image within the community. A year later JRC opened another restaurant, Little Bo Pizza. Although this latter venture only lasted a year, these businesses provided a much needed service to the community as well as to the youth who were able to work in them.

JRC maintained linkages with all levels of its milieu from the community to other service agencies, and to bodies of government. The majority of these relationships were positive, as demonstrated by the project's ability to maintain local funding so it could survive after Federal funding stopped.

#### Facility

From the time JRC separated from CETA and struck out on its own, the agency was plagued by difficulties in finding and keeping adequate facilities. When affiliated with CETA, JRC had operated out of a basement office in downtown Haddonfield. The base program stayed there for another six months after starting New Pride. Unfortunately, the program was not particularly welcome in the city of Haddonfield, a small, upper-middle class suburban town within commuting distance of Philadelphia. While there were few overt

incidents where neighbors expressed hostility towards JRC clients, the project was basically unwanted and even feared by many Haddonfield residents. It tried to keep a low profile, keeping the telephone unlisted and posting no name on the office door.

As New Pride staff were hired, JRC quarters quickly became overcrowded. At one point, seven people shared one office. Meanwhile, the agency was looking desperately for a new facility to house the Alternative School. After a three month search, a site only a few blocks away from JRC was located and a lease was negotiated. However, as the Director related, "on the day we were to pick up the lease, we were informed that another tenant had been found." JRC was told it was "incompatible" with the other tenants in the building.

The search for a facility continued and extended into the city of Camden, where the few available sites were too expensive. As the time for the school to start drew close, the Juvenile Court Judge intervened to ask the owners of a Camden building to donate space to the Alternative School. They refused.

In June, 1980, most of the staff hired to fill New Pride positions, which included staff for the school, moved on a temporary basis into office space in the suburb of Stratford, about 10 miles away from Haddonfield. There they did some diagnostic testing of the first New Pride clients, and started individual tutoring for a few clients who were to enter the Alternative School. This space, however, was not large enough to house the school.

Just before the school year was scheduled to start, a temporary home was found for the Alternative School. It was in a church located in downtown Haddonfield, just a few blocks from the base program facility. Although the school could open there, the space was far from satisfactory. One large room had been partitioned to make two classrooms, and noise from one class could be heard in the other. Another large room housed all the counseling staff, separated from one another by mobile partitions. In addition, the school had an administrative office area and the use of a gym. Since they were in central

Haddonfield, the students were instructed to go directly to class and head directly home after leaving school. They were not to "hang out" in the area.

Close to the same time that the school opened, the base program moved to a building on the edge of Camden, next to a rapid transit station. Those quarters were well located and quite spacious, and proved to be a comfortable home for the program.

The school continued to search for a permanent facility. In January, 1981, they found a potential site in Camden, but were rejected again. The reason, as related by a court official, was this: "The people who have it on lease from the State don't want to rent to JRC because they are not financially stable enough."

The Alternative School's six month lease with the church ran out early in 1981, and the church was pressuring them to leave. They located a new prospective building in downtown Camden, which had previously housed another alternative school. A lease was negotiated and plans were made to move in April. On a prearranged date, all the school's furniture and materials were moved to the new site. Unfortunately, the lease had not been finalized. The school staff and students suddenly found themselves locked out of their new building, for state regulations governing school facilities forbade their occupancy of the space until the lease was legally binding. The church allowed the students and staff to return until the new facility was available, but it was difficult to conduct classes with no furniture or materials. They went on almost daily field trips during this waiting period, and the school staff began to refer to themselves as "the boat people." Finally, in July of 1981, the new facility was made available and the Alternative School officially moved to Camden.

The Alternative School remained in this facility for almost two years, until early in 1983 when it moved into the building next door. This facility was newer and had even better arranged space, including a fully equipped kitchen.

About six months later, in October, the base program moved into the Alternative School facility. This move was motivated by a shrinking budget and

clientele. The New Pride grant was phasing out and JRC was going through a period of contraction. They could no longer support the other facility, and so moved in with the school to cut costs.

One other incident occurred regarding program facilities which seriously impacted JRC. From early 1982, the agency had been planning to start a farm where it could operate a small residential facility to provide aftercare treatment to youth released from correctional institutions. The State Department of Corrections had already made a preliminary agreement to fund such a program. This agreement meant that JRC would finally have a foot in the door to receive funding from corrections, an important step towards institutionalization. In 1983, when the farm land had been leased and plans for the residential facility were being developed, local residents heard the news. Their reaction was strong - they did not want a residential facility for serious juvenile offenders in their community. JRC was forced to abandon its residential plan and decided to use the farm land to run a day program.

For an agency like JRC, the challenge of finding a facility out of which to operate can have a vital impact on the type of services such an agency can provide and who it can serve. As the Camden CPO observed, "The community almost forced New Pride to be in Camden. Finding housing restricted them." Their location in Camden determined, in turn, the kind of youth who would be referred to the program. Camden has such a tough reputation that almost no court or school official would refer a youth from one of the outlying suburban communities to a program in the city of Camden. After leaving Haddonfield, JRC's clientele became predominantly composed of black, inner city youth. As the Director explained, "New Pride has become a city-based program rather than a court-based program. We just don't get the suburban kids down here."

#### **Eligibility Criteria**

Everyone involved with the New Pride program in Camden was convinced there were plenty of youth who would qualify, that is, who were between 14 and

18 years old, had an adjudicated presenting offense, and two previous adjudications for serious offenses within the last 24 months. While there appeared to be enough eligible youth in the program's target area, these youth were very serious offenders. The Camden judge would often handle juvenile cases informally or dismiss them. He proceeded to a formal adjudication only with very serious offenses or multiple offenders. Some youth would have numerous complaints against them before they were brought to court. As one JRC administrator described, cases are adjudicated so seldom that by the time a juvenile has three adjudications, he has "almost turned into a career criminal."

Assured that plenty of their clients would qualify for New Pride, JRC administrators set up no screening process to intake New Pride clients. They continued to operate as they had prior to getting the New Pride grant, taking most youth who were referred and giving them the standard services, with the addition of some new services introduced under the auspices of New Pride. Although the New Pride grant officially began in March, 1980 and the program considered itself to be serving New Pride clients from June on, none of these clients had been screened to see if they met the New Pride eligibility criteria until November. At this time the evaluator went to the juvenile court to check the records of JRC clients.

The youth who met the New Pride eligibility criteria in Camden turned out to be very serious offenders, as could be expected given local court practices. There are MIS data for 175 New Pride clients admitted from the start of the program until January 1, 1983. These youth had an average of 5.2 sustained criminal events prior to coming to New Pride. Eighty-one (46 percent) of these clients recidivated during the program. This amount of recidivism was unanticipated by the JRC administration. They had not been prepared for the New Pride clients to be such serious offenders, for one of their project objectives in the New Pride proposal was that "70 percent of all youth would not be rearrested while participating in the program." Breaking down these recidivism figures between base and Alternative School clients shows that the school had the more difficult clients: 42 percent of base clients recidivated during the program, as compared to 53 percent of the school's clients.



Given these kinds of court records and this amount of continuing criminal behavior, JRC was finding its current clientele to be much tougher and more difficult to serve than its previous clients. Not surprisingly, project administrators and other key people involved with the agency were concerned. Both the Director and the CPO stated, in separate interviews, that many of the New Pride clients should be in jail, rather than in the project. The CPO elaborated on the problem from the court's point of view:

"After getting the New Pride grant the court had a dilemma. They wanted the program but then the program squeezed out kids who would have needed it. The New Pride kid is not the same as the original JRC kid. They are far tougher. This was the Judge's big beef with the Feds - over the eligibility criteria."

The Judge did make his case before OJJDP when he attended the January, 1981 Project Director Conference. Arguing that the requirement of three adjudications be changed to three "confirmed criminal events," he said:

"If the point is reached between jail and New Pride, the judge's decision should be respected. Instead of adjudications, confirmed criminal events should be the idea. We judges were told by LEAA to divert, and get penalized for it."

After this conference the eligibility criteria was changed so that rather than two prior adjudications, there had to be "documented judicial determinations of involvement (guilt) in two previous criminal events" and a presenting offense for which the youth had been adjudicated and found delinquent. This modification did help to ease the problem for both the program and the court, for after this decision, the Director noted, "The Judge began referring slightly less serious kids."

Throughout the program, however, New Pride clients were generally more serious offenders than the non-New Pride clients. As late as 1983, a program

administrator said they were much more difficult to treat and, compared to the other JRC clients, "New Pride stands out like a sore thumb."

New Pride clients usually represented only half or less of JRC's total clientele. The agency's administration believed that programs "should be mandated" to serve less serious along with very serious offenders, both sexes, and different ethnic groups. It was a philosophical underpinning of JRC that mixing the population in this way makes for a more balanced and effective program, and serves to temper the behavior of the more delinquent youth.

Despite the mix, however, and even after the easing of the eligibility criteria, many of the New Pride clients were too delinquent to be helped by the program. They were "very inappropriate for the program," said the CPO, for "it's not a program for the unmotivated." He went on to explain, "The New Pride kid burns out staff so the non-New Pride kid isn't getting the same level of treatment. PO's come to me and say 'Why can't we have it (JRC) the way it was?'"

The practice of determining New Pride eligibility retroactively, sometimes months after a client was admitted, even after the client left the program, continued throughout the four years JRC operated under the New Pride grant. This practice was encouraged by the fact that JRC received funds from a number of different sources, sometimes from as many as 8 or 9 agencies. If a client proved ineligible for funding under one contract or grant, he or she was usually eligible under some other criteria. If not eligible for New Pride, the client could be eligible for CETA funds, or monies from the Department of Youth and Family Services, or the Department of Education. Money to pay for services would always come from somewhere.

To keep all of these funding sources open, JRC accepted clients from more than 20 different referral sources. Most of these were associated with the juvenile justice system, but referrals were also accepted from private agencies, schools, and even as walk-ins off the street. When asked about this, as New Pride clients were all supposed to be referred by the court, the Director said he

intended to keep all these referral sources open regardless of the New Pride model. He said he needed to keep these doors open for the time when he would need to secure additional funding.

In September 1981, in a move to secure a more solid funding base, the Alternative School began to accept youth referred by child-study teams operating under the State Department of Education. These teams would refer to JRC youth they had diagnosed as "socially maladjusted." This type of child is not emotionally disturbed but demonstrates aggressive acting-out behaviors, including severe truancy and other more serious behaviors. The school was to provide educational services to these students for one year, and was paid tuition for them by the local school boards. This arrangement worked so well that it was decided, in March, 1982, that the school would only accept referrals from the child-study teams. Some of these socially maladjusted youth, however, proved to be New Pride eligible as well, so JRC still considered the Alternative School to be serving New Pride youth. As the Director explained, "(The Alternative School) will get some New Pride kids, but that is not the eligibility criteria. The school system has its own set of eligibility criteria, but it won't change the program."

This new policy created a problem with the court, for it was no longer able to refer youth directly to the Alternative School. Probation Officers could refer a youth to a child-study team, who, if it diagnosed the youth to be socially maladjusted, could then refer him or her to the school. But the Alternative School became less accessible to the local justice system. After some pressure from the Probation Department, the school reversed its policy and agreed to accept direct referrals from the court once again.

According to MIS data, JRC took fewer New Pride clients each project year. The agency began serving clients in June, 1980 and had admitted 101 New Pride clients by June, 1981. Fifty-one of these were served at the base program, and 50 at the Alternative School. During the following year, only 47 New Pride clients were admitted, fewer than half of the number promised under the grant. Of the 47, 18 were served at the base and 29 at the Alternative School. The

third project year, the final year for which there is complete MIS data, JRC served only 27 New Pride clients. Of these 26 were at the base and only one at the school. By this time, it was clear that the school had turned its focus totally towards the socially maladjusted children and away from court-referred serious offenders.

#### **Adaptation of the New Pride Model**

As the JRC administration was committed to retaining the agency's own identity and "flavor," not thinking of themselves as operating just another New Pride program, it is not surprising that JRC staff members were unfamiliar with the New Pride replication model or with JRC's proposal to run the New Pride program. When JRC staff thought of New Pride they usually thought of the eligibility criteria or the MIS. If they were base program staff, they might have thought of the Alternative School.

For some time after the New Pride grant was awarded, the evaluator was the person most familiar with the New Pride model and proposal. The evaluator determined which clients were New Pride eligible, trained staff to write behavioral objectives, and responded to staff questions about New Pride.

Occasionally a situation arose when it was necessary for the rest of the staff to focus on New Pride. Such a situation arose after a Project Director Conference in early 1981, when the Camden project received some criticism for not adhering to the New Pride model. Staff training sessions were held to review the New Pride model and the program's goals and objectives. After these sessions, the evaluator commented, "We've had the grant for a year and staff are just beginning to realize that New Pride is at Ferry Avenue (the base program facility), too."

New Pride came into the spotlight another time, just before the OJJDP program monitor was scheduled to arrive for a site visit. Once again, materials about the replication model were circulated and discussed by staff. This time

the evaluator observed, "There has been more done to implement the model in the last two weeks than during the entire funding period." This consciousness of the New Pride model did not last long, though, and soon it faded back into the familiar patterns of JRC.

Despite the minimal awareness of New Pride as a replication program, JRC was definitely altered by winning the New Pride grant. Prior to New Pride, the JRC program had had very little structure and kept few records. Some clients who were served had only their names recorded. After New Pride began, the program became somewhat more routinized and accountable, ending up somewhere in between where they had been before and where the New Pride model directed them to be in terms of their basic structure. Counselors were instructed to contact clients once a day during their intensive service phase, conduct one planned counseling session a week, and make one home visit a month. In general, counselors did maintain intensive supervision. At the base program, however, clients tended to be involved intensively with the program for a period of time less than six months. At the school, the intensive phase was often longer, extending through two semesters. The follow-up phase was rather loosely structured, although more defined than it had been prior to New Pride. The Director explained that the amount and type of follow-up was determined by the individual counselors, but that, on an average, clients were contacted weekly in person or by phone.

While staff filled out Individualized Integrated Service Plans (IISPs) for most clients, they were only used at the Alternative School. Few plans were updated during the program, and the Director admitted, "We're not using that tool." However, staff did hold regular weekly staffings on clients at both the base program and the Alternative School.

#### **The Educational Component**

The Alternative School was the vehicle through which a full New Pride program was to be provided to JRC's younger clients. By its very nature as a

school, it emphasized the educational aspect of New Pride far more than the other types of services.

The school experienced difficulties during its early months, with conflicts among its administrative staff, an inexperienced line staff, and a student body of very serious offenders. During the first month after fall classes began, both the Principal and the Assistant Director were fired. The Counselor Supervisor, who had previously been the principal of another local alternative school, was promoted to be the school's principal.

Despite this shaky start, the school did pull together and run an effective program. Between 30 and 40 students were accepted each semester. Attendance was reported to vary between 65 percent and 85 percent, a commendable rate given the previous attendance records of the students.

Discipline proved to be a real problem, and the staff worked hard to devise creative, consistent, and effective ways to deal with acting-out behaviors. Gradually, a behavior modification system was developed that both staff and students could support.

The school program went year-around. Every year, funding for summer classes was uncertain until the very last minute, but each year it managed to come through.

In 1982, as described above, the school began accepting youth referred by child-study teams and charging tuition for these students. This income made the entire Alternative School almost financially self-sufficient, and school administrators began to consider seriously becoming independent from the rest of JRC. Eventually they decided to remain a part of JRC, but as a semi-autonomous program. This autonomy diminished, however, when the base program moved into the same building with the school in 1983 and the two programs were forced to share one facility.

The educational component of the New Pride model stressed the importance of reintegrating students back into regular public schools. In its New Pride proposal, JRC set a goal of reintegrating 90 percent of its 15 and 16 year old clients back into public schools after six months of services. They never came close to meeting the goal. School administrators reported that, after two years, only 20 to 35 percent of their students had returned to the public school system.

JRC had originally had a staff position responsible for reintegrating youth. This position was also responsible for maintaining a liaison with the court, and the latter task gradually eclipsed the school liaison task entirely. School reintegration became one of the responsibilities of the student's counselor.

By 1983 the Alternative School had almost given up trying to reintegrate youth. Of the students who ended the semester in June, only one was recommended for return to a public school. Two were referred to vocational schools and four to GED programs. As the Principal explained, "We are not as encouraged for students to go back into the traditional schools this year as we were previously." Their experience had shown that few of their students were able to adapt to the public school expectations. The Principal also said, "Some principals blatantly refuse to take students because they know they can get away with it."

In 1983 the school experienced a real triumph. Center City Private High School, the new name for the Alternative School, graduated its first student.

The educational component at the base program was quite different. Two types of educational classes were offered: GED preparation and Adult Basic Education (ABE) classes, the latter for students not yet ready for GED classes. Both these classes met twelve hours per week, and students could be enrolled in classes for as long as they wished. Most clients were ready to take the GED examination after four months of preparation. A few clients moved into GED preparation classes after completing remedial work in the ABE class. It was

assumed that none of the clients at the base program would want to return to regular public school, so reintegration of these youth was not even considered.

#### Diagnostic Component

The diagnostic component of the New Pride model consisted of a four-level testing battery, staff qualified to administer these tests, and a structured procedure for using the testing results to formulate specific treatment plans. As such, this component was never fully instituted at either the Alternative School or the base program.

Both programs experienced frequent turnover of diagnosticians, most of whom were school psychologists. JRC was unwilling to pay a competitive salary for this position, so most of the diagnosticians either had other tasks to perform, or they worked for the program on a part-time or consulting basis. Fortunately, only a few of the tests had to be administered by certified professionals, among them the IQ and psychological tests. Because a certified diagnostician was not always available, these tests were not given regularly. Although each New Pride client was supposed to be given an IQ test, there were IQ scores in the MIS for only one-third of the clients. No scores were recorded for any psychological tests or for any of the other diagnostic instruments used to verify the presence of a learning disability or to specify its nature.

The achievement tests, required for all New Pride clients, could be administered by an uncertified person. These were usually given by one of the teachers. Scores for the WRAT, Woodcock, and Keymath, the three required achievement tests, are recorded in the MIS for 65 to 70 percent of all New Pride clients. Although these tests were given, they were often given long after the clients had entered the program and had started receiving services. In these cases, the testing could not have been used to design an individual service plan.

Those clients whom the school accepted as socially maladjusted had been fully tested and screened by public school diagnosticians prior to intake. As the

school principal explained, "The diagnostic component of the New Pride model is identical to the State of New Jersey's special education component, so the interface was ready made." This took the pressure off the program to provide its own professional diagnostic services. Unfortunately, only the scores of tests administered under JRC auspices are recorded in the MIS, so we have no test scores for those clients who were diagnosed prior to their entry into the program.

Since the administration of the diagnostic battery was so spotty at JRC, one wonders how much the staff used diagnostic results in program planning for its clients. The Alternative School did appear to use some of these results when they screened students for placement in remedial classes and planned appropriate lessons for them. At the base program, this was not the case. Test results were seldom used. The teachers of the GED classes would administer their own tests to students and use those results for program planning, ignoring the other diagnostic information. The Director expressed the general attitude of the base program towards diagnostics when he said, "I don't think the insights provided by testing have given enough results to justify the resources required. The results of testing don't seem to be much more insightful than the perceptions (gained) from interviews."

#### **The Learning Disability Component**

For both of JRC's programs, staff views towards the learning disability component were very similar to their views about diagnostics. Neither program had an actual LD component, but the Alternative School did provide more LD services than the base program.

Thirty-five percent of the Alternative School's New Pride clients were diagnosed LD. These students spent part of each day in a Learning Lab classroom, where they received some specialized remediation from a special education teacher.

At the base program, only six percent of the New Pride clients were diagnosed LD. These students were placed in the ABE classroom along with non-LD students, where they received a limited amount of remedial instruction.

#### **Employment Component**

At the base program, the major service objectives for clients were to get a job and a GED. Thus, employment services were considered to be very important. Administratively there was no separate employment component, but most of the direct service staff, including counselors and teachers, were involved in providing employment services.

As mentioned above, the philosophical orientation of JRC was not to get jobs for clients. Handing a client a job encouraged dependency, they believed, for when the youth lost that job, he or she would be no better prepared than before to find a new one.

"Mission Employable" was an intensive, week-long job preparedness course given to most clients at the base program. For most, this was the first service they were involved with at the program. After "Mission Employable," the main thrust was for youth to go out and find their own jobs. MIS data show that of the 94 New Pride clients taken into the base program prior to 1983, 53 (56 percent) had jobs. Almost one quarter of these clients had two jobs while in the program; three had three jobs. The clients held their jobs for an average of six weeks.

The policy of sending clients out to get their own jobs generated a very high proportion of employer-supported positions. The employer paid the wages for 86 percent of the jobs held by base clients. CETA paid the wages for nine percent. None of these jobs were funded by New Pride stipends.

Actually, the proportion of employed clients at the base program – 56 percent – was not high, given the program's emphasis on employment. In the New Pride proposal, one of the project's objectives was to place 70 percent of all

clients in a job. CETA, which funded some of the basic JRC services, had the same goal, that 70 percent of the clients would be employed. When the actual employment figures fell short of this, CETA officials threatened to cut program funding. It was unclear whether they actually followed through on this threat or not, for JRC did continue to get some CETA monies.

Far less emphasis was placed on employment at the Alternative School. These youth were younger and still involved in school, where it was thought their focus should remain until they finished school. Too, the job market is quite restricted for children under 16. Because of this, few students had jobs except during the summer, when CETA slots became available. During the school year, few employment services were provided for these clients. This was changed in 1983, when arrangements were made for an employment counselor from the base program to come and hold job preparedness classes at the Alternative School two days a week.

Despite the de-emphasis of employment for the Alternative School youth, MIS data report that, of the 80 New Pride clients admitted there prior to 1983, 37 (46 percent) held jobs during the program. Almost as many school clients were employed as were base clients. Surprisingly, youth at the school held their jobs longer, for an average of nine weeks. Employers paid the wages for almost half of these jobs, and from 40 to 45 percent of the rest were CETA funded.

In 1982, JRC began to put a lot of energy into developing its own businesses. The first one was the Lunchbox, a cafe in downtown Camden. JRC clients staffed this small restaurant, and while it did not provide many jobs, the jobs it did open up were excellent learning opportunities for the clients. Later, several other businesses were started, providing more new jobs as well as vocational training for clients.

#### **The Management Information System**

Throughout the period of the New Pride grant, JRC administrators were

supportive of the MIS effort. For four years, they employed both a program evaluator and a data coder. They encouraged staff to fill out MIS forms and submit them regularly to the evaluators. JRC even invested in the purchase of a computer system on which they set up their own individualized MIS. They hoped to keep this system going after New Pride ended, but were forced by financial constraints to give it up several months after the New Pride grant ended.

This support is extremely difficult to understand in light of the fact that neither the JRC administrators nor the staff got very much information out of the MIS. Occasionally the evaluator would present different types of MIS reports to the program managers, but these were never utilized on a regular basis. The teachers used no attendance data, the employment counselors used no employment data, and no objective update reports were used for staffing clients. Camden provided thorough and clean MIS data for the national evaluation, but the program did not learn to use its own data in any meaningful way.

#### **Management Issues**

Although it evolved out of a bureaucracy, JRC was far from bureaucratic itself. On the contrary, it was almost a classic example of a pre-bureaucratic organization. JRC's founder and Director ran the agency in a paternalistic mode. He set the tone and was the central decision maker. The agency had very few rules, so decisions were made for specific cases only, without general application. Leadership roles were taken by employees, rather than delegated, and the extent of one's authority was left undefined. Loyalty was valued as one of the most important attributes of a staff member.

The agency's goals tended to reflect the Director's personal beliefs. For example, the Director did not believe that a formal education was necessary for counselors, so counselors with high school diplomas had rank equal or even superior to counselors with MSW degrees. The Director did not believe in therapy, so staff who had been trained as therapists were given very little opportunity to practice their skills. The Director thought very negatively of the public schools, so clients were never expected to return to public school.

The environment at JRC was loose and unstructured, hence chaotic, most of the time. When things were going well for the agency, this atmosphere stimulated creative programming and dynamic interactions between staff and clients. At other times, when the agency was under a high level of stress, this chaos led to anarchy. At these times the tension in the agency would become almost unbearable, clients would act-out frequently, and staff morale would plummet.

When the Alternative School was being set up, the person hired as principal had many characteristics which were opposite and even antagonistic to those of the JRC Director. The school Principal was an ex-correctional educator whose style was rigid, authoritarian, and highly bureaucratic. He wanted the school's rules and procedures to be fully documented. Decisions, incidents, and inter-staff communications were all to be put in writing.

It is not surprising, then, that the Alternative School was housed apart from the base program. The JRC Director described the separation of the two facilities:

"Both our components are going to be somewhat self-contained...The New Pride replication (here meaning Alternative School) is going to have their own counselors, their own vocational (staff), their own educational (staff). Sometimes, as far as the service delivery is concerned, they'll be somewhat separate in that youth won't come from the Alternative School and get vocational, pre-vocational training. That will happen there."

Fueled by their differences in style and their geographical separation, tension and distrust developed between the two programs. At base program staff meetings, staff referred to regular schools as "hell holes." At Alternative staff meetings the Principal declared that he wanted to change "the JRC mind set that a GED and a job are the only options. Kids can go back to school."

This mutual antagonism was exacerbated by the fact that each program was experiencing its own internal problems. The base program, as the continuation of the original JRC, had just experienced a rapid expansion of personnel and services. They were desperately trying to maintain their old identity in the face of more difficult clients, new and inexperienced staff, and unfamiliar program demands to meet New Pride requirements. Staff morale was low and the tension level was high. There was talk of mass resignation.

The Alternative School was also going through a critical period, for it was just getting started. It had to deal with the complex and time consuming process of gaining state accreditation, a process which was not completed until April, 1981. Not all the newly hired teachers were properly certified to teach in an Alternative School. Curriculum material had not arrived, they were housed in cramped and noisy temporary quarters, and the students they were supposed to teach were acting-out multiple offenders.

In early October, 1980, when the Counselor Supervisor was made principal after the original Principal was fired, the dissension between the school and the base began to diminish. The new Principal proved to be a capable administrator, who was able to run a relatively structured school and work cooperatively with the JRC administrators. Despite this, the Director was still concerned about keeping "the same flavor in both agencies." He sent his Assistant Director, who had been with JRC from its CETA days, to the Alternative School for several months to "take the JRC philosophy there."

Over time, the relationship between JRC's two programs developed into a rather distant, though mutually supportive accord. Administrative staff from both programs met weekly, and occasionally a joint activity would be planned. For the most part, the two programs operated independently. As one base manager said of the Alternative School, "...they are only on the other side of town, but we're doing our own thing and they're doing their thing."

JRC experienced a second period of crisis which began in late 1981. Feeling a burst of self-confidence at having overcome its original obstacles, JRC

began an expansionist phase. The agency opened a small residential program, designed to help youth move out onto their own. The school began to develop plans for a second school facility. In addition, a major new program was planned for the neighboring Burlington County. JRC started hiring new staff and promised promotions to other staff as these new programs developed. Suddenly, however, the rug was pulled out from under these plans when both the Burlington County and the Alternative School expansions fell through. Seven staff members were laid off and raises that had been promised had to be postponed. This had a destructive effect on the staff, causing morale to drop and tensions to rise. More staff left JRC voluntarily, with the result that a number of services were disrupted.

Throughout 1982, JRC was shaky. It did manage to pull out of this, however, by cutting its losses, consolidating its services, and making an effort to build some structure into the agency. Agency administrators wrote new goals and objectives and used them when making programming decisions. New personnel policies were developed. The Alternative School put together a procedures manual and systematized its curricula.

By mid-1983, JRC was on a stable footing. The CPO, referring to this newly gained stability, commented: "They have solidified many of the projects they have been running during the last year."

As the agency matured, its atmosphere could still be described as loose and unstructured, but it was an atmosphere which encouraged creativity. Project services were not so routinized that they had become ends in themselves, but could be individualized to meet the unique needs of clients. In order to keep less motivated clients involved, JRC would invite them to bring friends, siblings, or their girl or boyfriends with them to the program. In one case, a client's mother was tutored to take the GED test. She and her son had a contest going over who would score the highest, and the program opened its services to the mother to keep the client's interest high. As one program manager explained, "We will do anything that will work."

### Institutionalization

From its beginning as a part of CETA, JRC received funding from several sources. At the time the New Pride grant was awarded, JRC was receiving monies from nine different agencies. Even after the grant award, the agency continued to accept youth referred from many sources and about half of their clients were not New Pride eligible youth. Thus, JRC administrators expected their funding sources to continue to support their program even after New Pride monies ended. "It is very easy for us to think in terms of institutionalization," said the Director. "We are not talking about institutionalizing something new. We are talking about continuing what we have been doing and the only thing that we do."

Agency administrators discovered, however, that maintaining many relatively small amounts of funding from a number of sources required an enormous expenditure of their time and energy. As the program experienced its periods of crisis, administrators found themselves overextended. The Director explained their dilemma thus: "I always maintain that we could run a program as well as anybody in the country. I also maintain that we could probably raise money as well as anybody could. I don't maintain we can do both at the same time."

Sometimes money was promised and then did not come through, as happened with the Burlington County grant. Funds the agency expected to get from the Department of Corrections failed to materialize. Even some of the oldest and most reliable sources of money began to look like they might disappear.

Early in 1981, when CETA funds were being cutback nationwide, JRC decided to explore a new direction. They decided to open a few of their own small businesses, which could immediately provide some jobs for clients and hopefully, after some start-up time, could provide financial support for the agency.



**CONTINUED**

**1 OF 4**

The first business was the Lunchbox Cafe, which opened in July, 1981. It proved so successful that a second restaurant, Little Bo Pizza, opened a year later. The following year, JRC leased land for a small farm. They began a new program called FAST, the Farm and Skills Training Center. This program included construction and carpentry classes, baking classes, and agricultural training. Its purpose was to prepare youth to work on the farm, growing crops and running a greenhouse operation, and also to prepare baked goods on a wholesale basis.

While the Lunchbox continued to attract customers, the pizzeria closed after a year, and the bakery never got off the ground. The farm did produce some crops, but was more successful with its greenhouse venture. JRC quickly learned that, while its businesses could provide excellent work opportunities for a few youth and new resources to the community, they could not support the agency. Indeed, they would be doing well to show any profits at all. JRC administrators went back to their original plan to continue to secure relatively small amounts of funding from other local agencies.

At the time the New Pride grant ended, JRC was receiving funds from many of the same funding sources that had been supporting the agency four years before, as well as a few new ones. JRC received money from both County and City CETA, the Department of Youth and Family Services, the State Departments of Education, Labor, and Corrections. In addition, they were looking forward to a substantial two-year subcontract with the Camden Prosecutor's Office. The Alternative School, receiving tuition money for serving socially maladjusted children, had become self-supporting.

Most key actors involved with the agency were optimistic that JRC would survive the loss of New Pride monies. The Director said, "We will institutionalize a part of the program, (but) not as New Pride. Some program pieces have already been institutionalized." He continued, "Since we don't have a large parent organization who does other things, we'll stick around."

### Program Impact

It is difficult to assess the impact of the Camden New Pride program apart from the impact of JRC, for, as has been shown, they are not two different entities. The New Pride grant was responsible for the Alternative School being started and it did stimulate JRC to accept more serious offenders as clients. These two aspects of New Pride had a discernable impact.

The Alternative School, while it did not return many students back into the public system, did take the system's most difficult problem children and provide them with educational services. The Principal saw the school being used as "a dumping ground," but said that it was able to succeed with many children who had been labeled failures by the public schools. She said, "We have helped turn students around who would never have made it otherwise."

Although JRC had served delinquents prior to New Pride, with the New Pride grant it began to function as a real alternative to incarceration for some serious offenders. The juvenile CPO testified: "We have many kids who are going to New Pride who would have gone to jail. Some of these kids have made it. That's an impact on the system."

In addition to its impact on these larger institutions, New Pride was responsible for a number of youth being helped. When JRC's Director was asked if the New Pride project had had a positive impact, he thoughtfully replied:

"We've had both dramatic successes, like the kids at the Lunchbox, and dramatic failures - some murders. The majority is in between. More kids got something out of it than just used it to beat the system. Some kids have decided they don't want to be in jail. They've gotten a job, married. They don't want to be in trouble again. Others hurt people. Some didn't get help fast enough.

"I don't think the program has hurt any kids. On the balance, more has been gained, more have been helped."

## CHICAGO NEW PRIDE

In March of 1980 the Better Boys Foundation (BBF) of Chicago was awarded an \$875,000 grant from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention to conduct a replication of the New Pride Model for two years. It was also indicated that after the two years, a third year grant could be awarded for a transition period to arrange for private and/or local government-supported funds to continue the project. The project lasted for three years, from March 1980 to May 1983.

### General Status of Local Juvenile Justice Systems

In 1983, the Juvenile Court of Cook County, Illinois was described in its information booklet as being the first juvenile court in the United States. Established on July 1, 1899, the Juvenile Court was designed to help children and their families, and at the same time, to provide protection to the public. From the passing of the first Juvenile Court Act on April 14, 1899, through its 50 plus years at its present location, the Juvenile Court has been constant in its efforts to protect the rights of children to full opportunity for normal growth and development, to protect the right of families to remain together, and to protect the right of society to safety.

During 1980, the year that Chicago New Pride (CNP) was started, the Juvenile Court of Cook County had sent 441 youths to the Illinois Department of Correction - Juvenile Division. In 1981, that figure almost doubled as 941 juveniles were incarcerated.

These increases brought about changes in the attitudes of many in the juvenile justice system toward the incarceration of juvenile offenders. It became more apparent than ever that alternatives to incarceration were needed. The posture of the State's attorney and his assistant seemed to undergo a change, as did the attitudes within the court system generally. CNP with BFF as its parent agency came into being during a time when attitudes towards alternatives to incarceration had begun to change.

## Parent Agency

Chicago is divided up onto 77 community areas. These areas grew out of tradition, for the most part; some grew out of segregated areas, for a very minor part. All of the community areas in the city share a rich tradition, a rich history, of all the residents that have lived in a particular community area. In effect, there is not only a South Side, a West Side, and a North Side of Chicago, but there is also a North Lawndale, a Humboldt Park, a Hyde Park, and so on. The Better Boys Foundation is a private, not-for-profit, community social service agency serving underprivileged youth and adults in Chicago's North Lawndale community.

Established in 1961 by a Chicago businessman from the area, the Better Boys Foundation is unique among social agencies because of its historical emphasis on educational and development programs. The programs of the agency currently operate under three broad headings: education, social development, and cultural arts. The programs are implemented by a staff of forty-five professional, para-professional, and volunteer workers. The total client population is approximately 1,500.

BBF occupies a building that originally was the gymnasium for the heavy weight contender, Archie Moore. That building is located in the North Lawndale area on the West Side of Chicago. It had been purchased in the hopes that the gym would serve as a training ground for future fighters and if not for future fighters, then it would certainly provide juveniles, according to the theory in the early 1960's, with a chance to burn up that excess energy and keep them from being involved with juvenile delinquency.

As time went on BFF came to function less as a recreational program and more as a social service agency. It began to help people in the manner of a traditional social service agency. Residents of all ages came to the agency and requested assistance in resolving personal, family, and sometimes inter-family problems. It also provided educational, social development, and cultural arts programs for the entire family.

In 1969, with the cooperation of the Chicago Board of Education, it helped to start the first outpost for high school dropouts in the city. The cooperative venture was cited by many educators and the May, 1976 issue of Time Magazine named it one of the five innovative educational programs in the country. The Farragut Outpost has since become the model for similar schools in North Lawndale. In keeping with its concern for improving the education of the youth in North Lawndale, BBF designed a unique program called Project LEAD (Leadership, Education and Development), which was funded by the Rockefeller Foundation for three years. Project LEAD provided over ninety pre-adolescents with intensive counseling, leadership training and educational opportunities.

Some of BBF's community contributions have included a major role in the development of the Lawndale Peoples Planning and Action Conference, and a leadership role in Educon, a coalition of business, school and community groups, formed in 1970 to plan and develop educational priorities. Also, BBF was chosen as one of the sites for the United Parcel Urban Intern Training Program, and helped the DeSota Corporation to develop a management training program.

Support for the Better Boys Foundation has come from a variety of sources. The chief source of funding is an annual dinner honoring the top athletes in the NFL - the National Football League Player's Association Awards Dinner. Now in its seventeenth year, the NFLPA Dinner is one of the premier events of its kind in the country, hosted by celebrities such as Buddy Hackett, Bill Cosby, Johnny Carson, and Alan King. Proceeds from the dinner sometimes exceed half a million dollars. The remainder of the agency's annual budget is obtained through foundation grants, corporate gifts, auctions, and public resources.

At the time CNP was launched, the active Board of Directors of BBF was chaired by a prominent Chicago attorney. BBF's Administrator was a well-known social worker. One of the components of BBF was a Family Development Unit (FDU). FDU included three or four programs that addressed the problems of youth who were considered unmanageable or ungovernable and consequently

had run away, youth who needed assistance to stay at home with their parents, and youth who were in need of guidance generally.

Another component that was in existence in 1980 was a theatrical troupe consisting of youth and young adults. This troupe hosted and produced some original plays, most of which had been written by playwrights in the Chicago and Midwestern area. The theatrical troupe did very well and was the pet project of the Executive Director of BBF.

With the exception of the large theatrical company, BBF was otherwise a fairly typical large city social service agency. Operating locally, BBF had seldom served youth or families outside of the North Lawndale area prior to the establishment of Chicago New Pride (CNP). The acquisition of the CNP therefore constituted a significant departure from previous programming performed by BBF.

#### Acquisition of the New Pride Grant

Large and well organized fund-raising efforts require specialized staff. The Better Boys Foundation maintained a corporate development office housed at a separate location. A talented individual who had benefitted in his youth from BBF programs was the Director of Corporate Development at the time of the New Pride initiative. He worked in a public relations capacity as well, along with a retired NFL football star. This person was deeply interested in bringing a New Pride project to Chicago, and was single-handedly responsible for the preparation of the proposal. He personally raised the \$100,000 needed for the match.

The submission process was not without problems, however. Several members of the BBF Board of Directors opposed the idea on the grounds that the project did not appear to be cost effective in relation to the number of youth to be served, and that it would represent a change in focus for BBF in terms of target population and city-wide orientation. Since the Head of Corporate

Development was the prime mover behind Chicago New Pride, and since he was also on the parent agency's Board of Directors, he was able to persuade the skeptical members to give New Pride a chance.

Just after the grant was awarded, and at the time the project was starting-up, the prime mover resigned to take a position with the American Bar Association. Though he remained on the BBF Board, he had little to do with the subsequent implementation of the New Pride program in Chicago.

#### Project Location and Facilities

The site selected by BBF for the CNP program was located in downtown Chicago, the idea being that youth coming to the project would not have to cross or enter rival gang territory. (It was assumed that many of the youth coming into the program would be involved with gangs.) The person who had written the proposal to get the initial OJJDP grant had had a major role in the selection of the site. He wanted to see BBF launch an educational program which would be accessible to all youth in the city. Nevertheless, BBF did not move, but maintained its principal offices and operation at their North Lawndale location.

A considerable amount of care and attention went into preparing the facility. As a result, the facility was laid out in a very useful and efficient manner and well geared to the needs of the program as that program had been originally envisaged. There were several classrooms, very nice individual offices for teachers and staff, a conference room, a spacious office for the director, and a large reception area. There were, however, no recreational facilities at or near the site.

#### Program Design

CNP was viewed by its own supporters as being a unique community-based alternative to incarceration that offered individualized services to serious

juvenile offenders.\* CNP was seen as being designed specifically for juveniles who had incurred multiple adjudications from the Juvenile Court and who, in great probability, would have otherwise been sent to the Department of Corrections. Juveniles were referred to the Chicago project directly from the Probation Department of Juvenile Court as a condition of probation. After the diagnostic/intake process was completed, the client was then to be assigned a counselor/advocate and begin participation on a daily basis in either the New Pride Alternative School or the Learning Disabilities program. The first phase of the program was to include a minimum of six months of intensive participation. Besides attending classes five days a week, clients were to receive one-on-one and group counseling as well as academic tutoring. The clients also were to begin a program of job preparation and training, an element of the program which was only minimally implemented. Vocational training was to be available via referrals between CNP and local vocational training programs. This, too, did not work at all as planned.

Daily contact with the clients and families was to be maintained. It was the responsibility of the counselor/advocates to ensure that no problems which might operate to the detriment of the client went undetected and untreated. The essence of the program during the first six months (the intensive phase) was to be available when help was needed and to use every available resource to provide the required assistance.

As the client neared the end of his or her first six months in the program, the objective of the counselor/advocate was to prepare the client to be more self-reliant. While contact was to be maintained with the client and his family during the last six months of the project, increasing responsibility for coping with and resolving internal and external problems which occurred was to be shifted to the family unit.

\* While the UDIS program in the Chicago area had provided alternatives to incarceration for less serious offenders, this program was to suffer serious defunding during CNP's lifetime and for all intents and purposes ceased to function.

### Administration and Staffing of the Project

The key units of Chicago New Pride as originally conceived were:

1. administration
2. education
3. counseling
4. job placement
5. diagnostic assessment
6. evaluation
7. volunteer support

The key staff were those who had responsibility for implementing the work of the key units above. Key staff were:

1. Project Director
2. Assistant Director
3. Education Coordinator
4. Counseling Coordinator
5. Diagnostic Team (consisting of the psychometrist and the learning disabilities specialist)
6. Evaluator
7. Volunteer Coordinator.

The Project Director for CNP was responsible for the overall operation of the project. She had worked in a large state bureaucracy and several small programs in Chicago, but was new to BBF. The Project Director's chief responsibilities were the management of the budget, staff supervision, and public relations. There was a difference of opinion concerning who was responsible for the maintenance and development of project resources, with the Director and

the New Pride public relations packet asserting that it was the responsibility of the BBF board. The BBF board, on the other hand, never accepted this and maintained that it belonged to the Project Director. Such divergence of views on an issue of such critical importance did not auger well for project continuation beyond the period of Federal support.

The Assistant Director had the responsibility for managing the daily operations of CNP. The Assistant Director coordinated each of the program functions and generally assisted the Project Director in the internal management of the project. The person holding this position was also to have the principal role in maintaining positive relations with the Juvenile Court of Cook County, the Chicago Police Department, and other institutions whose cooperation was vital to the success of the project.

The Education Coordinator was responsible for the management of the Chicago New Pride Alternative School and the Learning Disabilities Center. In this capacity, the Education Coordinator was to ensure that the Alternative School and the Learning Disabilities Center were properly staffed at all times. Responsibilities included developing strategies to improve upon educational service delivery to clients, establishing positive relationships with the public schools where New Pride clients had been in attendance, and working closely with the diagnostic team to ensure that all test data were properly interpreted and recorded. The Educational Director was also to perform regular teaching duties in the New Pride Alternative School.

The Counseling Coordinator was responsible for the supervision of all counseling staff, which originally was to include two counselor advocates, one learning disabilities counselor, and two vocational counselors. The counseling coordinator was also to maintain a small caseload. Other responsibilities were to include participating in the intake process, providing advice to the Diagnostic Team and counselors, and being chiefly responsible for developing and implementing the approved treatment plan for each client. The Counseling Coordinator was also to act as the primary liaison to the Juvenile Court of Cook County and participate in all pre-screenings to determine client eligibility for the project.

The Diagnostic Team was to consist of a psychometrist and a learning disabilities specialist. These specialists, with the input of the counseling and education coordinators and the Assistant Director were to perform functions related to intake and diagnostic assessment of each CNP referral. The learning disabilities specialist was to assist in the work of the Learning Disabilities Center.

The Volunteer Coordinator was to have primary responsibility for the recruitment, assessment, and management of volunteers for CNP. CNP volunteers were to perform various functions in the project. They were to assist at the Alternative School and the Learning Disabilities Center. They were also to help organize special events related to the project. In addition, a cadre of volunteers was to work closely with the counseling staff in providing services to families.

All the staff of CNP were to be carefully screened by a committee consisting of select Advisory Board members and BBF staff leadership. Volunteers were also to be assessed prior to their acceptance into the program. In this way it was felt that persons of questionable moral character would be kept from serving in a staff or volunteer capacity.

#### **Some Special Staff Issues and Concerns**

Most of CNP's teaching staff were very dedicated. Two particularly stood out. These two teachers extended themselves in many different ways. Since, however, they were Board of Education teachers, they followed the Board contract, which created separateness and disharmony within the staff. This became particularly evident during staff meetings when at 3 p.m. the Board of Education teachers would simply rise and leave, feeling that their work day had concluded. Another staff person, who taught math, was also very dedicated. She and two other teachers would often remain long after the normal working day concluded to work on their materials and/or with the juveniles.

There were problems in finding and hiring several key staff. Once hired there were some problems in turnover. The staff at Chicago New Pride tended overall to be quite stable, compared to that of other projects. Turnover in both line and administrative staff was rather low. Notable exceptions were the slots of director of alternative education, which turned over three times in the course of three years, and the diagnostician slot, which seemed to have been filled by an endless succession of people. Staff positions did not offer a high pay scale for the level of professional sought, particularly in the case of the diagnostician position. Another problem was that the staff who were hired tended to have backgrounds which did not equip them to work in an experienced manner with juvenile delinquents, let alone juveniles who had committed extremely serious offenses. In-service training might have helped this situation, but it was not provided.

#### **Staff Morale**

Staff morale and communications began to fall off measurably soon after the initial honeymoon period. The evaluator observed that when he thought that morale had reached its lowest point, he was surprised at how much lower it continued to go.

Problems involving client behavior with which staff had to contend nearly daily included such things as discipline problems both in the facility and on field trips, and pot smoking and stealing on the premises. Staff got increasingly discipline and rule-minded. The program evaluator felt that more staff training would have helped. Increasing numbers of staff wanted to "get out"; some were fired.

Some staff indicated that the Project Director was another cause of their morale problems. Primarily an administrator, the Director seemed to have a difficult time in developing the program along the lines that had been specified in the original proposal. She, in fact, gave little energy to implementing the employment component. The diagnostic aspect of the program was never fully

realized. Five diagnosticians came and went. Eventually, testing became the responsibility of the Board of Education, who sent someone over to the project on Wednesday mornings. Teaching staff did not wait for the testing to be done. Rather, they conducted their own brief tests to find out where the youth were in reading and in math. Various staff positions were left unfilled for varying lengths of time. Individualized Service Plans were never fully developed or utilized. While there was team work amongst the staff, the Director was not really involved.

#### **Advisory Board and Ad Hoc Planning Committees**

The Advisory Board for CNP was constituted of 20 individuals who represented a wide range of expertise considered helpful to CNP in the areas of service delivery, resource development, program management, and public relations. The CNP Advisory Board was to meet on a monthly basis. Meetings were to be hosted on a rotating basis by the various members of the Board.

The Advisory Board participated consistently in the development and planning of CNP. After an initial meeting in which the prospective members of the Advisory Board were given the background information on the Denver model, the decision was made to establish committees for the purpose of assisting in the planning of the project. Ad Hoc Planning Committees were created to focus on the following subjects: Education, Mental Health/Diagnostic Assessment, Employment and Training, Legal Rights, Volunteer Support and Evaluation and Management.

Meetings were set for each of the various committees and it was in these committee meetings that the Advisory Board members were to make their input relative to the structure of the particular component. The development of the program design was to reflect the input and advice of every individual on the Advisory Board.

Once the project was underway, the Advisory Board was to play a major role in determining how best to oversee the entire operation of the project. The Board was to serve as primary decision makers in matters of policy, fiscal accountability, and project management. In an effort to help to ensure continuity with the overall governance of the Better Boys Foundation, the president of the BBF Board and the BBF Executive Director were to participate on the CNP Advisory Board as ex-officio members. Several of these key principals were engaged in ongoing disputes, and they injected these conflicts into Board interactions. As a result, the potential effectiveness of the Advisory Board was seriously diminished.

#### **Program Components**

The program components to be described briefly here are the following: education, counseling, job placement, diagnostic assessment, evaluation, and volunteer support.

##### **Education Component**

The educational component was to be comprised of two parts: the Alternative School and the Learning Disabilities Center. With respect to their facilities, both the Alternative School and the Learning Disabilities Center were to use common space, equipment, and supplies. The LD Center, however, was never fully implemented.

##### **The Alternative School**

The Alternative School was to involve three teachers provided by the Chicago Board of Education. A fourth teacher/administrator was to function as the Educational Coordinator for both the Alternative School and the Learning Disabilities Center. New Pride counselors were to work closely with the



teaching staff in assisting students who wished to re-enroll in the public school system. This reintegration function was never fully carried out, partly because of other more immediate priorities, and partly because no single person focused in an effective way on carrying out the function.

Each student was to be interviewed by a teacher to determine his or her interest and educational goals. Following this interview, the teacher was to consult with the client's counselor and the psychologist to determine a precise, individualized plan of instruction for the client. Lesson plans were to be developed to remediate areas of weakness as evidenced in results of the WRAT. As previously noted, this regularly failed to occur as planned.

As in the Denver model, the Alternative School was to emphasize student interests and strengths with a view to establishing a solid basis for further learning. Instruction was to be designed to be intensive and tailored to the individual. Most teaching was to occur on a one-to-one basis or in small groups, and all New Pride clients were to assemble regularly for a lecture on a topic of current interest. Such lectures were planned to be entertaining, informative, and inspirational. This aspect of the educational component was perhaps the most most effectively carried out.

CNP clients were technically enrolled in a West Side high school, which received the stipends for them. The Alternative School was allowed to give credit by the Chicago Board of Education and credits would be applied towards graduation if the client opted to re-enroll in the regular public school system. As the school reintegration role was never fully implemented, few returned to school and made use of this provision.

#### Learning Disabilities Center

The Learning Disabilities Center was to duplicate the Denver model. In cases where visual, auditory, motor, or language dysfunctions were detected, further refined tests were to be administered to determine the nature of the

disability. Process tests which measured such dysfunction were to be used to help to define a specific pattern of learning disability which could then be used to develop a prescription for further learning. The primary focus of therapy at the Learning Disabilities Center was to have been on remediating the most common learning disabilities observed in the client population.

Difficulties in hiring and keeping appropriate staff, the placing of higher priorities elsewhere, and problems of apparent inertia on the part of the Director stood as barriers in the way of implementing these efforts as planned. As a result, this component never got off the ground.

#### Special Aspects of the Educational Component

A particularly noteworthy aspect of the educational component was the attention given to remedial and developmental approaches to the learning of basic skills. A broad array of instruments and materials had been purchased to use in implementing multi-media lesson plans. The visual and auditory dimensions of the program stressed simulation activities and encouraged the formation of automatic skill responses. All multi-media lessons were correlated with workbook or copymaster exercises for individual application. The entire word attack and phonics program was to be cross-correlated to psychotechnics materials and was to allow for both diagnostic testing and prescriptive teaching on a group or individual basis. Owing to problems noted earlier these potentials were never fully realized.

#### Cultural, Physical, and Health Education

Cultural Education consisted of a variety of experiences designed to introduce all clients to the various forms of culture. Students visited such places as the Art Institute, the Museum of Science and Industry, the Dusable Museum, the Museum of Contemporary Art, and the Oriental Art Museum. These efforts proved fairly successful, although there were major discipline problems which marred their success from time to time.

Physical Education was to be a structured part of the program and was designed to teach self-awareness, group interaction, cooperation, and interdependence in a supervised environment. Clients were to be taken to Navy Pier Gymnasium once a week to participate in team sports. Also, students were to be given instruction in swimming and yoga through a program offered by the central YMCA college. These efforts began but were very short lived, owing to discipline, logistic, and other problems.

Health Education was a part of a special Survival Skills Program focused on hygiene, sex, health, drugs, and career awareness. Health Education emphasized the importance of a sound body and mind. Personal health care and nutritional education were among the subjects offered. Videotapes, films, lectures, and other methods were used. Lectures given by volunteers from Mt. Sinai Hospital, the Planned Parenthood Center, Red Cross, and the Mile Square Health Center were a regular feature of the Health Education Program. Visits to the courts were also scheduled on at least one occasion. Clients met with the judges and asked questions after hearing a case dealing with drug trafficking.

#### **Intensive Supervision Component**

Intensive supervision was both client- and family-oriented. Counselor caseloads were not to exceed 15 active cases, and the entire family unit was considered part of the counselor/advocate's caseload.

Based on the results of the initial assessment, the counselor/advocate participated in the development of a treatment plan for the client and his family. The plan focused on problems which could be readily resolved, such as a job placement for an out-of-work adult, a referral to a public agency for additional assistance if it were warranted, etc. A key facet of the intensive supervision component was its emphasis on providing concrete services and aggressive advocacy on behalf of the client and his family.

Individual, family, and group counseling were provided by counselor/advocates on a regular basis. Counselor/advocates were to maintain detailed casenotes on all client and family contacts and, if it were necessary for a client to appear in court, the counselor/advocate would appear with him to provide whatever documentation he or she had that might be helpful to the client. One of the major responsibilities of the counselor/advocate was to begin preparing the client to assume more responsibility for his actions after the intensive phase of New Pride ended.

The person responsible for for court liaison was the Counseling Coordinator, who reviewed each case at the time of referral. All available material on the youth was presented to the liaison at this time and he discussed with the youth's prospective treatment plan with the probation officer. The court liaison also established a regular case conference schedule with the probation officer (minimum of once a month) to evaluate the progress of the plan. A written report was submitted by New Pride when an unusual incident occurred or when a change of plan or residence was implemented.

Overall, the Intensive Supervision Component was implemented with a good degree of success. It was not, however, informed as it might have been by a strong, ongoing, and updated team assessment effort. Also, the counselors did not receive any in-service training that might have helped them do a better job and stave off burn-out. Further, there did not appear to be any common therapeutic orientation which might have helped the program by providing a common and reinforcing thrust to the efforts of the staff. The holistic provision of service delivery, which is a cornerstone of the New Pride model, was effectively mastered by the teachers and the counselors in CNP.

#### **Employment Component**

The employment component of the program was to focus on job preparation and job placement. As in the Denver model, the component had originally been designed to introduce clients to the world of work and its expectations.

Emphasis was to be placed on providing clients with a meaningful employment experience, through which they could earn income for work performed.

At the outset CNP had entered into a collaborative relationship with the Jobs for Youth Program. Jobs for Youth was a newly established program which provided vocational assessment and orientation, pre-placement and job readiness counseling, job placement, job follow-up, and job upgrading. The program was to provide a two year tracking service on all placements and also provide referral and supportive services. Jobs for Youth was also to provide the following educational services: 1) work-related competency-based education; 2) individualized instruction on pre-GED training and on-the-job related skills and; 3) individualized instruction on planning, organization, and goal setting for career and life planning.

One New Pride vocational counselor was to be based at the Jobs for Youth program and to handle all of the project's referrals to Jobs for Youth counselors. Although based at Jobs for Youth, he was to be accountable only to CNP. The remaining vocational counselor for CNP was to work intensively with youth at New Pride headquarters to prepare them for referral to Jobs for Youth. The counselors were also to have responsibility for locating new jobs within the private sector for New Pride clients.

The relationship between CNP and Jobs for Youth although planned, never fully materialized. Instead, the counselors at CNP had to seek out job placements themselves. One attempt was made to hire a job developer, but he did not work out.

Problems in finding jobs for New Pride clients in Chicago seemed almost insurmountable. Employers in the area were generally not open to considering serious juvenile offenders for employment. There were locally tight restrictions on the employment of younger and non-union workers in many job categories. If a job could be found, frequently it could not be used if it required travel through the territories of rival gangs. Travel distances were also a problem.

The Project Director had no familiarity with job programs in the city, nor with their effective implementation. This meant that she could provide no guidance when it came to the employment component, and that it was more easily de-emphasized. For all intents and purposes, although some clients got jobs, CNP had no functioning employment component. No businesses were started that could employ project youth. Job readiness skills and career awareness were taught in the classroom.

#### **Volunteer Component**

Volunteer support for CNP was seen as an important ingredient in the overall success of the project. The Retired Teachers Association was to provide volunteer teachers to assist in the New Pride Alternative School and the Learning Disabilities Center. The Commander of the Youth Division of the Chicago Police Department was to provide some of his men to serve on a voluntary basis in a "Big Brother" type program, taking New Pride clients to baseball or football games, to movies, and other events. Also, student interns from Chicago State University were to be recruited to serve on a voluntary basis. Finally, the CNP Advisory Board committee on volunteer support developed a plan to get the parents of New Pride clients involved in the project on a volunteer basis. Very little of what was planned actually materialized.

#### **Diagnostic/Intake Component**

Upon referral, a complete diagnosis of the client was to be conducted. This diagnosis was to include intelligence testing, attitudinal and aptitudinal assessment, a psychological test, achievement tests, a diagnostic medical examination, and, if necessary, further tests to determine learning or behavioral disorders. Also an individualized needs assessment which took into consideration family, employment, legal, and transportation concerns was to be conducted. Following this, a treatment plan tailored to the particular needs of the individual client was to be developed. This was to be developed with the client's approval.

None of these objectives was met in a consistent and effective manner, due to the sporadic occupation of the diagnostic positions, staffing problems, and because other, more pressing service delivery concerns took priority.

A unique necessity to label clients as "behavior disordered" in order that they might qualify for special services through the Chicago Board of Education eventually rendered the LD category obsolete. If they were "behavior-disordered," clients qualified for transportation money to get to and from the project (an "L" stop was right outside the facility), as well as for health and other kinds of services.

#### Data Collection and Project Evaluation

Before the replication award was granted, CNP enlisted the support of a professional information service, Data-Aide, to develop basic procedures and systems necessary for the collection, storage, and retrieval of project-related data. After initial discussions with them, they recommended that Pacific Institute assume those responsibilities. Approximately 15 percent of the CNP budget had been earmarked for the Management Information System.

While the MIS never operated up to its potential at CNP because of lack of emphasis and management support, the qualitative aspects of program evaluation were thorough and useful in clarifying the problems, potentials, and levels of effectiveness. The evaluator established himself as a highly respected and helpful member of the staff. Teachers indicated that he had participated in extra-curricular courses teaching clients about electronics and computers. One said,

"He really got some kids started in that and that's something they'll take with them forever. And to see a male in a role where he isn't dominant and doesn't have to be in control of everything; he can lose; all those types of things. . . Coming without tie and suit, he goes over there and sits down with the kids and actually spends some time with them."

The data file with test score information was inadequately maintained in Chicago because insufficient testing was done on the clients. The service plans were never really used as designed, to develop individualized treatment objectives for clients. Rather, a less precise tracking, or level system was employed. Information regarding the backgrounds and attitudes of project youth was more systematically collected, as well as service delivery and termination data. Offense history information was especially complete, and the Chicago evaluator continued to update information on clients and comparison subjects past the time the project was terminated. He also continued the updates at the Kansas City site, which closed after its third year.

#### Eligibility Criteria

Start-up client intake was slow due to the major problems of interface between OJJDP guidelines for eligible referrals and the methods of operation of the Cook County Juvenile Court. Often the clients who did meet the guidelines had an extensive juvenile offense history characterized, for example, by nineteen station house adjustments for separate offenses before the first adjudication, several additional offenses before the second, and more for the third. There was a procedure whereby the public defenders office would convince the prosecuting attorney to drop charges that were "tried together" at one hearing, except for one, perhaps the most serious of the group.

It was often difficult to get an adjudication for any but the most serious offenses. Sometimes the offender was sent to the Department of Corrections (DOC) after one adjudication if the offense was serious enough. If it was a property crime or other less serious offense, witnesses were much less likely to see the case through to its actual conclusion. As a result, over half of all cases that were remanded to juvenile court in the early years of New Pride were dropped entirely or settled without a finding, according to published figures of the Cook County Juvenile Court.

Because of the overall difficulties of getting a case to adjudication, and attendant time delays (which could amount to ten months or more from the date of the arrest) the number of eligible clients under OJJDP guidelines requiring three adjudications for placement in Project New Pride were relatively few. This did not mean that there weren't many serious offenders in the city of Chicago. But it did mean that it was a rare person who acquired three formal adjudications without having already been sent to the Department of Corrections. If they had been sent to the DOC, they were ineligible for New Pride under the original guidelines. (Guidelines were amended in 1983 to admit youth under reintegration provisions.)

The problem was compounded by the 1980 decision of the Illinois Supreme Court to uphold the Habitual Offenders Act, despite dissenting briefs filed by the Juvenile Court Judges in Chicago. Under this Act, any child who had been adjudicated three times was automatically labeled a Habitual Offender and had to be remanded to the DOC. The Act was upheld by a unanimous decision of the high court justices.

Because of these procedures of the Court, it was clear that when Chicago New Pride began it would have a problem finding eligible clients. The proposal preparer was not at fault, since a guideline consisting of only two adjudications had been alledged in the solicitation for the action grants. Nevertheless, after three months of start-up, from August through October, the intake at New Pride had not exceeded 10 clients. This created problems for the staff, as well as for the project administration. On the one hand, there was a problem keeping a program running with more staff than clients and on the other, there was the problem of justifying the existence of so many "highly paid professionals" that were working with so few juveniles.

There was also the problem of explaining the criteria to the juvenile court officials, both probation officers and judges. When many of these individuals realized that CNP was asking for three-time adjudicated youngsters, they were most reluctant to leave such juveniles in the community. It was their opinion that these juveniles should be sent to the Department of Corrections. As time

went on, however, because of personnel changes in key political positions, a "get-tough" policy with juveniles and juvenile delinquents was initiated. As a result, many more cases were filed for court action. It eventually became easier to find qualified youngsters. However, these juveniles on the whole had records that were not as serious as the juveniles who had come into the program originally.

In February of 1981, a change was made by OJJDP in the criteria for eligibility. After this happened, it became much easier to identify eligible referrals. Problems in getting clients into the program still persisted, but not to the extent they had previously. New guidelines operationalized in Chicago at this time and for the remainder of the program stated that to be eligible for CNP, a juvenile had to be:

1. Between 14 and 17 years old,
2. Have at least one felony adjudication and two prior judicial determinations of criminal involvement\* exclusive of murder and rape, and
3. Reside in the City of Chicago within the guidelines for eligibility established by the Justice Department.

#### Program Linkages, Impacts, and Related Concerns

##### Juvenile Justice System

The most important program linkage that CNP needed to establish was with the Juvenile Court. The cooperation of the Juvenile Court was key to the New Pride Project, since all the referrals of clients were to come through the Juvenile Court.

At the outset CNP had been able to establish a very close rapport with the Presiding Judge and with the Chief Probation Officer. Both of these court

\* At first this had been "adjudications." Later "adjudications" was changed to "findings." This change considerably eased CNP's difficulties in obtaining referrals from the courts.

officials were enthusiastic about the idea of community-based treatment and both saw the need for an alternative to incarceration and probation. They willingly cooperated in providing CNP with the clients it was designed to serve. As time went on, this positive relationship weakened slightly, although it always remained good. Part of the problem was owing to the failure on the part of the Director to maintain communications. The eligibility criteria had also caused conflict. Additionally, because the court liaison functions ended up being part of the responsibilities of the counseling supervisor, who was also the assistant project director, they were not carried out with the kind of concentration, skill, and tenacity which was needed in the situation. Ideally, this should have been a full-time position.

In 1982, although referrals were accepted on a regular basis from the court, communication with new probation officers was not aggressively pursued. As a consequence, some of the referrals (about one out of five) were of youth already on probation, such that participation in the program could not be made a special condition of the probation contract. This had the effect of making the consequences of non-participation less clear to the youth involved.

### Schools

The next major linkage other than the Juvenile Court which was essential was with the Board of Education. In the original proposal an agreement was to be pursued between the Board of Education and BBF through CNP. The agreement, which was implemented, allowed as many as two or three Board of Education special education certified teachers to be assigned to Project New Pride as a donation or in-kind service. Two of these teachers who remained with CNP proved to be dedicated and effective.

The operation of the New Pride Alternative School was routed through a bureaucratic system in such a way that all of the clients had their previous academic records transferred to Farragut High School, a high school which was on the West Side of Chicago and in the same district as Better Boys Foundation.

This meant that all of the contact with the system went through this particular high school. Farragut High School had a reputation for being "tough," and was often closed for gang warfare problems.

In addition to the problems of Farragut High School, the reputation of the Chicago Public School System as a viable alternative to parochial or private school was quite poor. It does not seem surprising, given the problems facing the school system, that CNP had only lukewarm support from the superintendent of public schools and the school system generally. In the view of the evaluator, this reluctance on the part of those in the school system to get behind CNP's efforts and provide needed support could be traced in some part to feelings of territoriality and fear of possibly being made to look bad. How would it look if juveniles in the Alternative School which was using school system materials and teachers outperformed juveniles of similar ages within the regular school system? How would it look if CNP succeeded where the school system had failed?

Despite obstacles such as these there were some positive connections between the Board of Education and CNP. Some Board of Education personnel made it a point to promote the project both within the Board and in the community. Some doors were thereby opened to CNP which made it possible for CNP clients to participate in such things as field trips and special education events which took place in and around the city.

### Youth Serving Agencies

CNP was not successful in establishing many linkages with various youth-serving agencies. A case in point was Jobs for Youth, which was located on the second floor of the same building as CNP. Jobs for Youth was a not-for-profit agency that assisted teenagers in obtaining employment. Initially it was to provide for the employment counseling and placement needs of CNP clients. The nature of the services which were to be provided by this organization are described in the Employment Component section above. As also noted there, this plan was never implemented.

A few linkages, however, were made. One youth-serving agency with which CNP was able to work was the Plano Institute, which was designed to provide optometry services for low-income families, particularly black families on the South Side of Chicago. In addition, an informal agreement was worked out with the Youth Guidance Network to assist clients (if possible) with their reentry to public school. This effort was not markedly successful.

CNP's linkage with BBF was problematic and was, in fact, never strong. For example, when performances or programs were held at BBF, participants from CNP seldom had an opportunity to see them or participate, and vice versa. This had a great deal to do with the leadership of BBF and the leadership of CNP. Oddly enough, the Executive Vice President of BBF never offered CNP the kind of assistance it so needed to deal with programmatic matters and problems. In his meetings with the CNP director, he seemed to concern himself only with personnel matters and not with the more critical issues affecting the success or failure of CNP. This was apparently due, at least in part, to the overwhelming problems he faced in this role with the parent agency.

The fact BBF chose to have a downtown location for its New Pride site, while maintaining its principal offices and operation elsewhere meant that in fact two programs were operating simultaneously under the name of the Better Boys Foundation. The Project Director had been hired from outside the agency and did not have adequate influence within it. The staff that became part of the New Pride Program never felt that they were part of the Better Boys Foundation, and the Better Boys Foundation, located on the West Side, never felt that the New Pride staff were part, "of anything more than a small, overpaid, aloof group that worked in the Loop."

#### **Institutionalization**

The original strategy for institutionalization of CNP was an ambitious one. It involved seeking separate financial and in-kind support for the various components of the project from a variety of sources. This primarily involved

seeking funding from sources where there existed a precedent for involvement in any of the key activities related to management and service delivery. Efforts at implementing this strategy were to be undertaken in collaboration with the BBF Development Office. The Project Director for CNP was to maintain and develop the institutional relationships necessary to ensure the continued functioning of the project after federal funding ceased. The actual efforts of the Project Director to institutionalize the program were, according to two harsh critics, meagre and ineffectual. It is instructive to note that early on the Project Director had stated her belief in an interview that fund raising and institutionalization were BBF's responsibilities and not CNP's. She in fact stated that she "would not want to do anything that (would) be in conflict with (BBF)."

A close observer commented that the political climate of the Better Boys Foundation at the time of the project's implementation doomed it from its inception. The proposal writer and the BBF Executive Director were at odds and at various times they continued their battle, using the vehicle of New Pride as the means. In the last year of CNP, the prime mover returned to take over the position of the Executive Director. By this time, it was too late for him to do much to save the project. New Pride staff made last minute efforts to obtain funding from Illinois Title XX allocations and from the McCormick Foundation, but were not successful.

#### **Strengths and Weaknesses**

Strengths of this project included the following:

1. The educational and counseling components were strong and effective.
2. For the most part, staff retained a spirit of dedication despite lack of support from the project's management.
3. The program evaluation function seemed to be carried out in a particularly useful manner.

4. The project did provide a meaningful alternative to incarceration in spite of the fact that its full potential failed to be realized.

Several major weaknesses were evident. These included the following:

1. Organizational and political conflict within BBF and between BBF and CNP stood in the way of sound program development and institutionalization, with prospects for institutionalization being very bleak from the outset.
2. The Project Director did not believe it was her responsibility to see that the project was institutionalized.
3. The overall effectiveness of the Project Director was called into question early on. An early and consistent indication was low staff morale. The Director was unable to implement the full New Pride model, in particular, the employment component and LD Center.
4. The eligibility criteria to which the project had to adhere, particularly during the first year of the project, made getting adequate numbers of clients extremely difficult.
5. The staff did not seem well suited to dealing with serious juvenile offenders and while their attempts were laudable considering their lack of experience, they would likely have benefited from continuing in-service training aimed at helping equip them better.

#### Ways in Which CNP Differed From the Model

The project as established in Chicago was substantially different from the New Pride model. The initial attempt to subcontract the employment component was a case in point. That this component, along with the diagnostic and Learning Disabilities remediation components were never effectively implemented, are others. Another difference from the model lay in the fact that pre-GED training was given no attention to speak of within CNP. The teaching staff seemed to reason that the clients were not qualified to take the GED exam if they did prepare, given that they were too young to meet the test's eligibility requirements. This view did not seem to be shared by other sites.

#### Summation

The establishment of the program in Chicago, despite an enormous need in the city for the New Pride alternative, was seen by senior administrative staff as tenuous. The BBF board basically ignored the project once it was set up in its neutral loop territory. It was the first BBF program that had 1) a city-wide focus (other programs are on the West Side) and 2) a focus on serious juvenile offenders (other programs are more family and prevention-centered). It was seen as an oddity by some members of the board and as unreasonably expensive to operate by others. The CNP Director had no previously established credibility with BBF, so despite her arguments, the project was never taken seriously as a "cause" that should be adopted. Because New Pride in Chicago failed to convince the BBF Board of Directors of its value, it was unable to engender the aggressive support necessary to insure the institutionalization of the project with non-Federal funds.

In summing up the project generally, the evaluator assessed the results of CNP in the following way:

"Many juveniles who might have been significantly helped, were not; some juveniles who could have received some help were not helped at all; and some juveniles who were not helped as fully as they might have been were somehow treated and somehow educated. In no way, however, did the project reach the potential which it might have reached."



## FRESNO NEW PRIDE

In March, 1980, the Fresno County Economic Opportunities Commission (EOC) received a two year grant from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention totaling \$325,640 for the purpose of replicating the Denver New Pride model in Fresno. Fresno New Pride (FNP) was one of the four sites to survive through the fourth year of federal support and one of three to continue to operate on local support. Through April of 1984 supplemental funds were granted by the California Offices of Criminal Justice Planning and of Economic Opportunities. Since that time other funding sources have also been enlisted.

### General Status of Local Juvenile Justice System Efforts

In the time period from 1973-77, a few years prior to the time that EOC submitted its proposal, total active probation case loads in Fresno had increased dramatically. While California's total active case loads had dropped 3.5%, Fresno's had grown by 58.2%. Serious juvenile offenses had been a significant contributory factor in this increase. The District Attorney filings of delinquency petitions increased from 1,753 for fiscal year 1976-77 to 2,106 for fiscal year 1977-78, an increase of 21% with indications reported in the EOC proposal that this would increase 26% during 1978-79. This increase was occurring in spite of the fact that the population in the age group 15-19 had been decreasing proportionately.

### Adjudicatory Process Prior to the Time the Grant was Awarded

When a juvenile was confronted by law enforcement officers for an alleged offense, the officers had several choices of procedure. The officer could (1) release the minor, or (2) prepare a written notice for the minor to appear before a probation officer at a time and place specified in the notice, or (3) the officer could deliver the minor, in custody, to juvenile hall without unnecessary delay.

If the minor was delivered to the juvenile hall, a crime report was to be forwarded to the juvenile's probation officer for review and processing.

The Probation Department, after reviewing the case, had two options. The minor could be put on informal probation or the probation department could refer the crime reports to the District Attorney's Office along with a request that a petition be filed on the minor.

The District Attorney's Office filed the petition if there appeared to be legal sufficiency of the charges. If the minor was detained, the petition had to be filed within forty-eight (48) hours and a detention hearing held the next day if the alleged offense was a felony. If the alleged offense was a misdemeanor, the petition had to be filed and the detention hearing held within 48 hours. If the minor was not in custody, an arraignment hearing would be scheduled after the petition was filed.

At the detention/arraignment hearing the minor was to be advised of the charges, and of his rights to counsel; the issue of the minor's placement pending any further hearings was to be decided; and a confirmation hearing was to be scheduled within five (5) court days. The purpose of that hearing was to decide if the case would be going to court and how long the case would take to adjudicate.

At the jurisdictional/adjudication hearing, a judge or court-appointed referee would determine whether the petition was true or untrue. At this stage of the proceedings, the minor specifically was entitled to all the rights and privileges of any criminal defendant. If the petition was found untrue, the case would be dismissed. If the petition was found to be true, a disposition hearing would be scheduled. The minor and/or his parents would then have the right to a rehearing, or if denied a rehearing, an appeal of the court's decision.

At the dispositional hearing, the probation department was to submit a social report to the court. The court was also to consider any other relevant information from the minor, the minor's attorney, the minor's parents and the

District Attorney. The court would then make dispositional orders based on all the information received. The minor and/or his parents would have the right to a rehearing, or if a rehearing were denied, an appeal of the court's dispositional orders.

All court orders were subject to review and modification based upon changed circumstances. At each of those hearings the minor was entitled to counsel and all procedural rights of due process.

#### Services Available Prior to New Pride

Prior to FNP's involvement in the Fresno community, the continuum of services for youth offenders was not extensive. Community programs designed to serve youth offenders focused more on those categorized as "at risk" of entering the justice system, rather than on those already involved. Two drop-in centers were in operation, and although staffed by "counselors", the primary purpose of the centers was to provide recreational opportunities for youth in an attempt to keep them off the streets. There were also two residential programs for status offenders.

On the other end of the continuum, the county operates the C. K. Wakefield School for Boys, a long-term detention facility for Fresno County court-committed youth. The Probation Department operates the STAR program, an educational program which intensively monitors school attendance in conjunction with weekly court scheduled school reviews. However, nowhere did a program exist as comprehensive as New Pride. If a youth was not a serious offender, there were drop-in centers for him to attend. If he was a chronic, serious offender he was incarcerated. Everyone in between was simply on probation and assigned to a field Probation Officer for supervision.

#### Acquisition of the New Pride Grant

The Chairman of the Criminology Department at California State University - Fresno first heard of the proposed New Pride Replication and contacted the District Attorney. This was in August, 1979, and the proposal was due in September. Much groundwork had to be laid to meet the September deadline. It was decided that, if interested, the Fresno County Economic Opportunities Commission (EOC) was the most appropriate agency to manage New Pride. Their experience with youth offenders included the operation of a home for status offenders.

The EOC proposal to replicate the New Pride model in Fresno provided a means of increasing the dispositional options available to the Juvenile Court. The prospect of having additional options available seemed welcomed. The Presiding Juvenile Court Judge in 1979 is quoted in EOC's proposal as stating that "it is crucial (that) the (juvenile court) have alternative rehabilitative measures available for disposition for serious offenders." She stated her readiness "to refer adjudicated minors who (had) a history of serious offenses (to the proposed program)." Similar pledges from other components of the juvenile justice system were gathered in support of the proposal.

The Executive Director of EOC felt that New Pride would be an appropriate project to operate under this agency, and assigned the task of developing the proposal to the Deputy Director of Special Projects. This individual remained intimately involved for the majority of the first year, and less actively to date.

The four key individuals responsible for the development of the proposal included the EOC Deputy Director, the District Attorney, the Chairman of the Criminology Department at California State University-Fresno and the Chief Probation Officer. Strong outside support was provided by the Juvenile Court

Judge who was, herself, personally sympathetic to alternatives to incarceration and took responsibility for gathering much of the statistical data needed for the proposal.

### **The Parent Agency**

The Fresno County EOC was created in 1965 as one of the Community Action agencies to combat the War on Poverty. It is a not-for-profit community-based agency governed by an elected Board of Directors. At the time the New Pride proposal was submitted, EOC had a 15 year performance record of human service delivery with an annual operating budget of \$10 million.

The parent agency's mandate was to assist low income residents of Fresno County to become self sufficient. Some of EOC's major programs had included Head Start Pre-School, meals to seniors, family planning, minor home repair and weatherization, summer youth employment and the DSO (status offender) home.

### **Project Facility**

As soon as the grant was awarded, attention turned to locating a suitable facility. One was found which was part of a small office complex across town from EOC. It had individual offices, a kitchen, a small recreation room and an upstairs area consisting of three larger rooms which were to house the school. It was located just north of the downtown business district in an area which was culturally diverse and "neutral territory" with respect to the youth the program would be serving.

### **Program Design, Administration and Staffing**

In the administration of the grant, Fresno County EOC assumed responsibility for bookkeeping, payroll, and related fiscal procedures, and

assigned the Deputy Director to oversee the implementation of the project. The Deputy Director also took responsibility for procuring all needed office equipment and supplies.

### **Staffing**

The first staff position filled was that of the Evaluator. This position was filled immediately prior to the PIRE training session held in May, 1980. In June, the EOC Personnel Committee approved the hiring of the Project Director, Educational Coordinator, and Counseling Supervisor. These key individuals were responsible for much of the early preparation and organization of the office. A considerable amount of their time was spent reviewing the replication manuals from Denver and preparing materials which would be used to train new staff.

Though notification of the grant award was received in March, 1980, the target date for acceptance of the first youth into the program was August. Unlike other agencies that were already functioning entities, FNP started literally from scratch, and needed the first few months to set up a physical operation. Therefore, the remainder of the staff began in late July or early August, and included four Counselors, an Employment Coordinator, a Volunteer/School Reintegration Coordinator and a Remedial Education Instructor.

The project planned to accept youth on a continuous admission basis, rather than by cohorts, and planned to serve 75 youth during the first year of operation. It was anticipated that all youth would be enrolled in the Alternative School, which would operate for three hours, Monday through Thursday mornings. Although no formal academic work was scheduled on Friday, youth were required to attend structured recreational activities.

Rather than hire a psychometrist as the original model indicated, it was decided that while the client census was low at the beginning of the program, the testing responsibility would rest with the Educational Coordinator. She also supervised two instructors and had classroom responsibilities as well.

The only other deviation from the suggested initial staffing pattern included the positions of Data Coder and Speech and Language Instructor. These positions were not deemed essential in the program's early stages, and the positions were never filled.

#### **The Advisory Board**

The first Advisory Board meeting was held in August, 1980. Members attending the first meeting included some powerful community leaders: the District Attorney, the D.A.'s Administrative Assistant, the Director of Juvenile Probation, the Director of C. K. Wakefield School, the Chairman of the Fresno State Criminology Department, the past and present Juvenile Court Judges, the Chairman of the Juvenile Justice Commission, as well as representatives from the Police Department, the school district and the community as a whole. Many of these individuals had been involved since the project's inception and had a vested interest in seeing that the program was off to a successful start.

Meetings of the Advisory Board were held monthly and members of the Board participated actively on working committees. Standing committees of the Board focussed on the following: Public Relations, Youth Advocacy, Program Review, and Membership.

#### **Program Implementation**

During the start-up phase, several changes took place. The Project Director quit in July, barely one month into the job. Her resignation stated that her decision was "based on (her) opinion that the project could not succeed." Her decision also may have been influenced by some actions on the part of the Counseling Supervisor. He was frustrated with the typical start-up problems, particularly the seemingly cumbersome hiring procedure followed by EOC. The first four staff hired were white anglo, and there reportedly had been some comments by the EOC Board concerning the ethnicity of the staff given the

population of youth to be served. The Counseling Supervisor felt the EOC Board had begun to take steps to counter this perceived inequity by engaging in some "behind the scenes" maneuvering to try to change the professional qualifications for the jobs, if need be, and in effect, to help ensure the hiring of minority candidates. Although there was no hard evidence that this kind of intervention was taking place, he took it upon himself to tell the District Attorney what he thought was happening. The DA, having been involved and supportive of the program from the beginning, apprised EOC staff of the situation. As a result, the Counseling Supervisor was dismissed for not having followed the proper channels in expressing his concerns. He stated he had followed procedures and had permission from his supervisor (the Director). The Director denied giving permission for him to go to the DA, but nonetheless resigned simultaneously.

These events occurred so early in the life of FNP that they had little or no impact on the program other than to delay by perhaps a few weeks the intake of the first client. A new Project Director was chosen, the next ranking candidate from the original round of interviews. This Project Director was with the project close to a year. More will be said concerning the problems he faced and his operating style shortly. The third Project Director's accomplishments in the third and fourth years of the project will also be discussed below. As of August 17, 1984 the third Director resigned and the person in EOC who had served as the primary link between EOC and the project had assumed the role of Acting Director.

#### **Eligibility Criteria and the Referral Process**

Participants in the program had to be between the ages of 14 to 17 years old residing in the target area defined by the boundaries of the Fresno Unified School District. They had to be under court supervision for a serious offense, with records of at least two prior adjudicated offenses for serious misdemeanors and/or felonies (i.e. robbery, burglary, or assault) within the past twenty-four months and who would otherwise be confined in correctional institutions or placed on probation.

Youth who were identified as meeting the eligibility criteria were referred to the project by the Juvenile Courts, Probation Office, and/or the DA. The Presiding Juvenile Court Judge, Chief Probation Officer, and District Attorney had all emphatically indicated their willingness to make referrals to the project at the time the proposal was prepared and made good on their commitment, although some of their staffs or associates were not always as committed.

The first youth was referred to the program in August, 1980. Despite in-service sessions given by FNP staff to the Probation Department, referrals were slow in coming. As might have been expected, some PO's adopted a "wait and see" attitude before making referrals. Others had youth on their caseloads on whom all options had been tried except for FNP. Although not overtly stated, it was as though FNP were being given a real "trial by fire" test, in that some of the toughest juvenile offenders in the community were referred. Their PO's considered them to be hopeless candidates for rehabilitation. Most were subsequently rearrested after they had become FNP clients.

This raised the question of which youth were appropriate candidates for FNP. There was no problem finding youth who met the OJJDP criteria. However, some felt, particularly the DA in the Juvenile Division, that FNP was not the appropriate place for some of the most serious offenders. His experience with these youth led him to feel that there could be great differences between two prospective juveniles referred on the same offense. Differences in family backgrounds, criminal histories, etc., could influence the likelihood of success in the program. His concern resulted in the creation of a screening committee made up of representatives from FNP, the Probation Department, and the DA's office.

As the criteria for acceptance was known to all, no youth was referred to the screening committee unless the OJJDP criteria were met. The screening committee members added their personal knowledge about the youth and were able to assist the FNP representative in becoming better acquainted with the case prior to intake. Even though this additional screening was done, it did not become a "creaming" process; all youth were serious offenders and, in fact, the committee rejected very few youth.

Out of these meetings a screening form was developed which is still included in the PO's recommendation to the court. It states the reason why the PO is recommending FNP and whether or not the youth has been accepted by the committee. It also states whether the recommendation includes any detention time to be served. As all youth referred to FNP were serious offenders, there was general agreement that there should be some time served in detention at Juvenile Hall prior to program intake. This detention usually lasted for 10-15 days, but could sometimes last as long as 30 days.

There was another turn of events which influenced early referrals. Judge Hansen was on the bench when the New Pride RFP came out. She was very supportive of programs which were alternatives to incarceration, and had participated significantly in the writing of the proposal. Shortly after its submission she moved to the Fifth District Court of Appeals, and by the time the grant was awarded a new Juvenile Court Judge was named. In August, after just a few months on the bench, the new juvenile judge had a fatal heart attack. A temporary judge was appointed until a permanent judge was named in January, 1981. Each judge was receptive and supportive of the program; however, the fact remains that there were four different judges, three within the first five months of the program.

#### **Problems in Meeting the Diagnostic Assessment Requirements**

When referrals began to pick up in November, it became increasingly difficult to keep on top of Denver's diagnostic requirements. The Educational Coordinator was doing academic testing on Saturday mornings and the psychological testing had been contracted to a county school psychologist. A clinical psychologist who had recently completed her doctoral program was hired to do all testing and supervise the counseling component comprised of four counselors.

As had been spelled out in the proposal, a somewhat more thorough procedure was to have been followed. An interdisciplinary team, working closely

together, was to have assessed each participant. The team was to have been comprised of the Education Coordinator, the Psychometrist, a Remedial Education Teacher, and a Counselor. Each project participant was to receive a battery of tests at intake and if the initial testing and screening indicated learning problems, further tests were to be administered to assess learning disabilities.

#### Other Issues and Concerns which Emerged as the Program Developed

Around the end of 1980 and the beginning of 1981, a great deal of staff time was being used in the formulation of policies and procedures which followed the Denver New Pride model. It was the view of some FNP administrators that the written replication materials in some areas did not answer all the specific questions about replication components, in particular, the materials on the volunteer and employment components. FNP sought assistance from the Denver program, but did not feel that they received the assistance they needed. The consensus of the staff was that in spite of the fact that the Denver model of service delivery provided a good conceptual framework, many of the specific procedures needed to implement the model fully were lacking. Therefore, it was up to the staff to formulate specific policies in their areas. As a result, a very specific, detailed policy and procedures manual was developed.

The most tenuous time in the evolution of the Fresno program came early in 1981. It was a period of confusion and conflict. As mentioned above, many of the policies and procedures were in the process of being developed or revised. The program was barely underway and it seemed as if new situations were arising daily which had never before been addressed. Several of the youth had been rearrested and terminated. Not only had the program been around long enough to "catch the eye" of those in the justice field, but as a result of that exposure, it also seemed that everyone had an opinion on how the program should operate. The Director felt "there was a problem with the program being so complicated." He said he "felt like a fireman" and that it had taken ten years before the original program evolved into the model while at the same time, FNP

had been in operation for less than one year. He felt that OJJDP had unrealistic expectations concerning what could be accomplished in such a short period of time.

The FNP staff were a very diverse group. There were as many opinions on how a situation should be resolved as there were staff. The Director was a licensed clinical social worker, and his training led him to administer more like a therapist, often calling staff together to reach agreement on issues. Those staff with a similar orientation were comfortable with the "management by consensus" approach, but others wanted a strong administrator who was willing to make the decisions when consensus could not be reached. Some felt the program was lacking direction as almost weekly some aspect of the program seemed to change.

While some of these problems can be linked to the Project Director's administrative style, he felt he was being hampered by tight controls exercised by his EOC monitor. The Director described New Pride as being administratively tied very closely to EOC. In discussing his constant mediations with his staff, he said these had been made harder because his authority was being diluted. He reported he had less and less responsibility.

By the summer of 1981, several changes were made that would later be viewed as critical in providing the program with the stability it needed to survive. Out of frustration, the Director left and took a position as Director of a small residential adolescent mental health program. Also two counselors resigned, and two were hired to take their place. (One left to become a Parole Officer for CYA and one to work in construction.) Shortly after that, another counselor was dismissed, leaving three counselor positions. The Educational Coordinator had moved into the position of Acting Director in June 1981, and was subsequently appointed to the position permanently. The Remedial Education Instructor was promoted to Educational Coordinator and a new instructor was hired for the classroom.

There was also a change in the Probation Officer assigned to the program by the Department. Early on it was decided that the Probation Department would assign a PO whose caseload would include only FNP youth. This PO would spend considerable time at the project with those youth. The idea was good, but the individual assigned that responsibility was not particularly enthused about the job. He had been with the Department for some time, and, as one administrator put it, "had been in the system too long and was sour on (the) kids." After a while, he rarely spent time at the project. A new PO was appointed who had volunteered for the job. He wanted the youth to succeed in the program but was also quite serious about his responsibility as a PO.

In an attempt to respond to earlier concerns about holding youth accountable, an agreement was made with the Probation Department and the Juvenile Court Judge. FNP staff were committed to holding youth accountable, but were limited in their ability to do so (i.e., they could not place a youth in custody). Staff felt that one of the problems was that there were a number of disruptive (though not necessarily illegal) acts committed by the youths for which there were no consequences. They felt it was important to be very consistent in applying consequences if behavior was to be altered. For instance, coming to the project drunk or on drugs was not allowed, but it did happen. If a juvenile engaged in such behavior, he was at least in violation of his probation. A good deal of time had to pass, however, in order for new charges to be filed and a court appearance scheduled and held.

Because these constraints made it difficult to take effective and timely action, it was decided that for all youth committed to FNP, the judge would also order thirty days of stayed time. If the youth was in violation of project rules or other court-ordered rulings, the PO and the staff could agree on the appropriate amount of time to be served as a consequence. Even if the youth did a few days or a weekend in custody, it was an effective means of imposing immediate consequences, and the first step in holding program youth more accountable. This arrangement was particularly agreeable to the second PO and the staff. As a result, the word spread among the youth that FNP was "a tough program to get through."

Another practice developed about the same time was that of having monthly reviews on all active clients. The counselor, the youth and his parents, and the FO had a scheduled time each month to review each client's progress. If the school or employment staff needed to provide specific input, they also participated. The Evaluator developed a computer-generated staffing schedule and a monthly progress report which provided the needed structure for the monthly staffing. These MIS documents proved crucial in helping staff to remember which of 50 youth needed to be staffed. The program began to evolve around the staffing and monitoring of goals and objectives and the question of holding youth accountable was no longer an issue. The youth in the project were now in a much more structured environment than any youth under the caseload of the typical field supervisor, and certainly a more structured environment than most of their families provided.

Much of 1982 was a time of new cohesiveness for FNP. Conflict was minimal and there was a strong sense of direction. The results were seen also in fewer cases of client rearrests or being AWOL. (Of the 15 youth AWOL after four years, 13 left during the first year of the program).

However, in the Spring of 1982, just as things seemed to be jelling, the program was facing a third year of funding at a reduced level and the positions of Employment Coordinator and Recreation Coordinator (a position which will be discussed later) had to be eliminated. The Psychologist moved out of town to begin a private practice and the Volunteer Coordinator married and also moved from the area. These positions were not filled. The program was now operating with a staff of eight individuals: the Director, Evaluator, Educational Coordinator, three counselors, one instructor (although a second instructor continued to be provided by the school district), and a secretary. The Evaluator, as had been the case all along, assumed all Data Coder functions. The Educational Coordinator assumed the responsibility for school reintegration and supervising program volunteers, previously a separate position. The counselors did what they could to assist youth in becoming employed and all staff took turns supervising youth activities. In order to keep the program going, these kinds of cuts had to be made, but probably were only possible due to the dedication of the

particular staff employed at the time. Those individuals close to the project felt that the same quality program could only be maintained with existing staff assuming additional responsibilities.

Another central area of concern which gained increased importance during years three and four of the project was that of maintaining effective working relationships with those elements in the community which were critical to the success of the project - sound linkages with the juvenile justice system, the school system, and with other key youth serving agencies.

The soundness of such linkages was in turn directly impacting another area of ongoing concern - that of institutionalization of the project. Both of these topics are discussed more fully below. Prior to their discussion, however, the key components of the project will be more fully elaborated.

#### **Key Program Components\***

##### **Counseling/Intensive Supervision Component**

The amount of intensive supervision provided was individualized to allow sufficient freedom to teach the youth to make responsible and socially appropriate choices regarding free time and to provide sufficient structure to limit opportunities for further delinquent behavior. The close supervision held the youth accountable for attending school and counseling sessions. Rules were clearly defined, and infractions were to bring immediate consequences. This type of structure was designed to help the juvenile develop the skills to function adequately in society and learn to deal with his real world rather than the restricted one within the confines of a correctional institution.

\* Portions of the sections which follow draw heavily upon the February 1984 report of the Juvenile Services Committee of the Fresno County Juvenile Justice Commission.

When mental health therapy was court-ordered, Fresno County Health Department provided a therapist who was a psychiatric social worker. The therapist provided individual counseling as needed and group sessions with families monthly, as well as monthly group sessions with the youth. Each client also met regularly, daily when first accepted, and no less than weekly by the time of termination, with his or her counselor for an hour-long individual counseling session. Youth were held accountable for keeping appointments, both with their counselor and with the therapist. They were helped to look at their problems in a total way, involving family and community, and they were helped to recognize their responsibilities.

Many of the families of the youth in the project were dysfunctional and difficult to deal with, but FNP had some success in getting the families involved, giving them the assistance they needed, and helping to build family relationships.

When questions concerning intensive supervision efforts arose early in 1981, there were some feelings of concern over the amount of supervision given the youth in the project. Although youth were required to be at FNP daily, there was the feeling that, given the seriousness of their past criminal involvement, they were not being held sufficiently accountable for their time. It was argued that FNP was an alternative to incarceration, and if incarcerated, these youth would have 24-hour supervision. Despite the Director's attempts to reiterate that FNP was not a 24-hour facility, the concern persisted among a few people. In an attempt to respond, the Director assigned the counseling component to longer working hours. Two would work from 8:30 to 5:00 p.m. and two from 11:30 to 8:00 p.m. This allowed for late afternoon and early evening activities. There were a number of problems with this plan, not the least of which was that there was no public transportation after 6:30 p.m. and any youth at Pride had to be transported home. As a result, counselors would sometimes not get home until 10:00 p.m. In an attempt to relieve them, a recreation coordinator was hired. This constituted the first major departure from the Denver model. She worked in the afternoon, early evenings, and weekends and provided structured activities for the increasing FNP population and transportation to and from activities.



### The Educational Component

The Educational Component included credentialed instructors and learning disability and remediation specialists who made some attempt to assess each youth's level of educational attainment. Although most youth who participated in the project were seriously deficient academically, FNP adopted a policy that any student capable of functioning in the public school environment should stay in public school. The program provided these youth with whatever support they needed to remain in the public school, such as intensive supervision, counseling, and often tutoring, as well as other program services. Their attendance was monitored regularly.

Many of the clients were unable to function successfully in public school when they entered the New Pride program. As of early 1984, some 41 percent of all clients had either dropped out of school or been expelled at the time of intake. Some of them had not been attending classes for as long as two years prior to entry. These youth attended the program's Alternative School. Altogether, 57.6 percent of all clients in Fresno participated in the New Pride Alternative School.

Fresno's educational component appears to have been quite successful. Standardized tests administered at intake and again at the end of the intensive phase show that clients, in a 6 month period, demonstrated an average increase in mathematics skills of .7 years and in reading skills of 1.3 years. The number of days present in school increased from fifty-five percent prior to FNP to seventy-two percent during participation in the program. The number of unexcused absences decreased by forty-three percent.

The Fresno Unified School District counselors who were interviewed by the Juvenile Services Committee of the Fresno County Juvenile Justice Commission were reportedly very positive in their praise of the project. They stated that their initial response when first informed of FNP had been less than enthusiastic for "another program". After becoming knowledgeable about FNP by having some of their students in the program, they praised the excellent support and follow-through provided even after a youth had left the program.

The public school counselors were also impressed by the project staff whom they felt never seemed to give up on a student. They were impressed by the genuine caring attitude of the staff and the spirit of cooperation that existed between the school and the staff of the project. They were also impressed by the academic progress of the participants.

### Work Experience/Vocational Training Component

Almost every youth attending FNP received assistance in career awareness and planning. Under grants from the Fresno Employment and Training Commission CETA-funded Summer Youth Employment Project, FNP had placed all active youth over the age of thirteen in paid work experience for most of the summer. Older participants whose academic histories indicated little chance of successful graduation from high school, and especially those youth who lacked academic motivation, were encouraged to enroll in vocational courses, to study for the California High School Proficiency Exam, and/or to seek full-time employment. Youth were assisted in their job-finding ventures by their FNP counselors, EOC's Youth Manpower Services and the State Employment Development Department's Youth Employment Opportunities.

Youth were placed in vocational training classes through the Fresno Metropolitan Regional Occupational Center Program and Fresno Unified School District's Career Vocational Center. Placements were made in some of the following kinds of classes: rough carpentry, finished carpentry, auto technician, welding, landscaping, and auto upholstery.

While jobs in private industry were more difficult to locate, some placements had been found. These included restaurant work, construction work, and car washing.

All youth enrolled in FNP during the summer participated in a paid work experience Summer Youth Employment Program. In 1983 the youth had participated in a community clean-up of housing projects under the direction of

the Fresno Housing Authority. In 1984 the Private Industry Council awarded 40 youth employment positions to FNP to clean vacant land areas and buildings.

Through early 1984, 135 youth (60%) had been employed in a total of 196 jobs (some youth having more than one job experience). Most jobs were of the work experience or trainee type and paid minimum wage. The average amount of time spent on the job was 9 weeks. Given the difficulty of employing these youth, the 60% employment rate was considered above average. Youth employment was nonetheless one of the most challenging aspects of the program.

During the fourth year of the project, FNP hired an Employment and Training Coordinator through a special grant awarded by the State OEO to promote training and to find the most appropriate training placements in the community.

The emphasis given to this component seemed key to the success the program enjoyed into August of 1984. While on the one hand job placement was felt to be extremely important in helping keep youth from further delinquency, employment also afforded opportunities to the youth to take responsibility for paying restitution to victims. As of 1984 all of the youth receiving court orders to pay restitution had paid in full, or were paying on schedule while enrolled in FNP.

#### **MIS and Program Evaluation Component**

The New Pride model to be replicated featured a strong computerized management information system and an evaluation component staffed by a full-time evaluator and a full-time data coder. In Fresno the evaluator was not only extraordinarily capable and productive, but also remained in her position for all four years. Although working without the assistance of a data coder, information provided by the MIS was highly instrumental in getting the Fresno project financially supported by city, county, state, and private institutions. In a presentation to County Supervisors, the Juvenile Court Judge quoted statistics from the most recent annual report to augment his plea for funds.

At the Fresno site, in contrast to other replication sites, the computerized MIS was used to its fullest extent as a management tool. In Fresno all records were computerized and analyzed for management as well as for local evaluation purposes, including individualized service plans, treatment objectives and their regular updates, and the myriad of services delivered. School and employment progress reports were submitted on a regular basis. Periodically, the evaluator would produce comprehensive research reports on client impact, including recidivism. The evaluator also produced extremely thorough annual reports.

Unlike other sites, Fresno's MIS efforts emphasized both management and evaluation objectives. This dual emphasis served the project especially well. The management orientation of MIS efforts enabled the project to take a proactive rather than a reactive approach to shaping and reformulating individual treatment service plans and objectives. The evaluation orientation not only enabled the project to meet and effectively surpass the requirements of the National Evaluation Project, but it served the immediate practical purpose of assisting the project in enlisting the support and funding assistance so vital to its continuation and institutionalization.

#### **Comparison Group Data**

As regards the National Evaluation Project's requirement for a comparison group, such a group was identified. The group was comprised of youth who were similar in age, ethnicity and criminal sophistication to FNP youth, but who never received services from the program. Youth chosen as comparison group subjects were youth who were not incarcerated at the time, but were on formal probation under the supervision of a PO. These youth were followed and additional offenses and dispositions were recorded. As of 1984, the comparison group subjects outnumbered treatment group subjects by almost two to one.

### **Program Linkages, Impacts, and Related Concerns**

In spite of fiscal hardships and cutbacks, the program gained an extraordinary degree of credibility and support in the community. As time went on and the program proved itself, there was no longer a question of whether or not enough supervision was being provided to the juveniles. In part FNP was able to gain credibility and support because of the many linkages that were forged between the project and various key elements in the community.

#### **Linkages with the Juvenile Justice System**

The Probation Department was very supportive, an attitude reflected in the testimony of the PO's to the effectiveness of the program. The program was viewed as being stable, mature, realistic and cooperative with the local justice system, and as being a valuable part of the community. The Department had come to rely on the program as an important alternative to incarceration.

The Sheriff endorsed the program saying it was "one of the few programs for juveniles he would recommend."

The Juvenile Court Judge was also enthusiastic, citing FNP as "the best out-of-custody rehabilitation facility for seriously delinquent youth in the county." In a letter of support he further stated the program was "conducted in a professional manner by competent staff with realistic expectations."

According to one report the Juvenile Court regarded FNP as being invaluable to the community. It saw the strengths of the program as being the concerned, caring staff and the level at which the youth were held accountable.

As time went on, the relationship with the Court remained strong. A new judge was appointed early in 1983, and was as, or even more supportive of the program than his predecessor. As testimony to the depth of his interest and involvement, on several occasions he recessed court in order to call the Project Director about dispositions involving youth in the program.

### **Linkages with Schools and Community Agencies**

With some staff positions eliminated, linkages with schools and community agencies became even more important. The relationship with the school district had been that they would provide one classroom instructor. It was further agreed that additional assistance would be provided by a school psychologist for psychological testing. The Department of Mental Health was willing to assign one of their counselors to FNP to conduct group, individual, and crisis counseling as needed and to consult with FNP staff on specific problem youth.

Linkages were also maintained with local colleges and universities which provided volunteers and interns for the project.

### **Linkages with Other Community and Youth Serving Agencies**

The relationship FNP developed with other youth-serving agencies were numerous. These included but were by no means limited to the following:

- Department of Social Services
- City of Fresno Parks and Recreation
- Planned Parenthood of Fresno
- Central Valley Regional Center
- Interagency Child Abuse Council of Fresno County
- Council on Juvenile Problems
- Chicano Youth Center
- Southeast Fresno Concerned Citizens
- United Black Men of Fresno

The Director attended meetings of the Fresno Interagency Committee (a community-wide group with representatives of all organizations involved with youth and their families). In pressuring the school district to release dropout statistics, data from the project's Annual Report were used by Interagency as a catalyst in securing further information. The Department of Social Services

approached FNP about the possibility of operating a residential facility with the assurance of full funding by the Department. By 1983, FNP had carved out a place for itself in the Fresno community.

### **Institutionalization**

If institutionalization of a program only required strong community support, problems concerning the institutionalization of FNP would never have arisen. As has already been noted, some of the more exuberant supporters included the judges and the Probation Department. The former head of Probation, now Director of the California Youth Authority, has formally expressed his support. The Juvenile Justice Commission sent a team to review and evaluate the program and their results, many of which are incorporated here, were most positive. Their report stated that the project "has so many strengths that the Committee would like to see it made available to additional juvenile offenders, assuming the ratio of staff to youth does not change . . . . The Committee has concluded that (FNP) is a project for which Fresno should be proud."

Although the award was not received, FNP was nominated as a CYA Exemplary Program. The District Attorney in the Juvenile Division, once skeptical of sending hardcore youth to a community program, became a strong supporter. The police, schools, public defender, and Alternative Sentencing Program were also supportive.

As a result the program has had particularly positive media coverage during recent years, including a special segment on the local news program, "360". ("360" airs prior to "60 Minutes" and is in the same format.)

For at least one year prior to the end of Federal support, the Project Director and key Advisory Board members were active in efforts to secure both short range and long range funding. They made a number of appearances and gave interviews on behalf of the project. They also met with members of the

State Legislature, promoting a bill which would give educational monies for correctional programs to New Pride. Legislative changes were needed for the project to be eligible to receive these funds.

More volunteers and interns than ever before were offering their services to FNP. They included interns from California State University's Criminology and Education Departments, the California School of Professional Psychology, and Fresno City College. In addition, the Department of Mental Health continued to provide a Mental Health therapist to work with project clients and their families.

April 15, 1984 marked the end of EOC's grant from OJJDP. A no-cost extension was sought and authorized which enabled FNP to use unexpended OJJDP funds of around \$48,000 after the April 15 termination date and prior to the end of the 1984 calendar year.

In terms of actual dollars obtained, several resources had been identified and monies secured as early as late 1982, all of which were continuing into 1984/1985. One such resource was a Special Summer Youth Employment Project, which paid youth for their summer jobs. In addition, the school district continued to provide in-kind support in the form of an instructor assigned to FNP, valued at \$25,000 annually. In 1984-85 it was anticipated that the school district would provide an additional \$55,000 of in-kind services, which would, in effect, support the entire educational component.

In early 1984, the Director and Advisory Board Members made a concerted effort to enlist local agencies and institutions on behalf of FNP. They secured support from the City Council, the Chamber of Commerce, the Police Chief, Sheriff, and District Attorney. The Juvenile Court judge and the Director of Social Services committed their strong support in writing. Both the School District and a council of private industries pledged assistance.

The parent agency provided \$25,000 to help continue the project into a fifth year. The Director felt that this was a small amount considering the

quantity of administrative overhead the agency had received over the past four years because of the project.

In June and July of 1984, institutionalization efforts turned to the County and City of Fresno. From the project's start, the County had promised to pick up the FNP if it proved to be successful. FNP asked the County for \$174,000 and succeeded in obtaining \$121,000 of that amount. The City pledged \$12,500 and the Director was hoping to get an additional \$15,000 from this source.

#### Impact of Lower Levels of Funding

For the fiscal year just past and up to September of 1984, FNP had been operating on a budget of \$337,000, over \$100,000 less than the original project budget. This required most staff members to assume additional responsibilities in order to maintain previous level of services. By the end of July, 1984, approximately \$250,000 had been identified for program continuation beyond September 1, 1984.

As key Advisory Board members were actively involved in securing local monies, the projected shortfall was discussed in the July meeting of the Board. The minutes of that meeting reflect a decision on their part to continue the project with no cutbacks because of their concern about the possibility of impaired quality of services. The Advisory Board members had spent a great deal of time at the program and had developed an intimate understanding of the intensity with which the program operated. They also felt strongly that locating \$250,000 prior to fiscal 84-85 was indicative of funding yet to come and they were positive about their efforts to locate more funds in the following months. Additional monies from the school district, the State Office of Criminal Justice Planning, and either the Private Industry Council or the Office of Economic Opportunities seemed strong possibilities. Final decisions on those monies would be known before the end of 1984.

However, EOC was much less optimistic about the program's fiscal future, and developed a reduced budget reflecting only the \$250,000 which had been secured. Among adjustments to be made were across the board salary cuts, with those having been there the longest to receive the highest cuts (some as high as 20 percent). In addition, the positions of Evaluator and Remedial Instructor were to be eliminated and a portion of the facility closed off to reduce rent, and some smaller programmatic changes were to be made as well.

#### The Breaking Point is Reached

The Director was exceedingly frustrated with EOC's budget proposal and felt strongly that the quality of the program could not be maintained under these conditions. The staff also were demoralized to learn their efforts to date were to be rewarded by salary cuts. One counselor, concerned about job security, submitted her resignation effective August 1. The staff directed a memo to the Director asking why the Board's decision (as well as the staff's) to continue "full steam" was not an option, and if not an option, would salaries and positions be reinstated if further funding were found. The Director forwarded the memo to EOC, but there was no response. A second counselor submitted his resignation effective October 1.

The Director approached EOC and expressed her concern over not having been involved in the new budget proposal. At her initiative, she submitted an alternate proposal which had been re-worked within the \$250,000 limit. It included moving the Evaluator into the Head Counselor position in an attempt to maintain at least part of the evaluation data, and other programmatic changes. She reiterated her feeling with respect to the positive outlook for additional monies and felt especially good about the possibility of the school district providing another instructor position. She agreed that although the program was expensive, it was also highly effective. No matter what the job titles, certain functions needed to continue to maintain effectiveness, and a minimum number of staff was needed to fulfill those functions. She presented her budget proposal to EOC, but they did not accept it.

Unsatisfied with the response to her concern, she relayed her unwillingness to continue with the project and submitted her resignation. She was asked by EOC to leave sooner than anticipated, and the EOC Deputy Director assumed the role of Acting Program Director the next day. Subsequently, the Evaluator learned she would be relocating and also submitted her resignation.

### Strengths and Weaknesses

The strengths and weaknesses evidenced during the first four years of the project are many. The essential and most critical strengths and weaknesses will be dealt with in turn.

#### Strengths

The greatest strengths of the program were its staff and the intense level of commitment they demonstrated, and the high caliber of program efforts. These strengths became increasingly evident in the third and fourth years of the project.

The evaluation component was another strength. The evaluator's pragmatic and timely reports helped the staff to keep track of the activities of all clients and to make regular assessments of their progress. FNP's internal evaluation was a definite factor in helping the project to secure financial support.

The sound linkages which the project nurtured and maintained, the cost-effectiveness of the project, and the impact of the project on the youth it served were among the other key pluses of FNP.

Apropos the latter, the Juvenile Services Committee reported that during the fourth year of the project the youth in FNP with whom they had talked expressed deep appreciation for the help FNP had given them. They particularly

appreciated the fact that each member of the staff cared, from the director on down, and that being in FNP had helped them gain self-respect and improved communication with their families. They valued the help they received in school subjects and in finding jobs. They liked the fact that rules and consequences were clearly defined and that recreational activities were provided.

In the same report to the Juvenile Justice Commission from its Committee on Juvenile Services, the cost effectiveness of FNP was described in the following manner:

(the project) served between forty to fifty youth each month in 1982 at less than \$20 per day (per youth). If those youth had been committed to C. K. Wakefield School, costs to the county would have been over \$38 per day. Services to fifty youth per month at (FNP) result in a total annual cost of less than \$350,000. At C. K. Wakefield the cost is \$700,000. At the California Youth Authority, where costs are often as high as \$24,000 per youth per year, fifty youth can cost over \$1,000,000 per year. (FNP) is not inexpensive, but it is cost effective when compared with its alternatives. Youth with criminal histories as extensive as those in (FNP) are institution bound and would be placed in costly 24-hour custody if (FNP) were not available.

#### Weaknesses

The major weaknesses did not reside in the project itself, but rather in the relationship the project had with the parent agency. None of the three Project Directors hired between 1980 and 1984 had any experience prior to New Pride working for EOC. Therefore, none had an inside track record to generate parent agency support and resources. The project facility was located across town from EOC, which did not encourage communication. For whatever reasons the project never seemed to have had the full support of the parent agency.

This problematic relationship had manifested itself intermittently since the program's inception. The first major confrontation was the episode involving the

resignations of the first Director and Counseling Supervisor in the early months of the project. This was the first indication that problems existed between the parent agency and the project. The resignation of the second Project Director was also due, in part, to what he perceived was excessive dysfunctional interference by EOC. In the view of the staff, the parent agency had periodically taken actions which impacted the project without an adequate understanding of the constraints, problems, and issues that were involved.

Had EOC been wholeheartedly supportive of the project throughout these four years and had it respected the autonomy of those in key positions in FNP, allowing them to make decisions concerning staffing and the use of decreasing fiscal resources, it is likely that institutionalization efforts would have been far more fruitful, far earlier. It is also likely that tensions and ill-will generated by poorly informed judgment calls would not have thwarted and frustrated the efforts of those directly involved in running the project.

#### Summation

As Federal funding drew to a close after four years, the Director and Advisory Board members had succeeded in securing from state and local sources most of the money required to keep the project alive. Serious conflicts arose, however, between the Director, staff, and Advisory Board on one hand and the parent agency on the other over how the project should be modified in light of a reduced budget. The parent agency would not consider compromise and the Director resigned. This triggered the resignation of other key staff, which left the project with only a few remaining staff members, new to the project and inexperienced. Immediately after the Director left, the parent agency supervisor assumed the role of Acting Project Director. He was later replaced on a permanent basis by another administrator from the parent agency. It remains to be seen whether the new staff will be able to run a program as demanding as New Pride, and to provide the high level of services that this project had previously offered.

#### GEORGETOWN NEW PRIDE

On March 1, 1980, a New Pride Replication grant was awarded to the Georgetown University Child Development Center (CDC). The amount of the grant was for \$881,746 over a two year period. The University had agreed to provide a cash match of approximately \$100,000, an agreement which was never met. Owing to serious administrative and management problems, the project closed at the end of the second year.

#### General Status of the Local Juvenile Justice System

The Superior Court of the District of Columbia consists of one court with jurisdiction over all cases, including juvenile cases in the family court. A nonpartisan commission of lawyers and non-lawyers is responsible for screening and nominating judges. Selection of judges is organized on a merit basis.

In the District of Columbia, the family division of the juvenile court handles cases involving individuals under 18 years of age, unless the youth is to be charged by the U.S. attorney with murder, forcible rape, burglary in the first degree, armed robbery, or assault with the intention to commit any of these offenses. Such cases are automatically tried in adult court. Any youth 16 or older charged with a felony may be transferred to the adult court after a hearing in the Family Division if the prosecuting attorney initiates such action. Those youth who can be transferred include:

- Those 15 years of age or older at the time a felony was committed.
- Those 16 years or older already committed to an agency or institution as a delinquent.
- Those 18 to 20 years old, charged with a delinquent act committed before becoming 18.

In order to retain jurisdiction, the court must determine that there are reasonable prospects of rehabilitating the youth before his majority. The court must consider the age of the youth, nature of the offense, prior delinquency record, the mental condition of the youth, and past treatment and availability of treatment. The Division of Social Services has to submit a written report on the potential for juvenile treatment of the youth to the court. Probable cause that the youth committed the act is not considered during the hearing.

After being adjudicated as a delinquent or a person in need of supervision (PINS), offenders less than 18 years old are committed to the Social Rehabilitation Administration by the Family Division of the Superior Court, and placed under the supervision of the Bureau of Youth Services.

The Bureau of Youth Services may send the juvenile to an open co-ed school, or, in the case of aggressive male offenders, to a more secure facility. There are also group homes and small residential placement settings where juveniles on probation may be housed. Youths tried as adults are committed to the Department of Corrections, and they are usually placed in one of the Youth Centers. Inmates in the Youth Centers are between 16 and 26 years old. There are no administrative processes available to transfer offenders from juvenile to adult institutions or from adult to juvenile institutions.

#### **A Previously Existing Juvenile Justice System-Related Project Serving Serious Juvenile Offenders**

Prior to the funding of the New Pride Replication Project in the Washington, D.C. area, serious juvenile offenders were served by the Juvenile Restitution Program, a program involving several private agencies. Adjudicated juveniles were selected for participation in this restitution/community service program through a mediation process. The mediation process was directed at determining the form of restitution which might be appropriate to the adjudicated offense. Under this program, restitution took one of several forms:

- Making a direct money payment to the victim (if a job were available to the offender);
- Participating in a prescribed community service for a defined period of time; or
- Providing direct service of some form to the victim.

The program focused on adjudicated youth who were recommended for incarceration and adjudicated youth who were recommended for probation. While juveniles who fit the eligibility criteria for New Pride might fall into either of these categories, especially the first, the Restitution Project tended to be directed to juvenile offenders who had been involved in fewer or less serious crimes than those offenders eligible for the New Pride program. There was nonetheless considerable overlap of populations served by the Restitution Program and the New Pride program. This overlap was to become the source of a major problem for the New Pride program in obtaining adequate numbers of referrals.

#### **The Georgetown University CDC's Role as the Parent Organization for the New Pride Program**

Georgetown University, which was established in the late 1700s, has been under the direction of the Society of Jesus in Maryland since the early 1800s. The Child Development Center, the part of the university which served as the parent agency for GNP, is a division of the Department of Pediatrics, within the Georgetown University Medical Center. This center is an interdisciplinary training, service, and research program, with a declared mission to improve the quality of life for children and youth. Support for training and services programs have come from HHS and its precursor, HEW, LEAA and OJJDP, the District of Columbia, and other University, local, and private funding sources.

Faculty at CDC are drawn from a wide range of disciplines including the following: Communication Disorders, Dentistry, Early Childhood Development, Genetics and Birth Defects, Law, Neurology, Nursing, Nutrition, Occupational Therapy, Pediatrics, Physical Therapy, Psychiatry, Psychology, Social Work, and



Special Education. Many of the projects at the CDC were directly concerned with learning disabilities which was one of the areas focused on by Georgetown New Pride. One of these CDC projects involved providing diagnostic services for younger juvenile offenders.

#### Acquisition of the Grant

In October, 1978, the educational diagnostician and director of CDC's Division of Community Service/Special Education first developed an interest in the New Pride concept on hearing a presentation by Jean Granville of Denver New Pride. A correspondence between CDC and Denver New Pride ensued. Materials and information were shared. The Director of Denver New Pride also visited the Child Development Center to look into the diagnostic efforts CDC was involved in with referrals from the juvenile justice system. This program was known as the Georgetown Adolescent Intervention Team (GAIT) of the CDC.

The GAIT project, begun in 1975, was a collaborative project with the courts. It involved an interdisciplinary team of clinicians and social services personnel which identified, evaluated, and intervened on behalf of young juvenile offenders who were developmentally and learning disabled. Youths referred from the juvenile courts were tested to determine if developmental or emotional problems were present. The diagnoses were then used in further referrals of clients to appropriate treatment and social services agencies. The GAIT program was not a treatment program. It also differed from the New Pride program in that the average age of GAIT clients was significantly younger than New Pride's target group.

When the RFP for the New Pride Replication program was announced, New Pride was seen as a logical extension of services provided by GAIT and CDC in testing, diagnosing, evaluating and referring clients. The New Pride model was an approach that provided additional needed services which were designed to enable the youth to remain in the community as productive members.

At the time the RFP was issued, fiscal constraints and increased competition for social services funds were impinging on the CDC. Georgetown University was projecting decreasing enrollments in the near future which would increase competition for resources within the University.

The principal writer of the proposal was an employee of the CDC. This individual later became the first Acting Director of Georgetown New Pride (GNP)\*. He was a lawyer with a background in corrections and juvenile justice, who had developed many valuable contacts within the CDC and outside the University and had been actively involved with the GAIT program. He had visited the Denver New Pride project and was familiar with the concept and the components of the model.

When the proposal had been written, this individual took care to circulate the proposal to many sources in the criminal justice system and other youth serving agencies, as well as within the CDC. His concern was to include input from people who would be working closely with the project and who therefore would have a "vested interest" in developing a work plan compatible with the operations of their agencies.

In the course of circulating the proposal drafts and ideas, many letters of support for the project were received. The proposal treated these as sources of tangible aid. The planning that was done had been based on assumptions that needed support and assistance would be obtainable through this external network.

The Red Cross was counted on for the housing of the project if necessary. An additional assumption was made, which was to prove false, that support would be available for help in the renovation of an older house in the Anacostia area which was to be used as the project facility. The proposal included a

\* After grant acquisition, the name of the project was changed to Horizons XL because of another program called "Pride" operating within the District of Columbia. The project will be referred to here, however, as Georgetown New Pride.

subcontractual agreement with Associates for Renewal in Education (ARE) for \$22,460 to implement the School Maintenance/Volunteer Component of the Project in its first year.

Problems arose concerning the matching funds requirement of the RFP. Initially the Red Cross had agreed to provide the funds, but that arrangement fell through. The Head of Pediatrics at the Georgetown University Medical Center agreed to provide \$101,750, but this arrangement was also cancelled on the night before the deadline for submission of the proposal. Ultimately, the University guaranteed the matching funds, although the guarantee was intended to be a temporary measure to allow the Acting Project Director to find another funding source.

#### **The Project Facility**

A location for the project was found in Anacostia at the Assumption Church. The church was an older building once used as a nunnery and had been uninhabited for approximately ten years. The other buildings in that block included the Assumption School, the Catholic school. GNP rented its building from this school.

The Anacostia area was chosen because there was no room for the project at Georgetown in the CDC and it was felt that the physical site of the project should be close to the homes of the youth to be served. Sixty-five percent of the New Pride clients were expected to come from Anacostia.

In addition to the facility in Anacostia, the project also had a commitment from the Red Cross to allow the use of some empty offices in one of its buildings in Washington in the event of problems with the Anacostia location. This contingency arrangement was not used.

While the project site, a three-story building with a full basement, was structurally sound and in relatively good condition, many modifications were

needed to make the space useful to GNP. Neighborhood groups were a hoped-for source of help in the renovation. Such aid was not forthcoming, in spite of some initial efforts to reach the community directly and through the church. The staff ended up handling most of the construction themselves.

These initial efforts revealed a serious lack of communication between the Anacostia community and GNP and absence of solid community support.

#### **The Community in which the Project was Located**

Anacostia's population is predominately black. This area is one of the very poorest in all of the District of Columbia. In spite of the depressed economic conditions of most of the residents, there nonetheless exists a strong sense of community. The residents seemed to view GNP with considerable suspicion. They seemed to regard the University as being a primarily white institution, removed physically and socially from the Anacostia community. Residents expressed concerns that GNP would come into the community for a brief period, study the community, and then leave abruptly, without having provided any real benefits to them.

The first Acting Project Director noted in an interview early in the program that there had been several instances where programs came into this area promising great things and then disappeared essentially over night. He planned to take specific action to reassure residents that this would not be the case with GNP. He was also aware of the need to reassure residents that the juveniles being served by the project would not present a danger to the community. The first Acting Project Director was not in the job long enough to activate his plans to address these concerns. His successor, the Assistant Director, apparently neither shared nor saw the need for such an objective.

The second Acting Project Director and the CDC administrator serving as Project Monitor had conducted what they felt was appropriate beginning community outreach through church services and coffee meetings with the

neighbors. Concern on the part of residents nonetheless mounted. They were bitter about not having been consulted before the site for the facility was selected. They were concerned regarding the nature of the clients to be served through the project. They were also concerned about just what it was the staff members were doing. During the first months of the project, the residents in the community saw project staff enter the building daily, but there was no indication of what might be going on inside. No clients were being treated at the time.

#### **Project Administration and Management\***

The persons in the parent agency charged with carrying out oversight and monitoring responsibilities never really fulfilled these responsibilities. The person with primary responsibility in the parent agency for the project was a higher level administrator and head of a major center within the parent agency, who did not originally support the pursuit of the New Pride grant. The person who had monitoring responsibilities and was to spend two days a week on site at the project reported to the higher level administrator. The Project Monitor apparently fulfilled her role in a peremptory fashion. She even admitted in an interview conducted some three months after the project ended, that she evidently had had little awareness of the many problems plaguing the project.

Organization of the actual project at the outset was also noteworthy. The project was administered in the following way: The Project Director reported to the Project Monitor and the Project Monitor reported to the Director of the CDC. The Project Monitor was the Associate Director for Community Planning

---

\* There were changes in the use of titles over the course of the project. After a time, the Director of CDC signed her letters with two titles, Director of CDC and Director of the New Pride Project. The project monitor was referred to as the "Co-Director" in the last year of the project. These changes did not seem to coincide with the assumption of any additional responsibilities. To avoid confusion, throughout this document titles are used as defined in the project budget.

of the CDC. For several years, she and the Project Director had worked closely together, developing the juvenile justice component of the CDC. As Associate Director for Community Planning, she was responsible for a number of ongoing CDC programs, as well as continuing development in the juvenile justice area.

In theory, the responsibilities of the first Project Director were to include managing the linkages between GNP and the juvenile justice system, the local community, social services agencies, OJJDP, and the University. During his brief tenure, his attention was primarily focused on getting the facility ready and hiring staff.

The hiring of staff proceeded according to the Project Director's schedule. Professional staff were being hired and beginning work some three months before the expected mid-August initial intake of clients. The Project Director felt that this time was necessary for the staff to assimilate information being produced by Denver New Pride, the National Evaluator, and OJJDP. He also felt that the time would be needed to renovate the building and set up classrooms, diagnostic testing areas, the computer room, counseling rooms, meeting rooms, and administrative offices.

A search committee made up of the Project Director, the Project Monitor, the Police Chief, and a representative from the Probation Department hired the Assistant Director. This man was paid a higher salary than the Director and was to handle the day-to-day functioning of the program, even though both he and the Project Director were expected to be on-site on a daily full-time basis.

The Assistant Director was hired within a few months of the launching of the project. He came to the project from Florida where he had managed a program dealing with hard-core youthful offenders. His family remained in Florida when he moved up to take the position with GNP. He reportedly became involved in a movement within the project to have the Project Director dismissed. Key people in the University also wanted the Project Director removed. They viewed him as an inexperienced administrator who had a relatively large staff sitting idle for several months. They felt that the Project

Director had persuaded them to guarantee the cash match but had not produced an alternative source of matching funds. They also felt that his staff had become seriously disaffected.

The Project Director's problems were further compounded by budgetary constraints placed on him by the University. The Evaluation budget, for instance, was cut back, making it difficult, if not impossible, to get that component of the project operational. One person connected with the project surmised that this tightening up on the monies expended was occurring because someone in the University hierarchy thought that by being extremely frugal in early expenditures, enough could be saved to somehow be used for the University's matching share. There was no way of confirming or denying this.

During July of the first year of operation, the Project Director attended the Project Director's Meeting in Boston. Upon his return he found that he had been replaced by the Assistant Director.

New problems emerged. In the first place, the new (second) Project Director did not seem at all committed to replicating the New Pride model. He seemed far more inclined to model GNP after the project he had run in Florida. Both he and the Program Analyst had come from the same Florida program. Neither of these individuals had had any close ties with the community, local government, or the juvenile justice system, and, most importantly, the second Project Director seemed to have no familiarity with building the kind of close working liaison that the project needed to maintain with the juvenile justice system.

Problems with referrals from the local courts developed accordingly. Not only was the second Project Director not making needed contacts within the juvenile justice system, he was apparently resistant to staff using their own contacts. He was even resistant to having staff introduce him and paving the way for the establishment of such contacts.

In addition, the adequacy of the number of court referrals began to be jeopardized for other reasons. The Restitution Project, a program which was being run by the Court in the District of Columbia, as noted earlier, constituted a competitor for referrals. This project had 300 clients and a control group of an additional 300. This meant that as many as 600 individuals who were potentially eligible candidates for GNP, would, in effect be "unavailable" for referral. The first Project Director had foreseen this situation, but he had been confident that there were enough youthful offenders to fill the needs of both programs. He had also felt that his strong ties to the juvenile justice system would help ensure adequate numbers of referrals.

Making these referral problems even worse was the fact that the credibility of the program began to wane seriously. Contributing to this had been the problems arising during the first few months while the first Project Director was in charge. The serious set of problems developing under the leadership of the second Project Director had led to a very rapid worsening of the situation.

Problems arose between the Project Director and the project staff. Communications and relations worsened between the project and the parent agency. Staff morale was threatened in new and serious ways. Problems arose in the implementation of various components of the program. Overall effectiveness suffered, and prospects for the future dimmed.

The second Project Director instructed staff not to talk directly to the University personnel, including the Project Monitor. Meetings originally set up to be held on-site with University principals were moved to Georgetown and then eventually cancelled. The Project Monitor made periodic site visits and was assured by the Program Analyst and the Project Director that everything was running smoothly and that no problems existed. As she was overloaded with work on other projects, she apparently accepted these assurances with no major reservations.

The staff were feeling increasingly alienated from the University. One incident, mentioned by several staff in interviews held after the project closed, involved a request by the staff for a water cooler. Staff members had been purchasing soft drinks for the clients with their own funds. Their request was supposedly processed through the Project Director. They were told that the University had denied them this request. Conversations with the Project Monitor indicate that this and many other such requests were never referred by the second Project Director to the University.

Staff also made suggestions concerning institutionalization and fund raising. They even offered to arrange events to benefit GNP. To the chagrin of the staff, nothing happened - they got no response to the offers and suggestions.

Nine months after the second Acting Project Director took over, he quit to return to Florida where he had been offered another job. The Program Analyst who had been criticized from many quarters for having done a very poor job handling MIS and evaluation responsibilities was moved into the Project Director position. He proceeded to perform only slightly more effectively in that role. After several months he also left to take a job in Florida.

The head of the counseling component was then elevated to the position of Acting Project Director. This individual had been with the project from the beginning and was well liked by the staff. Under his leadership many positive transformations took place. By this time, however, so much had gone wrong with the program to undermine and destroy its overall effectiveness and so much damage had been done to the project's credibility that it failed to receive a third year of funding from OJJDP. Institutionalization was never a viable possibility based on the track record which the project evolved over its first year or more of existence. Time and resources were insufficient to undo the problems that had arisen during that time.

### **The Advisory Board**

While plans were laid to include relevant membership from agencies connected with the New Pride effort, such as Georgetown's own Advisory Board, the Probation Department, and other social agencies, the Advisory Board met once and promptly ended its association, never being called upon to convene again.

### **Program Components and Staffing**

With all of the management and administrative problems confronting the project during the better part of its existence, it seems somewhat surprising that any of the project's components could have functioned in an effective manner. While the components concerned with diagnostic assessment and employment were particularly fraught with problems, the counseling component exhibited real strengths and the educational component seemed particularly effective and was even viewed as being exemplary by persons in and out of the program.

That any efforts could be carried out in an effective, let alone exemplary manner, in an organizational context fraught with so many problems, can be attributed in this case to the dedication, experience, and tenacity of certain members of the staff, many of whom had been with the project from the beginning.

### **Diagnostic Assessment Component**

Originally, project staff wanted to use the diagnostic procedures of the GAIT program. When this was deemed non-acceptable, they wanted to use still different tests. A combination battery including tests from the replication guidelines and other sources was actually administered to the clients.

The diagnostician was one of the first employees hired. She remained with the project until close to its demise. Unfortunately the local analyst never entered any meaningful data from the testing into the test score data files. Nonetheless, she did provide diagnostic information directly to the staff. Overall, the staff were not impressed with the relevance of the test scores available to them for the design of treatment strategies.

### **The Counseling Component**

One of the responsibilities of the counseling component was to screen prospective clients for eligibility. Another was to visit the homes and schools of the clients in order to get a better idea of their living arrangements, their home life, and their academic records. Counselors also scheduled the youth for diagnostic testing. If a client's present school proved adequate, the youth remained there and came to New Pride for counseling.

While the counseling component at GNP had been weak under the first counseling supervisor, it developed some real strengths under the direction of a later one.

Essentially, both individual and group sessions were conducted. A Gestalt approach was used. Clients would have at least three-hour individual counseling sessions a week during the intensive phase.

Staff were encouraged to attend and join in group counseling sessions in order to provide support to the counselor in charge and also to use the sessions as an opportunity to gain the trust and respect of the students. These group sessions took place about once a week. The teachers in the Alternative School also took on the role of counselors as the situation required. One made the following statement in a final interview:

"Sometimes it would become necessary to take a situation that would come up in the class and bring everybody's attention to it, so at any particular time I might be doing

a group therapy session right in the midst of mathematics, or health, or whatever."

### **The Educational Component**

The educational component was highly regarded by those in and around the project. One of the teachers called it "the backbone of the project." It was so regarded by the Project Monitor at Georgetown as well.

### **The Alternative School**

The Alternative School was never accredited in the District of Columbia. There were, therefore, problems in reintegrating youth back into the public school system. There is evidence, however, that at a number of schools youth were retested after participating in the program and given a higher placement than the one they had been at prior to the time they had spent in the Alternative School at GNP.

The maximum number of clients served in the educational component appeared to be around fifteen youths in the morning sessions and around 12 in the afternoon sessions. The reading and language arts skills teachers split each group in half. The individual teaching mathematics and health taught all of the students in the morning or afternoon classes. In doing so, he employed a large number of group activities. He also had an individual program for each student. Youth who had poorer skills were teamed with other youth who had greater competencies. Also, faster students were given the opportunity to work independently with the assistance of the teacher.

All progress in skills mastery was written on a chart so the students could see their own progress and speed, and match it against that of the other students in their class. The teacher also kept students at one task until it was completed. This approach seemed to yield very positive results. In the first place it allowed the clients to track their own progress and to take pride in their

### Learning Disabilities

Initially the school had a coordinator who came into the classroom on an as-needed basis. They also had three teachers: a reading specialist, an LD (learning disabilities) specialist, and one teacher for math and health. The learning disabilities teacher left after 6 months; another 6 months elapsed before a replacement arrived. According to the project diagnostician, only a very few youths were identified as having learning disabilities. Relatively few students may have been so identified because of a reluctance on the part of this particular diagnostician to "label" anyone. Some of the principal administrators seemed to share her reluctance.

### **School Reintegration/Volunteers Coordination Component**

This component was subcontracted out to Associates for Renewal in Education (ARE). ARE was to work closely with the project staff in recruiting and training volunteers. The organization was also to work with project counselors to ensure that individual clients were informed about alternative options of formal education within the public school system, options which would be open to them upon completion of the intensive six month phase of the program. ARE was further responsible for helping to facilitate the access and reintegration of clients back into the public school system.

### **Employment**

There were certain problems in implementing the GNP employment component. A major problem lay in the fact that there were far fewer opportunities for unskilled teenagers in the District of Columbia than there were in practically any other city in the country. In part this was because there was no industry there. Government jobs, which were most plentiful, required a certain amount of intellectual functioning, and many of the clients in the program were not able to compete effectively for these positions.

accomplishments. It also introduced a healthy sense of competition into the classroom situation and made learning enjoyable. One extraordinary success story involved a student who had progressed all the way through basic math and geometry. This led to his passing the GED test and then scoring the highest score on a math exam for entry into the Navy.

Written objectives were set for students. These would be changed as frequently as they were accomplished. They might span a week or only a few days. Lesson plans were prepared for each week.

In classes emphasizing reading and language arts, the work for the youths was also individualized. Emphasis was placed on subject matter which would have particular interest to the students. One teacher used the Washington Post and the New York Times as reading material. He would also write up short stories which were based on the students own words and drawn from their own experiences. The story line would involve people and situations familiar to the students. This approach seemed to be highly motivating for many of the students. Reading levels rose at impressive rates in many cases.

Activities were geared here as they had been in health and math classes to helping students develop a positive self image. Outstanding papers were displayed on a bulletin board. Many had never had their work in school noticed in this way. They began to develop a sense of pride when their work was displayed.

The teachers tried hard to win the confidence of the students. This seemed essential if they were going to be effective in teaching them or in helping them in other ways. They seemed quite effective in conveying their interest and concern to the clients.

The teachers also helped the students develop new ways of coping or managing in the world. For instance, many of the students did not know how to eat properly. Some had never ridden public transportation or learned to use a phone properly. Others had never learned that relationships between male and female could be on other than a sexual level.

By the last months of 1982 when it was apparent that the Georgetown site was going to close, the vocational and employment activities were contracted out to ARE, which had employed the former head of the GNP Counseling Component. ARE had its own connections with the school system and appears to have mainly placed students in jobs involving school maintenance. The effort was essentially one of seeing to it that when the program closed, students were not left stranded.

#### **Data Collection and Program Evaluation**

As of June 30, 1981, Georgetown was the only replication site which had not succeeded in contributing to the data bank regularly. By mid-June of 1981, only two computer files contained any information. Extraordinary measures were undertaken in order for Georgetown to catch up on data entry. GNP was provided extensive technical assistance, more than any other site. The Program Analyst from the Chicago project was sent in to provide assistance. This proved to be only temporarily beneficial. In spite of all this support, problems in meeting the MIS/evaluation requirements were never resolved.

The Project Evaluator was not getting information coded and into the computer, and hence was unable to use the report-generating facilities of the network. Judging by a review of forms submitted on closure of the project, the Program Evaluator had evidently not tracked the forms to insure they were turned in. Also he had apparently failed to provide feedback to the staff to ensure an upgrading of their skills in dealing with the MIS.

Compounding problems with MIS/evaluation efforts was the fact that the person who had served in the role of GNP Program Evaluator seems to have set up his accounts and signons in a way that it made it impossible for the National Evaluation Project to communicate with the data coder or include her in conferencing with others.

Other problems included the insufficient amount of funds allocated by the parent agency for MIS/evaluation efforts. This was reflective of the parent agency's apparent basic lack of interest in really monitoring the project.

#### **Research Versus Service Orientation**

The staff of GNP were highly committed to providing services to their clients. They felt that the requirements necessitating heavy paper work drew them away from providing direct services. Though the paperwork done was never entered into the data base and rarely used for decision-making, there were continuing administrative pressures to meet these requirements. A counselor stated the following in a closing interview: "When I was hired for this job, I think more emphasis should have been placed on the research because I felt that's what it was. It was not a service-oriented project." This individual felt that the project was really a research-oriented project, not a service-oriented one and that he had not realized it would have such an emphasis when he was hired.

A counseling supervisor stated similar objections in a closing interview:

"...There was (so much) heavy documentation (required) that all you did most of the day was document evidence that you saw a kid or you were out doing this and you really had no time to do the actual counseling or whatever was done. We were carrying workloads in the beginning of 10-15 kids. We had to keep tabs on (what data) was due and then to write the IISP and then to visit the schools and parents, and then to go to court. All that was being done at the time with three...I think it was four counselors."

#### **Referral and Eligibility**

A chief difference in the criteria used for eligibility to GNP concerned the local juvenile justice system's definition of serious offenders. An accommodation was reached with OJJDP permitting use of a "consent decree"



for the first conviction. Permission was also given to extend the time span from two to three years during which the three adjudications for serious offenses had to take place.

### Strengths and Weaknesses

GNP's history was characterized by marked contrasts. The potential of the project to be an extremely effective one had looked very promising on paper. The effective implementation of the proposal was repeatedly hampered by a wide variety of problems and challenges. These problems included, but were by no means limited to, the following:

- A broad range of administrative and management problems within both the project and the parent agency which persisted for the life of the project.
- The absence of a deep rooted commitment on the part of the parent agency to implementing the project and the apparent antipathy of some key University administrators toward the project and consequent distancing of themselves from it.
- The lack of first hand experience on the part of the parent agency in running treatment-oriented projects generally and serving serious juvenile offenders specifically.
- The failure of the parent agency to make the project an integral part of its activities and to ensure access to University resources and facilities.
- The geographic distance of the project from the parent agency.
- The failure of the parent agency and/or the project to do the necessary ground work in the community that might have helped to ensure more harmonious relations with the community at the outset.
- Failure on the part of those hiring the first Assistant Director (the person to be in charge of implementing the project) to choose someone who had familiarity with the local situation and who had had significant experience relating to key persons in the juvenile justice system.

- The failure of those monitoring the project to identify problems early enough to take definitive action or to convince those in a position of authority to take definitive action.
- The extreme difficulty in discerning exactly what was going on and the problem of distinguishing between what was said in oral and written reports from what was actually happening.
- The breakdown in communication between the parent agency and the project.
- Lack of knowledge in the project of the New Pride concept with regard to the integrated service planning for clients, and the part that the client tracking device known as the MIS could play.

The strength of the project was its staff, who, in spite of all the obstacles, were able to provide a range of services which had some beneficial impact in the lives of those juveniles in the program. Other strengths of the program included the final Project Director, who did a commendable job in trying to improve the project and make it viable in its final months.

### Summation

A third year of funding might have provided the time needed to lay the groundwork for possible institutionalization. But the damage done the project through poor administration and management in its first year and the neglect and disinterest on the part of the parent agency proved too much for the project and it died at the end of the second year without qualifying for a third. A staff member poignantly summarized the situation in the following words:

"My major regret is that neither Georgetown nor the staff at Horizons used each other to their advantage, because, God knows, Georgetown is known to be a very above-board, a very outstanding, school. And this staff they hired (They hired us, mind you), were together some of the most talented people I, in my life, have ever worked with. Two of us were older. The rest were youngsters. And, some of the things I have witnessed these people

doing, people who had worked within the system ten to fifteen years would hardly BE able to do. They had the natural gift to deal with the students academically and socially. Georgetown had so many people, with so many varied, so many areas of expertise, that we should have been able to use more freely, more openly, but we couldn't, because there was no communication there. The students were the ones who lost out on that. That's my greatest regret."

## KANSAS CITY NEW PRIDE

In March of 1980, a two-year \$899,802 grant was awarded to Kansas Youth Trust, (KYT), an organizational unit of the Foundation for the Children of the Americas (FFC) in Kansas City, Kansas. The name chosen for the New Pride replication project was Kansas Youth Trust New Pride. The project will however, be referred to as Kansas City New Pride (KCNP) throughout this report. FFC committed itself to providing matching cash grants of approximately \$40,000, \$47,500, and \$50,000 for the first, second, and third years of the project respectively. The project ran for a full three years.

### General Status of Local Juvenile Justice System Efforts

Kansas is a "community corrections state" based on the California and Minnesota models. As a result of this and the historically positive relationship between the court and the community, the court has been very supportive of alternatives programs and court personnel have been involved in creating alternatives programs.

The District Court in Kansas is the general trial court. In some instances, a District Court exercises its jurisdiction in more than one county. The authority of the District Court is exercised by District Judges, Association District Judges, and District Magistrate Judges. The District Magistrate Judges exercise these courts' juvenile jurisdiction.

Individuals under the age of 18 enter adult court in two basic ways. First, a juvenile 16 or 17 years old may be waived into adult court after a hearing in juvenile court. Second, for all defendants over 13, traffic offenses are dealt with in adult courts.

There are also two less common ways in which a juvenile may be sent to adult court. If a juvenile has been waived into adult court for a previous offense and the waiver order issued by the juvenile court specified that any subsequent

offenses by this individual would be dealt with in adult court, then the juvenile will be processed in adult court. Also, if the juvenile is 16 or 17 and committed to a state institution, then some charges (e.g., burning a building or aggravated assault on an employee of the institution) will automatically take the juvenile into adult court.

In the years prior to the launching of the New Pride Replication Project, one of the serious problems which had confronted the personnel of the Juvenile Court was attempting to maintain the philosophical approach to the individual youth which allowed personalized treatment and consideration in the face of the overwhelming numbers referred to the Court. For instance, in 1959, 792 youth were referred to the Wyandotte County Juvenile Court. In 1974, 5,273 referrals were made. In 1959, 286 delinquency complaints (felonies) were handled. In 1978, 1,263 complaints in this category were processed. These figures exemplified the magnitude of the task and the need in 1979 for a broader range of options for dealing with juvenile offenders.

At the time the proposal for a New Pride grant was submitted, the Court was responsible for the operation of Kaw View Detention Home. This facility had a capacity of 16, 10 boys and 6 girls. It was staffed twenty-four hours a day under the general supervision of a Director, a superintendent, an assistant superintendent, and 14 male and female supervisors, plus maintenance personnel and cooks.

Another component of the detention responsibility of the Court was the Kaw View Annex. This was a separate section of the County Jail and had a capacity of 12. This facility was operated in cooperation with the Wyandotte County Sheriff. It was staffed around the clock by "Juvenile Guards" who were supervised by the Jail Warden. The population here were all more serious male offenders, 16 and 17 years of age.

The Junior League and the Junior Chamber of Commerce purchased a home to be called Wyandotte House for the exclusive use of the Juvenile Court. The Board of Directors of this house subsequently founded Logan House for girls. In

1979, they were in the process of opening a new home for girls to be designated Kiely House. These houses were supervised by live-in teaching parents. The overall operation of these homes was the responsibility of the Director of Group Homes on the Court staff. There was a full-time psychologist involved in this program.

In 1979, the Governor's Committee on Criminal Justice Administration instituted a "Crisis Intervention Team" in Kansas City, Kansas. This team tested, counseled and worked with the juveniles in detention and their families. They also conducted "Parent Effectiveness Training" for families in crisis situations. The personnel in this program were: a psychologist from the Wyandotte County Mental Health and Guidance Center, two (2) master degree psychologists, an arts and crafts coordinator and an education counselor.

The award of the New Pride replication grant to KYT make it possible to expand available options for dealing with juvenile offenders, particularly serious juvenile offenders.

#### Acquisition of the Grant

The prime mover in getting the grant was familiar with the model New Pride project in Denver. He had earlier written a proposal in response to the RFP for the National Evaluation Project under the auspices of a large research firm in Kansas City, Missouri. After this proposal lost, he decided to respond to the program solicitation to create and operate a replication project. He laid the organizational groundwork for this by forming the Kansas Youth Trust as an affiliate organization of the newly incorporated Foundation for Children, and by becoming the Acting Director of KYT. The KYT was a collaborative effort undertaken with a colleague who had helped to found the FFC and who served as its executive director.

While Kansas City, Missouri had moved ahead in the community corrections area, Kansas City, Kansas, its contiguous, poorer sister city had few juvenile

justice-related initiatives at the time. Partially because of this lack KYT was able to find immediate local support in Kansas. It was awarded state money in 1979 to run an aftercare project. This occurred right after the Foundation for Children was incorporated and its local affiliate established. The New Pride project which KYT was proposing would provide additional needed services.

The Founder of KYT, however, did not wish to become the Director of the New Pride project. He did not want to have full time responsibility for running the project, so he proposed that a different project director, a man from St. Louis, be brought in to manage New Pride. He did, however, maintain a very strong presence in the project.

#### **The "Grandparent" and the Parent Agencies**

FFC is a non-profit non-sectarian organization which incorporated in 1979 in the State of Missouri. FFC was founded by a group of Kansas City business and professional persons to promote the "physical, mental, spiritual, and social welfare of all needy children in the Americas." FFC'S primary focus originally was to be directed at the millions of poor and crippled children in Latin America. The corporation began with small scale initial efforts in 1979 focusing on children in Bogota, Columbia and in Guatemala.

FFC's basic strategy of operation was that of identifying youth with the most serious of problems or in situations of the highest risk and developing funds for organizations already at work with such youth. Its affiliate, the Kansas Youth Trust, was developed to address the needs of youth in Kansas. Also in 1979, the KYT began to operate its own programs in specialized areas of need, such as juvenile delinquency.

KYT's first (and last) project involved a community-based approach to serving serious juvenile offenders. This project had been under development since the summer of 1978 and was known as the Transition Care Project. It provided aftercare services in the Kansas City, Kansas area for serious juvenile

offenders released from the Kansas State Centers for Youth until June of 1983, when it was defunded by the State of Kansas. The project used a case management/service advocacy approach to youth and provided direct services such as counseling, supervision, and family therapy.

FFC felt that if KYT were successful in getting the New Pride Replication grant, KYT would have the capacity to deinstitutionalize nearly all the delinquent youth in the Kansas City, Kansas area, except those who were extremely dangerous to themselves or others.

#### **The Project Facilities**

For the first 8 months or so of the life of the project, KCNP used the basement offices of the KYT in a brand new, but essentially abandoned downtown shopping mall. These facilities were cramped and not at all well suited to operating the KCNP program.

In the second week of November 1980, KCNP moved into a building leased from St. Anthony's Parish. Located directly across the street from the court house, this building served as the new site for the project. The facility was an unused rectory, which had to be extensively remodeled in order to make it suited for use by KCNP. The first floor was changed to include a learning center and snack room. Counseling and administrative offices were established on the second floor and a work experience center was created in the basement. Work was completed on the building while the project was in residence there.

#### **Project Purpose and Design**

Like other replications of New Pride, the project was designed to address the needs of teenagers who were chronic juvenile offenders and who might also have learning disabilities. It was designed to serve up to sixty youth at one time and to provide for diagnostic evaluation and a six month course of instruction,

work experience and intensive supervision. A follow-up period of up to six months was then provided for clients after they left the intensive phase.

The services provided by KCNP were characterized by the program as being "comprehensive, integrated, and individualized." They included the following: a diagnostic evaluation, intensive supervision and counseling, alternative education, job preparation and placement, and follow-up supervision and counseling.

The central thrust of project efforts aimed at helping nurture in juvenile offenders a new sense of pride and self-worth based on a better understanding of themselves and others and the realities of their world and of the society in which they lived. Its particular strength was in the area of youth employment, the component that received the greatest amount of emphasis in KCNP.

#### Project Administration

While KCNP was administered by FFC, it was overseen by its own Advisory Board made up of persons, including youths, from the Kansas City, Kansas community. (The composition and activities of the Advisory Board are more fully described below.)

There was an oddity in the administration of the project in that the Executive Director of KYT, the parent agency, served in a part-time capacity as Program Evaluator to the project. Wearing two hats, the KYT Executive Director/part-time KCNP Program Evaluator was actually being paid more than the Project Director. The Project Director was hired from outside the Kansas City area. He was a very strong person who had had a great deal of experience working with youth in institutional settings.

This extraordinary relation between the Project Director and the Program Evaluator (who was at once above and below him organizationally) worked satisfactorily in the early stages of the project, but became problematic later on.

At first the Executive Director of the Foundation for Children did not play a major role in KCNP except to assist the organization in getting set up financially and legally. Later on when the first Project Director quit, the Executive Director of FFC served simultaneously as Director of KCNP.

The first New Pride Project Director resigned his post after two years as a result of a break in the working relationship which had been established between KCNP and the juvenile court. The actions of the KYT Executive Director/KCNP Program Evaluator and general confusion about who was running the project precipitated this break with the court. Although attempts were made by the second director to mitigate these problems, the flow of clients to the project was jeopardized and prospects for institutionalization and fiscal support for KCNP were dashed. (The last New Pride client was admitted to the program in July of 1982, eight months before its Federal funding ran out.)

#### Staffing

Kansas City New Pride managed to put together an incredibly precisely balanced staff: 50 percent women, 50 percent men, 50 percent black, 50 percent white, 50 percent residents of Kansas City, Missouri and 50 percent residents of Kansas City, Kansas. The distribution of sex and race balance was throughout the organization, in better paying administrative positions as well as in less well paying service delivery and clerical slots. In attaining this balance, the most difficult challenge was in finding professionally prepared individuals who resided in Kansas City, Kansas. All staff were interviewed by at least three people, usually the Executive Director of the parent agency, the Project Director, and the Evaluator.

There were early problems with the staff, especially the Assistant Director, who was officially supposed to do what the Evaluator did so well (public relations and administrative tasks). When this individual was hired in June of 1980, PIRE staff commented that the Evaluator, "was already doing a superb job of what was supposed to be the Assistant Director's, even though he was not paid specifically to do it."

Early staff turnover occurred in the positions of Job Development Coordinator, Data Coder, and School Reintegration Coordinator. But after the early months of project start-up, turnover problems did not re-emerge as a concern. Heads of the Diagnostic Component, the Alternative School, and Intensive Supervision remained on the project until it became reasonably clear that the project was not going to continue with a fourth year of funding.

#### **The Advisory Board**

The Advisory Board met on a regular basis. The Board was very helpful in providing ongoing suggestions as to program development and community involvement. It was also helpful in introducing the program to the community. Through the Board's efforts KCNP received many applicant referrals for staff and volunteer positions.

Representation on the Advisory Board included:

- Community residents
- Youth
- Representatives of juvenile justice agencies (Wyandotte County Juvenile Court; Kansas City, Kansas Police Department-Youth Unit; Kansas Division of Services to Children and Youth)
- Representatives of institutions of higher learning
- Representatives of labor unions
- Representatives of local public officials
- Representatives from private industry

The Board had four committees which were established to address the following concerns:

- Technical Assistance and Research
- Finance and Evaluation
- Community Service
- Building

#### **Program Components**

Primary program components included the following:

- Diagnostic Component
- Intensive Supervision Component
- Educational Alternative School Component
- Employment Component
- Volunteer and School Reintegration Component

#### **Diagnostic Component**

The Diagnostic Unit administered batteries of tests in order to assess physical, educational, intellectual, and vocational needs, as well as the psychological and emotional health of the clients. Prospective clients with severe emotional problems were on occasion identified in this manner and diverted from the program. Learning disabilities were also identified.

The information gathered by the diagnostic unit helped in the development of client IISP's and allowed the diagnostic team to present as accurate a picture as possible of the functional ability of clients. Some of the problems identified by the diagnostic unit concerned the validity or need for requiring certain clients to take some or all of the batteries of tests when their abilities, attitudes, or circumstances rendered the results useless.

When diagnostic procedures confirmed a handicapping condition not previously identified by the client's school, and when the time came for the client to reenter school, the school reintegration coordinator often became an advocate for proper special education placement.

#### **Intensive Counseling and Supervision**

Counselors were given very small case loads in order that frequent, extended, and consistent contact could be maintained, both with the client as well as with the client's family. Counselors worked with teachers, job specialists, and other project staff in developing a plan of action to address each client's needs.

Follow-up counseling was also provided after the intensive six month phase had come to an end. These efforts aimed at assisting the client in adjusting to the regular community without New Pride services.

#### **Educational Component**

The educational program was set up on a learning center approach. Alternative education efforts at KCNP were based on a psychoeducational model which aimed at replacing a "failure identity" with a sense of competence and worth. Attempts were made to mitigate clients' sense of failure by promoting self-control and responsibility. An attempt was made to address a broad range of cognitive, emotional, and social-behavioral needs.

The curriculum included instruction in six areas: reading, mathematics, social studies, language arts, consumer education, and vocational education. Kansas law required that every student be instructed in these six subject areas, which meant that alternative school programs could not be completely individualized. After extensive assessments, clients were identified as being directed toward a termination placement goal. This would entail one of the following:

- (1) Reintegration into a formal school situation,
- (2) Placement in a community adult education (GED) program (if GED was not passed), or
- (3) No further formal education and placement in a vocational skills program.

When the goal was identified, instruction was then oriented toward that goal. Academic objectives which aimed at achieving this goal were written into the client's IISP. Formal diagnostic evaluations, informal assessments, background information, the client's legitimate wants, and diagnostic testing during the client's first two weeks were then used as the basis for formulating the client's educational objectives. This approach to planning was seen by the project as accommodating all clients in a personalized way, irregardless of the handicapping or educational problems present.

By October of 1980, KCNP's alternative school was approved and accredited and arrangements had been made through the school district for credits to be issued for the academic work done there.

#### **Employment Component**

KCNP initiated a broad range of employment options and ways of developing their employment capability. Realizing the difficulties in finding suitable placements for younger clients, the KCNP project took the initiative to seek out and develop options where they were in greater control of the placement.

One such option was a contract with the Heart of America Soccer League of Johnson County to construct and install soccer goals on all of their soccer fields. They also contracted to maintain the fields, which included chalking and mowing the fields and boundary lines. The youths enrolled in this project were supervised by the KCNP vocational specialist. Funds to purchase all materials and equipment for the project were also included in the contract.

KCNP also developed plans for a work activity center to be housed in their project facility. Youths employed at the center participated in contractual work projects under the direction and supervision of program staff. Other projects provided clients experience in painting, carpentry, bricklaying, masonry, and landscaping. The project staff developed these projects in the hope that they would lead to future employment possibilities with increased responsibility and skill training. The staff member in charge of this component did an excellent job of organizing it and was extremely creative in developing new and profitable ideas.

The employment component also received the special attention of the project's prime mover, whose special area of interest it was. Because of its innovativeness, and the success KCNP's employment component achieved in creating and finding jobs for youth in the project, this component of the project was highly acclaimed.

Special training and seminars were provided for clients to help them develop better job search techniques and job survival skills. These included mock video taped interviews and the completion of job applications. Of some interest was KCNP's practice of paying clients for the interviews they succeeded in landing.

As an incentive for employers, KCNP spent some time trying to certify clients for the Targeted Tax Credit Program, but only a small portion of clients were qualified. Also as an incentive for employers, KCNP solicited businesses with possible interests in a subsidized work experience program. The project evaluated client performance in private sector jobs during a 30 day subsidization period. If work performance was satisfactory, the employer was expected to assume responsibility for the client's wages and management. A \$102,000 CETA grant had enabled KCNP to pay client wages on work projects.

The activities of the employment component were especially well developed and seemed to be a positive motivating factor in the client's participation in the project. They also gained widespread recognition. As

successes of KCNP's employment component were shared with other sites, approaches developed by KCNP were in some cases transplanted and adapted elsewhere to good advantage.

### **Volunteer and School Reintegration Component**

#### Volunteer Efforts

The goals in securing volunteer services were two-fold. The major objective was to secure needed services for clients, including tutoring and work supervision, and to provide positive male and female role models. The second objective was to make advocates for the program within the larger community, thereby increasing community support and understanding of KCNP. To this end, the recruitment of volunteers from the community and from community-based institutions, organizations, and agencies was an ongoing process. The following institutions provided volunteer practicum students and student interns: Kansas City, Kansas Community Junior College, Kansas University, The Cooperative Urban Teacher Education Program (Rockhurst College), and Wichita State University.

An agreement was also entered into with Donnelly College, a private college in Kansas City, Kansas, to provide work-study students. These students were used as part-time teacher aides in the alternative school. An after-school tutoring program for New Pride clients remaining in the public schools also utilized the services of such volunteers. Foster Grandparents helped in the tutoring program. Foster Grandparents provided work supervision as well. Vista volunteers provided support to the project by helping to inaugurate a recreational and cultural activities program in 1982. The Junior League was also a valued source of volunteer support.

A volunteer list was compiled of civic, business, and social organizations interested in KCNP's activities. Short television spots developed by the project highlighted KCNP efforts to help youth, while soliciting volunteers and donations.



A volunteer training manual was prepared and each volunteer was trained by the Volunteer Coordinator in conjunction with the supervisor of the component in which the volunteer worked. KCNP proved to be an excellent training facility for practicum and intern students in the areas of alternative education, special education, psychology, social work, and criminal justice.

The kinds of problems encountered in securing community volunteers involved lack of dependability and burnout. These problems seemed to be at least partly related to the economic situation and partly to the fact that most people needed to earn money for their services and would take paying jobs if they found them.

#### School Reintegration Efforts

In KCNP a high percentage of clientele continued to attend regular school while also participating in the project. School reintegration efforts were directed towards establishing an effective working relationship with the school personnel at each school where KCNP had clients attending school. Contact was maintained on a regular basis by phone to the school counselor. Discussions focused on problems the youth may have experienced, including such matters as attendance or peer problems. Through frequent communication, efforts were made to reintegrate clients attending the New Pride Alternative School back into the regular school system.

#### **Data Collection and Project Evaluation**

Over its life the project had some difficulties in meeting all of the MIS and evaluation requirements. This seemed to be owing in part to the fact that the prime mover's attention was largely focused on building the strongest possible employment component. It also seemed partly due to the fact that this individual had major disagreements with the National Evaluation Project concerning the process to be followed and the kinds and forms of data required.

Though KCNP used a microcomputer which required duplication in the construction of datasets and dictionaries, eventually difficulties in interfacing with the mainframe computer at Wayne State University were satisfactorily resolved.

The prime mover, who served 60% time as the KYT Executive Director and 40% time as the KCNP program evaluator, ended up spending very little time in carrying out his program evaluation role. A data coder handled many of these responsibilities. The evaluator did, however, succeed in carrying out certain of the major tasks bearing on MIS requirements, including pulling together needed comparison group data. To accomplish the latter, the evaluator had to go back two years prior to the beginning of the project to find a comparison group. This was necessary owing to the fact that when the project started, virtually all eligible juveniles were referred to it, leaving no other juveniles whose records could be used in a comparison group.

#### **Eligibility Criteria and the Referral Process**

The Wyandotte County District Court-Juvenile Department agreed to refer to the program an average of 10 youths per month who met the following eligibility requirements:

Adjudicated youth from 14 through 17 years of age residing in Wyandotte County, under Court supervision for a serious offense, with a record of at least two prior adjudications/convictions for serious misdemeanors and/or felonies (with priority for referral given to the offenses of robbery, burglary, or assault) within the past 24 months of the current period of jurisdiction, who would otherwise be confined to a correctional institution or placed on probation.

**CONTINUED**

**2 OF 4**

In the Memorandum of Agreement worked out between KCNP and the Wyandotte County District Court Juvenile Department, the referral process was described in the following way:

- The referral process from the Juvenile Court was to begin with the Probation Officer after the youth was adjudicated, but prior to disposition hearing.
- An initial assessment would be made to decide if the client might be appropriate for the KCNP.
- A brief referral notification would be sent to the KCNP Case Manager. The KCNP Case Manager would then request an informal meeting with the P.O. and, if advisable, with the client. Based on information received at this meeting, the P.O. and KCNP Case Manager would decide on the appropriateness of referral to program.
- If the referral were appropriate, then established guidelines bearing on due process and right to counsel were to be followed.
- Official referral to KCNP was to be made at the time of the dispositional hearing.
- The Court and KCNP would fully transmit information on the client, and this information would be treated with all rules, laws, and policies pertaining to confidentiality.
- KCNP would provide a copy of the termination summary on each client to the Court immediately upon the client's termination from the program.

#### **Eligibility-Related Problems Unique to KCNP**

There had been some initial indications that there could be problems in obtaining adequate numbers of clients for the project. These concerns turned out to be valid. When it became apparent that fewer than the hoped for number of clients were being referred to the project, the courts began to adjudicate more frequently. While this increased the number of "eligible" referrals, it qualified the terms of their eligibility in a new way. This meant that many of those technically meeting the eligibility requirements (e.g., having the requisite

number of adjudications) were being referred to the project for offenses which were of a significantly lesser degree of seriousness than those which the juveniles first entering the project had committed or which the juveniles participating in other replication projects had committed.

This difference in the nature of the offenses committed was particularly apparent because the evaluator had seen to it that the events which led to adjudication and referral were fairly fully described. Some involved property offenses of a non-serious kind. One example was a presenting offense which involved attempting to kick a vending machine, certainly not of the same caliber of seriousness as a burglary.

Another problem bearing on referrals was alleviated in early 1981 when OJJDP agreed to eliminate the twenty-four month restriction clause on the prior offenses of referred youth. This substantially increased the ability of the project to obtain needed referrals. Nevertheless, over the three year life of the project, only 114 clients were served, while the initial projections indicated that 120 clients per year would be served.

#### **Program Linkages, Impacts, and Related Concerns**

For the most part linkages which the project maintained with the juvenile justice system, the school system, and youth-serving agencies were substantial and positive ones which served the project well. Disagreements did develop, however, between KCNP and the juvenile justice system in the last year of the project. These difficulties had a profound negative impact on the project and its prospects for institutionalization.

#### **Juvenile Justice System Linkages**

Court liaison functions at KCNP were easier to carry out during much of the first two years than had been the case in other sites because of the proximity

of the project facility to the Court. Beginning in November of 1980, the KCNP facility was located across the street from the Court. Court liaison functions were performed by the counseling supervisor. No one person, however, was dedicated full-time to carrying out these duties. In the first two years of the program, such an arrangement was unnecessary because of the readiness and willingness of the court to refer clients.

#### **Community Corrections Advisory Board**

KCNP staff were involved with the establishment of the Wyandotte County Community Corrections Advisory Board and assisted in the writing of the Wyandotte County Community Corrections Plan. At least partially due to this involvement, the plan in its original form contained provisions that would have helped to institutionalize most elements of the KCNP program.

#### **The Probation Department's Intensive Supervision Project**

The Probation Department's Intensive Supervision Project began to operate after KCNP was established. It involved case managers with a low 10-person caseload, alternative education, employment, and other service components. The project was not housed in any one place, but services were "brokered" for each client by the case manager. The program was targeted for "high risk" youth who otherwise would go to training schools. It had no rigid entrance criteria. The program grew out of, in fact, a dissatisfaction with the restrictions of New Pride eligibility criteria. The Intensive Supervision Project had contracts with New Pride to provide case management and employment services for these delinquents, in addition to the New Pride clients.

During the last year of the project, however, the breach which developed between the project and the Court resulted in a decision by the Court to support an in-house community treatment program, rather than approve the diversion of state funds from the Community Corrections Act to Project New Pride.

Officials involved in this decision indicated a belief that a court operated program would be less expensive and involve fewer administrative problems.

#### **School System Linkages**

As noted earlier in the report, arrangements were made with the school system whereby clients would be able to receive credits toward high school graduation as a result of work completed in KCNP's educational program. This represented a solid early achievement of the KCNP project. The relationships with the public school system remained good throughout the project's life.

#### **Linkages with Youth-Serving and Other Agencies**

KYT staff established contact and support agreements with the following agencies to provide direct services to project clients on an as-needed basis:

- Wyandotte Mental Health Center -- emotional problems
- Children and Youth Center -- medical and health
- State Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services -- financial and social services.
- University of Kansas Medical Center -- neurological and other health-related problems.

#### **Volunteer Efforts**

KYT's Volunteer Component was quite effective in establishing many positive linkages with youth-serving agencies and with colleges and universities. The Volunteer Coordinator worked, for instance, with the Coordinator of Services for the Handicapped at Kansas Community Junior College, looking into ways of utilizing volunteers from the student body. Linkages with other

community-based organizations, agencies, institutions, and members of the public generally have been noted earlier.

#### **Media Exposure and Public Relations**

Media and public relations efforts geared to increase public awareness and inform the public of KCNP's progress helped in developing sound linkages with various elements in the community and the community generally. In addition to the TV spots, other PR efforts were quite successful. A major public relations event that was held in July of 1981 was an Open House and Dedication Ceremony attended by over 150 persons. A "White Elephant" sale was held later. The latter involved many hours of the time of both staff and volunteers. Other activities, including holiday luncheons involving clients and their families, were also held.

The results of Pacific Institute's Intensive System Impact Study of KCNP showed that these public relations efforts were successful. In the first two years of the program, over 80% of the Youth Agency Directors and over 65% of the key decision makers knew about KCNP and the services it provided. Over 92 percent of the former and 87 percent of the latter were favorably impressed, rating the project "good" to "very good".

#### **Ways in Which PNP Differed from the Model**

Essential emphasis was the major way in which KCNP differed from the model program in Denver. In the model, the holistic concept of service delivery was pre-eminent. Equally important project components were to be equally emphasized in order to provide the necessary range and depth of services to clients. In Kansas City the employment component was very strong, but disproportionately emphasized. Demands of the school program were sometimes sacrificed to the demands of the job program. Employment was seen as far more

important than schooling. It was not made contingent upon a youth's adequate progress in school, although it could have been used as a significant incentive.

The founder of KCNP was never convinced that much that was useful went on in the alternative school. Basically, he had never been an advocate of the overall model. He voiced a particular lack of interest in the model's emphasis on the diagnostic process and the remediation of learning disabilities. Because of his powerful project influence and great enthusiasm for what KCNP was doing in the area of employment, other program components remained without adequate authority and influence in the treatment experience of clients.

#### **Institutionalization**

By 1984, the Kansas Youth Trust had become an inactive division of the Foundation for Children of the Americas. While Federal funding of KCNP had ceased in March of 1983 after three years, the employment component continued until the June of the same year. At that time the State defunded the Aftercare Project, which had provided stipends for youth engaged in the weatherization program. The FFC, with the person who brought the New Pride grant to Kansas City still active on its Board, was trying to raise money for children in Latin American by sponsoring magazine subscription drives.

#### **Summation**

While this project had certain management and communications problems, it had some very major assets, chief of which was the exemplary fashion in which the employment component was implemented and the positive influence it had on some of the other New Pride Replication Sites. The effectiveness achieved by the project generally could be attributed in large measure to the dedication, hard work, and abilities of most of the administrators and staff associated with KCNP. Had problems not developed between those involved in administering the project and the juvenile court system, the continuation of the project might well have been assured.

## LOS ANGELES NEW PRIDE

On March 1, 1980, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention awarded a two year grant of \$900,000 to the Campus Community Involvement Center, a private, not-for-profit agency with a number of centers serving the Chicano community. Local matching funding of \$90,000 was authorized by the City of Los Angeles - Department of Health Services with the understanding that approximately 30 drug abusers would be treated each year as part of the project. (The matching funding was withheld presumably because of the failure of the project to treat the required number of drug abusers.)

OJJDP funding was to be used to develop and implement a replication of the New Pride model in East Los Angeles. In October of 1981 OJJDP cut \$230,000 remaining from the two year grant after finding "mismanagement." Ayudate New Pride was mired in problems from the outset which were to get increasingly worse as time went on. The parent agency closed its doors January 27, 1982.

### Programmatic and Fiscal Context

From a national perspective on criminal justice, California is synonymous with innovation. It has always been the first to implement and research new concepts, new methods, and the most up-to-date treatment technologies. Entire treatises designed to be illustrative of community corrections generally have been written about programs and research conducted entirely in California (i.e. Frank, 1971). Alternatives to institutionalization, such as intensive supervision, non-residential and residential treatment, out-of-home-placements, specialized probation and parole units, as well as a host of diversion and crime prevention approaches--all begin earlier in California than anywhere else.

Here the community corrections movement took root and spread out to instigate similar changes in other states. Early research on the Community Treatment Project grabbed the interest of administrators and practitioners

around the country, throwing into question conventional procedures and established ways of dealing with offenders. In 1965, the California State Legislature passed legislation which provided a state subsidy to county probation departments. Reduced commitment rates of offenders to state correctional institutions were made a mandatory condition for the receipt of subsidy monies. Other states followed much later with similar legislation, often called "Community Corrections Acts," (e.g., Minnesota in 1973 and Kansas in 1979).

By the time the awards were made to replicate New Pride, the State had enacted legislation to allocate money directly to county criminal justice planning boards through block grant provisions. Each county was to have a balanced board with representatives from each part of the criminal justice system. They were instructed to develop and implement county plans for the most effective and creative deployment of those funds. Statewide, the aftermath of Proposition 13 was beginning to be felt. Smaller programs began vying for greatly reduced county appropriations with powerful, entrenched, sometimes unionized organizations providing traditional, and therefore, more publicly justifiable services.

Nationally as well, the winds had changed, spear-headed once again by the forces that moved California. Decentralization became of paramount concern in the State and then federally. LEAA was disbanded entirely. A few of the LEAA functions which remained were consolidated in the Department of Justice such as the National Institute of Justice, which sponsors research, and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Emphasis in the Department of Justice seemed to shift toward research and development efforts with little funding available for programs.

Early awareness of the impending scarcity of resources prompted keen competition for every dollar that might be available to agencies for community-based alternatives to incarceration. California alone hosted eight of the nineteen New Pride finalists, from which the original site selections were made. Three of these were from the Los Angeles area. Identical letters of support were sent from the local juvenile court to each of these competitors, indicating

that any New Pride Program funded in Los Angeles could expect 150 clients per year to be referred.

Ayudate submitted, by all estimates, an outstanding proposal. Nevertheless, based on the statistics cited in the Ayudate proposal, the National Evaluation Project had pointed out possible problems with the number of cases that might qualify for New Pride given the required offense types. According to this document, there had only been 29 total arrests of juveniles for robbery, 62 for aggravated assault, 112 for burglary, and 22 for non-aggravated assault that resulted in petitions in 1978. This number would likely be reduced considerably by age limits, multiple offender requirements, and further screening in the adjudication process.

The National Evaluation Project had concluded that Ayudate might have difficulty getting the targeted (n = 120) number of clients who met New Pride standards for seriousness and chronicity. It was also noted that the match money at Ayudate was contingent upon the program serving 30 drug abusers per year, thus introducing yet another eligibility concern. As the nineteen finalist proposals were reviewed it became apparent that problems with the number of qualified referrals in the Los Angeles area were likely to emerge.

#### The Juvenile Justice System

While juvenile programs serving as alternatives or adjuncts to conventional probation and the incarceration of offenders were well-established in Los Angeles, there was nothing quite like the New Pride model, which aimed at treating serious repeat juvenile offenders within the context of a nonresidential program in the community. At the time of the award to Ayudate the Department of Public Social Services listed twenty-four diversion and fifteen delinquency prevention projects in the East Los Angeles section of the city alone. Ayudate New Pride originally proposed to serve youth only from East Los Angeles, and receive all of its referrals from the ELA probation office. This was expanded to include additional sections in the Greater Los Angeles area when

difficulties were experienced in getting adequate numbers of referrals from ELA.

The unit head of the ELA Juvenile Field Services Bureau agreed to refer "juveniles, male and female, ages 14 to 17 years old, with two adjudications/convictions for serious misdemeanors or felonies within the two previous years." The presiding juvenile court judge agreed to refer the targeted youth population who resided in East Los Angeles. The RFP did not specify the need for three prior adjudications/convictions, which was the actual guideline eventually implemented by OJJDP. This caused quite a problem later.

Juvenile court procedures as implemented in Los Angeles rarely allowed for youth with three formal adjudications to remain in the community. Rather, for the first offenses, youth were most frequently diverted, placed on informal probation, and released without a finding if they had no further law violations. If arrested again for a serious misdemeanor and/or felony, the case might be referred downtown for a formal hearing and determination of guilt. If the count was sustained, the youth would be placed on formal probation. With formal probation, as well as with the informal probation which precedes it, supervision takes place in one of the four field offices, while adjudication hearings are conducted in a central location downtown at the Courthouse.

All activities concerned with the screening of complaints, the decisions to divert, to file petitions, to supervise youth on both informal and formal probation, and to select appropriate treatment programs for youth are conducted in one of the four probation field offices in Los Angeles County. Probation agents have the authority to initiate any disposition but commitment to CYA, including short term detention and longer term commitment to county-run ranches or camps.

The only reason juveniles are adjudicated three times is to initiate long-term commitments to state training schools, where youth are likely to stay an average of a year. Third offense petitions are only remanded for adjudication

when all alternatives available to youth have failed. The LA County CPO estimated an expense of \$2,000 to send a case through the adjudication process.

#### **Difficulties With OJJDP Eligibility Criteria**

Given these contingencies it was obvious that Ayudate New Pride could not operate within the three-adjudication guideline mandated by OJJDP. There were simply too few juveniles who qualified given the eligibility criteria. The Chief Probation Officer of Los Angeles County offered the following analysis:

"A survey of cases within the four area offices - East Los Angeles, Bellflower, Rio Hondo and South San Gabriel reveals that there were only 25 cases with three or more sustained petitions for the two year period of January 1, 1979 to January 1, 1981. Without further screening of the cases, it is obvious that not all of the 25 cases would be eligible for the New Pride Program."

Although he was supportive of the New Pride project, he felt that it would not be possible to make an adequate number of referrals using the required criteria for eligibility. Careful scrutiny of the complete offense records of those juveniles who were referred during the period of time Ayudate New Pride was in operation revealed that only 16 of 51 clients served met the OJJDP guidelines. This examination was conducted by the national evaluators.

#### **The Parent Agency and Acquisition of the New Pride Grant**

The parent agency began in October, 1972 as an off-campus facility of East Los Angeles College's Campus-Community Involvement Center (CCIC). CCIC had been funded by the Office of Education of H.E.W. to provide crisis and counseling services to students with drug-related problems.

In June of 1973, CCIC became a freestanding agency when the National Institute of Mental Health and the Los Angeles County Office of Drug Abuse

agreed to fund drug-free counseling services to youth living in the East and Northeast Health Districts of the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services.

Funding from other governmental and nongovernmental sources was to follow. Projects which were funded included a minibike/yard service program, drug abuse programs, a Big Sister program, and a community crime prevention program. The latter was funded by LEAA.

The program monitor at LEAA who had responsibilities for supervising the community crime prevention project was the person who first informed some of the individuals administering that project about the possibility of a national initiative to replicate New Pride. Several of the CCIC administrators had also seen a network TV program on Denver New Pride. Subsequently, several of the CCIC administrators visited Denver New Pride while in Denver attending another conference.

When the RFP was released they were eager to submit a proposal. They sought assistance from a professor at California State University at Los Angeles who had a reputation in the field of learning disabilities. This individual ended up delegating and overseeing the writing of major portions of the proposal and putting it all together. He became so enthusiastic about the potential of the project that he became the project's Associate Director when it was funded.

Several of the key persons in CCIC had previously been involved with another community agency known as the Greater Los Angeles Community Action Agency (GLACAA). (The proposal writer was new to Ayudate and had had no involvement in this organization.) GLACAA was the subject of considerable controversy. In fact "60 Minutes" aired a story focusing on allegations that GLACAA programs had been grossly mismanaged. Indeed the individual who held the position of CCIC Deputy Director in charge of finances was under indictment for fraud in connection with the running of that organization before it ceased its operations.



In spite of the concerns involving some of the key would-be implementers of the grant, the award was made. As one observer put it, the proposal seemed exceptionally promising and the need for this kind of program in East Los Angeles was very great. The principal actors were enthusiastic about New Pride. Since they had been working in the agency (about two years), it had grown and prospered. The judgment was based not only on the strengths of the proposal and a site visit, but also on the recent track record of CCIC. Shortly after the project was funded, the name of the parent agency was changed, at least unofficially, to Ayudate, which means "Help yourself."

#### General Program Design, Requirements, and Procedures

The program was designed to serve serious juvenile offenders from the greater East Los Angeles area, between 14 and 17 years of age. Like the model, it was originally intended to have two phases. These were described in project literature in the following way:

- Phase 1: Intensive treatment - including assessment, evaluation, programming, and treatment in the areas of general health, education, psychological, vocational, and counseling needs.
- Phase 2: Follow-up phase - including job placement, follow-up counseling, and continuing education.

Each phase was to be of six months duration with total services provided each client for a period not to exceed one year.

The requirements for admission were as described in the following way in the project literature:

1. Referral through the Juvenile Justice System.
2. Parental consent for the juvenile to participate in Ayudate New Pride.
3. A statement of willingness to participate by the juvenile.

4. Written parental and client consent for assessment.
5. Acceptance by a multidisciplinary client review panel.

Through October of 1980, the intake process was fairly smooth, although step 5 was never implemented. The counseling coordinator would get referrals from the Probation Department and immediately begin meeting with all interested parties, including, of course, the client. After completion of the referral form, a decision would be made as to the eligibility of the client, based on the New Pride entrance criteria.

Once the client was accepted, home visits would be initiated by the counseling coordinator and the counselor assigned to the client. After all the papers were signed by parents, clients, and the courts, etc., the client would be appropriately placed. Diagnostic assessment was to be arranged at this point. This latter phase, as will be noted, was never effectively carried out.

Specific staff were not assigned to the courts in a liaison capacity until the end of 1980 when referrals had practically ceased. Plans were initiated at that time to have staff in and around the Probation Department field offices throughout the week in order to identify potential clients and explain the New Pride program.

#### Program Components and Key Staff

The New Pride Program in Los Angeles was to include the following elements:

- Diagnostic Assessment
- Remedial Education
- Special Education
- Intensive Counseling/Therapy
- Job Preparation and Job Placement
- Cultural, Physical, and Health Education

- Volunteer Support

### Diagnostic Assessment

Diagnostic Assessment was to involve a Diagnostic Team Leader 20 percent time, two school psychologists (each 50 percent time), a counseling supervisor, and three counselors. (The counselors and the counseling supervisor would primarily be involved, however, in providing counseling services).

The professor who had done much of the work writing the proposal had originally been written in to perform in the 20 percent time role of Diagnostic Team Leader. His enthusiasm for the project became so great that when the project was funded he was asked to assume a full-time role as Associate Director of the Project instead. He nonetheless retained diagnostic responsibilities.

Visual, auditory, and physical examinations were supposed to be handled under contract by the Community Health Foundation in East Los Angeles. This arrangement did not work out as planned.

Early in the project, diagnostic staff became concerned about the diagnostic tests that had been used in the New Pride model and that had been selected for the diagnostic process generally. These replication questions seem to fade in importance in light of other far more critical problems and areas of concern which were to emerge later on and which directly affected the survival of the project.

In April of 1981, OJJDP issued a first notice to Ayudate of their intent to terminate the project. They cited the project's failure to implement the diagnostic assessment component and to provide the diagnostic services required as a major reason. OJJDP also cited the project's failure to develop appropriate individualized service plans (IISPs) for each new client entering the project. According to OJJDP, assessments and IISP's had not been completed on any active cases as of March 1981.

### Educational Programs

The educational component consisted of two parts: Alternative Education and Special Education. Alternative Education was to have two credentialed remedial teachers, one special education aide, one to two student teachers, and volunteer assistants. Special Education for Learning Disabilities was to have a speech and hearing teacher, an LD teacher, a special education aide, one to two LD student teachers, and volunteer assistants. The Assistant Director was to serve as the Coordinator of Educational Programs.

In December of 1980, the only teacher who was then a part of the Educational Component resigned. Shortly thereafter, his replacement resigned. The educational coordinator and only remaining qualified teacher submitted her resignation effective the end of January 1981. This staff turnover was precipitated by problems internal to the parent agency and because of the extremely low number of clients to be served.

### Intensive Counseling/Therapy

Intensive Counseling/Therapy was to have a counseling supervisor, three counselors, one to two Master's level counseling interns (Guidance, School Psychology, Clinical Psychology), and volunteer assistants. Arrangements were made whereby graduate interns in the areas of special education and counseling could be assigned field work placements in Ayudate New Pride.

Though the intensive supervision component always maintained staff, the counseling supervisor had no autonomy to contact the court system. Eventually, he was fired for refusing to respond to an order from parent agency management to intervene in the personal life of a staff member.

### **Job Preparation and Job Placement**

Job preparation and job placement were seen as encompassing vocational guidance, exploration, on-the-job training, and work study. The staff to be hired for this program component included a coordinator of job preparation and job placement, two employment counselors, one employment counselor aide, and one or two vocational rehabilitation interns. On-the-job training (paid) in local small and middle-sized business firms and work study programs which would be done for high school credit were to be made available for clients. The work study programs were to be with local businesses and companies and existing Ayudate programs. Five vocational education training programs in the community were also to be utilized.

While initial efforts were made to involve project youth in a lawn care project, this arrangement broke down when the director of the employment component left for another job in the fall of 1980. Subsequently, the implementation of this component ceased. It was not in place one year after the start of the grant.

### **Cultural, Physical, and Health Education**

The Volunteer Coordinator who also had responsibilities for school reintegration was to be involved in providing cultural services. Various field trips were to be arranged.

Physical education activities were to involve consultants as needed. Activities at local recreational facilities and parks were to be scheduled involving all of the staff.

Health education was to be handled by LD and remedial teachers, aides, counselors, and other community health care resources. Topics to be covered included nutrition, personal hygiene, and sexuality and the adolescent.

### **Volunteer Support**

This program element was never fully implemented. Some of the volunteer efforts which did occur are noted in the section on Linkages, Impacts, and Related Concerns.

### **Data Collection and Project Evaluation**

A Director of Management, Information, Data Collection, and Program Evaluation was to serve in a full-time capacity for the two years of the project. According to the original proposed organization chart, this person was to be assisted by a data coder. No provision for such a position appears, however, to have been included in the proposed budget as it was originally submitted.

The implementation of this program element was delayed, in large measure owing to administrative and fiscal problems internal to Ayudate, through the first year of the project. Money was not made available to operate the computer terminal, although the evaluator did participate in national training events.

The project had two persons serving sequentially in the role of evaluator. The second was far freer than the first to perform his role, but because of the program's severe problems, even his fine efforts could not make up for or fill in the gaps left in MIS and evaluation efforts undertaken in the first year of the project's operation.

### **The Advisory Board**

For all intents and purposes, the New Pride Advisory Board was non-existent. While planning had been done which might have culminated in the establishment of such a body, it was never fully carried out. According to the proposal the Advisory Board was to meet on a bimonthly basis and provide input into project design and progress. The Project Director was to be in charge of

establishing and coordinating the Board. Its membership was to have included the following:

- Local public officials (city, county, state)
- Parents, other private citizens residing in the community
- Educators, psychologists, school guidance counseling and diagnostic personnel, vocational educational professionals
- Community leaders, business leaders, representatives from community agencies serving delinquent youth
- Students of Ayudate (selected on the basis of peer group recommendations)
- Juvenile justice professionals (correctional, probation, judiciary, legal)
- Law enforcement agency representatives (LAPD, LA City Sheriffs)
- Human services professionals (DPSS, CETA, Department of Manpower Development, mental health clinics)

The Board of Directors of Ayudate did function at times in an advisory capacity, but the oversight they exercised and the actions they took never had any substantive impact on the manner in which the project was managed or on program outcomes. In the last months they did oversee the development of a procedures manual, which, owing to the early death of the parent agency as well as the project, was never really used.

#### Administration

Unlike virtually every other replication site, the parent agency retained both administrative and fiscal responsibility for the project. This relationship had not been depicted in this way in the proposed organization chart which had accompanied the proposal. Ten percent and 15 percent of the time of the Ayudate Executive and Deputy Directors respectively, were, however, earmarked in the proposed budget.

In practice the Project Director and Associate Project Director did not operate autonomously in any sense. Neither could obligate project resources to purchase needed educational materials. All purchases had to be approved by the Ayudate management, which often either failed or refused to authorize essential expenditures. The Associate Director of the New Pride project reported to the Director, while the Director was answerable to the Executive Director of Ayudate. The Ayudate Executive Director and Deputy Director held the tightest possible rein on Ayudate's projects in the sense that no major or minor decisions could be made by the Project Directors.

Ayudate finances were handled by a consultant and his staff. None of the financial staff spoke English. As few of the staff or management of LANP were bilingual, this made communications concerning fiscal matters difficult. The financial problems of the project as well as Ayudate generally were of every imaginable sort:

- Checks were not issued on time.
- Checks which were issued by Ayudate had bounced so often that eventually only one bank in the area agreed to cash them.
- Employee benefits, including health benefits and retirement, were never properly taken out and provided for. (The Federal government eventually attached liens to all Ayudate bank accounts for failure to pay payroll taxes.)
- The purchase of materials essential to the operation of the components of the project and essential to day to day operations either never got authorized or were never purchased.
- Materials which were finally authorized and purchased never appeared.

Numerous irregularities were eventually alleged by the staff and/or uncovered by persons visiting the project. Early in the second year of the project the problems became so great that auditors from various levels of government representing tax audit and funding agencies descended on Ayudate.

By the time all Federal funding was withdrawn from Ayudate there were eleven resident auditors daily going over Ayudate's books. According to several sources, records of the organization never were adequately sorted out.

It bears noting here that according to the original proposal the Project Director was to function in a primarily administrative capacity with all key project personnel directly accountable to him; as is pointed out here, however, the project never had autonomy and its activities were for all intents and purposes dictated directly by the parent agency. The Project Director was also to assume primary responsibility for developing a strategy for institutionalization after Federal funding ceased. In addition, the Project Director was to interface directly with all juvenile justice agencies in all phases of the project as well as with community resource agencies in the project service area. Neither of these tasks was effectively carried out.

#### **Project Facilities**

Initially Ayudate was renting a facility located in East Los Angeles on East Whittier Boulevard. In that this building was only available on a month to month basis, Ayudate explored other possibilities. They found a more ample facility (4,400 square feet) on South Garfield Avenue, also in East Los Angeles. The building selected was right on the bus line and in neutral gang territory. The location made it ideal in that gang members would not have to cross the territories of rival gangs in order to reach the project. They were able to lease this building beginning August 1, 1980.

The building at the Garfield site was in need of major remodeling. Classrooms had to be set up in order for the alternative school to function. In addition to three classrooms, remodeling plans called for providing a conference room, a reception area, restrooms, and nine offices. Other improvements were also to be undertaken.

While efforts were made to carry out the necessary remodeling tasks, they were not carried out adequately. By the time the project came to an end, the remodeling efforts had still failed to meet code requirements.

A much newer building on Washington Avenue, two blocks away from the Garfield facility, was secured during the first year to serve as the administrative offices for the parent agency. Offices were also maintained there for the administrators of the project. The firm which was contracted to handle Ayudate's finances also used offices at this site.

#### **Project Management**

During the early months of the project the first Director was fairly regularly involved in New Pride affairs. The Associate Director, who had written the proposal, was, however, the one who assumed increasing responsibility for developing the program components and overseeing day to day operations. Owing to the fact that the Ayudate Executive Director and Deputy Director were desirous of maintaining control of the project, the Associate Director was not allowed to take any independent action or to perform any liaison or public relations functions without the Project Director being along.

The first Director became less and less involved in the project after the first few months, evidently owing to problems of a personal nature. When he did return to Ayudate, he reportedly was spending most of his time writing proposals for the parent agency. The Associate Director was for all intents and purposes serving as Acting Director, but with serious constraints on his actions placed there by the Ayudate Executive Director and Deputy Director, including an absence of authority and agreed upon operational procedures and an absence of control or influence concerning resource acquisition and utilization. The Associate Director's hands were tied.

For most persons the constraints placed on the Associate Director would have proved too much and they would have quit. Because of this individual's

overwhelming dedication to what he saw as being the goals of the project and because of his abiding commitment to doing all that he could to achieve those goals, he did not quit. Neither did he lose all hope. His health, however, did fail and he suffered a heart attack in the first year of the project, apparently precipitated by the emotional strain of fighting a losing battle. He left his position because of these health-related problems.

#### **The Staff During the Initial Months**

With only a single exception all key staff members were hired through open competition. The Associate Director was able to play a key role in the hiring process and in helping ensure that strong, well qualified individuals were selected.

With a qualified staff in place, certain problems began to emerge, a prime one being that the Executive Director of Ayudate and those closest to him apparently felt threatened by a highly professional staff. Tensions between those having professional backgrounds and those at the highest levels of the parent organization who had no professional credentials served to create a disharmonious setting for the operation of the program. Conversely, the professionals on the staff were used to having a certain degree of autonomy to do their jobs and they were quite unused to having their professional capacity restricted by persons who had neither credentials nor expertise.

#### **Project Staffing Over Time**

The project was to have two "shifts" of staff. The staff which had originally been hired became increasingly distraught concerning the manner in which the parent agency was constraining and actively undercutting the project's development. They were also understandably upset about how the finances of the organization were being handled, including being paid late or having inadequate materials to carry out their assigned tasks. The first Associate

Director had been so concerned over the failure of the staff to be paid on time that on one occasion he had used his own personal resources to provide salaries to the whole group.

A group of particularly dedicated staff members became so disgruntled and felt so deeply concerned regarding a wide range of management and fiscal problems affecting them and stifling the project's potential that they expressed their concerns in writing. They sent letters to OJJDP and other agencies of state and federal government which they felt would be concerned. These staff members soon thereafter resigned or were fired. In fact, by the time the project moved into its second year there had been a turnover in practically all the project's staff through resignations and firings.

#### **The Second Shift of Staff and Management**

A new Project Director was hired to replace the old one. The first Director was moved over to Ayudate to work there. Many of these changes were either forced or precipitated by OJJDP when it began to become aware of the nature and extent of the problems facing the project. OJJDP subsequently conducted its own investigations into allegations of mismanagement.

The second Project Director seemed to have a somewhat freer hand than the first in overseeing the day to day operations of Ayudate New Pride. He still was under the thumb of the Executive Director and Deputy Director of Ayudate. The Executive Director of the parent agency was now, however, threatened with curtailment of funding for the effort if management and fiscal problems were not straightened out.

The new Project Director had additional problems which the previous set of staff and management had not faced. A central problem concerned referrals. The problems the project was having may also have become known to the juvenile justice system in East Los Angeles because staff heard that Ayudate New Pride was at least temporarily taken off the approved list of alternative

programs. The scarcity of referrals forced the project to look to other sources beyond East Los Angeles.

The project was never fully restaffed after the first staff was gone. There also was little if any indication that the "second shift" of staff knew anything about the New Pride model which they were supposed to be replicating.

The educational component had never really gotten off the ground during the first year and there was no school operating during the last months. A couple of counselors were hired, but no supervisor. A new evaluator was hired who did a yeoman's job in straightening out the MIS aspects of the project, to the extent that this was possible to do and to the extent the data were accessible and had been gathered in the first place. Most of the diagnostic data had never been adequately gathered, because the testing was not done. Money was not approved for diagnostic materials until the second shift of staff. Thereafter, an outside consultant from a local university provided testing on an as-needed basis. It was too late, however, for such relatively minor changes to help the project.

Funding was withdrawn from the project by OJJDP prior to the end of the second year of funding, when, upon further investigation, a more complete picture of the nature and extent of the problems afflicting the project emerged. Other agencies providing funds to the parent agency were soon to follow suit.

#### **Program Linkages**

An extraordinary amount of effort had gone into the preparation of the proposal submitted to OJJDP by Ayudate. A very broad range of letters of agreement and support had been solicited and included in the proposal. The letters indicated that groundwork had been laid which would help ensure the development of sound linkages between the project and all elements of the community. Written agreements were included in the proposal which involve the juvenile justice system, educational elements within the community, job training

and job placement opportunities, volunteer intern placement and cooperative arrangements with youth serving agencies.

#### **Juvenile Justice System Linkages**

Referral agreements had been worked out in advance with the following: the Presiding Judge of the Juvenile Court of the County of Los Angeles; the District Attorney of the County of Los Angeles; the Juvenile Field Service Bureau of the Probation Department, Los Angeles County; the Regional Administrator of Parole of the California Youth Authority; the Gang Violence Reduction Project of the California Youth Authority; and the United States District Judge. In the opening months of the project the Director and Associate Director spent a great deal of time contacting and meeting with persons in the juvenile justice system. Soon, however, communications seemed to stall or slacken off when the Director faded out of the picture. Everyone else was denied any authority to initiate or maintain such contacts. By December of 1980, as a result of external pressure, there was a renewed effort to re-establish communication with all agencies concerned. Direct communication links were established with probation departments and the D.A.'s office.

#### **School System Linkages**

An agreement had been included in the proposal between the Almansor Education Center and the project. The Center agreed to offer a basic education program, speech and language therapy, and sensory-motor training at a pre-specified per diem rate for tuition. The Center also agreed to maintain active reintegration efforts aimed at helping learning disabled students return to private or public school programs.

Eight schools were contacted in the initial months of the project. These schools had all indicated an interest and willingness to cooperate with project efforts.

### Linkages with Youth Serving and Other Agencies

Cooperation with community agencies was seen by the first program evaluator as being good to poor. He pointed out in January of 1981 that some community agencies in East LA had been less than cooperative. He noted that getting medical/health provisions for clients had been a constant problem and at that time was not nearing resolution. The same evaluator noted, however, that Ayudate New Pride had had considerable success in securing tours and tickets for various educational/recreational activities and that the clients had reaped the benefits of such generosity.

Job training and job placement agreements included in the original proposal involved the following three firms: Coffee Time Incorporated, Wood Concepts, and Schaeffer Grinding Company, Inc. Agreements were also struck with the Department of Special Education and the Department of Guidance and Pupil Personnel Services (Vocational Guidance), both of California State University at Los Angeles to provide volunteer intern placements. After initial efforts to establish communication by the Associate Director, no follow-up took place to reinforce linkages or implement the agreements.

### Ways in Which the Project Differed from the Model

The essential structural difference of this project from the New Pride model was the relationship that Ayudate New Pride had with the parent agency. The parent agency did not allow the project any autonomy and made it impossible for those attempting to manage the program to function in an effective manner. Because of the many problems plaguing the operation of the project, the program components never became fully functional and cannot, therefore, be compared with those of the model.

### Institutionalization

While there were some early efforts to develop and pursue a strategy for institutionalization, there is no evidence any sustained efforts were expended on institutionalizing the project. The first Director, when asked about plans for institutionalization in an early interview with the National Evaluation Project, had mentioned his intention to seek funding from private industry. In a similar early interview, the first Associate Director had mentioned that initial contacts had been made with the State Department of Special Education and LA City Special Education personnel. None of these contacts resulted in any agreements to provide funds. As the program never succeeded in becoming fully functional, it never reached the point of being salable.

### Strengths and Weaknesses

The greatest strength of the project was in the dedication and tenacity of the initial staff and especially the person serving during the first year of the project as Associate Director. The efforts of the final program evaluator also represented a strength. To some extent the efforts of both the first and second Directors represented strengths, the first Director during his initial participation in the project which was effective, and the second Director for his conscientious effort to keep the project afloat and get it back on course.

The weaknesses of the project can be summed up in a word: "mismanagement." The responsibility for the mismanagement was directly traceable to the parent agency, which never allowed the project the autonomy it needed in order to evolve and survive on its own. In their April 1981 letter of intent to terminate the project, OJJDP cited as major management problems the following:

- Staff turnover
- Payroll problems



- Low client flow
- Critical program elements not operative (employment, volunteer support, and diagnostic services)

Questionable documentation of the offense records of clients was also cited by OJJDP. The agency found clients' records inconsistent and/or inaccurate. OJJDP also cited Ayudate New Pride's failure to operate a project which was cost-effective in relation to the number of youth served and the services actually received.

The fiscal problems of the project alone would have destroyed its viability. Combined with stultifying and unworkable management problems and practices, not even the most dedicated, expert, and enduring staff and senior project management could have ensured the project's survival. Here was an example of the parent agency effectively undercutting, thwarting, and ultimately destroying any hope of success there might have been for its replication project.

## PENSACOLA NEW PRIDE

A two-year \$1 million grant was awarded to the Community Mental Health Center in Pensacola, Florida in March of 1980. The Community Mental Health Center sponsored the grant with the Director of the Center's Child Development Program being responsible for putting the proposal together. When the project was funded he became its director. The project was re-funded in each of two subsequent funding years and ended in March of 1984.

### General Status of Local Juvenile Justice System Efforts

In 1978, over 2,000 juvenile delinquents were handled by the county. Of these, over 1,000 were adjudicated. Options available for adjudicated youth in Pensacola included commitment to residential training schools. Supervised probation was also an option, and restitution and community services sentences were also given on occasion. Operation Divert had provided an additional alternative prior to New Pride, and PNP became still another option.

The Probation Department, called "Community Control," was a part of the State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). HRS operated all social service programs within the state spanning the gamut of health, medical, welfare, and rehabilitative services. Included were other juvenile justice system related services such as in lieu of prosecution programs.

By 1981, the juvenile prosecutor could direct file juvenile cases in adult court depending on the age and nature of the criminal activity involved. This provision of statute was vigorously employed by the Pensacola District Attorney responsible for juvenile matters. In fact, more youth were waived to adult court in Pensacola than in Miami or any other county in Florida. Since juvenile sanctions could be invoked one last time for individuals so remanded, many youth whose cases were waived were eventually served by PNP.

### The Parent Agency

The parent agency of PNP was the Community Mental Health Center, one of the largest private not-for-profit agencies operating in Pensacola.\* It provided a wide range of residential and day treatment services. Such services included psychiatric, drug abuse, alcoholism and related counseling programs involving the provision of family, individual, and group counseling services.

Prior to New Pride the Community Mental Health Center had gained experience working with youth, particularly those with learning disabilities and delinquency problems, through a program called Operation Divert. Operation Divert had been funded by the Office of Education for the Handicapped from 1978 to 1980. It enjoyed a fine relationship with the juvenile justice system that proved very useful for PNP. Since one of the components of Pensacola New Pride (PNP) was the diagnosis and remediation of learning disabilities, a substantial part of the staff from Operation Divert moved over to PNP. Operation Divert's funding ended in June of 1980, while PNP's funding began March 1, 1980.

As the project was implemented, the Community Mental Health Center provided considerable administrative support to PNP. In addition to funding the proposal submission process, travel, and other project costs prior to award, the Center provided personnel and accounting support for PNP. They also assisted with reporting requirements and helped generate budgets.

With regard to community relations, the Center Director and members of the Board of Directors were available to assist the project in any of a variety of ways. They provided counsel and even direct help in establishing linkages and networking with others in the community.

---

\* Its name was later changed to "Lakeview Center" because of its more neutral connotation. However, throughout this report the agency is referred to as the Community Mental Health Center.

The Center also afforded PNP staff development opportunities that it would not have been able to afford otherwise. The Director of In-service Training for the Center was able to bring in consultants and trainers to run workshops for the PNP staff. PNP staff, in turn, also provided training sessions for other Center personnel.

### Program Design

PNP was a non-residential, community-based treatment program for adjudicated youth with a history of serious offenses. The project was designed to offer counseling, alternative education, vocational awareness, and employment to approximately 100 juvenile offenders annually. As was the case in all other sites, the actual number of clients served fell far short of projections. In its four year span of operation, a total of 185 clients were served. Youths accepted into the program had to be between 14 and 17 years of age and have two or more adjudications and a recent infraction in the community. As with other New Pride Project replications, the program was designed to provide six months of intensive supervision and intervention services and six months of follow up.

### Administration

The Director of Youth Programs for the parent agency initiated and supervised the submission of the New Pride proposal and subsequently became the Project Director. He was to relinquish his first hat nearly two years into the project when responsibilities for both became overburdening. A major reason for this change and for the increase in agency focus on PNP seems to have been pressures brought to bear by the administrator of the Community Mental Health Center, who had become increasingly concerned over problems in carrying out the MIS and evaluation requirements of the New Pride project in a timely fashion. A continued failure to meet these requirements satisfactorily was seen as jeopardizing OJJDP funding as well as the hospital accreditation status of the Center and its programs. Those problems were not fully resolved until the final months of the project.

### **Staffing**

There had been some difficulty in getting staff initially, but this was soon resolved. The project was obligated to pay staff by the same pay schedule used by the Community Mental Health Center, which pays by degree, not specialty area. The project had a hard time finding minority staff in part owing to the pay schedule criteria coupled with a lack of qualified individuals applying for work at the Center.

Over the four year life of the project the persons holding the positions of director and assistant director remained the same. Significant changes did occur in several other key staff positions, including the heads of all of the components and the project evaluator. The change in the head of the intensive supervision component resulted in major improvements in the overall effectiveness of the project. Replacement of the original evaluator with a more effective one in the second year of the program helped the project meet major evaluation requirements.

As initial staffing problems were resolved over the first year or so of the project, the staff became extremely supportive of each other. In fact, in the view of one evaluator, there seemed to be an overall effort to please.

A considerable amount of time and attention were given to in-service staff training. Training meetings were held on a frequent and regular basis. These seemed to contribute in a positive way to staff effectiveness and morale.

### **Advisory Board**

The Advisory Board of the project did not maintain a high profile or seek to have a major say in project efforts. The capabilities, expertise, and direction provided the project by the Director and his staff may well have been the primary reasons that such a low profile was kept. The fact that the project was part of the Community Mental Health Center, a well-established county agency,

may have meant that members selected for the Advisory Board were accustomed to serving in an advisory capacity to well-run programs. A third reason for the low profile may well have been the fact that the project did not represent a major departure from the Operation Divert program.

### **Project Facilities**

Initially the project's facility provided adequate space. PNP used the same space that Operation Divert had used. This involved a little under 5,000 square feet of space. Subsequently, space problems developed as new staff people were hired. Additional rooms had to be converted to serve new purposes. Two main needs at the outset were for more office and storage space.

The classroom was arranged as an open classroom setting. This seemed to be less confining than separate classrooms. LD students, clients in the alternative school, and youth with emotional problems referred by the public schools all received individual instruction in the same large room. A basketball court and a baseball backstop were also developed in an area next to the facility.

### **Program Components**

#### **Alternative School**

The Alternative School began to operate on August 4, 1980. Of particular interest is the fact that in the early days of the first year of the school, the classroom was composed entirely of New Pride clients. Beginning some time in 1982, classes were mixed. They included New Pride clients along with children from the juvenile center that is part of the Community Mental Health Center and children who attended the emotionally handicapped program that the Center operates for the county schools.

The teachers were also intermingled. While this change was necessitated by budget cuts, it did not appear to result in any major problems. In fact, aside from the budgetary savings there seemed to be an added plus of bringing serious juvenile offenders into close contact with youth who had far less serious behavior problems, or none at all. This mixing was felt to have had a beneficial socializing effect on the youth with the most serious behavior and delinquency problems.

In the first months of the project the attendance averaged around 70 percent. This situation improved notably when better rules were worked out and a level of privilege system was established which gave the youth privileges to work toward rather than threats of things taken away. Morale and motivation to do well in the program were both positively affected by these changes.

#### **The Intensive Supervision Component**

The major thrust of the program involved creating internal motivation to change on the part of the clients. The project staff tried to encourage the clients to take responsibility for their own actions and they tried to make whatever sanctions that were imposed for rule infractions flow naturally and logically from the behavior. In sum, the approach taken seemed to be a fairly straightforward representation of Adlerian principles.

The educational program and job training and development elements of the program were particularly designed to allow juveniles to experience the consequences of their actions. Ideally, the components of the project were to function in a mutually supportive way.

This approach had not gone at all smoothly at first. Early in the project's life some major problems arose between the intensive supervision component (the counseling component) and the educational component. These two components seemed to be vying for power and attempting to carve out separate

territories. This problem evidently arose because of the actions of the person holding the position of counseling supervisor at the time.

Led by this individual, the other counselors were influenced to view the counseling component as the central and most important component in the entire program. They did not feel that their actions with the juveniles needed to be necessarily supportive of the educational staff and their efforts. Indeed, the teachers felt for a time that the counselors were undermining their efforts and failing to provide the kind of support that would have been helpful to them. When the counseling supervisor was moved out of this position and into another part of the parent agency, this situation was rapidly resolved.

#### **The Employment Component**

The employment component initiated its three-phase system of services in October of 1981. During the first phase all juveniles participated in group work for several weeks and pre-vocational skills were taught. These skills included completing employment applications and learning effective interview techniques. In the second phase, the juveniles were worked with individually to explore interests and identify potential placements. During the third phase actual interviews were arranged and real efforts were made to obtain job placements. This component proved to be particularly effective and innovative.

A resource list was compiled by the supervisor of the employment component. It included businesses, labor organizations, and religious groups. Using this list, the employment counselors made 134 contacts in the community during the first quarter of operation alone. This was done in an effort to locate part-time job placements.

In assigning clients to jobs, employment counselors had to be concerned not only with the ability of the clients to perform well, but also with the consequences of the clients' performance on the ability of PNP to hold onto that job placement. If two or three clients had been assigned to a particular

placement in the past and performed poorly, or only marginally, the employment counselors had to exercise restraint and not assign another marginal client to that placement for fear of losing the placement entirely. Over time the counselors became increasingly adept at balancing both client and project needs.

On the innovative side, PNP created a business which in turn contracted with the Fiesta of Five Flags to provide the labor to clean city streets and sidewalks after several Festival Week parades. Other contracts and business efforts included providing for:

- The lawn maintenance of a National Guard Armory and other lawn care contracts.
- Janitorial service for the Child Development Center of the Lakeview Mental Health Center and other janitorial contracts.
- Washing vans for the Council on Aging each week.
- Moving the contents of a halfway house to a new location.
- Painting the interior of a rental house.

Vocational education was a part of the survival skills curriculum. A variety of exercises, activities, and experiences were used to expose juveniles to the world of work. Interest tests, films, personality assessments, pre-vocational skills training, and career exploration were used in the curriculum.

Other experiences were used to expose clients to employment possibilities. Tours of major businesses and industry provided first-hand knowledge of work duties. Speakers from various occupations were brought in to discuss their experiences and opportunities that might be available for hands-on work in unskilled labor positions or on-the-job training.

#### **The Volunteer Component**

The role played by volunteers in the project seemed to vary considerably

over the life of the project. The person who had served as volunteer coordinator at the outset had done a very good job. When she left, the volunteer component became somewhat disorganized and relatively weak. By late 1982 this situation changed with the hiring of a new person to provide public relations services and oversee the volunteer component. The volunteer program took on a new life.

Volunteers served a variety of functions. They provided clients with individual tutoring, ran arts and crafts projects, and supervised recreational activities. Graduate students in psychology used practicum placements at PNP. The Pensacola Education Program for physicians placed doctors on month-long residencies at the project.

The only problems with the volunteer effort involved the large amounts of staff time required to train and supervise interns and other volunteers. Eventually, volunteer services were not seen as being worth the effort put into them.

#### **The Diagnostic Component**

PNP had an extraordinarily strong diagnostic component. Strength in this component was not surprising in that there had been a strong diagnostic component in Operation Divert and in other Community Mental Health Center activities which focused on juveniles with learning disabilities. Those persons in charge of implementing the diagnostic component of PNP had had extensive experience in such efforts. The Project Director was an educational psychologist with training in the area of learning disabilities. The Assistant Director had prior experience and familiarity with children diagnosed LD.

Testing of New Pride clients was normally completed within the first two weeks after the youth entered the program. If some of the tests had been administered in the recent past, those results would be used rather than readministering the tests.

Following an assessment of the results of the testing, the diagnostician prepared written recommendations to the teachers indicating both strengths and weaknesses of the client. The teachers seemed quite willing to use the results of the testing in designing the client's curriculum and program. They were confident in the educational assessments of the diagnostic component. The results of the testing were discussed at the Individual Service Plan meeting and incorporated in the development of the treatment plan for the client.

The primary use of the test scores was in conjunction with the academic program at New Pride, but the results were also available to the case managers involved with the client and to the employment counselors, who had understandably less use for them, but who used the data when appropriate.

Clients were informed concerning the results of their tests, with their strengths generally given the primary emphasis. If the tests indicated that the client was learning disabled, the diagnostician would indicate this to the child and discuss with him or her special programs which might help upon reentry into public schools. The diagnostician also made an effort to inform the client's parents of the results of the testing, although such attempts were only successful in a few cases.

Early in the project, the diagnostician had felt that the test results were not used as much as they should have been in designing the curriculum for the clients. This situation appeared to change for the better a year or more into the project, when there was a change in the person holding the position of teaching supervisor.

#### **The Holistic Approach**

In the view of one of the evaluators of the project, the most interesting part of the approach taken in Pensacola was the extraordinary degree of cooperation which evolved among the various components of the project. The evaluator felt that this was particularly remarkable given vast differences in the

training, background, and experience of staff members. This evaluator felt that as the project evolved, the staff proved itself to be increasingly adept at working together for the benefit of a single person. The diagnostic procedures fed into the development of a comprehensive plan for each juvenile coming into the project. In order for this plan to be implemented effectively, efforts of staff in all components of the project had to be mutually supportive and well meshed. Significant attention was given to regular meetings at which client progress was discussed, and to keeping lines of communication open between project components. In these ways everyone who needed to know was kept informed of pertinent developments bearing on the progress of each youth.

#### **Data Collection and Project Evaluation**

While the overall service delivery was extremely effective over most of the life of the project, internal and external evaluation efforts were severely hampered until the final year of operation of the project by problems bearing on managing and evaluating information. Collecting and processing data pertinent to evaluating the project's overall effectiveness were limited due to the following causes:

- Initial problems in adequately staffing the evaluation component.
- A computer designed only for the on-line entry of information, as opposed to one with a memory that could "burst" information into the data files at Michigan much more rapidly.
- A long-term problem created by absence of management support within the project for the evaluation component.
- Uneven utilization of data which was collected, particularly under-utilization of data gathered for the purposes of program improvement.
- Absence, until the final year of operation, of any valid comparison group.

These matters were the source of considerable conflict and dissension which, when not overt, were present as persistent undercurrents for all but the final few months of the life of the project.

These problems with the evaluation directly affected project staff, and gave rise to the following developments:

- The initial evaluator had to be replaced.
- OJJDP threatened to terminate funding until and unless the problems bearing on data collection and project evaluation were rectified.
- In part because the termination of Federal funding could have jeopardized the accreditation status of the Community Mental Health Center, dissension evolved between the Executive Director of the Community Mental Health Center and the Director of the project. The Director apparently yielded to pressures and relinquished directorship of the Community Health Division of the Center (PNP was under this Division); he was thereby able to devote full time to the project and to work to ensure that reporting requirements were met.
- The uneasy but acceptable working relationship between the Project Director and key persons involved with the National Evaluation of the New Pride Replication Program was eroded and remained so for much of the life of the project.
- The positive relationship that had existed between OJJDP and the project was disrupted.

Data collection and project evaluation had not been a high priority. While the Director obviously was very committed to serving the best interests of the juveniles served by the project and doing so in a highly professional and capable way, he seemed to have resistance to the quantitative data collection and entry requirements which were a part of the project. While data which could be used to justify continuation of the program seemed to be of some interest to him, overseeing their compilation and processing apparently were not of similar interest. Although MIS data entry had a low priority, PNP regularly submitted monthly diaries of project activities to the national evaluators.

A comparison group which PIRE considered valid was not developed until October/November of 1983. The original expectation had been that the comparison group would be drawn from past years, because PNP was "referred all the eligible clients." Instead what emerged was a contemporaneous comparison group. This was gathered by looking at the records of the juveniles in the program, determining if there were any accomplices, and, if there were, finding out what they were doing and determining their subsequent record of delinquent behavior. A list of clients assigned to different probation officers was also used.

#### Questions Concerning the Bearing of Diagnostic Testing on National Evaluation Efforts

The PNP Director raised some important questions concerning the scoring and purpose of many of the tests being administered in the New Pride Replication, especially regarding their use in project evaluation efforts and in comparisons across project sites. He pointed out that a number of these tests were not designed for juveniles between the ages of 14 and 17. Because of that, no norms had been established for people in that age group. The Director felt that it did not make sense to use these tests when there were other achievement and intelligence tests available which were normed for this age group. The Director felt that "it (would) be hard to justify using tests that are not applicable to this age group in an evaluation and say that there is this much difference between kids, when in fact it could be due to so many different kinds of things."

#### Referrals and Eligibility Criteria

PNP began accepting referrals from the courts on June 1, 1980. During the first months of to project's operation several problems concerning the eligibility criteria for referrals emerged. These bore on who would be referred to the project and how, in light of peculiarities in Florida State laws, the project's eligibility criteria would be interpreted or defined.

The first problem pertained to the vigorously exercised option of direct-filing juveniles who were sixteen or older with prior adjudications to adult court. It was feared that this might jeopardize the project's ability to get a sufficient number of clients. This problem was resolved when it was discovered that the adolescents could be remanded to the adult court, and still have juvenile sanctions imposed. After the waiver statute changed in 1981, the PNP staff initiated a concerted effort to make the project known to adult court judges, public defenders, and state attorneys.

The second problem involved the criteria which were to be used by all New Pride replication sites in court referrals of juveniles to the projects. In Florida, every finding of guilt is not adjudicated. This means that findings of guilt tend to be much more frequent in juvenile cases in Florida than in jurisdictions which adjudicate for every finding of guilt. In October of 1980, OJJDP agreed that juveniles referred to the program need not have three separate adjudications for criminal offense, and the guidelines for the sites were to be interpreted in the following way:

That the adolescent must have two prior findings of guilt for separate criminal events and be adjudicated on his third separate criminal offense in order to be eligible for entry into the program.

This interpretation was consistent with the procedures of juvenile courts in Florida, and made it much easier for the project to find eligible youth.

#### **Program Linkages , Impact, and Related Concerns**

##### **Juvenile Justice System**

Program linkages with the juvenile justice system were very good throughout the project's history. This was due in large measure to the groundwork that had been laid by Operation Divert in the years immediately preceding the launching of PNP. PNP had fallen heir to this legacy with the transfer of Operation Divert staff into PNP.

PNP staff continued to work closely and effectively with the juvenile justice system. In fact, the judges had gotten to know PNP staff so well, that when they noticed the PNP liaison person in the courtroom, they would immediately know that PNP felt that the juvenile before the judge was a likely candidate for the project.

Program linkages with the justice system were also strengthened through specially designed activities. In one particularly notable case, a special event was held which was directed at improving relationships between the juveniles in the project and the police. This event, which sparked a great deal of enthusiasm, involved juveniles in the project in a basketball game with members of the police department. It was a highly spirited game which appeared to have at least a temporarily beneficial effect of helping break down prejudices the juveniles had concerning the police. It also gave the policemen an opportunity to relate to these juveniles in a positive way. (The PNP clients won the game by one point in the closing seconds).

##### **Juvenile Justice System Concerns**

The PNP Director felt that there were certain problems that would always be present in the juvenile justice system. These were problems with which both Operation Divert and PNP had to contend. They included:

- The nonreceptive attitude of some of the community control officers in the system who had worked a number of years and become a bit burned out as the result of heavy caseloads and the general nature of their jobs.
- The "hardnosed" attitudes on the part of a few persons in the system concerning treatment of adolescents.

Another problem which emerged in August 1982 involved the shortening of the length of probation for juveniles from one year to four months. This change was made in order to reduce drastically the caseloads of probation officers. It had a potentially disruptive impact on PNP in that juveniles referred to the



project in a probationary status could drop out after the four month period concluded, although they might voluntarily continue in the program. With this change New Pride clients could also be supervised by another probationary service called "Treatment Alternative to Street Crime," which picked up the slack. These changes seemed to create no major problems for the project.

### Schools

The school system was the source of a little contention, at least initially. While the relationships were generally very good between the project and the various school faculties or the schools themselves, the linkages between the project and the school system administration was a source of concern. Problems included the following:

- Withdrawal of an earlier agreement to allow PNP to use school buses for transporting the juveniles in the project.
- Inability/refusal to share textbooks with the project's educational program.
- A suspension and expulsion policy which was aimed at keeping or getting out of school those who were not interested in learning, with truants being expelled for not coming to school.

It was the opinion of project leadership that the school administration could have found ways to share the school system's scarce resources. In the case of the administration's stringent disciplinary policy, it was the feeling of some of those running the project that the school system was not fulfilling its obligations in doing the best it could by every student and providing all the services it was obligated to provide.

The school district ran the Beggs Educational Center, a special school for problem youth, but this school was viewed by project leadership, as well as others, as a dumping ground for problem youth as well as for tenured teachers who could not get along with principals but could not be fired. PNP's help was

enlisted by the Beggs Center to assist the staff to develop more effective ways of working with the Center's youth.

### Other Youth-Serving Agencies

The Community Mental Health Center along with HRS, provided a broad range of services to the juveniles in the program. Services sought from and provided by HRS primarily involved those of the community control officers. The main function of community control was to provide supervision and probation services for adolescents. These officers also had the responsibility of monitoring restitution and enforcing curfews.

PNP also got families involved with HRS social workers and saw to it that the juveniles made use of medical services offered by HRS. HRS ran several kinds of specialty clinics. They provided some limited counseling services, including family counseling. Mutual agreements were worked out whereby they might see the parents or the juvenile and PNP would see the other. In some cases HRS ran group therapy sessions with the youth. It also offered group homes and foster home arrangements when a juvenile had to be moved out of his or her regular home.

Linkages were established with some other agencies. The Dental Hygiene Program at the Junior College provided dental examinations and cleanings. Clients were also taken on occasion to the Public Health Department for examinations and, in some cases, treatment. PNP also worked with the local Lions Club to buy prescription glasses for juveniles who could not afford them. PNP leadership generally felt that, "those agencies which they had worked with had been very helpful."

### Ways in Which PNP Differed From the Model

PNP differed in a variety of ways from the Denver model. Some examples

which were relatively minor compared to more substantive service delivery concerns included the following:

- Rather than running an all day program, PNP ran several shifts in the alternative classroom. This was owing in part to staff and in part to space constraints.
- Rather than having the juveniles rely on public transportation or school transportation, PNP provided the transportation.

The chief differences involving the actual services delivered were:

- PNP used one of the counselor slots to create a court liaison position. This role was carried out in an extremely effective way.
- Greater attention was given by PNP to the testing and remediation of learning disabilities.
- PNP placed heavy stress on Adlerian principles in the counseling component and in the overall project.

When asked about ways in which the model might be refined, the Director of PNP noted his following preferences:

- An increased "beefing" up of counseling efforts, emphasizing the family as a system rather than focusing on the juvenile alone and apart from that system.
- A focusing of training on functional skills, community living skills, rather than spending so much time on academics or remedial training.
- A decided emphasis on the development of internal monitoring and motivation systems within the juveniles rather than on the development of less generalizable external motivation systems.

With regard to the latter, the Director noted that he felt that the Adlerian approach which was taken in PNP served "to build in and develop an internal monitoring and motivation (system) within the kids." He felt that the behavioral

approach which was being used by some other sites and in the model in effect established "external motivation systems." He felt strongly that there was a better chance of generalizing the internal monitoring and motivation approach to other areas than of generalizing the external behavioral approach.

#### Institutionalization

A public relations institutionalization plan was compiled in January of 1981. In a systematic way it provided for steps that could be taken to ensure ongoing community support for this community-based treatment program for delinquents. The following objectives were specified in the plan:

- To explore possibilities of obtaining local funds for continuation of PNP services in Pensacola.
- To provide community leaders with frequent updates concerning the status of the project.
- To encourage decision-makers in other communities and metropolitan areas within the Southeast Region of the United States to seriously consider the New Pride model as an alternative to incarceration.
- To facilitate the adoption of the New Pride model in whole or in part within the southeast region.

In the end PNP was successful in obtaining only enough funding from agencies to continue aspects of the educational and counseling programs. These components of PNP in effect became part of a school referral program which addresses the educational needs of juveniles with little or no history of juvenile delinquency. Staff associated with the PNP Alternative School program and the counseling component shifted into the school referral program. The employment component of PNP is no longer operating and what remains of the diagnostic component apparently focuses primarily on the assessment of referrals from the schools.

In the year before the project came to an end there had been some hopeful signs that it might be given the funding it needed to continue. By what turned out to be the final year of the project, funding was coming from a range of sources besides OJJDP. The Community Mental Health Center provided 10 percent matching funding. In addition to this 10 percent match, other funding commitments included some fee-for-service from Medicaid and money generated from PNP businesses. The Bureau of Criminal Justice in Tallahassee had agreed to provide partial funding to the reintegration component in the amount of approximately \$30,000.

A newspaper article on the project appearing January 17, 1983 in the Pensacola Journal stated that the recidivism rate among juveniles in PNP during its first 18 months of operation was 15 percent, whereas the recidivism rate among youth who had come out of residential training programs was 30 percent for a similar 18 month period. In the same article the cost per juvenile in a residential training program was cited as running around \$35 a day (\$12,775 a year), while in 1983, the cost of PNP per juvenile was stated as being \$14 per day, or \$3,640 per juvenile per year. Based on these data, the approach offered by PNP was felt by its supporters to be twice as effective and half as expensive.

Getting funding for a fifth year proved impossible, despite some extraordinary efforts on the part of the Director and others. The editorial of January 1983 had recommended that funds be located to enable the project to continue. In addition, other media coverage was forthcoming which was highly laudatory of the project. As a result of this support, a number of community groups volunteered to work for institutionalization of the project. These groups included: Common Cause, the local Republican Party, Friends of Liberty, the League of Women Voters, the United Methodist Women, and others. These efforts might have yielded some short-term results, but proved to hold little promise for the long run.

Also in 1983, the Director of PNP submitted two grant proposals to Florida State Bureau of Criminal Justice Assistance soliciting support for New Pride

services. These efforts were to fail. At one point the Director even had legislation pending in the State Legislature that would have allowed the project to continue as a part of HRS funding. This too failed.

In spite of the fact that public relations efforts and the maintenance of close linkages with all the key elements of the community were extremely successful, they simply failed to uncover the kind of ongoing financial support essential to the continuation of the project. In fact budget cuts and the state of the local and regional economies made the chance of finding such support extremely slim.

PNP closed in March, 1984. There were a number of reasons for the project's failure to institutionalize. These included the following:

- The needs addressed by PNP were not perceived as being the community's highest priority; they might have been given a higher priority in communities with greater crime problems involving juveniles 14 to 17 years of age. The number of youth brought before the court was, in fact, noticeably declining as a consequence of age and population shifts.
- There was not the kind of strong economic base in the community that would have helped to ensure the project's continuation; local and state governments were operating under austere budgetary constraints.
- A large number of juvenile offenders were waived to adult court (30 - 40 percent).

#### The Project's Final Site Visit

Pensacola New Pride was visited for the final time in January 1984 by a member of the Advisory Panel for the National Evaluation of the New Pride Replication Program. He observed the program in operation, talked with the Director and Assistant Director, interviewed the presiding Juvenile Court Judge, and met with the Director of the parent agency.

He reported that the judge was very supportive and felt the program was successful. Asked why he could not get the program continued, the judge replied that he could only order youth into HRS and that HRS did not want to pick up funding responsibilities. The judge also felt that the program was a bit too expensive. He thought that it should be able to operate for about \$15 per youth per day, rather than \$25. One of his suggestions was to cut the program analyst position.

By that time, PNP staff was feeling defeated and the Director of the Community Mental Health Center was somewhat apathetic about New Pride. He said, "It is a large private agency. New Pride is only one of the components." The project appeared to be operating at about 75 percent efficiency, according to the Advisory Panel member.

#### Strengths and Weaknesses

Overall the quality of the services delivered to the clients in the project was superior. In fact, the way in which an evaluator from the National Evaluation Project summed it up in a letter written to the Director of PNP in October of 1982 was to be reechoed by other evaluators throughout the life of the project:

"...I have been constantly impressed with the quality of the staff at New Pride and the quality of the services that you provide the clients. I have visited numerous treatment programs throughout my career and I can honestly say that I have not visited one that is as well organized as yours nor one that provides the quantity and quality of service to serious delinquents as your (that) project does."

PNP employed an effective holistic approach to address a broad spectrum of each client's needs, involving diagnostic, counseling, educational, and employment components, and all of these components came to function in a mutually supportive manner. Staff were capable and shared a deep interest in the juveniles in the program.

Aspects of the project which were of particular note are as follows:

- With few exceptions, there were well trained, highly experienced and effective persons on the staff throughout the life of the project with many of the staff initially coming from Operation Divert.
- Effective liaison was maintained between the project and the criminal justice system - so much so that the National Evaluation Project recommended the addition to the model of the court liaison position role along the same lines as PNP had established; the court liaison was down at the court all the time talking to judges, tracking juveniles who were potential referrals, talking to community control officers and assisting project efforts in a very valuable way.
- The employment component was ambitious, innovative, and effective.

Problems with data collection and processing internal to the project were evident in some form throughout the duration of PNP. While these problems seemed in no way to impair service delivery, they did create tensions between the project and PIRE, as well as between the project and OJJDP. They served to divert energies from other concerns and in that sense seemed a real shame and waste. Had these problems been resolved fully in the first year or two of the project, it is conceivable that the evaluation might have helped in "fine tuning" the project and making it even more effective. Another possible spinoff might have been the compilation of data and generation of evaluative analyses earlier which could have helped efforts to obtain continued funding for the project on a local or state level. It should be emphasized, however, that it is likely that funding would not have been forthcoming in any case simply because of the economic picture in the area and the budgetary constraints of potential funding agencies and organizations.

The primary constraints which got in the way of institutionalizing the project were ultimately economic. Perhaps the project could have been kept alive for at least a few more years by carrying out plans devised in 1982 to add a technical assistance component to the model. This might have been

accomplished by enlisting funding support from those communities and metropolitan areas which had funds and which were interested in adopting or adapting an approach similar to PNP to address their needs. Federal support might have been solicited in getting such a technical assistance effort off the ground. In this way the four year Federal investment made in project might have had a major beneficial impact in the Southeastern Region of the United States, rather than a relatively short term impact on one site.

#### PROVIDENCE NEW PRIDE

A two-year grant for \$790,089 was awarded to Opportunities Industrialization Center (OIC) of Rhode Island in February of 1980. The Director of Youth Services for OIC played a key role in initiating work on the proposal. Responding to a call from the Governor's Justice Commission Planning Office, she made extensive inquiries into the Denver model and the possibilities of replication, travelling to Boston and Washington, D.C. to meet with Tom James and eventually to Denver to see the project. At her suggestion the Executive Director of OIC made the decision to bid to replicate New Pride in Providence. She and the Planning Department of OIC were key in actually putting the proposal together. Two specialists helped in developing elements of the proposal concerned with diagnostic services and the learning disabilities program efforts. The court system, the probation department, and the police department were all consulted in the process.

The first Project Administrator hired for Providence New Pride\* (PNP) worked only a few months during the start-up period and resigned prior to the project's becoming fully operational. The OIC Director of Youth Services who had served in a temporary acting capacity prior to the hiring of the first official Project Administrator again resumed a role as acting Project Administrator. She has since assumed the title of Project Administrator and has remained in that role to the present.

The project was refunded in 1982 and 1983 by OJJDP. In 1984 most of the components of PNP were still functioning with funding from other sources. (Note: In spite of the fact that the project continues, the past tense is often used in referring to the activities of the project in that this report focuses on the first four years during which the project received OJJDP funding.)

---

\* While the project was variously referred to as Rhode Island Project New Pride and Project New Pride, it is being referred to here as Providence New Pride.

Over its six year history prior to launching PNP, OIC had established an extensive track record working with delinquent youth. Most of the services which PNP was to provide to delinquent juveniles were already being provided by one or another of OIC's five youth programs when PNP got underway. PNP, however, was different in several essential ways. The first and most important was the fact that PNP was to focus on serious juvenile offenders. Secondly, it was to provide services along far more comprehensive and holistic lines than any of the other programs provided for OIC clients. A major substantive difference was in the role, breadth, and importance given the diagnostic component in PNP. Diagnostic concerns had not played such a major role in any of the other programs that OIC ran.

#### General Status of Local Juvenile Justice System Efforts

Before PNP came into being, there had been no local comprehensive community-based programs for serious juvenile offenders. In 1980 all juvenile justice system resources were being expended on prevention, diversion, and institutional programs. The residential facilities which provided services to serious juvenile offenders were utilized solely on an aftercare basis.

Serious juvenile offenders were either confined in the State Training School or placed on probation. Confinement was seen as being unsuccessful in terms of recidivism rates, cost effectiveness, and community reintegration.

In 1980, when the institutional recidivism rate was ranging between 80 and 90 percent, the annual cost per client was approximately \$35,000. While treatment planning at the institutions was seen as improving, it was deemed less than adequate. Training school clients, in the view of PNP managers, were "seldom any better prepared to function productively in society after discharge."

Probation services were also considered to be seriously deficient. Large caseloads of between 50 and 60 clients meant that little supervision or guidance could be provided.

#### Juvenile Law and Family Court Policies in Rhode Island

The Rhode Island Family Court Act of 1956 (reenacted in 1969), Chapter 14 of the Rhode Island General Laws, is the major piece of legislation governing the behavior of juveniles in the State. The law defines a juvenile as a person under 18 years of age. Two sections (14-1-7 and 14-1-7.1) of the Rhode Island General Laws provide for a waiver of Family Court jurisdiction for certain serious juvenile offender cases. Section 14-1-7 states that:

"If a child sixteen (16) years of age or older is charged with an offense which would render said person subject to indictment if he were an adult, a judge of the juvenile court after full investigation, may waive jurisdiction and order such child held for trial under the regular procedure of the court which would have jurisdiction of such offense committed by an adult; provided, however, that if any such judge shall waive such jurisdiction over any such child, such waiver shall constitute a permanent waiver by said court of jurisdiction over said child with respect to any and all further court proceedings with respect to such offense and any offense with which said child may be charged thereafter, notwithstanding its nature."

This waiver has been used primarily in cases where the youth committed very serious crimes (such as murder, rape, or armed robbery) and after any or all resources available to the Family Court have proven or are considered to be ineffective in the treatment of the juvenile. The Family Court has adopted and promulgated two rules which provide judicial guidelines for the use of the waiver provision under Section 14-1-7. Generally, the rules establish prerequisites for waiving juvenile cases. In addition, a uniform policy position of the judges is established. Two standards are used, either of which may serve as a sufficient basis for waiver: 1) treatability of the juvenile; and 2) protection of the public.

Of greater concern to the New Pride Project is the second waiver provision under 14-1-7.1. This provision requires that certain serious youth offenders over the age of 16 years will be automatically waived to adult court jurisdiction. Section 14-1-7.1 of General Laws of Rhode Island states:

"A child sixteen (16) years of age or older who has been found delinquent for having committed two (2) offenses after the age of sixteen (16) which would render said child subject to an indictment if he were an adult, shall be prosecuted for all subsequent felony crimes by a court which would have jurisdiction of such offenses if committed by an adult."

This statute has been challenged for constitutionality and has been upheld by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in a recent decision. In *State vs. Berard*, 1979, it was the opinion of the court that:

"Section 14-1-7.1. . . is a reasonable and rational classification and that it violates neither the due process clause nor the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States nor any provision of the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island.\*

This automatic waiver provision does not screen out very many youth from Family Court jurisdiction for two reasons: 1) Many first offenders are diverted or continued and are never found delinquent on offense; and 2) Relatively few of those twice-convicted offenders had committed both offenses after their sixteenth birthday. During the year prior to program implementation, less than 10 juveniles were waived to adult jurisdiction under this provision.\*\*

#### Juvenile Diversion – Formal and Informal Policies and Practices

Many juvenile offenses, especially status offenses and misdemeanors, are diverted by the local police departments. The amount of diversion that the various police departments practice in the Providence metropolitan area varies

\* *State of Rhode Island vs. Berard*, 1979, Supreme Court of Rhode Island. Judge Weisberger delivering the opinion.

\*\* Joe Butler, Rhode Island Family Court Clerk September 10, 1979.

widely, with some of the police departments putting more emphasis on diversion than others. Police departments usually will refer a juvenile to community treatment programs or the Department of Corrections Youth Service Bureau. The Youth Service Bureau serves non-adjudicated youth from four scattered offices throughout the state.

If the local police decide to petition the court, the Family Court Intake Unit conducts an initial interview gathering client information and considers the possibility of informal diversion. The intake unit does not screen cases for petition, however. Rather, there is a set of very explicit guidelines, rigorously followed, based on age and the seriousness of the alleged offense. If the youth qualifies for informal diversion, then he or she is referred to community-based programs and possibly given a verbal or written warning. The Family Court Intake Unit also has a youth Diversionary Unit which formally diverts juveniles from adjudication through a three month period of counseling and other services. Youths who have been arrested and brought to Court on certain kinds of delinquency and wayward offenses may be diverted until their third offense before the Family Court Intake decides to adjudicate through a formal hearing process.

After conducting the Intake Interview and consulting the guideline, Family Court Intake may decide that a particular case should proceed to adjudication. Once this decision is made, a calendar date is set for an arraignment. At the arraignment hearing a judge may still decide to divert the case without a finding of wayward or delinquent by continuing the case. As long as the youth stays out of trouble for a year, the petition will be dismissed. This decision is based on the nature of the offense and occasionally the amount of evidence attached to the case.

#### The Parent Agency

The parent agency, OIC, was founded in 1968 by a group of volunteers from Providence's minority community with strong support from local business and

government. By 1980 when PNP was established, OIC had become the largest minority human service agency in Rhode Island with a budget of approximately \$2.5 million annually and a staff of over one hundred full-time employees.

For the most part, OIC's program activities focused around the areas of vocational training and job placement for economically disadvantaged people from throughout the State of Rhode Island. Comprehensive training efforts included assessment, counseling, and job development and placement services. OIC consistently worked to build a system of vocationally-oriented, academic support programs to assist persons with severe learning deficiencies to enter skills training programs.

Over the years, funding for OIC programs has come from the Department of Labor, Providence CETA, and Rhode Island CETA, and the U.S. Economic Development Administration. Other support has come from LEAA, local business and industry, the United Way, and others.

Since 1975 OIC had served over 800 youth through its various youth programs. Most of these youth have been minorities, from economically disadvantaged families, and many have been either potential or actual offenders. Two programs which were specifically intended to serve adjudicated and status offender youth were the Youth Diversionary Program (YDP) and the Early Intervention Program (EIP).

YDP was an intensive, long-term counseling program utilizing indigenous paraprofessional youth advocates to provide services with professional supervision to a 50-client caseload aged 10 to 17. Through a formal working relationship with the Providence Police Department and Rhode Island Family Court, youth who would otherwise be sent to Rhode Island training schools were referred instead to OIC. The program grew out of a need to decrease the disproportionate representation of minority populations at the Training Schools. Youth referred to the YDP were provided a range of services and activities

including assessment, individual counseling, psychiatric and psychological therapy, educational assistance, recreation, and general advocacy. Parental involvement through counseling and group activities was integral to the program.

EIP started in April of 1978. This program was begun as a joint effort by OIC and the Juvenile Bureau of the Providence Police Department to intervene in the lives of youth aged 8 to 13 who had evidenced potential for delinquent behavior. The purpose of EIP was to intervene at the earliest point possible after a juvenile first became involved with the criminal justice system - specifically his first encounter with the police. Through the provision of counseling and recreational activities developed by EIP staff, and family intervention at this critical point, an effort was made to divert the juvenile from a life of criminal behavior. This program achieved excellent cooperation between the Police Department and OIC of Rhode Island.

OIC also operated a Pre-Trial Intervention Program from 1976 to 1977 under a CETA Title II grant from the Rhode Island Balance of State Prime Sponsor. That program provided vocational exploration, counseling, and job placement for 118 youth offenders diverted by Family Court prior to adjudication.

Other OIC programs which provided supportive services to youth included the following:

- The Alternative Learning Program (ALP) - an innovative and intensive educational program serving youth 12 - 17 who, due to behavioral problems, were not functioning successfully in the public schools. The program had a 1 to 7 teacher-pupil ratio and was linked with the Providence School system with students eligible to participate on athletic teams and extracurricular activities at Central High School. Youth also received academic credit for all work and many ALP students eventually returned to the public school system.
- Youth Employment and Training Program (YETP) - a program in career exploration for Providence youths who had dropped out of school. YETP was designed to enhance the students knowledge of educational and vocational



options, remediate academic deficiencies, and increase employability. The program required participation in GED instruction and provided limited skills training through a variety of approaches.

- 70001 program - a program affiliated with National 70001, Ltd. model of unstipended rapid pre-employment training and job placement primarily in retailing and distribution occupations. This program served high school dropouts aged 16 to 21 and included a high school equivalency preparation program.

Enrollees in the 70001 program were involved in a variety of academic and extracurricular activities. Upon enrollment in the program, students pursued a required course in GED training. Assessment and career exploration followed, as did career choice and corresponding individualized instruction. Motivation and competition were both encouraged and developed through the 70001 Program.

- OIC Group Home - a Group Home established to serve seven delinquent or neglected minority boys aged 13 to 17. This home operated under contract with the Rhode Island Department of Social and Rehabilitative Services as part of an effort to de-institutionalize and improve youth services. The OIC Group Home provided youth a personalized and therapeutic environment in a familiar community setting. Through a simulated home environment and extensive support services it was expected that Group Home residents would become better prepared for socially acceptable independent or family living.
- Career Exploration Project (CEP) - a project designed to provide youth between the ages of 16 and 21 with ten weeks of career exploration. The program provided career exploration through classroom training, field trips, and job placement primarily in the private sector. Participants worked on a job for 20 hours a week, and attended classroom instruction/field trips another 10 hours per week. Counseling and other supportive services were also provided by OIC. Twenty-five percent of the youth enrolled in this program were referred from the juvenile justice system via the Family Court.

Because most of OIC's youth programs had been very closely interfaced with elements of the Juvenile Justice System, essential relationships which would be needed between PNP and these elements could be readily established.

Since many of the key staff of the project had transferred to PNP from other OIC programs, these relationships tended to be sound and well developed from the outset.

Prior to the launching of PNP, OIC of Rhode Island had established firm linkages with other youth-serving agencies in Rhode Island. Recreational activities were held at a number of agencies' facilities such as the South Providence Boys Club, Chad-Ad Sun Youth Center, Hartford Park Recreation Center, John Hope Settlement House, Salvation Army Center, and East Site Community Action.

#### Program Design

Providence New Pride described itself as being "an intensive, integrated program containing the following components: Alternative Learning Program (ALP), Learning Disabilities Component, Counseling and Supervision, and Employment." Assessments and dispositions of clients involved staff from each component and outside consultants, all functioning as a multi-disciplinary team. Clients were referred to as "associates."

Responsibility for administrative supervision of PNP rested with the OIC Director of Youth Services who had continuing oversight for five other projects at the time PNP was launched. She served in an acting capacity as Project Administrator of PNP when the first administrator who was hired left after a very brief period of time. She later assumed title of Project Administrator, while continuing to function in her other roles.

#### Staffing

A sixteen week start-up period was planned in which to hire staff and get the project ready to begin to accept referrals and provide its first services to New Pride associates. Several of those hired initially came from other parts of OIC. Most staff were hired before July 1, 1981.

At the administrative level, personnel included the following: the Project Administrator, an Assistant Project Administrator, an administrative secretary and a van operator also serving as a counselor. The personnel serving in the project components included the following:

- Diagnostic/Education Component:
  - Diagnostic/Education Director
  - School Reintegration/Volunteer Coordinator
  - 2 LD Teachers
  - 2 Alternative Learning Program Teachers
- Counseling/Intensive Supervision Component:
  - Counseling Supervisor
  - Court Liaison
  - 3 Counselors
- Employment Component:
  - Employment Specialist
  - Job Developer
- Evaluation Component:
  - Program Analyst
  - Research Assistant

While abundant use was made of professionals in and outside of the community, the Project Administrator and the prime movers behind the project felt that the key to helping these juveniles was to have paraprofessional staff persons who had been brought up in the community, "knew the system," had (ideally) a good understanding of themselves, and had been in situations similar to those which the juveniles in the project had experienced. Staff were selected for their ability to work well with young people, families and others from a wide range of elements in the community, including the juvenile justice system, schools, and other service providers.

Since many of the staff had transferred from other OIC programs which were based on this same philosophy, a majority of them had such qualities and, moreover, had experience in working in paraprofessional roles as service providers for young people with problems. The chief difference between their previous efforts and their work in PNP was that the juveniles with whom they had previously worked had not been involved in serious criminal behavior. The staff nonetheless appeared for the most part to rise to the occasion extremely well. Beyond this, staff members were used to interfacing closely with the community. Hence, this orientation continued as a natural mainstay of the project.

Some staff members experienced burnout and low morale, and attributed them to the style and actions of the Project Administration. From time to time, undercurrents of tension and conflict would emerge in a tidal surge. Despite this, the project itself seemed to have fared well and its clients appeared to have been well served. Burnout was to be expected, even among experienced staff, due to the challenge of trying to serve such a difficult target population.

A most interesting chemistry appeared to be present in this project. It involved the operating style of the administrator which was characterized in various ways by those in and out of the project as being dynamic and forceful. In a number of other situations, these qualities could have threatened or undermined the success of a project. Here they periodically created problems with the staff, yet not in a way that made the staff ineffective. In fact, the chemistry worked. Perhaps it worked because the administrator, as well as the staff, had abundant first hand, frontline experience working with difficult youth. Also, because of the Project Administrator's efforts and insistence, the New Pride model was replicated very thoroughly. Understanding and implementing the model was a bonafide job qualification for New Pride staff.

### **The Advisory Board**

PNP had a separate Advisory Board from OIC. The PNP Advisory Board included persons from both the public and private sectors who held roles of importance in the community or state. Two parents and one youth also held membership on the Board, as well as the head of the Juvenile Division of the Police Department.

The Board took a very active role in PNP affairs. Of some note is the fact that the Advisory Board held the preeminent position in the PNP organization chart, being at the Center top of the chart and directly over the Project Administrator. In fact the evaluation subcommittee of the Advisory Board assisted in finalizing the PNP organization chart.

In 1980, the acting Project Administrator had stated her expectation that the Advisory Board would probably meet three times a year. During the second quarter of 1981 alone, they met twice - one indicator of their active early interest in the enterprise.

The Advisory Board had an extremely active group of subcommittees focussing on such areas as career development, legal concerns, evaluation, institutionalization and education. The subcommittees worked closely with PNP staff. In the Project Administrator's view, the subcommittees had "proven beneficial in getting Board members involved in the process as well as allowing them the opportunities of interfacing directly with (PNP) personnel."

The efforts of the evaluation subcommittee had been particularly noted by the Project Administrator. She felt that they had played a valuable role in insuring the optimal timing of evaluation activities by underscoring the importance of having a preliminary local analysis ready in time for legislative deliberations. They had also played a helpful role in mapping out general analysis strategies and in supplying evaluation literature.

While the original expectation of the Project Administrator seemed to be that the Board would play a key behind-the-scenes role in helping get the project institutionalized and in keeping positive lines of communication open with the community, she did not seem to expect that the Board would take the kind of active role it did. She seemed, however, to welcome their more active involvement.

### **Project Facilities**

When the project began on March 10, 1980, it was housed in temporary facilities. It moved at the end of June to a spacious newly constructed building, built to house all of OIC. The OIC building is in the South Providence area, the most depressed area of Providence. The construction of this building was a major boon for the local economy. It continues to benefit the area by remaining open to the public.

Within the OIC facility, PNP was given a relatively large amount of space. Two rooms served as classrooms, one for regular students and one for the learning disabled. A third room had two private offices at one end for the diagnostician and one other staff person. The counselors, evaluators, and teachers all worked in a semi-open area where work stations were divided by partitions only four feet high. This seemed to constitute something of a problem in that there was no place in this large area where private exchanges could be carried on. In addition, the Project Administrator occupied a separate office.

PNP was able to use both the cafeteria and the auditorium in the OIC facility. Additionally, they had access to some recreational facilities in the immediate vicinity of the OIC building. The Family Court provided desk space in this building for New Pride's Court liaison to use as the need arose.

## Program Components

### Diagnostic/Education Component

One person served as Director of the Diagnostic/Education Component. Reporting to that person were the alternative education teachers and the LD teachers. Also reporting to the Director of the Diagnostic/Education component was the person who had responsibilities in two other related areas – school reintegration and volunteer coordination. Each area of responsibility will be addressed separately here.

#### 1. Assessment and Diagnosis

The diagnostic process focused on evaluation of the psychological and educational needs of the potential associate. A decision of acceptance or rejection, based upon all information gathered during the initial intake screening was made by a multidisciplinary team within 15 working days of the referral. Once accepted into the program, the associate could receive, if needed, additional assessment designed to facilitate the identification of possible learning disabilities. Once the associate's needs and assets had been identified, an Individualized Integrated Service Plan (IISP) was developed.

#### 2. Learning Disabilities

Special assessment and remediation services were provided to New Pride clients who had been diagnosed as having a particular learning disability. This component was staffed by two experienced professionals, supplemented by assessment and consultation services from the R.I. Youth Guidance Center, the Sargent Hearing and Speech Center, an optometric specialist, and two senior consultants who are nationally known specialists in learning disabilities.

### 3. Employment Preparation

Efforts particularly emphasized vocationally-related remediation for those youth who were unlikely to return to school. A job-readiness curriculum was developed for both the learning disabled juveniles in the program and the juveniles in the Alternative Learning Program. At first this learning unit was taught to mixed groups of juveniles. Later on the recommendation of an Advisory Board subcommittee studying this matter, the learning disabled were taught this learning unit separately from those in the Alternative Learning Program.

### 4. Alternative Learning Program (ALP)

For those youth whose school failure was not primarily linked to a learning disability, an Alternative Learning Program was implemented which aimed at assisting the youth to re-enter full-time schooling in the Providence School System, or some other appropriate school, and at assisting youth who could not realistically be expected to re-enroll in public schools to complete a GED program and enter some other appropriate vocational or academic program. This program focused on highly individualized learning activity. Owing to a special agreement between PNP and the Providence School System, New Pride students were able to receive school credit for work completed while in the Alternative Learning Program.

Physical Education was a mandatory part of each student's enrollment at PNP. Activities included basketball, baseball, running, and swimming.

Educational, cultural, recreational, and social activities were extremely varied and many included all PNP associates or as many who wished to participate. These activities seemed to add extraordinary vitality to an already vital program, and were generally oriented to helping the juvenile become adept at living a full and responsible life as a member of society.

## 5. School Reintegration

Associates between the ages of 14 and 16 were required to re-enter the public school system to obtain their high school diploma. Associates 16 to 17 had the option of going back to their own school or entering any vocational training (of their preference) that could provide or fulfill a career goal. The person acting as the school reintegration coordinator was extremely effective in maintaining a close working relationship with the school system.

## 5. Volunteers

The person with responsibility for school reintegration also had responsibility for coordinating volunteers. Volunteer interns served in various capacities within the counseling component. Others helped with court liaison functions and administration. Eventually volunteer intern instructors were able to serve in the classrooms when some of the regular instructors completed a required cooperating-teachers course.

Some New Pride staff members, however, perceived there to be a serious problem with the volunteer component. There was a high turnover rate of volunteers resulting in a lack of long-term continuity with these people.

Beginning in 1983 a contract was entered into with the Foster Grandparents Program. During the last quarter of 1983, six senior citizens from that organization volunteered their time to PNP on an ongoing basis. The addition of foster grandparents seemed to have a positive, civilizing impact on the behavior of associates.

## **Intensive Supervision Component**

### 1. Court Liaison

All associates of Project New Pride were referred by Rhode Island Family Court as a condition of probation on at least their third adjudication of delinquency. The initial intake process was the responsibility of New Pride's Court Liaison. This preliminary process included a verification of associate eligibility, conferences with probation personnel, and attendance at all necessary court hearings. After this first phase of the intake process was completed, all information concerning the associate was relayed to other PNP staff for further screening.

### 2. Intensive Supervision

Associates of PNP were assigned a counselor who worked with them in solving problems they might have with school, their job, their family, the community, and their personal life generally. Counselors tried to assist associates in making intelligent decisions concerning their daily lives. Associates and counselors explored the consequences of various decisions together, but the associates were left to make the final decision as to what they would in fact do.

During the first six months they were in the program, associates were to see their counselors several times a week. In the final six months, less frequent meetings were held in preparation for making the associate more independent and responsible for his or her own behavior. In fact, many associates would continue to keep in touch with the project staff and seek counseling after their year was up. One staff person noted that "kids come back year after year. . .we are their second families."

## The Employment Component

The PNP Employment Program was designed to be a supportive service component, specifically geared towards giving each associate direct exposure to the "World of Work." While in New Pride, they explored various vocational fields and received job readiness and job training skills designed to help them obtain employment. Once they had a job, employment counseling and follow-up contact were provided on an ongoing basis.

Options within the employment program included:

- on the job training
- work experience (traineeships)
- direct placement
- referral to outside employment/training programs

These services were provided by an employment specialist and a job developer. The employment specialist became responsible for teaching job readiness to those associates in the Alternative Learning Program, while the job developer assumed a similar role for those associates with learning disabilities.

In 1983 the employment component developed a contract with the Rhode Island Juvenile Restitution Program giving PNP money to pay wages of associates with court-ordered victim restitution. The Employment Specialist placed clients paying restitution in the same way as other clients. The associates were placed in part-time jobs; they had to turn 75 percent of the wages they earned back to the court, which in turn distributed the money to the victims the juveniles' offenses. A major draw back in the restitution program seemed to be the high percentage of the wages that had to be returned. This seemed to act as a disincentive and may have been a major factor in the failure of many to remain in their jobs. (Around half did remain.)

## Special Problems Bearing on Employment Opportunities

The Providence area's largest potential employers of skilled and unskilled labor directly or indirectly involves the defense establishment. Because of the nature of the work, job applicants have to be carefully screened and applicants who have been found guilty of committing offenses are routinely excluded from consideration. Even enlisting in the armed services has been out of the question for juveniles with records of serious offenses, although one PNP associate was able to enlist after successfully winning a law suit which removed this barrier for him. The extent to which this precedent might be applicable to other cases is unclear. For the most part, opportunities for employment in most major Providence industries remain closed to these youth.

## Evaluation Component

The evaluation component had several problems at the outset. These smoothed out as personnel changes were made and the persons coming into those positions proved able to work in a more effective manner with the Project Administrator.

Although somewhat skeptical and uncertain about the purposes of this component, the Project Administrator provided all of the support necessary to meet national evaluation requirements. The Individualized Integrated Service Plans (IISPs) were done as specified in the New Pride model, and many treatment objectives were defined for each client. MIS information was collected and entered into the terminal in a timely fashion throughout the life of the national evaluation effort. Excellent research reports were written to generate additional funding.

In 1983 in response to the National Evaluation requirements, PNP came up with a comparison group of over 100 subjects. These had been gathered from a random pool of cases adjudicated in Rhode Island Family Court. Subjects met the same age, residency, and criminal history criteria as New Pride associates,

but had never been referred to PNP. However, after trying to match the group with PNP associates, many less than this group of 100 were found to be useable. Additional subjects had to be identified and comprehensive juvenile justice histories completed on each one. A total pool of 180 comparison subjects were eventually identified, and 92 of them were matched.

All things considered, PNP met the challenges and requirements of the National Program Evaluation efforts extremely well. Evaluation efforts carried out by the staff seemed to reflect objectivity and candor as well as an ability to elucidate the qualitative factors which played such a major role in the project's effectiveness.

However, when it came down to operating on a shoe string as Federal money decreased, the evaluator's position was phased out of the budget. The data coder's position, filled throughout the project's duration by a member of OIC's staff, was also eliminated. With newly acquired and refined skills in MIS and data entry, the coder moved back to another position in OIC.

#### **Eligibility Requirements**

The Family Court was to refer to PNP (upon its discretion) youth offenders who met the following program entry requirements:

- a. Adjudicated youth who were 14 to 17 years of age, under court supervision for a serious offense who had a record of at least two prior adjudications/convictions for serious misdemeanors and/or felonies within the previous 24 months.
- b. Youth who were residents of Providence, Cranston, Johnston, North Providence, Central Falls, Pawtucket, East Providence, and Warwick.
- c. Youth who had not been identified as having serious substance abuse problems or as severely emotionally disturbed.

The Court referred youth to New Pride to participate in the program as a condition of their probation.

New Pride clients were to participate for a maximum of one year unless they were terminated for negative reasons. The Family Court was to assure that New Pride clients who had been negatively terminated from the program or who appeared before the Court for another offense were represented by Counsel in dispositional hearings.

#### **The Referral Process**

All New Pride referrals were to be initially screened during an assessment period of up to a maximum of fifteen working days (3 weeks) before they were considered for enrollment in the program. In some cases, as time went on, this assessment was begun by New Pride staff prior to the youth's adjudication. With other cases, the Court could refer a youth to the program without New Pride staff having the opportunity to conduct the fifteen day assessment prior to the adjudication. All such referrals which had not been pre-screened were only considered for enrollment after this fifteen day assessment was completed.

During the fifteen day assessment and screening period, each youth received a screening battery of tests designed to be a general assessment covering areas of sensory and learning processes and academic, psychological and behavioral functioning. The home living situation and social history of the youth were also assessed. This information was combined with other available information on the youth to determine his or her acceptance into the program. Referrals to New Pride were not accepted if, after assessment, it was determined by program staff that the needs of the youth were beyond the treatment capabilities of the New Pride Program or if the youth demonstrated no desire to obtain its services.

There had been an initial concern that there would be a problem in getting judges to make referrals to the program. Throughout the four-year period of time covered by this report, there was a continuing concern regarding referrals. A number of factors were at play here. One concerned the attitudes of the courts and politicians regarding the disposition of serious juvenile offenders. Another factor involved recurrent difficulties in assuming an effective and aggressive role in getting referrals. A third involved the very small number of female clients owing to the fact that female repeat offenders were relatively rare.

The primary option open to the court had been sending the juvenile to training school. The problem with this was that no rehabilitation was seen as taking place there. Youth came back to the community with the same problems they had when they went into the institution.

But there were initial questions in the minds of judges concerning the wisdom of allowing as determined by program staff that the needs of the youth werserious juvenile offenders to stay in the community, even if they were participating in a highly structured program. Judges and other political figures were still inclined to "lock-up" the more serious youth offenders. These attitudes did not change quickly.

By mid-1981 the court had changed its procedure for referrals in a minor way so that on the request of judges PNP on occasion would assess a potential client before a decision to officially make the referral. This process was similar to that utilized in the model New Pride project in Denver. It only occurred in a small percentage of cases, however.

As of mid-1982 the system for referrals had become better organized than it had been up until that time, and it took only two weeks to complete the intake process. The program analyst attributed this improvement to a change in the court liaison and to a heightened amount of behind the scenes lobbying. By mid-1982 it had become easier to target appropriate youth. Referrals continued to remain low, however.

### Court Liaison's Role in the Referral Process

To insure a smooth referral and reporting process, PNP assigned a Court Liaison to the Family Court. This individual worked on several levels to facilitate referrals to the program and fulfilled the necessary reporting requirements of the Court. The Court Liaison performed the following kinds of tasks:

1. Referral Screening and Client Information: This entailed working with juvenile police officers in order to identify potential New Pride referrals. In addition, the Liaison worked with Family Court Intake, and the Court Clerk's Office in order to identify potential New Pride referrals when petitions were filed in the Court. With the authorization of the Intake Supervisor and Court Clerk's Office, the Liaison also accessed background information on wayward/delinquent petitions using the automated juvenile justice information system in order to identify juvenile offenders who met the program entry requirements.
2. Collaboration: The Court Liaison worked with juvenile police officers, probation counselors, public defenders and/or private attorneys, and occasionally with city solicitors to determine the appropriateness of PNP as a treatment alternative for youths being adjudicated. She also helped develop a dispositional plan to be recommended to the Court.
3. Consultation: The Court Liaison consulted with presiding Judges at arraignment hearings, pre-trial conferences, trials, and informal conferences and was available to the Judges at the times when New Pride potential referrals were being adjudicated.
4. Communication and Reporting: The Court Liaison was to communicate with and report to the Court as requested and to juvenile probation counselors on a periodic basis. Since all New Pride referrals were under the supervision of Juvenile Probation or the later reinstated Juvenile Units, probation counselors were actively involved with each New Pride client's treatment. The New Pride Liaison was to report to the appropriate probation counselors at least once every two weeks and more frequently if necessary.



The Court Liaison also developed a contact with the adult system in order to track youth whose cases had been adjudicated in that system and to help ensure that channels of communication were kept open concerning former PNP participants who became repeat offenders as adults.

#### **The Termination Process**

Normally, clients of OIC New Pride participated in the program for a maximum of one year, at which time a final evaluative report on the performance and progress of the youth was provided to Juvenile Probation. It was anticipated that it would be necessary to negatively terminate some who, for a variety of reasons, failed to meet the minimum performance requirements of the program. Such failures to meet performance requirements included accumulation of a certain number of unexcused absences, disruption in the program, unwillingness to cooperate, and repeated delinquency or reappearance in Court for another serious offense. At the time of their acceptance into New Pride, all clients signed an agreement between themselves and the program which articulated the conditions of participation and the dismissal actions taken if these conditions were violated. Before any client was terminated from the program, he or she was given two warning conferences, or, if the client had been re-arrested for a serious offense, the decision to terminate was immediately considered.

#### **A Concern Regarding the Adjudication Process**

A concern which surfaced during the evaluation of the program involved the extraordinary amount of discretion judges apparently are able to use in handling cases. It was not at all clear who screened the evidence against youth charged with serious offenses. Neither was it clear how the propriety of prosecution was determined. A case in point involved a youth who was taken into custody and sent to a juvenile facility on the basis of a charge the police were clearly not going to prosecute. No policeman was in court and apparently

the action was taken at the judge's discretion. A question arises concerning the rights of juveniles adjudicated guilty for current offenses purely as a function of prior offenses. Apparently the only review that seems to have been made by the court was to look at the juvenile's previous record. Evidently this automatically flagged the case for prosecution, and no review of the evidence was made to see if the new charges warranted prosecution.

#### **Program Linkages, Impact, and Related Concerns**

##### **Juvenile Justice System**

Program linkages with the juvenile justice system were generally good throughout the first four years of PNP. This was owing in large part to the fact that in the years prior to the establishment of PNP, OIC had successfully operated several other youth programs, a number of which closely interfaced with various elements of the juvenile justice system. In this way sound relationships had already been established by OIC prior to the launching of PNP.

One small but important indicator of the solid relationship existing between PNP and the Family Court System was the fact that the court had provided PNP's court liaison desk space in the court building. Of greater significance was the interest shown in the program by the judges. In fact, the judges participated not only in local meetings and activities focusing on PNP, but also participated in meetings held on a national basis which brought together judges from all the New Pride Replication jurisdictions.

The picture was less clear concerning the support given to PNP by probation officers. While the Project Administrator expressed the view in July of 1982 that judges and probation officers were among the project's strongest supporters, several of the key personnel in the project expressed different views concerning the degree to which probation officers supported PNP. One felt that "the probation officers are the most difficult to work with" and that this was because "they are threatened by us. . . (because) we potentially threaten their

jobs." This same individual felt that because probation officers felt so threatened, they were PNP's biggest critics. A second person independently echoed the same sentiment.

Another person with major responsibilities in PNP felt that "while the judges love New Pride. . . (and) are constantly amazed at our success, the parole and probation people are the real problem." This individual said that PNP's relationship with probation officers was not good. She said that probation officers had become fed up with the juveniles who were being referred to PNP and wanted to see these juveniles incarcerated. When PNP began to provide them with monthly progress reports on the juveniles, there was some easing in the criticisms being leveled. The program became more accountable to the court, bringing problems and successes to its attention.

With respect to police support of the program, this seemed fairly favorable. In fact several key staff confirmed that police were generally so supportive of the program that when a New Pride juvenile got in trouble, the police often would call PNP first. In many cases they would not even charge the youth, knowing that he was in New Pride. If the police knew that the juveniles were in New Pride, they appeared to be easier on them.

#### Schools

PNP enjoyed extraordinarily close ties with the school system. Clients were given regular school credit for the learning units they completed at the program. PNP maintained consultative ties with the schools. A manual was developed by PNP to make certain that educational component staff members were fully informed of all requirements of the school. Free tests were provided, as were free lunches. Arrangements were made with the school system whereby juveniles in PNP could take part in certain aspects of regular school athletic programs.

#### Youth Serving Agencies

Because of the philosophy of the other youth programs of OIC, an extraordinarily broad range of linkages with youth serving agencies had already been forged prior to the launching of PNP. PNP became the direct beneficiary of these efforts and the good will which had resulted from them. When PNP came into being the linkages were transferred or expanded to include PNP. Through its own efforts, PNP also added other linkages to those already existing.

PNP's emphasis on exposing associates to concrete experiences which would facilitate learning was well served by these numerous linkages. One case in point was the contact established by PNP with the Rhode Island School of Design Museum. Museum personnel became interested in helping PNP in whatever way they could after a group of associates were taken on a tour of a museum exhibit. Another example was the arrangement made for clients to utilize the South Side Boys' and Girls' Club facility for the PNP physical education program. Linkages were also established with the senior citizens in the volunteer program and with nearby colleges and universities which provided volunteers and interns.

#### Parents

One of the most striking aspects of PNP efforts was the emphasis given to the families of the juveniles in the program. Early on, a Parents' Association was formed. Participation by parents in special program activities was encouraged. Dinners were held at Thanksgiving and Christmas time and on other occasions. Movie nights were scheduled. Unique opportunities were provided for parents to take a positive part in the program. Family therapy was also provided.

PNP also kept parents involved by keeping in touch with them concerning behavior problems or other issues that might need addressing as these arose. PNP also took parents into consideration by providing them with regular reports

on their child's progress. This seemed to yield particularly positive results. Providing these regular reports to parents was one notable way in which PNP differed from the model.

### The Replication Effort

The major way in which PNP replicated the Denver model was the broad all-inclusive philosophical orientation of PNP. Both projects really attempted to provide a range of services to juveniles, and the emphasis went far beyond the holistic delivery of services. Rehabilitative efforts were aimed at addressing the most meaningful aspects of the juvenile's world - their self understanding, their relationships and roles with respect to family, community, the world of work, and society, and opportunities to develop through educational activities and personal and group guidance. Recreational and cultural activities were provided to help the juveniles become happier and healthier and expand their horizons.

The major similarities between PNP and the model were of a qualitative nature and had to do with the nature of the thrust of PNP's efforts. There were very few structural, functional, or substantive differences. The following are among the major similarities that were found, aside from the effective implementation of model components:

- The extremely close relationship maintained between the educational component and the public school system.
- The wide range of positive linkages which PNP was able to foster and maintain in all sectors of the community.
- The extent and effectiveness of the program's focus on parent involvement.
- The emphasis on reality therapy and the nurturing of positive internal motivation on the part of the juveniles rather than on external motivational factors and reward and punishment systems.
- An extraordinarily active Advisory Board which seemed to interface in an effective, helpful, and non-threatening manner with project administrators and staff.

### Institutionalization

OIC itself had been extraordinarily effective in becoming institutionalized and had developed a proven track record. A major part of its success was owing to the broad base of support it had been able to enlist. This same base of support seemed to expand readily to undergird PNP when the New Pride concept came along and the opportunity to launch the project materialized.

It was anticipated that there would be far fewer obstacles to institutionalizing PNP than might have been encountered elsewhere. This seemed in fact to be the case, for PNP had relatively little problem in becoming institutionalized. The single program component was not institutionalized was the evaluation component.

In the summer of 1984, the Project Administrator reiterated that Providence New Pride needed \$250,000 a year minimum in order to run as it had been designed to operate. She further believed that an adequate budget would be closer to \$300,000 per year. She did not in any way wish to compromise New Pride services by deleting what she viewed as essential components of the model.

By then \$180,000 a year in State and local money was committed to PNP: \$100,000 from the Department of Children and Their Families, \$60,000 from the Governor's Justice Commission, and \$20,000 from a local school system. That much planning and work towards the institutionalization of the project had taken place is evidenced by the fact that these three sources were identified two years earlier as the ones most likely to provide funds.

In July of 1984 the Project Administrator applied for emergency accreditation of the New Pride Alternative School. Accreditation would provide the remaining money needed to operate the program through Department of Education payments for youth enrolled in the school. At that time, PNP was still serving youth. It had 35 active clients.

Despite the fact that a majority of key decision-makers interviewed in 1982 in the Providence area believed that the chances of finding continuation money were slim, there is every evidence that PNP—with all of its direct service components intact — is a respected and established alternative to incarceration in Providence.

#### Strengths and Weaknesses

In this project the strengths and positive impacts seemed to far surpass the weaknesses and problems found. Perhaps PNP's greatest strength was that it had a strong foundation already laid for it in its parent agency, OIC. PNP enjoyed wide-spread support — partly inherited, partly self-generated — throughout the juvenile justice system and from many key elements of the community, parents, the staff, and importantly, the associates themselves.

The program had an abundance of other strengths which help account for the support it enjoyed. These most notably included:

- The philosophical orientation of the program focused on the rehabilitative process in a well-rounded way and emphasized practical outcomes as well as healthy human development and socialization.
- Most of the staff and project administration during the greater percentage of the first four years of the project were wholeheartedly supportive of the goals of the programs; they came to the project extremely well trained and increased their skills through extensive training opportunities offered them.
- The educational component was strong and well organized, as was the employment component. The emphasis on real life learning experiences, on developing an awareness of the world of work, and on learning how to obtain and keep jobs were all major strengths of the program.
- The counseling component did a highly commendable job.

It is no surprise that almost all elements of the program were well on their way to being institutionalized by the end of the fourth year of the project.

#### Weaknesses

While this replication did have some problem areas, none of them was sufficiently serious to threaten the overall effectiveness of the program. These problems included:

- Ongoing "minor" problems among the associates — absenteeism, behavior problems, motivation, drug use (especially pot smoking), and the carrying of weapons.
- Intermittent problems involving staffing, staff burnout, and conflict and tensions arising in part out of differences of opinion regarding management styles.
- Budget cuts and inability to keep the full complement of staff on board in the third and fourth years of the project.
- Difficulties in finding adequate numbers of quality job placements.
- Difficulties in getting referrals.
- The perceived tension between PNP and probation officers with the feeling on the part of some staff that PNP was threatening to the probation officers.
- The tendency of educational efforts to fail to address the needs of the "middle group" falling between the learning disabled and the fully functioning associates.

#### Overall Impact

In addition to ethnographic data suggesting that this project was the most effectively implemented and institutionalized of all the replications of New Pride, management information and evaluation data indicated that it had the most positive impact on its clients. Analyses of the expected recidivism probabilities of groups by site placed this project consistently first, as the one

with the greatest margin in favor of the treatment group. Furthermore, a greater percentage of clients successfully completed the program at this site than at any other.

The effectiveness of the project could be attributed to many different factors. These included the credibility and influence that the Project Director had with the parent agency from the beginning, and the high level of experience, skill, and motivation of the staff. In-service training was provided to the staff to assist them in implementing the New Pride model.

#### Summation

Almost all of the staff had extensive prior experience working in programs addressing the needs of delinquent youth. Many of them had worked previously for the parent agency in other of its youth projects, so they were not only acquainted with the operating style of the agency, but they also had a first hand acquaintance with the resources of the agency and the extensive networking that the agency had done in developing working relationships with various elements within the community. Ready access to these resources meant that staff did not have to begin from scratch in building these essential ties with the juvenile justice system, the school system, and youth serving agencies in the community.

The project's administrators and personnel were especially well prepared and equipped to implement the project in a holistic manner. They infused into their overall efforts a sense of mission and a degree of experience and expertise which allowed them to be highly successful service providers to the New Pride target group.

The project was tightly controlled, but very well run. The full complement of program components which were a part of the New Pride model were implemented in an effective manner. The fact that the project was located in the same facility as the parent organization contributed in a major way to the success of the project. Isolation of the project from the parent agency was not a

problem. The readiness of the parent agency to open doors for the project, share resources, and provide support in other essential ways also played a significant role in the success of the project.

Like the model program in Denver, State funds to support New Pride were generated from three major sources: The Departments of Social Services, Corrections, and Education. Because of effective management support by the parent agency, a good reputation in the community, and extremely hard work by a Director who believed in New Pride, the project was still fully functioning and financially independent of Federal subsidy as of September 30, 1984. The project demonstrated that, at least for the short term, institutionalization could become a reality.

## SAN FRANCISCO NEW PRIDE

In March of 1980, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention awarded the Golden Gate Chapter of the American Red Cross a two year grant of \$887,335 to develop and implement San Francisco New Pride (SFNP). The San Francisco Red Cross, at the time the proposal was submitted, had obtained the written cooperation of the San Francisco Juvenile Court to refer as many as 150 youth per year to the San Francisco Program. These youth were to come from the Hunters Point, Mission, and Western Addition Districts of San Francisco.

### The Juvenile Justice System

Juvenile intake in San Francisco is the responsibility of the Probation Department. There are two intake units. One serves the northern portion of the city and one serves the southern portion. There are three options at intake for offenders who are not yet on probation. The first is to "admonish and close," where the youth penetrates no further into the juvenile justice system. The second is "voluntary or informal probation" in which no petition is filed, but the youth is supervised by a probation officer. The third option is a recommendation to the prosecutor's office that a formal petition be filed. After this initial screening of complaints by probation staff assigned to intake units, their affirmative recommendations are sent to the prosecutor's office, which has final responsibility for proceeding to adjudication. If a youth is already on probation, the decision as to what should be done with a new offense is determined by his or her own probation officer.

In San Francisco prosecution is the responsibility of a specialized juvenile unit of the District Attorney's office. The office is located on the premises of the juvenile court and staffed with five full-time attorneys.

Legal counsel to indigent juveniles is the responsibility of a specialized juvenile unit of the Public Defender's office. The juvenile unit of the Public

Defender's office is staffed with seven full-time attorneys and also located in the juvenile court building. Legal services attorneys provide defense counsel in cases where there are multiple defendants and/or a conflict of interest. Private attorneys provide legal services to that small proportion of youth who can afford such representation. Contested adjudication proceedings in San Francisco are adversarial in nature. However, respondents reported that a large proportion of cases are settled without contest through the plea bargaining process.

If a petition is adjudicated true - that is, the youth is found guilty - a number of disposition options are available. For first-time, non-serious offenders, where the family unit is somewhat stable, informal probation is the most frequently used option. For more serious offenders, formal probation is ordered. Probation supervision may or may not be accompanied by other restrictions. Some of the more commonly applied restrictions are restitution to the victim and community service in a probation-operated public works program.

A more restrictive disposition option is commitment to the county-run Log Cabin Ranch. This is used for older, multiple, or more serious offenders, and generally involves an eight-month to one-year commitment. As alternatives to this option the judge might sentence a youth to weekends in the juvenile hall or to the Intensive Counseling Program with 30, 60, or 90 days in juvenile hall.

"Out of home" or "private placement" in special settings such as group homes are generally reserved for psychologically disturbed youth. The state training school, the California Youth Authority, is a seldom used option. It is reserved for very serious offenses or for youth when all of the other options have been tried and found lacking.

Both judges and referees sit on the San Francisco Juvenile Court bench. The Head Judge is a Superior Court Judge who is rotated through the Juvenile Court position, but not for any specified length of time. Though the Judges and referees generally follow the disposition recommendation of probation officers, there are a substantial number of cases in which they do not.

The San Francisco Juvenile Court has a long history of working closely with community-based organizations. Despite the adversarial relationship that developed during the activist era of the 1960's, the court and probation department have worked closely with traditional agencies such as the YMCA, Jewish Family Services, and Catholic Social Services as well as with smaller community-based agencies.

An internal study conducted by the Probation Department revealed that almost three-quarters of the youth under the supervision of the department also had an active involvement with an outside community agency. Approximately 20 such agencies in San Francisco provide the majority of these services.

#### Acquisition of the New Pride Grant

The Chapter Manager of the Golden Gate Chapter of the American Red Cross played a key role in the decision to apply for a New Pride grant. He had a particular interest in New Pride in that he had played a funding role in assisting Denver New Pride to develop its first program. During the twelve years prior to coming to San Francisco, he had served as Director, Assistant Manager, and Deputy Manager of the Red Cross Chapter in Denver. While Director of the Denver Chapter he initiated the Reachout Office under which Project Pride was developed.

The Chapter Director convinced the agency's Board of Directors to apply for the grant and contribute the 10 percent match. Apparently at the outset there were reservations from the Board about participating in this effort in that the Red Cross, historically, does not usually accept federal monies. In addition, there was apparent reluctance on the part of the Board to go into the business of treating serious delinquents. The Chapter Director won the support of a key benefactor on the Board and the New Pride proposal was written and submitted despite the objections of other Board Members.

The staff person who played the primary role in writing the grant proposal was to have no involvement with the project after it was funded. It also bears noting that the proposal itself appeared to be hastily done with very little apparent attention given to substantive concerns and issues bearing on the program. A separately bound copy of the California State Laws pertaining to juvenile offenders was appended.

Another San Francisco agency, Youth for Service (YFS), had also submitted an application for a New Pride Replication Project. This agency was invited by OJJDP to serve as a subcontractor to the Red Cross. The combination of contractors was seen as combining the administrative strength of the Red Cross with the youth service capability of YFS.

#### The Parent Agency

The Golden Gate Chapter of the American Red Cross is a private, non-profit, multi-service agency, operating in San Francisco and San Mateo counties. In 1978-79, the chapter involved 6,600 volunteers and 58 staff in service to 156,000 people through 120 community programs and projects. Services fell into four major areas: health and safety education, youth services, social services, and disaster relief and preparedness. The 1978-79 operating budget was \$1,265,000.

For many years the Chapter had worked closely with Government in providing services to victims of disaster, veterans, and active servicemen and their dependents. In more recent years, the Chapter had adopted and developed new programs and projects to address the needs of the changing urban population.

One of the chapter's projects was the Mission Service Center. This center provided services to a predominately Spanish-speaking clientele. In 1979 it served 7,647 residents of the Mission District of San Francisco through a variety of programs. The Center's Vital English Project was one of the largest

all-volunteer tutorial programs in the city. It was designed to provide basic English lessons to newly arrived residents. The project also attempted to increase the participants' self-confidence and motivation to move on to more advanced courses in a conventional school setting.

During 1978-79 Red Cross Social Services reported 6,122 cases served. This department offered counseling in personal and family problems, assistance with government benefits, financial assistance, information, and referral to active servicemen and their dependents, veterans, civilians, and disaster victims. Counseling for personal and family problems and financial assistance comprised the bulk of the caseload, which was 50 percent black and 70 percent minority. In 1979 this department had a grant from the State Department to provide location and verification of family relationships to assist the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the immigration and reunification of Southeast Asian families.

Traditionally the youth services which were provided by the Red Cross dealt in an indirect way with clientele. Staff providing such services were generally experienced professionals with degrees in education and social work. They would normally work closely with administrators and teachers at all levels of public and private schools to involve students in curriculum-related service projects, such as the candy-striper programs at local hospitals. They also provided school personnel with free consultation on the use of a wide range of health and safety materials, such as films, curricula, and program guides.

The Chapter did have a few youth programs which provided direct services to youth. One such project was funded in 1978 by the San Francisco Foundation and the Zellerbach Family Fund. It was a youth diversion program designed for 64 adolescents from four junior high schools. Youth having delinquent tendencies or recent court records were identified by school counselors. The program had three major components: volunteer service, personal growth, and leadership development.

The Chapter had also provided supervision for adult and juvenile offenders on probation. It administered a CETA grant of \$110,000 from the County of San Mateo to provide on the job training, and developed job search workshops for teenagers entering the job market.

During the summer of 1979 the Chapter received a grant from the San Mateo Foundation to provide a job readiness program for unemployed teenagers in San Mateo County.

#### The Subcontracting Agency

YFS was to serve as the subcontracting agency. On paper this arrangement promised to provide effective employment-related services to SFNP clients. In actuality, problems which evolved between the contractor and subcontractor led to dissolution of the arrangement at the end of the first year.

YFS was a city-wide agency serving youth aged 16 to 25. Its goal was to help youth meet their employment, educational, counseling, and social needs. Some services were also extended to clients' families.

Clients of YFS had primarily been minority youth from economically, educationally, and culturally disadvantaged backgrounds. Emphasis had been placed on service to delinquent and pre-delinquent youth, in or out of school. YFS had had extensive experience in dealing with the psychological, social, and economic problems of youth and their families. A grass roots community-based agency, it had developed a good reputation among the human services agencies in San Francisco.

In the late 1970s YFS operated a city-wide CETA-funded training program. This program helped unemployed youth aged 18 to 25 with a high school diploma or equivalent to develop job seeking skills. The program was of six weeks duration, two weeks of which were spent in the classroom developing job seeking skills such as application completion, resume preparation, telephone techniques,



prospective employer research techniques, interview skills development, want ad assessments, and San Francisco labor market analysis. Clients' skills and attributes were also assessed, and participants enhanced their skills through videotaped practice interview sessions and working closely with an employment specialist. The remaining four weeks of this program were spent working in the field with an employment specialist seeking employment. The YFS Job Search Program had been funded through the San Francisco Mayor's Office of Employment and Training since 1974 and as of 1979 had served 1,500 clients.

In the arrangement struck in May of 1980, YFS and the Red Cross agreed that YFS would "provide all services relevant to the employment component of New Pride . . . and assist in the selection of two classroom teachers." It was also agreed that an equal number of representatives from the Red Cross and the YFS Boards of Directors would act as the project's Steering Committee.

#### **SFNP Steering Committee and Advisory Board**

The Steering Committee was to be composed of equal numbers from the Red Cross and YFS Boards of Directors and to have responsibility for the programmatic direction of SFNP. The Steering Committee was also responsible for setting up New Pride's Advisory Board. The Advisory Board was to be composed of Red Cross and YFS board members and community participants. It was to serve as a resource procurement, development, and distribution body.

#### **Program Components**

SFNP had six components:

1. A diagnostic component
2. An educational component
3. A counseling/intensive supervision component

4. An employment component
5. A recreational component
6. A program data collection/evaluation component

#### **Diagnostic Component**

As in the Denver model, the diagnostic component was to involve a team consisting of a learning disabilities specialist and a psychometrist. These specialists were to screen each client with respect to visual, speech, hearing, and learning abilities. The screening process was to run approximately two weeks and contribute to the overall client service plan.

The turnover in staff in this component and the failure of management to provide adequate support and leadership thwarted the effectiveness of these efforts and impeded their adequate interfacing with the other components of the project.

#### **Educational Component**

The staff of the educational component was to consist of a school maintenance coordinator, a learning disabilities teacher, two classroom teachers, and a speech and language teacher. The school maintenance coordinator was to work closely with San Francisco Unified School personnel to develop and maintain a reentry and support system for participants returning to the public school setting.

The educational component was to develop individualized educational plans for each student and conduct classes for a maximum of twelve students in a half-day educational setting. Unlike most replications of Project New Pride, there was no job position of Alternative Education Coordinator. Rather, at least for

the first year or more of operation, an LD teacher assumed that function along with the project diagnostician.

The education component was implemented in a noteworthy way, in spite of and not because of administrative support for its efforts. Not only did those with administrative responsibility for the project demonstrate their recalcitrance and apparent inability to address personnel matters in an effective manner, but they had major problems relating to the staff. Faced with recurrent disciplinary problems with clients, they failed to provide needed support and leadership. All of these factors probably rendered the educational efforts less effective than they might have been. Owing to the dedication and professionalism of the staff, however, progress was made nonetheless.

The educational component became more credible in the project's last year, due to a change in project director and more intervention on the part of OJJDP. The direction of this component was assumed by a warm and effective administrator who had also served as the Coordinator of Intensive Supervision. When she eventually assumed the role of project director half-way through the third year, the whole program began to operate better.

#### **Counseling/Intensive Supervision Component**

A counseling team was to be established consisting of one supervisor and three full-time staff. The counseling team was to be responsible for conducting intakes on new clients and helping them participate in project activities by providing ongoing guidance on educational, employment, and social problems.

A number of staff initially hired as counselors transferred positions within the project, rather than stay with their initial assignments. Despite such changes and high staff turnover generally, the counseling component was also carried out in a fairly effective manner.

#### **Employment Component**

Originally, as previously mentioned, the employment component was to be provided by Youth for Service (YFS) under a subcontract arrangement. After twelve months, the YFS Board of Directors voted not to renew their subcontract with SFNP. They had become aware of some of the project's problems and wanted to disassociate themselves from SFNP.

Now the responsibility for the employment component was assumed directly by SFNP. An employment team consisting of three staff offered job preparedness training which included methods for seeking and maintaining employment. When the training was completed the staff was to find each client half-day employment.

Although initially this component had some serious problems, it was eventually one of the best implemented of the entire project, particularly during the year beginning October 1, 1981. An extensive report covering this period of activity reflects a well organized and effective effort. Of the 95 students served during that timeframe, 65 percent were found placements.

All students were exposed to a wide range of materials and information concerning the world of work. Career awareness efforts included tours of businesses and industries and presentations by persons working in these organizations. Career preparation included videotaping of practice job interviews, filling out application forms, developing resumes, making appointments for interviews, and the like.

Credit for the success of these efforts must go to the Employment Specialist and other staff who were directly involved. The final director of this component was very well qualified to do it, having done extensive job development work prior to assuming this position. He was dedicated to young people; he even organized and instructed New Pride youth in the production of videotapes about issues affecting youth today. These were subsequently aired on public television. He organized a walk-for-work program and other efforts aimed at facilitating client employment.

**CONTINUED**

**3 OF 4**

### Recreational Component

A multicurricular recreational team consisting of all program-related New Pride staff was to supervise a program of recreational, social, and personal growth activities for clients. While these efforts were less well structured than had been originally planned, they were carried out to some extent by the more dedicated members of the staff.

### Data Collection/Evaluation Component

Serious problems evolved in data collection and program evaluation efforts. Some of these reflected the constant dislocations in other aspects of the project; others had their source elsewhere. Highlights of these problems include the following:

1. A high rate of turnover in the persons holding data collection and program evaluation-related positions, including the diagnostician position, and intermittent failure to keep these positions filled.
2. Failure on the part of the project administrators to ensure that persons hired to perform MIS/evaluation functions were able to avail themselves fully of training and technical assistance opportunities offered by the National Evaluation Project.
3. An early decision by the project administrators to purchase a computer which was not readily compatible with MTS.
4. Refusal at times on the part of the administrators to allow persons performing MIS/evaluation functions to do so unimpeded and unencumbered by non-MIS/evaluation responsibilities.
5. Increasing difficulties faced by each newly-hired person in having to correct and "clean up" previous work while trying to do what was possible to keep current.
6. Difficulties bearing on the administration of the project, including strained relationships and communications between the administrators and the National Evaluation Project and OJJDP.

7. Apparent difficulties in obtaining the data required.
8. Apparent footdragging and refusal to provide certain data.
9. Failure to complete data gathering requirements in a timely manner.
10. Undue problems in acquiring needed comparison group data.

The result of these many problems was that the data collection and evaluation requirements did not begin to be met adequately until the final year of the project and that no complete evaluation using information about the activities of earlier cohorts was possible. Data were eventually cleaned up and entered correctly by an outstanding program analyst hired in the project's last year. Comparison group data were finally obtained.

### Staffing

In addition to these components and staff, SFNP had a series of persons serving as project directors, assistant project directors, school reintegration coordinators, and project evaluator/researchers. Information from the service provider data file indicated that there was a three-year project total of 200 staff members, approximately 25% more staff than clients served.

Before the grant was awarded, but after being given the "go-ahead" by OJJDP, the Red Cross hired a New Pride director, a diagnostician, and a researcher. The Chapter Director then dropped out of the New Pride picture and never reemerged. The administrative responsibility for the program rested with the Project Director and an Assistant Director/Fiscal Officer, who occupied that position for only a few months. The first evaluator resigned after two months and the diagnostician after nine. The Project Director was replaced after a year and a half, and a newly appointed Assistant Director became the Acting Director. He stayed in that position for one year, and was replaced during the

project's final 6 months by the Coordinator of Intensive Supervision. High staff turnover plagued the project throughout its life.

The project Advisory Board, which was formed during the first three months of project operation failed to serve its intended function. It did not emerge as a viable decisive influence in the history of this project.

### **Project Facility**

During its first year, the project occupied a portion of the space on the first floor of the Red Cross Chapter building at Sutter and Gough in San Francisco. This space was cramped and the offices were inadequately furnished. In the second year the project took over all of the first floor space. With the expansion in space, various environmental improvements were made.

The relationship of SFNP with its parent agency would have been strained without their occupying the same building. The fact that the facility was located in the same building strained the relationship all the more, particularly as the project got underway, and incidents involving theft, violence, and drug use took place on the premises.

### **Implementation**

The project did manage to last a full three years with Federal funding. That it was never institutionalized was not surprising. Chances for success were bleak from the outset. Initial problems which emerged will be touched on and then some ensuing problems will be briefly discussed. This overview will be divided into the following four phases:

1. The pre-launch period
2. The launching of the project

3. The first two years
4. The final year

### **The Pre-Launch Period**

As previously noted, the proposal appeared to be both hastily and inadequately prepared. On top of that the initial decision to seek the grant had for all intents and purposes the strong support of only one Board member. Moreover, the decision to join forces with YFS involved attempting to establish a bond between two organizations which did not have much in common.

The part of the Red Cross facility which was to be used for New Pride had to be extensively refurbished in order to accommodate the project. This was accomplished hurriedly with less than adequate planning.

The thought of locating SFNP in the same building as other Red Cross chapter activities was not welcomed by many of those who used or worked in the building. The perception was widely held that the project would bring dangerous juveniles into the building who could cause all kinds of problems, including endangering life, safety, and property.

### **The Launching of the Project**

The person hired as the Director had had little experience to qualify him to run the project. He proved to be lacking in basic administrative, management, and organizational skills. The staff who were hired quickly realized that longevity in their positions depended on how well they were able to get along and go along with the Director. Many quit as they found it impossible to do one or the other or both.

The Director and from time to time his immediate colleagues demonstrated an early inability and/or reluctance to work with the National

Evaluation Project. While there were early indications that a cooperative relationship might be achieved, these were to be repeatedly dashed. The MIS activities were off to the wrong foot from the outset.

#### The First Two Years of the Project

Problems with staff turnover, failure to maintain the full complement of key staff, and low staff morale continued during this period. In addition, there were serious discipline problems at the project. Clients acted-out, and staff were thwarted in their attempts to set firm and consistent rules and sanctions. Those in primary positions of responsibility in the project seemed unable to take steps that might have helped alleviate this situation. During its first two years, the project was simply too poorly managed for any decisive steps to be taken and few meaningful limits were ever successfully placed on the actions of the juveniles at the project. A case which illustrates this near absence of limitations involved one of the staff who, while in her seventh month of pregnancy, was assaulted by a client. She demanded that the client be terminated from the project or she would not return to work. The client was not terminated and she did not return to work.

Problems with court liaison functions made getting referrals difficult despite intake criteria that differed significantly from that used by the other nine sites. (See Appendix). Problems SFNP staff and administration apparently had in accepting and/or interpreting project requirements made data collection efforts involving court data less than efficient or effective. The requirements for a comparison group were adequately met only after staff of the National Evaluation Project met with Court representatives to help sort out some of the problems SFNP was having.

Relationships between the project and the National Evaluation Project were strained early on and seemed to steadily worsen. This seemed to be in part owing to SFNP's apparent reluctance or incapacity to meet reporting requirements and in part owing to repeated gestures of unwillingness to

cooperate and communicate openly (i.e., missed appointments). The site's evaluation efforts ranged from meagre to unusable.

Similarly, relationships between SFNP and OJJDP deteriorated with time. This process of deterioration did not begin until the middle of the second year of the project. By around the 18th month of the project, OJJDP was demanding that the Director be replaced. The Director was **nominally** replaced; his title was changed to Director of Institutionalization in the Red Cross Chapter. While no longer technically working for the project, he was supposed to be responsible for the institutionalization of SFNP. He also continued for some months to fulfill other functions which had been his responsibility as Director, even though another director had been hired.

One of several reasons that OJJDP insisted on the Director's removal was the emergence of problematic audit reports. At this Director's request New Pride monies were handled in a different audit system than other projects and activities of the Red Cross. This unusual situation effectively removed project resources from the administrative review procedures of the parent agency. Eventually Justice Department auditors found many discrepancies.

#### The Final Year

During the third and last year, particularly the last six months of the project's life, many beneficial changes were made, including an effective (as opposed to the previously titular) change in project directors. The last director was promoted from the staff position of Coordinator of Intensive Supervision. She had an MSW degree and previous managerial experience as Director of Clinical Services in a psychiatric hospital in New York. A clinical psychologist was hired to fill her vacated slot.

The program began to pull together in a more concerted manner and an environment which was more conducive to good service delivery began to emerge. Rebuilding the program became the focus of effort. Help was accepted

from the technical assistance contractor, as well as from the national evaluation staff.

### Eligibility Criteria and the Referral Process

Early on SFNP worked out an agreement with the court which changed the eligibility criteria from three adjudications (findings of guilt) to three offenses (see appended agreement between Project New Pride and the Juvenile Justice Court and Juvenile Probation Department). The rationale behind this move was that too few referrals would otherwise have been available to the project. As a result of this modified criteria, however, the clients of SFNP were, on the whole, less serious offenders than those of other sites.

Youth between the ages of 14 and 17 years who had been involved in misdemeanors and/or felonies were eligible for Project New Pride. The juvenile had to have been referred to the probation department or the juvenile court on two previous occasions for criminal activities, and, at the time just prior to entry into the New Pride Project, be before the court on a third offense.

Youth eligible for SFNP were referred by the San Francisco Juvenile Court Judge, court referees, and the Probation Department. The following procedural mechanism was followed:

1. The Probation Department contacted SFNP's Counseling/Intensive Supervision Coordinator to initiate referral.
2. A referral form was forwarded to the coordinator which included relevant information concerning the prospective client and the name and phone number of the probation officer.
3. The Probation Department then notified the youth and the family of the youth concerning the referral.
4. The Intensive Supervision Coordinator in SFNP informed the project's administration of the client referral for administrative screening.

5. The Coordinator was then to assign a counselor to initiate contact with the client and his/her family within three days of referral.

Procedures were also developed involving collaboration between the juvenile justice system and SFNP to define and implement a contractual agreement with the youth, his/her family, SFNP, and the Probation Officer. Other procedures were defined for rejecting a referred candidate.

### Program Linkages, Impact, and Related Concerns

SFNP's image in the community and relationships with the juvenile justice system, the school system, and the youth serving agencies appeared to be fairly positive. A detailed description of the opinions presented by members of these groups can be found in the chapter on the Intensive System Impact Study. Because of the positive regard in which the project was held, one might conclude that most of the numerous, major internal problems of SFNP and problems between SFNP, its parent agency, and its initial subcontractor were either not readily apparent or not important to most of those interviewed in the study. Key elements in the community treated and regarded SFNP as if it were a relatively sound program, although they were not very hopeful concerning its possible institutionalization.

The relatively positive image that SFNP held in the community was doubtlessly shored up by the Director's public relations efforts. He was, in the words of one critic, capable of "talking a good game." He was apparently able to create or sustain a positive image with regard to the project's soundness, effectiveness, and viability. Evidently, he even convinced the parent agency that the project was sound enough to merit institutionalization and that he was capable of helping in the process.

The nature of SFNP's linkages with various elements in the community needs to be understood in light of the preceding considerations. Simply stated, the project was not as it seemed. The community and evidently even the parent

agency did not fully appreciate the problems the program had while it was in operation. Indeed, two years after the project started, many individuals within the community continued to hold the project in high regard. With respect to key persons in the Red Cross, they showed an absence of appreciation of the nature of the problems facing SFNP when they refused to sever the Director and instead retained his involvement with the project.

Linkages, impacts, and concerns bearing on the juvenile justice system, the school system, and other youth serving agencies are discussed more fully below.

#### Juvenile Justice System

The most important linkage for New Pride sites was the one with the juvenile justice system. The sketchy and sparse documentation from the project makes it difficult to depict the character of this relationship much beyond what has already been indicated.

In an interview conducted during the project's start-up phase, the Director remarked that the court did not seem to understand what the eligibility criteria were. Yet the agreement between New Pride and the court and probation which was signed during that same period indicated that the project was sanctioning and making official a significant departure from the replication's eligibility criteria. Indeed, when the National Evaluators later examined the site's MIS records, they found that approximately half of the juveniles who entered the project were ineligible according to replication guidelines.

Other aspects of court/project interaction which bear noting here involve problems in communications concerning meeting the data requirements. The National Evaluation Project staff had convened a meeting with important representatives of the San Francisco Juvenile Court to help SFNP sort out some of the issues which arose concerning comparison group and follow-up data. While expected, no one from SFNP appeared at the meeting. Nonetheless, some problems were cleared up. Others may well have been circumvented had the

project administration accepted training and technical assistance for itself and the project staff.

#### School Linkages

A small problem had arisen early on which raised questions concerning credentials of teachers and accreditation of the SFNP educational efforts. A solution was found by using the term "rehabilitation education" in place of "special education."

In early 1981 the diagnostician, alternative school coordinator, and teachers had met with the SFNP liaison from the SF Unified School District. This meeting was held for the purpose of setting up procedures and developing Individual Educational Plans (IEP's) for clients who would be reintegrated into the school system and who were identified as LD.

While these two instances constituted examples of a cooperative relationship between SFNP and the school system, overall the relationship did not seem all that cooperative. According to a person who had major responsibilities for the education component, the school district had not wanted "to give out data on grades and attendance or anything. . .the diagnostic people were always having trouble getting information from the school district." As a result of these difficulties no data could be collected concerning the school status of clients prior to their entering SFNP.

Regarding other kinds of linkages with schools, several students were taken on site visits to community colleges to better acquaint them with future educational possibilities. The first client to enter a college enrolled in City College of San Francisco in late 1981.



### **Youth Serving Agencies**

SFNP had a wide range of other linkages to youth serving agencies. During the first year of its operation, YFS had been linked as a subcontractor to the program as has been noted above. Another linkage was with the SQUIRES program (San Quentin's Utilization of Inmate's Resources, Experiences, and Studies). SQUIRES consists of inmates who see as their task "redirecting youth in a meaningful direction, away from prison, and to a useful life in society." SFNP clients made three Saturday visits to San Quentin. These visits included twelve hours of intensive counseling focusing on how easy it was to get into trouble and how difficult it was to get out.

There was involvement in project activities by a wide range of organizations. The San Francisco Police Department provided speakers who addressed topics which ranged from crime prevention to backpacking. Volunteers from the Red Cross network were also drawn upon, but were not used in an optimal manner given the many problems affecting the day to day operations of the project.

### **Ways in Which SFNP Differed from the Model**

The problems bearing on the internal workings of the project, all of which are enumerated above, comprise the crucial ways in which SFNP differed from the model. Substantively, having significantly looser eligibility criteria represented a divergence from the model.

### **Institutionalization**

The original strategy for institutionalization appears to have rested primarily on the hope that the influential Board member who initially supported the submission of a New Pride proposal would somehow pave the way for

institutionalization when the time came. For whatever reasons, this was not to happen.

A number of factors made institutionalization highly implausible, and eventually impossible:

- The poor administration and management of the program and its institutionalization effort.
- The lack of identification of appropriate sources of support that could have opened the way to institutionalization.
- Few and rarely well-organized efforts to acquire alternative funding.
- The fact that no effective efforts were made to "sell" the program.

No clear or realistic plans to find local support were ever implemented at this site. The last Project Director, while a capable administrator, was new to California and unfamiliar with State and local funding sources. Moreover, she was fully occupied meeting crises and repairing damages resulting from the project's previous management.


### **Summation**

Given the myriad of serious problems plaguing SFNP during its first two years, it is not surprising that the program components did not and could not function in a fully effective manner during that time. In fact it is quite surprising that they were able to function as well as they did. Although positive changes began to occur in the third year, the programmatic focus of these efforts necessarily eclipsed any attempts to institutionalize the project.

Some clients were well served by the project. This was a result of the efforts of individual professionals on the staff who continued to dedicate their energies to caring for and helping the delinquent youth in the program. These

individuals seemed to be able to continue functioning with a relatively high degree of effectiveness in spite of innumerable problems which so deleteriously affected the project. When the project closed, the holistic concept of service delivery involving the organized and concerted effort of professionals from several disciplines on behalf of young people with many needs had, for the first time, some chance of becoming a reality.

S-290



American Red Cross

Golden Gate Chapter  
1550 Sutter Street  
San Francisco, CA 94109  
(415) 776-1500

PROJECT NEW PRIDE

July 16, 1980

Ms. Marjorie Miller  
Juvenile Justice Specialist  
Special Emphasis Division  
LEAA - U.S. Department of Justice  
Office of Juvenile Justice and  
Delinquency Prevention  
633 Indiana, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20531

Dear Ms. Miller:

The enclosed referral procedures represent the agreement between the San Francisco Juvenile Justice Court and the Probation Department with Project New Pride-San Francisco. We are enthusiastic as to the New Pride endeavor and collectively support its success in San Francisco.

Regards,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "James F. Williams".

James F. Williams  
Manager, Golden Gate Chapter  
American Red Cross

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Joseph J. Botka".

Joseph J. Botka  
Chief Probation Officer  
City and County of San Francisco

Enclosure

S-291



Sharing in United Way funds

PROJECT NEW PRIDE - SAN FRANCISCO  
AND  
THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO  
JUVENILE JUSTICE COURT AND JUVENILE PROBATION DEPARTMENT

REFERRAL PROCEDURES

I. DEFINITION

For purposes of the New Pride initiative, it is the understanding of Project New Pride - San Francisco and the San Francisco Juvenile Court and Probation Department that the definition of serious offender, according to the Washington, D. C. criteria, denotes those youth guilty of law violations determined by self-admission and/or court proceedings. As such, these violations are deemed to promote, escalate, and/or result in repeated law violating activity that is detrimental to the physical and/or psychological well-being of the youth and/or community.

Youths between the ages of 14 and 17 years will be eligible for Project New Pride who have been involved in law violations, i.e., misdemeanors and/or felonies. Further eligibility requirements are that the boy or girl must have been referred to the probation department or the juvenile court on two previous occasions for criminal activities, and presently be before the court on his/her third offense. Due to the situation of the third involvement the minor is in danger of otherwise being placed out of the home or placed on probation.

**END**

**CONTINUED**

**4 OF 4**