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Criminology Against Crime: Criminologists and Crime Control
for the Indianapolis Police Department

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Final Report

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The City of Indianapolis, Indianapolis Police Department (IPD), Hudson Institute, and Indiana University entered into a collaborative relationship in 1995 to enhance the crime control capabilities of IPD through the application of crime analysis and evaluation. The collaboration was initiated through the National Institute of Justice's Locally Initiated Research Program. The effort produced the Indianapolis Management Accountability Program (IMAP).

The IMAP program, implemented in early 1996, is an attempt to apply and adapt the New York Police Department's (NYPD) program known as COMPSTAT in Indianapolis. COMPSTAT involves regular meetings of top command staff in crime control strategy sessions. In these sessions, crime patterns are analyzed and managers are held accountable for their knowledge of these patterns and for effectively responding to crime in their precincts. The COMPSTAT program has been given credit as a key component in NYPD's successful effort to reduce crime in New York City.

The IMAP program represents the first attempt to replicate and adapt the COMPSTAT program in a major U.S. police department. This report describes the history of developing IMAP in Indianapolis. The story is one of significant organizational development and accomplishment. A number of obstacles (e.g., lack of timely crime data) likely to face most police departments were overcome. Other issues await resolution and are being studied through a second stage NIJ evaluation.

IMAP provides a forum for police managers to focus exclusively on crime. It is almost axiomatic that police managers are consumed by the minutiae of managing the organization. Most of their time is devoted to issues like staffing, personnel, and budget. In year one, the IMAP program created time for police managers to meet to deal specifically with crime in Indianapolis. Indeed, during the first year, 28 IMAP sessions lasting two to two and one-half hours were conducted. This represents a significant commitment of organizational resources.

The year one evaluation focused on IPD's success in achieving four objectives of the IMAP program:

- To improve the quality and utility of management information systems to support crime control,
- To enhance inter-departmental communication,
- To foster the design and implementation of effective crime control strategies,
- To hold department managers strictly accountable for the results of these efforts.

A major accomplishment of IMAP was to focus IPD's administration on the need for timely and reliable crime data. The IMAP meetings demonstrated inconsistencies in various information systems and a time lag in producing clean crime data. It became obvious that strategic planning for crime control required accurate and timely data. At the beginning of the project, there was an eight-month delay in producing UCR offense data. The chief committed sufficient resources to the data processing unit to eliminate the significant backlog of cases. As a result, IPD can now generally provide last month's crime data, in clean form, the first week of the subsequent month. Relatedly, IPD has begun to integrate a variety of information systems housed in varied units and created for specific purposes. These are major accomplishments. The Indianapolis experience, similar to that of NYPD, suggests that regular crime meetings and the associated emphasis on accountability will create a demand by police managers for accurate and timely crime data. In other words, IMAP was the catalyst for major improvement in IPD's crime information systems.

Related to the improvement in information systems is the finding that IPD managers are much better informed about their crime problems and their control operations. IPD managers are very familiar with this information, or if they are not personally familiar, they know how to get an answer quickly.

IMAP also generated significant improvements in the sharing of information. IPD is a decentralized organization with four (now five) geographic districts and several special units. Prior to IMAP, it was rare for police managers from one district to discuss crime control strategies with managers from another district. With IMAP, this became a weekly event. For example, one week's meeting focused on a successful intervention at a chronic crime and disorder hotspot. The deputy chief explained the initial unwillingness of the property owner (a

commercial establishment) to cooperate. The deputy chief then went to the business's corporate headquarters in Atlanta for assistance. This led to cooperation and a number of changes at the location, and ultimately, a significant reduction in calls for service at the location. The other deputy chiefs asked numerous questions and took notes about the steps undertaken. It was clear they were thinking of how to apply the strategy to hotspots in their own districts. Similar discussion occurred about topics such as the use of nuisance abatement, addressing open-air drug markets, and working with community groups. Thus, IMAP is a forum for the dissemination of innovative problem-solving strategies throughout the department.

An additional accomplishment of IMAP was to foster the development and evaluation of crime control strategies. There were numerous examples of this during the year. Several districts in particular re-instituted a program known as IMPACT whereby officers identify problem sites and follow the SARA problem solving model to respond. On a broader level, the district chiefs began to build evaluation into their crime control strategies. IMAP meetings became an opportunity for the chiefs to present both process and outcome data on special projects. For example, several districts implemented interdiction projects during the year. The IMAP program made it clear that the district chiefs were expected to produce data such as: traffic stops, citations, arrests, drug and gun seizures, and pre-post measures of calls for service and crime. IMAP has been a key to institutionalizing problem-solving in IPD.

The final objective was to increase accountability for crime control efforts among police managers. In many respects, the first year implementation and evaluation does not provide an adequate test of meeting this objective. Introduction of a program like IMAP into an organization necessitates a learning curve as the program is modified and adapted to the organization. Over the course of the year, IPD managers demonstrated an increasing command of knowledge about crime patterns in their districts. They also were able to point to crime control efforts to address these patterns. The next logical stage in the IMAP process is to continually assess the effectiveness of these efforts. Although there were a number of examples of assessment, it had not been systematically built into IMAP at the end of year one. This remains a key objective of IMAP as the program continues to evolve.

Although not an explicit objective of IMAP, an additional accomplishment of NIJ's Locally Initiated Research Program was the establishment of an ongoing partnership between IPD, the Hudson Institute, and Indiana University. As a result

of the relationships developed through IMAP, and the commitment to problem solving and evaluation, IPD has worked with the researchers to develop studies of a number of crime control strategies. These include an NIJ-funded evaluation of directed patrol, an assessment of a COPS-funded anti-gang initiative, and studies requested by IPD of a police-probation home detention program, and the costs-benefits of IPD's helicopter patrol. These efforts indicate that through the IMAP project, NIJ has increased the capacity for research and evaluation in Indianapolis.

The most telling evidence of the success of IMAP is the fact that it has been continued and enhanced under a new police administration. The resignation of Chief Christ who implemented IMAP, nine months into the program, could have been the death knell of the program. Chief Zunk, his successor, has re-instituted IMAP and shown a clear commitment to the program. The ongoing evaluation will chronicle the continued evolution of IMAP. The evaluation will give attention to three issues unanswered in this initial study: 1) the ability to hold managers accountable for crime control efforts, 2) the ability to create information flow between the command staff IMAP meetings and patrol operations, and 3) the impact on crime in Indianapolis.

I. Introduction

This report describes the collaboration between the City of Indianapolis, the Indianapolis Police Department, the Hudson Institute, and Indiana University. This collaboration was part of the National Institute of Justice's Locally Initiated Research Program. In this document we examine the activities and results of the first year of the project (1996).

The collaboration was designed to enhance the crime control capabilities of the Indianapolis Police Department (IPD); an organization with decentralized management of active community policing and problem solving activities. There were two major components of the collaboration. First, members of the research team provided statistical and other analytical support to the IPD, as well as the Department of Public Safety, an agency responsible for the overall management of the city's police and fire departments. The second component was the Indianapolis Management Accountability Program (IMAP), our effort to replicate the New York Police Department's COMPSTAT program of weekly crime control strategy sessions.

The structure of the collaboration was quite unique. The principal partners were the IPD and the Hudson Institute; an Indianapolis based policy research organization. Under a contract with the Department of Public Safety, Hudson would provide staff for analytical support to IPD. Funding from NIJ was used to support the IMAP project. The Hudson Institute entered into an agreement with Indiana University to allow the participation of professors Alexander Weiss, Edmund McGarrell and Kenna Davis Quinet.

The outline of our report is as follows. First, we briefly review crime control activities of IPD. Second, we examine the introduction of the Indianapolis Management Program. Third, we review the IMAP program and discuss the issues related to its implementation. Finally, we summarize our experiences in the collaboration project.

II. Problem-Solving and Community Policing in Indianapolis

In 1992 Stephen Goldsmith, former Marion County Prosecuting Attorney was elected mayor of Indianapolis. Goldsmith was very familiar with the

administration and operations of IPD, and was also very aware of the changes taking place in American policing. He was committed to introducing community policing and problem solving to IPD. To that end, Goldsmith engaged several prominent researchers to come to Indianapolis and assist the IPD with implementation of these programs. One of these scholars was Professor Lawrence Sherman of the University of Maryland, a leading authority on crime control strategy. As part of a unique arrangement, Professor Sherman agreed to spend the 1994-95 academic year in Indianapolis. He would be appointed IPD Chief Criminologist, and at the same time four additional criminologists were retained, one for each of IPD's geographical commands.

In this program Sherman would provide consulting services to IPD and the Department of Public Safety, and the district criminologists would provide similar services to each district deputy chief. The centerpiece of the Sherman effort was the Indianapolis Model for Police Accountability for Community Targets (IMPACT). The goal of IMPACT was to ensure that problem solving was an integral part of IPD's crime control activities, and that all police officers participated in these efforts.

In the IMPACT system there were several steps:

- District criminologists identify repeat crime or problem locations,
- Police officers choose a target, and after consulting with their supervisor develop a strategy to ameliorate the problem,
- The district criminologist designs an assessment plan for the target,
- Summaries of targets, officers' activities, and assessments are reported to the Chief of Police quarterly.

The IMPACT program encountered significant implementation problems. First, although officers were given training on the SARA model of problem oriented policing, these ideas were very new to most of them. When they were asked to identify targets and design strategies they were not prepared to do so. Second, there was inadequate guidance provided to first-line supervisors, many of whom felt that this system reduced the degree of control they exercised over police officers. Third, there was a degree of resentment towards the district criminologists, primarily because their role was poorly defined. Finally, IMPACT was unsuccessful because there was a widespread belief in IPD that there was not enough available time to engage in these discretionary activities.

Interestingly, although IMPACT was not initially successful, the concepts of problem oriented policing were spreading throughout the organization. The department, for example, developed a new database called "RunsInfo." This system allowed the department to examine patterns of repeat calls. District level community policing squads used this information to identify opportunities for nuisance abatement. Even though the specific tool of IMPACT was not widely adopted, the potential of problem solving as a tool in controlling crime and disorder was becoming increasingly apparent.

III. IPD and COMPSTAT

By the middle of 1995 IPD had made significant progress towards its goal of institutionalizing problem solving and community policing. Police officers had registered about 100 IMPACT targets, there were problem solving units in each district, and police managers were increasingly convinced about the utility of crime analysis to support police operations.

On a visit to New York, Indianapolis Mayor Goldsmith had an opportunity to learn about NYPD's use of weekly crime control strategy sessions. The NYPD program, COMPSTAT (Computerized Statistics) was created in

April 1994 as “a means to increase the flow of information between the agency’s executives and commanders of operational units, with a particular emphasis on the flow of crime and quality of life information.”¹

The COMPSTAT program revolves around the use of weekly meetings held in the department’s command and control center. At each session the department executive staff critically examines one of the city’s eight patrol boroughs. Precinct commanding officers from that borough deliver presentations about the activities in their command. They are then questioned by senior department commanders about the presentation and about reports prepared by the department’s COMPSTAT unit. During the session computer generated crime maps and other information about the precinct are displayed on large video screens in the command center. In COMPSTAT, precinct commanders are expected to demonstrate detailed knowledge about crime and disorder in their areas, and should be able to develop strategies to address these issues.

NYPD staff attribute COMPSTAT’s success to four general principles:

- Accurate and timely intelligence,

¹ Howard Safir, The COMPSTAT Process. NYPD Office of Management Analysis and Planning.

- Effective Tactics,
- Rapid Deployment, and
- Relentless follow-up and assessment.

Mayor Goldsmith believed that a system of crime control sessions based on the COMPSTAT model could prove useful in Indianapolis, and instructed IPD staff to investigate the possibility of such a program. To that end, then assistant chief of police Donald Christ and deputy chief criminologist Alexander Weiss visited NYPD to observe COMPSTAT and to interview staff in the COMPSTAT Unit. By the fall of 1995 IPD had decided to introduce weekly crime control strategy sessions.

IV. Developing IMAP

Our visits to New York generated enthusiasm for implementing a COMPSTAT-like program. However, we realized that several issues needed to be resolved prior to implementation. The two most significant issues revolved around the availability of data, and how this program would fit the chief's management style.

One of the unique aspects of the COMPSTAT program was the timeliness of data. In NYPD each precinct compiles a weekly crime and productivity summary and delivers the data to the COMPSTAT unit. Using this approach the department attains a remarkably timely knowledge of crime in the city. We knew up front that it would take a considerable effort to facilitate timely data from IPD's management information systems.

Like many police departments IPD gathered crime data for many purposes other than crime control. Its primary uses were for reporting to the Uniform Crime Reporting system and to support criminal investigation through the identification of offender characteristics and patterns. Unfortunately, neither of the data bases created for these purposes was useful for our purposes.

The UCR system data was very reliable but untimely. That is, the department placed great emphasis on producing accurate UCR statistics. They did this however, in part, by limiting the number of personnel examining case reports and completing UCR classifications. As a result the department had about an eight-month backlog of reports to be classified, and little was being done to correct this problem.

There were other alternative types of data available but all were problematic. The department had the capacity to estimate the number of crimes through an incident system. In this database each case report received an identification number linked to a record in the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system. That is, when a call for service resulted in a crime report, a unique identifier was attached that included the nature of the offense. Unfortunately, this system was based on dispatch types rather than types of offenses. For example, an officer might be dispatched to a "hold-up" call. Even if this call resulted in a robbery report, it would not show up in a query of robberies unless the dispatcher updated the dispatch record. As a result of this problem, estimates of crime based on the incident file were typically off by as much as fifty percent.

The IPD also maintained a case management system known as the "booking" system. While most department managers believed this system to be reasonably reliable, it only included cases assigned for follow-up investigation. The department's crime analysis section maintained files, but their staff only analyzed homicide, sexual assault, robbery, and motor vehicle theft.

In addition to problems of data timeliness and reliability, there were more general problems related to the management of department information. Many of the department's data systems had been developed for a particular purpose for a specific unit. As a result, these systems were often proprietary (incapable of being shared by other systems), or under the control of disparate department units. For example, information about narcotics arrests was maintained in a unique database maintained by the Narcotics Unit, CAD data was maintained by a county-wide communication agency, and records of arrests and case dispositions were maintained in still another system operated by a county agency.

In addition to our concerns about data we were also unsure how the COMPSTAT style of public dialogue would fit in IPD. Our observations in New York left us with the impression that the success of COMPSTAT was based in part on the rigorous questioning managers received during the sessions. Moreover, we were told that many precinct commanders in New York had been reassigned because they had performed poorly in COMPSTAT.

Donald Christ expressed concern about both of these issues. He felt that public criticism of top managers would be inconsistent with IPD's organizational culture (it is a remarkably close-knit organization for its size). Christ noted that unlike NYPD, IPD command staff had to work closely with one another on a daily basis. Moreover, Chief Christ was uncertain what sanction could be applied to a senior manager who failed to perform satisfactorily. He lamented that there were too few undesirable assignments at his disposal.

In spite of these constraints the department remained committed to adopting the COMPSTAT system, and moved expeditiously towards that goal.

V. Implementing IMAP²

In January 1996 the Indianapolis Police Department introduced its replication of COMPSTAT. It would be called the Indianapolis Management Accountability Program or IMAP. As described in the chief's memo to staff, IMAP would be organized in order to replicate

COMPSTAT, but it would be consistent with IPD's organizational culture and systems.

In the initial plan IMAP sessions were to be held weekly. Each session would examine a geographical or specialized command. We would first examine each of the four districts (east, west, north, and south), one per week. A fifth session would review the traffic section and downtown squad. A sixth session covered the criminal investigation division. Finally, Chief Christ devoted an IMAP session to the administration division. Given this scheme a unit would be reviewed about every seven to nine weeks. Each session would last two hours and be held on Wednesdays from 10AM until Noon, in the Chief's conference room. This time had previously been reserved for one of three weekly executive staff meetings.

Deputy chiefs were informed that they would be responsible for making a presentation at their IMAP session. They were given significant latitude about the nature and content of these presentations but among the suggested topics were:

² In discussing implementation of IMAP, we use the male pronoun in referring to police managers in order to provide anonymity for IPD managers.

- Successful pattern identification and response,
- Overall crime trends,
- Major case investigations,
- Community policing projects,
- Innovative strategies,
- Successful manpower utilization.

Managers were informed that they could be questioned about:

- Crime trends,
- Crime patterns and "hot spots,"
- Status of major cases,
- Productivity measures.

There were a number of logistical issues to be resolved prior to the first session. First, it was unclear who would participate in the preparation for the sessions, and, in particular, who would assist the deputy chiefs. Our original proposal to the chief was that the Indiana University professors participating in the NIJ sponsored collaboration would provide support to the deputy chiefs and that the chief would create a small unit for his

preparation. The chief rejected this plan. He favored an approach in which the members of the research team would work with him and the deputy chiefs could utilize resources under their command.

Related to this question was the issue of who would pose the questions to the deputy chiefs during the sessions. We proposed a panel that consisted of the chief, the assistant chief and the director of public safety. Again this plan was rejected, and the issue was not resolved for several weeks.

Finally, because crime data were not readily available the chief determined that we would rely principally on calls for service data. This information was accessible and timely (delayed by one month). It would be relatively easy to use these data to analyze problem-solving efforts.

Our first IMAP session was held on January 10, 1996. Like any new endeavor there was a fair amount of uncertainty and confusion. To begin, all of the participants were seated around a large conference table. After the chief made some opening remarks about the purpose of the program the assistant chief offered a short briefing on a program of legal insurance for police officers. Of course, this diversion from a focus on crime was

inconsistent with IMAP objectives, and while this type of event rarely occurred after this occasion, it served to point out how difficult it would be to focus management attention on crime control rather than administration.

The presenting deputy chief quickly raised the issue of data availability, pointing out a weakness in the calls for service database. When the county communications agency delivered a data tape to IPD a member of the staff "cleaned" the file and then loaded it the department LAN as part of the "RunsInfo" system, a DOS based program for analysis of calls for service (CFS). The department's district criminologists (contract employees) then prepared reports for the deputy chiefs. Two problems existed. First, there was occasionally a delay in installing the CFS data in "RunsInfo." Second, because headquarters staff was using Microsoft Access (a windows based program) to analyze the data the results were often different from those of the district criminologists. This was critical because the chief was receiving reports based on the Access analyses and the deputies received reports based on RunsInfo.

These discrepancies were very critical because the chief believed that knowledge of crime patterns was an essential first step to problem solving.

It was difficult to verify that knowledge when there was divergence in the data sources. It was not uncommon, for example, for the list of "hot spots" in a district that had been produced for the chief to be very different than that produced for the district commander.

There was also some difficulty in maintaining continuity during the session. The chief was interrupted several times for phone calls and messages. This would remain a significant problem for many weeks.

At the second IMAP session the chief came prepared with a list of questions prepared by a police sergeant on his staff. The topics addressed by these questions were quite mixed. Some explored high calls for service locations. Others focused on high profile cases. Still others dealt with matters of department policy or procedure. These lists of questions would become the topic of considerable interest. Because it was in a presenter's best interest to be able to respond effectively, deputy chiefs would work very hard to try to anticipate the list. In fact, rumors began to circulate that the deputy chiefs were exerting pressure to obtain the list before the session.

In the first sessions of IMAP it became apparent that the deputy chiefs were ill prepared to answer the chief's questions. Some of this difficulty was clearly related to data problems. Moreover, some of the questions were trivial, and the deputy chiefs should not have been expected to know these answers. Clearly, however, there were many questions that the deputy chiefs should have been able to answer but could not. This underscored the need to engage in efforts like IMAP. These senior level commanders had never been expected to know the answers to these questions, and thus they typically did not.

The chief also used the initial IMAP sessions to reinforce his support for the IMPACT program of problem solving target identification and assessment. He accomplished this by asking deputy chiefs why places that they had identified as "hot spots" were not registered as IMPACT projects. This type of inquiry resulted in significant increases in target registration, and provided additional incentives for commanders to support police officer's problem-solving efforts.

IMAP provided a forum for discussing general issues related to crime control policy. For example, in an early session we discussed a shopping

center in the city that had historically been the site of numerous automobile thefts. Interestingly, most of the senior staff believed that it was the responsibility of the shopping center management to prevent these crimes. Others disagreed, arguing that the police department was ultimately responsible. Although no clear consensus arose during the discussions, it was useful for the chief to understand how his commanders viewed their roles.

The third IMAP session was delayed by a protracted discussion of the department's upcoming promotion exam, again illustrating the difficulty of blocking this time for crime control policy. Once underway, however, this session provided some very useful insights into IPD's decentralized management structure.

During the presentation a deputy chief presented several tables describing problem solving efforts, including a project to reduce crimes at a chain of convenience stores. After examining these tables we learned that they were derived from a database maintained by the deputy chief. This posed a problem for the chief. First, because no one other than the deputy chief had access to this database, it was not available to headquarters analysts. That

is, it was not available for inclusion in the data assembled prior to IMAP. Second, the problem solving efforts described in this database were not included in the department's IMPACT system, ostensibly the department's single registry for all such efforts.

This situation posed a potential threat to IMAP. Recall that the chief's briefing documents for IMAP were based on CAD data and on reports from IMPACT. He now was faced with a situation in which he would know about the trouble spots but not know about the police activities related to those locations. This was an untenable situation. Unfortunately, although the chief expressed his concern about this situation he failed to give clear instructions that would have integrated these reports with IMPACT.

By the end of the first month under the IMAP system it was clear that the availability and accuracy of data remained problematic. As a result, we held a meeting for all city and county units involved in maintaining IPD data. Interestingly, about forty people attended this session. As a result of this session three important facts emerged:

- CAD data is a reliable source of data to identify frequent call addresses but it is not a useful source of crime data,
- Short-term CAD data was available at district stations, but complete archival data would only be supplied each month, and then it would have to be prepared for distribution to districts,
- The department's process of coding and recording crime reports was under an eight-month time lag, and the transcribing of recorded crime reports was two weeks behind.

As a result of these discussions the department made some important policy decisions. First, the chief ordered that the department devote the resources necessary (including overtime) to reduce the backlog of transcriptions and to produce timely crime reports. Second, he instructed staff to ensure that the CAD data was delivered promptly to district analysts and that district criminologists be provided with Access software. Finally, he discontinued the use of incident reports (i.e. CAD reports) as a basis for estimating the incidence of crime. The chief believed strongly that the success of IMAP and the department's crime control efforts demanded timely and accurate crime data.

Our next IMAP session highlighted the activities of a newly appointed deputy chief. As such, it provided an opportunity to examine how the IMAP process provides a context for management development. To begin, we observed that the presenter knew very little about crime in the district. He was hard pressed, for example, to explain an increase in homicide in the past year. In fact, the chief of police questioned the presenter rather aggressively, more so than in previous sessions.

On the positive side this deputy chief did not harbor pre-conceived notions about problem solving and IMPACT. For example, he reported having initiated an IMPACT project at a district shopping center, and he reported that his review of district "hot spot" lists had highlighted emerging problems at a motel in the district. He was organizing a project to respond to this target.

As we began the second round of IMAP sessions the format changed. The chief decided to make the sessions more formal. To that end, we changed from a meeting type setting (a large conference table) to a format more like COMPSTAT. The conference room was rearranged so that presenters stood at a podium, while the chief and his panel (three Indiana University

professors) were seated at a table directly across from the presenter. The chief also was far less likely to accept phone calls or other interruptions during the sessions.

The deputy chiefs responded to this format by making their presentations more formal and polished. They also began the practice of using their subordinates to provide portions of the presentation.

One of the most promising aspects of IMAP was its enhancement of communication between commands. It was a terrific mechanism for sharing the results of crime control projects. Participants often learned about novel strategies in other districts, and also offered their own experiences. IMAP also provided opportunities to share information about policy and procedure. On one occasion a presenter was lamenting the fact juvenile offenders could not be interviewed without a parent being present. Another deputy chief reported that the prosecuting attorney had recently determined that juveniles could be questioned without parental consent when they were asked about the activities of other offenders. This was important information that had not been communicated before the topic came up in IMAP. In this sense IMAP played a critical role in information sharing.

Some presenters were much better prepared for questioning when they appeared at second and subsequent sessions. For example, a newly appointed deputy chief that had struggled during his first session improved remarkably at later sessions. He exhibited a remarkable level of knowledge about his district. It was difficult to ask a question that he couldn't answer. Another deputy chief seemed to improve with each session. There also seemed to be increased cohesiveness between the deputy chief and his commanders.

By contrast, some deputy chiefs seemed hesitant to embrace the IMAP process, at least in its current format. While they were eager to highlight the positive accomplishments of their units, they seemed ill prepared to either answer questions posed by the panel, or seemed to suggest that their ideas about crime control were more valid than those articulated in IMAP.

It is important to note that this divergence in performance was not simply a function of the level of preparation or of differences in skills for public presentation. These differences occurred, we believe, because managers had differing levels of acceptance of the IMAP system. That is, some

managers used IMAP as a mechanism to enhance unit cohesiveness and to highlight their own performance. Others appeared to either question this style of management accountability or to take a "wait and see" attitude toward IMAP. Of the managers who appeared reluctant to embrace IMAP, some questioned the "public grilling" of IMAP, stating that they saw it as a "dog and pony" show. Others complained that there was insufficient follow-up to ensure accountability for crime control and problem solving. All the managers, however, appeared to appreciate the level of information about crime patterns that was provided through IMAP.

Among the more interesting sessions were those that focused on the investigations division. The division is a complex admixture of operational units (e.g. homicide and narcotics) and support staff (e.g. crime analysis and the UCR unit). At these sessions we often observed the consequences of poor communication. For example, on one occasion the chief questioned the commander of the homicide unit about a narcotics related homicide. It was clear that the commander had failed to adequately consult either the narcotics unit or the intelligence unit to support this investigation.

On another occasion, the commander of the sex crimes unit reported that the unit was not currently investigating any serial or pattern offenders. In fact, they described at great length their efforts to counter a recent newspaper story that had suggested that such an offender was present in the southern part of the city. Later in the same IMAP session (after the sex crime commander had left) the commander of the crime analysis unit reported that they had recently identified two pattern offenders. It was unclear why the sex crime unit commander did not know this information, but the incident underscored a serious problem. The IMAP meeting, however, pointed to communications problems that otherwise would likely remain hidden in the organization.

On one occasion a narcotics commander was describing the use of the department's "Dope Hot Line," a special phone number that was established so that citizens could offer confidential information about narcotics problems in their neighborhoods without going through normal communication channels. The data from these calls were a potentially rich source of intelligence. However, we were informed that current policy permitted dissemination of this information only to those members that had

been polygraphed (i.e. members of the narcotics unit). Of course, these data should have been provided to district commanders, but they were not.

After six months IMAP had been well integrated into the IPD crime control system. However, the program faced three problems. First, while the process had proved very useful in identifying department problems, we had not identified an effective strategy to make managers accountable for the solutions. There was no follow-up, for example, on the communications problems in the investigation division.

Second, we still did not have access to timely crime data, although we had been promised that the department was making significant progress in that area. This was particularly troublesome because we had hoped to integrate computer generated mapping into the sessions, but we could not do so.

Finally, there were some organizational issues that affected the utility of IMAP, but that could not be easily resolved through IMAP. For example, the department had a scheme for assigning investigators in which some detectives were assigned to centralized units (e.g. homicide and robbery) and others were assigned to police districts as generalists. It became

apparent through IMAP that there were differences in the ways these detectives were managed and evaluated. These differences adversely affected productivity and the situation required a careful analysis and departmental action. This type of organizational change was beyond the scope of IMAP.

Members of the research staff began to formulate procedures to respond to these issues. Unfortunately, while these issues were being examined a major incident of police misconduct occurred, creating a huge public relations problem, and eventually resulting in the resignation of the chief of police, the principal architect of IMAP.

Even with his departure IMAP continued under the direction of the acting chief. The program was somewhat limited because the department was preoccupied with problems related to the officer misconduct, and because there was a sense among managers that their goal was to maintain the status quo until a permanent chief was appointed. Despite these obstacles, 28 IMAP crime control sessions were held during 1996.³ Given that the

³ This does not include IMAP meetings focused on administration.

meetings typically lasted two to two and one-half hours, this was a significant commitment of departmental resources.

That appointment process was protracted, and in fact, a new chief was not appointed until January 1997. The new chief, Michael Zunk, expressed his support for IMAP and the program was reinstated. These activities will be described in subsequent reports.

VI. IMAP Evaluation

When IMAP was implemented the Indianapolis Police Department articulated four objectives for the program:

- To improve the quality and utility of management information systems to support crime control,
- To enhance inter-departmental communication,
- To foster the design and implementation of effective crime control strategies,
- To hold department managers strictly accountable for the results of these efforts.

In this section we review the IMAP program relative to these objectives.

Management Information Systems

When we began the IMAP program we faced severe limitations relative to data systems. Crime data were eight months old, calls for service data were controlled by an outside agency and its applications in IPD were fragmented, and data processing was distributed among numerous entities.

As a result of IMAP, IPD has made significant progress towards developing an effective management information system. Crime data are now up to date. Generally, within the first week of each month the previous month's data are available for analysis. We have significantly upgraded the computing capacity of district criminologists, and while there are still some inherent problems associated with the CAD data, they are, at least, available throughout the department in a timely fashion. Finally, the city of Indianapolis has begun the process of integrating the many systems that are used by the IPD. While this process will be costly and time consuming, there is unequivocal commitment to accomplishing this goal.

It is of interest, of course, that IMAP proved to be the catalyst for such action. Although there was agreement among department staff that the data systems were inadequate, prior to IMAP there was little incentive to rectify this situation. IPD, like most law enforcement agencies, placed little emphasis on crime trends. They tended to focus on such issues only when the FBI announced annual crime statistics. It simply wasn't very important to know how many robberies may have occurred last month.

In IMAP this information became essential; managers clamored for such information. In fact, by the end of the year department managers complained that CFS data (which was always more timely than the crime data) was one month old. Our experience illustrates that the best way to develop a management information system is to hold a manager accountable, that is, to ask the right questions.

In addition to being timely, data must, of course, be accurate. In fact, any system that holds managers responsible for results must insure the accuracy of information. Not only is it important to avoid making a judgement about a manager based on erroneous information, but if managers can find errors in data it allows them to shift the focus from their activities to the data. At

some point in this process all of the participants must agree that the data are reliable and good indicators of results.

Inter-departmental Communication

IMAP played several roles in IPD communications. First, it provided a forum for managers to describe their crime control efforts, and for others to learn from these discussions. To that end, it was clearly beneficial, particularly in a geographically decentralized organization. Second, IMAP provided an opportunity for the chief to articulate his goals and objectives for the department and to clarify his policy positions. Finally, IMAP helped to expose glaring communication problems.

While IMAP clearly helped to enhance the flow of information it did little to correct communication problems. There were two reasons for this difficulty. First, the department did little to directly intervene in these areas. For example, there was no investigation as to why the commander of the sex crimes unit was unaware of critical information developed about pattern rapists. This was an egregious error and deserved prompt attention.

Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, interdepartmental communication was not enhanced because it was not effectively linked to results and accountability. That is, it seems obvious that if managers are to be held accountable they will seek out every bit of information that might facilitate good results. In the absence of senior level accountability information will remain proprietary.

Crime Control Strategies

Our lack of crime data significantly limited our ability to assess crime control strategies. We did, however, experience significant success in introducing problem solving projects. Of particular interest was the emergence of IMPACT as an important management tool. This occurred for two reasons.

First, the chief was quick to focus on any hot spot that had not been assigned as an IMPACT project. If it had been assigned the chief wanted to know what strategies had been implemented at the site. The chief was particularly frustrated when a presenter reported that problem-solving

efforts were underway at a site, but that those efforts had not been registered in IMPACT.

The second reason IMPACT became important was because it proved to be an efficient way for managers to organize their problem-solving activities. That is, when they made their IMAP presentation they could provide summaries of the sites, the strategies and the results. Even if the efforts had not been very successful, the deputy chief could, nonetheless, point with great precision to their efforts.

IMPACT went from being a program with a relatively poor track record, disliked by many officers, to a cornerstone of IPD's crime control program. IMPACT needed the accountability it gained through its place in IMAP.

IMAP and Accountability

At a recent conference held by the NYPD, participants were shown a video describing the COMPSTAT program. In this film we see a police manager addressing the command staff of the department. The manager looks very troubled, and sweat is pouring from his brow. In the next scene we see the manager back at his office examining crime statistics and discussing

strategy with his staff. Finally we see the manager back at COMPSTAT, sailing through the tough questions. In a very real sense this was how IMAP was supposed to work. The chief would ask tough questions, the managers would see their weaknesses, and then do whatever necessary so as to do better the next time.

Arguably, the most difficult part of the COMPSTAT model to replicate was strict accountability. Chief Christ knew he could not be like NYPD Commissioner Bratton, nor could IPD possibly be as aggressive as NYPD in terms of reassigning management staff. There were both structural and cultural dimensions to this position. Structurally, the chief had relatively limited options in terms of reassigning managers. Culturally, the confrontational approach used in NYPD was considered inconsistent with the organizational culture of IPD. These managers had to work together once the IMAP meeting ended. Additionally, given the lack of timely crime data and questions about the CFS data, it was difficult to hold managers accountable for crime when the outcome indicators were either old or of questionable reliability.

With these constraints in mind, IMAP did provide initial steps toward increasing management accountability for crime control. On one hand IMAP provided a terrific mechanism for senior managers to enhance their performance. Several of the department's managers improved remarkably in their command of data and in their presentations over the course of the year. One of these managers was newly appointed and used the IMAP system as a mechanism to organize his crime control efforts. Another district chief used IMAP as a mechanism to enhance cohesion in his unit, and to generate support from his subordinates. On one occasion a captain in his command vigorously defended the deputy chief's unit. The chief of police later reported that it was the first time that he had heard this captain speak up in twenty some years.

At the same time other managers appeared less receptive to IMAP and did relatively little to enhance IMAP or to support these efforts. The problem for the chief was how to address these manager's performances, particularly given other positive aspects to their work.

In part, the chief's inability to sanction poor performance in IMAP was as a result of inadequate documentation. There were too few benchmarks

available to evaluate performance. To that end several administrative procedures might have helped, including:

- Written records of problem areas, targets, and unresolved issues, and in particular, a list of whom would be responsible for addressing these issues. This report could provide the basis for discussion during subsequent sessions, or might be addressed at other staff meetings.
- Questions posed to presenters should be designed to emphasize a key strategic issue, rather than serve as a tool to embarrass or humiliate. Many of the questions posed seemed irrelevant. This, of course, tends to obscure more valid questions.
- Greater emphasis should be placed on results. Our capacity to do this was limited by data, but this remains essential.

Whether a chief decides to re-assign a subordinate because he or she fails to control crime in their command is a decision that will be very idiosyncratic to that organization. Some police managers clearly value loyalty over competence, and in such organizations change would be unlikely. If, however, crime control becomes a more common basis upon which to judge police executive performance, we are likely to see far greater emphasis on results.

VII. Conclusion

This report has examined a locally initiated research collaboration between the Indianapolis Police Department, the Hudson Institute and Indiana University. Our principal effort in this collaboration was to replicate COMPSTAT in IPD. On balance, this effort has been very successful.

First, the partners in the collaboration remain committed to these efforts. In addition to the IMAP program, researchers from Hudson and IU are evaluating a COPS gang intervention program and an NIJ-funded experiment on the effects of directed patrol. Several additional evaluations are underway at the request of IPD. Thus, the initial NIJ investment through the Locally Initiated Research Program has been a catalyst for building evaluation capacity in IPD.

Second, in spite of a significant change in the IPD command staff IMAP has continued. Chief Zunk, appointed in January 1997, has redesigned IMAP to conform to his management style and to address some of the issues highlighted in year one. The current IMAP program has been

considerably enhanced by timely crime data and computer-generated crime maps. Additionally, IPD has committed ten individuals to an IMAP research committee in support of IMAP. This new phase of IMAP is being evaluated under a new NIJ grant.

Finally, it is clearly the case that IPD has benefited from the introduction of IMAP. Crime control is now viewed as central to the role of police management, not simply incidental. Indeed, the current administration has made IMAP the cornerstone of its crime fighting strategy.