THEFT IN THE MARKET - AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COSTS AND INCENTIVES IN IMPROVING PREVENTION BY GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE POLICE AND REDUCING LOSS BY INSURANCE

• NCJ Number: 27429
• Author(s): R L CARTER
• Date Published: 1974
• Length: 96 pages
• Sale Source: Institute of Economic Affairs
• Language: English
• Country: United Kingdom

Annotation

A VARIETY OF APPROACHES ARE TAKEN TO THIS PROBLEM, INCLUDING THE PROVISION OF CERTAIN POLICE SERVICES FOR A FEE, SENTENCING THEFT OFFENDERS ACCORDING TO THE DAMAGE DONE OR LOSSES INCURRED, AND LICENSING PRIVATE POLICE.

Abstract

THE AUTHOR EXAMINES THE OPTIMUM QUANTITY OF PUBLIC POLICE PROTECTION WITH REGARDS TO PRIVATE SECURITY FIRMS. HE DESCRIBES THE RAPID GROWTH OF THE BRITISH SECURITY INDUSTRY AND LOOKS CLOSELY AT THE ASPECT OF COMPETITION BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC POLICE. IN HIS DISCUSSION OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY, THE AUTHOR PRESENTS AN ANALYSIS OF THE DIVISION OF RISK BETWEEN INSURER AND INSURED (BY DEDUCTIBLES, CO-INSURANCE, AND FIRST-LOSS INSURANCE), THE EFFECTS OF 'MORAL HAZARD', AND THE DEGREE OF REFINEMENT IN PREMIUM SETTING. HE ALSO DISCUSSES INFORMATION ON THEFT PREVENTION AND HOW IT SHOULD BE PROVIDED AT NO COST BY GOVERNMENT AND AT A MARKET PRICE BY PRIVATE AGENCIES.