NCJ Number
235694
Journal
American Criminal Law Review Volume: 48 Issue: 1 Dated: Winter 2011 Pages: 143-183
Date Published
2011
Length
41 pages
Annotation
This article discusses the use of clear, simple rules that would make plea bargaining a more effective tool for the legal system.
Abstract
Plea bargaining is a pervasive and troubling aspect of our criminal justice system. Recent criticism of the practice has concentrated on its failure to mirror the likely outcome of trial. Convictions generated through plea bargaining are less related to the evidence, and hence to actual guilt, than convictions generated by trial. Notwithstanding this significant difference between the processes and factors that generate convictions by trial and those that generate convictions by plea bargain, the legal system treats all convictions as formally identical. In doing so, the legal system violates basic principles of fairness and undermines its own legitimacy. To the extent bargained-for convictions are aligned less reliably with actual guilt than convictions after trial, they should be classified as distinct from trial convictions. Additionally, defendants who wish to secure the benefit of a plea bargain routinely are compelled to admit factual guilt to do so. Yet innocent persons will sometimes be induced to plead guilty through the practice of plea bargaining. Compelling the innocent to lie in order to secure the benefit of a plea bargain further undermines the perceived integrity of the legal system by denying the defendant a meaningful opportunity to be heard. This article proposes that plea bargaining be regulated through a few simple and clear rules that would limit the harm to the legal system caused by the practice. (Published Abstract)