NCJ Number
116713
Journal
American Criminal Law Review Volume: 26 Issue: 2 Dated: (Fall 1988) Pages: 463-490
Date Published
1988
Length
28 pages
Annotation
This article reviews the felony murder doctrine and seminal death penalty cases.
Abstract
The basic common law felony murder doctrine provides that a homicide is considered murder if the death results from 'the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony.' The doctrine operates essentially to transfer malice from the intended felony to the unintended homicide. Although the rule is applied most frequently to the triggerperson, criminal liability for felony murder may extend to all co-felons, including those who do not directly cause a death. In the case, Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), a standard was created whereby the death penalty could not be applied to the nontriggerperson in a felony murder, based on the question of intent. In Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986), there is a retreat from the protections of Enmund in that any State court can make the requisite findings of intent to kill after the death penalty is imposed rather than before. In Tison v. Arizona, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 1678, 1684 (1987), the Court concluded that reliance on a defendant's subjective intent provides an inadequate test for imposing the death penalty on felony murderers. This standard places no substantive limitation on the types of felony murderers who may receive the death penalty. With only superficial regard to the defendant's 'blameworthiness,' there is a disregard for the defendant's state of mind or level of culpability in the evaluation of death sentences. By disregarding the teachings on how punishment must be proportionate to the crime, courts are imposing the death penalty arbitrarily and without regard to individual culpability, a result which would appear to overreach the court's intent in Tison and violate the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 192 footnotes.